Category Archives: The Denise Simon Experience
Look Who Hillary Hired for Benghazi Help
Richard Verma: Presently in India selling a ‘people to people cooperation’ to tackle climate change, Verma was nominated by Obama to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs when he left in 2011. He is a lawyer at Steptoe & Johnson and was an advisor to Harry Reid from 2002-2007.
Oh, then there were some Hillary and Richard Verma email exchanges with particular questions to the matter of the Russian reset in 2010.
Clinton tapped D.C. lawyer to help respond to Benghazi questions
*Richard Verma had ‘special government employee’ designation
*He worked at State Department while retaining his job at a law firm
*State Department inspector general launched inquiry into the program
Hillary Clinton tapped a former State Department employee to help respond to various inquires from Capitol Hill after the 2012 fatal attacks in Benghazi, Libya, at the same he was being paid by his law firm.
Richard Verma was designated a “special government employee,” allowing him to work at the department as well as at Steptoe & Johnson law firm, according to an email he wrote that was obtained by Citizens United, a conservative group that has filed lawsuits to access records from the State Department.
The arrangement has prompted additional questions about the way the federal program at the State Department was used while Clinton served as secretary of state.
Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has long been concerned about the use of the program, which was supposed to be designed to allow the government to bring aboard outside talent to fill voids in its expertise.
“It’s not clear that responding to congressional inquiries is how the special employee designation was meant to be used,” Grassley said Thursday. “It was designed to get special expertise that the government can’t get in-house. Agencies already have congressional affairs staff who are employed to help respond to congressional inquiries. The State Department has stretched the definition in several cases.”
A similar arrangement involving another of Clinton’s closest confidants, Huma Abedin, led the State Department inspector general to launch a review into the department’s use of the designation and, apparently, whether it was abused in the hiring of Abedin, who was working at the State Department and Teneo, a company that provides political intelligence to clients.
In August, Grassley asked the FBI whether the inspector general’s office had notified the bureau of any inquiry into Abedin that had evolved into “a full-fledged criminal investigation.” The FBI referred Grassley to the inspector general.
The inspector general’s office declined to comment Thursday on the status of its inquiry.
“The special government employee designation is not limited to specific types of position descriptions,” State Department spokesman Alec Gerlach said.
Clinton campaign officials did not respond to requests for comment.
Grassley has been asking whether the State Department’s “excessive use” of the program undermines government ethical standards, because conflicts of interest can arise when a government employee is simultaneously working for a private contractor.
Revelations of private email use and multiple jobs held at the same time by one individual raised more questions. Now, more details are coming in, and they warrant more questions. The bottom line is still whether the taxpayers are well-served by agency practices and spending. No one will know for sure until the State Department is more transparent about how it operates. Senate Judiciary Chairman Charles Grassley
The inspector general told him in a letter that the office would examine whether the program “conforms to applicable legal and policy requirements” and safeguards against any possible conflicts of interest. The employees may or may not be paid.
Clinton, now the front-runner for the 2016 Democratic nomination for president, has been under fire for actions at the State Department, including exclusively using a personal email account for government work, as well as her response to the attacks in Benghazi that led to four deaths, including the ambassador.
Clinton’s chief of staff, Cheryl Mills, asked Verma, now U.S. ambassador to India, to help respond to various congressional requests related to Libya because of his background working on Capitol Hill, according to the Verma email of Oct. 12, 2012, in which he outlined his job arrangement.
“Cheryl thought my prior experience handling investigations and my work on the Hill would be useful in advising the team as they process requests,” he wrote to two State Department officials.
Verma, a former assistant secretary of state for legislative affairs, led the State Department’s efforts on Capitol Hill and served as a senior member of Clinton’s team.
His unpaid advisory role began Oct. 1, 2012. Verma said he would spend two to three hours a day discussing issues, primarily with the State Department legislative team. The designation is given on an annual basis, according to the department, but Verma said he had expected to work for 60 days.
In his email, Verma indicated he was issued a State Department identification, email account and Blackberry so he could keep his responsibilities apart from his full-time job. He had been working on President Obama’s re-election campaign but stopped when he went back to the State Department.
As we discussed, any political activities that I undertake must be done on my personal time, and not involve government resources. I obviously have followed that guidance strictly. Richard Verma in a letter to the State Department
Citizens United began filing Freedom of Information Act requests at the State Department last year in hopes of getting enough information to produce a documentary about Clinton. They have sued the State Department for unresponsive requests multiple times.
Obama nominated Verma, who also had worked at Albright Stonebridge Group and the Center for American Progress, to be ambassador in September 2014, more than a year after Clinton had left the State Department. He had also worked as a senior national security adviser, counsel and foreign policy adviser to Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev.
Obama Sells Syrian Peace Talks that Will Never Come
As noted in the Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes interview with Barack Obama, when challenged on leadership, Obama said he leads on climate change.
The White House has falsely created a bucket-load of people to blame for any intelligence failures, including declaring CENTCOM had modified intelligence reports to make al Qaeda appear as though the terror group was decimated, which is hardly a fact of today.
It should also be noted, the U.S. intelligence agencies collaborate several times daily with allied foreign intelligence services and the United Nations has their own intelligence pathways. In fact, the UN has been approached to seek urgent agreements of peace, no-fly zones, cease fires or a discussion on a coalition government for Syria.
WASHINGTON —CIA-backed rebels in Syria, who had begun to put serious pressure on President Bashar Assad’s forces, are now under Russian bombardment with little prospect of rescue by their American patrons, U.S. officials say.
Over the past week, Russia has directed parts of its air campaign against U.S.-funded groups and other moderate opposition in a concerted effort to weaken them, the officials say. The Obama administration has few options to defend those it had secretly armed and trained.
The Russians “know their targets, and they have a sophisticated capacity to understand the battlefield situation,” said Rep. Mike Pompeo, R-Kan., who serves on the House Intelligence Committee and was careful not to confirm a classified program. “They are bombing in locations that are not connected to the Islamic State” group. More here.
So, within DC, there are arguments at every corner about what to do with regard to Russia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan. It is not a matter of failed intelligence. Saudi Arabia is especially concerned about Syria and has been equipping anti-Assad forces. The Saudis met with the Russians over the weekend.
U.S. intelligence officials fired back that they had provided lawmakers with warnings about Russia’s intentions to begin military operations in Syria, including in the weeks before airstrikes began in late September.
“Any suggestion that the intelligence community was surprised by Russia’s military support to the Assad regime is misleading,” a senior intelligence official told The Daily Beast. Members of Congress had access to intelligence reports on the movements of Russian aircraft into Syria as well as the buildup of ground troops and could read them anytime they chose, another official said.
Russia has long been a subject of close scrutiny for the CIA and other intelligence agencies. But since the end of the Cold War and a post-9/11 shift to focusing on terrorist organizations and the rise of extremist groups, some lawmakers have questioned whether the agencies are paying enough attention to old foes in Moscow.
“For several years, the Intelligence Community has provided regular assessments of Russia’s military, political, and financial support to the [Assad] regime,” Brian Hale, a spokesperson for the Director of National Intelligence, said in a statement. “In recent months, the Intelligence Community tracked and reported Moscow’s determination to play a more direct role in propping up Assad’s grip on power, including its deployment of offensive military assets to Syria. While these events unfolded quickly, the IC carried out its responsibilities with equal agility.”
The pushback from officials underscored how sensitive the agencies are to allegations of “intelligence failures” and in particular being behind the curve about Russia’s international ambitions and the rise of extremists groups in the Middle East. The Defense Department is also investigating allegations that senior intelligence officials at the military’s Central Command manipulated intelligence reports to paint a rosy picture about the U.S.-led air campaign against the so-called Islamic State, widely known as ISIS, in Iraq and Syria.
The congressional inquiry also highlights how politicized the Obama administration’s strategy in Syria has become in the wake of a total breakdown in the U.S. military’s training of rebel groups and a 13-month-old U.S.-led air campaign that has failed to destroy ISIS forces in Syria or Iraq.
The White House defended the quality of the intelligence reporting on Syria and noted that journalists had also been tracking the deployment of military aircraft and ground troops into the country.
“I don’t think there was anybody that had the expectation in the administration that Russia wasn’t prepared to use that equipment to advance what they view as their interests inside of Syria,” White House press secretary Josh Earnest said on Thursday, adding that officials had already assessed Russia and wanted to prop up the embattled Assad regime before the airstrikes began.
“I don’t think that’s a surprise,” Earnest said. “The president, before Russia commenced their military activities, said that a decision by Russia to double down on Assad militarily would be a losing bet. That’s something that the President said before we saw this Russian military activity and we continue to believe that that’s true.”
Reuters first reported that lawmakers were examinig possible intelligence lapses over Russia’s intervention and were concerned that intelligence agencies were slow to grasp Putin’s intentions.
That’s a charge that lawmakers have made in the past.
After Russian forces invaded the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine in 2014, lawmakers blasted the Pentagon and intelligence community for failing to anticipate Putin’s plans.
“It was not predicted by our intelligence. That is well known, which is another massive failure because of our total misreading of the intentions of Vladimir Putin,” Sen. John McCain told then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel during a hearing. That prompted James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, to defend his analysts’ work.
“I have lived through some genuine intelligence failures in my career, and this was not a failure by any stretch,” Clapper said in an interview with Washington news radio station WTOP in March 2014.
“We tracked [the situation in Ukraine] pretty carefully and portrayed what the possibilities were and certainly portrayed the difficulties we’d have, because of the movements of Russian troops and provided anticipatory warning of their incursion into Crimea,” Clapper said.
Three months later, when ISIS forces rolled into the Iraqi city of Mosul and established a major foothold inside the country, the agencies again found themselves on the defensive, recounting all the times they’d said they warned lawmakers about the rising strength of ISIS in the region and how it could threaten security. Critics said, however, that the intelligence agencies hadn’t predicted ISIS would take over whole cities, and that the reporting wasn’t specific enough to develop a counterattack.
The debate over intelligence assessments on Russia’s recent airstrikes has a similar theme. Lawmakers are zeroing in on specific reporting about military movements and potential targets, as well assessments about Putin’s intentions and his strategy, to get at the question of how the U.S. response to Russia’s operation might have been different with other kinds of information.
Rep. Adam Schiff, the senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee said in a statement on Thursday that it was “certainly true that few would have predicted that Putin would react to the weakening position of the Assad regime by sending in combat aircraft and augmenting its naval presence. An increase in Russia’s material support for the Assad regime seemed much more probable.”
That suggested that some lawmakers viewed the intelligence assessments as not declarative or precise enough for Congress to understand how the events would unfold.
But, Schiff added, “As Putin’s intention to deploy more military power to Syria became clearer in recent weeks, the Intelligence Community kept the Committee apprised of those developments. Although we will continue to look into the timeliness and accuracy of intelligence assessments, I do not think we should rush to find fault with the Intelligence Community in its ability to discern exactly what is in Putin’s head.”
Military and intelligence officials did warn that Russia was likely to begin military operations in Syria in the days before air strikes began.
Nine days before Russia’s first bombing runs on Syrian rebel groups, including those that the CIA had given weapons and training, three U.S. officials told The Daily Beast that airstrikes would begin “soon.” They noted that Russian drone flights to scout potential targets were underway—those same flights were also reported on social media by eyewitnesses in Syria.
The officials’ assessment on the imminence of Russian airstrikes marked a shift from previous statements, when officials had said they weren’t sure whether Russia intended to use force in Syria and enter into the country’s long and brutal civil war. That shifting analysis reflected the rapid increase in the number of Russian jets in the region, as well as reports by eyewitnesses that Russian military forces were working with Assad’s army. Videos supporting those claims could be found on YouTube.
And yet, those aggressive, visible moves were met with hardly a shrug in some circles in Washington.
“There are not discussions happening here about what this means for U.S. influence on the war against ISIS,” one defense official told The Daily Beast at the time.
In light of the administration’s response, it’s questionable whether more precise assessments of Russia’s movements would have led to any attempts to head off its intervention.
Schiff, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, said that reading the Russian leader’s mind was all but impossible.
“Putin notoriously keeps a tight counsel and employs a deliberate strategy of improvisation and unpredictability,” Schiff said. “That said, we need to make sure that we appropriately prioritize so-called hard targets like Russia.”
Only Obama Adheres to Iran Deal, Others Pretend
Primer:
SUBJECT: Iran’s ‘partial nod’ to nuclear deal
FULL TEXT: Iran’s parliament gave a partial nod to a nuclear deal with world powers Sunday but only after fiery clashes and allegations from a top negotiator that a lawmaker had threatened to kill him.
Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency, went on the attack for the government at the end of a boisterous debate where he and other officials were accused of having capitulated.
Ultraconservative lawmakers repeatedly warned of holes in the text of the agreement and criticized President Hassan Rouhani for suggesting MPs were deliberately delaying the deal.
Red with anger, Alireza Zakani, who headed a panel reviewing the accord, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, for two months, demanded “fundamental changes” to the text.
“This deal serves Wendy Sherman” and not Iran’s interests, Zakani said, referring to America’s senior negotiator in talks which resulted in the agreement in Vienna on July 14.
Hardliners in Tehran often railed against two years of diplomacy that led to the deal. Iran’s government says the accord will protect the country’s nuclear program while seeing sanctions lifted.
Despite Sunday’s[11 Oct] disagreements, the outlines of a motion titled “Iran’s Plan for Reciprocal and Proper Action in Implementing JCPOA” were approved by 139 of 253 lawmakers present.
One-hundred lawmakers voted against and 12 abstained. Iran has 290 MPs in total. They stopped short of endorsing the nuclear accord on Sunday and said specific details of the text are to be discussed and voted on Tuesday. Members of the U.S. Congress failed in September to torpedo the White House’s historic deal with Iran.
Salehi, an atomic scientist by training and a former foreign minister, hit out at what he said was the “immoral” behavior of some MPs in the way they had responded to talks and the deal.
Having to raise his voice, Salehi said: “Truth might be bitter for some… Listen. Listen. Hear me once and for all. Hear it from someone who is going be buried under cement.”
The latter remark was in reference to a lawmaker who Salehi said took a vow to kill him because the government agreed to remove and disable the core of a reactor at Arak, one of Iran’s nuclear sites.
“We negotiated within a framework and principles. Who set that framework? Me? A minimum and maximum was set for us,” Salehi said.
So-called red lines for the talks were also laid down by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Supreme National Security Council that he oversees.
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who led Iran’s diplomacy with the six powers, attended Sunday’s parliament session but he did not speak publicly. State television broadcast only live audio of the session over stills of the parliament, citing “opposition from Majlis authorities.”
However, pictures posted on social media sites showed the fierce exchanges.
Now to Obama:
Obama will be the only person sticking to Iran deal
What? The JFK Warren Commission Report Cover-Up?
Hah….say it isn’t so….C’mon…but who ordered the CIA to protect facts and sources? At least since most of us never trusted the Warren Commission Report, some new facts are revealed. Ever wonder why the entire file is not declassified, which is law after 50 years? (Ask Barack Obama).
Politico: John McCone came to the CIA as an outsider. An industrialist and an engineer by training, he replaced veteran spymaster Allen Dulles as director of central intelligence in November 1961, after John F. Kennedy had forced out Dulles following the CIA’s bungled operation to oust Fidel Castro by invading Cuba’s Bay of Pigs. McCone had one overriding mission: restore order at the besieged CIA. Kennedy hoped his management skills might prevent a future debacle, even if the Californian—mostly a stranger to the clubby, blue-blooded world of the men like Dulles who had always run the spy agency—faced a steep learning curve.
After JFK’s assassination in Dallas in November 1963, President Lyndon Johnson kept McCone in place at the CIA, and the CIA director became an important witness before the Warren Commission, the panel Johnson created to investigate Kennedy’s murder. McCone pledged full cooperation with the commission, which was led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, and testified that the CIA had no evidence to suggest that Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin, was part of any conspiracy, foreign or domestic. In its final report, the commission came to agree with McCone’s depiction of Oswald, a former Marine and self-proclaimed Marxist, as a delusional lone wolf.
But did McCone come close to perjury all those decades ago? Did the onetime Washington outsider in fact hide agency secrets that might still rewrite the history of the assassination? Even the CIA is now willing to raise these questions. Half a century after JFK’s death, in a once-secret report written in 2013 by the CIA’s top in-house historian and quietly declassified last fall, the spy agency acknowledges what others were convinced of long ago: that McCone and other senior CIA officials were “complicit” in keeping “incendiary” information from the Warren Commission.
According to the report by CIA historian David Robarge, McCone, who died in 1991, was at the heart of a “benign cover-up” at the spy agency, intended to keep the commission focused on “what the Agency believed at the time was the ‘best truth’—that Lee Harvey Oswald, for as yet undetermined motives, had acted alone in killing John Kennedy.” The most important information that McCone withheld from the commission in its 1964 investigation, the report found, was the existence, for years, of CIA plots to assassinate Castro, some of which put the CIA in cahoots with the Mafia. Without this information, the commission never even knew to ask the question of whether Oswald had accomplices in Cuba or elsewhere who wanted Kennedy dead in retaliation for the Castro plots.
While raising no question about the essential findings of the Warren Commission, including that Oswald was the gunman in Dallas, the 2013 report is important because it comes close to an official CIA acknowledgement—half a century after the fact—of impropriety in the agency’s dealings with the commission. The coverup by McCone and others may have been “benign,” in the report’s words, but it was a cover-up nonetheless, denying information to the commission that might have prompted a more aggressive investigation of Oswald’s potential Cuba ties.
Initially stamped “SECRET/NOFORN,” meaning it was not to be shared outside the agency or with foreign governments, Robarge’s report was originally published as an article in the CIA’s classified internal magazine, Studies in Intelligence, in September 2013, to mark the 50th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination. The article, drawn from a still-classified 2005 biography of McCone written by Robarge, was declassified quietly last fall and is now available on the website of The George Washington University’s National Security Archive. In a statement to POLITICO, the CIA said it decided to declassify the report “to highlight misconceptions about the CIA’s connection to JFK’s assassination,” including the still-popular conspiracy theory that the spy agency was somehow behind the assassination. (Articles in the CIA magazine are routinely declassified without fanfare after internal review.)
Robarge’s article says that McCone, quickly convinced after the assassination that Oswald had acted alone and that there was no foreign conspiracy involving Cuba or the Soviet Union, directed the agency to provide only “passive, reactive and selective” assistance to the Warren Commission. This portrait of McCone suggests that he was much more hands-on in the CIA’s dealings with the commission—and in the agency’s post-assassination scrutiny of Oswald’s past—than had previously been known. The report quotes another senior CIA official, who heard McCone say that he intended to “handle the whole (commission) business myself, directly.”
The report offers no conclusion about McCone’s motivations, including why he would go to lengths to cover-up CIA activities that mostly predated his time at the agency. But it suggests that the Johnson White House might have directed McCone to hide the information. McCone “shared the administration’s interest in avoiding disclosures about covert actions that would circumstantially implicate [the] CIA in conspiracy theories and possibly lead to calls for a tough US response against the perpetrators of the assassination,” the article reads. “If the commission did not know to ask about covert operations about Cuba, he was not going to give them any suggestions about where to look.”
In an interview, David Slawson, who was the Warren Commission’s chief staff investigator in searching for evidence of a foreign conspiracy, said he was not surprised to learn that McCone had personally withheld so much information from the investigation in 1964, especially about the Castro plots.
“I always assumed McCone must have known, because I always believed that loyalty and discipline in the CIA made any large-scale operation without the consent of the director impossible,” says Slawson, now 84 and a retired University of Southern California law professor. He says he regrets that it had taken so long for the spy agency to acknowledge that McCone and others had seriously misled the commission. After half a century, Slawson says, “The world loses interest, because the assassination becomes just a matter of history to more and more people.”
The report identifies other tantalizing information that McCone did not reveal to the commission, including evidence that the CIA might somehow have been in communication with Oswald before 1963 and that the spy agency had secretly monitored Oswald’s mail after he attempted to defect to the Soviet Union in 1959. The CIA mail-opening program, which was later determined to have been blatantly illegal, had the code name HTLINGUAL. “It would be surprising if the DCI [director of central intelligence] were not told about the program” after the Kennedy assassination, the report reads. “If not, his subordinates deceived him. If he did know about HTLINGUAL reporting on Oswald, he was not being forthright with the commission—presumably to protect an operation that was highly compartmented and, if disclosed, sure to arouse much controversy.”
In the 1970s, when congressional investigations exposed the Castro plots, members of the Warren Commission and its staff expressed outrage that they had been denied the information in 1964. Had they known about the plots, they said, the commission would have been much more aggressive in trying to determine whether JFK’s murder was an act of retaliation by Castro or his supporters. Weeks before the assassination, Oswald traveled to Mexico City and met there with spies for the Cuban and Soviet governments—a trip that CIA and FBI officials have long acknowledged was never adequately investigated. (Even so, Warren Commission staffers remain convinced today that Oswald was the lone gunman in Dallas, a view shared by ballistics experts who have studied the evidence.)
In congressional testimony in 1978, after public disclosures about the Castro plots, McCone claimed that he could not have shared information about the plots with the Warren Commission in 1964 because he was ignorant of the plots at the time. Other CIA officials “withheld the information from me,” he said. “I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information.” But the 2013 report concluded that “McCone’s testimony was neither frank nor accurate,” since it was later determined with certainty that he had been informed about the CIA-Mafia plots nine months before his appearance before the Warren Commission.
Robarge suggests the CIA is responsible for some of the harsh criticism commonly leveled at the Warren Commission for large gaps in its investigation of the president’s murder, including its failure to identify Oswald’s motive in the assassination and to pursue evidence that might have tied Oswald to accomplices outside the United States. For decades, opinion polls have shown that most Americans reject the commission’s findings and believe Oswald did not act alone. Four of the seven commissioners were members of Congress, and they spent the rest of their political careers badgered by accusations that they had been part of a coverup.
“The decision of McCone and Agency leaders in 1964 not to disclose information about CIA’s anti-Castro schemes might have done more to undermine the credibility of the commission than anything else that happened while it was conducting its investigation,” the report reads. “In that sense—and in that sense alone—McCone may be regarded as a ‘co-conspirator’ in the JFK assassination ‘cover-up.’”
If there was, indeed, a CIA “cover-up,” a member of the Warren Commission was apparently in on it: Allen Dulles, McCone’s predecessor, who ran the CIA when the spy agency hatched the plots to kill Castro. “McCone does not appear to have any explicit, special understanding with Allen Dulles,” the 2013 report says. Still, McCone could “rest assured that his predecessor would keep a dutiful watch over Agency equities and work to keep the commission from pursuing provocative lines of investigation, such as lethal anti-Castro covert actions.” (Johnson appointed Dulles to the commission at the recommendation of then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy.)
The 2013 report also draws attention to the contacts between McCone and Robert Kennedy in the days after the assassination. In the wake of the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, the attorney general was asked by his brother, the president, to direct the administration’s secret war against Castro, and Robert Kennedy’s friends and family acknowledged years later that he never stopped fearing that Castro was behind his brother’s death. “McCone had frequent contact with Robert Kennedy during the painful days after the assassination,” the report says. “Their communication appears to have been verbal, informal and, evidently in McCone’s estimation, highly personal; no memoranda or transcripts exist or are known to have been made.”
“Because Robert Kennedy had overseen the Agency’s anti-Castro covert actions—including some of the assassination plans—his dealings with McCone about his brother’s murder had a special gravity,” the report continues. “Did Castro kill the president because the president had tried to kill Castro? Had the administration’s obsession with Cuba inadvertently inspired a politicized sociopath to murder John Kennedy?”
The declassification of the bulk of the 2013 McCone report might suggest a new openness by the CIA in trying to resolve the lingering mysteries about the Kennedy assassination. At the same time, there are 15 places in the public version of the report where the CIA has deleted sensitive information—sometimes individual names, sometimes whole sentences. It is an acknowledgement, it seems, that there are still secrets about the Kennedy assassination hidden in the agency’s files.