The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the United Kingdom’s (UK) National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) released a joint Technical Alert (TA) about malicious cyber activity carried out by the Russian Government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the Russian government as GRIZZLY STEPPE.
NCCIC encourages users and administrators to review the GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity page, which links to TA18-106A – Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices, for more information.
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Senator Tom Cotton: Our nation’s communications networks benefit us in ways unimaginable at the start of the digital age. But a potential danger lurks: hidden “backdoors” in network equipment. A hostile foreign power could use these backdoors to spy on Americans or attack our critical infrastructure by injecting viruses or launching denial-of-service attacks. These backdoors can be designed into routers, switches, and virtually any other type of telecommunications equipment that, together, make up our networks.
This highlights the importance of our networks’ supply chain—that is, the process by which telecommunications equipment is manufactured, sold, distributed, and installed. Whether the threat involves hacking into our nation’s communications networks or conducting industrial or political espionage at the behest of a foreign government, the integrity of the supply chain has worried U.S. government officials for years.
In 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released a bipartisan report on the national security threats posed by certain foreign manufacturers. This past year, Congress barred the Department of Defense from buying certain equipment and services from Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE on account of concerns about those companies’ connections to that country’s government. And Congress recently banned all federal agencies from using products or services made by Kaspersky Lab, a company with alleged ties to the Russian government.
We’re committed to protecting our national security, and this proposal is a prudent step to accomplish that goal.
But the supply-chain threat persists. Just this February, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified about “the risks of allowing any company or entity that is beholden to foreign governments that don’t share our values to gain positions of power inside our telecommunications networks.” These risks include the ability to “maliciously modify or steal information” and “conduct undetected espionage.” As the supply chain for our networks increasingly stretches beyond U.S. borders, this danger has become all too real.
Given the national security risks, we believe it’s time for more concerted federal action. Among other things, that means making sure that our government doesn’t make the problem worse by spending the American people’s money on products and services from any company that poses a national security threat to our communications networks.
The Federal Communications Commission is a good place to start. It regulates America’s communications networks. And it administers the Universal Service Fund, an almost $9 billion-per-year program designed to ensure that all Americans have access to phone and broadband services. The money in the Fund comes from fees paid by the American people on their phone bills. About $4.7 billion annually is spent expanding high-speed Internet access in rural communities; $2.7 billion helps connect schools and libraries to the Internet; $1.3 billion assists in making phone and broadband services more affordable to low-income Americans; and about $300 million supports communications services for rural health-care facilities. These are important programs. But there’s no reason one dime of this funding should go to suppliers that raise national security concerns. There are plenty of other providers we can use to help bridge the digital divide.
That’s why the FCC will vote on April 17 on Chairman Pai’s recent proposal to bar the use of universal service funding to buy equipment or services from any company that poses a national security threat to the integrity of our communications networks or the communications supply chain. If approved, the proposal would also seek public input on how we should identify suspect firms and which types of telecommunications equipment or services should fall within the prohibition. Everyone concerned about this issue will have a chance to weigh in.
Bottom line: We’re committed to protecting our national security, and this proposal is a prudent step to accomplish that goal. The FCC, Congress, and all government agencies must work together to safeguard the integrity of our communications supply chain. We strongly urge the full Commission to approve this proposal and for other agencies to follow the lead.
Category Archives: China aggression
What the Heck? Dept of Interior has Rookie IT People or What?
Is this a joke? Those computers had/have malware installed that was never detected even after that major OPM hack that forced the mainframes to communicate with Russia…..yes RUSSIA. So, here comes that Inspector General audit report. We are bleeding data, even classified data….So we have tech companies and social media operations that are not protecting or safeguarding our data, now for sure we have government that cant do it either…..
There was a hearing though…..ahem
In part from the audit report: This memorandum transmits the findings of our evaluation of the U.S . Departmentof the Interior’ s incident response program. We found that the Office of the ChiefInformation Officer had not fully implemented the capabilities recommended byNational Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) in its incident detectionand response program.We make 23 recommendations to help the Department improve its incident responseprogram , so it can promptly detect and full y contain cyber threats to maintain theavailability, confidentiality, and integrity of Department and bureau computersystems and data.In response to our draft report, the Department concurred with all recommendationsand provided target dates and officials responsible for implementation.We consider all 23 recommendations resolved but not implemented.We will forward the recommendations to the Office of Policy, Management andBudget for tracking and implementation. We understand that some of these recommendations may require significant investment in cyber security infrastructureas well as the recruitment of additional staff, but the intended timeframe to implementthese recommendations remains a concern.Five recommendations will not be addressed for more than 5 years, and four recommendations will not be addressed for more than 3 years.In the interim, the Department should consider additional temporary or partial solutions.
Three years after Chinese hackers stole security clearance files and other sensitive personal information of some 22 million U.S. federal employees, cyber-defenses at the Department of Interior, which hosted White House Office of Personnel Management (OPM) servers targeted in the theft, were still unable to detect “some of the most basic threats” inside Interior’s computer networks — including malware actively trying to make contact with Russia.
In a 16-month examination of Interior’s ability to detect and respond to cyber-threats, evaluators from the department’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) also discovered that Interior’s technicians simply did not implement a sweeping array of mandatory, government-wide defensive measures ordered up after the disastrous OPM hack, didn’t investigate blocked intrusion attempts, and left “multiple” compromised computers on their network “for months at a time,” according to a redacted OIG report issued in March.
Ultra-sensitive security clearance files have since been moved to the Defense Department, but, among other things, the OIG report noted that:
● sensitive data at Interior could be taken out of the department’s networks “without detection.”
● network logs showed that a computer at the U.S. Geological Survey, an Interior bureau, was regularly trying to communicate with computers in Russia. The messages were blocked, but “the USGS facilities staff did not analyze the alerts.”
● dangerous or inappropriate behavior by network users — including the downloading of pornography and watching pirated videos on Russian and Ukrainian websites — was not investigated.
● computers discovered to be infected with malware were scrubbed as soon as possible and put back into use—meaning little or no effort went into examining the scope and nature of any such threats to the broader network. This happened, the OIG team noted, with one intruder they discovered themselves.
● simulated intrusions or ransomware attacks created by the examiners were carried out with increasing blatancy without a response—in the case of ransomware, for nearly a month
● After the devastating OPM hack, which was discovered in April 2015, the department didn’t even publish a lessons-learned plan for its staffers based on the disaster. The OIG inspectors reported that Interior started to draft an “incident response plan” that month to deal with future intrusions, but “did not publish it until August 2017”— two months after the OIG team had finished their lengthy fieldwork.
● Distressingly, the report also notes that the department’s cybersecurity operations team was not privy to a list of Interior’s so-called “high-value IT assets” prepared by the Chief Information Officer, “due to its sensitive nature.” More here.
Foreign Espionage Spying on Cell Phones in Washington DC
There was an investigation and the report is complete…but who has it, where is it? Between the FBI, Secret Service, DHS, Capitol Police as well as other agencies…why the suspense? Why is it still going on?
In related reading, this site published in November of 2017: Surveillance: China’s Big Brother, America’s Also?
U.S. Suspects Cellphone Spying Devices in Washington
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (FRANK BAJAK)(AP) — For the first time, the U.S. government has publicly acknowledged the existence in Washington of what appear to be rogue devices that foreign spies and criminals could be using to track individual cellphones and intercept calls and messages.
The use of what are known as cellphone-site simulators by foreign powers has long been a concern, but American intelligence and law enforcement agencies — which use such eavesdropping equipment themselves — have been silent on the issue until now.
In a March 26 letter to Oregon Sen. Ron Wyden, the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that last year it identified suspected unauthorized cell-site simulators in the nation’s capital. The agency said it had not determined the type of devices in use or who might have been operating them. Nor did it say how many it detected or where.
The agency’s response, obtained by The Associated Press from Wyden’s office, suggests little has been done about such equipment, known popularly as Stingrays after a brand common among U.S. police departments. The Federal Communications Commission, which regulates the nation’s airwaves, formed a task force on the subject four years ago, but it never produced a report and no longer meets regularly.
The devices work by tricking mobile devices into locking onto them instead of legitimate cell towers, revealing the exact location of a particular cellphone. More sophisticated versions can eavesdrop on calls by forcing phones to step down to older, unencrypted 2G wireless technology. Some attempt to plant malware.
They can cost anywhere from $1,000 to about $200,000. They are commonly the size of a briefcase; some are as small as a cellphone. They can be placed in a car next to a government building. The most powerful can be deployed in low-flying aircraft.
Thousands of members of the military, the NSA, the CIA, the FBI and the rest of the national-security apparatus live and work in the Washington area. The surveillance-savvy among them encrypt their phone and data communications and employ electronic countermeasures. But unsuspecting citizens could fall prey.
Wyden, a Democrat, wrote DHS in November requesting information about unauthorized use of the cell-site simulators.
The reply from DHS official Christopher Krebs noted that DHS had observed “anomalous activity” consistent with Stingrays in the Washington area. A DHS official who spoke on condition of anonymity because the letter has not been publicly released added that the devices were detected in a 90-day trial that began in January 2017 with equipment from a Las Vegas-based DHS contractor, ESD America .
Krebs, the top official in the department’s National Protection and Programs Directorate, noted in the letter that DHS lacks the equipment and funding to detect Stingrays even though their use by foreign governments “may threaten U.S. national and economic security.” The department did report its findings to “federal partners” Krebs did not name. That presumably includes the FBI.
The CEO of ESD America, Les Goldsmith, said his company has a relationship with DHS but would not comment further.
Legislators have been raising alarms about the use of Stingrays in the capital since at least 2014, when Goldsmith and other security-company researchers conducted public sweeps that located suspected unauthorized devices near the White House, the Supreme Court, the Commerce Department and the Pentagon, among other locations.
The executive branch, however, has shied away from even discussing the subject.
Aaron Turner, president of the mobile security consultancy Integricell, was among the experts who conducted the 2014 sweeps, in part to try to drum up business. Little has changed since, he said.
Like other major world capitals, he said, Washington is awash in unauthorized interception devices. Foreign embassies have free rein because they are on sovereign soil.
Every embassy “worth their salt” has a cell tower simulator installed, Turner said. They use them “to track interesting people that come toward their embassies.” The Russians’ equipment is so powerful it can track targets a mile away, he said.
Shutting down rogue Stingrays is an expensive proposition that would require wireless network upgrades the industry has been loath to pay for, security experts say. It could also lead to conflict with U.S. intelligence and law enforcement.
In addition to federal agencies, police departments use them in at least 25 states and the District of Columbia, according to the American Civil Liberties Union.
Wyden said in a statement Tuesday that “leaving security to the phone companies has proven to be disastrous.” He added that the FCC has refused to hold the industry accountable “despite repeated warnings and clear evidence that our phone networks are being exploited by foreign governments and hackers.”
After the 2014 news reports about Stingrays in Washington, Rep. Alan Grayson, D-Fla, wrote the FCC in alarm. In a reply, then-FCC chairman Tom Wheeler said the agency had created a task force to combat illicit and unauthorized use of the devices. In that letter, the FCC did not say it had identified such use itself, but cited media reports of the security sweeps.
That task force appears to have accomplished little. A former adviser to Wheeler, Gigi Sohn, said there was no political will to tackle the issue against opposition from the intelligence community and local police forces that were using the devices “willy-nilly.”
“To the extent that there is a major problem here, it’s largely due to the FCC not doing its job,” said Laura Moy of the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown University. The agency, she said, should be requiring wireless carriers to protect their networks from such security threats and “ensuring that anyone transmitting over licensed spectrum actually has a license to do it.”
FCC spokesman Neil Grace, however, said the agency’s only role is “certifying” such devices to ensure they don’t interfere with other wireless communications, much the way it does with phones and Wi-Fi routers.
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Links:
DHS letter to Sen. Ron Wyden: http://apne.ws/eJ7JipM
DHS enclosure in letter to Sen. Ron Wyden: http://apne.ws/dBMPqWw
Cyberwar: The new Forever Battle, Indicators of Compromise
The United States is in the midst of the most resounding policy shift on cyber conflict, one with profound implications for national security and the future of the internet. The just-released U.S. Cyber Command “vision” accurately diagnoses the current state of cyber conflict and outlines an appropriate new operational model for the command: since cyber forces are in “persistent engagement” with one another, U.S. Cyber Command must dive into the fight, actively contesting adversaries farther forward and with more agility and operational partnerships.
The vision, however, ignores many of the risks and how to best address them. Most importantly, the vision does not even recognize the risk that more active defense – in systems and networks in other, potentially friendly nations – persistently, year after year, might not work and significantly increases the chances and consequences of miscalculations and mistakes. Even if they are stabilizing, such actions may be incompatible with the larger U.S. goals of an open and free Internet. More here including the critique of the report.
*** Meanwhile we know all too well about Russia and China’s cyber espionage, yet when proof surfaces by hacking into their documents for evidence….both countries begin another denial session. And Trump invited Putin to a bi-lateral meeting at the White House? Any bi-lateral meeting should take place outside the United States in a neutral location like Vanuatu or the Canary Islands….
TheTimes: Russian attempts to fuel dissent and spread disinformation have been exposed by a cache of leaked documents that show what the Kremlin is prepared to pay for hacking, propaganda and rent-a-mob rallies.
Hacked emails sent by Moscow-linked figures outline a dirty-tricks campaign in Ukraine, which was invaded on the orders of President Putin in 2014. Experts said that they exposed the dangers faced by Britain and its allies because Russia used the same weapons of disinformation, bribery and distortion to attack the West.
Bob Seely, a Tory MP and expert on Russian warfare, said his analysis of the leaks, which comprise thousands of emails and a password-protected document related to the conflict in Ukraine, revealed a “shopping list of subversion”.
“There is overwhelming evidence that the tools and techniques of Russian covert conflict are being used in and against the UK, the US and the EU,” he added. “In the wake of the Skripal poisoning it’s more important than ever that we understand these methods.”
The cost and extent of tactics were disclosed in a third tranche of the so-called Surkov leaks, named after Vladislav Surkov, a Kremlin spin-master said by some to be Mr Putin’s Rasputin.
Two previous tranches, published online by Ukrainian Cyber Alliance, a hacker activist collective, were said to include emails from an account linked to Mr Surkov. He has been closely involved with the management of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, two Russian-controlled “statelets” in Ukraine established by pro-Moscow separatists.
The latest publication appears to contain emails found in accounts linked to Inal Ardzinba, Mr Surkov’s first deputy, and to a Ukrainian Communist party leader. They suggest that the Kremlin paid local groups and individuals in Ukraine that were willing to advance its aim to fracture the country.
One set of correspondence from October 2014, which appears to have been sent by a Russian politician to Mr Ardzinba, contained proposals to fund cyberoperations, including hacking email accounts for between $100 and $300. A wider plan to “troll opponents”, “demotivate enemies” on social media, and amass the personal data of targeted individuals in Ukraine’s second largest city, Kharkiv, was priced at $130,500.
The Russian foreign ministry has denied in the past that Mr Ardzinba has had anything to do with propaganda in Ukraine. According to Mr Seely, the leaks appear to reveal plans to plant new historical and philosophical ideas. The emails also include an event and two books that would claim that an area of Ukraine had Russian heritage.
Other proposals included the orchestration of anti-Ukraine, pro-Russia rallies. These involved the transport of “sportsmen” trained in martial arts to agitate at the rallies, bribes to local media to feature the protests and bribes to police to turn a blind eye. A month of rallies in Kharkiv was priced at $19,200. It included 100 participants, three organisers and two lawyers. It is unclear if the rallies took place, though others orchestrated by the Kremlin did happen, the research said. Moves to get 30 ex-communist figures elected to local government were floated in June 2015, at $120,460, the leaks said.
The Kremlin has claimed in the past that the Surkov leaks are fabricated and in the information war between Ukraine and Russia falsehoods may have been planted. However, the authors of correspondence in the first two tranches confirmed their authenticity. They were supported by the Atlantic Council, an international affairs think tank, after an analysis of metadata.
In their analysis of the third tranche, Mr Seely and his co-researcher Alya Shandra, managing editor of an English-language Ukrainian news website, say the leaks are “very likely to be authentic”. Ms Shandra and Mr Seely plan to publish their report with the Royal United Services Institute.
Peter Quentin, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said: “There is no reason to believe these leaks are any less credible than the previous tranches. This third tranche certainly seems to fit with the trend of well-documented subversion by Russian activists in the region.”
China and Russia Military Collaboration Against the West
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A dedicated electronic warfare (EW) version of the Shenyang J-16 fighter completed its maiden flight on December 18 last year. The first images of the aircraft — sometimes described as the J-16D or even J-16G — reveal several changes compared to the standard J-16 fighter-bomber: most obviously, two large EW pods on the wingtips that are very similar in appearance to the AN/ALQ-218 tactical jamming receivers used by the Boeing EA-18G Growler. The aircraft also features a new, shorter radome and the standard 30mm cannon and the optical sensor in front of the starboard side of the windshield have been removed. In addition, several conformal dielectric EW arrays can be seen around the fuselage, front section (behind the radome), and intakes. Photo
In the wake of Russia’s demonstrations of advanced electromagnetic spectrum and communications jamming capabilities, most recently displayed in their incursion into Ukraine, China also is upping its game in this space, demonstrating similar capabilities in the Pacific.The U.S. Department of Defense, in an annual report to Congress on China’s military and security developments, assessed that the country is placing greater importance upon EW, on par with traditional domains of warfare such as air, ground and maritime.
“The [People’s Liberation Army] sees EW as an important force multiplier, and would likely employ it in support of all combat arms and services during a conflict,” the 2016 report asserts. “The PLA’s EW units have conducted jamming and anti-jamming operations, testing the military’s understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and performance. This helped improve the military’s confidence in conducting force-on-force, real-equipment confrontation operations in simulated EW environments.”
According to the report, China’s EW weapons include “jamming equipment against multiple communication and radar systems and GPS satellite systems. EW systems are also being deployed with other sea- and air-based platforms intended for both offensive and defensive operations.”More here.
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Moscow sold Beijing, “export versions of the Su-27 and Su-30 fighter, the S-300 SAM defense system, Sovermennyy-class guided missile destroyer, and Kilo-class diesel-electric submarine,” the report said, citing data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Fears of China copying Russian systems led to a drop off in arms sales between the two countries – especially higher end weapon systems. Chinese arms manufactures are notorious for taking, modifying and reproducing weapon designs. More here.
Russia and China are planning to merge their satellite tracking systems, RT.com is reporting.
The giant system will be able to cover most of an area including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan. according to RT, the Russian-funded news outlet.
The two nations will reportedly negotiate terms of the merger in May during a conference in China.
Russia and China will be able to share data on positions of navigation satellite groups and to improve efficiency in a real-time environment, RT reported.
The merger was initiated by Chinese officials.
“If the project is implemented, it will allow for an improvement in accuracy for both systems,” a spokesman for the Russian Federal Space Agency, Roscosmos was quoted.
Japan and India are getting set for their own regional navigation satellite systems, RT reported. The system is expected to be operational by the end of the year.