Foreign Spies on our College Campuses

Posted on November 7, 2016November 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

International Espionage on Campus

Bishop/CB: The idyllic American university campus conjures the image of a safe and open academic environment where students spend four or more years learning new ideas and preparing for future careers. Professors challenge eager students to open their minds to old and new perspectives in science, mathematics, business, and of course, the arts and humanities. Universities nurture an atmosphere where academics and scientists can engage in groundbreaking research, make advances in technology, and publish on novel theories and discoveries.

For many students, college may be the first time they are living on their own, allowing them to explore not only academic freedom but personal freedom. For parents coping with their children leaving home, some comfort is found in the expectation that while students are on campus the university will be actively taking measures to protect them from physical harm and risks that could affect their future. Parents don’t realize that for some students, college may be the first time students are exposed to the clandestine world of international espionage.

Espionage knows no boundaries. Foreign intelligence officers and spies lurk wherever there is information of value to be had or people with access to it. Information does not have to be a government secret for a foreign intelligence service to want to steal it. Nation states play the Great Game to gain an advantage, whether political or economic, over their adversaries. And there is plenty of information of value on American college campuses to attract the attention of adversary nations. From advanced research in sciences and technology to professors with access to U.S. government officials, American universities are a target-rich environment for intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and the illicit transfer of research and technology. The welcoming nature of American universities—from unlocked entrances to university facilities, minimal investigation into the backgrounds of students enrolling in classes, and open admission to conferences, seminars, and other campus events—creates the perfect opportunity for undercover foreign intelligence officers or their human sources to slip onto campus and search for students who have potential for entering sensitive positions in the U.S. government or landing jobs with American companies engaged in the development and production of emerging and advanced technologies.

While the threat of espionage may not be apparent to parents and students, American universities have little excuse for not knowing about it. Federal law enforcement agencies like the FBI regularly attempt to advise universities of the potential espionage threats on campus, and the media also has reported extensively on them. The risks are real, knowable, and preventable, and universities that ignore the threats could face potentially devastating consequences to their reputations, relationships, and financial well being. For students who do not fully appreciate the risk and get wrapped up on the wrong side of the clandestine world, the impact on their futures can be tremendous and irreversible. Espionage on campus and the often-related illicit transfer of research and technology from school laboratories also contribute to immediate and long-term decline of U.S. national security interests and the competitive advantage the United States possesses in sciences and technology. The university campus has been part of the Great Game chessboard for years. This is nothing new and not much has changed.

In 1930s Great Britain, five college students with communist sympathies came under the spell of espionage at the University of Cambridge. Donald MacLean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, and Kim Philby were in their undergraduate years when the NKVD, the Soviet precursor to the KGB, recruited them to serve the communist cause. At the time, none of the students had access to information of value or persons of interest, but the NKVD believed these men, who came from the right social class, would find their way into positions of influence and access. They all did.

MacLean landed key positions in the UK’s foreign office, the equivalent of the U.S. Department of State. Burgess held positions with the foreign office, the BBC, and MI6. Blunt spent some time in MI5, served as the Surveyor of the King’s Pictures, and used his standing in academic and social circles to spot other potential Soviet spies. Cairncross made the rounds at MI6 and Bletchley Park, the precursor to the UK’s Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ). Kim Philby was the prize of the five. While starting his espionage as a freelance journalist in the Spanish Civil War, which gave him access to pro-Franco forces—the ideological enemies of the Soviet Union—Philby returned to the UK and entered MI6. There, he steadily rose through the ranks, eventually overseeing MI6’s counterintelligence operations against the Soviet Union. The Cambridge spies, most notably Philby, are still considered to be some of the most damaging spies in UK espionage history. The notoriety of these men is well known in England, and their association with the University of Cambridge as the Cambridge Ring or Cambridge Five will forever be remembered.

American universities have not been immune to the espionage efforts of foreign intelligence services. In 1984, a student-spy working for the Cuban intelligence service and studying at Johns Hopkins University “spotted” Ana Montes as a potential Cuban recruit. After being introduced to Cuban intelligence officers, Montes agreed to spy for Cuba while still a graduate student at Johns Hopkins. She later became an intelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), focusing on Cuban issues. She was arrested in 2001 and sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Other known espionage or technology/research theft cases affecting the American university community include:

In 2002, Qingqiang Yin, a former Cornell University researcher was arrested before boarding a flight to Shanghai from New York. He was carrying numerous bacteria samples and yeast cultures belonging to the university. The FBI investigation revealed Yin was seeking a job with a research facility in China and offered to bring the bacteria and yeast cultures to China for commercial enzyme production. He was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government.

In 2006, Carlos Alvarez, a psychology professor at Florida International University, admitted during a plea hearing that he had been a Cuban spy for nearly 30 years, gathering and transmitting information about Cuban exile groups to Cuban intelligence agents. His wife Elsa, also a professor, admitted knowing of her husband’s conduct. They were sentenced to five and three years’ imprisonment, respectively.

In 2012, the FBI arrested 12 deep-cover Russian SVR intelligence officers who were engaged in espionage against various American targets. One of the SVR officers was Cynthia Murphy, a.k.a. Lydia Guryeva, who while studying for a master’s degree at Columbia University, was tasked by the SVR to develop relationships with classmates and professors who have or will acquire access to secret information and to report on their backgrounds and characteristics, providing assessments on their vulnerability for recruitment as spies. The SVR also directed Guryeva to collect information on students seeking employment with the CIA. After pleading guilty to failing to register as an agent of a foreign government, the United States returned Guryeva (and the other deep-cover officers) to Russia in exchange for prisoners held there.

In 2013, Hua Jun Zhao, a Chinese research assistant at the Medical College of Wisconsin, was arrested and charged with economic espionage after stealing cancer research compounds and shipping them to China, where he allegedly planned to take them to a Chinese university for further development. He pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of illegally downloading research data and was sentenced to time served (four-and-a-half months).



Since 2004, the Chinese government has opened numerous Confucius Institutes at universities across the world, including approximately 64 institutes at American universities. While the stated mission of the institutes is to promote the study of Chinese language and culture abroad, concerns have been raised about the ulterior motives of these institutes. Allegations have also surfaced that the institutes may be Trojan Horses used by the Chinese government to conduct espionage activities. Regardless of the public evidence available on the alleged intelligence function of these institutes, from this former intelligence officer’s perspective, they are the perfect front for penetrating American universities and targeting their students.

Again, these are only examples of the espionage threats facing American universities. These incidents and others have been well documented in the public domain, and American universities dedicated to risk management should know about them, if not for their own protection, then for the benefit of their donors and students and U.S. national security.

Today’s American university receives funding from a variety of sources, including alumni, businesses, philanthropic organizations, and federal and state governments. Research grants from the public and private sectors are a significant source of income for universities, and donors want the university to reap the benefits of their contributions. No donor wants to see years of research and funding illegally diverted to a foreign government or competitor. A university that does not take this risk seriously could begin to see expected research grants and contributions being provided to other schools or facilities, especially when the U.S. government is the funding source.

Universities should also consider the disruption a law enforcement investigation into espionage on campus can have on its day-to-day operations, reputation, and ability to maintain investor (philanthropic) confidence. The media will undoubtedly provide thorough coverage of an espionage investigation, the accuracy of which is not guaranteed.

Investigators will be removing and combing through files and records. Computers may be seized, and electronic files of all kinds will be requested. Interviews of those with knowledge of the incident or perpetrators will be required, and if a public trial takes place, there will be more disruption and publicity. A university wanting to maintain or salvage its reputation after the uncovering of espionage on its campus will find it advantageous if it can truthfully state it has been cooperating with law enforcement on the investigation rather than have a story surface that the university was one of the obstacles law enforcement had to overcome in order to put an end to the espionage. Having the university’s name negatively associated with a foreign espionage investigation is not the kind of publicity a university will find easy to overcome.
For students, the consequences of becoming entangled in espionage could be severe.   Students make easy targets, and their idealism and naiveté can often get in the way of their judgment. Once a student is recruited as a spy, his opportunities for reversing course without consequence are limited. One only needs to look at the choices made by Glenn Duffie Shriver, an American just out of college and living in China, who was slowly manipulated by Chinese intelligence to seek employment with the CIA. Shriver was arrested and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit unlawful conveyance of national defense information. Shriver was released from prison in 2013, but he will be forever remembered as a Chinese spy. Not a great resume builder.

From a national security perspective, espionage on campus also contributes to the perpetual and long-term decline of the United States’ competitive advantage over its adversaries. The technology and research lost to other countries through espionage and theft robs the American economy of the commercial and economic benefits it would have derived in terms of jobs, profits, and scientific and technological advancement. The stolen knowledge increases the commercial and economic standing of the countries that committed the theft to the detriment of the United States. If the stolen technologies and research have military, defense, or security applications, then the losses also contribute to the threats the United States faces from countries and adversaries who seek to challenge or harm its national security interests.

Universities are a soft target for espionage and offer potentially lucrative rewards for our adversaries’ intelligence targeting efforts. Every loss resulting from espionage or foreign theft at an American university is a gain for the adversaries of the United States. These risks and potential consequences transcend the inerrant concept of the open, academic environment.

Friday’s Web Outage, Gonna Be Worse due to Selling Access

Posted on October 24, 2016October 24, 2016 by Denise Simon

Hackers Sell $7,500 IoT Cannon To Bring Down The Web Again

Forbes: Think Friday’s massive outage was bad? Worse is expected, as hackers are selling access to a huge army of hacked Internet of Things (IoT) devices designed to launch attacks capable of severely disrupting web connections, FORBES has learned. The finding was revealed just days after compromised cameras and other IoT machines were used in an attack that took down Twitter, Amazon Web Services, Netflix, Spotify and other major web companies.

In what is a first for the security company, RSA discovered in early October hackers advertising access to a huge IoT botnet on an underground criminal forum, though the company declined to say which one. (F-Secure chief research officer Mikko Hypponen said on Twitter after publication that it was the Tor-based Alpha Bay market). “This is the first time we’ve seen an IoT botnet up for rent or sale, especially one boasting that amount of firepower. It’s definitely a worrying trend seeing the DDoS capabilities grow,” said Daniel Cohen, head of RSA’s FraudAction business unit.

The seller claimed they could generate 1 terabit per second of traffic. That would almost equal the world record DDoS attack, which hit French hosting provider OVH earlier this month at just over 1 terabit. For $4,600, anyone could buy 50,000 bots (hacked computers under the control of hackers), whilst 100,000 cost $7,500. Together, those bots can combine resources to overwhelm targets with data, in what’s known as a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.

Cohen said he didn’t know if the botnet for hire was related to Mirai, the epic network of weaponized IoT computers used to swamp DYN – a domain name system (DNS) provider and the chief target of Friday’s attack – with traffic. But FORBES was able to find a forum post on Alpha Bay from the seller, who went by the name loldongs, which noted they had created a Mirai-based botnet. The original post was on 4 October, just a few days after the Mirai source code was made available to everyone. In a later post, in response to another user’s request, loldongs claimed: “I can take down OVH easily.”

RSA uncovered a botnet for hire, made up of IoT devices like connected cameras and fridges. It could generate an astonishing amount of power, the company warned.

Statement By Secretary Johnson On Recent Cyber Incident

Release Date:

October 24, 2016

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010

The Department of Homeland Security is closely monitoring events arising from the distributed denial of service attack on Dyn on Friday, October 21. Later that day, the Department convened a conference call of about 18 major communication service providers to share information about the incident. At this time, we believe the attack has been mitigated. We have shared relevant information with our partners and through our Automated Indicator Sharing program.

We are aware of one type of malware potentially used in this incident. This malware is referred to as Mirai and compromises Internet of Things devices, such as surveillance cameras and entertainment systems connected to the Internet. The NCCIC is working with law enforcement, the private sector and the research community to develop ways to mitigate against this and other related malware.

The Department has also been working to develop a set of strategic principles for securing the Internet of Things, which we plan to release in the coming weeks.

Rosoboronexport, Putin and Iran, N. Korea and Syria

Posted on October 21, 2016October 21, 2016 by Denise Simon

On November 4, 2000, the Rosoboronexport Unitary enterprise was set up by Decree №1834 of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, as the sole state intermediary agency for Russia’s military exports/imports.

In 2015: WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The United States has imposed sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies, including Russian state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport, for violating a U.S. law restricting weapons trade with Iran, North Korea and Syria.

The U.S. State Department published a notice of the sanctions in the Federal Register on Wednesday. They were later condemned by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Moscow will take countermeasures in response to new U.S. sanctions, Interfax reported late on Wednesday, citing a commentary on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website.

The State Department’s notice did not specify how each company had run afoul of the United States’ Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, but the act prohibits the trade with those three countries of goods, services, or technology used to make weapons of mass destruction or cruise or ballistic missiles.

Russia has supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a 4 1/2-year-old civil war that has killed more than 200,000 people and displaced millions, including by supplying him with military gear.

Iran and North Korea are under United Nations arms embargoes.

The sanctions announced on Wednesday prohibit the U.S. government from procuring goods or services from the listed entities, as well as selling them defense-related goods and services. Additionally, no new licenses will be granted to export certain controlled goods to the listed entities, and any existing such licenses will be suspended.

Many of the entities targeted on Wednesday already faced multiple rounds of U.S. sanctions.

One of the individuals listed was Chinese businessman Li Fangwei, also known as Karl Lee. He has already been sanctioned for allegedly supplying Iran’s ballistic missile program in violation of an embargo. He denied the allegations in a 2013 interview with Reuters.

The companies sanctioned also included China’s BST Technology and Trade Co, which had previously been sanctioned by the United States in 2013, the Russian Aircraft Corp, and two North Korean firms. The Sudanese Armed Forces were also listed in the notice, as well as the overseas arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, called the Qods Force, and its commander, Qassem Soleimani.

Related reading: Rosoboronexport Naval Inventory

Related reading: Rosoboronexport Ground Force Inventory

**** It gets worse and U.S. voters need to take notice as to why any relationship with Moscow is sitting on the knife’s edge.

(Paris)– France should reconsider allowing Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state-owned arms trading company, to participate in Euronaval, a major international arms show being held outside of Paris from October 17 to 21, 2016, human rights groups EuroMed Rights and Human Rights Watch said today. The arms show is sponsored by the French Defense Ministry.

The office building of Rosoboronexport company in Moscow, Russia, March 1, 2016.

© 2016 Reuters

Human rights organizations have called for the United Nations Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Syria, and for Rosoboronexport in particular to stop supplying arms to Syria in light of compelling evidence that the Syrian government is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

“France is leading the call on ending violations in Syria but at the same time allowing Russia, which is complicit in those violations, to promote its weapons and land new deals,” said Michel Tubiana, president of EuroMed Rights. “It’s not acceptable to do business as usual with a company arming a government engaged in systematic atrocities against its own people.”

More than 90 exhibitors from 70 countries are expected to attend the Euronaval arms show, including Rosoboronexport. Rosoboronexport said in October, 2015, that it is continuing to supply arms to the Syrian government despite its record of serious international human rights and humanitarian law violations.

Under international law, providing weapons to Syria while its forces are known to be committing war crimes and crimes against humanity may translate into aiding and abetting the commission of those crimes. Any arms supplier could bear potential criminal liability as an accessory to those crimes and could face prosecution. In addition to Rosoboronexport, all other suppliers of arms to Syria should be subject to scrutiny.

The Russian government began conducting military operations in Syria on September 30, 2015. Since then, Russian-Syrian airstrikes have hit civilian objects and caused civilian casualties, Syrian-Russian joint military operations have extensively used internationally banned cluster munitions, and there has been an increase in the use of incendiary weapons in Syria. Since September 19, 2016, Russian-Syrian forces have bombarded opposition-controlled parts of the city of Aleppo. The attacks included the use of indiscriminate barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and incendiary weapons, and damaged or partially destroyed at least five hospitals in six separate attacks.

In November 2015, the Rosoboronexport chief executive officer, Anatoly Isaikin, indicated that Russia’s military involvement in Syria was “good testimony for Russian armaments.” Media reports indicate that Russian airstrikes in Syria actually have contributed to buyer interest in weaponry from Rosoboronexport and could result in billions of dollars in new contracts.

Given its role in Syria, Rosoboronexport should not be allowed to promote itself and seek new contracts at Euronaval, the organizations said. Should Rosoboronexport be permitted to participate in the arms show, all arms show participants, including official delegations and private arms brokers, should decline to negotiate any new deals with Rosoboronexport.

**** Need more?

From UANI:

“Russia has offered Iran its latest Antey-2500 missiles, the head of Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec said on Monday according to media reports, after a deal to supply less powerful S-300 missiles was dropped under Western pressure. Sergei Chemezov said Tehran was now considering the offer, TASS news agency reported. Russia scrapped a contract to supply Iran with S-300 surface-to-air missiles under Western pressure in 2010, and Iran later filed a $4-billion international arbitration suit against Russia in Geneva, but the two countries remain allies.” (Reuters, “Russian offers Iran latest anti-aircraft missiles: TASS,”

2/23/15)

—

“Russia’s government-run weapons manufacturer is supplying equipment for Iran’s missile program, intelligence documents recently presented to the US Congress indicate. According to intelligence estimates, this does not represent official cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, but rather demonstrates the inability of the Russian government to prevent state firms from engaging in illegal trade with the Islamic Republic. The Russian firm in question is Rosoboronexport, which supplied Iran with defensive missile systems in 2006 and continues to maintain business ties with Iran in the missile sector.” (YnetNews, “Russian manufacturer selling missile equipment to Iran,” 6/11/12)

—

“For two years, the United States regarded Rosoboronexport, Russia’s official weapons exporter, as an international pariah for selling arms to Iran and Syria. Then, in 2010, the U.S. suddenly lifted sanctions against it. By June of this year, the reversal was complete: the Pentagon awarded the company a no-bid contract worth upwards of $1 billion… Rosoboronexport, whose annual revenues have grown to nearly $9 billion, had only recently been removed from the list of companies sanctioned by the U.S. State Department for violating U.S. laws prohibiting the sale of weapons to Iran and Syria. Among the suspected sales were surface-to-air missiles to Iran. But after sanctions were lifted, the Army went full steam ahead with plans to sole-source a $375 million contract to the Russian arms agency, now arguing that it was the only legitimate vendor of Russian armaments.” (Wired, “Russian Firm Got No-Bid Pentagon Contract After Selling Arms to Iran,” 8/31/11)

—

“Russia’s state arms export agency said Monday that it is supplying Iran with defensive weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, but did not say whether they include the sophisticated long-range S-300 missiles…Rosoboronexport said in a statement that ‘only weapons of a defensive nature are being supplied to Iran, including anti-aircraft weaponry.’ It added that, previously, Tor-M1 air-defense systems were supplied to Iran.” (AssociatedPress, “Russia giving Iran only defensive weapons,” 12/22/08)

—

“Rosoboronexport contracted with Iran late July to modernize 30 Su-24 front bombers which may bear tactic nuclear weapons. The contract is to be executed by Sukhoi.” (Kommersant, “Sanctions Imposed on Russian Companies Linked to Iran,” 08/05/2006)

In summary:

MOSCOW — The United States imposed sanctions against Russian state arms export agency Rosoboronexport and four Russian defense industry enterprises — including the MiG aircraft corporation — for alleged violations of a nonproliferation and missile technology control regime.

The State Department announced the sanctions in a notice posted on the Federal Register. Twenty-three firms across the world, including entities based in China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, had violated the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), it said.

“These entities were sanctioned based on credible information that they have been involved in the transfer or purchase to or from Iran, North Korea or Syria of goods, services or technology listed on multilateral export control lists, US national control lists, or other items that could make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction or missile proliferation,” said US Embassy Moscow spokesman Will Stevens.

The move prevents any US company or government agency from doing business with the sanctioned Russian defense entities, which include Russia’s state arms export agency Rosoboronexport.

Rosoboronexport is the doorway between Russia’s defense industry and foreign export customers. The agency claimed to have delivered $13.2 billion in military exports last year, and at the MAKS airshow last week said Russia’s export backlog amounts to $40 billion.

The famous MiG aircraft company was among those Russian companies singled out in the latest sanctions action — which closely coincided with the Department of Commerce announcing a new round of economic sanctions in response to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The other three companies on today’s list were high-precision weapons maker Instrument Design Bureau (KBP) Tula; a rocket and missile design bureau near Moscow known as NPO Mishinostroyenia — the same bureau that designed the USSR’s SS-19 ICBM; and the Katod company in Novosibirsk.

Katod manufactures, among other things, night vision goggles that were sold in the US; the sanctions cut the company off from that market.

In comments carried by the TASS news agency on Wednesday, Katod CEO Vladimir Loktionov mocked the sanctions against his company as a sign that Russian night-vision technology intimidated US competitors.

“So, Russia doesn’t just pump oil, it can also do something that can compete with American companies,” Loktionov said, brushing off any impact the sanctions might have by claiming the majority of its customers are in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union or one of the BRICS nations.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry was furious with the sanctions — both from the State and Commerce departments — responding in a statement later on Wednesday that the US is trying “to punish us for the rigorous pursuit of [our] national interests, and for the free choice of the inhabitants of Crimea and Sevastopol,” to join Russia last year.

Obama Directs Intelligence to be Shared with Cuba

Posted on October 20, 2016October 20, 2016 by Denise Simon

Ah what?

In part from CubaToday: Diaz-Balart, a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said Cuba shares intelligence with Russia and Iran, among others. Earlier this year, Gen. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Cuba was among four countries that pose the greatest espionage threat to the United States. The others were Russia, China and Iran.

“The threat from foreign intelligence entities, both state and non-state, is persistent, complex and evolving,” Clapper testified in a February hearing on “Worldwide Threats.” “Targeting collection of U.S. political, military, economic and technical information by foreign intelligence services continues unabated.”

Over the course of five decades, Fidel Castro built one of the world’s most active intelligence services, whose missions included spying on U.S. military facilities in South Florida and infiltrating leading Cuban exile organizations in Miami. More here.

Previously on this site, it was published that Cuba’s largest source of revenue is stealing and selling intelligence and secrets to enemies of the United States.

Now it appears, Barack Obama is not finished with his new friends in Cuba and handing off gifts to them.

Today, I approved a Presidential Policy Directive that takes another major step forward in our efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. This Directive takes a comprehensive and whole-of-government approach to promote engagement with the Cuban government and people, and make our opening to Cuba irreversible. Read more here.

It gets worse…..

China and Russia have maintained a sophisticated spy base in Cuba for many years.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 14, 2016

Presidential Policy Directive — United States-Cuba Normalization

October 14, 2016

SUBJECT: United States-Cuba Normalization

I. Introduction

On December 17, 2014, I announced that the United States would chart a new course with Cuba, ending an outdated policy that had failed to advance U.S. interests and support reform and a better life for the Cuban people on the island over several decades. Under the new policy, the United States expands and promotes authorized engagements with Cuba to advance cooperation on areas of mutual interest, and increase travel to, commerce with, and the free flow of information to Cuba. The objective of the new policy is to help the Cuban people to achieve a better future for themselves and to encourage the development of a partner in the region capable of working with the United States to confront regional challenges, such as climate change, disease, and illicit trafficking.

Endogenous changes underway in Cuba offer opportunities to advance U.S. interests and shift away from an embargo, which is an outdated burden on the Cuban people and has impeded U.S. interests. My Administration has repeatedly called on the Congress to lift the embargo. United States policy is designed to create economic opportunities for the Cuban people; promote respect for human rights; further advances on regional security and defense issues, such as health, law enforcement, and migration; and pursue cooperation with the Cuban government that can strengthen our leadership in the hemisphere. We recognize Cuba’s sovereignty and self-determination and acknowledge areas of difference. We seek to address such differences through engagement and dialogue, and by encouraging increased understanding between our governments and our peoples.

The large Cuban-American community in the United States has an integral role to play in normalization, and in reconciliation between members of the diaspora who left Cuba and those who remain on the island. Normalization necessarily extends beyond government-to-government rapprochement — it includes rebuilding bridges between individuals and families.

This directive: (1) describes the U.S. vision for normalization with Cuba and how our policy aligns with U.S. national security interests; (2) assesses progress toward normalization; (3) describes the current and foreseen strategic landscape; (4) describes priority objectives for normalization; and (5) directs actions required to implement this PPD.

II. Vision for United States-Cuba Normalization

The vision of the United States for U.S.-Cuba normalization is guided by the following national security interests, as described in the 2015 National Security Strategy:

The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.
A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
A rules-based international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity.

Our vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization reflects my Administration’s support for broad-based economic growth, stability, increased people-to-people ties, and respect for human rights and democratic values in the region. In the long-term, the United States seeks the following end-states:

1. Enhanced security of the United States and U.S. citizens at home and abroad. We seek to ensure U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba are safe and secure and the United States is protected from: those seeking to exploit increased connectivity for illicit ends, irregular migration, and natural or man-made hazards. Our policy advances bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including diplomatic, agricultural, public health, and environmental matters, as well as disaster preparedness and response, law enforcement, migration, and other security and defense topics. Our policy also supports increased cooperation with Cuba on regional initiatives on behalf of these interests.

2. A prosperous, stable Cuba that offers economic opportunities to its people. Increased travel and economic interconnectedness supports improved livelihoods for the Cuban people, deeper economic engagement between our two countries, as well as the development of a private sector that provides greater economic opportunities for the Cuban people. Efforts by the Cuban authorities to liberalize economic policy would aid these goals and further enable broader engagement with different sectors of the Cuban economy. United States policy helps U.S. businesses gain access to Cuban markets and encourages the sustainable growth of the Cuban economy. The U.S. private sector, scientific and medical researchers, agriculture industry, foundations, and other groups have new avenues for collaboration that can provide opportunities for Cuban entrepreneurs, scientists, farmers, and other professionals. At the same time, increased access to the internet is boosting Cubans’ connectivity to the wider world and expanding the ability of the Cuban people, especially youth, to exchange information and ideas. The United States is prepared to support Cuban government policies that promote social equality and independent economic activity.

3. Increased respect for individual rights in Cuba. Even as we pursue normalization, we recognize we will continue to have differences with the Cuban government. We will continue to speak out in support of human rights, including the rights to freedoms of expression, religion, association, and peaceful assembly as we do around the world. Our policy is designed to support Cubans’ ability to exercise their universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, with the expectation that greater commerce will give a broader segment of the Cuban people the information and resources they need to achieve a prosperous and sustainable future. In pursuit of these objectives, we are not seeking to impose regime change on Cuba; we are, instead, promoting values that we support around the world while respecting that it is up to the Cuban people to make their own choices about their future.

4. Integration of Cuba into international and regional systems. We seek Cuban government participation in regional and international fora, including but not limited to, those related to the Organization of American States (OAS) and Summit of the Americas to advance mutually held member objectives. We believe that a Cuba that subscribes to the purposes and standards of such fora will benefit, over time, from bringing its domestic economic and political practices in line with international norms and globally accepted standards. Our policy strengthens the U.S. position in international systems by removing an irritant from our relationships with our allies and partners and gaining support for a rules-based order.

III. Progress Toward United States-Cuba Normalization

Since the United States announced on December 17, 2014, that it would chart a new course with Cuba, we have re-established diplomatic relations and have made progress toward the normalization of our bilateral relationship. We opened our respective embassies, six U.S. cabinet secretaries visited Havana, four Cuban ministers visited the United States, and I became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Cuba since 1928. We established a Bilateral Commission to prioritize areas of engagement, and we concluded non-binding arrangements on environmental protection, marine sanctuaries, public health and biomedical research, agriculture, counternarcotics, trade and travel security, civil aviation, direct transportation of mail, and hydrography. We launched dialogues or discussions on law enforcement cooperation, regulatory issues, economic issues, claims, and internet and telecommunications policy.

Given Cuba’s proximity to the United States, increased engagement by U.S. citizens, companies, and the nongovernmental sector holds extraordinary promise for supporting our national interests. Bearing in mind the limits imposed by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (LIBERTAD) Solidarity Act of 1996 (“Libertad Act”) and other relevant statutes, the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce implemented six packages of regulatory amendments to the Cuba sanctions program, easing restrictions on travel, trade, and financial transactions. United States individuals, firms, and nongovernmental organizations are availing themselves of these regulatory changes to visit Cuba, and authorized travel to Cuba increased by more than 75 percent from 2014 to 2015. Future U.S. citizen travel will be supported by scheduled air service, which began in August 2016, and the first U.S. cruise liner visited Cuban ports in May 2016. We also commenced direct transportation of mail between our two countries, and U.S. telecommunications firms established direct voice and roaming agreements with Cuba. For its part, the Cuban government has continued to pursue incremental economic reforms and launched more than 100 public Wi-Fi hotspots across the island.

These developments lay the foundation for long-term engagement with Cuba that advances U.S. interests. But we have a great deal more to do to build on that foundation based on a realistic assessment of the strategic landscape surrounding normalization.

IV. Strategic Landscape

Cuba is experiencing several transitions in areas such as leadership, the economy, technological development, civil society, and regional and global integration. Cuba’s leaders recognize the need to transition to the next generation, but they prioritize gradual, incremental changes to ensure stability.

Cuba has important economic potential rooted in the dynamism of its people, as well as a sustained commitment in areas like education and health care. Yet the Cuban government faces significant economic challenges, including eliminating its dual-exchange-rate system, making its state-run enterprises more efficient and transparent, developing a financial system that provides expanded services to individuals and the private sector, and reducing its reliance on foreign subsidies. Cuba remains highly dependent on food and energy imports, yet must cope with limited sources of hard currency to pay for import needs. Significant emigration of working age Cubans further exacerbates Cuba’s demographic problem of a rapidly aging population.

A series of statutes limits U.S. economic engagement with Cuba, precluding a complete lifting of restrictions on U.S. travel to Cuba, prohibiting United States Government export assistance and the provision of U.S. credit for Cuban purchases of agricultural commodities, and requiring that the embargo not be suspended or terminated unless the President determines that a transition or democratically elected government has come to power in Cuba.

Due to Cuba’s legal, political, and regulatory constraints, its economy is not generating adequate foreign exchange to purchase U.S. exports that could flow from the easing of the embargo. Even if the U.S. Congress were to lift the embargo, Cubans would not realize their potential without continued economic reform in Cuba. Cuban government regulations and opaque procurement practices hamper transactions with U.S. companies that would be permitted under U.S. law.

Normalization efforts have raised Cubans’ expectations for greater economic opportunities. With an estimated 1 in 4 working Cubans engaged in entrepreneurship, a dynamic, independent private sector is emerging. Expansion of the private sector has increased resources for individual Cubans and created nascent openings for Cuban entrepreneurs to engage with U.S. firms and nongovernmental organizations. We take note of the Cuban government’s limited, but meaningful steps to expand legal protections and opportunities for small- and medium-sized businesses, which, if expanded and sustained, will improve the investment climate.

Cuba is not a member of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, which could provide expertise and potentially finance economic reforms and viable investment projects.

Although Cuba has reached agreement with several creditor nations on bilateral debt relief through restructuring and forgiveness, it remains in default to the United States Government on pre-Cuban revolution bilateral debts and does not participate in international capital markets. Cuba and the United States are both members of the World Trade Organization (WTO); however, neither country applies the agreement to the other because of the U.S. embargo toward Cuba.

Rapprochement has enabled us to increase our engagement with Cuba on regional issues such as the Colombia peace process and healthcare in Haiti, and has undermined an historic rallying point for regimes critical of the United States. Although Cuba has expressed no interest in participating in the OAS, it did attend the Summit of the Americas in 2015. We also welcome engagement between Cuba and other U.S. allies from around the world, including our European and Asian treaty allies. At the same time, we recognize that Cuba and the United States will continue to have differences on many regional and global issues.

U.S. engagement with the Cuban government will also be constrained by Cuba’s continued repression of civil and political liberties. We anticipate the Cuban government will continue to object to U.S. migration policies and operations, democracy programs, Radio and TV Marti, the U.S. presence at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, and the embargo. The United States Government has no intention to alter the existing lease treaty and other arrangements related to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, which enables the United States to enhance and preserve regional security.

In this strategic environment, the policies and actions the United States pursues to advance our vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization will significantly shape the future of bilateral and regional relations, as well as our shared security and prosperity.

V. Six U.S. Objectives for the Medium-Term U.S.-Cuba Relationship

To advance the four end-state goals associated with our strategic vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization, the United States will move concurrently on the following six priority objectives:

1. Government-to-Government Interaction

We will continue high-level and technical engagement in areas of mutual interest, including agriculture, the economy and small businesses, transportation, science and technology, environment, climate, health, law enforcement, migration, national security, disaster preparedness and response, and counterterrorism. Through the Bilateral Commission, we will identify and prioritize areas of collaboration and engagement that advance our end-state goals. Stronger diplomatic ties will enable constructive engagement on bilateral differences, including our democracy and broadcasting programs, while protecting our interests and assets, such as the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. We will utilize engagement to urge Cuba to make demonstrable progress on human rights and religious freedom. As the United States and Cuban governments build trust through more frequent engagement, we will increasingly conduct working-level interactions between Cuban ministries and U.S. agencies and departments that lessen the need for high-level conversations on routine matters. Given the lack of diplomatic relations over the past several decades, we will seek broad engagement across the Cuban government, including ministries and local officials. When appropriate and legally available, we will engage with Cuba to normalize trade relations fully.

2. Engagement and Connectivity

The United States will continue to encourage people-to-people linkages through government and privately sponsored exchanges, including those involving educational, cultural, business, science, environment, technology, and sports. As permitted by law, we will continue to support the development of scheduled and chartered air service and maritime links, including ferries. An ongoing partnership with the Cuban-American community is of particular importance given Cuban-Americans’ strong family and socio-cultural ties, as well as their natural role as citizen-ambassadors. We will facilitate opportunities for Cuban-Americans to rebuild and create new bonds with family to support reconciliation. To facilitate Cuba’s goal of increasing its internet access from 5 percent to 50 percent of the population by 2020, we will seek the establishment of a bilateral working group to expand internet connectivity. We will seek opportunities that enable U.S. foundations and universities to establish linkages with Cuba.

3. Expanded Commerce

The United States Government will seek to expand opportunities for U.S. companies to engage with Cuba. The embargo is outdated and should be lifted. My Administration has repeatedly called upon the Congress to lift the embargo, and we will continue to work toward that goal. While the embargo remains in place, our role will be to pursue policies that enable authorized U.S. private sector engagement with Cuba’s emerging private sector and with state-owned enterprises that provide goods and services to the Cuban people. Law enforcement cooperation will ensure that authorized commerce and authorized travelers move rapidly between the United States and Cuba. Although we recognize the priority given to state-owned enterprises in the Cuban model, we seek to encourage reforms that align these entities with international norms, especially transparency.

United States regulatory changes have created space for the Cuban government to introduce comparable changes. In tandem with the Department of the Treasury’s regulatory change to expand Cuba’s access to the U.S. financial system and U.S. dollar transit accounts, the Cuban government announced in early 2016 plans to eliminate the 10 percent penalty on U.S. dollar conversion transactions, subject to improved access to the international banking system. We will sustain private and public efforts to explain our regulatory changes to U.S. firms and banks, Cuban entrepreneurs, and the Cuban government.

4. Economic Reform

While the Cuban government pursues its economic goals based on its national priorities, we will utilize our expanded cooperation to support further economic reforms by the Cuban government. Recent exchanges among financial service institutions and regulators have provided greater mutual understanding of our respective financial system and economic priorities. We will undertake government-to-government dialogues to discuss options for macro- and microeconomic reform, with the goal of connecting the changes in U.S. policy with Cuban reforms in a manner that creates opportunity for U.S. firms and the Cuban people.

If and when the Congress lifts the embargo, my Administration will engage with the Congress and stakeholders on preparatory commercial and economic exchanges and dialogues. My Administration would then similarly engage the Congress on the substance and timing of a new bilateral commercial agreement to address remaining statutory trade requirements.

5. Respect for Universal Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms, and Democratic Values

We will not pursue regime change in Cuba. We will continue to make clear that the United States cannot impose a different model on Cuba because the future of Cuba is up to the Cuban people. We seek greater Cuban government respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms for every individual. Progress in this area will have a positive impact on the other objectives. We will encourage the Cuban government to respect human rights; support Cuba’s emerging, broad-based civil society; and encourage partners and nongovernmental actors to join us in advocating for reforms. While remaining committed to supporting democratic activists as we do around the world, we will also engage community leaders, bloggers, activists, and other social issue leaders who can contribute to Cuba’s internal dialogue on civic participation. We will continue to pursue engagements with civil society through the U.S. Embassy in Havana and during official United States Government visits to Cuba. We will seek to institutionalize a regular human rights dialogue with the Cuban government to advance progress on human rights. We will pursue democracy programming that is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies around the world. We will utilize our increased ability to engage regional partners, both bilaterally and through regional bodies, to encourage respect for human rights in Cuba. We will consult with nongovernmental actors such as the Catholic Church and other religious institutions. Finally, we will work with the European Union and likeminded international organizations and countries to encourage the Cuban government to respect universal values.

6. Cuban Integration into International and Regional Systems

We will expand dialogue with Cuba in the organizations in which it already holds membership, such as the WTO and the World Customs Organization (WCO), and we will encourage Cuba to move toward rules-based engagement, subject to statutory requirements. We will encourage Cuba to bring its legal framework, particularly its commercial law, in line with international standards. We will encourage Cuba to meet WCO standards for supply chain security. To the extent permitted by and consistent with applicable law, we will facilitate integration into international bodies, including through the use of technical assistance programs. We will pursue cooperation with Cuba on regional and global issues (e.g., combating the Ebola outbreak and the Colombia peace process). Ending the embargo and satisfying other statutory requirements relating to trade will allow the United States to normalize trade relations with Cuba.

VI. Policy Implementation

1. Roles and Responsibilities

To facilitate the effective implementation of this directive, departments and agencies will have the following roles and responsibilities, consistent with the relevant legal authorities and limits:

The National Security Council (NSC) staff will provide ongoing policy coordination and oversight of the implementation of this PPD and the overall Cuba strategy as necessary.

The Department of State will continue to be responsible for formulation of U.S. policy toward and coordination of relations with Cuba. This includes supporting the operations of Embassy Havana and ensuring it has adequate resources and staffing. Other responsibilities include the issuance of nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, refugee processing, promotion of educational and cultural exchanges, coordination of democracy programs, and political and economic reporting. State will continue to lead the U.S.-Cuba Bilateral Commission and coordinate a number of dialogues, such as the Law Enforcement Dialogue, annual migration talks, and meetings to resolve outstanding claims.

State will continue to co-lead efforts with the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure democracy programming is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies. State will coordinate efforts to advance science and technology cooperation with Cuba. State will support telecommunications and internet access growth in Cuba and provide foreign policy guidance to the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury on certain exports, financial transactions, and other license applications.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN), in coordination with State, will oversee multilateral issues involving Cuba at the United Nations. USUN will identify areas of possible collaboration with Cuba that could help foster a more collaborative relationship between the United States and Cuba at the United Nations. The USUN will also participate in discussions regarding the annual Cuban embargo resolution at the United Nations, as our bilateral relationship continues to develop in a positive trajectory.

The Department of the Treasury is responsible for implementation of the economic embargo restrictions and licensing policies. The Treasury will continue its outreach to help the public, businesses, and financial institutions understand the regulatory changes. The Treasury will continue to review and respond to public questions and feedback on regulations and public guidance that could be further clarified and to discuss with State any novel license requests that the Treasury receives from the public to determine whether such requests are consistent with the regulatory changes and existing law. The Treasury will make use of available channels for bilateral dialogue to understand Cuba’s economic and financial system and encourage reforms and will continue to engage in dialogue with the Cuban government about our regulatory changes.

The Department of Commerce will continue to support the development of the Cuban private sector, entrepreneurship, commercial law development, and intellectual property rights as well as environmental protection and storm prediction. If statutory restrictions are lifted, Commerce will promote increased trade with Cuba by providing export assistance to U.S. companies. In the meantime, Commerce will continue a robust outreach effort to ensure that U.S. companies understand that U.S. regulatory changes provide new opportunities to obtain licenses or use license exceptions to increase authorized exports to Cuba, including to Cuban state-owned enterprises that provide goods and services to meet the needs of the Cuban people. Additionally, Commerce will continue to engage in dialogue with the Cuban government about our regulatory changes, as well as the need for simplification of the Cuban import process, transparency in Cuban business regulations, and other steps that will lead to full realization of the benefits of our regulatory changes.

The Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to take steps to expand the defense relationship with Cuba where it will advance U.S. interests, with an initial focus on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and counternarcotics in the Caribbean. The DOD will support Cuba’s inclusion in the inter-American defense system and regional security and defense conferences, which will give Cuba a stake in hemispheric stability. The DOD will continue to make contingency preparations and support the capacity of the Department of Homeland Security and State to address mass migration and maritime migration issues pursuant to Executive Orders 12807 and 13276 and consistent with other applicable interagency guidance and strategy.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will engage, together with the Department of Justice, with the Cuban government to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime. In support of U.S. security and foreign policy objectives, DHS will develop protocols for investigative cooperation with Cuba in coordination with other departments and agencies. The DHS will strengthen the security and efficiency of cross-border supply chains and travel systems in support of people-to-people engagement and authorized U.S. trade with the Cuban private sector. The DHS will safeguard the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, to include the facilitation of lawful immigration and ensure protection of refugees. The Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Government lead for a maritime migration or mass migration, with support from the Secretaries of State and Defense, will address a maritime migration or mass migration pursuant to Executive Orders 12807 and 13276 and consistent with applicable interagency guidance and strategy.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) will engage, together with DHS, with the Cuban government to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime. The DOJ will work with Cuba to expand security and law enforcement cooperation, increase information sharing, and share best practices with Cuban counterparts. This work will build upon, and strengthen, current law enforcement cooperation with Cuba under the umbrella of the U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue and its various working groups, which focus on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, cybercrime, human trafficking, and other areas of criminal activity.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) will continue to engage with the Cuban government, entrepreneurs, small businesses, and cooperative enterprises. The SBA will support exchanges with the Cuban government in areas of mutual interest, particularly on formalization of small businesses and to spur the growth of new enterprises.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative will provide trade policy coordination in international fora and, consistent with statutory requirements and restrictions, prepare for negotiations to normalize and expand U.S.-Cuba trade.

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) will work to increase U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba by building market opportunities, improving the competitive position of U.S. agriculture, and building Cuba’s food security and agricultural capacity, while protecting plant, animal, and human health. USDA will work with the Government of Cuba to advance cooperation outlined in the U.S.-Cuba agricultural memorandum of understanding signed in March 2016. The USDA will build the U.S.-Cuba trade and development relationship to the extent permitted by and consistent with applicable law.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in accordance with the June 2016 memorandum of understanding between HHS and the Ministry of Public Health of the Republic of Cuba, will collaborate with Cuban counterparts in the areas of public health, research, and biomedical sciences, including collaboration to confront the Zika virus, dengue, chikungunya, and other arboviruses. The HHS will promote joint work, such as development of vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics; partner with Cuba to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks; collaborate in the field of cancer control, treatment programs, and joint research; and exchange best practices related to access to healthcare.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) will coordinate with departments and agencies the United States Government’s response to unplanned environmental occurrences, such as natural or manmade disasters. The USAID will co-lead efforts with State to ensure that democracy programming is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) will continue to develop air and surface transportation links between the United States and Cuba in support of transportation providers, authorized travelers, and commerce, while providing required regulatory and safety oversight of transportation providers and systems.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) will support broader United States Government efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, with Intelligence Community elements working to find opportunities for engagement on areas of common interest through which we could exchange information on mutual threats with Cuban counterparts.

The Department of the Interior (DOI) will continue cooperation with Cuba on marine protected areas and continue to engage Cuban counterparts to finalize arrangements on wildlife conservation, terrestrial national protected areas, and seismic records.

2. Congressional Outreach

Strong support in the Congress for U.S.-Cuba normalization would contribute to the speed and success of the aforementioned goals, particularly with respect to the embargo and adequate embassy staffing. We will seek to build support in the Congress to lift the embargo and other statutory constraints to enable expanded travel and commerce with Cuba and accelerate normalization. We will regularly engage with Members of Congress and staff on challenges and opportunities in Cuba, advocate for United States Government policies and sufficient staff and resources to implement the aforementioned goals and policy priorities, and encourage and facilitate congressional travel to the region.

3. Monitoring and Oversight

The Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), or its future equivalent, will have primary responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the implementation of this policy. The NSC staff will convene regular IPC and Deputies Committee meetings as necessary to monitor implementation and resolve obstacles to progress. The following departments and agencies will designate senior individuals responsible for managing policy implementation in their agency: State, the Treasury, Commerce, DOD (Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff), DHS, DOJ, USDA, HHS, DOT, USUN, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, USAID, SBA, and DNI.

4. Previous Guidance

Executive Order 13276, Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented Aliens Interdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region, dated November 15, 2002, and Executive Order 12807, Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, dated May 24, 1992, remain in effect.

BARACK OBAMA

China’s Chemical Weapon for Sale and Killing Thousands

Posted on October 7, 2016October 7, 2016 by Denise Simon

Chemical weapon for sale: China’s unregulated narcotic

SHANGHAI (AP) — For a few thousand dollars, Chinese companies offer to export a powerful chemical that has been killing unsuspecting drug users and is so lethal that it presents a potential terrorism threat, an Associated Press investigation has found.

The AP identified 12 Chinese businesses that said they would export the chemical — a synthetic opioid known as carfentanil — to the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium and Australia for as little as $2,750 a kilogram (2.2 pounds), no questions asked.

Carfentanil burst into view this summer, the latest scourge in an epidemic of opioid abuse that has killed tens of thousands of people in the United States alone. Dealers have been cutting carfentanil and its weaker cousin, fentanyl, into heroin and other illicit drugs to boost profit margins.

Despite the dangers, carfentanil is not a controlled substance in China, where it is manufactured legally and sold openly online. The U.S. government is pressing China to blacklist carfentanil, but Beijing has yet to act, leaving a substance whose lethal qualities have been compared with nerve gas to flow into foreign markets unabated.

“We can supply carfentanil … for sure,” a saleswoman from Jilin Tely Import and Export Co. wrote in broken English in a September email. “And it’s one of our hot sales product.”

China’s Ministry of Public Security declined multiple requests for comment from the AP.

Before being discovered by drug dealers, carfentanil and substances like it were viewed as chemical weapons. One of the most powerful opioids in circulation, carfentanil is so deadly that an amount smaller than a poppy seed can kill a person. Fentanyl is up to 50 times stronger than heroin; carfentanil is chemically similar, but 100 times stronger than fentanyl itself.

“It’s a weapon,” said Andrew Weber, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs from 2009 to 2014. “Companies shouldn’t be just sending it to anybody.”

The AP did not actually order any drugs so could not conduct tests to determine whether the products on offer were genuine. But a kilogram of carfentanil shipped from China was recently seized in Canada.

Carfentanil was first developed in the 1970s, and its only routine use is as an anesthetic for elephants and other large animals. Governments quickly targeted it as a potential chemical weapon. Forms of fentanyl are suspected in at least one known assassination attempt, and were used by Russian forces against Chechen separatists who took hundreds of hostages at a Moscow theater in 2002.

The chemicals are banned from the battlefield under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In fiscal year 2014, U.S. authorities seized just 3.7 kilograms (8.1 pounds) of fentanyl. This fiscal year, through just mid-July, they have seized 134.1 kilograms (295 pounds), according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection data obtained by the AP. Fentanyl is the most frequently seized synthetic opioid, U.S. Customs reports.

Users are dying of accidental respiratory arrest, and overdose rates have soared. China has not been blind to the key role its chemists play in the global opioid supply chain. Most synthetic drugs that end up in the United In States come from China, either directly or by way of Mexico, according to the DEA. China already has placed controls on 19 fentanyl-related compounds. Adding carfentanil to that list is likely to only diminish, not eliminate, global supply.

Despite periodic crackdowns, people willing to skirt the law are easy to find in China’s vast, freewheeling chemicals industry, made up of an estimated 160,000 companies operating legally and illegally. Vendors said they lie on customs forms, guaranteed delivery to countries where carfentanil is banned and volunteered strategic advice on sneaking packages past law enforcement.

Speaking from a bright booth at a chemicals industry conference in Shanghai last month, Xu Liqun said her company, Hangzhou Reward Technology, could produce carfentanil to order.

“It’s dangerous, dangerous, but if we send 1kg, 2kg, it’s OK,” she said, adding that she wouldn’t do the synthesis herself because she’s pregnant. She said she knows carfentanil can kill and believes it should be a controlled substance in China.

“The government should impose very serious limits, but in reality in China it’s so difficult to control because if I produce one or two kilograms, how will anyone know?” she said. “They cannot control you, so many products, so many labs.”

Several vendors recommended sending the drugs via EMS, the express mail service of state-owned China Postal Express & Logistics Co., as a fail-safe option.

“EMS is a little slow than Fedex or DHL but very safe, more than 99% pass rate,” a Yuntu Chemical Co. representative wrote in an email. “If send to the USA, each package less than 250g is the best, small and unattractive, we will divide 1kg into 4-5 packages and send every other day or send to different addresses.”

EMS declined to comment.

A Yuntu representative hung up the phone when contacted by the AP and did not reply to emails seeking comment. Soon after, the company’s website vanished.

Not all of the websites used to sell the drugs are based in China. At least six Chinese companies offering versions of fentanyl, including carfentanil, had IP addresses in the United States, hosted at U.S. commercial web providers, the AP found.

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“NOBODY WAS MOVING. THEY PUT THE PEOPLE THERE LIKE DOLLS”

In 2002, Russian special forces turned to carfentanil after a three-day standoff with Chechen separatists, who had taken more than 800 people hostage in a Moscow theater. They used an aerosol version of carfentanil, along with the less potent remifentanil, sending it through air vents, according to a paper by British scientists who tested clothing and urine samples from three survivors.

The strategy worked, but more than 120 hostages died from the effects of the chemicals.

Olga Dolotova, an engineer who survived the attack, remembers seeing white plumes descending before she lost consciousness. When she awoke, she found herself on a bus packed with bodies. “It was such a horror just to look at it,” she said. “Nobody was moving. They put the people there like dolls.”

The theater siege raised concerns about carfentanil as a tool of war or terrorism, and prompted the U.S. to develop strategies to counter its use, according to Weber, the former Defense Department chemical weapons expert.

The U.S., Russia, China, Israel, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and India are among the countries that have assessed carfentanil and related compounds for offensive or defensive applications, according to publicly available documents and academic studies.

“Countries that we are concerned about were interested in using it for offensive purposes,” Weber said. “We are also concerned that groups like ISIS could order it commercially.”

Weber considered a range of alarming scenarios, including the use of carfentanil to knock out and take troops hostage, or to kill civilians in a closed environment like a train station. He added that it is important to raise awareness about the threat from carfentanil trafficking.

“Shining sunlight on this black market activity should encourage Chinese authorities to shut it down,” he said.

Fentanyls also have been described as ideal tools for assassination — lethal and metabolized quickly so they leave little trace.

Agents from Israel’s secret intelligence service, Mossad, sprayed a substance believed to be a fentanyl analog into the ear of Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal as he walked down a street in Amman, Jordan, in a botched 1997 assassination attempt.

The U.S. began researching fentanyl as an incapacitating agent in the 1960s and, by the 1980s, government scientists were experimenting with aerosolized carfentanil on primates, according to Neil Davison, the author of “‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons” who now works at the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The U.S. says it is no longer developing such chemical agents. But two state-owned companies in China have marketed “narcosis” dart guns, according to Michael Crowley, project coordinator at the University of Bradford’s Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project. He said the ammunition “might very well be fentanyl or an analog of fentanyl,” adding that in the 1990s, the U.S. explored similar guns loaded with a form of fentanyl.

Among the problems with fentanyls is that the line between life and death is too thin.

“There is no incapacitating chemical agent that can be used in a tactical situation without extreme risk of injury or death to everybody in the room,” Crowley said.

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“HURRY TO BUY”

DEA officials say they are getting unprecedented cooperation from China in the fight against fentanyls, noting unusually deep information sharing in what can be a fractious bilateral relationship.

The DEA has “shared intelligence and scientific data” with Chinese authorities about controlling carfentanil, according to Russell Baer, a DEA special agent in Washington.

“I know China is looking at it very closely,” he said. “That’s been the subject of discussion in some of these high-level meetings.”

Last October, China added 116 synthetic drugs to its controlled substances list, which had a profound impact on global narcotics supply chains. Acetylfentanyl, for example, is a weaker cousin of carfentanil that China included on last year’s list of restricted substances. Six months later, monthly seizures of acetylfentanyl in the U.S. had plummeted by 60 percent, DEA data obtained by the AP shows.

Several vendors contacted in September were willing to export carfentanil, but refused to ship the far less potent acetylfentanyl. A Jilin Tely Import & Export Co. saleswoman offered carfentanil for $3,800 a kilogram, but wrote, with an apologetic happy face, that she couldn’t ship acetylfentanyl because it “is regulated by the government now.”

Contacted by the AP, the company said it had never shipped carfentanil to North America and had offered to sell it just “to attract the customer.”

Seven companies offered to sell acetylfentanyl despite the ban, however. Five offered fentanyl and two offered alpha-PVP, commonly known as flakka, which also are controlled substances in China.

Liu Feng, deputy general manager of Zhejiang Haiqiang Chemical Co., said his company sent a large order of carfentanil to India last year and has sold smaller amounts to trading companies in Shanghai. He said they also had put false labels on packages for customers.

“Everyone in the industry knows it,” he said. “But we just do not say it.”

Another company went out of its way to recommend acetylfentanyl. “Our customer feedback that the effect is also very good,” Wonder Synthesis emailed in broken English. The company says it has warehouses in the United States, Europe, Russia and India.

Wonder Synthesis did not respond to emails seeking comment and the phone number provided did not work. The AP visited its published address in Beijing and found a beauty parlor.

The problem with carfentanil is not limited to the United States. In late June, Canadian authorities seized a kilogram of carfentanil shipped from China in a box labelled printer accessories.

The powder contained 50 million lethal doses, according to the Canada Border Services Agency — more than enough to wipe out the entire population of the country. It was hidden inside bright blue cartridges labelled as ink for HP LaserJet printers. “Keep out of reach of children,” read the labels, in Chinese.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers in Vancouver sealed themselves inside hazmat suits, binding their wrists, ankles, zippers, and face masks with fat yellow tape. With large oxygen containers on their backs and chunky respirators, it looked as if they were preparing for a trip to the moon.

“Cocaine or heroin, we know what the purpose is,” said Allan Lai, an officer-in-charge at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Calgary, who is helping oversee the criminal investigation. “With respect to carfentanil, we don’t know why a substance of that potency is coming into our country.”

In August and September, high-level delegations of Chinese and U.S. drug enforcement authorities met to discuss joint efforts on synthetic opioids, but neither meeting produced any substantive announcement on carfentanil.

Nonetheless, some Chinese vendors are already bracing for a new wave of controls. In an email, Wonder Synthesis wrote, “If you need any chems, just hurry to buy.”