Category Archives: Cyber War

Federalize Policing with Soviet Style Tactics

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Soviet style tactics:

‘Another fundamental change is underway but not such that you would notice unless you understand the conduits of people and activists groups. Law enforcement across the country is subservient to mayors and mayors manage the money flows and rules of engagement in all communities. One must look closely at mayors and their operational playbooks as noted in the case of Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, mayor of Baltimore. She is walking in cadence with Al Sharpton at National Action Network who himself has unfettered access to the White House as he is calling for officially federalizing police.

Then it must be noted that the ACLU is part of the conduit as this week that organization paid for and developed a smart phone app called ‘MOBILE JUSTICE’. “We want to multiply the number of cameras that can be trained on police officers at any time,” said Hector Villagra, executive director of the ACLU of Southern California. “They need to know that anything they do could be seen by the entire world.”  Users will have to open the app on their Android or Apple devices before filming, ACLU officials said. When the recording stops, it automatically sends a copy to the ACLU’s server and keeps the video on the phone. A text report will then pop up, allowing users to explain in writing what they saw but allowing them to remain anonymous if desired. ACLU officials said their legal team would screen the reports and review any videos they believed might show problematic activity.

So who would use this smart phone app? Easy answer to the question. Those already part of yet another organization are part of the conduit, ‘WeCopWatch‘, maybe you have seen the t-shirts. It is even more curious that members of this group are also part of yet many others that include those that support the ‘FreePalestine‘ movement and that of Black Intifada.

Blair Anderson
Project Coordinator for Michigan, Ohio, Illinois
Blair is a Black Panther who lived through COINTELPRO era of the Black Power movement of the sixties. Blair is also the head of the WeCopwatch elder council which helps provide guidance for WeCopwatch in matters of organizing, tactics and strategies.

David Whitt
Project Coordinator for St Louis County
Whitt formed the Canfield Watchmen in the neighborhood where Mike Brown was killed. They have been actively copwatching, as well as training and distributing cameras to the public.

Jacob Crawford
Project Coordinator Support.
Crawford is a long time Copwatcher. He is assisting on the back end in supporting Copwatch expansion projects.  Do the posters below look familiar? Same ones the Islamists in America use as well. They also have a tip sheet that explains what to do if the FBI comes to their door.

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They are using GoFundMe to raise money to purchase go-pro cameras, but one should wonder if GoFundMe will take down that account as they often do for patriot requests.

The sad question now is just how will police forces across the country react? They are under siege.

 

Putin’s New Offensive

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Our top concern is a revanchist Russia. General Breedlove:

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Members of the Committee.  Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.  It is an honor to be here representing the dedicated Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, civilians and families of the U.S. European Command.  Thank you for all you do to support them, as they serve the nation.

Compared to just one year ago, Europe faces a very different, and much more challenging security environment.one with significant, lasting implications for U.S. national security interests.

Our top concern is a revanchist Russia.

Russia is blatantly challenging the rules and principles that have been the bedrock of European security for decades.  The challenge is global. not regional. and enduring. not temporary.  Russian aggression is clearly visible in its illegal occupation of Crimea, and in its continued operations in eastern Ukraine.

In Ukraine, Russia has supplied their proxies with heavy weapons, training and mentoring, command and control, artillery fire support, and tactical-and operational-level air defense,. Russia has transferred many pieces of military equipment into Ukraine, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery pieces, and other military vehicles.

What we have seen over the course of the fight, was that when the Russian proxy offensive ran into trouble, Russian forces intervened directly to “right the course.”

Today on the ground, the situation is volatile and fragile.  Russian forces used the opportunities provided by the recent lull in fighting to re-set and re-position, while protecting their gains.  Many of their actions are consistent with preparations for another offensive.

The hope remains that both parties will fully implement an effective ceasefire as an important step toward an acceptable political resolution of the conflict, one that respects the internationally recognized border.

I am often asked, “Should the United States and others provide weapons to Ukraine?”  What we see is a Russia that is aggressively applying all elements of national power – diplomatic, informational, and economic, as well as military.  So my view,.is it would not make sense to unnecessarily take any of our own tools off the table.

But the crisis in Ukraine is about more than just Ukraine.    Russian activities are destabilizing neighboring states, and the region as a whole,..and Russia’s illegal actions are pushing instability closer to the boundaries of NATO.

We cannot be fully certain what Russia will do next, and we cannot fully grasp Putin’s intent. What we can do is learn from his actions,. And what we see suggests growing Russian capabilities, significant military modernization, and ambitious strategic intent.

We also know that Putin responds to strength., and seeks opportunities in weakness. We must strengthen our deterrence in order to manage his opportunistic confidence.

At the same time, Europe also faces the challenge of a surge in violent extremism.

European nations are rightly worried about foreign fighters returning home to Europe from the fight in Syria and Iraq, with new skills and malign intent.  Attacks like those in France. Belgium. and Denmark. are only likely to become more frequent.

Foreign fighters are part of a much broader pattern of insecurity to  Europe’s south, with roots in the Middle East and North Africa.  Transit routes are shared by violent extremists, organized criminal networks, and migrant populations fleeing difficult conditions in Libya and other under-governed places. The spread of instability into Europe, and the transnational terrorism we all face could have a direct bearing on the national security of the U.S. homeland.

EUCOM is working with European nations bilaterally and supporting NATO Alliance initiatives, to meet and counter this new and more complex security environment.

Based on the decisions made at the NATO Wales Summit last year, the Alliance is adapting in order to improve its readiness and responsiveness.  The Readiness Action Plan, or RAP, is well underway.  Our Allies are stepping up, making significant contributions that give them a real stake in the outcome.  The United States will have a key and sustained role to play in supporting and enabling these changes – especially in critical areas that are hardest for our Allies to provide, like lift, sustainment, and enablers such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

At the same time, our own U.S. efforts in Europe remain essential.  Our leadership is perhaps more important now than at any time in recent history.

Since Russian troops illegally occupied Crimea last year, U.S. forces, under the banner of Operation Atlantic Resolve, have continued to take concerted steps to assure Allies of our commitment to their security and to Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty – the common defense cornerstone of transatlantic security.

EUCOM air, land, maritime and special operations forces have maintained presence in all three of our NATO allies in the Baltics; Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as in the Black Sea,..providing an array of capabilities including  airborne, armor, mobile infantry, light fighter, strike-fighter, advanced air, and maritime presence in addition to training, advising, and exercising with host nation forces.

You have made most of this persistent presence possible through your support for the European Reassurance Initiative, or “ERI.”  The assurance measures it supports enable the Alliance to remain strong and cohesive in this new security environment. In facing both of these serious challenges – to Europe’s east and to its south – EUCOM is working closely with many others,.our sister COCOMs, NATO partners as well as Allies, and other international organizations including the European Union.  There is plenty of work to go around, and our collaboration, and our unity, are essential.   EUCOM is also drawing heavily on great new efforts underway in the Department of Defense – not least the Defense Innovation Initiative, which applies cutting-edge approaches to some of the toughest challenges in our theater, like anti-access area denial.

The strong threat posed by Russia, and the growing challenge to the south, lead me to three areas where EUCOM could particularly use your help:

First – sufficient persistent forward presence.

Our forward presence in Europe is the bedrock of our ability to assure Allies, to deter real and potential adversaries, and to be postured to act in a timely manner should deterrence fail.

It was our permanent presence in Europe that gave EUCOM the ability to respond immediately after Russian troops illegally occupied Crimea. Soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Germany deployed to the Baltic States and Poland within 96 hours of receiving their mission. And our F-15s from Lakenheath, England began flying missions out of Poland within 18 hours of mission receipt.

That same permanent presence ensures that EUCOM can play a full array of essential supporting roles for other Combatant Commands – from neighboring AFRICOM and CENTCOM, to STRATCOM and TRANSCOM.

Rotational presence is not a substitute for permanent forward presence in building relationships or signaling our commitment.  A fully funded rotational presence can play an important role in helping meet the requirements in our theater – but only if it is heel-to-toe and properly resourced.

Second – sufficient intelligence support.

Since the end of the Cold War, our nation’s community of Russian area experts has shrunk considerably, and intelligence assets of all kinds have been shifted to the wars we’ve been fighting or to understanding potential future threats.

Russian military operations over the past year, in Ukraine and in the region more broadly, have underscored that there are critical gaps in our collection and analysis.  Some Russian military exercises have caught us by surprise, and our  textured feel for Russian involvement on the ground in Ukraine has been quite limited.

Earlier indications and warning – and the ability to better understand Moscow’s thinking and intent – are absolutely critical for avoiding future surprise and miscalculation, for deterring effectively, and for preparing to respond if required.   Getting this right requires more ISR, high-power analytical support, and appropriate intelligence-sharing with Allies and partners.  The same holds true for effectively waging counter-terrorism and counter-ISIL operations in and through the European theater.  A small investment in this capability could lead to a large return in our understanding of the complex challenges we face.

Third, and finally, sufficient future resourcing.

In the near term, EUCOM’s particular request is for your support for European Reassurance Initiative for Fiscal Year 2016.  Your support for ERI in 2015 demonstrated commitment to our Allies, increased our ability to shape the European Theater, and allowed EUCOM to build and sustain the capacity of our Allies and partners.

The request for ERI funding in FY16 builds on this initiative.  Key components include: maintaining air superiority presence, participating in NATO exercises, supporting the rotational presences of an Armored Brigade Combat Team,  repositioning equipment, funding Global Response Force exercises, fostering SOCEUR engagement with partners, and increasing Guard and Reserve participation across the theater.

We understand that these reassurance measures come at a cost, and in the current budget environment, additional cost means making tough choices.  As a result of previous budget constraints, EUCOM has already assumed greater risk to our mission.  Specifically, our deployment timelines are longer, our preparations are less robust, and our fundamental ability to deter and defeat in a timely and effective manner is less sure than it was a decade ago.

As Secretary Carter testified recently, further reductions would damage our national security, and have a direct and lasting impact on our ability to protect and defend the nation in and from the European Theater.  Meanwhile, the security challenges in and around Europe are growing sharper and more complicated.

*** It is complicated and the ambitions of Russia are not without notice, but are certainly without dispute or consequence from any Western leaders.

Moscow Likely to Choose Control of Territories Over Their Economic Development

The Russian government is considering building a new water link connecting the Caspian Sea to the ocean via the Azov and Black seas. The new route is supposed to be the shortest and the cheapest way to carry Chinese goods via Central Asia to Europe. Existing oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea to outside markets also have hit the limits of their capacities, and finding new ways for exporting oil and gas is another important aspect of the project. Central Asian countries are regarded as the primary beneficiaries of the new transportation link, with Kazakhstan reportedly being its most ardent supporter. It is believed the new link will also boost the stagnant economies of the North Caucasus, creating new jobs and providing better access to world markets and investment. The Eurasian Development Bank has allotted $2.7 million for early project assessment, and the results of the research was discussed in the Russian Ministry of Transportation, but that discussion was closed to the public (Kavkazskaya Politika, April 17).

The proposed water link, commonly referred to as the “Eurasia canal,” would significantly affect the economic and political situation in the North Caucasus and southern Russia more generally (see EDM, June 25, 2007). Southern Russia has significant agricultural potential and would certainly be of interest to Chinese investors. Access by Chinese investors to the North Caucasus would also substantially improve local economies and decrease their dependence on subsidies from Moscow. As a rule, the Russian government prefers control to development. Unless the government is reassured that there is no threat to its control over the North Caucasus, it is unlikely to proceed with even the most lucrative developmental projects.

Iran’s Free Pass on Hijacking Cargo Ships

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Members of the U.S. Congress insist on reviewing any agreement with Iran before it takes effect, largely over Israeli concerns shared by many in Congress over Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Zarif said Tehran does not want “to get bogged down into the domestic procedures of the United States” and was negotiating with the government.

He also said Iran was committed to maintaining freedom of navigation in the Gulf in the aftermath of the seizure of a commercial ship by Iranian forces on Tuesday. “For us, freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf is a must,” he said. More here.

A few days ago, Iran seized a cargo ship. The U.S. has no plan nor responsibility to free the ship as told by the U.S. State Department. The ship is owned by the United States by flies a Marshall Island flag. There is more intrigue.

Here’s Why Iran’s Seizure of a Cargo Ship Is So Odd, and Disturbing

While Revolutionary Guard boats often harass passing vessels, the capture of the MV Maersk Tigris appears to be something new:

No one knows why Iranian military forces seized a 52,000-ton container ship in the Strait of Hormuz, and that’s worrying. Nor is it clear what the U.S. Navy or anyone else can do about it.

The strait is one of the world’s great maritime chokepoints; among other cargo, nearly 20 percent of the world’s annual supply of crude oil passes through its 6-mile-wide shipping channel. From time to time, Iran threatens to close the strait to shipping, though any such move would be vigorously contested by the United States and other countries, and it’s doubtful that the passage would remain closed for long. Still, news about maritime threats in the strait can send tremors through global markets.

The MV Maersk Tigris — a brand-new cargo ship built to carry more than 5,400 standard shipping containers — was heading westward through the strait in Iranian territorial waters on Tuesday, according to Pentagon spokesman Col. Steve Warren. It was approached by several patrol vessels of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, or IRGCN, the maritime arm of the paramilitary unit that is generally tasked with “preserving the Islamic revolution.”

So far, nothing terribly unusual. The IRGCN, assigned to patrol the Gulf, routinely sends boats to shadow — some say “harass” — vessels of other nationalities as they transit the strait. Just three days ago, CNN reported, four IRGCN boats surrounded the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington in the Strait of Hormuz and followed it closely for some time. The U.S. Fifth Fleet subsequently issued a notice to mariners.

What happened next to the MV Maersk Tigris, however, was quite out of the ordinary.

“The master was contacted and directed to proceed further into Iranian territorial waters,” said Warren. “He declined and one of the IRGCN craft fired shots across the bridge of the Maersk Tigris. The master complied with the Iranian demand and proceeded into Iranian waters in the vicinity of Larak Island.”

William Watson, a maritime consultant based in Washington, D.C., called the situation “very strange and peculiar.”

Iran, which claims the entire strait as its territorial waters, might legally board a vessel if it deviated substantially toward the Iranian coast, Watson said. But ships moving normally through the strait have the right of innocent passage, a right routinely and firmly asserted by U.S. warships, among thousands of other vessels.

Via its Fars News Agency, the Iranian government said, “The ship is a trade vessel and has been seized by the Iranian navy at the request of Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization…The ship was seized after a relevant court order was issued for its confiscation.” The article said the IPMO had monetary differences with the ship owner.

Watson found this mystifying. If someone has a financial claim against a vessel’s owners, the claimant can “arrest” the vessel, or hold it until the dispute is resolved. But he added that in his decades of watching the world’s maritime trade, he’d never heard of such a thing done on the high seas. Arrests happen in port or at anchor, he said.

Soon after the container ship encountered the IRGCN boats, it sent a distress signal. The U.S. Navy responded by dispatching a guided missile destroyer, the USS Farragut, to have a look. As well, it sent a maritime patrol aircraft (the Navy has two kinds, the propellor-driven P-3 Orion and the jet-powered P-8 Poseidon).

It’s unclear what the Navy might do from here. The U.S. can act forcefully to protect ships under U.S. flag, and generally must lay off when a vessel is sailing under some other country’s banner. The Maersk Tigris is a bit in the middle; it flies the flag of the Marshall Islands, which in the wake of World War II placed itself under the military protection of the United States.

“NAVCENT [U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command] is communicating with representatives of the shipping company and we continue to monitor the situation,” Warren said. “According to information received from the vessel’s operators, there are no Americans aboard.”

The incident comes just days after the U.S. Navy dispatched an aircraft carrier and escort to ward off Iranian ships headed for the civil-war-wracked country of Yemen, and amid tense and ongoing negotiations surrounding the framework nuclear deal between Iran and other nations. It is also part of a long history of naval confrontations between the U.S. and Iranian forces; most dramatically, the daylong naval battle in 1988 in which the U.S. retaliated for the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts by sinking two Iranian warships and damaging other assets.

Update (4/29): The day after the seizure, Maersk officials told Reuters they still did not know why their ship had been taken, and that they were working with Danish diplomats to learn more. The world’s largest shipping company, Maersk is based in Copenhagen.

Update 2 (4/29): Via the government’s IRNA news agency, Iran added a bit to its explanation for the seizure, saying that “the decree was issued upon a complaint lodged by a private company named ‘Pars-Talaeeyeh Oil Products Company’ against MAERSK Shipping Line. The case passed its legal proceedings and finally MAERSK was sentenced to pay financial damages….The [Navigation and Ports Organization] underlined that the issue is merely a legal case and has nothing to do with political issues.”

Update 3 (4/29): The website MarineTraffic produced this video showing the course of the MV Maersk Tigris before, during, and after its interception.

Now there are talks with the Marshall Islands about future interceptions. Officials from the United States and the Marshall Islands are discussing “the way ahead” after Iranian patrol boats forcibly diverted a cargo ship flying a Marshall Islands flag into an anchorage in Iranian waters, the Pentagon said on Wednesday.

A US Navy destroyer, the Farragut, and three coastal patrol ships, the Thunderbolt, Firebolt and Typhoon, were operating in the vicinity of the Strait of Hormuz conducting maritime security operations following the detention of the cargo ship, the MV Maersk Tigris, the Pentagon said.

 

Brennan and his Kill Drone Operation

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Catch him if you can, as speeches to one audience are very different from those to another audience. CIA Chief, John Brennan is the designer of the Obama drone program and ‘that’ kill list.

In part: No one else was double-checking the administration’s work, and making sure that what Brennan called the “surgical” approach was only killing bad guys and not simply peasants with guns, civilians whose deaths might prolong the conflict. It was a secret program with an ad hoc structure and no real oversight or outside checks — only John Brennan. The courts weren’t interested even when Americans started showing up on the kill lists, and Congress was lost in a confused thicket of jurisdictional limitations surrounding covert action in the military and CIA. As one congressional staffer told me last year, “No one has a 360-degree view of this.” That left only public opinion, and the White House had a strategy for that. *** Almost a year later, in May 2012, the New York Times revealed that the U.S. had developed a new way of counting casualties. Instead of two categories, the U.S. had only one: militant. The U.S. assumed that every adult male who was killed — whether their names were known or not — was guilty. There were no innocent among the dead. The whole thing was an accounting trick.

But, Obama declared he has a pen and a phone. He can change anything, and does. Meanwhile, the family of Dr. Weinstein, the USAID worker killed in the drone strike, did pay a ransom to get him released. So that pesky and common question remains often, what did the White House know and when did it know it?

President Obama secretly granted the Central Intelligence Agency more flexibility to conduct drone strikes targeting terror suspects in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world after approving more restrictive rules in 2013, according to a published report.

The Wall Street Journal, citing current and former U.S. officials, reported that Obama approved a waiver exempting the CIA from proving that militants targeted in Pakistan posed an imminent threat to the U.S. According to the paper, under that standard, the agency might have been prevented from carrying out a Jan. 15 strike that killed an American and an Italian who were held hostage by Al Qaeda-linked militants.

The deaths of Dr. Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto have renewed debate in Washington over what, if any, new limits should be put on the drone program. After announcing the deaths of Weinstein and Lo Porto on Thursday, Obama said that he had ordered a “full review,” but said the strike that killed the hostages was “fully consistent with the guidelines under which we conduct counterterrorism efforts in the region.”

The CIA conducts drone strikes in Pakistan as well as in Yemen, where it works alongside the military. The Pentagon has also conducted drone strikes in Somalia.

Drone strikes carried out by the CIA fall into two categories. Specific terror leaders are targeted due to their presence on a so-called “kill list.” Strikes that target anyone on a “kill list” must be approved personally by Obama. The second type of operation is a so-called “signature strike”, which does not need the president’s approval and can be carried out against any suspected group of militants. It was the latter type of operation that resulted in the hostages’ deaths on Jan. 15.

The Journal reports that while Obama issued a directive in 2013 aimed at eventually eliminated “signature strikes” in an effort to cut down on civilian deaths, officials say many of the changes specified in the directive either haven’t been implemented or have been works in progress.

The paper also reports that the CIA’s Pakistan drone strike program was initially exempted from the “imminent threat” requirement until the end of U.S. and NATO combat operations in Afghanistan. Officials told the Journal that waiver was extended when Obama decided to keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan beyond the original withdrawal date of December 2014, though it is not clear exactly when this happened.

If the “imminent threat” requirement had been extended to Pakistan, the Journal reports, the CIA would have had to carry out more surveillance of the suspected militants, possibly preventing the fatal Jan. 15 mission from being launched.

In addition to Weinstein and Lo Porto, the drone strike also killed two Americans who had leadership roles with Al Qaeda. U.S. officials told the Associated Press late last week that the compound was targeted because intelligence showed it was frequented by Al Qaeda leaders.

Late Sunday, the Wall Street Journal reported that heat sensors and other surveillance tolls indicated that there were only four people at the compound, not the six who were ultimately killed. Analysts tell the paper that they now believe Weinstein and Lo Porto were kept underground, either in a basement or a tunnel, which would have prevented them from being detected by heat sensors.

Obama’s Emails Hacked, Russia’s Cyberwar

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Russian Hackers Read Obama’s Unclassified Emails, Officials Say

WASHINGTON — Some of President Obama’s email correspondence was swept up by Russian hackers last year in a breach of the White House’s unclassified computer system that was far more intrusive and worrisome than has been publicly acknowledged, according to senior American officials briefed on the investigation.

The hackers, who also got deeply into the State Department’s unclassified system, do not appear to have penetrated closely guarded servers that control the message traffic from Mr. Obama’s BlackBerry, which he or an aide carries constantly.

But they obtained access to the email archives of people inside the White House, and perhaps some outside, with whom Mr. Obama regularly communicated. From those accounts, they reached emails that the president had sent and received, according to officials briefed on the investigation.

White House officials said that no classified networks had been compromised, and that the hackers had collected no classified information. Many senior officials have two computers in their offices, one operating on a highly secure classified network and another connected to the outside world for unclassified communications.

But officials have conceded that the unclassified system routinely contains much information that is considered highly sensitive: schedules, email exchanges with ambassadors and diplomats, discussions of pending personnel moves and legislation, and, inevitably, some debate about policy.

Officials did not disclose the number of Mr. Obama’s emails that were harvested by hackers, nor the sensitivity of their content. The president’s email account itself does not appear to have been hacked. Aides say that most of Mr. Obama’s classified briefings — such as the morning Presidential Daily Brief — are delivered orally or on paper (sometimes supplemented by an iPad system connected to classified networks) and that they are usually confined to the Oval Office or the Situation Room.

Still, the fact that Mr. Obama’s communications were among those hit by the hackers — who are presumed to be linked to the Russian government, if not working for it — has been one of the most closely held findings of the inquiry. Senior White House officials have known for months about the depth of the intrusion.

“This has been one of the most sophisticated actors we’ve seen,” said one senior American official briefed on the investigation.

Others confirmed that the White House intrusion was viewed as so serious that officials met on a nearly daily basis for several weeks after it was discovered. “It’s the Russian angle to this that’s particularly worrisome,” another senior official said.

While Chinese hacking groups are known for sweeping up vast amounts of commercial and design information, the best Russian hackers tend to hide their tracks better and focus on specific, often political targets. And the hacking happened at a moment of renewed tension with Russia — over its annexation of Crimea, the presence of its forces in Ukraine and its renewed military patrols in Europe, reminiscent of the Cold War.

Inside the White House, the intrusion has raised a new debate about whether it is possible to protect a president’s electronic presence, especially when it reaches out from behind the presumably secure firewalls of the executive branch.

Mr. Obama is no stranger to computer-network attacks: His 2008 campaign was hit by Chinese hackers. Nonetheless, he has long been a frequent user of email, and publicly fought the Secret Service in 2009 to retain his BlackBerry, a topic he has joked about in public. He was issued a special smartphone, and the list of those he can exchange emails with is highly restricted.

When asked about the investigation’s findings, the spokeswoman for the National Security Council, Bernadette Meehan, said, “We’ll decline to comment.” The White House has also declined to provide any explanations about how the breach was handled, though the State Department has been more candid about what kind of systems were hit and what it has done since to improve security. A spokesman for the F.B.I. declined to comment.

Officials who discussed the investigation spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicate nature of the hacking. While the White House has refused to identify the nationality of the hackers, others familiar with the investigation said that in both the White House and State Department cases, all signs pointed to Russians.

On Thursday, Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter revealed for the first time that Russian hackers had attacked the Pentagon’s unclassified systems, but said they had been identified and “kicked off.” Defense Department officials declined to say if the signatures of the attacks on the Pentagon appeared related to the White House and State Department attacks.

The discovery of the hacking in October led to a partial shutdown of the White House email system. The hackers appear to have been evicted from the White House systems by the end of October. But they continued to plague the State Department, whose system is much more far-flung. The disruptions were so severe that during the Iranian nuclear negotiations in Vienna in November, officials needed to distribute personal email accounts, to one another and to some reporters, to maintain contact.

Earlier this month, officials at the White House said that the hacking had not damaged its systems and that, while elements had been shut down to mitigate the effects of the attack, everything had been restored.

One of the curiosities of the White House and State Department attacks is that the administration, which recently has been looking to name and punish state and nonstate hackers in an effort to deter attacks, has refused to reveal its conclusions about who was responsible for this complex and artful intrusion into the government. That is in sharp contrast to Mr. Obama’s decision, after considerable internal debate in December, to name North Korea for ordering the attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, and to the director of national intelligence’s decision to name Iranian hackers as the source of a destructive attack on the Sands Casino.

This month, after CNN reported that hackers had gained access to sensitive areas of the White House computer network, including sections that contained the president’s schedule, the White House spokesman, Josh Earnest, said the administration had not publicly named who was behind the hack because federal investigators had concluded that “it’s not in our best interests.”

By contrast, in the North Korea case, he said, investigators concluded that “we’re more likely to be successful in terms of holding them accountable by naming them publicly.”

But the breach of the president’s emails appeared to be a major factor in the government secrecy. “All of this is very tightly held,” one senior American official said, adding that the content of what had been breached was being kept secret to avoid tipping off the Russians about what had been learned from the investigation.

Mr. Obama’s friends and associates say that he is a committed user of his BlackBerry, but that he is careful when emailing outside the White House system.

“The frequency has dropped off in the last six months or so,” one of his close associates said, though this person added that he did not know if the drop was related to the hacking.

Mr. Obama is known to send emails to aides late at night from his residence, providing them with his feedback on speeches or, at times, entirely new drafts. Others say he has emailed on topics as diverse as his golf game and the struggle with Congress over the Iranian nuclear negotiations.

George W. Bush gave up emailing for the course of his presidency and did not carry a smartphone. But after Mr. Bush left office, his sister’s email account was hacked, and several photos — including some of his paintings — were made public.

The White House is bombarded with cyberattacks daily, not only from Russia and China. Most are easily deflected.

The White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and intelligence agencies put their most classified material into a system called Jwics, for Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. That is where top-secret and “secret compartmentalized information” traverses within the government, to officials cleared for it — and it includes imagery, data and graphics. There is no evidence, senior officials said, that this hacking pierced it.