Who Granted him Permission to Enter the United States?

He entered on a non-immigrant visa and became a pilot? Nonimmigrant visas are issued to foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States on a temporary basis for tourism, business, medical treatment and certain types of temporary work. The type of nonimmigrant visa needed is defined by immigration law, and related to the purpose of the travel.

A video still of Al Farooq, Al Qaeda’s most notorious training camp, in June 2001. It was destroyed in the American bombing campaign in Afghanistan in the weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks. A Saudi man living in Oklahoma has been arrested after his fingerprints were found on an application to join the camp that he filled out in 2000. via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

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The Al Farouq training camp, also known as “the airport camp”,[1] and Jihad Wel al-Farouq, was an alleged Al-Qaeda training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan. Camp attendees received small-arms training, map-reading, orientation, explosives training, and other training.

The United States attacked the area with cruise missiles on August 20, 1998, in retaliation for the 1998 embassy bombings.[2][3] It continued to operate until August 2001, when it was shut down by its trainers.[4] The camp was bombed again on October 10, 2001.[5]

According to American intelligence analysts, the director of the Al Farouq camp was a Saudi named Abdul Quduz, who was later one of the commanders at the battle of Tora Bora.[6][7][8]

*** Image result for al farouq training camp afghanistan

Abu Hammam training at al-Farouq camp n Afghanistan. Usama Bin Laden appointed him responsible for the Syrians then. Abu Hammam al-Suri, aka Farouq, fought in Afghanistan; was Emir of Kandahar Airport; trained Jihadists for Zarqawi and joined Nusra

WASHINGTON — A Saudi immigrant suspected of once applying to join Al Qaeda’s most notorious training camp was arrested on a charge of visa fraud in Oklahoma, where he had been living for years with his family, federal law enforcement officials said on Tuesday.

The F.B.I. discovered the man, Naif Abdulaziz Alfallaj, only recently, when the authorities matched his fingerprints to those taken from a document captured in Afghanistan, the officials said. The document was an application for the Farooq camp, where four of the Sept. 11 hijackers trained.

He apparently filled out the application in 2000, when he was about 17, the officials said, well after Al Qaeda had made its intentions of attacking the United States and its allies known to the world. Anyone who tried to join the camp would have known that Al Qaeda was a terrorist organization, the law enforcement officials said.

Typically people who applied to the camp filled out what was known as a “mujahedeen data form.” They needed an invitation to join the camp and a reference from someone known and trusted by Al Qaeda. Trainees learned how to use weapons and explosives at the camp. After training, camp attendees fought with Al Qaeda or the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Mr. Alfallaj, 35, obtained his pilot’s license in 2016, according to public records and American officials. Noncitizens are required to submit fingerprints as part of the licensing process.

Mr. Alfallaj came to the United States in about 2011 on a nonimmigrant visa and had been living in Weatherford, Okla, about 70 miles west of Oklahoma City, American officials said. The F.B.I. had been watching hi m for about five months and had been trying determine whether Mr. Alfallaj was involved in terrorist activity in the United States. The F.B.I. declined to comment, and little else was known about him.

The case highlights the difficulty facing the government in processing the large amounts of fingerprints, photographs, messages, email addresses, phone numbers and DNA samples that have been collected in nearly two decades of war.

Many documents and electronic media collected in Afghanistan land on the shelves of a unit in the F.B.I.’s counterterrorism division. The materials, which are stored in federal facilities in Northern Virginia and at F.B.I. Headquarters in Washington, have been a vexing problem for the agency. A merican officials have long wanted to exploit the materials but lacked the resources as the F.B.I. has focused on other pressing terrorism investigations over the years.

The number of documents was staggering, perhaps in the hundreds of thousands, said a former F.B.I. official who worked in the unit. Much of the information is in other languages, such as Arabic. To inspect the materials, the F.B.I. would need to reassign linguists from other cases.

The case of Mr. Alfallaj is similar to one brought in 2011 against two Iraqi men who were arrested in Bowling Green, Ky., after they had entered the United States. The F.B.I. discovered the men after finding fingerprints on explosive devices that had been used to attack American soldiers in Iraq. The two men were later convicted of terrorism charges and sentenced to life in prison.

After the men were discovered, the F.B.I. deployed hundreds of people to pull fingerprints off of improvised explosive devices stored at the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, known around the bureau as the Bomb Library of America. Officials said a similar effort is underway to make sure other materials similar to the training camp application are examined.

At some point, the F.B.I. decided to go through the terrorist camp applications to determine whether any fingerprints could be identified as part of a renewed ef fort to identify possible terrorism suspects, law enforcement officials said.

Mr. Alfallaj should never had been able to enter the country, said James W. McJunkin, the former head of counterterrorism at the F.B.I.

“I’d say there was a number of breakdowns going back to where the original intelligence was maintained and stored,” Mr. McJunkin said. “He should have been on a watch list.”

The WH, DHS and State Taking on a Higher Middle East Threat

We have been making demands to list the Muslim Brotherhood as a terror organization for years. While other allied nations have taken a more aggressive posture with listing the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat, the United States remains uncommitted. Are some pieces beginning to line up for national security?

The State Department is at least taking ‘some’ steps however in the right direction, but it regards Egypt.

Image result for Lewaa Al-Thawra

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ahmed Abu Zeid welcomed the decision made by the United States to include the groups of “Hasm” and “Lewaa El-Thawra”, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist organization, on the US list of terrorist organizations. He regarded the decision as a positive development in the recognition of Egypt’s international partners, primarily the UnIted States, of the danger the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots pose to the security and stability of Egypt and its people.

 The Spokesperson added that the US decision is a practical display of solidarity with Egypt against terrorism, and the despicable attempts that aim to hinder its developmental trajectory and economic launch. This stance was recently expressed by the US officials at the highest levels, and represents an important step forward towards adopting an international comprehensive and effective strategy to eradicate and root out terrorism.

Okay, that is a good thing. But there are a few more piece of news to add.

A Department of Homeland Security draft report from late January called on authorities to continuously vet Sunni Muslim immigrants deemed to have “at-risk” demographic profiles.

The draft report, a copy of which was obtained by Foreign Policy, looks at 25 terrorist attacks in the United States between October 2001 and December 2017, concluding there would be “great value for the United States Government in dedicating resources to continuously evaluate persons of interest” and suggesting that immigrants to the United States be tracked on a “long-term basis.”

The CBP draft report comes on the heels of a controversial study by DHS and the Justice Department, released on Jan. 16, which claimed that three out of every four individuals convicted of international terrorism or terrorism-related offenses were immigrants. Critics have charged that the joint report had serious methodological issues and cherry-picked the data to justify the Trump administration’s restrictive immigration policies. Read more here for context.

What is the Trump administration coming to learn that the previous administration refused to address?

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard helped relocate al-Qaeda members and leadership by providing them with new clothes, shoes, Iranian passports and money.

Image result for Atiyyatullah al-Libi

These details were discovered in a series of letters from the al-Qaeda communication officer Atiyyatullah al-Libi, whose real name is Jamal Ibrahim al-Shtaiwi al-Musrati. He was appointed by Osama bin Laden himself as an al-Qaeda envoy in Iran.

The letters also reveal the nature of the cooperation between Iran and one of the al-Qaeda fighting factions in Libya.

Image result for iranian revolutionary guard corp meets nader

Letters from a member of the Libyan al-Qaeda fighting groups called Nader, addressed to Atiyyatullah al-Libi who in turn informed bin Laden about its content, showed that the Iranian regime’s approach to its international relationships is based on interests, not friendship.

This is what the Iranian Revolutionary Guard confirmed in a meeting with Nader while arranging for his departure from Iranian territory in 2007. They said: “We have no friends in the world, even the place you are going to, there are only common interests between us.”

According to the letter, this took place at the headquarters of al-Qaeda leaders and the al-Zarqawi group in one of the compounds dedicated for them.

An Iranian passport and a warning not to return

At the end of these discussions, the Revolutionary Guards granted the al-Qaeda fighter, Nader, an Iranian passport with an entry stamp, according to the letter. He added that he met a “Kurdish brother” who lent him a sum of money, after which al-Qarry (an al-Qaeda leader who was killed by an unmanned US drone in Afghanistan in 2017) sent him another $1,080.

Al-Masry becomes Ayman al-Zawahiri’s deputy in Syria

The escape was in 2007, as mentioned in a letter from Atiyyatullah to Osama bin Laden which was found as part of what is known as the Abbottabad files.

Nader remained in Iran along with Abu al-Khair al-Masry and Muhammad Rajab Abdul Rahman, the second-highest ranking commander of al-Qaeda.

“Abdulhadi al-Libi left a week before me, and I do not know anything about him. As for Abdullah Rajab, he stayed with us for a year and 4 months, while his family stayed in a house in Zahedan, which made him psychologically ill. But after a year and 4 months, they reunited him with his family and told him you have to stay here,” Nader said.

Despite the fact that Iran kept Abu al-Khair al-Masry for more than a decade and a half, the Revolutionary Guard sent him to Syria in 2013 as a deputy of Ayman al-Zawahiri who was the top leader of al-Qaeda. Al-Masry was killed in Idlib, north of Syria, in 2015.

Al-Qaeda recruitment and the move to Syria

The Iranian’s coordination with the Syrian regime in recruiting al-Qaeda elements, and directing them according to the common interests of both parties, was revealed in a letter showing parts of negotiations between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and a number of al-Qaeda factions in Evin prison.

Nader reunited with al-Qaeda members in Evin prison three weeks before he was released, and they were all sent to a “secret location”.

Bin Laden’s companions and al-Zarqawi

Iran’s Evin prison was not limited to Osama bin Laden’s companions and fighters, it also housed the al-Zarqawi group, including Abu al-Qasim, known as “Khaled Al Arouri”, al-Zarqawi’s assistant who is currently based in Syria and is part of what is known as the Khorasan Qaeda group.

This group’s leaders moved from Iran to Syria in 2013. The prison also housed the Yemeni Ali Saleh Hussein, known as “Abu al-Dahak”, who was close to Osama bin Laden, and was the link between al-Qaeda and its supporting organizations in Chechnya.

 

12 Strong the Movie

Image result for task force dagger photo

DoD: Those of us who are old enough to remember the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have vivid memories of that day. But the military mission launched in retaliation isn’t one most of us heard anything about until years later. Now, it’s being depicted on the big screen.

“12 Strong” comes out this weekend and is based on what happened when a 12-man U.S. Special Forces team was inserted into Afghanistan just weeks after the attacks on 9/11. The team, which was one of the first boots on the ground, worked with feuding local warlords and resistance fighters to take down the Taliban regime that was harboring al-Qaida.

The operation, dubbed Task Force Dagger, is still considered one of the most successful unconventional warfare mission in U.S. history.

The soldiers depicted in the movie were Green Berets assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group. They became famous not just because of their success against the Taliban but also because many of them did so on horseback – the first to ride to war that way since World War II – and they did it with only small weapons, while the Taliban enemy had tanks armed with artillery, mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.

The Americans also had key air power from the Air Force backing them up … but still.

Forever after that, the Green Berets became known as the “horse soldiers.”

How the Movie Matches Up

“12 Strong” is based on the 2009 book “Horse Soldiers” by Doug Stanton. But how does it fare in telling the real-life story?

“We were impressed with what they did,” said Army Lt. Col. Tim Hyde, the deputy director of the Los Angeles Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, which provided advice on the project.  “What they did do very well is they got across the experiences that these soldiers went through.”

He said although producers did still take some “creative license” with it and added a few “obvious dramatizations,” they told an accurate story, in part, thanks to the Defense Department working with the crew on the production.

The DoD’s Contribution

The movie was shot from November 2016 to February 2017 in the Albuquerque, New Mexico, area, with a few weeks spent shooting at White Sands Missile Range, which provided a lot of the enemy vehicles you see in the movie.

“The U.S. Army aircraft that you see in that film are actual 160th [Special Operations Aviation Regiment] aircraft that they brought in from Joint Base Lewis-McChord [in Washington state],” Hyde said.

Active-duty personnel were used in the movie – but you don’t actually see them. They were the people flying those aircraft.

None of the men who were depicted in the film played a role, but two of them – including real-life Capt. Mark Nutsch (portrayed by actor Chris Hemsworth) and Chief Warrant Officer Bob Pennington (portrayed by Michael Shannon) – watched the filming for a few days to get a sense of how producers were portraying their story.

“This is a fictional portrayal – don’t lose sight of that,” Nutsch told the Tampa Bay Times in a recent interview.

A few more tidbits about their incredible real-life mission:

  • Each Green Beret carried about 100 pounds of equipment on his back, including GPS, food and U.S. currency.
  • The Afghan horses were feisty stallions who would fight each other, even when the soldiers were riding.
  • They hoofed it over some scary terrain, at times riding on foot-wide trails by cliffs at night anywhere from 6 to 18 miles a day.
  • The soldiers were operating so deep in Afghanistan that additional supplies often had to be air-dropped to them.
  • In two months, three 12-man teams like the troops in the movie, as well as more than a dozen support personnel and Afghan militia, accomplished more than any other force in Afghanistan at the time. The enemy was driven out of its safe havens in what al-Qaida still considers its largest, most destructive defeat.

Soldiers Magazine put together a great story about these horse soldiers. If you want to know more about their courageous journey, I suggest you read it!

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Throughout the campaign, Army Special Forces, assisted by AFSOC Combat Controllers (CCTs) called in bombing runs from B-52, B-1 bombers as well as Navy F14 and F18 attack aircraft. AFSOC AC-130 Gunships, operating exclusively at night and coordinated by CCTs, provided close air support. On several occasions, MC-130E/H aircraft dropped 15,000lb BLU-28 ‘Daisy Cutter’ bombs on Taliban troop positions with devastating effect.

The combination of SOF-coordinated air power and indigenous anti-Taliban forces characterized the opening rounds of Operation Enduring Freedom.

ODA 595 & ODA 534 – Mazar-e-Sharif and Dari-a-Souf Valley

The 2nd TF-Dagger team to insert was ODA 595, which was flown across the Hindu Kush mountains by SOAR MH-47s on the 20th of October. The team was inserted in the Dari-a-Souf Valley, south of Mazar-e-Sharif, linking up with the CIA and General Dostum, commander of the largest and most powerful Northern Alliance Faction.

ODA 595 on horseback ODA 595, CIA SAD operatives and attached AFSOC CCTs found themselves required to ride on horseback alongside General Dostum’s troops. In scenes reminiscent of Lawrence Of Arabia, US SOF and Northern Alliance swept across the Afghanistan countryside towards Taliban positions in classic cavalry charges.

Few of the US SOF were accomplished riders and none were comfortable with the traditional wooden saddles common in Afghanistan. Following an urgent request, leather saddles was air dropped to the grateful men on the ground.

ODA 595 split into two units, Alpha and Bravo. Alpha accompanied Dostrum as his force pushed towards the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, calling in strikes from US warplanes against a series of Taliban positions, whilst Bravo called in strikes against Taliban positions across the Dari-a-Souf Valley.

A further Special Forces team, ODA 534, inserted by SOAR helos on the night of November 2nd were tasked with supported General Mohammad Atta, a Northern Alliance militia leader. ODA 534, along with CIA officers, eventually linked up with ODA 595 and Gen Dostrum outside Mazar-e-Sharif.

As the 2 SF ODAs and attached AFSOC personnel called down air strikes, Northern Alliance foot soldiers, cavalry and armored units took the city. More here.

DoJ Official Explains the Terror and Immigration Report

Politico published an item regarding the White House press briefing on 1/17/2018 where a Justice Department official, Ed O’Callaghan explained several terror cases inside the United States had connective tissue to chain migration as well as illegal immigration in an effort to give rise to the whole debate on Capital Hill as it relates to DACA, funding the border wall and shutting down the Federal government if no deal is reached. The only paragraph that did not have some bias slant to it is:

The report’s release, part of an executive order signed by President Donald Trump last year, comes as the White House is pushing for changes in the U.S. immigration system that would end the diversity visa lottery program — through which a terrorist who killed eight people with a rented truck entered the U.S. — and chain migration, the practice of legal immigrants sponsoring family members’ entry into the country.

So, what is in this report?

 

Executive Order 13780 Section 11 Report – Final by zerohedge on Scribd

Most of the critical national security enhancements implemented and effectuated as a result of Executive Order 13780 are classified in nature, and will remain so to prevent malicious actors from  
exploiting our immigration system.
However, to “be more transparent with the American  people and to implement more effectively policies and practices that serve the national interest,” Section 11 of Executive Order 13780 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, to collect and make publicly available the following information:
(i) Information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been charged with terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; convicted of terrorism-related offenses while in the United States; or removed from the United States based on terrorism-related activity, affiliation with or provision of material support to a terrorism-related organization, or any other national-security-related reasons;
(ii) Information regarding the number of foreign nationals in the United States who have been radicalized after entry into the United States and who have engaged in terrorism-related acts, or who have provided material support to terrorism-related organizations in countries that pose a threat to the United States;
(iii) Information regarding the number and types of acts of gender-based violence against women, including so-called “honor killings,” in the United States by foreign nationals; and, (iv) Any other information relevant to public safety and security as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General, including information on the immigration status of foreign nationals charged with major offenses.
According to a list maintained by DOJ’s National Security Division, at least 549 individuals were convicted of international terrorism-related charges in U.S. federal courts  between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2016. An analysis conducted by DHS determined that approximately 73 percent (402 of these 549 individuals) were foreign-born. Breaking down the 549 individuals by citizenship status at the time of their respective convictions reveals that:
1. 254 were not U.S. citizens;
2. 148 were foreign-born, naturalized and received U.S. citizenship; and,  
3. 147 were U.S. citizens by birth.
 8 specific cases were listed in the report with a summary of each case. The Boston bombers were not listed in this report. They went from a tourist visa, to asylum status, to green card and one got citizenship. We also have the San Bernardino killers that arrived on a marriage visa and a cultural visa. Both of those have stay limits. The argument here in both cases they are in the spirit of chain migration.
Diplomatic favors? How about that Christmas Day bomber? How was he granted a visa?

The Christmas Day bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, had initially had his visa denied in 2004, four years prior to his 2008 application. In 2004, he applied again, and the initial denial was overturned because a supervisory consular officer decided Abdulmuttalab’s father was too prominent in Nigerian politics and finance to upset the U.S. diplomatic applecart in that country and deny his son a visa. Ironically, this was the same father who four years later visited the U.S. embassy in Nigeria and sought to help the U.S. keep his son out of the U.S., only subsequently to have the U.S. decide he was not important enough to listen to.

The legal kicker in this visa story is that on Abdulmuttalab’s 2008 application, he lied and said he had never received a prior denial, enough to deny him a visa under law and keep him out of the country. As the matter was “considered resolved,” State Department did not look again at the 2004 denial when the young Al Qaeda operative sought another visa in 2008. Instead, he was granted the multi-year visa he used to attend an Islamic convention in Houston in 2008 and again for airline check-in on Christmas Eve.

This is incredibly embarrassing to the State Department. Despite State’s spin on this “new” fact, what this makes clear is that: (1) the intelligence community was not primarily to blame after all for failure to revoke the visa, as it should never have been issued in the first place; but (2) raises – once more – a larger issue of the State Department’s policies regarding visa issuance; and (3) whether State should continue to be responsible for the visa process. More here.

The Democrats are in a pre 9/11 mentality. After the 9/11 Commission Report, recommendations and solutions were drafted of which the congressional leaders all approved. In particular, go to page 24 of the summary as it relates to immigration.

Iraq Before and After ISIS, Satellite Images and Data

Mosul in March 2016, under Islamic State control, when nighttime lighting had fallen by 55 percent compared to its pre-ISIS levels in January 2014

January 9, 2018

What Life Under ISIS Looked Like from Space

Rand Corporation: Mosul in March 2016, under Islamic State control, when nighttime lighting had fallen by 55 percent compared to its pre-ISIS levels in January 2014

Image by NOAA Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)

A sandstorm swept through the besieged Iraqi city of Ramadi on the day it fell to the Islamic State. In the murk and confusion, suicide car bombs raced into the city center and leveled entire blocks. By the afternoon, the black flag of ISIS flew from the government headquarters.

Hundreds of miles above, an array of satellites captured what came next. Markets emptied. Factories went cold. Fields of wheat and barley withered. And the lights went out all over the city.

Data from those satellites provided RAND researchers an unprecedented look at life inside the Islamic State. They found a path of economic destruction, with few exceptions. In city after city, as in Ramadi, the arrival of the Islamic State meant a plunge into darkness.

Local Economies Under ISIS

By the time Ramadi fell in mid-2015, the Islamic State controlled an area of Iraq and Syria approaching the size of Great Britain. Its advance had been ruthless, its brutality staggering. RAND researchers wanted to know: What happened to cities and local economies when the Islamic State tried to govern?

Satellites were their way in.

Satellite observations have opened windows on everything from nuclear weapon programs to rush-hour traffic in the decades since RAND first proposed a “world-circling spaceship” in 1946. The United States alone now has more than 800 active satellites in orbit; more than half of them are commercial. Analysts have used satellite data to measure poverty in Kenya, black markets in North Korea, even the number of customer cars in Home Depot parking lots.

Those same kinds of data, RAND researchers realized, could provide a remarkably detailed look inside one of the most dangerous places in the world.

Satellite data measuring surface reflections from the Earth, for example, would show how much land was planted for agriculture. Urban heat readings would help pinpoint working factories. And infrared ground scans would show where city lights were glowing in the night, bright spider webs against a dark background.

In Syria, more than 60 percent of the lights went dark as ISIS struggled to restore electricity or fuel generators. In Iraq, it was more like 80 percent.

The researchers collected data on more than 150 cities in Iraq and Syria, month by month. They estimated that as much as a third of the population had fled areas under ISIS control. Factories closed; fields dried up. In Syria, more than 60 percent of the lights went dark as ISIS struggled to restore electricity or fuel generators. In Iraq, it was more like 80 percent.

“What’s unique about this is that we were able to bring all these different measurements together and provide a much more holistic understanding of the local economies,” said Eric Robinson, a research programmer and analyst at RAND who led the project. “We were able to use nighttime lighting to understand electricity consumption, but control for population levels. We knew that if an entire city had depopulated, then there was no one there to turn the lights on.”

Some Economic Decay, Some Effective Governance

The researchers then zoomed in on five major cities using high-resolution photographs from commercial satellites. Those photographs, similar to the satellite-view images on Google Maps, were so detailed the researchers could count cars on the road or measure foot traffic at a market. A small army of volunteers helped them go through the images, one by one, and perform those counts by hand—a crowd-sourced solution to a big-data problem.

The images told two very different stories.

In cities like Ramadi, Tikrit, and Deir ez-Zor, where ISIS was under fire and struggling to maintain control, its rule brought economic decay. Satellite images of the main market in Ramadi, for example, showed a ghost town. Commercial trucks all but disappeared from the roads in Tikrit. And in Deir ez-Zor, the lights went dark in ISIS-controlled neighborhoods even though the group held massive oil fields outside the city that could have kept generators running.

But in the core of the caliphate, where ISIS control was more secure, the satellite images showed some evidence of effective governance. In its capital city of Raqqa, for example, the group managed to keep the lights on at hospitals even when the rest of the city went dark, a sign that it was managing electricity. In the big city of Mosul, the group transformed an open-air market into a covered shopping district that was soon bustling with shoppers and car traffic—all of which it could tax.

Mosul City Center and Market

Following liberation of the city, recent satellite photo shows extensive damage and destruction to Mosul.

Satellite image by Digitalglobe

“There were obviously just terrible stories of brutality coming out of the city, but people still need to buy food, and shop owners still own shops, and goods are still moving in and out of this market,” Robinson said.

“One of the key takeaways of our report,” he added, “is that without the military campaign to retake this territory, the Islamic State could have tried to replicate some of the modest success it experienced in Mosul and Raqqa. We would be facing a much different enemy.”

Preparing for a Post-ISIS Recovery

In fact, the researchers concluded it wasn’t necessarily the harsh rule and high taxes of ISIS that ground out local economies. The group was constantly trying to fend off counterattacks and air strikes, and could not turn its attention to governing or building back local economies.

Its caliphate has since splintered. It lost Tikrit in 2015, Ramadi in early 2016. Iraqi forces declared Mosul liberated last year, after dislodging ISIS forces neighborhood by neighborhood. A RAND analysis calculated that the Islamic State had lost more than half its territory by early 2017, a rout that has continued since then.

The extensive destruction of West Mosul, Iraq, June 2017

The extensive destruction of West Mosul, Iraq, June 2017

Photo by Sipa via AP Images

The disintegration of the Islamic State as a state has given RAND’s satellite analysis new importance. No longer a window into how the group governs, though, it is now providing a window into the economic damage it left behind, and what it will take to rebuild. Researchers have been working with U.S. government agencies to prioritize work in Syria to help stabilize cities captured from ISIS—restoring the electric grid, for example, or investing in markets.

“I think the big concern in this region is that if we don’t help truly rebuild and reconstitute the local governance in those areas, that there will be a resurgence of an ISIS 2.0 or an ISIS-like group,” Robinson said. He’s hoping to continue tracking the satellite data, “to measure our progress so far, to make sure we don’t take our foot off the gas too soon.”

The scale of that need is apparent in Ramadi. It’s been almost three years since ISIS fighters swept into the city in the blur of a sandstorm, and two years since Iraqi forces swept them back out. RAND’s satellite data showed destruction in almost every neighborhood in the city; every bridge was demolished. The city was once home to nearly 300,000 people; RAND’s data suggest no more than 36,000 still lived there after ISIS.

— Doug Irving