What is the Syria Strategy from the West?

Posted on April 16, 2018April 16, 2018 by Denise Simon

In the days ahead, it appears that Russia and the rogue friends they keep will respond to the West likely by a obscure cyber war. Take personal caution with your financial activity.

The other warning is news reports for are specific assassination attempts covered to look as suicide. While we heard about the poison assassination attempt in Salisbury, England of Skripal and his daughter, the United States had it’s own successful assassination in 2015 of Mikhail Lesin in Washington DC. Additionally, the UK had two another successful wet jobs as it is called going back to 20o6 and 2010. Those victims were Alexander Litvinenko and Gareth Williams who worked for GCHQ

There are many other hit operations that happened in Russia including the recent death of Maxim Borodin.

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There are an estimated 250+ journalists that have been killed since the fall of the Soviet Union.

So, it is now declared that the United Nations quit counting the dead from the Syria civil war since the number has officially exceeded 500,000. What is disgusting however is, we sorta care about the dead but the methods no longer matter unless chemical weapons are used. How nuts is that? So, France, Britain and the United States respond to the most recent attack –> Russia says Syria 'gas attack' caused by terrorist weapons ... photo

check – round one of airstrikes

check – round two of airstrikes

Let’s give credit where credit is due. By John Hannah

First, U.S. President Donald Trump set a red line and enforced it. He warned that the large-scale use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime would trigger a U.S. attack. When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad crossed that red line a year ago, Trump responded with 59 cruise missiles that took out about 20 percent of Syria’s operational aircraft. A year later, Trump has acted again after Assad chose to challenge him a second time. This attack was twice as big and hit multiple targets, including what U.S. defense officials called the “heart” of Syria’s chemical weapons program, substantially degrading Assad’s ability to produce the deadly agents.

That ain’t peanuts. No, there’s no guarantee it will end Assad’s use of chemical weapons — in which case Trump and his military have made clear that they’ll strike again, almost certainly harder than the time before. And no, nothing that happened Friday night will, in isolation, alter the trajectory of Syria’s bloody civil war. But the effective deployment of U.S. power in defense of a universal norm barring the use of some of the world’s worst weapons against innocent men, women, and children is nevertheless to be applauded — limited an objective as it may be. Also to be praised is the possible emergence of a commander in chief whose threats to use force need to be taken seriously by U.S. adversaries. Once established, this kind of credibility (while no panacea) can be a powerful instrument in the U.S. foreign-policy arsenal. Once lost, it is hard to recover, and the consequences can be severe. For evidence, just see the post-2013 results, from Crimea to Syria.

A second important virtue of Friday night’s attack was its multilateral character. With barely a week’s notice, Britain, France, and the United States, the three most powerful militaries of the trans-Atlantic alliance, all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, seamlessly operated on the seas and in the skies of the Middle East to defend their common interests and values against a murderous Russian and Iranian client. What’s the worth of that kind of unity, coordination, and seriousness of purpose? It’s hard to quantify precisely. But anyone who’s ever toiled as a practitioner in the national security space knows, deep in their bones, that it matters — a lot. And it especially matters in the case of a U.S. president who has too often unfairly — and, to my mind, dangerously — discounted the value of Europe, the West, and the post-World War II system of institutions and alliances that his predecessors built. In that power and righteousness of the world’s leading liberal democracies acting in concert, there’s a significant value-added that no mere counting of ships, planes, and missiles can adequately capture. Kudos to the president and his team for their skill in mounting this posse. It’s an important framework that they hopefully will continue to invest in to confront the multitude of urgent international challenges now staring us in the face.

A few other related observations: Say what you will about the wisdom of some of the president’s public messaging last week, but once he made clear that he again would act to enforce his red line, U.S. adversaries took him deadly seriously. Russian ships dispersed from port. Syria abandoned its own air bases and rushed to co-locate its aircraft near Russian military assets. And Iranian-backed fighters, including Hezbollah forces, allegedly vacated certain positions and went to ground for fear of a possible U.S. strike. Again, the fact that the United States’ worst adversaries appear to take Trump’s threats with the seriousness they deserve is a very good thing, a genuine national security asset that needs to be husbanded, reinforced, and carefully but systematically exploited going forward. But hopefully last week’s experience also serves as a reminder to the president of the deep wisdom inherent in the criticism that he’s long leveled at his predecessors: Don’t telegraph your military punch.

Another observation: There was much nervous hand-wringing before the strike about a possible U.S.-Russia confrontation. Rightly so. No one wants World War III to break out over Syria. All prudent and appropriate measures should be taken to mitigate those risks. But in some circles, the hyping of the concern threatened to become absolutely paralyzing, a justification (or excuse) for doing nothing in the face of Assad’s abominable use of weapons of mass destruction.

In the end, of course, for all their chest thumping, the Russians did next to nothing as Western planes and missiles flew under their noses to strike a client that they’ve expended significant resources to save.

Just as the Israelis, for their part, have conducted nearly 100 strikes against Russia’s Iranian, Hezbollah, and Syrian allies with barely more than a clenched fist from Moscow. The fact is that for all the firepower they may have assembled in Syria, and for all the success they’ve enjoyed carpet-bombing defenseless civilian populations and poorly equipped Islamist radicals, Russian forces are severely overmatched — both in terms of quality and quantity — by what the United States and its allies can bring to bear in any head-to-head confrontation in the eastern Mediterranean. Putin knows it. So does his military. That reality of the actual balance of power — not only militarily, but economically and diplomatically as well — is always worth keeping in mind.

On their own, the Syrians and their Iranian allies were virtually defenseless against the U.S.-led strike. The best they had was a flurry of unguided missiles haphazardly fired after the mission’s designated targets had been turned to smoldering ruins. Of course, it was only a few years ago (well before the Russians intervened with their advanced S-400 surface-to-air batteries) that senior U.S. officials were pointing to the dangers of Assad’s air defenses as an excuse for not acting to protect Syrian civilians from being systematically terrorized by barrel bombs, indiscriminate artillery fire, and Scud missiles. Let’s hope that the overwhelming success of this attack puts the reality of that threat into somewhat better perspective for U.S. military planners — while also serving as a powerful reminder not just to Assad, but to Iran and other adversaries as well, of the extreme vulnerability they potentially face at the hands of U.S. air power and weaponry.

My criticisms of the U.S. strike? It was clearly at the lowest end of the options presented the president. As suggested by some of what I’ve said above, Trump was too risk-averse. Even with the president telegraphing that a strike was coming, the universe of targets that the United States could have attacked — while still minimizing collateral damage and the threat of great-power escalation — was far larger than what it ended up hitting. Trump could have done much more to degrade the Assad regime’s overall capability to wage war against its own people. The United States could have sent far more powerful messages to the Syrian government’s key military and intelligence power nodes of the risks they run to their own survival through mindless obedience to Assad’s genocidal criminality. Ditto the Russians and Iranians, and the realization that their failure to reign in the most psychotic tendencies of their client could substantially raise the costs and burdens of their Syrian venture if they’re not careful.

In short, everything the United States wanted to do with the strike — hold Assad accountable, re-establish deterrence against the use of chemical weapons, send a message to the Russians and Iranians about the price to be paid for failing to control their client, and move toward a credible political settlement — could have been done more effectively, at acceptable risk, with a significantly larger strike.

More fundamentally, I have deep concerns about what appears to be the president’s emerging strategy in Syria. It amounts to defeating the Islamic State, deterring the use of chemical weapons, and then withdrawing U.S. forces as quickly as possible from eastern Syria. As for the more strategically significant menace posed to vital U.S. interests by an aspiring Iranian hegemon seeking to dominate the Middle East’s northern tier, drive the United States out of the region, and destroy Israel, the administration’s strategy is not particularly compelling. As best as one can tell from the president’s recent statements — including the one he made on Friday night announcing the Syria strike — it amounts to encouraging some combination of regional allies (and perhaps Russia) to fill the vacuum the United States leaves behind.

That kind of abdication of U.S. leadership rarely works out well. Leveraging U.S. power to demand greater burden-sharing from partners who have even more at stake than the United States does? Definitely. Less effective: When the United States washes its hands of a problem with deep implications for U.S. national security in vague hope that other parties — smaller, weaker, more deeply conflicted and strategically myopic than the United States is — will organically rise to the occasion and mobilize a virtuous coalition that takes care of business and keeps at bay the country’s most vicious adversaries.

The president is right, of course: The Middle East is a deeply troubled place. There are no great victories to be won there. There is no glory to be gained. Just worst disasters to be avoided, threats contained, and important national interests preserved. Yes it is imperative that the United States does so smartly, prudently, by, with and, through local partners and multilateral coalitions, using all instruments of national power, and in a way that sustains the understanding and support of the American people. But do so the country must. Packing its bags and vacating the playing field to the likes of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah is escapism masquerading as strategy. Trump’s important response to the Syrian chemical weapons attack last week is evidence that he may still be capable of grasping that unforgiving reality. He should be encouraged to build on it.

John Hannah

Hey Android Users, How about that Bundled Permission Thing

Posted on April 16, 2018April 16, 2018 by Denise Simon

A few members of congress did ask Mark Zuckerberg about bundled permissions and Zuckerberg played dumb on the question. Remember that thing when your phone asks for permission to post to Facebook? Well it goes across all your synchronized devices. What? uh huh…read on.

This screen in the Messenger application offers to conveniently track all your calls and messages. But Facebook was already doing this surreptitiously on some Android devices until October 2017, exploiting the way an older Android API handled permissions.

Better check and ask some harder questions…..

[Update, March 25, 2018, 20:24 Eastern Time]: Facebook has responded to this and other reports regarding the collection of call and SMS data with a blog post that denies Facebook collected call data surreptitiously. The company also writes that it never sells the data and that users are in control of the data uploaded to Facebook. This “fact check” contradicts several details Ars found in analysis of Facebook data downloads and testimony from users who provided the data. More on the Facebook response is appended to the end of the original article below.

This past week, a New Zealand man was looking through the data Facebook had collected from him in an archive he had pulled down from the social networking site. While scanning the information Facebook had stored about his contacts, Dylan McKay discovered something distressing: Facebook also had about two years’ worth of phone call metadata from his Android phone, including names, phone numbers, and the length of each call made or received.

This experience has been shared by a number of other Facebook users who spoke with Ars, as well as independently by us—my own Facebook data archive, I found, contained call-log data for a certain Android device I used in 2015 and 2016, along with SMS and MMS message metadata.

In response to an email inquiry by Ars about this data gathering, a Facebook spokesperson replied, “The most important part of apps and services that help you make connections is to make it easy to find the people you want to connect with. So, the first time you sign in on your phone to a messaging or social app, it’s a widely used practice to begin by uploading your phone contacts.”

The spokesperson pointed out that contact uploading is optional and installation of the application explicitly requests permission to access contacts. And users can delete contact data from their profiles using a tool accessible via Web browser.

Facebook uses phone-contact data as part of its friend recommendation algorithm. And in recent versions of the Messenger application for Android and Facebook Lite devices, a more explicit request is made to users for access to call logs and SMS logs on Android and Facebook Lite devices. But even if users didn’t give that permission to Messenger, they may have given it inadvertently for years through Facebook’s mobile apps—because of the way Android has handled permissions for accessing call logs in the past. (For Facebook’s instructions on turning off continuous contact uploading, go here. )

If you granted permission to read contacts during Facebook’s installation on Android a few versions ago—specifically before Android 4.1 (Jelly Bean)—that permission also granted Facebook access to call and message logs by default. The permission structure was changed in the Android API in version 16. From Android 4.1 on, a single request from those applications would trigger two separate permission requests.

But until the “Marshmallow” version of Android, even with split permissions, all permissions could still be presented all at once, without users getting the option to decline them individually. So Facebook and other applications could continue to gain access to call and SMS data with a single request by specifying an earlier Android SDK version. Starting with Marshmallow, users could toggle these permissions separately themselves. But as many as half of Android users worldwide remain on older versions of the operating system because of carrier restrictions on updates or other issues.

Apple iOS has never allowed access to call log data by third-party apps, overt or silently, so this sort of data acquisition was never possible.

Facebook provides a way for users to purge collected contact data from their accounts, but it’s not clear if this deletes just contacts or if it also purges call and SMS metadata. After purging my contact data, my contacts and calls were still in the archive I downloaded the next day—likely because the archive was not regenerated for my new request. (Update: The cached archive was generated once and not updated on the second request. However, two days after a request to delete all contact data, the contacts were still listed by the contact management tool.)

As always, if you’re really concerned about privacy, you should not share address book and call-log data with any mobile application. And you may want to examine the rest of what can be found in the downloadable Facebook archive, as it includes all the advertisers that Facebook has shared your contact information with, among other things.

Update, March 25, 2018, continued:

Facebook responded to reports that it collected phone and SMS data without users’ knowledge in a “fact check” blog post on Sunday. In the response, a Facebook spokesperson stated:

Call and text history logging is part of an opt-in feature for people using Messenger or Facebook Lite on Android. This helps you find and stay connected with the people you care about, and provide you with a better experience across Facebook. People have to expressly agree to use this feature. If, at any time, they no longer wish to use this feature they can turn it off in settings, or here for Facebook Lite users, and all previously shared call and text history shared via that app is deleted. While we receive certain permissions from Android, uploading this information has always been opt-in only.

This contradicts the experience of several users who shared their data with Ars. Dylan McKay told Ars that he installed Messenger in 2015, but only allowed the app the permissions in the Android manifest that were required for installation. He says he removed and reinistalled the app several times over the course of the next few years, but never explicitly gave the app permission to read his SMS records and call history. McKay’s call and SMS data runs through July of 2017.

In my case, a review of my Google Play data confirms that Messenger was never installed on the Android devices I used. Facebook was installed on a Nexus tablet I used and on the Blackphone 2 in 2015, and there was never an explicit message requesting access to phone call and SMS data. Yet there is call data from the end of 2015 until late 2016, when I reinstalled the operating system on the Blackphone 2 and wiped all applications.

While data collection was technically “opt-in,” in both these cases the opt-in was the default installation mode for Facebook’s application, not a separate notification of data collection. Facebook never explicitly revealed that the data was being collected, and it was only discovered as part of a review of the data associated with the accounts. The users we talked to only performed such reviews after the recent revelations about Cambridge Analytica’s use of Facebook data.

Facebook began explicitly asking permission from users of Messenger and Facebook Lite to access SMS and call data to “help friends find each other” after being publicly shamed in 2016 over the way it handled the “opt-in” for SMS services. That message mentioned nothing about retaining SMS and call data, but instead it offered an “OK” button to approve “keeping all of your SMS messages in one place.”

Facebook says that the company keeps the data secure and does not sell it to third parties. But the post doesn’t address why it would be necessary to retain not just the numbers of contacts from phone calls and SMS messages, but the date, time, and length of those calls for years. Sean Gallagher Sean is Ars Technica’s IT and National Security Editor. A former Navy officer, systems administrator, and network systems integrator with 20 years of IT journalism experience, he lives and works in Baltimore, Maryland.

Russia’s Response to the West, Cyber War

Posted on April 16, 2018April 16, 2018 by Denise Simon

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the United Kingdom’s (UK) National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) released a joint Technical Alert (TA) about malicious cyber activity carried out by the Russian Government. The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the Russian government as GRIZZLY STEPPE.

NCCIC encourages users and administrators to review the GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity page, which links to TA18-106A – Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices, for more information.

*** photo

Senator Tom Cotton: Our nation’s communications networks benefit us in ways unimaginable at the start of the digital age. But a potential danger lurks: hidden “backdoors” in network equipment. A hostile foreign power could use these backdoors to spy on Americans or attack our critical infrastructure by injecting viruses or launching denial-of-service attacks. These backdoors can be designed into routers, switches, and virtually any other type of telecommunications equipment that, together, make up our networks.

This highlights the importance of our networks’ supply chain—that is, the process by which telecommunications equipment is manufactured, sold, distributed, and installed. Whether the threat involves hacking into our nation’s communications networks or conducting industrial or political espionage at the behest of a foreign government, the integrity of the supply chain has worried U.S. government officials for years.

In 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released a bipartisan report on the national security threats posed by certain foreign manufacturers. This past year, Congress barred the Department of Defense from buying certain equipment and services from Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE on account of concerns about those companies’ connections to that country’s government. And Congress recently banned all federal agencies from using products or services made by Kaspersky Lab, a company with alleged ties to the Russian government.

We’re committed to protecting our national security, and this proposal is a prudent step to accomplish that goal.

But the supply-chain threat persists. Just this February, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified about “the risks of allowing any company or entity that is beholden to foreign governments that don’t share our values to gain positions of power inside our telecommunications networks.” These risks include the ability to “maliciously modify or steal information” and “conduct undetected espionage.” As the supply chain for our networks increasingly stretches beyond U.S. borders, this danger has become all too real.

Given the national security risks, we believe it’s time for more concerted federal action. Among other things, that means making sure that our government doesn’t make the problem worse by spending the American people’s money on products and services from any company that poses a national security threat to our communications networks.

The Federal Communications Commission is a good place to start. It regulates America’s communications networks. And it administers the Universal Service Fund, an almost $9 billion-per-year program designed to ensure that all Americans have access to phone and broadband services. The money in the Fund comes from fees paid by the American people on their phone bills. About $4.7 billion annually is spent expanding high-speed Internet access in rural communities; $2.7 billion helps connect schools and libraries to the Internet; $1.3 billion assists in making phone and broadband services more affordable to low-income Americans; and about $300 million supports communications services for rural health-care facilities. These are important programs. But there’s no reason one dime of this funding should go to suppliers that raise national security concerns. There are plenty of other providers we can use to help bridge the digital divide.

That’s why the FCC will vote on April 17 on Chairman Pai’s recent proposal to bar the use of universal service funding to buy equipment or services from any company that poses a national security threat to the integrity of our communications networks or the communications supply chain. If approved, the proposal would also seek public input on how we should identify suspect firms and which types of telecommunications equipment or services should fall within the prohibition. Everyone concerned about this issue will have a chance to weigh in.

Bottom line: We’re committed to protecting our national security, and this proposal is a prudent step to accomplish that goal. The FCC, Congress, and all government agencies must work together to safeguard the integrity of our communications supply chain. We strongly urge the full Commission to approve this proposal and for other agencies to follow the lead.

Russia Blames the White Helmets for the Chemical Attacks

Posted on April 11, 2018April 11, 2018 by Denise Simon

Really Moscow? Exactly how much aid and assistance has the Russian forces provided to the dying innocent Syrians? None. Who are the White Helmets?

Then there are those that believe Assad and Putin when they say that had nothing to do with the chemical attacks….hummm What is the real issue here? Diplomatic relationships….Exactly how many rebel groups have barrel bombs, helicopters and full protection of laboratories to manufacture chlorine and nerve agent gasses? It is called Agent 15 or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate. For a detailed timeline, go here.

*** ‘War crime': U.N. finds sarin used in Syria chemical ... photo

After a Syrian photographer found parts made by German company the Krempel Group in the remains of Iranian-produced chemical rockets that gassed Syrian civilians in January and February, the firm rejected on Wednesday new US warnings about the dangers of conducting business with the Islamic Republic.

“There continue to be ongoing risks with doing business there, because the Iranians have not reformed their system,” Sigal Mandelker, the US under secretary of the Treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, said on Tuesday.

Mandelker, speaking in London, said Tehran was financing Hezbollah, Hamas and Syrian President Bashar Assad.

There is no transparency in the Iranian banking system, she said. “The onus of responsibility lies in Iran and we’re going to continue to highlight the risks of doing business there, because they haven’t taken the actions that they have promised they would take,” she said.

When asked whether it had ignored US warnings, Krempel told The Jerusalem Post on Wednesday it has continued business deals with Iran, but “Krempel GmbH complies strictly with legal guidelines. In unclear situations, we seek legal advice and apply corresponding measures in order to remain in compliance.”

Krempel added that it now “delivers a different pressspan (also not a dual-use good) exclusively to a manufacturer (OEM) [Original Equipment Manufacturer] in Iran because we can know the end usage.”

A presspan is an insulating material with a cellulose base that can be used in motors. Dual-use goods can be used for both military and civilian purposes, and what items come under this rubric is subject to dispute.

Green Party politician Volker Beck told the Post that “Germany has apparently in the past allowed the delivery of dual-use goods to Iran. That is completely unacceptable. One cannot stress the ‘special relationship’ with Israel and at the same time deliver material for Iranian rockets that threaten Israel’s existence.

“The victims of the Assad regime are paying the price for this mistake,” Beck added.

The Krempel Group, located near the southern city of Stuttgart, sold electronic press boards to Iranian companies that were used in the production of Iranian rockets. The press boards are frequently inserted in motors.

Assad regime forces fired the Iranian missiles containing Krempel material, resulting in the severe gassing of 21 adults and children.

Krempel added in its statement to the Post that the company halted business relations with the two buyers in Tehran, who were involved in delivering the Krempel material for the chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The firm said it terminated business with the two men who operate companies in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar because it cannot influence the use of its products in that market.

The two former Krempel business partners are Reza Moghaddam Panah and Mahmood Hasan Darvish Commerce. Krempel had $184,000 in annual sales to the Iranian companies.

The German firm operates a distribution center called Krempel Insulation Technologies, LP, in Deerfield, Michigan.

KREMPEL’S DECISION to continue business with Iran prompted criticism from Julie Lenarz, a senior fellow at the Israel Project.

She told the Post that “on Saturday, harrowing footage of children foaming at the mouth, dying in agony from exposure to chemical weapons, flashed across our television screens again. If our politicians want to move beyond empty mantras of condemnation, they can start by punishing the protectors of the murderous Assad regime.

“Since the nuclear accord was signed with Iran in 2015, European countries and companies have flocked to Tehran for lucrative business deals. The consequences have been grim. Material sold by Krempel was caught in Iranian chemical rockets deployed against Syrians civilians. And yet the company refuses to stop trading with Iran, hiding behind smug legal truisms,” Lenarz said.

She added that “no company with a robust ethical code, nor any country with a moral compass intact, could possibly regard Iran as a legitimate business partner. The Islamic Republic is the No. 1 state sponsor of terror. The greatest threat to stability in the Middle East. A brutal occupier abroad, and a repressive theocracy at home.”

The Krempel Group describes itself on its website as “an independent manufacturer of high quality semi-finished products and a leading global system supplier of modern materials. Our electrical insulations, composites, solar and electronic materials, as well as special laminates, enjoy an excellent reputation worldwide and we are global market leaders in many of these sectors.”

When asked about Krempel and German companies conducting dual-use business with Iran, Christiane Fuckerer, a spokeswoman for Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control – BAFA, said she could not provide such information by press time.

Beate Baron, a spokeswoman for Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, which oversees BAFA, declined to answer a Post media query.

BAFA said in February that Krempel’s Presss pan PSP 3040, the material used in Iranian chemical rockets, is not classified as dual-use merchandise.

German exports to Iran increased in 2017 by 19%, with a total value of just under €2.4 billion. The Post reported in 2017 that numerous German intelligence agencies reported that Iran sought chemical and biological weapon technology in the Federal Republic.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said she was “shocked’ about Saturday’s chemical attack in Syria and the repeated use of poison gas in the country.

*** Anyone remember the report of North Korea assisting Assad with chemical weapons?

In part: North Korea has been sending equipment to Syria that could be used in the manufacturing of chemical weapons, according to a New York Times report citing United Nations experts.

The UN spokesman also said that shelling between rebels and Government forces in Syria had not stopped, despite a UN-ordered ceasefire, and it was not safe for relief crews to get humanitarian and medical aid into Eastern Ghouta and other parts of war-ravaged Syria.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad agreed to destroy his country’s chemical weapons in 2013.

However, United States officials reportedly believe Mr Assad has secretly kept part of the chemical weapons stockpile and might have continued evolving Syria’s arsenal.

Myanmar also receiving arms, reports say

The news of North Korea’s possible assistance with Syria’s chemical weapons program comes after reports that Myanmar had been receiving ballistic missile technology and weapons from North Korea.

Myanmar’s Government has denied having any military ties with North Korea.

But earlier this month another confidential UN report, sighted by Reuters, suggested one unnamed country reported it had evidence that Myanmar received ballistic missile systems from North Korea, along with conventional weapons, including multiple rocket launchers and surface-to-air missiles.

Myanmar’s UN ambassador Hau Do Suan responded to the claims, stating the Myanmar Government “has no ongoing arms relationship, whatsoever, with North Korea” and is abiding by the UN Security Council resolutions.

It is believed that North Korea earned upwards of $200 million from banned exports in 2017 alone.

Iran’s Nuclear Program, Deviations From JCPOA

Posted on April 11, 2018April 11, 2018 by Denise Simon

Primer: from a former Pentagon official

The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), all but guaranteed a nuclear Iran no later than 2030, necessitating U.S. withdrawal at some point to prevent a critical threat to American national security interests. But there was no urgency for Washington to do so.

What was pressing, following the Iran-Russia alliance with Bashar al-Assad gaining the upper hand in Syria’s civil war in 2016-17, was to roll back Tehran’s growing regional hegemony. Addressing this first would also have offered Trump more leverage with Iran in correcting the nuclear deal’s deep flaws.

Trump pledged to address both elements of the Iranian threat, but he has resisted confronting Iran regionally. Recently, he insisted upon the urgency of pulling out of Syria once Islamic State is defeated and his desire to let “other people take care of it now.” Those caretakers would be Iranians and Russians. This approach will raise the likelihood of an Iranian-Israel conflict over Syria, where the Assad regime is believed to be behind a weekend chemical weapons attack that killed dozens near Damascus and which in turn is blaming Israel for an attack on a Syrian airbase that killed several Iranian military personnel 24 hours later. Much more here to his cogent summary.

Arak photo

MEMRI: In advance of Iran’s National Nuclear Technology Day, on April 9, this document focuses on a number of steps taken by the Iranian regime to maintain and further develop Iran’s nuclear capabilities – steps that deviate from the framework of the JCPOA nuclear deal, and that in some cases even blatantly violate it. This paper will address the following:

1. Iran’s intention to enrich uranium above the percentage permitted in JCPOA.

2. Leaving the plutonium core of the reactor at Arak unblocked and usable.

3. Iran’s refusal to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections at its military sites.

1. Iran Announces Decision “To Construct Naval Nuclear Propulsion” – While Naval Nuclear Propulsion Requires Uranium Enriched To 60%-90%

On December 13, 2016, just six months after the JCPOA was finalized, Iranian President Hassan Rohani sent a letter to Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) director Ali Akbar Salehi instructing him as follows: “As part of Iran’s nuclear program for peaceful purposes, and in the framework of Iran’s international commitments, the AEOI must formulate a plan to produce nuclear fuel for naval transportation, in cooperation with [Iran’s] scientific and research centers.”[1] It should be noted that nuclear propulsion requires uranium enriched to 60%-90%.

Shortly thereafter, on December 26, 2016, AEOI deputy director and spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi, who was a member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, clarified to the Iranian Arabic-language Al-‘Alam TV: “The fuel is in effect for ships and submarines. At this time, Iran has a naval fleet [deployed] around the world, and with regard to submarines, Iran has long-term plans…

“There are various types of [nuclear] fuel, even fuel at 95% [enrichment, which is suitable for developing a nuclear bomb]. What is important is that Iran wants to carry this out in accordance with the JCPOA, but this does not mean that if we require 20%[-enriched] fuel that we will abandon this [the plan to enrich uranium to 60%-90%].”[2]

On March 25, 2017, Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Alaa Al-Din Boroujerdi explained: “Iran’s naval potential must be addressed, because Iran has a great deal of international maritime transportation, and therefore we need to use nuclear fuel capability. This is a capability that we will leverage for the oceans, and for submarine fuel. The matter of nuclear fuel [for this purpose] is an issue on which the IAEA will be informed… To date, we have not received any objections in this matter from the international institutions.”[3]

It should be emphasized that submarines are not used for civilian or commercial maritime purposes. In an August 28, 2017 interview with the Iranian news agency IRNA, Salehi explained the matter of producing nuclear fuel for naval transportation, saying: “A horizon of 10-15 years should be set so that this project will materialize… At this time, the research team is ready, and we have given it a place to directly advance this project. It should be noted that this industry has its own complications. We must place a pressurized reactor on a vessel and we must consider the risks. If the vessel is harmed or sunk, peoples’ lives will be in danger.

“We have said many times that this type of activity is Iran’s certain right. It creates capability for us. I also spoke about this to [IAEA secretary-general Yukia] Amano, and the important thing is that our activity is carried out under IAEA oversight.”[4]

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who was a senior member of the nuclear negotiating team, told Iranian Channel One in a January 13, 2018 interview: “We have responded to America’s moves for renewal of the ISA [Congress’s 1996 Iran Sanctions Act, extended by the Senate on December 1, 2016 for a further 10 years], and Iranian President [Rohani] has ordered the production of nuclear fuel [for maritime transportation, which requires enrichment to 60%-90%], and this is considered a strategic move [on our part].”[5]

On February 22, 2018, an IAEA report noted for the first time that Iran had, in a January 6, 2018 letter, informed the agency that it had decided “to construct naval nuclear propulsion in future.” The IAEA said in the report that it had asked Tehran to provide “further clarifications and amplifications under the Additional Protocol” by May 2018.

Also according to the IAEA report, Iran had added that since this matter was still in the early stages, it would provide the required information as soon as it was available.[6]

Significance

The Iranian regime’s intention to “construct naval nuclear propulsion” means only one thing: an advance announcement that it intends to enrich uranium to a higher level that it was permitted on the JCPOA (3.67%) to a level of 60%-95% required for nuclear propulsion for ships or submarines. As noted, submarines are not used for civilian or commercial maritime traffic. It should be noted that 95% enriched uranium can be used by Iran to produce a nuclear bomb.

With this announcement, Iran is taking the first practical step to eliminating its fundamental obligation in the JCPOA not to enrich uranium above 3.67%.

2. Is Iran Permitted To Maintain The Plutonium Core At Arak?

According to a series of tweets on January 21-22 by Iranian Ambassador to the UK Hamid Baeidinejad, who was also a member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team, during the talks for the JCPOA Iran had demanded that it be allowed to keep the core of the heavy water reactor at Arak undamaged. He added that Iran had filled only the core’s holes with cement, so that it could reactivate it when necessary, as had been previously confirmed by AEOI director Salehi (see below). Baeidinejad tweeted:

“For us, preserving the essence of the reactor at Arak as a heavy water reactor, and modernizing it, are considered the most important outcomes, and the achievement of which we are the most proud, in the JCPOA. The Western psy-ops organization wants to convert this triumph into a defeat [for us], and therefore presented a false picture of the filling of the reactor core with cement, which was attended by reporters who realized that this was fake. We must beware of the enemy’s plot.”[7]

“After we forced the members of the P5+1 into allowing us to preserve the reactor at Arak as a heavy water reactor, and to modernize it, they claimed that modernizing the core, i.e., the calandria, meant replacing it with a new one. In order to prevent the misuse, or the possible use [of the old calandria], they insisted on sending it outside Iran.”[8]

“Iran objected to this, and noted that it would not send any of its nuclear equipment out of the country. After lengthy talks, we realized that there was a need to find a technical way to prevent the immediate use of the core. They proposed welding the core, which is steel, and cutting it into pieces.[9]

“Iran opposed this proposal and noted that it wants to put the core in a museum on public display showing the creativity of Iran’s scientists. Ultimately, it was suggested that the holes of the core, not the core itself, be filled with cement so that it could not be used immediately.”[10]

Supporters of Baeidinejad’s statements tweeted the photo below and noted that the image on the right had been doctored to show the core filled with cement, and that this photo had been circulated by opponents of the JCPOA in Iran who wanted to show a false picture of Iran’s submission to the demands of the West. The image on the left, they said, was an actual photo of the Arak reactor taken by the reporters mentioned by Baeidinejad.

Photos of the Arak plutonium reactor (Source: Twitter.com/Esferayn1/status/955385176221257728, January 22, 2018.

AEOI director Salehi also stated that the core had not been filled with cement, and that “we [actually] poured cement only into some of the reactor’s pipelines, [pipes] several centimeters in diameter and two to three meters long. [We poured it] not into the reactor itself but [only] into the external pipes… ” (see MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis No. 1341, Head Of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization: Only External Pipelines Of Arak Reactor Were Filled With Cement, Its Core Was Not; Within Five Days, We Can Begin Enriching Uranium To 20%, September 1, 2017).

3. Is The IAEA Allowed Access To Iran’s Military Sites?

The discussion on the issue of IAEA access to Iran’s military sites has been ongoing since July 2015, with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 that set out the elements of the JCPOA. Iranian regime spokesmen continue to claim that neither the JCPOA, the NPT nor the Additional Protocol allow IAEA inspectors to enter Iranian military sites.

On January 14, 2018, AEOI spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi said: “No one in Iran will allow the IAEA access to the military sites, and this matter is not mentioned in the [NPT] treaty, the Additional Protocol, or the JCPOA. I reject the four conditions of the American president in the matter of continuing [the implementation ] of the JCPOA. In the past, there was the matter of visits to military sites such as Parchin. [But] this file was closed, and now there is no issue that the IAEA has presented in this matter that [justifies] allowing them access to military sites. The American president is making unfounded statements in this matter, perhaps because he knows that we, like other countries, are sensitive in this matter, and he expects us to immediately say that we do not agree and in fact oppose it vehemently. Thus he is trying to leverage [our refusal] so that he can say that Iran is not willing to allow access under any conditions.

“There are rules for access [to military sites]. We cannot possibly allow access casually, or allow [visits] out of [mere] curiosity. Everything [in this matter] has rules, and these rules are presented and set out in the Additional Protocol. Actually, the Protocol does not mention access to undeclared sites. Even when a particular place is declared [as nuclear, proof must be presented that] nuclear activity [actually] takes place there.

“We are conducting no nuclear activity whatsoever at any of our sites, and we are not a country that wants a [nuclear] bomb or weapons.

“It is the Americans who have stated that Iran wants [nuclear] weapons, and because they themselves are acting to [produce them?] at [their own] military sites, they have concluded that there must be access to these sites [in Iran].

“In recent years, the only instance presented in this matter was the issue of the PMD [Possible Military Dimension s] and they [the Americans] made a lot of noise about it for no reason. They raised the issue of Parchin, and after [IAEA General Director Amano] visited [there] and samples were provided [by Iran], it became clear that their noise in this matter was baseless, and this file was closed forever. Therefore the IAEA has not brought up any plan in the matter of access to military sites, and also is not talking about it [any longer]. If Trump thinks that Iran or any other country will open the doors of its sites, particular military sites, so that they [the West] will take advantage of this and want to spy, [he needs to know that] this is not going to happen in Iran, and that Iran will not allow anyone to do such a thing.

“Our obligations under the JCPOA are carried out according to the Additional Protocol. We are responding to the IAEA’s questions, and complementary access is in accordance with what is presented in the Additional Protocol. The IAEA has indicated this in several reports, and it is completely satisfied, and as of now no issue in the matter of access is on its table. If there are such matters, the IAEA must present them, and say so.

“It is inconceivable for America to say that it wants access to Iran’s military sites without asking the IAEA, or that it has any information at all on them [the sites] . These actions on its part are aimed solely at finding a pretext to elicit a negative response from Iran. Iran will certainly say ‘no,’ and this [access to its military sites] will not happen. Trump must not interpret this matter as Iran’s insufficient cooperation with the IAEA. We are sufficiently cooperating with the IAEA, as cooperation was clearly defined in the [NPT] treaty, in the [Additional] Protocol, and in the JCPOA. Even the IAEA has expressed satisfaction [with Iran’s cooperation]. The IAEA has no question in the matter that is on the table, and therefore it is not concerned. Trump needs to worry [only if] the IAEA is worried…”[11]

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, told Iranian Channel One in his January 13, 2018 interview: “The Americans thought that visiting military centers constitutes a weak point for us, and Iran cannot agree to [these visits] in any way. They tried to pull the IAEA in this direction, and invested months of efforts in ripping up the JCPOA at Iran’s expense, but did not succeed…

“It is the IAEA that needs to determine where and what to visit. This is a technical and professional matter whose framework is set out in the Additional Protocol and the JCPOA.

“Our nuclear facilities are under oversight. Beyond this, there are principles. America cannot tell the IAEA where it should go. We have acted with the IAEA in a way that [the agency] always stresses – and that way is that Iran is fully cooperating [with it].

“The IAEA has not asked to visit military centers, and things don’t work that way either – i.e. that it asks and that we approve [the request]. We will not allow the IAEA to interfere any more than it has to…”[12]

* A. Savyon is Director of the MEMRI Iran Media Project; U. Kafash is a MEMRI Research Fellow.