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You Must Meet Sanafi al-Nasr, Saudi al Qaeda, Khorasan

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Abstract: This article profiles Sanafi al-Nasr, a Saudi currently active with the Khorasan Group in Syria, whose ideological and personal animus toward the United States may influence the degree to which al-Qa`ida elements plot international terrorism from Syrian soil. He became active in al-Qa`ida’s Saudi chapter in the early 2000s and established himself as a prolific online writer. In 2007, he joined al-Qa`ida in the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran triangle where he learned from some of its top leaders and contributed to its media efforts and strategies. In April 2013, al-Nasr moved to Syria where he teamed up with Jabhat al-Nusra and emerged as a senior figure in the group.

Abd al-Muhsin `Abdallah Ibrahim al-Sharikh is a leading Saudi figure in the so-called Khorasan Group best known by his online moniker “Sanafi al-Nasr,” who has emerged as an important power broker and a strategic thinker in al-Qa`ida circles in Syria.[a] His growing influence is of significant concern because his writings reflect a deep-seated animus toward the United States that has both ideological and personal components. In the years after 9/11 one of his brothers was killed and two of his brothers were imprisoned by the United States. Even though al-Nasr has surfaced in media reports over the past year, this is the first comprehensive account of his jihadi trajectory.[1] The stage is set for al-Nasr to play an even more prominent role in the Khorasan Group. On July 21, 2015, the Pentagon announced the July 8 death of Mohsin al-Fadhli, the alleged leader of the group in an airstrike in northwest Syria.[2] A veteran Kuwaiti jihadi with ties to Usama bin Ladin, al-Fadhli had gone to Syria in 2013 after helping run an al-Qa`ida facilitation network in Iran in collaboration with al-Nasr.[3] If confirmed, al-Fadhli’s killing would be the latest in a series of losses for Syria-based al-Qa`ida elements previously located in the Khorasan region (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran). However, a number of these operatives remain active inside Syria and are worth scrutinizing because of the potential threat they pose to the security of Western countries. In Syria, some al-Qa`ida delegates have high-ranking positions in Jabhat al-Nusra, testifying to the close relationship between the two groups. Even though Jabhat al-Nusra claims it has been ordered by al-Qa`ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri not to mount external operations,[4] the number of foreign recruits available to al-Qa`ida in Syria, the group’s longstanding focus on the West, and intelligence suggesting that the Khorasan Group has engaged in plotting international terrorism,[5] make it vital to understand the Khorasan Group’s leaders and their profile, agenda, and priorities.

Jihadi Family
Al-Nasr was born in the Saudi town of al-Shaqra in Riyadh province on July 12, 1985,[6] into a family with longstanding ties to the Arab-Afghan milieu in general and al-Qa`ida in particular. His father fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and later encouraged his sons to engage in militancy,[7] as did the father’s now-deceased spouse.[b] Such activity earned the al-Sharikh the reputation for being a “mujahideen family” in a document found in 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s hideout in March 2003.[8]

Raised in their parents’ house in Riyadh’s al-Shifa district, the seven al-Sharikh brothers lived in what a family acquaintance called “martyrs street.”[c] One of the elder brothers—`Abd al-Latif—paved the way for several of the others to join jihadi groups. He trained at Khalden camp in Afghanistan before fighting with the Saudi jihadi Ibn al-Khattab in Chechnya, where he was killed in 2000.[9] His jihadi connections appear to have assisted his younger brothers’ militant trajectory. In 2000, three of them (`Abd al-Rahman, `Abd al-Hadi, and `Abd al-Razzaq) used connections in their deceased brother’s social network to migrate to Afghanistan.[10] In Kandahar, the al-Qa`ida leadership groomed `Abd al-Hadi and `Abd al-Razzaq[d] to help with the organization’s work in the Arabian Peninsula.[11]

These plans were cut short when they were captured after the fall of the Taliban and sent to Guantanamo.[e] `Abd al-Rahman, for his part, died in a U.S. airstrike while defending the Kandahar airport in late 2001.[12]

Early Militant Activities
Al-Nasr, the youngest of the brothers, stayed behind in Saudi Arabia and was likely inspired by his elder brothers. He began his jihadi career with al-Qa`ida’s Saudi branch,[f] having developed ties to its membership, including its higher echelons. When asked about the branch’s late leader Yusuf al-Uyayri and others, al-Nasr once said: “All of them [were] my companions.”[13] Although not a senior operative, he provided logistics and financial assistance.[14] For instance, he helped shelter `Abdallah al-Rashud, a top ideologue in the Saudi offshoot.[g] Al-Nasr also reportedly plotted attacks inside the kingdom with his friend Salih al-Qa`rawi, who later became a field commander with the Levant-based Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB) before his arrest in 2012.[15]

During this period, the young Saudi jihadi also started to earn a reputation as a writer. He participated in Sahwist-affiliated [h] and later in popular jihadi internet networks [i] such as al-Hisba, where he posted numerous pictures and brief biographies about many jihadis.[16] An ardent supporter of al-Qa`ida in Mesopotamia and its later incarnations, al-Nasr summarized the content of their video materials[17] while scolding their detractors, including the Turkish administrator of a militant forum.[18] In May 2006, he issued a vitriolic warning about the Shi`a and their supposed entrenched “enmity [toward] Sunnis” and their expansionist plans, with a focus on Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.[19]

Core Al-Qa`ida
In 2007, al-Nasr followed in his brothers’ footsteps and moved to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. He left with Muhammad al-Mutlaq, a renowned writer in the digital jihadi sphere[j] better known as Qahir al-Salib. The pair flew to Bahrain on April 8, 2007,[k] and were smuggled into Iran’s Kish Island by Muhammad Ja`far Iqbal,[l] a Bahraini jihadi veteran. Before setting off for Pakistan, al-Nasr met the Egyptian senior al-Qa`ida operative Sayf al-`Adl in Zahedan.[20]

On arriving in Pakistan’s tribal areas, al-Nasr befriended a diverse array of muhajiroun (émigrés), although his inner circle seems to have largely comprised fellow Saudis. Among them was Abu Bashir al-Najdi, born `Abdallah al-Qahtani, an al-Qa`ida official killed in North Waziristan in November 2009.[21] Another close acolyte was `Abdallah `Azzam al-`Azdi (real name Mu`jab al-Zahrani), an al-Faruq camp alumnus who served as a senior leader responsible for new volunteers in Waziristan before his November 2008 death in Bannu, Pakistan.[22] Al-Nasr also reconnected with old acquaintances, such as Ikrima al-Najdi, whom he knew from Saudi Arabia.

Al-Nasr received mentoring from a number of prominent al-Qa`ida leaders. According to his friend Bilal al-Khorasani, who is currently in Syria, the Saudi jihadi was “brought up at the hands of Abu Yahya and `Atiyyatullah,” [n] two Libyan ideologues then in al-Qa`ida’s leadership. Al-Nasr himself acknowledged `Atiyyatullah’s influence by contending that the Libyan had left an indelible mark on him.[23] Further, al-Nasr learned from, among others, Abu al-Miqdaq al-Misri, a late member of al-Qa`ida’s Shura council; Abu al-Layth al-Libi, a now-deceased top leader; and Khalid al-Husaynan, a slain Kuwaiti theologian.

This lengthy association with senior al-Qa`ida leaders helped al-Nasr to gradually ascend through the group. The Saudi émigré served as a mulazim (lieutenant) for Abu Yahya al-Libi and, in Bilal al-Khorasani’s words, their close relation led the one “who worked with [al-Nasr to be] touched by a scent of Abu Yahya in him.”[24] His brother-in-arms further praised him as “a noble, shy, and well-behaved man” who, despite his seniority, “hated to be called emir.”[25]

There is little documentation of al-Nasr’s engagement in al-Qa`ida’s military efforts. He is said to have featured in an al-Sahab production showing rocket attacks in Paktika, a province in southeastern Afghanistan.[26] Al-Nasr also provided a vivid account of a multi-pronged attack he had been charged with filming in 2007.[27] This supports other sources in which he was characterized as one of the “media men of Qa`idat al-Jihad in Khorasan” by a fellow member of the organization.[n] Al-Nasr’s only other appearance in al-Qa`ida’s official media was his later article for the group’s magazine Tala`i’ Khorasan in which he addressed the issue of Saudi women in custody.[28]

Most of his output was featured on jihadi forums such as al-Hisba and al-Fallujah, two of the most preeminent online platforms at the time. Al-Nasr acted as an on-the-ground “reporter” for his online audience, feeding it with news on the latest arrivals or battles in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.[o] Also, he penned a number of eulogies retracing the life and death of recently slain Arab militants, including mid-level al-Qa`ida commanders such as Abu Tayyib al-Sharqi.[p] Finally, the Saudi jihadi provided forums with audiovisual materials from the region, such as recordings of foreign fighters singing anashid (hymns).[29]

Between Iran and Pakistan
In late 2008 or early 2009,[q] al-Nasr was dispatched to Iran, where according to the United Nations “he was appointed the Iran-based representative of al-Qa`ida to replace Yasin al-Suri, an al-Qa`ida operative who had been jailed by the Iranian authorities. From Tehran, he managed a facilitation network that transferred finances and fighters to Afghanistan and Pakistan.”[r]

The al-Sakina website reported that frictions between the group’s leaders and Salih al-Qar`awi, the later AAB field commander, resulted in al-Nasr’s promotion.[s] The article claims that during a June 2008 meeting in Waziristan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, the then al-Qa`ida leader in Khorasan, enjoined al-Qar`awi to give bay`a (oath of allegiance) to Usama bin Ladin and that in return he would be handed control over the organization’s Persian Gulf file. He refused and al-Qa`ida instead appointed al-Nasr.

But his tenure was short-lived. Iranian authorities arrested him at some point during 2009 and only released him in May 2011. According to the United Nations, he then moved back to North Waziristan, where he continued to be involved in facilitation activities, and as of 2012, he had taken “charge of the finances of Al-Qaida core.” [t]

Despite taking on an increasingly senior role for al-Qa`ida, al-Nasr continued his written output, frequently publishing on the jihadi media house al-Ansar Mailing Group, which was also used by other al-Qa`ida figures.[30] It issued his 2011 essay “[What is required] Before al-Nafir,” followed by “[What is required] After al-Nafir.”[31] Aimed at providing guidance to would-be volunteers for jihad overseas, his work built on discussions with seasoned militants and his personal readings. He focused on physical preparation, “an essential pillar” of jihad, as well as the importance of listening to and obeying the emir and respecting local supporters of the cause.

Sometime in late 2012 or early 2013, al-Nasr returned to Iran, where he resumed a senior role in al-Qa`ida’s fighter and financing facilitation network. During this time he fostered a working relationship with the future alleged leader of the Khorasan Group. According to the United Nations, during this second spell in Iran he acted as the deputy in the network to Kuwaiti al-Qa`ida veteran Muhsin al-Fadhli.32 [u] In October 2012 the U.S. government stated:

“The network uses Iran as a critical transit point and operates under an agreement between al-Qa`ida and the Iranian government. Under the terms of the agreement between al-Qa`ida and Iran, al-Qa`ida must refrain from conducting any operations within Iranian territory and recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities informed of their activities. In return, the Government of Iran gave the Iran-based al-Qa`ida network freedom of operation and uninhibited ability to travel for extremists and their families.“[33]

Syria
As early as 2012, al-Qa`ida elements began leaving Khorasan (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) and moving to Syria. The exodus reflected a process sanctioned by al-Qa`ida’s general command, as those involved were characterized as “the members of the Khorasan delegation sent by Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri.”[34] The group has long been adept at deploying trusted operatives to local subsidiaries to assist and keep them in line with its policies. It was no surprise that al-Zawahiri wanted to replicate this in Syria, especially since his Iraqi affiliate, with its history of brutality, had dispatched members of its own, under the cover of Jabhat al-Nusra.

According to the United Nations, al-Nasr left Iran and relocated to Syria in April 2013.[v] If al-Nasr’s Twitter feed is any indication, the timeline seems accurate. After joining Twitter in early January 2013, he barely mentioned the Syrian conflict and the material he posted related to actions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A change occurred from mid-June, with later tweets clearly pointing to his presence in Syria. He began using the platform to reach out to senior Syria-based militant figures, informing his followers of his comrades “martyred” in Syria, and occasionally reporting what he witnessed. [w]

Operating in northern Syria, al-Nasr adopted the new alias Abu Yasir al-Jazrawi.[35] On account of their provenance, he and his associates were commonly referred to as the “brothers/mujahideen from Khorasan” in Syria’s militant circles.[36] They did not constitute a distinct group, but a mere extension of the Pakistan-based mother organization with specific instructions for implementation once in Syria. As al-Nasr related, “the organization Qa`idat al-Jihad asked all those who were sent to Syria to join Jabhat al-Nusra, except for two people [who were sent] to Ahrar al-Sham.”[37] Abu `Ubayda al-Maqdisi, the security chief who was in charge of dispatching al-Qa`ida members from Khorasan to Syria, even required an oath from operatives that they would team up with Jabhat al-Nusra.[x]

While some al-Qa`ida veterans assumed a public position in Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Nasr’s exact duties in the group remain less clear and seem to have shifted over time. He served in a combat role in and around north-western Idlib and Latakia provinces38 and, due to his years in Khorasan, was apparently appointed as Jabhat al-Nusra’s emir for al-Sahel in Latakia where his experience in mountain warfare was especially valuable. [39] [y] Al-Nasr’s military contribution is further underscored by the severe injuries he suffered from a tank shell during the first day of the al-Anfal battle in Latakia on March 21, 2014.[40]

More importantly for his ascension through the ranks was al-Nasr’s emergence as one of the top strategists for al-Qa`ida in Syria. According to a former al-Qa`ida member, al-Nasr distinguished himself “with strategic acumen and an ideologically driven approach to jihad throughout his career.”[z] Upon al-Nasr’s arrival in Syria, he headed a small al-Qa`ida council originally envisaged by Bin Ladin as offering guidance on “strategic policies and planning.”[aa] Combined with his description as “one of [Jabhat al-Nusra’s] top strategists”[41] by U.S. officials, it seems al-Nasr has been working as a senior advisor, this time with Jabhat al-Nusra’s emir Abu Muhammad al-Julani and his top aides,[bb] especially since his injuries in 2014.[42]

In that regard, al-Nasr, along with other Saudis and Jordanians, is alleged to have played a role in keeping Jabhat al-Nusra in al-Qa`ida’s orbit, even as some senior Jabhat al-Nusra figures pushed for a weaker relationship with the central leadership in Pakistan.[cc] Al-Nasr is also said to have participated in sidelining Jabhat al-Nusra’s former top religious official, Abu Mariyya al-Qahtani, who was dismissed in favor of the Jordanian Sami al-`Uraydi in the summer of 2014.[43] Conversely, al-Nasr apparently helped bolster the theological and judicial clout of the Jordanians Abu Qatada al-Filistini and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi over Jabhat al-Nusra’s Legal Committee.[dd] Both of these men had influenced him since his youth. Al-Nasr also reportedly contributed to the deepening of the Syrian affiliate’s reach in the Levantine militant environment by helping it develop its “operational relationship” [ee] with the AAB.

It is unclear if al-Nasr had any operational role in the alleged plotting of international attacks by the Khorasan Group. Nevertheless, in the case of an overseas attack in the making, it is most likely that he was, at the very least, made aware of the preparations owing to his close working relationship with al-Fadhli, who headed external operations for al-Qa`ida Central in Syria.[44]

In any event, al-Nasr’s writings clearly showed that the Saudi had considerable motivation to target the West, especially the United States. Indeed, upon arriving in the Afghanistan/Pakistan/Iran region in 2007, al-Nasr recounted that what had captured his attention was the fate of jihadis in U.S. custody, citing the cases of “Shaykh `Umar `Abd al-Rahman (aka the blind sheikh) and our prisoners in Guantanamo.” He then added that “we will take revenge for our brothers with all our strength” by striking the “Americans who hurt my brothers in Cuba” and their “Pakistani agents.”[45] Besides his long involvement in al-Qa`ida, al-Nasr’s grievances were also certainly cemented by the imprisonment and killing of his own brothers by the United States. Furthermore, according to the U.S. government he “used social media posts [in Syria] to demonstrate his aspiration to target Americans and U.S. interests.”[46] His desire to orchestrate attacks against the West may, for the time being, have been tempered by al-Zawahiri’s call for Jabhat al-Nusra not to use Syria as a base for international operations. His track record as a loyalist to al Qa`ida’s top command and his emphasis in his writings on obeying the emir suggests he is likely to abide by these orders.

A Harsh Critic of the Islamic State
The period during which al-Nasr and many of his comrades migrated to Syria corresponded with the growing rift between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State. Indeed, as al-Qa`ida’s emissaries entrusted with securing its interests in Syria, a number of them[ff] served as mediators in the then nascent fitna (sedition) that created the Islamic State, though there is no hard evidence that this was part of al-Nasr’s portfolio.[gg]

Despite several reconciliation attempts throughout 2013,[hh] the rift only intensified. Although al-Nasr did not specifically point to the Islamic State, he railed against “adolescent jihadism [which manifests in a] disorder of priorities, a rush to set loose rulings, [and] on-the-spot decision-making by temper.”[47]After infighting with the Islamic State broke out in January 2014, al-Nasr grew more outspoken about Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s men. He noted the discrepancy between what he was told by Islamic State members, namely that “they do not excommunicate Ahrar al-Sham,” and their “calls to send car bombs” against the group.[48] The hostility that the al-Qa`ida envoys reported to the leadership in Pakistan was a driving factor in the organization’s decision to disown its Iraqi affiliate in February 2014.[ii] Al-Nasr’s aversion to the Islamic State reached its climax later that month with Abu Khalid al-Suri’s slaying, which the Saudi blamed on the “state of oppression and injustice.” [jj]

Further asserting his anti-Islamic State sentiment, al-Nasr signed the joint statement “About al-Baghdadi’s group” issued on July 18, 2015.[49] The Saudi jihadi, alongside other prominent foreign militant figures, admonished al-Baghdadi’s forces for having “increased their crimes.” This was the first time that al-Nasr’s name featured on a public communiqué as one of Jabhat al-Nusra’s top representatives. Al-Nasr was last heard of on August 24, 2015, when he eulogized Idris al-Balushi—Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s nephew, who he evidently knew—on a Twitter account he had apparently newly created.[50]

Conclusion
Al-Nasr’s trajectory from the Saudi wing of al-Qa`ida to al-Qa`ida in Khorasan epitomizes the intertwined nature of the jihadi milieu, where social bonds and family pedigree often prove to be significant in one’s radicalization process and subsequent role. Although he is a member of the younger generation that used to acclaim Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi’s jihad in Iraq, the Saudi has remained devoted to al-Qa`ida’s old guard, and established himself as a staunch critic of al-Zarqawi’s heirs in the Levant. In light of his recent feature role as one of Jabhat al-Nusra’s major officials and the demise of many of al-Qa`ida’s longtime figures, al-Nasr appears set to further increase his stature within al-Qa`ida’s global network. Should the organization change its calculus with regard to launching international attacks from Syria, al-Nasr’s background and mindset would likely see him play a key role in orchestrating terrorist attacks against the West.

Kévin Jackson is a contributor at the Jihadica academic blog, runs the All Eyes on Jihadism blog, and is completing a degree in Middle East Studies at Sciences Po. You can follow him
@alleyesonjihad.

Substantive Notes

[a] Al-Nasr is on Saudi Arabia’s February 2009 most-wanted list and the United Nations Security Council and the U.S. Treasury Department both added him to the list of al-Qa`ida figures on the sanctions list in August 2014. See “Tafasil fi Qa`ima al-85 al-Mulahaqin Amniyyan,” `Ukadh, February 5, 2009. I am grateful to the blogger known as Mr. Orange for his help in translating Arabic texts; “United Nations Security Council Adds Names of Six Individuals to Al-Qaida Sanctions List,” United Nations, August 15, 2014; “Treasury Designates Additional Supporters of the Al-Nusrah Front and Al-Qaida,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 22, 2014.

[b] An internal al-Qa`ida document states that “after [`Abd al-Razzaq’s] brother [`Abd al-Latif] died in Chechnya, his mother sent him, along with two brothers, to jihad.” See `Abd al-Razzaq’s profile in “The Guantanamo Docket.” New York Times (updated June 2015).

[c] It was named as such given that, besides `Abd al-Latif, another Saudi living close by nicknamed Abu `Abdallah al-Shabani was killed in Bosnia. See Hamad al-Qatari, “Min Qisas al-Shuhada’ al-`Arab, `Ibad al-Najdi.” Available at http://www.saaid.net/Doat/hamad/48.htm. (shari’ al-shuhada’).

[d] While Sanafi al-Nasr has explicitly mentioned `Abd al-Latif and `Abd al-Rahman as his brothers, he did not do so concerning `Abd al-Razzaq (born in al-Shaqra, like al-Nasr) and `Abd al-Hadi. Nonetheless, it is evident that these two are also al-Nasr’s brothers. Not only do they share the same family name, but the two also stated that `Abd al-Latif and `Abd al-Rahman were their brothers. See, for instance, `Abd al-Razzaq’s profile in “The Guantanamo Docket.” New York Times (updated June 2015). Bilal al-Khurasani, a personal friend of al-Nasr, though not naming `Abd al-Razzaq or `Abd al-Hadi, confirmed that two of al-Nasr’s brothers had been imprisoned in Guantanamo. See Bilal al-Khurasani, “Wa madhi Kawkab min Kawakib Khurasan—al-Amir al-Nabil Sanafi al-Nasr Rahimahullah,” March 26, 2014. On the connections between the brothers also see Thomas Jocelyn, “Treasury designates 2 ‘key’ al Qaeda financiers,” The Long War Journal, August 22, 2014.

[e] After being transferred to their home country on September 5, 2007, the two brothers were later rearrested on terrorism suspicions. See “Former Guantanamo Detainee Terrorism Trends,” Defense Intelligence Agency, April 8, 2009.

[f]  This branch was the first incarnation of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and was mainly active in Saudi Arabia between 2003 and 2006. After several setbacks in the kingdom, the group announced its “reactivation” in January 2009, with the merger between its Saudi and Yemeni components. For an exhaustive account of AQAP’s first incarnation, see Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[g] Al-Nasr hid al-Rashud while the latter was “snubbed by many of those that he had considered to be among his closest friends.” See Bilal al-Khurasani, “Wa madhi Kawkab min Kawakib Khurasan—al-Amir al-Nabil Sanafi al-Nasr Rahimahullah,” March 26, 2014. Al-Rashud eventually managed to flee to Iraq, where he was killed in 2005.

[h] The Sahwists were reformist Islamists who led the non-violent opposition against the Saudi regime in the first half of the 1990s.

[i] Al-Nasr’s early online involvement was recounted to this author by Aimen Dean. The Saudi Islamist-run forums al-Nasr was active on were al-Islah, owned by the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia, and al-Masrah, created by Kassab al-`Utaybi, a Saudi dissident. These were the two online platforms where Dean would come to know and interact with al-Nasr from 2000 onward.

[j] Sanafi al-Nasr, “Hal Ta`rifun Sanafi al-Nasr, Innahu fi Sahat al-Wagha,” Ana Muslim, May 5, 2007. Al-Mutlaq was likely killed in a U.S. drone strike that targeted a compound in North Waziristan on January 29, 2010. To read more on his background, see “2 More Web Jihadists Announced Dead,” Jarret Brachman blog, February 1, 2010.

[k] Before leaving, al-Nasr returned to his home to see his parents and bid them farewell.

[l] Also known as Abu al-Harith, Iqbal went to Afghanistan in 1991 and 1992 before turning his attention to the Bosnian jihad in the mid-1990s. He enjoyed close relations with Libyan jihadis, especially in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

[m] Bilal al-Khurasani, “Wa madhi Kawkab min Kawakib Khurasan—al-Amir al-Nabil Sanafi al-Nasr Rahimahullah,” March 26, 2014. For more on `Atiyyatullah al-Libi and his ideological views, see Christopher Anzalone, “Revisiting Shaykh Atiyyatullah’s Works on Takfir and Mass Violence,” CTC Sentinel 5:4, (2012). He was also known by the alias Abu `Abd al-Rahman. His real name is Jamal Ibrahim Ishtiwi al-Misrati. He was born in 1970 in Misrata, Libya, traveled to Afghanistan in the late 1980s and was killed in a drone strike in Pakistan on August 22, 2011. See Don Rassler et al, “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, May 3, 2012, p. 5.

[n] This was said on the Twitter account @Kmohajer63, which has since been shut down. Aimen Dean was also adamant that al-Nasr was an “al-Qa`ida Central media guy.”

[o] For instance, al-Nasr announced the arrival of a forum administrator to Khorasan in late June 2008. See “Report: The brother asdasd99, one of the supervisors of the Al-Firdaws web forum, has joined his mujahideen brothers in Afghanistan,” NEFA Foundation, June 29, 2008. To read a battle report written by al-Nasr, see Sanafi al-Nasr, “Tafasil Saytarat Taliban Bakistan `ala al-Ta`irat al-Thalath kama Yarwiha Sanafi al-Nasr,” Hanayn Forum, June 18, 2008.

[p] His real name is Talayhan al-Mutayri. Abu Tayyib al-Sharqi joined al-Qa`ida in the late 1990s. After three years in custody in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of 9/11, he moved to the Afghan-Pakistan border region and reconnected with his group. He led a major assault against a U.S. military base in Khost in August 2008 before being killed in an airstrike shortly after. To read his eulogy, see Sanafi al-Nasr, “Silsilat `Am al-Huzn 1429h—Abu al-Tayyib al-Sharqi Rahimahullah,” Ana Muslim, March 28, 2009.

[q] It is not clear exactly when al-Nasr traveled. This estimate is based on the author’s analysis of al-Nasr’s statements.

[r] “United Nations Security Council Adds Names of Six Individuals to Al-Qaida Sanctions List,” United Nations, August 15, 2014. According to the U.S. Treasury, Yasin al-Suri has been active in al-Qa`ida’s facilitation networks in Iran since 2005 and later became the head of its activities in the country. He was also involved in moving the group’s elements from Khorasan into Syria. “Treasury Targets Key Al-Qa’ida Funding and Support Network Using Iran as a Critical Transit Point, U.S Department of the Treasury Press Release,” July 28, 2011. For more details on al-Suri’s most recent activities, see Thomas Jocelyn, “Report: Senior al Qaeda Facilitator ‘Back on the Street’ in Iran,” The Long War Journal, January 31, 2014.

[s] See “Asbab Ghadhab al-Qa`ida `ala al-Qar`awi wa `Azluhu min Mansibihi,” al-Sakina, February 22, 2015. Although it does not mention al-Nasr, an insider account substantiates the article’s information about al-Qa`ida’s strained relationship with al-Qa`rawi. In it, al-Qa`rawi is decried as a rogue element whose “reckless behavior” caused major troubles in the Khorasan-based militant community, which prompted al-Qa`ida’s leaders, including Abu al-Yazid, to attempt to “contain him.” See `Abd al-Hamid al-Iraqi, “Allahu Akbar—bi Idhnillah—Tahrir Bayt al-Maqdis ala yad al-Qa`ida (ma`a Dalil),” Post 13, Ana Muslim, July 17, 2010.

[t] “United Nations Security Council Adds Names of Six Individuals to Al-Qaida Sanctions List,” United Nations, August 15, 2014. In the same vein, the U.S. Treasury says that al-Nasr functioned “as a key financial facilitator in Pakistan” for the organization.

[u] It should be noted that al-Nasr hinted at his close relationship with al-Fadhli by lauding him as his “companion” when rumors surfaced that the Kuwaiti had been killed in a U.S. airstrike in Syria in September 2014.

[v] The United States is less exact, identifying only the spring of 2013. Interestingly, there was a time lapse between early February 2013 and early April 2013 during which al-Nasr went dark on Twitter.

[w] Author monitoring of the @Snafialnasr Twitter account. The account contains many personal recollections in the first person indicating it is authored by al-Nasr, not a supporter.

[x] This was claimed by a Jordanian who defected from al-Qa`ida to the Islamic State and became a vocal opponent of his former group. See Abu Jarir al-Shamali, “Al-Qaidah of Waziristan,” Dabiq, Issue 6, December 29, 2014, p. 51.

[y] Al-Nasr is said to have been working with `Abd al-Rahman al-Juhani, a top leader of al-Qa`ida who arrived in Syria from Pakistan in 2012, in his duties in Latakia. See “United Nations Security Council Adds Names of Six Individuals to Al-Qaida Sanctions List.”

[z] Interview with Aimen Dean, July 28, 2015. Based on his online conversations with al-Nasr, Dean saw him as being from “la crème de la crème” of jihadis, those who, as opposed to the “romantic” or “bloodthirsty” types, are “ideologically, politically, and strategically driven.”

[aa] In late 2009 or early 2010, Bin Ladin addressed a letter to Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in which he brought up the need for “one or two brothers to specialize in the area of strategic policies and planning,” adding that “this person might give us lucid ideas during the events the nation will go through since this is his field of study.” U.S. intelligence sources told Thomas Jocelyn that this very restricted body eventually grew and became known as the “Shura al-Nasr.” (Victory Council), with al-Nasr running it. I am indebted to Thomas Jocelyn for having shared his insights into the origins and development of the council.

[bb] On a broader level, the role played by al-Qa`ida’s representatives in orienting Jabhat al-Nusra is echoed in primary sources. For example, an insider account refers to an unnamed “delegate of Ayman al-Zawahiri” as one of “Jabhat al-Nusra’s advisors and leaders” keen to push forward reform in the group. See “Interview with Abu Samir al-Urduni,” Dabiq, Issue 10, July 14, 2015, p. 76.

[cc] Interview with Aimen Dean, July 28, 2015. Charles Lister agrees that a cluster of Jordanians, Saudis, and some Kuwaitis lobbied for keeping Jabhat al-Nusra under al-Qa`ida’s umbrella. To read more about Jabhat al-Nusra’s internal divisions, see Charles Lister, “An Internal Struggle: Al Qaeda’s Syrian Affiliate Is Grappling With Its Identity,” Huffington Post, May 31, 2015.

[dd] Interview with Aimen Dean, July 28, 2015. During their discussions on Islamist forums, al-Nasr told Dean that the two most influential scholars he had come across were al-Filistini and al-Maqdisi, whose book al-Kawashif al-Jalliyya fi Kufr al-Dawla al-Sa’udiyya considerably influenced his views on the Saudi monarchy. Also, al-Nasr participated in online debates involving al-Filistini and the Syrian militant cleric Abu Basir al-Tartusi. Al-Nasr’s role in specifically strengthening al-Filistini’s standing in Jabhat al-Nusra led one member of Ahrar al-Sham to dismissively refer to the Saudi government as “nothing but a stooge of Abu Qatada.”

[ee] Interview with Charles Lister, July 29, 2014. According to Lister, besides al-Qar`awi, al-Nasr also knew Majid al-Majid, the late emir of the AAB, and “had relationships into Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps.” These contacts proved useful in fostering the Jabhat al-Nusra-AAB nexus. Lister added that the Lebanese-founded group “Jund al-Sham in Homs along the Lebanese border may have helped with several covert crossings to Tripoli in this regard.”

[ff] Although he had the main authority in solving these internal disputes as per al-Zawahiri’s orders, Abu Khalid al-Suri was not the only one involved. For example, the biography of Abu Firas al-Suri, a jihadi veteran now part of Jabhat al-Nusra’s senior leadership, specifies that he “returned to Syria from Yemen in 2013 when the conflict between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State took place and he desperately tried along with Shaykh Abu Khalid al-Suri to address the issues.” See Abu Firas al-Suri, “Silsalah al-Shahada: Chain of Testimonies,” al-Basira Media Productions, March 21, 2014.

[gg] Both Aimen Dean and Charles Lister raised doubts about al-Nasr’s possible involvement in the mediation. Dean holds that al-Qa`ida favors “grey beards,” (meaning historically authoritative figures with long experience in jihad) for such a sensitive mission.

[hh] According to Abu `Abdallah al-Shami, a top Jabhat al-Nusra religious official, one of the proposed solutions was to send two figures, one from Jabhat al-Nusra and one from the Islamic State, to al-Zawahiri so that he could choose the most suitable candidate to lead both groups in Syria. See Abu `Abdallah al-Shami, “But If They Had Done What They Were (Actually) Told, It Would Have Been Best For Them,” al-Tahaya Media Foundation, March 30, 2014.

[ii] This had been reported by Adam Gadahn, a key figure in al-Sahab until his death, who declared that “numerous reports from reliable sources—including some sent to Syria especially for the purpose of evaluating the situation on the ground—confirmed the accuracy of many of the accusations leveled against Islamic State.” See “Resurgence,” al-Sahab, Issue 2, June 25, 2015, p. 54.

[jj] See https://twitter.com/Snafialnasr/statuses/437596608906407936. Al-Nasr further revealed what al-Suri had told him shortly before his assassination, from a meeting with Bin Ladin in Afghanistan in the 9/11 aftermath to the death threats he received from ISIS in Syria.

Citations

[1] For the most thorough article on al-Nasr to date see Thomas Jocelyn, “Head of al Qaeda ‘Victory Committee’ in Syria,” The Long War Journal, March 6, 2014.

[2] Barbara Starr, “U.S. Official: Leader of Khorasan Group Dead,” CNN, July 21, 2015.

[3] For more details on al-Fadhli, see Thomas Jocelyn, “Report: Former Head of al Qaeda’s Network in Iran now Operates in Syria,” The Long War Journal, March 25, 2014.

[4] “Translation: Interview with Abu Muhammad al-Joulani on Al Jazeera (Part 1),” al-Minara, June 1, 2015.

[5] To read more about U.S. allegations regarding plots against the West hatched by the Syria-based al-Qa`ida cadre, see Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Feared Al Qaeda Group Targeted in Syria Was Plotting Terror,” Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2014.

[6] “Tafasil fi Qa`ima al-85 al-Mulahaqin Amniyyan,” `Ukadh, February 5, 2009; “Treasury Designates Additional Supporters of the Al-Nusrah Front and Al-Qaida, United States Department of the Treasury, August 22, 2014.

[7] Bilal al-Khurasani, “Wa madhi Kawkab min Kawakib Khurasan—al-Amir al-Nabil Sanafi al-Nasr Rahimahullah,” March 26, 2014, available at http://justpaste.it/snafi. For details on how the al-Sharikh patriarch directly encouraged his sons to take up the cause, see `Abd al-Hadi al-Sharikh’s profile on “The Guantanamo Docket,” New York Times (updated June 2015).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] `Abd al-Hadi al-Sharikh’s profile on “The Guantanamo Docket,” New York Times (updated June 2015).

[11] `Abd al-Hadi al-Sharikh’s profile on “The Guantanamo Docket,” New York Times (updated June 2015). The mission they were assigned to was to attack a U.S. airbase in Saudi Arabia.

[12] “Shuhada’ al-Islam alladhina Jahadu wa Nadhalu wa Nalu Sharaf al-Shahada wa al-Mawt fi Sabil Allah,” Ahla Shalahu, February 18, 2011.

[13] Bilal al-Khurasani, “Wa madhi Kawkab min Kawakib Khurasan—al-Amir al-Nabil Sanafi al-Nasr Rahimahullah,” March 26, 2014. The relationship between al-Nasr and al-Uyayri was confirmed to this author by Aimen Dean, a former member of al-Qa`ida.

[14] “`Abd al-Muhsin al-Sharikh, al-Sira al-Dhatiyya `an `Abd al-Muhsin al-Sharikh, Man Huwa Sanafi al-Nasr,” Nahr al-Hub, August 24, 2014.

[15] “`Abd al-Muhsin al-Sharikh, al-Sira al-Dhatiyya `an `Abd al-Muhsin al-Sharikh, Man Huwa Sanafi al-Nasr,” Nahr al-Hub, August 24, 2014. For more on the cooperation between Jabhat al-Nusra and AAB see Charles Lister, “Al-Qa`ida Plays a Long Game in Syria” in this issue, p. 13.

[16] “Shuhada’ al-Islam alladhina Jahadu wa Nadhalu wa Nalu Sharaf al-Shahada wa al-Mawt fi Sabil Allah,” Ahla Shalahu, February 18, 2011.

[17] Sanafi al-Nasr, “Taqrir `an Film Qawafil al-Shuhada’ fi Bilad al-Rafidayn,” Ana Muslim, March 2, 2007.

[18] Sanafi al-Nasr, “Maghalitat fi Bayan ‘Mish`an al-Juburi’ al-Mushrif al-`Am `ala Mawqi’ al-Mukhtasar,” Ana Muslim, February 26, 2007.

[19] Sanafi al-Nasr, “Al-Rayy al-`Am li-al-Rafidha Yu`id Fasl al-Mintaqa al-Sharqiyya bi-al-Quwwa,” Ana Muslim, May 16, 2006.

[20] Interview with Aimen Dean, July 28, 2015.

[21] “Istishhad al-Shaykh `Abdallah al-Qahtani—Abu Bashir al-Najdi—Ahad al-Matlubin,” Ana Muslim, November 13, 2009.

[22] Sanafi al-Nasr, “Wa rahala Hafid Abu Hurayra al-Qiyadi al-Bariz `Abdallah `Azzam al-`Azdi Rahimahullah,” Ana Muslim, February 8, 2009.

[23] This was mentioned on al-Nasr’s former Twitter profile.

[24] See Bilal al-Khurasani, “Wa madhi Kawkab min Kawakib Khurasan—al-Amir al-Nabil Sanafi al-Nasr Rahimahullah,” posted on Justpaste and disseminated by pro al-Qa`ida Twitter accounts, March 26, 2014.

[25] Ibid.

[26] See “Sharpshooters of Paktitka,” al-Sahab, March 3, 2012. A comrade of al-Nasr made this claim on his now defunct account @ali_gt959.

[27] Sanafi al-Nasr, “Ibrat Madhi al-Tariq!,” Ana Muslim, December 13, 2007.

[28] “Hal Sayafaji’na al-i’alam al-Sa`udi bi-Quwa`im al-Matlubat,” Tala`i’ Khurasan, Issue 19, September 11, 2011.

[29] “Khasrian…Jalasat Anashadiyya al-Ikhwanuna al-Mujahidin fi Afghanistan Muhadat Min al-Akh Sanafi al-Nasr li-Ghurfat al-Ansar,” originally published on a jihadi forum, March 26, 2009. Accessed through archive.org. Al-Nasr also shared a video paying tribute to a cluster of foreign militants killed in Zabul, Afghanistan. The video was narrated by Abu Damdam al-Qurayshi (Khalid al-`Utaybi), a Saudi national reported to have facilitated al-Nasr’s departure from Saudi Arabia. See “Ghurfat al-Ansar fi al-Baltuk Tuqaddim: Abrar fi Zaman al-Inkisar,” al-Qimmah Forum, February 28, 2009.

[30] See, for example, Abu `Ubayda al-Maqdisi, “Eulogy for the Lion of ash-Sham: Shaykh Mahmud Mihdi Aal Zaydan (Mansur ash-Shami),” al-Ansar Mailing Group, June 8, 2012.

[31] Sanafi al-Nasr, “Ma Qabl al-Nafir,” Ana Muslim, July 1, 2011; Sanafi al-Nasr, “Ma Ba`d al-Nafir,” Defender of the Lands Arabic, September 30, 2011. The term al-nafir means heading to jihad.

[32] “United Nations Security Council Adds Names of Six Individuals to Al-Qaida Sanctions List” United Nations, August 15, 2014.

[33] “Treasury Further Exposes Iran-Based Al-Qa’ida Network,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 18, 2012.

[34] “Kanz `Adhim li-kul Talib Ilm Mujahid—Silsila Nadira Jiddan lil Shaykh Abu Yahya al-Libi Rahimahullah,” November 15, 2013.

[35] See https://twitter.com/abo11hosam/status/447260012369309697.

[36] See for instance, http://ask.fm/tash3ri/answer/73743073854.

[37] See https://twitter.com/Snafialnasr/statuses/438441163000152064.

[38] Interview with Charles Lister, July 29, 2014.

[39] Interview with Aimen Dean, July 28, 2015.

[40] See Thomas Jocelyn, “Head of al Qaeda’s ‘Victory Committee’ Survived Battle in Syria,” The Long War Journal, April 19, 2014.

[41] “Treasury Designates Additional Supporters of the Al-Nusrah Front and Al-Qaida,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 22, 2014.

[42] One source claims that after his recovery, al-Nasr focused more on “administrative” tasks. See “Asbab Ghadhab al-Qa`ida `ala al-Qar`awi wa `Azluhu min Mansibihi,” al-Sakina, February 22, 2015.

[43] Ibid. Abu Qatada al-Filistini, who is also said to have played a role in Jabhat al-Nusra’s leadership shift, categorically denied the allegations.

[44] Interview with Thomas Joscelyn, August 31, 2015.

[45] Sanafi al-Nasr, “Hal Ta`rifun Sanafi al-Nasr, Innahu fi Sahat al-Wagha,” Ana Muslim, May 5, 2007.

[46] “Treasury Designates Additional Supporters of the Al-Nusrah Front and Al-Qaida,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, August 22, 2014.

[47] See https://twitter.com/Snafialnasr/statuses/366998172230361088.

[48] See https://twitter.com/Snafialnasr/statuses/424671349320069120.

[49] See “Statement of the Muhajireen of Shaam Regarding Baghdadi’s group,” March 18s, 2015.

[50] See https://twitter.com/snafialnasr0. For more details on al-Nasr’s eulogy, see Thomas Joscelyn, “Jihadists Say Nephew of 9/11 Mastermind Killed in Raid by Pakistani Intelligence,” The Long War Journal, August 26, 2015.

Did Washington DC FBI Field Office Miss a Jihad Memo?

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Note the date? Are they perhaps playing each other?

Primer:

Oh, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson was there…..hummmm

All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) Hosts Muslim Community Forum with the Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security: Thursday, June 11, 2015 in Sterling, Virginia

Building on and deepening its 14 years of community partnership with all levels of law enforcement, and its ongoing independent efforts for national security, civil rights, and social resilience, on Thursday evening, June 11, the All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) hosted a forum with The Honorable Jeh Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, and members of his team.

Approximately 100 community leaders, activists, and young people from Virginia, DC, and Maryland mosques and organizations representing several hundred thousand VA/DC/MD Community members participated in the  forum. Participants discussed national security, countering and preventing violent extremism and hate crimes, and protecting civil rights.  The overall spirit was positive and constructive.  The group focused on the key values of shared engagement, partnership, and participation of grass roots citizens, congregations, organizations, and the Department.

ADAMS Board Chair, Rizwan Jaka, introduced the program and reaffirmed Muslim Community partership for National Security, Counter-Terrorism, and Civil Rights

   
ADAMS Quran student and youth recited the verse from the Quran “O humankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)”

ADAMS Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of America led a Flag Ceremony, Pledge of Allegiance and Sang America The Beautiful
ADAMS President, Syed Moktadir, welcomed the community leaders and said “We truly appreciate the commitment of community partnership and dialogue demonstrated by Secretary Johnson and his team and
thanked the community leaders for being engaged and at the table.” 
   
ADAMS Executive Religious Director, Imam Mohamed Magid mentioned that Muslim community should be at the table in dialogue and looked at as partners and not suspects. He also discussed the FATWA (religious ruling) Against Terrorism:
The main subject areas of discussion included:

I.  Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

It was noted that the number of young people potentially susceptible to recruitment to extremism is small (a fraction of a fraction), but that one person radicalized is one too many.  99.999% of Muslim Youth are productive and high achieving citizens, and immune to any threat of radicalization.Discussions occurred around how to engage mental health and human services components into counter-radicalization and counter-violent extremism.  Those few youth susceptible to extremist recruitment have often shown signs of mental health and behavior problems similar to those enticed into other destructive paths, such as joining gangs or getting involved in drugs.  Parents of those who might be susceptible are alerting imams about their concerns, and imams are counseling them to de-radicalize them.  We talked about how we can partner more effectively to counter-radicalize before someone crosses the line, while making sure law enforcement handles anyone planning to do criminal action.

II.  National Security Partnerships between Law Enforcement and the Muslim community

We discussed partnership and trust as key to national security.  Muslim community members are increasingly seen, respected, and engaged as partners, rather than as suspects; we agreed on the importance of cultivating this trend.  Its value has already been actively demonstrated: Some 42% of terrorism arrests have resulted from Muslim community members calling law enforcement: (http://sanford.duke.edu/centers/tcths/about/documents/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_Since_911_An_Accounting.pdf )

III.  Civil rights and Civil liberties

Civil rights issues such as ethnic or religious attire profiling, especially in airports and in travel generally, were discussed.  Also, there was discussion of the increases in hate crimes against mosques and Muslim community members, as well as discussions of DHS’ role in responding to hate crimes.

IV.  Responding to all Violent Extremists

DHS activity to counter other violent extremist groups was another key concern.  An FBI study of terrorism on U.S. soil from 1980 to 2005 found that 94% of terror attacks were committed by non-Muslims:
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005/terror02_05#terror_05sum

V.  In Conclusion

The evening drew on a wide range of people and perspectives, unified by all parties’ shared commitment to the safety of the nation, its peoples’ security, the growing partnership between citizens and the Department, and the resilience of its future.  As the evening concluded, the mood was positive, confident, and upbeat.  The ADAMS website will continue to carry news of this work and invitations to related events, and the Center invites you to connect and participate.

REFERENCES:

1. For over 14 years, ADAMS has been a key member of the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO)’s American Muslim Sikh Advisory Committee.  We have consistently encouraged open dialogue and cooperation between the Muslim community and law enforcement, simultaneously protecting our nation’s safety while safeguarding the individual civil rights accorded and guaranteed by the US Constitution.  ADAMS has hosted several Town Hall meetings with the FBI WFO at our mosque, and had many advisory sessions with the WFO director and field agents, sharing mutual concerns and exploring ways of enhancing and strengthening our cooperation.

2. FATWA (religious ruling) Against Terrorism:
    https://www.adamscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/FATWA_Muslims_Against_Terrorism.pdf

3. ADAMS is a National Community Outreach Partner with the FBI in its Arab/Muslim/Sikh/South Asian-American Category.  See the section “Our Outreach Partners” on the FBI website:
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/partnerships_and_outreach/community_outreach/outreach_contacts

4.  ADAMS has also been a member of the Department of Homeland Security’s Countering Violent Extremism Working Group:
(http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_cve_working_group_recommendations.pdf).

5.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/fbi-field-office-director-james-mcjunkin-leads-by-example/2011/08/30/gIQAxIg3HK_story.html

6.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/20/AR2006092001675.html

7.  http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1129587,00.html

8.  MUFLEHUN – Counter-Radicalization organization – Chaired by Imam Magid (ADAMS) and Humera Khan (Executive Director):
http://www.muflehun.org/

9. ADAMS Hosts Seminar on Preventing Violent Extremism in the Muslim American Community since 2011:
http://muflehun.org/event-internet-safety-workshop-what-parents-need-to-know/

10.  New York Times Article:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/us/muslim-leaders-in-us-seek-to-counteract-extremist-recruiters.html

11.  ABC NEWS Interviews:
–  ABC News’ Martha Raddatz speaks to an imam in Virginia fighting attempts by ISIS to lure young Muslim Americans into extremism.
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/countering-isis-recruiting-tactics-29141084
(ADAMS Interviews start at Video Time Period 1:30)
http://abcnews.go.com/US/isis-recruiters-run-virginia-imam-working-counter-message/story?id=29166473

12. All Dulles Area Muslim Society focuses on Religious Freedom Around The World:

 
The All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS), one of the largest Muslim communities/mosques in the DC Metro Area and in the United States, is a non-profit 501c (3) Organization that serves over 6000 families(25,000 people) with 10 branches in Virginia/DC – Ashburn, Crystal City, Fairfax, Greater Gainesville, North Reston, South Riding, Sterling/Herndon, Sully/Chantilly, Tysons Corner,  and Washington DC.   ADAMS is governed by a 13-member democratically elected Board of Trustees that includes both men and women.  ADAMS Provides Religious services & education and social activities to several thousand people a week. ADAMS engages in regular interfaith, government relations, social services and community service, and has one of the largest Cub Scout, Boy Scout and Girl Scout programs in the DC Metro area. ADAMS Coordinates 22 Friday Prayers at 10 Locations. ADAMS Eid Prayers are attended by 15,000 to 25,000 People at 6 ADAMS Eid Holiday Locations. The ADAMS hosts the Adams Compassionate Healthcare Network(ACHN) Office and Clinic. ADAMS has three official seats on ACHN Board of Directors.

Why worry? From The Counter Jihad Report:

One of Northern Virginia’s most prominent Islamic organizations, the All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) Center was created by jihadis, and continues today to be a center of the Islamic Jihadi Movement in the Washington, D.C. area and beyond.

Despite this, ADAMS continues to be the primary “go-to” Islamic organization for churches, synagogues, and eventhe FBI in the D.C. metropolitan area.

122106-Holocaust2-500

Imam Mohamed Magid speaking at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum

 

The face of ADAMS continues to be Imam Mohamed Magid, the Executive Director of ADAMS and the previous leader of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), identified by the U.S. government as a financial support entity for Hamas – a designated terrorist organization – and the “nucleus” for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic Movement in North America.

Besides this obvious link between ADAMS and ISNA, ADAMS identifies itself as an affiliate of ISNA on its website (see image below).

Screen-Shot-2015-03-09-at-10.37.30-AM

In the largest terrorism financing and Hamas trial ever successfully prosecuted in American history (US v Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), Dallas 2008), the U.S. government specifically states:

“During the trial. the Court entcrcd Into evidence a wide array of testimonial and documentary evidence expressly linking ISNA and NAIT to the HLF and its principals; the Islamic Association for Palestine and its principals; the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States and its Palestine Committee headed by HAMAS official Mousa Abu Marzook; and the greater HAMAS-affiliated conspiracy described in the Government’s case-in-chief.” (GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONERS ISLAMIC SOClETY OF NORTH AMERICA AND NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST’S MOTION FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF p7)

It should be noted the U.S. Palestine Committee is Hamas in the America, created by the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood on orders from the International Muslim Brotherhood headquarters in Egypt.  HLF and IAP were two of the four Hamas entities created in the U.S.  The other two were the UASR and the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR).

“ISNA and NAIT. in fact, shared more with HLF than just a parent organization. They were intimately connected with the HLF and its assigned task of providing financial support to HAMAS. Shortly after HAMAS was founded in 1987, as an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, Govt. Exh. 21-61, the International Muslim Brotherhood ordered the Muslim Brotherhood chapters throughout the world to create Palestine Committees, whose job it was to support HAMAS with “media, money and men.” Govt. Exh. 3-15. The U.S.-Muslim Brotherhood created the U.S. Palestine Committee, which documents reflect was initially comprised of three organizations: the OLF (HLF), the IAP, and the UASR. CAIR was later added to these organizations.” (Ibid, p13)

In his order signed in 2009 and unsealed in 2010, Federal Judge Jorge Solis ruled, “The Government has produced ample evidence to establish the associations of CAIR, ISNA and NAIT with HLF, the Islamic Association for Palestine (“IAP”), and with Hamas.”  The appellate panel ruled unanimously to keep ISNA’s name on the “Unindicted Co-Conspirator” list for the HLF case.

Imam Mohamed Magid, the Executive Director for the ADAMS Center, was the President of ISNA at the time of this ruling and was the Vice President of ISNA prior to that.

The massive amount of evidence produced in the HLF case also revealed that money was sent directly from ISNA and NAIT bank accounts to Hamas leaders and Hamas organizations overseas.  The North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) is the bank for the Muslim Brotherhood in North America.  Hamas is a designated terrorist organization.

The founding Chairman of the Board for the ADAMS Center is Ahmad Totonji, one of the original Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders in the United States who founded some of the largest MB organizations in North America.  Totonji resides in Northern Virginia and has been identified by the U.S government as the co-founder of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) and the Safa Trust.  These organizations are/were headquartered in Herndon, Virginia, and provided financial and material support to designated terrorist organizations Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas.

According to the government affidavit, the Safa Trust was raided by the federal government after 9/11 because the organizations and leaders “in the Safa Group maintained a financial and ideological relationship with persons and entities with known affiliations to the designated terrorist Groups PIJ and HAMAS.”

One of those Safa organizations was the Sterling Charitable Gift Fund whose six (6) primary advisors are prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders in America including:  Dr. Taha J. Al-Alwani (former Director of IIIT and the MB’s Fiqh Council of North America), Dr. Jamal Barzinji (one of the leading MB leaders in America), Dr. Ilyas BaYunus,  Sheikh Mohamed Hanooti (unindicted co-conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and the HLF case), Dr. Iqbal Unus (senior MB leader in America), and Imam Mohamed Magid.

The Safa Trust affidavit featured ADAMS founder/Chairman of the board Ahmad Totonji:  “Ahmad Totonji is a corporate officer of several Safa Group organizations, including Safa Trust, Inc., and was referenced in Al-Alwani’s 1991 letter expressing solidarity with Al- Arian. Totonji is also referenced in another seized letter from Al-Arian to Al-Alwani. In this letter, Al-Arian solicited more funding and referred to a meeting he had with Totonji where Totonji promised him another $20,000. As recently as November 1, 2001, Totonji signed a check for $10,000 to Al-Arian through Al-Arian’s organization known as the Tampa Bay Coalition for Justice and Peace, drafted on the account of Safa Group charity IIIT.” (Affidavit, p79)

Sami Al-Arian is the convicted leader of the designated terrorist organization PIJ.

When the government conducted numerous raids in conjunction with the Safa Trust investigation, the homes of Omar and Muhammed Ashraf were also raided. Omar Ashraf is a member of the ADAMS Project Committee and Executive Vice President of Sterling Management Group.  Muhammed Ashraf is the ADAMS Legal Advisor and was also an attorney for Abdurahman Alamoudi, the convicted Al Qaeda financier.

The Vice President of the Board of Trustees and an ADAMS Laws Committee member, who was mentioned above as an Advisor for the Sterling Charitable Gift fund is Iqbal Unus.  Unus was also Dean of Students at the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS) in Leesburg, Virginia, another Muslim Brotherhood organization. GSISS was also raided during the Safa Trust investigation, as was the home of Unus.   The homes GSISS President Taha al-Alwani and Yaqub Mizra, President of the Sterling Management Group, were also raided.

A check written by Yaqub Mirza from the account of SAAR Foundation to ADAMS in the amount of $250,000, was deposited into a Safa Trust account on December 15, 1997.  On SAFA’s 1997 Form 990, however, this amount is not reflected as a contribution received from either ADAMS or SAAR.  Moreover, Safa’s 1997 Form 990 does not reflect any other transactional relationship with ADAMS or SAAR that would explain the transaction.

The relationship with the Safa Trust terrorist support network is clear.

In a 2014 letter to ISIS leader Al Baghdadi, Imam Mohamed Magid was signatory #82.  In this letter, the signatories make clear their support for Sharia, Jihad, and the Hadud punishments under Sharia, which include stonings, beheadings, and crucifixions.  This is the face of ADAMS.

The ADAMS Center was created by the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood and operates as a part of the jihadi network in the United States as a hostile entity to accomplish the Muslim Brotherhood’s stated mission here – to wage “civilization jihad” to destroy America.

When considering conducting any “outreach” to the ADAMS Center, organizations should decide whether they want to work with this jihadi organization which seeks their destruction.

Europe on the Brink of Collapse: Schengen Agreement Suspended

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As posted on this site earlier, the Schengen Agreement, the open European borders treaty is now in question as suspension has happened between Germany and Austria.

A raw and partial translation into English from the German labor minister:

Federal Labour Minister Andrea Nahles warned in a tedious process of integration of the refugees coming to Germany. Not even one out of ten bring with the requirements to be conveyed directly in a work or training, the SPD politician said on Thursday in the Bundestag: “Usually lack the knowledge of German, but also other.” Nahles: “not all who come, there are highly qualified. Clearly, this is not so. The Syrian physician is not the normal case.” Although she was convinced that we will be able to provide first aid treatment of refugees. But Nahles is skeptical to the labour market. You need in most cases “supplementary qualification”, in many cases but only “an undergraduate education”.

Nahles said: “that is reflected in the unemployment statistics. I hope that everyone who says today that do we press, we take on the people we want to remember that even in a year.” This is “Then there’s no sign of a failed labour market policy, but a sign that we a running task must cope with a large.”

In the parliamentary debate on the budget for her Department, Nahles underlined that she will require 2016 expected to an additional three billion euros in its budget. Alone for the livelihood of refugees who are expected to remain in Germany, she count on spending from one to two billion euros. Nahles said one could say still no exact number. This depends on how quickly how many asylum applications are accepted and how many family members would comply. For programmes for the integration into the labour market, she quote 600 million to 1.1 billion euros. An additional 180 million euros would be needed for work-related courses. It will be not enough that they turn for a year “in crisis mode”, “and then everything goes back to normal”.

This is a historic moment for Europe due to the hundreds of thousands refugees flooding into every country and the consequences for Europe’s stability is in question. Social and entitlement programs will be insolvent, crime has risen to epic numbers, protests and civil unrest is an hourly occurrence, the banking and currency system is in jeopardy. These are all conditions and tools that America must learn quickly to not fall victim to the same circumstance.

Congressman Mike McCaul had this message this weekend:

Some 10 million people have been forced from their homes in Syria, with almost 500,000 arriving in Europe

To speak of the terror threat and jihad recruiting component is capping off dangerous environment.

Islamists in Germany trying to recruit young refugees

Berlin (AFP) – Muslim radicals in Germany are trying to recruit some of the growing numbers of asylum seekers reaching the country, according to intelligence services quoted by the German news agency DPA.

The Islamic extremists “are trying to approach the young unaccompanied refugees, who arrive in our country without their families and are particularly looking for contacts and support,” a spokesman for the intelligence service in the southern state of Bavaria told DPA.

He said many of the youths are approached around reception centres but also at Munich railway station where many of the asylum seekers have arrived from Hungary and Austria in recent days.

The Islamic extremists “want to take advantage of the insecurity and distress of the refugees,” he said.

***

‘We can’t take any more!’ Germany stops ALL trains from Austria as they reintroduce border controls and temporarily suspend Schengen Agreement

  • Germany has become the destination for many desperate Syrian refugees
  • Munich, which has been the main entry point, is now at breaking point
  • Germany has announced a reintroduction of ‘temporary’ border controls
  • The move marks a dramatic shift back from Europe’s Schengen agreement
  • Europe is struggling to deal with the huge influx of people fleeing violence

German politicians have called for urgent action on the migrant crisis as the country today halted all trains from Austria due to an overwhelming influx of refugees.

This evening Germany reinstated controls at its borders with Austria in an historic move which saw the open borders Schengen Agreement temporarily suspended.

The decision marks a dramatic shift away from the current abolishment of passport checks throughout Europe’s Schengen zone.

German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said: ‘At this moment Germany is temporarily introducing border controls again along [the EU’s] internal borders. The focus will be on the border to Austria at first.

‘The aim of these measures is to limit the current inflows to Germany and to return to orderly procedures when people enter the country.

Mr de Maiziere added: ‘This step has become necessary. The great readiness to help that Germany has shown in recent weeks… must not be overstretched.’

The Interior Minister did not specify how long the border controls would remain in place or give details of exactly how incoming migrants would be handled. He said there could be disruption to rail travel. Most migrants have been arriving by train.

Germany’s national railway, Deutsche Bahn, said it had halted service between Austria and Germany for 12 hours at authorities’ orders.

The rules of Europe’s passport-free travel zone, known as the Schengen area, allow countries to reintroduce controls in exceptional circumstances, and the European Commission said that ‘the current situation in Germany … appears to be a situation covered by the rules.’

In a statement the EU executive said: ‘The temporary reintroduction of border controls between member states is an exceptional possibility explicitly foreseen in and regulated by the Schengen Borders Code, in case of a crisis situation.’

It added that the executive would keep the situation under review and said the aim would be to return to the normal situation of no border checks between member states of the Schengen zone ‘as soon as feasible’.

The European Commission added: ‘The German decision of today underlines the urgency to agree on the measures proposed by the European Commission in order to manage the refugee crisis.’

It is not yet clear exactly what the temporary measures include, but the move comes as German authorities have warned they are at ‘the limit’ in coping with the migrant crisis, with locals claiming Munich is on the brink of collapse.

German newspaper Bild cited security sources as saying the state government in Bavaria had asked the federal police to help deal with the task.

The newspaper said the federal police would send 2,100 officers to Bavaria to help it secure its borders.

Germany has become the destination for many desperate Syrian refugees fleeing their war-torn home country, after it waived EU rules in August.

Tens of thousands of people have crossed Austria by train on their way to Germany since the two countries threw open their borders to the migrants last weekend. A record number were expected to enter Austria from Hungary on Sunday.

The German government announced the nation would take in applications for Syrian asylum-seekers, regardless of where they first arrived in the EU.

Munich, in Germany’s southern state of Bavaria, has been the main entry point for those entering the country.

Some 13,015 refugees arrived in Munich yesterday alone and 1,400 more are expected to reach the city today – but there are fears it is already at breaking point.

A police spokesman in Munich said: ‘Given the numbers from yesterday, it is very clear that we have reached the upper limit of our capacity.’

Federal transport minister Alexander Dobrindt added how ‘effective measures are necessary now to stop the influx’. For the photo essay and complete story, click here.

 

Sanctions Relief Summary by U.S. per Iran JPOA

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The White House has never been concerned about an up or down vote by Congress to approve the Iran deal, rather the only concern is what Congress will do on the outside in regards to the sanctions on Iran. In the past week, Republicans and conservatives in Congress have been meeting to discuss all options to hurt the deal as it moves forward. One such option is to sue again Barack Obama on abuse of power over Congress using waiver authority on laws and standing sanctions on Iran and that discussion is taking place.

Sanctions Relief under the JCPOA  (Direct text transfer from page 17 on in detailed Congressional Report. For the full report, click here.

The easing of sanctions under the JCPOA is relatively consistent with the stipulations of the framework accord. Under the JCPOA, the overwhelming bulk of sanctions relief occurs at Implementation Day—the day when the IAEA certifies that Iran has completed those stipulated core nuclear requirements listed in Annex V of the JCPOA (primarily reducing the size and scope of its enrichment of uranium). According to the JCPOA, the following sanctions are to be eased:

On Implementation Day, many U.S., virtually all EU, and most U.N. sanctions are to be lifted or suspended that Iran has taken certain key nuclear-related steps that are U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20 contains this provision.

The U.S. sanctions that are to be suspended are primarily those that sanction foreign entities and countries for conducting specified transactions with Iran (so-called “secondary sanctions”). U.S. sanctions that prohibit U.S. firms from conducting most transactions with Iran are not being suspended. However, the JCPOA does commit the United States to a slight modification in the U.S. “trade ban” with Iran (Executive Order 12959 of May 1995) to permit: licensing the sale to Iran of commercial aircraft, and the importation of Iranian luxury goods such as carpets, caviar, and some fruits and nuts.

The U.S. sanctions to be suspended are mostly those imposed since U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 was enacted in June 2010.55 That resolution identified Iran’s energy sector as a potential contributor to Iran’s “proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.”

Type of Sanctions to Be Removed or Suspended. The sanctions relief on Implementation Day includes lifting or suspension of U.S. sanctions on foreign firms involved in Iran’s:57 (1) energy sector, including those that penalize Iran’s exportation of oil and sanction foreign sales to Iran of gasoline and energy sector equipment, and which limit foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector; (2) U.S. sanctions on foreign banks that conduct transactions with Iranian banks; (3) U.S. sanctions on Iran’s auto sector and trading in the rial. The United States is to revoke the designations made under various Executive Orders of numerous specified Iranian economic entities and personalities (listed in Attachment III of Annex II of the JCPOA), including the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), various Iranian banks, and many energy and shipping-related institutions. That step would enable foreign companies to resume transactions with those Iranian entities without risking being penalized by the United States.

U.S. Laws to Be Waived and Executive Orders to Terminated. The suspension of U.S. sanctions as required under the JCPOA will necessitate: exercising presidential authority to waive sanctions mandated by the core operative provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act (P.L. 104-172 as amended);58 Section 1245(d)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81); the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (P.L. 112-158); the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (Subtitle D of P.L. 112-239); and the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195). The statutory basis for the sanctions would remain unchanged by the agreement. Implementing the U.S. commitment will also require terminating the provisions of the following Executive Orders: 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645, and Sections 5-7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628. For information on the exact provisions of the Executive Orders and the laws referenced above, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions and CRS Report R43311, Iran: U.S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions.

Request for Congress to Lift Sanctions Outright. The JCPOA requires the U.S. Administration, within eight years (“Transition Day”), to request that Congress lift virtually all of the sanctions that will be suspended under the JCPOA. The JCPOA requires all U.N. sanctions to terminate after 10 years of adoption of the JCPOA. Under the JCPOA, the eight year mark after JCPOA adoption is known as the Transition Day and the 10-year mark is known as the Termination Day.

EU Lifting of Sanctions on Implementation Day. The EU sanctions to be lifted include: (1) the EU ban on purchases of oil and gas from Iran; (2) the ban on Iran’s use of the SWIFT electronic payments system that enables Iran to move funds from abroad to its Central Bank or its commercial banks; and (3) the lifting of EU sanctions (assets freezes/visa bans) on entities listed in Annex II, Attachment 1. This attachment does not include one controversial personality –IRGC-Qods Force Commander Qasem Soleimani. EU nuclear-related sanctions on him are to remain until Transition Day, although he will remain sanctioned under EU decisions on Syria and on terrorism. U.S. sanctions on Soleimani will remain, including secondary sanctions on entities that deal with him.

U.S. Sanctions to Remain in Place. Other U.S. sanctions that are not required to be suspended in accordance with the JCPOA are mostly those sanctioning Iran’s support for terrorism, its human rights abuses, and worldwide arms and WMD-related technology to Iran. The specific Executive Orders and statutory provisions that will not be suspended include (1) E.O. 13224 sanctioning terrorism entities (not specific to Iran); (2) the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act that sanctions foreign firms that sell arms and weapons of mass destruction-related technology to Iran; (3) the Iran-North Korea-Syria Non-Proliferation Act (INKSNA);59 and (4) the Executive Orders and the provisions of CISADA and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act that pertain to human rights or democratic change in Iran. Iran also will be remaining on the “terrorism list” and all sanctions triggered by that designation will remain in place, at least for now. The United States has not pledged in the JCPOA to remove or to reconsider Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. That designation triggers numerous U.S. sanctions, including a ban on any U.S. foreign aid to Iran and on U.S. exportation to Iran of controlled goods and services, and a prohibition on U.S. support for international lending to Iran.

U.N. Sanctions on Arms Sales and Ballistic Missiles to Be Terminated After Several Years. One issue that arose during final negotiations on the JCPOA was the suspension of U.N. sanctions on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and on Iran’s importation or exportation of conventional weaponry. The April 2 framework accord indicated that these sanctions would remain in place in the JCPOA. However, as subsequently negotiated, the ban on Iran’s development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is to be lifted within eight years of the JCPOA and the ban on conventional arms sales to Iran and on Iran’s exportation of arms are to be lifted within five years,60 as stipulated in Resolution 2231. However, as noted, U.S. sanctions on foreign entities that assist Iran with such programs will remain in place, as will specific U.N. Security Council Resolutions that prohibit weapons shipments to Lebanon and to Yemen.

Ban on Reimposing those Sanctions that are Lifted or Suspended. The JCPOA contains language requiring that the parties to the agreement not reimpose the sanctions that will be suspended, as long as Iran is complying. The agreement states that if U.S. sanctions are reimposed (other than through reimposition on the grounds of Iranian noncompliance), Iran would not be bound by its nuclear commitments. An Iranian letter to the President of the U.N. Security Council, dated July 20, interprets the provision to bar the reimposition of those sanctions that are being suspended under “non-nuclear” justifications such as Iranian support for terrorism or armed factions in the Middle East, or for human rights violations. Iran interprets reimposition to be those sanctions that target the same sectors of Iran’s economy on which sanctions are being lifted or suspended (energy, financial, auto, shipping). However, there does not appear to be a prohibition on enacting further U.S. sanctions (other than those being suspended under the JCPOA) on arms sales to Iran, human rights violations and Iranian support for terrorism or armed factions in the region .

Automatic Reimposition of Sanctions (“Snap-Back”)

The JCPOA (paragraph 36 and 37) contains a mechanism for the “snap back” of U.N. sanctions if Iran does not satisfactorily resolve a compliance dispute. According to the JCPOA, the United States (or any veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council) would be able to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue the lifting of U.N. sanctions despite Iran’s refusal to resolve the dispute. In that case, “… the provisions of the old U.N. Security Council resolutions would be reimposed, unless the U.N. Security Council decides otherwise.” These provisions are included in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231.61 The total time for this “dispute resolution” mechanism –between the time of the complaint of Iranian non-compliance and the reimposition of U.N. sanctions, is 65 days.

A related question is whether the effect of sanctions currently realized could ever be reconstituted if U.N. sanctions are lifted but U.S. sanctions are reimposed. The effect of all sanctions has depended on the substantial degree of international compliance and cooperation with the sanctions regime that has taken place since 2010. A wide range of countries depend on energy and other trade with Iran and might be reluctant to resume cooperating with reimposed U.S. sanctions unless Iran commits egregious violations of its commitments. Countries that do not wish to reimpose their sanctions on Iran could argue that, because U.N. Security Council sanctions are lifted, they are no longer bound to cooperate with U.S. sanctions.

Implications for Iran of the JCPOA Sanctions Relief

The suspension of sanctions on Implementation Day would likely have significant implications for Iran’s economy, including the following:

Crude Oil Exports. Iran will be able to export crude oil without restriction. Iranian energy officials estimate that Iran could double its oil exports from the 1.1 mbd level of the JPA period within about six months. Significant quantities of Iranian oil will likely hit the market immediately after sanctions suspension because Iran reportedly has about 30 million -50 million barrels of oil stored, and therefore available for immediate release onto the market.

Access to Restricted Foreign Exchange Reserves. Upon the suspension or lifting of sanctions on Implementation Day, Iran will have access to about $120 billion in foreign exchange assets currency that it has been unable to repatriate to its Central Bank. However, according to Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew in testimony on the JCPOA in late July, about $65 billion of those funds are obligated. About $20 billion is owed to China for infrastructure projects performed in Iran by Chinese firms. About $45 billion is owed to cover loans to Iranian energy companies and other Iranian firms. The Treasury Department says that only about $56 billion would be available for Iran to use at its discretion, after these obligations are paid. The funds consist of some assets deposited before restrictions on the movement of the funds was imposed in February 2013 (Iran Threat Reduction Act), but the bulk of the assets are oil sales proceeds deposited since that restriction went into effect.

 According to the Treasury Department, Iran’s foreign exchange reserves are held by many banks around the world, and particularly in those of Iran’s five remain oil customers: China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey.62 Some funds might be held in EU banks as well. Other banks said to hold Iranian foreign exchange funds are, according to a determination of waiver provided to Congress on June 17, 2015, in Oman, Switzerland, and South Africa.63 And, banks in the United Arab Emirates, a major trading partner of Iran, might hold some of the monies as well.

Post-Sanctions Economic Growth. Economists estimate that Iran’s economy could grow as much as 7% after sanctions are suspended.64 Iran’s energy sector, automotive production sector, and other industrial sectors are likely to rebound strongly as importation of parts becomes easier to finance. Some assert that Iran will use the additional economic resources generated by the deal to enhance its regional position. The Administration acknowledges Iran might steer some extra funding to regional allies but argues that Iran will use the great bulk of the additional funds to invest in its domestic economy which has been starved by sanctions for several years.

Commercial Aircraft Sales. Iran is likely to seek to purchase significant quantities of commercial aircraft because of the advanced age of most of the aircraft used by its airlines. The deal commits the United States to license commercial aircraft sales to Iran, including U.S.-made aircraft. If such sales are consummated, U.S.-Iran trade in dollars, which has been highly limited by sanctions for many years, could expand significantly. The importation to the United State of U.S. luxury goods is likely not to boost bilateral trade significantly because of the low-volume and low dollar-figure nature of these imports by U.S. buyers.

 

 

Iran Does Not Need to Cheat, Lying Works

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TEHRAN, Sep. 12 (MNA) – AEOI Deputy Zarean says no inspections of Iran’s military sites are on the agenda of a Tuesday visit by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Iran. Deputy of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Asghar Zarean said on Saturday that IAEA inspectors are scheduled to arrive in Tehran on Tuesday for talks. 

He added that during this round of negotiations, inspections of Iran’s military sites are not on the agency’s agenda. The Iranian nuclear official maintained that the visit is within the framework of the JCPOA and the sides will hold talks for further coordination and practical measures in the future. On July 14, Iran and the IAEA signed a road map for “the clarification of past and present issues” regarding Iran’s nuclear program in the Austrian capital Vienna. The deal came on the same day Iran and the 5+1 group of countries reached an agreement over Tehran’s nuclear program.

 

 

And the timing of this announcement is beyond suspicious:

FNC: Iran has reportedly found an unexpectedly high reserve of uranium, following assessments that the country is running low on the nuclear raw material and just days after President Obama essentially secured an international nuclear deal with the country’s leaders.

The discovery was reported first by Reuters and based on comments made by Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi to the state news agency IRNA.

“I cannot announce (the level of) Iran’s uranium mine reserves,” Salehi was quoted as saying. “The important thing is that before aerial prospecting for uranium ores we were not too optimistic, but the new discoveries have made us confident about our reserves.”

The international deal with Iran, largely brokered by the Obama administration, slows the country’s nuclear development for nearly a decade in exchange for the lifting of billions of dollars worth of crippling economic sanctions.

World leaders think Iran is trying to develop a nuclear weapon, despite Tehran’s denial.

However, Iran under the deal will still be able to pursue a nuclear-development program, for which the uranium could be used.

The remarks by Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, could not be found Saturday morning on the IRNA website. But another story had him as saying the deal — reached in July and officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — will not slow the pace of Iran’s nuclear program.

“The official said the restrictions which the JCPOA entails are by no means the ones which would restrict Iran in its nuclear activities,” reads one line in the story.

Several other news-gathering agencies have either picked up the Reuters’ story or cited it in their own version.

That Obama would win congressional approval of the deal became apparent in recent weeks, but not without a fight from the GOP-controlled Congress and other critics including conservative groups and pro-Israel organizations.

However, the president worked all summer to garner support from Senate Democrat, who on Thursday block chamber Republicans from disapproving of the deal and from forcing Obama to resort to a presidential veto to win approval for what will likely be considered his biggest foreign policy achievement.

Salehi reportedly said uranium exploration had covered almost two-thirds of Iran and would be complete in the next four years.

Uranium can be used for energy production and scientific purposes but is also a key ingredient in nuclear weapons.

Some Western analysts have previously said that Iran was close to exhausting its supply of yellowcake — or raw uranium — and that mining it domestically was not cost-efficient, according to Reuters.

A report published in 2013 by U.S. think-tanks Carnegie Endowment and the Federation of American Scientists said the scarcity and low quality of Iran’s uranium resources compelled it “to rely on external sources of natural and processed uranium,” the wire service also reported.

Iran has repeatedly denied overseas media reports that it has tried to import uranium from countries like Kazakhstan and Zimbabwe.