Gitmo: Soon to be at 90 Detainees, Then What?

Control of the released detainees after transfer? Hardly.

Former Guantanamo detainee travels to Argentina, calls for asylum for remaining detainees

A former Guantanamo detainee who was resettled in Uruguay is asking Argentina to grant asylum for detainees still at the U.S. detention facility.

Abu Wa’el Dhiab wore a Guantanamo-style orange jumpsuit as he told Barricada TV that he believes “the Argentine government could receive the prisoners at Guantanamo here in a humanitarian way.” Calls to the Foreign Ministry seeking comment were not returned.

From the Director of National Intelligence:

Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism.

Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose particular problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions.

Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations— including other former GTMO detainees—an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged.

Source: ‘Al Qaeda followers’ among 17 being transferred from Gitmo

FNC: The group of 17 detainees expected to be transferred out of Guantanamo Bay as early as this week includes “multiple bad guys” and “Al Qaeda followers,” a source who has reviewed the list told Fox News.

Little is known publicly about which prisoners are being prepared for transfer, but the Obama administration has notified Congress it plans to ship out 17 detainees – some of whom could be transferred within days.

While the identities of the men are closely held, the source who spoke with Fox News said it includes “multiple bad guys … not taxi drivers and cooks.”

This is a reference to the administration’s transfer of Ibrahim al Qosi to Sudan in 2012. Despite entering a “re-integration program,” the one-time cook for Usama bin Laden has now fled to Yemen, where he is among the leadership of Al Qaeda in Yemen. That transfer is now said to be a source of considerable heartburn for the Obama administration.

As for those on the docket for immediate transfer, the source told Fox News the administration will not identify the detainees until they are relocated in their new home countries — because knowing who they are in advance would create further roadblocks and increase the controversy.

Multiple countries have agreed to take the men, in small groups, and the source said some of the countries were so-called first timers — a reference to the fact those countries had not taken Guantanamo detainees in the past.

The move to clear out 17 detainees is seen as part of the administration’s long-term plan to ultimately shutter the detention camp.

The transfer of 17 prisoners would bring the number of detainees left down to 90 – the bulk of whom cannot be transferred to another country.

Many in Congress, though, fiercely oppose any plan to bring those detainees to the U.S.

President Obama in his year-end news conference justified the closure of the detention camp, claiming “Guantanamo continues to be one of the key magnets for jihadi recruitment.” But the Middle East Media Research Institute, or MEMRI, which tracks jihadist propaganda, said that terrorist groups have moved on from using Guantanamo in their recruitment efforts.

“The topic of Guantanamo prisoners appeared rather frequently in Al-Qaeda’s propaganda in past years,” MEMRI’s Eliot Zweig said. “However, the topic has received little to no attention in the last year or two … Gitmo hasn’t received much attention in official ISIS releases.”

 

Saudi Executes 47, Including Iranian Cleric

And so it begins Iran versus Saudi Arabia, a matter to be watched closely.

Earlier today: A flight left Tehran heading to possibly Riyadh to evacuate Iranians or collect those that Saudi Arabia is expelling.

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Fury in Iran and Iraq as Saudis execute top Shiite cleric

Tehran warns Riyadh will ‘pay high price’ for killing Nimr al-Nimr, accused of role in al-Qaeda attacks; 46 others also put to death

Saudi Arabia on Saturday executed a prominent Shiite cleric behind anti-government protests along with 46 other men, drawing angry condemnation from Iran and Iraq.

A list published by the official Saudi Press Agency included Sunni Muslims convicted of involvement in al-Qaeda attacks that killed Saudi and foreigners in the kingdom in 2003 and 2004.

One of those executed was Fares al-Shuwail, described by Saudi media as al-Qaeda’s top religious leader in the kingdom. He was arrested in 2004.

Mohammed al-Nimr, the father of Ali al-Nimr, a Saudi youth facing execution for taking part in pro-reform protests speaks to AFP in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, on September 23, 2015. Mohammed appealed to Saudi King Salman to spare the life of his son, who was only 17 when he was arrested in February 2012 and whose sentence has drawn international condemnation over his young age at the time and allegations that he was tortured into making a confession. (STR/AFP)

Mohammed al-Nimr, the father of Ali al-Nimr, a Saudi youth facing execution for taking part in pro-reform protests speaks to AFP in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, on September 23, 2015. (STR/AFP)

Notably absent from the list, however, was Nimr’s nephew, Ali al-Nimr, whose arrest at the age of 17 and alleged torture during detention sparked condemnation from rights watchdogs and the United States. More here from TimesofIsrael.

WashingtonInst.: Iran’s history of targeting Saudi Arabia: On April 27, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, lashed out at Saudi Arabia and its recent military intervention in Yemen, accusing the “treacherous Saudis” of “following in Israel’s footsteps” by “shamelessly and disgracefully bombing and mass killing” the Yemeni people. The increased Saudi aggression in the region, he contended, demands a tougher response from Tehran. Similarly, Hezbollah deputy secretary-general Naim Qassem warned in an April 13 interview with the Associated Press that the kingdom will “incur very serious losses” and “pay a heavy price” as a result of its Yemen campaign. Given historical precedent — not to mention numerous other angry statements from Tehran of late (see PolicyWatch 2423, “Yemen’s War Heats Up Iran’s Anti-Saudi Rhetoric”) — Riyadh should take such threats at face value.

TRACK RECORD OF TARGETING SAUDI INTERESTS

Iran has a long history of plotting attacks against its Saudi rivals in response to transgressions real and perceived. These plots, carried out by Iranian agents and Hezbollah proxies, have targeted Saudi interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. One of the most recent — traced back to IRGC Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani and other senior Iranian decisionmakers — was the failed October 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington by bombing a restaurant he frequented. Yet Tehran’s earliest anti-Saudi schemes stretch back nearly to the regime’s founding.

WashingtonInst.: Hassan Rouhani’s victory in Iran’s presidential election has been widely heralded as a protest vote against the hardliners and a window of opportunity for diplomatic breakthrough with Western powers. But such assumptions beg the question: just how much moderation should be expected from a “moderate” Iranian president, particularly with regard to state sponsorship of terrorism? Past precedent suggests that expectations should be tempered.

RAFSANJANI’S TERRORISM REPORT CARD

Rouhani is not the first Iranian “moderate” to win the presidency. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, elected in 1989, was frequently described as a moderate as well. According to U.S. intelligence, however, he oversaw a long string of terrorist plots during his eight years in office.

The CIA linked Rafsanjani to terrorist plots as early as 1985, when he was serving as speaker of parliament. In a February 15, 1985, memo, the agency assessed that “Iranian-sponsored terrorism is the greatest threat to US personnel and facilities in the Middle East…Iranian-backed attacks increased by 30 percent in 1984, and the numbers killed in Iranian-sponsored attacks outpace fatalities in strikes by all other terrorist sponsors. Senior Iranian leaders such as Ayatollah Montazeri,…Prime Minister [Mir Hossein Mousavi], and Consultative Assembly speaker Rafsanjani are implicated in Iranian terrorism.”

In September of 2015: WashingtonInst.: Two weeks ago, according to several media reports, Ahmed al-Mughassil, the military chief of Saudi Hezbollah (Hezbollah al-Hijaz) and the principal architect of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, was apprehended in Beirut — where it was believed he lived under Lebanese Hezbollah protection — and was transferred to the custody of Saudi Arabia. A physically small man, standing at five feet four inches and weighing 145 pounds, Mughassil is accused of orchestrating and then personally executing one of the most spectacular terrorist attacks carried out by Iran and its proxies against the United States.

The circumstances of Mughassil’s capture are still unknown, but the timing raises multiple questions. How did a man who evaded capture for almost 20 years suddenly get caught? And what does it mean that the arrest comes against the background of the Iran nuclear deal and in the context of rising tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and between their respective allies in Lebanon?

Officials in Beirut, Riyadh, and Washington have yet to confirm Mughassil’s capture, but it is no secret that both Saudi and American investigators have been keen to apprehend him for years. Mughassil was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for the bombing, and the U.S. State Department’s Rewards for Justice Program offers $5 million for information leading to his capture. More reading here from Matthew Levitt, at Washington Institute.

How Saudi fought al Qaida:

A documentary series aired on the Al Arabiya News Channel reveals never-seen-before footage of al-Qaeda’s operations in Saudi Arabia and the subsequent raids and crackdowns on the group by authorities.

In 2003 the then security chief Prince Mohammed bin Nayef launched a counter attack that would see a three-year security crackdown on the group, with thousands of its members thrown into prison.

More than ten years on, the Al Arabiya News Channel is airing TV series on the attacks, promising an inside look into al-Qaeda, after hours of footage from cameras and mobile phones were recovered and released by Saudi security officials.

The documentary series, split into three episodes, was produced for the Al Arabiya News Channel by OR Media, a London-based independent production company. The three videos listed below will play in your video player.

http://saic.alarabiya.net/program/15/12/04/20151204-terrorinksa-002.mp4 Part 1
http://saic.alarabiya.net/program/15/12/05/20151205-terrorinksa-001.mp4 Part 2
http://saic.alarabiya.net/program/15/12/04/20151204-terrorinksa-003.mp4 Part 3

Afghanistan is a Growing Festering War, Again

WASHINGTON —Afghanistan’s security situation is so tenuous that the top U.S. commander there wants to keep as many U.S. troops there as possible through 2016 to boost beleaguered Afghan soldiers and may seek additional American forces to assist them.

Army Gen. John Campbell said in an interview with USA TODAY that maintaining the current force of 9,800 U.S. troops to train Afghan forces and conduct counter-terrorism raids is vital, and that the scheduled reduction to 5,500 by Jan. 1, 2017, should be put off as long as possible.

“My intent would be to keep as much as I could for as long as I could,” Campbell said by telephone from Kabul. “At some point it becomes physics. I’m going to have to get them out.”

News from Afghanistan in 2015, when American troops ended their daily combat mission after 14 years, has been grim. Taliban insurgents stormed the northern provincial capital of Kunduz in October and were pushed out after fierce fighting that included an inadvertent attack by a U.S. warplane on hospital that killed 42 civilians. In the south, Taliban insurgents have battered Afghan troops in Helmand province; an al-Qaeda training camp was also discovered there and destroyed. Islamic State fighters have set up outposts in the east. Last week, six U.S. airmen were killed by a suicide bomber outside Bagram Air Base.

The Pentagon’s own quarterly assessment of security in Afghanistan this month noted that in “the second half of 2015, the overall security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated with an increase in effective insurgent attacks and higher (Afghan security force) and Taliban casualties.”

Campbell will be Washington soon to brief senior leaders on the security situation in Afghanistan and troop levels required for their missions. He declined to offer specifics on his recommendations, saying they were classified. More here from USAToday.

Report: Russia Signals Readiness to Ease UN Sanctions Against Taliban

A senior Russian diplomat reportedly said Moscow is ready “to show flexibility” on possibly easing United Nations Security Council sanctions imposed on Afghanistan’s Taliban, which has intensified attacks against U.S. service members and American-trained Afghan security forces.

Breitbart: The Taliban recently claimed responsibility for killing six U.S. troops, and the group has been behind a record number of casualties incurred by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which includes army, police, and militia units.

“He appeared to be suggesting that major powers should consider an accommodation with the Taliban to stop the spread of rival Islamic State [ISIS/ISIL] militants, deemed a much bigger, international menace by the West,” Reuters reports, referring to Zamir Kabulov, a department chief at Russia’s Foreign Ministry and President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy on Afghanistan.

“We are ready to approach in a flexible way the issues of a possible easing of the regime of sanctions under Security Council Resolution 1988 on the Taliban, if this does not contradict Afghanistan’s national interests,” the Tass news agency quoted Kabulov as saying, according to Reuters.

“No one is talking today about achieving a victory by military means over the Taliban, while the implementation of the national reconciliation policy would in practice mean their return to power,” he added.

Kabulov noted that Russia supports the U.S.-backed Afghanistan government police aimed at achieving national reconciliation.

In 2011, the UN Security Council Resolution 1988 was passed, designating the Taliban insurgency as a threat to international peace and imposing a freezing of assets, bans on travel, and other restrictions on individuals deemed to be associated with the terrorist group.

Although the Taliban branch in Pakistan—Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—is listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, the Afghan Taliban is not. TTP is also known to carry out attacks on the Afghanistan side of the country’s border with Pakistan.

ISIS terrorists, which have seized swaths of Iraq and Syria, have established a presence in eastern Afghanistan and have been engaged in turf battles with the Taliban, which has labeled ISIS as “barbaric” in the Afghan territory it has captured.

Last week, Kabulov said that Russian interests in Afghanistan “objectively coincide” with those of the Taliban movement in the fight against ISIS.

He noted that Russia had established communication channels to exchange information on ISIS with the Taliban.

“Moscow, currently conducting a bombing campaign in Syria it says is aimed at Islamic State forces, has been concerned about the possible spread of Islamic State from Afghanistan into neighboring ex-Soviet states like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,” points out Reuters.

U.S. Gen. John Campbell, the top commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, and the Pentagon have acknowledged that ISIS is growing in Afghanistan.

“Groups associated with Islamic State have made growing inroads in Afghanistan, attracting fighters and support away from disenchanted members of the Taliban,” reports Reuters.

“They have been battling government forces and the Taliban in a challenge for supremacy of the Islamist insurgency, and its rise has caused alarm outside Afghanistan, with U.S. commanders citing the movement as a reason to delay troop withdrawals,” it adds.

Militants from the ethnic Uzbek minority in Afghanistan have been linked to the Islamic State.

Russian is reportedly helping to strengthen the Afghan security forces.

In September, a United Nations report revealed that ISIS is actively recruiting supporters in nearly three-quarters (25) of the country’s 34 provinces.

Kabulov estimated in October that there were nearly 3,500 ISIS-linked jihadists in Afghanistan, adding that the number was growing.

Gen. Campbell recently said that between 1,000 to 3,000 ISIS-linked militants were operating in Afghanistan.

 

Ramadi Liberated? Not so Fast

BAGHDAD — An Iraqi military spokesman says that the city of Ramadi, which was taken by the Daesh group in May, has been “fully liberated.”

Brig. Gen. Yahya Rasool announced on Monday[28 Dec] that government forces had retaken the capital of Anbar Province after a protracted siege. But Gen. Ismail al-Mahlawi, head of military operations in Anbar, said that troops had only retaken a strategic government complex and that parts of the city remained under Daesh control.

Iraq’s military flew the Iraqi flag above the central government complex in city of Ramadi, a military spokesman said on Monday[28 Dec], the morning after the army declared the city captured in its first major victory over Daesh.

“Yes, the city of Ramadi has been liberated. The Iraqi counter terrorism forces have raised the Iraqi flag over the government complex in Anbar,”

joint operations spokesman Brigadier General Yahya Rasool said in a statement broadcast on state television.

Victory in Ramadi is the first major triumph for Iraq’s US-trained army since it collapsed in the face of an assault by the militants 18 months ago.

The Liberation Of Iraq’s Ramadi And What Comes Next

MusingsonIraq: Both the taking of Ramadi by the Islamic State and its recapture by the Iraqi forces were a long time coming. IS attacked the city for almost a year, while the operation to free it took five months. The aftermath of securing the area, re-establishing governance and services will take even longer. Despite these difficulties the liberation of Ramadi was a huge setback for the militants proving that they lack the resources to hold urban areas in Iraq, and a boost for the Iraqi government that was severely criticized for losing the city in the first place.

Both before and after the summer 2014 offensive, which saw the seizure of Mosul and Tikrit, the Islamic State remained focused upon Anbar and its capital Ramadi. The province was one of its major bases, and was the first place it seized territory when the insurgency was reborn. Its Sunni population and its tribes were also seen as an enticing base for the organization to build within. The final push that took Ramadi came in two waves. First, in mid-April IS started a new series of attacks, which led to the seizure of several neighborhoods. On April 16 a security source told the National Iraqi News Agency that 70% of the city was under IS control. The final assault came in mid-May. IS sent in reinforcements from Mosul and Salahaddin, and began with men dressed in military uniforms and driving Humvees to infiltrate the defenses, and then unleashed thirty suicide car bombs against the government complex in the downtown. The Iraqi Security Forces and allied tribes quickly crumbled, IS took the city, and immediately began executing people. This was a huge victory for IS. It solidified the group’s control over more than half of the governorate topped off by capturing the provincial capital. It also caused dissent amongst local tribes and undermined the government’s attempt to create a new Sahwa in Anbar. Ramadi was the birthplace of the Awakening and its loss was a sign that Baghdad could not protect its allies there. For example, several sheikhs accused the government of betraying them during the battle as they felt abandoned when the ISF pulled out of the city. Anbar’s tribes would only back the side that would stand by them to assure their self-preservation, and after Ramadi the government did not look like it could play that role.

There were also repercussions for Prime Minister Haider Abadi. First, he was talking about freeing all of Anbar after Tikrit was taken in March. Then Ramadi fell and his strategy looked like a failure. Second, even before Ramadi was lost the premier was coming under increasing pressure from Nouri al-Maliki and pro-Iranian Hashd groups such as Badr and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). They complained they were being kept out of the Ramadi fight, and being constrained in Anbar overall even though they were already operating in places like Garma. Even though Abadi is commander and chief and the Hashd are supposed to be under his command Badr’s Hadi Ameri said they would fight in Anbar no matter what the premier said. Third, the Anbar provincial council undercut Abadi as well authorizing the Hashd to deploy to the governorate since it was shell shocked after the fall of Ramadi. Finally, members of the prime minister’s own Dawa Party and State of Law (SOL) list came out against him. One SOL parliamentarian said that IS’s victory in Ramadi proved that the United States was helping the insurgents, and that Iraq should turn towards Iran instead. A Dawa official claimed elements of the security forces and the tribes the Abadi was arming were working with IS. Abadi had been riding high just a few months beforehand when Iraqi forces retook Tikrit the first major city to be liberated from IS. Then he lost all of that prestige with Ramadi. Not only that it allowed his rivals like Maliki and Ameri to attack his governance, and his alliance with the Americans as everything was blamed on the two. That split continued as plans were made to retake the city.

The divide between Abadi and the pro-Iranian Hashd continued when the offensive to retake Ramadi began. Immediately after the city was taken the prime minister said there would be a swift response to liberate it. Ameri contradicted him by saying he had his own plan for Anbar, and that did not include going after Ramadi right away. Ameri’s strategy was quickly revealed to not include the city at all, but going for Fallujah instead. That meant the day the Ramadi offensive began the Hashd started their own one in Fallujah. Hashd leaders like Ameri were directly challenging Abadi’s leadership of not only security in Anbar, but the entire country. Ameri and others had already been calling for them to take over command of operations instead of the security forces. Now the fall of Ramadi gave them the opportunity to claim the premier had failed, and now they were going to bring victory to the province. Not only that, it split the forces that could have been arrayed against Ramadi. That hurt because the lack of manpower has been an on going dilemma for the Iraqi forces as they have not been able to hold many of the towns and suburbs that they cleared. In turn, the Hashd did not have the fighters to be successful in Fallujah either causing problems in both cities.

On the other hand, the United States stepped up its support to make sure that Ramadi would be retaken. U.S. advisers in Anbar helped plan the operation. The Americans trained the army units fighting for the city, and a new force of tribal fighters. Washington also wanted to keep the Hashd out of Ramadi to make sure that it was an Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) victory. That eventually happened as Hashd units left bases where U.S. advisers were working, and then a mass exodus occurred by October under pressure from Baghdad. An Iraq Oil Report article claimed there was an agreement between the Abadi government, the U.S. and the Hashd to withdraw from the operation. The Americans got their tribal fighters into the Hashd so that they could get paid. Finally, the U.S. fired artillery from bases they were stationed at and carried out air strikes to support the ISF’s advances. The Americans were determined that Ramadi would be liberated. They also wanted to make sure that it would help PM Abadi after all of the criticism he received for losing the city. That meant building up ISF and Sunni Hashd units to capture Ramadi, and pushing the Shiite Hashd out that were trying to undermine the premier. While much of this happened behind the scenes by the end of the battle the Iraqi papers were full of stories of U.S. special forces and helicopters taking part. It’s not clear how much the Americans were involved in end, but their influence was apparent to all especially to the pro-Iran Hashd who were opposed to their presence and assistance.

The final attack on Ramadi started on December 22. The elite Golden Division led the operation crossing a bridge that was construction by the ISF to cross the Warar canal into the center of the city. Iraqi police units came from a different direction. Five days later the Khalidiya Council said that IS was withdrawing to the east taking civilians with them as civilian shields. Then the next day the ISF declared victory and hoisted the Iraqi flag over the government center that was taken by the Islamic State seven months earlier. This was a huge accomplishment for the ISF, which had been humiliated back in May. Not only was it able to liberate the city, the ISF did it largely on their own with Shiite Hashd units mostly on the periphery. This helped PM Abadi as well because he could say his forces and leadership were the right way to take in the fight against IS unlike the pro-Iranian groups who quickly got bogged down in Fallujah, and worked against the Ramadi campaign from the start. Most importantly it exposed the Islamic State. The group can put up a grinding defense, but it lacks the fighters to hold any city against a large and determined government force. At the same time, reaching the middle of a city is only the start of the larger battle to rid Iraq of the insurgency.

The taking of the downtown was not the end of the struggle for Ramadi or against the Islamic State. There are still IS elements in many of the surrounding suburbs and towns and it has re-infiltrated into others. A member of the Anbar council said that there were insurgents in 25% of the city and in the outlaying region that would have to be dealt with. It will take a lot to permanently clear out these fighters, something the ISF has always struggled with. The government is trying to create a new police force to carry out these duties, but the numbers that have appeared in the press are nowhere close to what is required. There are also fears that tribes will want to exact revenge upon those who worked with IS. For example, there was a story that claimed that tribes had lists of collaborators. Carrying out vendettas will not help bring stability to the city or prove that the government is back in control. Last, 80% of the city is reportedly destroyed, and a member of the Anbar Council believed that it would take 10 years worth of budgets to rebuild it. None of these issues are easy to tackle. Fighting will continue in the city and its environs and could quickly deteriorate to what it was like right before the city fell with neighborhoods under IS control. The tribal vengeance can only be deterred if the government is strong, but it may not have the forces or judicial capacity to fully deal with the situation. Finally, real stability can not return to Ramadi until it is reconstructed, services are restored and the authorities have real power over the entire area. These are the challenges that lie ahead and could very well be replayed in future military operations in places like Fallujah and Mosul. If the government can’t get Ramadi right it may not be up to the task of providing real security to other cities after they are freed of IS in the future. The victory in the city therefore, brings both promise and peril that will play out in the coming months.

 

Ramadi, capital of mainly Sunni Muslim Anbar province in the Euphrates River valley west of Baghdad, had been Daesh’s biggest prize of 2015, seized in May.

 

Iraqi forces launched an assault on the city last week and made a final push to seize the central administration complex on Sunday[27 Dec]. Their progress had been slowed by explosives planted in streets and booby-trapped buildings.

 

Security officials have said the forces still need to clear some pockets of insurgents in the city and its outskirts.

 

If the recapture of Ramadi is confirmed, it will be the first major city seized from Daesh by Iraq’s military.

 

The militias were held back from the battlefield in Ramadi this time to avoid antagonizing the mainly Sunni population.

 

The government has said the next target after Ramadi will be the northern city of Mosul, by far the largest population center controlled by Daesh in either Iraq or Syria. —  Sources and citations

2015: a Year of U.S. Warriors

http://www.defense.gov//News/Special-Reports/1215_yip?source=GovDelivery