Migrants linked to 69,000 would-be or actual crimes in Germany

Inviting in people of unknown backgrounds under the banner of humanitarian objectives is a dangerous policy, when innocent citizens are victims. This is occurring in the United States with wild abandon, yet apathy reigns and there are no real grass-roots efforts to demand and restore order or security.

Even if cases go to court, the judicial systems in Europe and in the United States render feeble sentences which is worse and almost no one is deported. Discretionary application of the law for the sake of an alleged culture, humanity and for refugee/asylum conditions with grow instability, clog and corrupt processes and cause illness or death.

Below, in the case of Germany the publication of this condition translate to a situation that is likely worse than actually being reported especially when Merkel had control over a media blackout.

Migrants linked to 69,000 would-be or actual crimes in Germany in first three months of 2016: police

Reuters: Migrants in Germany committed or tried to commit some 69,000 crimes in the first quarter of 2016, according to a police report that could raise unease, especially among anti-immigrant groups, about Chancellor Angela Merkel’s liberal migrant policy.

Immigrants are escorted by German police to a registration centre, after crossing the Austrian-German border in Wegscheid near Passau, Germany, October 20, 2015. REUTERS/Michael Dalder

There was a record influx of more than a million migrants into Germany last year and concerns are now widespread about how Europe’s largest economy will manage to integrate them and ensure security.

The report from the BKA federal police showed that migrants from northern Africa, Georgia and Serbia were disproportionately represented among the suspects.

Absolute numbers of crimes committed by Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis – the three biggest groups of asylum seekers in Germany – were high but given the proportion of migrants that they account for, their involvement in crimes was “clearly disproportionately low”, the report said.

It gave no breakdown of the number of actual crimes and of would-be crimes, nor did it state what percentage the 69,000 figure represented with respect to the total number of crimes and would-be crimes committed in the first three months of 2016.

The report stated that the vast majority of migrants did not commit any crimes.

It is the first time the BKA has published a report on crimes committed by migrants containing data from all of Germany’s 16 states, so there is no comparable data.

The report showed that 29.2 percent of the crimes migrants committed or tried to commit in the first quarter were thefts, 28.3 percent were property or forgery offences and 23 percent offences such as bodily harm, robbery and unlawful detention.

Drug-related offences accounted for 6.6 percent and sex crimes accounted for 1.1 percent.

In Cologne at New Year, hundreds of women said they were groped, assaulted and robbed, with police saying the suspects were mainly of North African and Arab appearance. Prosecutors said last week three Pakistani men seeking asylum in Germany were under investigation after dozens of women said they were sexually harassed at a music festival.

The number of crimes committed by migrants declined by more than 18 percent between January and March, however, according to the report.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi = 1 Barack Obama = 0

The truth is that Barack Obama continues to tell us and the world that ISIL (as he calls them) is NOT Islamic, but rather a JV team of rag tag militants…..but here is the deal, the leader of Islamic State has a PhD and we don’t even really know what Barack has…

While many don’t want to understand the historical Islamic threat as it is for sure convoluted and quite a long teaching moment, the enemy does use it as a weapon and since it is historical and is a disgusting religious culture, countries in the West just don’t know how to create a strategy and defeat this non-state, non-country caliphate.

Consider, even IF ISIS is defeated in either Libya, Syria or Iraq, at this point the war goes on, their platform is planted around the globe so the fight could be a forever fight. The tactics of the enemy may change but it is important to understand the dynamics and fluid enemy strategy as it not exclusive to a battlefield in Fallujah, Raqqah or Mosul or Sirte or Sa’ana in Yemen.

Meanwhile the text below is the creed of Islamic State and there are important factors to understand not only as citizens, voters but as well demand more from a new regime in the White House in 2017.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the implications for domestic security and stability are very important. If you question the focus, keep in mind San Bernardino, Paris and Brussels.

   

A Self-Profile Of The Islamic State: The Creedal Document

By: Prof. Ella Landau-Tasseron*

MEMRI: In 2015, the Islamic State (ISIS) released a document titled “These Are Our Creeds and Ways.” The document is a self-profile of the Islamic State, presenting the organization’s basic theology and political ideology. It deals with topics that have occupied Muslim minds for generations, yet it also reflects modern and local conditions and phenomena. An examination of its contents reveals that ISIS adds nothing new to traditional Islamic dogmas except for making the return of the caliphate a mandatory article of faith. It is firmly based on Islamic sources, which it cites often, and much of its content is identical to Islamic conservative Hanbali and neo-Hanbali doctrines.

For the full text of Prof. Landau-Tasseron’s paper, click here.

 

The following is the full text of the report.

Introduction

In 2002 Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi established a jihadi group in Iraq called Monotheism and Jihad. In 2004 he pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and renamed his group “Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” thus apparently merging it with Al-Qaeda. After Al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006, his followers renamed the group “The Islamic State in Iraq,” without bin Laden’s approval. This ostensive state was not proclaimed a caliphate, but its leader, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, was referred to as “The Commander of the Faithful,” a term usually applied to the caliph. This first version of the Islamic State was almost annihilated by 2010. It recuperated, however, and in June 2014 the group reestablished the state, this time explicitly declaring it to be it a caliphate. This second version was at first called The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS; in Arabic: dawlat al-Islam fi al-Iraq wal-Sham, abbreviated as Daesh, and also translated as The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, ISIL). Later the name was changed to The Islamic State (dawlat al-Islam), in accordance with the organization’s rejection of the concept of nation states – though others continue to refer to the organization as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh (this report will use the name ISIS). Ibrahim Awwad, then head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, was appointed as the Islamic State’s first caliph. Upon assuming the title he took the name Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Al-Huseini Al-Qurashi.[1]

During the period in which Al-Zarqawi cooperated with Al-Qaeda (October 2004 – June 2006), his movement posted a short document on its website signed by “The High Command and the Legal Committee of Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (i.e. Iraq).” This document set out the main creeds and doctrines of the combined Monotheism and Jihad/Al-Qaeda organization.[2]

In 2015 – by which time the political scene in Iraq and Syria had changed considerably – ISIS republished the document with small modifications under the title “These Are Our Creeds and Ways.” Released by ISIS’s publishing house, Maktabat Al-Himma, it was posted on the Internet and apparently also distributed in print.[3] One of the online copies is subtitled “Ahl al-sunna wa-jama’a madha ya’taqidun wa-bi-madha yu’minun?” (“What are the creeds and beliefs of the People who follow the Prophet’s Customs and adhere to the Community?”).  The term ahl al-sunna wa-jama’a has always denoted orthodox Sunni Islam. This subtitle thus identifies the Islamic State’s Islam as the genuine form of the religion.

The following report summarizes and analyzes the 2015 version of the creedal document, with occasional references to the earlier version. (For the full Arabic text of the 2015 document, see the Appendix at the end of this paper, following the Endnotes).

The document comprises 36 paragraphs (unnumbered in the original), appearing in a somewhat haphazard order. The opening paragraph delineates the boundaries of the community of believers, as follows: members are those who believe in absolute monotheism and the mission of the Prophet Muhammad, and meet all the requirements that ensue from this belief. Whoever fails to fully meet any of these requirements is an unbeliever, even if they proclaim themselves to be Muslims.

The next 35 paragraphs define the requirements that one must meet in order to be considered a Muslim, mostly in the form of mandatory creeds (as opposed to specific duties that must be performed by the believers). The requirements fall in two basic categories: theological and political. The first category involves articles of faith that relate to the concept of monotheism and the divine message, and to eschatology. The second involves principles relating to sources of authority, leadership, jihad, internal cohesion, the nature of faith and conditions for the accusation of unbelief (takfir). This is not to say that the religious/political distinction is a sharp one. “Politics” in Islam is informed by religion: the sources of authority are the sacred texts; internal cohesion is a religious obligation, and so is jihad, and the conditions for takfir define the transgressors against the religion, who must be fought. Conversely, some of the theological articles of faith have political implications. For example, within the category of eschatology the document mentions belief in the return of the caliphate. This tenet implies that believers owe allegiance to the Islamic State.

Theology: Monotheism And The Divine Message

Debates about the concept of monotheism have raged among Muslims since the first centuries of Islam. Rationalists who were later referred to as the Mu’tazila movement raised several questions pertaining to monotheism. For example, how should a believer interpret Koranic idioms such as “Allah sees,” “Allah’s hand,” etc., which are anthropomorphisms and might therefore be seen as impairing absolute monotheism? Another problem was presented by the belief, widely-held among Muslims, that the Koran is uncreated: this belief implies the existence of an eternal (because uncreated) entity besides Allah. Regarding the first question, the rationalists concluded that the attributes should not be taken literally, and regarding the second they concluded that the Koran was created by Allah. Yet another major issue related to Allah’s justice, namely, predestination versus free will. If Allah decrees everything, this must include human actions. But then how can He punish humans for committing sins and reward them for doing good? The rationalists concluded that man is free to choose his own actions.

The Mu’tazila’s opponents rejected these rationalist positions, and some of them attempted to resolve the conundrums using various intricate formulations. Regarding the issue of Allah’s attributes, for example, it was suggested that at least some of them must be taken as metaphorical. The traditionalists, however, insisted on accepting the attributes as real and avoiding any attempt to apply human understanding to them. This was the position of many renowned medieval scholars, among them Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1348), the main authority for the neo-Hanbali school as well as for modern radical Muslims. ISIS adopts Ibn Taymiyya’s position, citing him verbatim (par. 2 of the document). Ibn Taymiyya’s formula alludes to the old controversies by emphasizing that Allah’s attributes must be taken literally, “without allegorical or figurative interpretation and without voiding them of their content” (min ghayr takyif wa-la tamthil wa-la tawil wa-la ta’til).[4]

Taking a similar approach to the question of the Koran, Ibn Taymiyya argued that it, too, is part of Allah’s attributes. As quoted in the document (par. 5), he wrote that the Koran “is Allah’s words, part of His attributes, uncreated, both its letters and its meanings.” By avoiding the word “eternal,” Ibn Taymiyya’s formula circumvents the implication that there is an eternal entity besides Allah (the Koran).[5] The angels have been yet another challenge to logic, and the ISIS document adopts the conservative position, asserting that they exist and that love for them is a sign of true faith (par. 4). As for predestination and free will, ISIS adopts a complicated formula that retains both Allah’s omnipotence and omniscience and human free will, without really resolving the paradox. According to this formula, Allah decrees everything, the will is His and His alone, He creates all human actions, and humans are free to choose their course of action if Allah chooses to allow this. In all of this He is just and compassionate (par. 9).

Being just, Allah has sent His message to humanity from the beginning of time. The document repeats the essential Muslim creed that Allah sent many prophets, the first being Adam and the last being Muhammad, whose message must be believed and obeyed by all humans (par. 3, 6).

Theology: Eschatology

Eschatological texts (i.e., texts discussing the afterlife and the end of days) in the Koran and Prophetical statements (hadith), and in other works by Muslims, comprise a vast corpus that allows for many different interpretations. That said, belief in certain eschatological themes was considered an indication of genuine faith from the very beginning of Islam. Moreover, the Last Judgment is presented in the Koran as the major incentive to repent and to believe in Allah and the Prophet.[6] The tribulations of the grave, the Last Day, the Resurrection, the Bridge leading to the final gathering place, the portents of the Hour, the Savior (Mahdi) who will rule justly before the Hour, the return of Jesus, prophet of Allah, who will break all the crosses and slay the evil false messiah (dajjal) – all of these and many other elements have been broadly accepted by Muslims as essential creeds. The view that whoever disbelieves in them is an unbeliever has been widespread. There are, however, many eschatological prophecies that did not become creedal, as well as eschatological elements whose creedal status is still debated.[7]

Muslims have debated the chronology of the eschatological events, as well as many details – and the reality – of the eschatological descriptions. For example, what are the respective roles of Jesus and the Mahdi? And is the resurrection in fact body-and soul? Are the pleasures of Heaven and tortures of Hell to be understood literally or figuratively? As with the issue of monotheism, the conservatives tended to understand the descriptions literally, whereas the rationalists did not.[8] Modern Muslims add new perspectives to the discussions. Some attempt to provide scientific explanations for apocalyptic descriptions, whereas others identify modern realities with eschatological events. The latter phenomenon peaked following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and again after the “Arab Spring” in 2011.[9]

The ISIS creedal document avoids alluding to controversies in eschatological matters. It merely repeats the main Sunni eschatological creeds (pars. 10-14), with one important addition: “We believe in the return of Jesus who will rule justly, and we believe in the return of the Righteous Caliphate (al-khilafa al-rashida), modelled on the practices of the Prophet” (par. 12).

The return of Jesus (and/or the Mahdi), who will rule justly, has long been an essential dogma; the return of the caliphate, however, has never been one.

Throughout Islamic history, claimants to power, and whole dynasties, identified themselves with prophecies about the Savior – the Mahdi – in order to gain legitimacy and win the hearts of the masses. The most famous of these were the Abbasids (749-1258), the Fatimids (909-1171) and the Almohads (1130-1269) – and in modern times, the Mahdi of Sudan and Ghulam Ahmad of India. Although they all propagated apocalyptic ideas, the return of the Righteous Caliphate never became an article of faith. The modern dream of reestablishing the caliphate apparently emerged after the demise of the Ottoman Empire (1924),[10] but did not become dogma. The Islamic State, which claims to have realized this dream, elevated the status of the caliphate by turning it into dogma.

The Islamic State makes the connection between the caliphate and eschatology not only in the creedal document but in other texts as well. As part of this, ISIS scholars occasionally cite an enigmatic prediction attributed to the Prophet, recorded as early as the 9th century: “There will be after me twelve rulers (or caliphs), all of them from the tribe of Quraysh.”[11] Pre-modern attempts to explain this prophecy usually applied it to past events, deliberating who the twelve caliphs might have been (the Rashidun and some of the Umayyads, etc.). In other words, the explanations of the twelve-ruler tradition mostly involved retrojection, namely attempts to prove that the Prophet foresaw events that came after him, such as the decline of the Umayyads and advent of the Abbasids, the internecine wars, the revolt of the Zanj in Iraq in the 9th century, and so forth. The idea of a renewed caliphate in the future was marginal in the explanations of this tradition. By the 10th century, the twelve-ruler tradition was relegated to the status of “forged” and was rarely cited, whereas the dogma of the Mahdi who will rule justly retained its status.[12] The fate of the twelve-ruler tradition changed in modern times, when it received truly eschatological interpretations.

Even before the Islamic State, jihadists cited the twelve-ruler hadith as referring to a future caliphate, and also cited other Prophetic predictions referring to this. However, as a rule, they relegated the renewed caliphate to some unknown point in the future, seeing it as the culmination of a process of unification and consolidation of Muslim power. Contemporary Muslim apocalyptic literature sometimes contends that the Mahdi himself will establish the new caliphate.[13]

Challenging this view of the caliphate as a distant and perhaps eschatological vision, the Islamic State announced that the Caliphate has returned in the here and now, as tangible and present reality.[14] Moreover, ISIS accords the belief in the caliphate the status of an article of faith, which it never had. In the creedal document this is expressed by mentioning this belief in conjunction with a long-established creed, namely, the return of Jesus. The political implication of this newly-added creed is obvious: Whoever disbelieves in the Caliphate is an unbeliever on a par with those who disbelieve in basic eschatological events such as the return of Jesus, the Last Day, the portents of the Hour, etc.

The return of the Righteous Caliphate was already presented as dogma in the early version of the creedal document, issued by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, namely by Al-Zarqawi during his period of cooperation with Al-Qaeda (2004-2006). As a matter of fact, Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda’s leaders were divided on the matter of the caliphate. Al-Zarqawi had aspired to establish a caliphate since his arrival in Iraq in 2002. Bin Laden and Zawahiri, however, did not make the establishment of a caliphate a first priority. On the contrary, Al-Qaeda warned against this at the time, arguing that the conditions were not ripe for a caliphate to be established. When the “Islamic State in Iraq” was first announced (in October 2006), it was not explicitly called a “caliphate,” though its head was referred to by the regnal title “Commander of the Faithful.” Bin Laden and Zawahiri firmly refused to recognize the state as a caliphate.[15] Accordingly, the paragraph about the caliphate in the earlier creedal document may be understood as expressing hopes for establishing a caliphate in the future – thus reflecting the ambition of Zarqawi and his followers, but also the reservations of Al-Qaeda about a caliphate in the here and now.

Only the second reincarnation of the Islamic State, established in June 2014 and headed by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, came fully into the open as a self-proclaimed caliphate. Interestingly, its creedal document retains the original paragraph about the caliphate, which presents it as a vision for the future. Apparently this article is now meant to convey that the current caliphate is the righteous one promised by apocalyptic traditions. Indeed, the Islamic State goes to great lengths to prove that it is a “caliphate molded upon the Prophetic rule and customs.” This line of propaganda should be understood in the context of the criticism and de-legitimation directed against ISIS by the majority of Muslim circles, including jihadist movements and scholars.[16] In addition, keeping the caliphate in the realm of eschatological creeds, even though it has been established in reality, lends the ISIS regime an attractive transcendental aura.

Politics: Sources Of Authority

Traditionally, the sources of authority in Islam are the Koran; the model presented by the Prophet as embodied in the Hadith literature; the consensus of the scholars (ijma); and experts’ conclusions derived by deduction (qiyas) and by considering the public good (maslaha). “Consensus” was understood as the opinions prevalent within a school of jurisprudence, or the points of agreement among major early jurists. The validity of qiyas and maslaha was debated and so was the status of the Hadith. On the one hand the Hadith explained and completed the Koranic teachings, which were often unclear. On the other, it was known that much of the Hadith was fabricated. Furthermore, a problem was presented by cases where the Koran and the Hadith seemed to disagree. Already at the end of the 7th century CE many scholars solved this problem by contending that “the Sunna (as embodied in the Hadith) was the judge of the Koran and not vice versa.”[17] But the problem remained how to choose between the differing and sometimes contradictory hadiths. The Muslims developed mechanisms for distinguishing between true and false hadiths, but these were far from foolproof. Scholars continued to disagree on the authenticity of hadiths and therefore also on matters based on these hadiths.

For ISIS, the Prophet’s authenticated practices (sunna) and statements, as recorded in the Hadith literature, have absolute authority. They consider the Hadith to be “a second revelation,” on a par with the Koran (par. 7). Shari’a laws must be derived exclusively from the Koran and the Hadith; no place is accorded by ISIS to the other traditional Islamic sources of law, namely qiyas, maslaha and ijma’. Admittedly, the first two of these have often been contested, but ijma’ has always had pride of place in Sunni law-derivation.

ISIS thus adopts the standard Salafi formulation, which recognizes as sources of authority only the Koran and the authenticated hadiths as understood by the salaf, i.e., the three first generations of Muslims (par. 23). The fact that Salafis disagree among themselves even on major issues attests to the problematic nature of this position. The problem stems from the fact that even authenticated hadiths are debatable: not everyone accepts the validity of the authentication. In addition, even authenticated hadiths, as well as the interpretations of the salaf, contain plenty of inconsistencies and contradictions.

Politics: Leadership 

The second basic tenet of Islam (after monotheism) is belief in the mission and the leadership of Muhammad. He was the last of the prophets, but as the leader of the community he was succeeded by the caliphs. In line with these tenets, the document affirms that Muhammad is a universal prophet and that every person must believe in him, follow his teachings, obey him in everything, love him and respect him. The Prophet’s family must also be loved and respected, though without exaggeration. As for the Prophet’s Companions, they must be respected without reservation, and their internecine wars must be passed over in silence (par. 3, 8).

The document states further that, once a leader is nominated, the community must accept and obey him even if he is known or suspected to be a sinner, or if he is mastur al-hal (“his condition is unknown”). Only if the leader is known to be an unbeliever must he be deposed and replaced by a righteous leader (par. 24, 29, 32).

These principles of ISIS are deeply rooted in the Sunni tradition. Love for the Prophet’s family “without exaggeration” has always been a hallmark of Sunni Islam. Sunnis regard this as a characteristic which differentiates them from the Shi’a: Sunnis love and respect the family of the Prophet (ahl al-bayt), whereas Shi’ites revere them excessively. The other side of the same coin is the attitude towards Muhammad’s Companions, the Sahaba. Supporters of the Shi’a denounce most of the Sahaba on the grounds that they were to blame for usurping the caliphate from Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son in law.[18] In response, veneration of the Sahaba became an article of faith for the Sunnis at least as early as the 9th century. By all accounts, most of the Companions sinned by participating in the internecine wars after the Prophet’s death, and the Shi’a hold this fact against them; the Sunnis, however, expressly disregard or explain away this sin.[19] It may be added that the Sunnis had no alternative but to respect the Companions, because they were the transmitters of Muhammad’s legacy (sunna) to the following generations. The Shi’a did not need the Companions for this purpose because they relied on the imams, namely the descendants of the Prophet, for information about Muhammad’s legacy.

The requirement to obey a leader even if he is a sinner is a traditional Sunni principle, inspired by fear of rebellion and of internecine wars.[20] The classical formulation of this rule (cited verbatim in par. 24) is that one may perform the ritual prayer behind any imam (leader), be he a righteous person, a sinner, or an unknown quantity in terms of the sincerity of his belief or his moral integrity.[21] In the ISIS context, the stipulation regarding “unknown condition” (mastur al-hal) may also refer to states of uncertainty, as happened in March 2015 when Al-Baghdadi was reportedly injured in an airstrike and the believers had no way of knowing the state of his health.

Politics: Internal Cohesion

Internal cohesion has been a religious obligation from the inception of Islam, as was the prohibition on internecine wars. Accordingly, the document praises solidarity among Muslims and denounces disunity and disagreement among them (par. 32). It emphasizes that all the Muslims form one community and that Arabs and non-Arab Muslims are equal, surpassing one another only in the degree of their religious devotion. When it comes to the matter of granting protection to non-Muslims on behalf of the Muslim community (dhimma, or aman), the highest Muslim official and the lowest-ranking Muslim are equally authorized to do so (par. 35). The lives, property and dignity of Muslims are inviolable “except as made licit by Allah and the Prophet” (par. 26). The Muslims must unite under one banner (par. 34). Issues that may be subject to reasoning (and therefore to disagreements) must not be the cause of mutual denunciation (par. 32, 33). Adherents of all religion except Islam are unbelievers whom the Muslims must fight (par. 36). The establishment of an Islamic caliphate is a communal obligation incumbent upon all Muslims; obedience to the nominated caliph is mandatory and rebellion is forbidden, according to the Prophet’s statement, “Whoever dies without having pledged allegiance to a caliph dies as one who has never converted to Islam” (par. 32).

All the stipulations in this document regarding solidarity, the obligation to establish a caliphate, the ban on rebellion and the duty to fight the enemies of Allah derive from classical Sunni jurisprudence. Some expressions in the document are taken verbatim from Ibn Taymiyya.[22] The purpose of the classical scholars in making these stipulations was to safeguard the Muslim identity and avoid chaos. The principle of equality is also taken verbatim from the Koran and the Hadith.[23]  As for the adherents of other religions, classical Islam tolerated them as submissive-protected communities under Islam (dhimma). In practice, the Islamic State does too, but the creedal document does not mention this possibility, labelling all non-Muslims as unbelievers who must be fought.[24]

The statement that Muslims are inviolable “except as made licit by Allah and the Prophet” in fact belongs to the issue of takfir (on which see below). It is vague enough to be subject to various interpretations. This means that the alleged inviolability of all Muslims may be set aside at the discretion of the Islamic State leaders and officials, as has in fact been amply proven by ISIS’s actions and practices.[25]

Politics: Jihad

Pre-modern Muslim jurists generally agreed that jihad must be waged in order to “make Allah’s word supreme,” that is, in order to make the Shari’a prevail wherever possible. They also agreed that Jihad must be declared and led only by a Muslim ruler or his representative, unless it is in defense of the life and property of Muslims. This pre-modern Sunni consensus on jihad disintegrated under the impact of modern circumstances and international doctrines and laws.[26] The result is a heated and ongoing debate among Muslims about the interpretation of jihad, its necessity, and many details of its implementation.

According to the ISIS creedal document, jihad must be carried out by means of both propaganda and weapons. War against Allah’s enemies is obligatory under all circumstances: with or without the permission of a nominated leader, and even single-handedly, especially if Islamic values are under attack. Propagating a religion other than Islam or insulting Islam are belligerent acts that obligate fighting the perpetrators (par. 25, 27, 30, 31). However, fighting renegades is more important than fighting unbelievers (par. 28).

The ISIS document thus blurs all distinctions and calls for a total war not only against unbelievers but also against non-ISIS Muslims. It does not mention any of the modern controversies concerning jihad.

Politics: The Nature Of Faith And The Conditions For The Accusation Of Unbelief (Takfir)

Muslims have debated the nature of faith since the beginning of theological deliberations in the 8th century CE. Some held that proper Islamic faith required belief in the heart, declaration with the tongue, and acts with the limbs, i.e. performance of the religious obligations. They also held that there were degrees of faith: “faith may increase and decrease,” as they put it; that is, one may be a better or a lesser Muslim – depending on one’s obedience or disobedience to Islamic law. Others held that there were no degrees of faith – one was either a Muslim or a disbeliever – and that performance of the religious obligations was not a necessary condition for being considered a Muslim. This means that belief in the heart and the declaration of faith suffice to make one a Muslim. In fact, both positions were accepted by classical Sunnism, but the more fervent and conservative scholars favored the first. Ibn Taymiyya, the main authority for neo-Hanbalism as well as for modern radical Muslims, argued that the position which excludes acts from the requirements of faith was in fact heretical, not Sunni.[27]

ISIS adopts the stricter position. The document states that being a Muslim requires belief in the heart, speech (that is, a declaration of faith), and acts, and there are different degrees of faith, depending on how closely a Muslim obeys the Shari’a. (par. 15)

The other side of the same coin is the conditions for the accusation of unbelief. In other words, when does one cease to be a Muslim? If one fails to perform all or some of the religious obligations, or violates Islamic prohibitions, does one become a renegade?

The matter was and continues to be hotly debated among Muslims because of the dire consequences of reneging from Islam: renegades must repent or be killed. Some 7th-8th century extremists (certain parts of the Khawarij movement) considered Muslim sinners to be unbelievers, but most Muslims have rejected this attitude and considered these Khawarij to be heretical. Various formulations were composed that, generally speaking, avoid takfir as far as possible (as opposed to the position of the abovementioned Khawarij). Even ISIS scholars, though they are extremist by the standards of the rest of the world (including Al-Qaeda), explicitly distance themselves from the fanatical Khawarij and from “extremists” (ghulat, par. 16).

The ISIS document stipulates that a Muslim forfeits the faith and becomes a renegade only if he or she abandons belief in monotheism and the Prophet, or fails to perform the ritual prayer, or commits sins while considering these sins to be licit. Committing sin (without considering it licit) does not in itself put a Muslim beyond the pale of Islam, nor does the omission of certain obligations, because the Islamic faith comprises many elements (shu’ba), not all of which are requisite for being considered a Muslim (par. 15-16).[28] According to the document, whoever appears to be a Muslim must be treated as one, unless he or she is involved in something that contradicts Islam (nawaqid al-Islam). Certain conditions and judicial processes are needed in order to establish an accusation of unbelief against individual Muslims (takfir al-muayyan) (par. 17, 19). At the same time, the document states that the Shi’a are all unbelievers, as well as everyone who adheres to a religion other than Islam (par. 18, 20). Countries governed by infidel governments are “the abode of unbelief” (dar kufr), but their inhabitants are not necessarily all unbelievers (par. 21).

All of these stipulations concerning takfir are characteristic Hanbali and neo-Hanbali positions, often cited verbatim in the document.[29] Muhammad bin Abd Al-Wahhab composed a list of ten nawaqid al-Islam.[30] Ibn Taymiyya in particular promoted the distinction between unbelief in the abstract sense, that is, the heretical doctrines themselves, and the proclamation of a specific individual as an unbeliever (takfir al-mu’ayyan).[31] The latter requires meeting certain conditions and carrying out a judicial process of proof. Its purported consequence is that no punitive measures may be taken against a renegade until his or her status as such has been proven. It should be noted that abandoning Allah and the Prophet, omitting the act of prayer, and considering sins as licit are not the only ways to forfeit the faith.[32] Thus, for example, Ibn Taymiyya considered the widely-practiced custom of venerating saints to be an expression of unbelief. Accordingly the ISIS document stipulates that whoever is involved in “anything that contradicts Islam” is an unbeliever (par. 19), and that “whoever fails to meet all the conditions and requirements [of monotheism] or infringes upon it in any way” (par. 1) is an unbeliever. However, the document does not specify precisely what “the conditions and requirements” of monotheism are, the result being that the statement “whoever pronounces the proclamation of faith and shows himself to be a Muslim must be treated as one” (par. 19) is rendered meaningless. Without specific rules regarding the tests of faith, the criteria employed in a judicial process to establish takfir al-muayyan remain at the discretion of the Islamic State. Indeed, in the past these tests of faith were at the discretion of the Muslim scholars. This is precisely why there were always disagreements about takfir. Furthermore, the document adds modern ideologies to the category of egregious unbelief, namely, secularism, nationalism, patriotism, communism and Baathism. It therefore appears that the distinction between abstract unbelief and specific unbelievers who must be punished is quite blurry, and the rules for the accusation of takfir are conveniently vague. It is not surprising that many Sunnis have been killed by the Islamic State not necessarily because they omitted to perform the ritual prayer, or disavowed Allah and Muhammad, but because they did not join the State, or criticized it. Obviously, ISIS’s loose criteria of takfir enabled it to kill those Sunnis as apostates or rebels, even though they proclaimed themselves to be Muslims.[33]

The stipulation that Muslims under infidel rule are not necessarily infidels themselves (par.21) harks back to situations in medieval times when frontier lands, as well as Al-Andalus, all of which were formerly under Muslim rule, fell back under the control of unbelievers. A famous case in point is that of the Anatolian town Mardin, which was contested between the Mongols and the Mamluks in the 13th century CE. Ibn Taymiyya wrote several legal rulings concerning the status of this town.[34] The legal problem was that many of the Islamic obligations, such as giving alms (sadaqa), performing jihad, judging according to the Shari’a and so on, depend on the regime being Islamic. Muslims under an unbeliever regime cannot perform these obligations, so the question arises whether they still count as Muslims.

In mentioning this issue in its creedal document (i.e. the status of those living under non-Muslim rule), ISIS is obviously referring to the citizens of Arab and Muslim countries, whose regimes it considers to be renegade. It is noteworthy that the earlier version of the document (the Al-Qaeda version) explained why the subjects of such renegade Arab and Muslim regimes still count as Muslims. It stated that these renegade regimes took power in Muslim countries and there was no Muslim State to deter them. The citizens of these countries, who were powerless, are therefore blameless and do not forfeit their status as Muslims. This explanation is omitted in the current ISIS document for obvious reasons: The Islamic State is now in power and fights the renegade regimes. Nevertheless, ISIS retained the statement about the inhabitants of the “abode of unbelief” not necessarily being unbelievers. The reason is probably ISIS’s wish to distinguish itself from “extremists” and to avoid alienating the inhabitants of these countries. However, this statement does not prevent ISIS from killing Muslims indiscriminately.

Conclusion

The document “These are our Creeds and Ways” is a self-profile of the Islamic State, reflecting its basic theology and political ideology. ISIS declares that it shuns extremism, and in fact it adds nothing new to traditional Islamic dogmas except for making the return of the caliphate a mandatory article of faith. The document deals with topics that have occupied Muslim minds for generations, yet it also reflects modern and local conditions and phenomena. It is firmly based on Islamic sources, which it cites often, and much of its content is identical to Islamic conservative Hanbali and neo-Hanbali doctrines.

 

* Ella Landau-Tasseron is a retired professor at the Department for Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research fields are early Islamic history, the Arabian tribal system, Islamic political institutions, hadith, Islamic historiography, and jihad. Among her publications are a series of articles on the tribal society in pre-and early Islamic times, two monographs on the institution of the Islamic “oath of allegiance,” and a monograph on non-combatants in Islamic thought.

 

Endnotes:

[1] See William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, New York, 2015, 1-22, 31-45, 73-84, 121-6, 135-44 (12-15 on the period of cooperation between al-Zarqawi and  al-Qaeda).

[2] “The Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad” website http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_35417.html (accessed 21 March, 2016).

[3] The document was provided to me by MEMRI. I owe thanks in particular to Rafi Green and Hagit Migron. The text can be accessed at https://ia801302.us.archive.org/1/items/3akedatona-1/3Qidatona.pdf and also at https://archive.org/details/3akedatona-1 (accessed 18 April, 2016). The date of publication is July 22, 2015 and the compiler is identified as Abu Qudama Al-Muhajir.

[4] This formula concludes Ibn Taymiyya’s highly sophisticated discussion of the subject, see Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu Fatawa Shaykh al-Islam, Medina: Majma’ al-Malik Fahd li-Tiba’at al-Mushaf al-Sharif, 2004, 8/432; idem, Al-Risala al-Tadmuriyya, Medina: Matabi’ al-Madina al-Munawwara, n.d. See also http://www.alagidah.com/vb/showthread.php?t=2238 (accessed  March 17, 2016).

[5] See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu Fatawa , 13/132.

[6] See e.g., Koran 2: 62, 126 177, 4: 39, 162, 6:31, 32:10-12, 70:26, among others. On the Apocalypse in Islam see J. Idleman Smith and Y. Yazbek Haddad, The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981; D. Cook, Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic, Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 2002 (apocalypse in the Quran: 269-306).

[7] See e.g., http://www.ahlalhdeeth.com/vb/showthread.php?t=231962  (accessed March 20, 2016). The scholarly works consulted for this paper do not make the distinction between eschatological themes that became creeds and others that did not.

[8] Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding, 65, 95, among others.

[9] Smith and Haddad, The Islamic Understanding, 127-46; D. Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005; McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, especially 28-29, 99-100, 105-111, 145-7 among others.

[10] There were a few abortive attempts to reestablish a caliphate, see McCants, ISIS, 122. See also Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic, 129-32, 225-9.

[11] McCants, ISIS, 114-9, 179-81.

[12] There are several versions of the twelve-ruler hadith, see, Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Khallal, Al-Sunna, Riyadh: Dar al-Raya lil-Nashr wal-Tawzi’, 1410/1489, 431 (no. 652); Ibn Hibban, Sahih Ibn Hibban, ed. Shu’ayb al-Arnauut, Muassasat al-Risala, 1993, 15/43-45; al-Haythami, Majma al-Zawa’id wa-Manba’ al-Fawa’id, Cairo and Beirut: Dar al-Rayyan lil-Turath and Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1407/ 1986, 5/178; Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Musnad Ahmad, Cairo: Muassasat Qurtuba, n.d. ,5/92-99; Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, ed. Muhammad Fu’ad Abd al-Baqi and Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Beirut: Dar al-Ma’rifa, 1379/1959, 13/213-215. For a discussion of this tradition, as well as the Mahdi and the return of Jesus, see D. Cook, Studies, especially  34-188, 236-47 (the twelve rulers  on pp. 36-49).

[13] See Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic, 90, 127-32, 157, 198, 226-9; McCants, ISIS, 134.

[14] Mullah Umar in Afghanistan assumed the Islamic regnal title “Commander of the Faithful” (amir al-muminin) as early as 1996, but his Emirate was not called caliphate. See Cook, Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic, 172-5.

[15] See McCants, ISIS, 3-20, 39-42, 52-5, 124-5; but cf. 52, 45, 78-9, 129-30. It should be mentioned that, once the Islamic State in Iraq was declared, bin Laden did not acknowledge it but he did not openly reject it, either. Apparently his statements concerning it depended on the contexts in which they were made and the public addressed.

[16] McCants, ISIS, 126-30; see also Ella Landau-Tasseron, Delegitimizing ISIS on Islamic Grounds: Criticism Of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi By Muslim Scholars, MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1205, November 19, 2015.

[17] See I. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2, translated from the German by C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern, London: George Allen and Unwin ltd. 1971, 31-3.

[18] See Etan Kohlberg, “Some Imami Shi’i views on the Sahaba”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 5 (1984), 143-75.

[19]  See e.g., al-Lalika’i, Sharh Usul I’tiqad Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a, ed. Ahmad Sa’d Hamdan, Riyadh: Dar Tayba li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi’, n.d. 7/1241 ff.

[20] See P. Crone, God’s Rule, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 135-8, 228-37; B. Lewis, Islam in History, Chicago: Open Court, 1993, part VI: History and Revolution (especially 261-322).

[21] Leading the prayer is one of the functions of the ruler – imam – or his representative, so that performing the prayer behind the appointed imam is a sign of obedience. See legal rulings on this topic, Islamweb.net, Markaz al-Fatwa, at

http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php?page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=120175 (accessed 19 April, 2016); Tariq al-Salaf, Bab al-Salah, at http://www.alsalafway.com/cms/fatwa.php?action=fatwa&id=3192 (accessed 19 April, 2016, cited from Ibn Taymiyya).

[22] Par. 35 – cf. Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, Majmi’ Fatawa, 1/414, 418-22.

[23] Koran 49:13. The hadith “All Muslims are equal in blood, and the lowest of them may grant protection” is widely circulating, see e.g. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Talkhis al-Habir, Cairo: Mu’assasat Qurtuba 1995, 4/216.

[24]  On ISIS and dhimma see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 1205, Delegitimizing ISIS on Islamic Grounds: Criticism Of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi By Muslim Scholars, November 19, 2015;

10-11.

[25] Atrocities committed against Muslims are too well known to be detailed here.

[26] See R. Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of jihad in Modern History, The Hague, Paris and New York: Mouton; Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter Distributor, 1979; Bonner, M. Jihad in Islamic History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006; also see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No. 1205, Delegitimizing ISIS on Islamic Grounds: Criticism Of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi By Muslim Scholars, November 19, 2015; 7-9.

[27] See a lucid explanation of the matter in Daniel Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, 24-40.

[28] Not all radicals would agree with this. See Lav, Radical Islam, 114-9. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmi Fatawa, 1/420, where he promotes internal cohesion, and denounces the Khawarij who infringe upon it by accusing other Muslims of unbelief.

[29]  See Lav, Radical Islam, 33-4, 38-40. The notion that faith comprises many elements is based on a widely circulating hadith cited in the document (par. 15).

[30] For the text, see:  http://www.twhed.com/vb/t5427/

[31] Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Al-Masa’il wa-l-Rasa’il al-Marwiyya ‘an al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, ed. Abdallah ibn Salman ibn Salim al-Ahmadi,  Riyadh: Dar Tayba, 1991, 1/225-30 (most of the opinions therein are not derived from Ibn Hanbal himself, although the book was published by al-Ahmadi under Ibn Hanbal’s name);  Abu al-‘Ala ibn Rashid, Dawabit Takfir al-Mu’ayyan inda Shaykhay al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya wa-Ibn Abd al-Wahhab wa-Ulama al-Da’wa al-Islahiyya, Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi’, 2004.

[32]  Lav, Radical Islam, 118.

[33]  See examples of ISIS’s arbitrary violence in McCants, ISIS, 33-5, 42-4, 136.

[34] See George Grigore, “The Historical Context of Fatwa of Mardin Given by Ibn Taymiyya,” 1st International Symposium of Mardin History Papers, ed. Ibrahim Ozcosar and Huseyin H Gunes, Istanbul 2006, 345-50.

At the DC Airport? I thought this was a Joke

Hat tip to CNN… and it seems that airport security and TSA may have bigger issues than we know or they will admit.

 

CNN Finds Somali War Criminal Working Security at DC Area Airport

FreeBeacon: CNN has found an alleged war criminal from Somalia now working in the United States as an airport security guard.

Yusuf Abdi Ali was a commander during the Somali Civil War during the 1980s and has been accused of ordering the torture and executions of civilians in what has been called a genocide.

When CNN found out that he was living and working in the United States, they sent a crew to his workplace, Dulles International Airport in Northern Virginia, just minutes from Washington, D.C. The film crew found a man matching Ali’s description working security and began asking him questions.

“What’s your name?” a CNN producer asked.

“Ali,” the guard responded.

“Yusuf Ali,” the producer said.

“Yeah,” Ali said.

“Where are you originally from?” the producer asked.

“Somalia,” Ali said.

CNN correspondent Kyra Phillips reported that Ali came to the United States from Canada with the assistance of his wife who helped him secure a visa into the United States. Ali was deported from Canada due to his past, but that did not prevent him from being able to get into the United States.

Phillips also reported that Ali has been removed from his position as a security guard and that his past did not come up during a background check.

****

In 2014:

One of the two Americans killed while fighting for the Islamic State (ISIS) terrorist organization in Syria had worked at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport cleaning planes before he went overseas to become a jihadist, an investigation has revealed.

Abdirahmaan Muhumed, 29, who died in the same battle as Minnesota native Douglas McCain, was employed by Delta Global Services, a cleaning company owned by Delta Airlines. Two former employees confirmed they’d worked with Muhumed, who had been married three times and was the father of nine children. While earlier this year, the airport’s cleaning contract was taken over by Airserv, another contractor, Muhumed would have had to had security clearance to work for Delta. More here from NewsMax.

This past April: 

ClarionProject: Brussels airport is partially reopening today for the first time since it was hit by twin suicide bombs on March 22 in attacks that killed 35 people.

The airport reopening was delayed by a strike called by police officers who de3maqnded extra security measures. Specifically they requested checks at the main entrance to the departure lounge. Authorities feared this could create bottlenecks going into the airport.

A group of police officers wrote an open letter to the press criticizing alleged security failings at Zaventem airport. They alleged that 50 ISIS supporters are still working at the airport.

Some people suspected of having fought in Syria came to the airport as “false tourists”. We reported their presence but we do not know if anything was done with that information, the letter read according to the Daily Mail.

The officers complained about people who worked at the airport whom they allege celebrated the Paris attacks.

“When we checked these people, we were surprised more than once. It was men with a radical ideology and a long police history,’ they said.

‘Even today, there are at least 50 supporters of the Islamic state who work at the airport. They have a security badge and have access to the cockpit of a plane”

 

Warning: Europe Terrorist Explosive Stockpiles

Terrorists likely stockpiling explosives in EU, says Europol

The threat of terrorists attacks in the EU remains the top national security concern among member states, with some 211 foiled plots last year alone, according to a top EU security official.

The threat of another attack similar in scale to the Paris attack in November last year or in Brussels this past March has national authorities on edge. Manuel Navarrete Paniagua, the head of the European Counter Terrorism Centre at the EU police agency Europol, told euro-deputies on Monday (23 May) that terrorist cells in the EU were likely stockpiling explosives for later use.

“We have some information reported by the member states that terrorists groups are trying to establish large clandestine stockpiles of explosives in the European Union to be used eventually in large scale home attacks,” he said.

Related: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report

Paniagua was briefing MEPs in the civil liberties committee on the yet-to-be published EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE-SAT) compiled by Europol and member states.

The report is set for publication in a few weeks’ time.

Paniagua cited figures and broader conclusions due in the report, noting that “jihadist terrorism” remains the top threat to security in the European Union.

The latest attacks in the EU suggest much better coordination among the terrorists than previously thought. He said their combined use of explosives and firearms was also a novelty and a threat that is evolving rapidly.

Authorities have yet to nail down any single profile of a home-grown terrorist or foreign fighter.

But he said many have petty criminal backgrounds. He pointed out a significant proportion of foreign fighters have also been diagnosed with mental problems.

More than 4,000 so-called foreign fighters have been identified in the EU and entered into a Europol database.

“Using the terrorist financial tracking programme, we provided last year more than 2,700 leads regarding foreign terrorist fighters to the member states,” he said.

Some 1,057 people were also arrested last year on terrorism-related offences, he said.

He said there are also unconfirmed reports that some jihadist militants have set up training camps in the Western Balkans and some EU states.

Terrorists and migration flows

Other concerns related to terrorists exploiting the migration flows from Turkey and elsewhere to enter the European Union.

“We found no evidence of the systematic of using this flow to infiltrate terrorists into the European Union. But they do, they use it, we have some cases, some of the people that perpetrated the Paris attacks were eventually disguised in this immigration flow,” he said.

Paniagua said migrants were being victimised twice as result. First they flee terrorists and then again when the same attempt to infiltrate the EU by hiding among the refugees, he said.

“Again, we have no indication that this systematic,” he said.

Earlier this month, Europol announced it would deploy some 200 counter-terrorist and other investigators to migrant arrival centres known as hotspots in Italy and Greece.

Related: Implementing the European Agenda on Security:
EU action plan against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and explosives.

Of those, Europol said it would dispatch around 50 “at key points on the external border of the EU” to track down and help identify suspected criminals and terrorists.

A European Commission report earlier this month noted that Turkey is suspected to have around 1,300 Turkish citizens fighting alongside Islamic militant groups in Syria and Iraq.

It noted that the plan to lift visa restrictions on Turkish nationals “could potentially have an impact on the terrorist risk in the EU”.

*****

For the United States, the Warning from DHS in 2011

(U//FOUO) DHS Warning: Terrorists Making Explosives With Commercial Products

Terrorist Acquisition of Commercial Products for Improvised Explosive Device Production(U//FOUO) Recent plots and attacks in the Homeland and overseas demonstrate a continuing terrorist focus on acquiring commercially available materials and components that can be used in constructing improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Heightened public and state and local official awareness, as well as tightened legal controls, have made it more difficult to purchase certain products that contain explosive precursors in bulk quantities or concentrated forms. Operatives are now more likely to use surreptitious, though legal, methods—such as multiple purchases in smaller quantities—to acquire sufficient amounts to create explosives.

— (U) On 27 July 2011, investigators found precursor chemicals and other IED components, including smokeless powder, clocks, batteries, wires, and other items commonly used to make IEDs in the hotel room of a US Army soldier who allegedly sought to target military personnel.
— (U) The admitted perpetrator of the 22 July 2011 attacks in Oslo, Norway avoided law enforcement suspicion by acquiring through legal means the ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, nitromethane, and blenders he used in constructing IEDs.

(U//FOUO) Commercial products containing precursor materials may include:
— (U//FOUO) Fertilizer and first aid cold packs (ammonium nitrate).
— (U//FOUO) Swimming pool chemicals (calcium hypochlorite/hydrogen peroxide).
— (U//FOUO) Some types of water filtration/treatment systems (potassium permanganate).
— (U//FOUO) Beauty supply products (hydrogen peroxide and acetone).
— (U//FOUO) Industrial cleaning supplies (hydrochloric acid or sulfuric acid).

(U) Potential Indicators of suspicious purchases: Most commercial products suitable for constructing IEDs serve legitimate purposes. Consequently, it is often difficult to identify purchases or other activities that may be associated with terrorist intent to create explosives. No single indicator is likely to divulge suspicious purchases, but, depending on specific circumstances, a combination of the behaviors listed below may warrant reporting and investigation:

— (U) Attempts to purchase all available stock or materials in bulk, especially by individuals with no previous history of bulk purchases.
— (U) Payment or insistence on payment in cash for bulk purchases, or using a credit card in another person’s name.
— (U) Insistence on in-store pickup instead of store delivery of bulk purchase.
— (U) Use of rented or out-of-state vehicle to transport bulk purchases.
— (U) Smaller purchases of the same products at different locations within a short period of time.
— (U) Displays of nervous or suspicious behavior and evasive or vague responses to questions about intended use of products.

(U//FOUO) For additional information, please see DHS-FBI Joint Homeland Security Assessment “(U//FOUO) Use of Common Precursor Chemicals to Make Homemade Explosives,” 10 August 2010; and Roll Call Release “(U//FOUO) Indicators of Suspicious Acquisition of Beauty Supply Products,” 26 February 2010.

Europe: Micro-financing of ISIS

Microfinancing the Caliphate: How the Islamic State is Unlocking the Assets of European Recruits

 

   

 

Author(s): Magnus Ranstorp

CTC/AbstractIslamic State recruits from Europe are raising significant funds for the group through multiple microfinancing techniques within the European Union. Moneymaking schemes have included petty theft, fraudulent loan applications, social insurance fraud, and VAT fraud. A range of techniques are being employed by aspiring and active European Islamic State operatives to transfer money to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, including bringing money with them when they travel to join the group, withdrawing funds from money transfer businesses operating along the Turkey-Syria border, sending cash couriers, and using the hawala system. To shrink this funding pipeline, financial intelligence must be better integrated into EU counterterrorism efforts. 

Much attention is focused on the Islamic State’s macro-level financial resources from within Syria and Iraq, where oil sales, plundering, and taxation as well as donations are the group’s primary funding sources. The Islamic State is also known to raise significant funds from exchange rate manipulation and transactions in Jordan and Iraq.[1] There has been, however, less focus on the range of foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) microfinancing schemes and transactions within Europe. This article explores the range of methods used by European Islamic State FTFs to raise and then transfer funds to Islamic State coffers. It is based in large part on a study conducted for the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority focusing on FTFs from northern European countries as well as extensive interviews with law enforcement, financial investigators, and intelligence officials.[2]

A Caliphate Cashing In  The Islamic State is encouraging each individual recruit to bring whatever assets are available to contribute to the group’s cause. The resulting efforts are often well-organized. As this article will outline, FTF microfinancing schemes range from sophisticated VAT (value-added tax) fraud schemes to benefit fraud. Money Service Businesses (MSBs) like Western Union, Moneygram, and a myriad of other companies operating along the Turkish-Syrian border are heavily used to transfer money, including to middlemen in Turkey and Syria.

The scale and scope of the travel of European FTFs to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State is unprecedented. It is estimated that around 5,000 European Union nationals have joined the Islamic State and to a lesser extent Jabhat al-Nusra since the onset of the Syrian civil war. While there are significant numbers of FTFs departing from France (1,700), Germany (800), and the United Kingdom (700-1,000), there are other smaller states with proportionately higher ratio of their Muslim population leaving for Syria. Belgium has 470 FTFs (including 50 women) who have joined the Islamic State. In Austria, there are over 300 FTFs (with a high proportion of individuals of Chechen descent), which is probably a spillover effect of its vicinity to the Western Balkans, an area from which several hundred FTFs have departed.[a] There are an estimated 210 FTFs from the Netherlands. Denmark has 135 FTFs, and Sweden has 299 FTFs, out of which at least 45 are women. In Scandinavia there is a cumulative total of 500 FTFs with almost 200 who have returned.

The large number of European FTFs have provided the Islamic State with significant incoming cash flows. Facilitators encourage aspiring fighters to raise as much money as possible before immigrating to the Islamic State. These facilitators help the recruits identify ways to unlock funds. Recruits with good credit histories and those well placed to defraud financial institutions, as well as those with a network of contacts willing to provide funds, are particularly prized.

Financial contributions vary according to the recruit’s individual financial position, ability, and situation. Often male recruits come from dysfunctional families or single-parent families (often without a father) and with multi-criminal backgrounds, having past convictions for drug offenses, theft, or violence. Many have operated together with territorial criminal gangs. Acquiring available funding provides FTFs with enhanced status and position upon their arrival in Syria with the Islamic State, providing significant incentives for them to raise as much cash as possible.

Consequently, there are a number of indicators that may allow law enforcement to identify FTFs before travel. FTFs often make sudden asset sales or transfers ahead of their departure. They often quit their jobs if they have one, and they commonly make unusually large withdrawals from their accounts. A red flag is unusually high activity in combination with many different loans and cash withdrawals. In terms of company financial activity, recruits often generate very large revenue in short periods. Credit is accumulated, and business purchases are at high levels to maximize credit limits with orders placed within a short period, with purchases often of IT or mobile phones. Bills are never paid. This means that by the time recruit has traveled, unpaid invoices accumulate.

FTFs travel to and from the principal conflict regions in Syria or Iraq through direct or indirect air travel routes (they often break up travel patterns to disguise destination) or through various land routes to staging points in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Turkey is a key hub for FTFs and for funding sources, particularly because of its long, porous land border with Syria. Often FTFs fly into Istanbul and then proceed to fly to Hatay or other airports closer to the Turkish-Syrian border. Some are turned back in Istanbul but then travel via boats through the Greek archipelago to gain entry to Turkey. Many FTFs now avoid Istanbul altogether because they are regularly refused entry. Instead they travel to charter destinations close to Syria. There have been cases of travel through several detour destinations.

There are a range of options used by European FTFs to transfer funds to the Islamic State. Some bring cash on their person across the border in to Syria even though there is a risk the funds will be confiscated by border security agents along the route. This has led others to withdraw funds from Money Service Businesses (MSBs) stationed in the Turkey-Syria border area. Groups of Europeans on their way to join the Islamic State sometime use fixers in the border region to withdraw funds from MSBs, as do Europeans who have already joined the group.[3]

All this has made Turkey a key hub for the flow of funds to Syria for terrorist use, especially its border towns with Syria. Intelligence suggests that foreign fighters engaged in fighting in Syria withdraw cash from ATMs on the border of Turkey and Syria and that the facilitators who bring them back and forth across the border play a key role in aiding this monetary activity.[4] Periodic withdrawals occur over prolonged periods along the border areas through MSBs. Small amounts of EUR €500–EUR €1,000 are typically withdrawn to avoid suspicions.

This article will now explore in detail how European FTFs are (1) raising funds for the Islamic State and then (2) transferring this money to the group in Syria and Iraq.

Part 1: Raising Funds  It is important to recognize that there are many legal fundraising activities that are exploited by FTFs, particularly the large charitable sector. The complexity of the crisis in Syria and huge need for humanitarian assistance make the issue of detection of terror finance extremely sensitive and difficult. A few aid agencies operate under strict Islamic State supervision (by the Islamic State Department of Relief) and no international staff is present.[5] Both charities that are genuinely seeking to provide humanitarian assistance and fake charities that have been set up to channel funds to the Islamic State operate under these conditions. A 2014 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report found that well-intentioned non-profit organizations (NPOs) most at risk of having funds requisitioned by the terrorist groups were “those engaged in ‘service’ activities … operating in close proximity to an active terrorist threat” and those “that send funds to counterpart or ‘correspondent’ NPOs located in or close to where terrorists operate.”[6]

Another common method of individual Muslim contribution is through Tajheez Al-Ghazi, which roughly translates as waging jihad by proxy by those unable themselves to travel.[7] This typically involves a complex web of sponsorship with no central hub or connector, which makes this type of effort difficult to pinpoint and counter. Funds can be distributed via humanitarian channels, or it may be as simple as buying someone’s airline ticket or sponsoring a piece of equipment. For FTFs from Middle Eastern countries, this contribution is often collected through online crowdfunding from sources in the Gulf States, and there is concern such activity is also going on in Europe.[8]

Theft and Petty Crime  European FTFs have funded their travel to Syria through a range of illicit streams including thefts and petty crime. The fact that a significant number of FTFs have past criminal convictions means they already have experience in raising funds this way. Extremist preachers have justified such criminal fundraising on religious grounds. A prime example was Khalid Zerkani, a Moroccan veteran of the Afghan Jihad who recruited dozens of Belgians to fight jihad in Syria between 2013 and 2014, including the team leader of the Paris attacks Abdelhamid Abaaoud. Zerkani was known as “Papa Noel” by his acolytes in and around the Brussels district of Molenbeek because he encouraged them to rob people in the street and steal the luggage of tourists and then distributed the proceeds to fund their travel to Syria. One Brussels-based FTF received €5000 ($5700) from Zerkani to make the trip.[9]

Bank Fraud Many FTFs have taken out loans from banks[b] without any intention of paying them back. Amedy Coulibaly, who attacked a kosher grocery store in Paris in January 2015, took out a €6,000 ($6,700) bank loan in Lille using a fake payslip shortly before the terrorist attack.[10] Some FTFs have applied for the funds via internet applications. In Sweden there are several cases of FTFs taking out unsecured bank loans in combination with other types of fraud such as quick loans (SMS loans) and the leasing of SUVs and other cars with no intention of paying them off and every intention of reselling the vehicles.[11]

There are also other types of banking fraud. In the United Kingdom, the Metropolitan Police unravelled a large-scale fraud by British FTFs in March 2015 who had pretended to be police officers and were targeting elderly citizens for their bank details. After telling them their bank accounts had been compromised, the FTFs instructed their victims to transfer money to an account under the control of the fraudsters.[12] In May 2016, eight individuals were jailed for defrauding U.K. pensioners out of more than £1 million ($1.44 million). Around 140 frauds or attempted frauds were discovered by the investigation; the group had used “16 telephone lines to make 5,695 calls to 3,774 different numbers.”[13]

VAT and Business Fraud The issue of withholding VAT payment is a very common and lucrative method for terror financing. Very large sums can be generated quickly via consumer goods that are easily resold. In Sweden, a 30-year-old salafi preacher, influential among FTFs, was charged with VAT fraud amounting to SEK6 million ($740,000) in a scheme lasting four months during the first quarter of 2013. He purchased mobile phones and tablets for SEK29.7 million ($3.6 million) in the United Kingdom and sent the order to his company in Finland. He then resold the shipment to a 23-year-old Swedish FTF and his company in Bergsjön. SEK5 million is believed to be missing still and is thought to be in the Middle East or North Africa.[14]

Another Swedish case involves the combined VAT fraud of the 20-year-old son of the late Islamic State of Iraq leader in Mosul (Mohammed Moumou who was killed in 2008 by U.S. forces in Iraq) and a 25-year-old man who worked as case officer for the Swedish Tax Authority.[15] The pair established a company with no employees and began importing iPhones from Lithuania for SEK28 million ($3.4 million), which they resold to retail outlets at a bargain price, withholding payment of any VAT to the Tax Authority. Owing SEK7.1 million ($870,000) in VAT payments, the company had no assets. Simultaneously, the 25-year-old had taken out several loans from SEB, Swedbank, Bank Norwegian, and dozens of other credit institutes amounting to SEK1 million ($120,000).[16] Criminal proceedings were transferred to Turkey and other countries in the region. There are indications these two individuals were part of a much broader financial, criminal enterprise led by Soheil Raffieé Bakhtiarzadeh and Shahin Raffieé Bakhtiarzadeh, two brothers wanted by Europol, on request by Sweden, and involving dozens of companies.[17]

These kinds of VAT carousels where phones are sold and resold to different companies create profitable criminal proceeds. In business jargon, these so-called “missing traders” receive a VAT number and then trade quickly before dissolving their companies.[18]

Another case of VAT fraud was perpetrated by Abdessamad Fateh in Denmark. Also known as Abu Hamza, he was officially designated by the United States as a foreign terrorist fighter and “a member of a Scandinavia-based network of extremists allegedly linked to al-Qa’ida, [who] has traveled to Syria.”[19] [c] Abu Hamza had been arrested previously as a suspect in a terror plot against the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard at Jyllands-Posten in 2008. He owned a company importing large quantities of chicken and cheese from Germany to Denmark and failed to pay DKK3 million ($460,000) VAT in a scheme in which accountants acted as facilitators through a series of shell companies—including a travel agency—that were created and then dissolved.[20]

VAT fraud can assume massive proportions. In 2014 Italian authorities discovered that so-called carbon credit and VAT fraud had occurred between 38 middlemen who sold carbon-credit between Italian SF Energy and a series of companies in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. This €1.15 billion ($1.3 billion) tax scam resulted in significant funds being channeled to the Taliban via bank transactions in Cyprus, Hong Kong, and the UAE.[21]

Often these VAT fraud schemes involve fake addresses or designated “fall guys” who assume the legal and financial consequences. This enables the real culprits to continue the scheme elsewhere.

Lease/Loans of SUVs and Cars  One of the most common fraudulent practices is to secure a car loan or leasing option with no intention of paying back the debt. This provides Islamic State sympathizers with opportunities to send cars to the Islamic State in Syria. Often these cars are larger SUVs. For example, Toyota Hilux pickups and Toyota Land Cruisers retrofitted with heavy weapons frequently appear in Islamic State propaganda videos in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.

Toyota Hilux models, for example, whether stolen or purchased, are shipped from around the world to Turkey. There are numerous reported cases of the vehicles coming from as far away as Canada and Australia.[22] Vehicles are also often driven from Europe to Turkey and then into Syria by FTFs. Turkish border authorities require coupling a driver with a foreign-registered vehicle for each entry/exit into Turkey. These transfers have become more difficult.

Social Insurance Fraud The issue of social insurance or benefit fraud has been flagged as a method exploited by FTFs in Syria and Iraq. Much of this problem stems from inadequate control systems requiring unemployed individuals to report regularly to authorities. In some EU states the problem has been exposed by inquiries by authorities. For example, investigation in Denmark revealed that 32 FTFs had received social insurance benefits amounting to DKK379,000 ($58,000) while they were in Syria fighting for the Islamic State.[23]

In Britain a probe has been launched to examine the extent to which British FTFs are abusing the taxpayer social insurance system through false claims, online fraud, and student loans. Police officials have confirmed that women were being used to smuggle out cash derived from benefit fraud as they aroused less suspicion.[24] In July 2015, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) Fraud and Error Service launched a wide probe into the extent of this benefit fraud. Investigations were prioritized after three women from Bradford with nine children between them claimed benefits and had allegedly left for Syria.[25]

In Belgium in August 2013, the cities of Antwerp and Vilvoorde stopped welfare payments to 29 FTFs as they did not live at their registered address. These FTFs had managed to access their bank accounts via ATMs across the border in Turkey and withdraw money.[26] The Dutch authorities took steps to freeze the payment of social benefits to 85 FTFs.[27] In France, authorities decided to cut welfare benefits last year for 290 persons identified as jihadis.[28]

Social Media Crowdfunding  As mentioned above, intelligence officials have flagged crowdfunding as an emerging source of funding for the Islamic State and its terror activity.[29] Crowdfunding for specific projects combines clever social media and emotional telethons with the fundraising power of a multitude of individuals. Establishing charitable NPOs for this purpose can attract funding through diverse social media sites. According to FATF reports, there are plenty of cases where the appeals for supply and equipment were quickly matched and specific instructions were given over encrypted platforms about where to direct the funds.[30]

Part 2: Transfer of Funds Interviews the authors conducted with Western intelligence and law enforcement officials provide a picture of how European FTFs are transferring funds to the Islamic State. It is important to note the Islamic State still relies on access to banking services in Syria and Iraq and in neighboring areas contested by the group. According to one report, “in Iraq alone, approximately ninety such international bank branches continue to operate in contested areas of Ninawa, Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Kirkuk provinces.”[31] One of its most important access points to the international financial system are bank branches situated in the border region between Turkey and Syria. The Islamic State was also for a period accessing the government funding of workers, which was provided every month in Mosul. The Iraqi government stopped paying these salaries in Mosul last August.[32]

Money Service Businesses (MSBs) Money remittance and currency exchange providers have been exploited for money laundering purposes and terrorism finance. Like money laundering, terrorists use sequencing or the breaking down of amounts into multiple/sequential transactions below the threshold, thereby circumventing mandatory reporting. They also may employ smurfing[d] or proxy techniques to avoid detection.

MSBs are widely used in Turkey to transfer FTF funds coming from Europe to recipients within the Islamic State using MSB offices and ATMs along border towns straddling the Syrian-Turkish border. Gazientep, Akcakale, Adiaman, Hacipasa, Reyhanli, and Sanliurfa are just some of the places where arriving and departing FTFs can access financial services. After receiving instructions from recruiters and facilitators, FTFs arrive in pre-determined destinations where they take out funds from MSBs through their home country bank accounts or via wired cash.

Regular withdrawals of smaller amounts along the border is common. As noted by U.K. authorities in a 2015 report, “funds are typically broken down in to smaller amounts to avoid the need to provide identification and to avoid detection. Intelligence also indicates that employees have been known to facilitate funds to terrorists through their position within MSBs.”[33] [e]

To avoid detection, the Islamic State regularly changes the playbook it provides European FTFs and their facilitators on how to move money. For example, after Western Union and a number of other MSBs began watching more closely for Islamic State linked transactions in the Syria-Turkey border area, the Islamic State urged aspiring European FTFs to transfer sums under €5,000 ($5,700). For a period of time, they also encouraged them to transfer funds through MSBs to recipients in Bosnia, particularly in the Brcko district, because it was seen as a safer option. Islamic State operatives provided contact details for these recipients.[f]

Pre-paid debit cards Another way FTFs and terrorists conceal their tracks have been through pre-paid debit cards. These can be recharged without identity checks as long as the total amount does not exceed €2,500 ($2,800) per year. They were used to rent hotel rooms outside Paris the night before the November 13, 2015, attacks.[34]

Informal Money Transfer Systems (Hawala) The traditional system of hawala is in operation around the world. In many cases Islamic State financial transactions are conducted through an underground hawaladar network established throughout Iraq, Syria, and beyond. As the Islamic State consolidates control over its provinces, such as in Libya, it is clear the group is relying increasingly on hawala networks for transferring funds.[35] This mechanism will increase in importance as the Islamic State expands in operational areas with infrequent or no access to international financial institutions.

In Europe it has been easier to detect and disrupt hawala networks being used for terrorist purposes. The most prominent case was the 2015 roll-up of a massive, secret hawala network composed of 300 hawaladars with clandestine offices in Spanish cities through 250 butcher shops, grocery stores, and telephone call centers. They managed “the savings of over 150,000 Muslims, many of whom were believed to be receiving social welfare payments from the Spanish state, without any legal oversight. The network allegedly paid the salaries of Spanish jihadis in Syria: They received about $800 if they were single and $1,200 if they were married.”[36]

Cash Couriers The Islamic State uses cash couriers to circumvent multi-layered barriers placed on the group by Western financial institutions. These cash couriers provide essential services for the Islamic State inside Syria and Iraq as well as across the border in Turkey where the money is distributed to trusted networks and used to buy essential equipment.

The system of cash couriers also works the opposite direction with European FTFs and support networks concealing and transporting cash to the Islamic State and their fighters. In one such case, Amal el-Wahabi, a British mother-of-two, was arrested and convicted in the U.K. for trying to smuggle €20,000 ($23,000) to her husband in Syria.[37]

Conclusion FTF microfinancing schemes are important to focus on for a number of reasons. They reveal a disturbing pattern of the Islamic State’s wider and deeper efforts to find funding from a diverse range of sources. For the Islamic State, every recruit holds the potential to unlock financial assets. Focusing on FTF financial sources also provides important insights into the web of the Islamic State’s transnational networks and local recruitment/facilitation focal points. There is a greater need to tackle the Islamic State’s network in Europe using financial enforcement agencies and tools. This requires a more concerted effort by governments to integrate financial intelligence into counterterrorism machinery within and across EU states. This is increasingly urgent as intelligence officials point out that money flows are not just going in one direction—from recruits to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Intelligence now suggests that money is sent from Islamic State sources to recruits and supporters in Europe as ways to fund terror operations.[38]

Dr. Magnus Ranstorp is Research Director (CATS) at Swedish Defence University and Quality Manager at the EU Radicalisation Awareness Centre of Excellence. He has worked on terrorism and counterterrorism issues for over 25 years around the world. Follow @MagnusRanstorp

Substantive Notes [a] This information was collected by Linus Gustafsson at Swedish Defence University throughout 2015-2016 and is based on officially available figures by national authorities or media reports. These figures have been collected from open sources by Swedish Defence University on behalf of the Swedish National Countering Violent Extremism Coordinator every month since mid-2015.

[b] In the 2000s multiple British al-Qa`ida plotters funded their operations through bank fraud. For example, three of those involved in the 2006 transatlantic airline plot successfully applied for loans totaling GBP26,000 ($37,600). See Paul Cruickshank, “The 2006 Airline Plot,” in Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares eds., The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, October 2014).

[c] Abu Hamza returned to Denmark after traveling to Syria and later died of natural causes there.

[d] Smurfing involves the process of making numerous cash deposits into several bank accounts.

[e] It is also important to recognize that FTF facilitators use the MSBs for a variety of purposes. They receive payment for facilitation of travel of fighters on behalf of the Islamic State but have also received funds through them from worried parents who want to extract radicalized children from the clutches of the Islamic State. This information is based on testimony from relatives of FTFs in both The Hague (September 2014) and Stockholm (November 2014).

[f] This area is a well-known jihadist hotspot. The village of Gornja Maoca, for example, contains a high concentration of jihadis. See Gordon N. Bardos, “Jihad in the Balkans: The Next Generation,” World Affairs, September/October 2014.

Citations [1] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, “Fact Sheet: Taking Stock of the Counter-ISIL Finance Group’s Achievements in its First Year,” April 12, 2016. For example, see UK Foreign Affairs Sub-committee, ISIL financing inquiry, Oral and Written Evidence.

[2] Magnus Normark and Magnus Ranstorp, Understanding Terrorist Finance Modus Operandi and National CTF Regimes, March 2016. The law enforcement and intelligence officials were interviewed between June-December 2015 in a number of countries: in the U.K., the Metropolitan Police (SO15); in the Netherlands, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTV); in the United States, the Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Department of Justice, and Department of State Office of Counterterrorism; in Canada, the Canada Security and Intelligence Service, Royal Canadian Mountain Police (RCMP), Public Safety Canada, and FINTRAC Canada; in Sweden, the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) and the Swedish Finance Police (FIPO); and in Denmark, the Danish Security & Intelligence Service (PET). The authors also interviewed officials at Europol, Counter Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in The Hague.

[3] Personal interviews, several European intelligence officials, 2015-2016.

[4] Personal interviews, several European intelligence officials and Swedish banks, 2015-2016.

[5] Eva Svoboda and Louise Redvers, “Aid and the Islamic State,” IRIN/HPG Crisis Brief, December 2014.

[6] Financial Action Task Force (FATF), “Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks,” October 2015, p. 14.

[7] Aimen Dean, Edwina Thompson, and Tom Keatinge, “Draining the Ocean to Catch one Type of Fish: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Global Counter-Terrorism Financing Regime,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7:4 (2013).

[8] Personal interviews, European law enforcement and intelligence officials, 2015; Normark and Ranstorp.

[9] Jugement contre Khalid Zerkani et al., Tribunal de Premiere Instance Francophone de Bruxelles, July 29, 2015, pp. 44-65.

[10] ”Paris attacks: Investigators turn up new leads,” BBC News, January 19, 2015.

[11] “Lån och bedrägerier finansierar terrorresor,” Sveriges Radio, June 22, 2015.

[12] Jonathan Owen, “British pensioners targeted in scam by extremists raising funds for Isis,” Independent, March 5, 2015.

[13] “Gang jailed over pensioner phone scam,” BBC, May 4, 2016.

[14] “Momsfiffel finansierade jihadister I Syrien,” November 28, 2004.

[15] For an earlier article on circumstances surrounding the 25-year-old, see Magnus Ranstorp, “The Foreign Policy Essay: Scandinavian Foreign Fighters—Trends and Lessons,” Lawfare, December 7, 2014.

[16] Lasse Wierup, ”Tjänsteman åtalas för svindel,” Dagens Nyheter, April 11, 2016.

[17] Soheil Raffieé Bakhtiarzadeh and Shahin Raffieé Bakhtiarzadeh, ”Momsfusk ger nätverk miljoner,” Dagens Nyheter, April 12, 2016.

[18] “Julhandeln högtid för kriminellas momsfiffel,” Dagens Nyheter, December 3, 2014.

[19] U.S. Department of State, “Designation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters,” September 24, 2014.

[20] Personal interview, journalist Troels Kingo Larsen at DR, May 2015; “Terrormistænkte indblandet i fødevarefusk i København,” DR, January 24, 2016.

[21] “Milliardsvindel med dansk kvoteregister er mistænkt for at finansiere terror,” DR, October 1, 2014; “Italy tax scam ‘may have funded terrorism,’” Local, September 24, 2014.

[22] Stewart Bell, “Ontario extortion racket has ties to Hezbollah,” National Post, July 21, 2011.

[23] ”Syrienkrigere har fået 378.000 kroner i velfærdsydelser,” Ritzau, May 18, 2015.

[24] Peter Dominiczak, Tom Whitehead, and Christopher Hope, “Jihadists funded by welfare benefits, senior police officer warns,” Daily Telegraph, November 26, 2014.

[25] Imogen Calderwood, “ISIS jihadis in Syria and Iraq are funding their evil war by milking Britain’s benefits system through false claims, online fraud and student loans,” DailyMail, June 7, 2015.

[26] “Belgian jihadists in Syria stripped of welfare benefits,” France 24, August 19, 2013.

[27] FATF.

[28] “France cut welfare benefits for 290 jihadists last year,” France 24, March 18, 2015.

[29] “Islamic State using social media as crowdfunding platform for terrorist activities, expert warns,” ABC News, November 17, 2015.

[30] FATF.

[31] Matthew Levitt, “Here’s how ISIS still has access to the global financial system,” Business Insider, March 24, 2015.

[32] Aymenn al-Tamimi, “A Caliphate under Strain: The Documentary Evidence,” CTC Sentinel 9:4 (2016).

[33] HM Treasury/HM Home Office, “UK national risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing,” October 2015.

[34] “France targets prepaid debit cards in fight against terror finance,” Agence France-Presse, November 23, 2015; “Prepaid cards: help for financially excluded or finance for terrorists?” Express Tribune, November 29, 2015.

[35] Personal interviews, European intelligence and law enforcement officials, 2015.

[36] Jose Maria Irujo, “Una extensa red de 250 locutorios y carnicerias financia la yihad en Siria,” El Pais, February 2, 2015.

[37] Sandra Laville and Duncan Gardham, “Two unlikely jihadis: the ‘weed-smoking kaffir’ and the ignorant dupe,” Guardian, August 13, 2015.

[38] Personal interview, intelligence source, spring 2016.