ISIS Master Plan Documents Located

The Isis papers: a masterplan for consolidating power

Islamic State exercise training camp, northern Iraq.
Boys known as the ‘caliphate cubs’ hold rifles and Islamic State flags as they exercise at a training camp in Tal Afar, near Mosul, northern Iraq. Photograph: AP

Islamic State

Caliphate on the prophetic methodology

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful:

“No, by your Lord, they will not believe until they have you rule over them in what they have disagreed and find in themselves from what you have judged and willingly submit.”

Principles in the administration of the Islamic State – 1435AH [2103-2014]

Introduction

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful

As for what follows:

After 50 years of jihad whose sides have fallen prostrate in the totality of the land, and the states gathered against the centres of the Sunni jihad in the world, God ennobled his true soldiers whom he selected to establish the caliphate state whose fortresses had fallen at the hands of global Zionism in al-Astana [Istanbul] 100 years ago. [Note: This is a reference to the end of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924].

Indeed the establishment of the Islamic State, its concept does not stand on the basis of a mujahid soldier fighting and bearing his arms, nor does it rest on da’wa [evangelising] in a mosque or a street, but rather it is a comprehensive system requiring the leaders of the ummah [Muslim nation] to realise its concepts.

So on the expansion of the Islamic State, the state requires an Islamic system of life, a Qur’anic constitution and a system to implement it, and there must not be suppression of the role of qualifications, skills of expertise and the training of the current generation on administering the state.

From the start of the uprising of blessed Syria against the Nusayris [derogatory for Alawites], the mujahideen came in great numbers out of zeal for their religion. But some of them harboured Arab nationalist and tribalist arrogance, and others a zeal and will without shari’a aims.

But it was inevitable that there would be an organisation of these numbers and their principles as a shari’i [Islamically legitimate] organisation accepting the current reality that the world marshalled against it from its soldiers and intelligence services.

And from then there would be the confrontation of altering the principles and selling out to which the first mujahideen [fighters] did not show deference in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and elsewhere.

And from then there would be the cultivation of educational and societal change with which the muhajireen [immigrants] co-existed and organisation of their ranks with the ansar [natives] – the people of the land.

And there were many challenges and difficulties that one would have to deal with according to its establishment and according to its special ideological programme, and one must deal with each one of them on an individual basis.

Chapter one

Announcement of the Islamic Caliphate

The announcement of the renewal of the caliphate in Iraq in the year 1427AH [2006] was the arbiter between division and separation as well as the glory of the Muslims. That year was tantamount to the hemiplegia for the idolatrous west that began preparing equipment and projects to strike any project of the Islamic State, and the announcement of the caliphate.

And the announcement of the caliphate was the result of the mujahideen’s realising the lack of advantage in fighting against the idolaters without the existence of a leader and caliph who could gather the Muslims under his banner and be a figure of strength for them.

America and its allies were able to destroy the caliphate project [ie the Islamic State of Iraq] to a great extent in Iraq after they established the Sunni Iraqi Sahwa forces [Sunni Awakening tribal forces that fought the Islamic State of Iraq] and struck the Sunni nursemaid [ie basis of Sunni support for the Islamic State of Iraq], by portraying it as a treacherous terrorist state of hypocritical political projects, with great marshalling of the media to accomplish that. The deeds of the soldiers of the state thus became limited to security operations to strike American targets and their allies.

After the arising of the blessed uprising of Syria, the Islamic State had a great role in striking the Nusayris in it and destroying the pillars of the rule of Assad in the heart of the command centres.

And it has therefore been the case that the lesson to be learned from the prior leaders of the state is the way to benefit from prior mistakes, and the means to preserve the revolutionaries of Syria on the jihadi trend while not moulding them in a western framework which that western support brings.

And in the second chapter is a statement on the administration of the muhajir (foreign) mujahid in particular and developing the creed of the Islamic State among the ansar in Syria.

The announcement of the caliphate in Syria was a powerful blow that the agents of the west who were set on the direction of the Sahwat of Iraq by whom the west thought that it could put an end to the Islamic caliphate project as it had weakened it in Iraq did not expect.

There were new modified problems that the leadership of the state was able to deal with, among them [Abu Muhammad] al-Joulani, [Note: the leader of al-Qaida in Syria formerly of Islamic State] announcement of his rejection of joining the Islamic State despite his allegiance to the caliph in Iraq, and in that he was trying to split the ranks and sabotage the project in subordination to his personal agendas bound with regional states, and his rejection was a confrontation for the Islamic project that God gave victory to despite the multitude of those discouraged and the callers to humiliation and servitude.

And the one who witnesses the events of Syria sees how God has given might to the Islamic State and lowered Joulani and those with him.

Chapter two

Organisation of the individual and group

With the entry of the second year of the uprising of Syria, the Shia militias of various nationalities entered Syria to fight at the side of the Nusayri-Rafidite [Assad] regime which flaunted its crimes with regards to the Sunnis, which led to a global Islamic uprising represented in the hijra [migration] of thousands of Muslim youths to fight in the rank of the Sunnis from the various regions of the land.

Thousands migrated to Syria to fight alongside the mujahideen, without their knowing the direction of any faction, its affiliation or private agendas.

It was necessary to prepare a sound programme in which the muhajireen might take refuge as their jihad is the result of the glory to Islam and the monotheists.

So the announcement of the caliphate was the obligation that gathers those arriving in the land of jihad, strengthens their hearts – and through it their minds are set – and gathers them over the difference of their colours under one banner, one word and one caliph

The majority of the first muhajireen came from the Gulf states and the Arabic Maghreb whose zeal for their religion urged them on, and among them were those with zeal for their Arab Sunni brothers without religious jihadist inhibition, and without there being for them prior expertise in global jihadi organisations.

After them was hijra [migration] from the states of the world after the announcement of the caliphate, as no disbelieving state has remained which hasn’t also suffered from the hijra [migration] of its youth to support the Islamic State which the soldiers of Joulani and the apostate Sahwa forces from the Free [Syrian] Army and others besides them rejected.

And after that, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ordered to establish a first camp which included the new muhajireen [immigrants] who had no deeply ingrained expertise and creed, near the prior borders for the Sykes-Picot “Iraq-Syria” lines.

And the camp included the organisation of the muhajir [immigrant] individual in the Islamic State and laying aside local tribalism and ignorance before him, and making his affiliation to the religion alone and under one banner.

And the camp included nurturing the spirit of the brothers between the muhajireen and the ansar through laying aside the prior identity for the muhajir, and making him a resident in the Islamic State with his family without feelings of estrangement or distinguishing between him and his brothers from the muhajireen and the ansar.

And without Islam it is not possible for this change to be included which encountered difficulty in the beginning on account of place affiliation that the mujahideen felt on the day of their fight with the Free Army Sahwa and inclinations of nationalism and ethnic division which was making the muhajir lose his zeal to fight alongside them.

And there resulted from the camp the formation of joint fighting groups between the muhajireen and the ansar established on the basis of the leadership of the individual most capable of bearing responsibility, having prior expertise and the military and sharia [law] tests of the camp.

And there also resulted from the camp the formation of groups composed of the muhajireen from the western states in particular in view of the difficulty of linguistic communication in the beginning and launch stage and in view of the mutual understanding and precedence of coordination between some of the muhajireen from Chechnya and France to fight in single cells without the existence of any distinction for members from those besides them [ie there was no differential treatment on the basis of ethnic identity].

And it was inevitable that Arabic character should precede over the character of the muhajireen, for the language of the Qur’an is Arabic, and the prophetic hadiths [sayings] are in Arabic and the customs of Islamic society were Arabic in great part, and in view of the nature of the local society of the peoples of Syria it was inevitable that Arabic character should be cultivated in the language and religious culture in the muhajireen and laying aside the foreign identity that bears in its hidden nature hostility to Islam, its culture and its roots.

For unifying the life of the mujahid and his language and culture is the guarantor for unifying the rank of the mujahideen and realising their total belonging in the Islamic State that includes muhajireen from every corner of the earth.

Chapter three

Administration of the camps

The preparatory camp is the first home and school of the mujahid in which his military and jihadi training sessions take place and he undergoes sufficient education in matters of his religion, life and jihad.

And according to the plans of the Islamic State to nurture the caliphate generation, the camps are divided into three types:

1. Continuation camps

And these are special camps for the mujahideen who lead in the jihad and those who are masters of expertise in managing and planning the battle in beginning and end. And the camp includes physical preparation for 15 days. And that is in a training session every year, and the mujahid through that camp comes upon the latest arts of using weapons, military planning and military technologies currently put forth in battles and weapons whose use by the enemy are anticipated, along with detailed commentary on the technologies of enemy use of the weapons, areas of their use, their strength and how the soldiers of the state can take advantage of them.

2. First preparation camps

For the mujahid on the day he joins the Islamic State, whether as a muhajir or from the ansar: and the camp includes sharia sessions through which the mujahid studies the fiqh [jurisprudence] of the rulings, Islamic doctrine, al-wala’ and al-bara’ [loyalty and disavowal], in addition to the arts of fighting and the arts of using weapons, with screening of every mujahid in a specialty in which he excels and completing his camp according to his skill in specific weapons.

3. Preparation camp for children

The camp includes sharia sessions in fiqh of doctrine and rulings, with special sessions in Islamic society and manners, and training on bearing light arms and the principles of use.

Outstanding individuals are selected from them for security portfolio assignments, including checkpoints, patrols and the various Amniyat units [internal security units].

And the camps administration is responsible for planning, aims and results, and as the results of the camp should be in alignment with the aims and principles of the Islamic State, it has been necessary to establish a centre for the administration of the camps whose tasks are as follows:

1. Preparing special sharia sessions in the camps in coordination with the al-Buhuth and al-Eftaa [fatwa – legal opinion] committee.

2. Preparing educational programmes to teach the Arabic language and recitation of the Qur’an in coordination with the Diwan al-Ta’aleem [department of education] for every province.

3. Preparing military programmes teaching the types of weapons and military tactics with the supervision of the military commander in every province.

4. Studying expenditures and allowances for every camp whose study and analysis are to be completed by the military leader or wali [governor] of every area according to the needs connected with every wilaya [province] and submitting the study to the wali.

5. Overseeing the selection of the educational and training staff in the camp.

6. Putting in place detailed planning and programmes on the course of the battle.

7. Tracking the supervision of the camp according to the defined programmes.

8. Assessing the camp session and raising a report to the officials concerning the readiness of the session after the camp.

Chapter four

Direction administration

The mujahid [soldier] remains in need of direction and tracking after his completion of the special training session for him, for spiritual direction is the foundation of his success in every matter he undertakes and the mujahid’s direction in every stage will consist of reminding him of the aims of the Islamic State and hadiths [prophetic sayings] on the virtue of the mujahid and persevering and continuing despite the difficulty of the path of jihad.

1. Direction before the battle

And here the military commander for the mission or the sharia official accompanying him should undertake it, and the direction should be a little before the launching of the mujahid to battle through mentioning hadiths on the virtue of jihad and endurance on encountering the enemy as well as following the decisions and instructions of the field commander during the battle, along with the virtue of martyrdom in the path of God to raise the banner of Islam and the caliphate and the virtue of the one struck with wounds in the land of the battle. All this should be done during the readying and preparation for the battle. And the director oversees the mujahideen in all their moments until their absence from him in the battle.

And the director should not be discouraged, having doubts, hesitating or cowardly because he is the example that the mujahid summons whenever the furnace of the battle flares up.

2. Direction after the battle:

In the event of victory, the director summons what came from the Prophet from sayings on the virtue of the mujahid and their feelings that what they have accomplished aspires to be in the service of their religion and creed, with their being reminded to embrace the instructions coming from the battle leadership from the rulings of spoils and not adopting any decision to plunder the wealth of the people except by its rights and by explicit order from the commander responsible.

In the event of being broken, the direction should be on patience, reckoning and steadfastness on meeting the enemy while not heeding those having doubts and those who spread rumour and terror in the ranks of the soldiers.

3. Lasting direction:

Remaining on activity and steadfastness with the mujahid in all his states and lessons in al-wala and al-bara [loyalty and disavowal] as well as fiqh, Islamic creed and listening to and obeying the amir [leader].

The staff of direction in every province should be from the cream of the crop of free sharia and military officials who have the ability to argue, convince and encourage as well as from the soldiers around whom the group have congregated and should be possessors of confidence among them.

Chapter five

Organisation of the provinces

The Sykes-Picot agreement and after them the indirect rule of the west over the states of Islam tried to place administrative borders drawing social, madhhabist and ethnic differences in every region, and deepening the roots of the differences between the Sunni Muslims.

Thus the distinction of the Sunnis from the Shia in the provinces of Iraq and oversight of the centres of administration in every Sunni region, and even the appointment of officials in the Sunnis’ regions from the filth of the Rafidites have been clear, while the regions have been entrusted under the rule of [their own] Kurdish and Shia sects independent in decision-making from the ruling presidency as we have seen in Kirkuk and Irbil and in even smaller regions including from them in the cursed Najaf and Karbala and that have enjoyed “religious” administrative independence, unannounced.

All those divisions have also forbidden the Sunnis from the simplest of their rights while making the Nusayris masters of the sea, and the Shia in Iraq the kings of oil and the merchant pathways, and the Yazidi Kurds the sheikhs of the mountains while the Druze have become masters over the mountains overseeing Israel.

All that has not merely been a coincidence, but it was a dirty political decision in order to implement a tightening stranglehold on the Sunnis and make them the most remote people and strip them of all assets for advancement or thinking of a rightly-guided Islamic State.

If we were to see today the borders of the Islamic State and the borders of the Sunnis regions, we would see them torn apart, besieged and persecuted, for there are the Shia from the south of Iraq, the Nusayris from the west of Syria and the communist Kurdish parties to their north, and the Druze to their south.

So it is no surprise that today we see the bloodshed flowing in the land of Syria and Iraq.

So it has been from the law and sound mind to redraw the borders of the provinces and give lengthy consideration to every development that occurs in the region. Thus we protect the power of the Sunnis and strengthen its expansion and focal points, and then special teams can be deployed for fundamental change in the structuring of the regions that are subject to the rule of the Islamic State.

And that was what the companions [of the Prophet Muhammad] and after them the caliphs pursued against every heretic community: that is, dispersing their groupings so there no longer remained any impeding opinion, strength or ability, and the Muslim alone remains the master of the state and decision-making and no one is in conflict with him.

And in what there is no doubt is the fact that among the assets of the ummah [Islamic nation] are: its wealth, the nature of its land, its inhabitants and its water. And in everything is distinction:

1. Wealth of the state

It is the principal component and source of financing for all internal and external operations, and the existence of secure financial resources whose value does not change in every time and place is a must – and the need of the people for them should be clear with the nations unable to do without them despite the existence of the impediments that prevent their use and purchase from the land of the state.

This includes oil and gas and what the land possesses including gold as currency that does not deteriorate or decline, as well as trade routes from which they have no wealth and all of it should be the intervention of the Islamic State as a powerful side in all their plans and such that they cannot pretend that it has no existence and might.

2. The nature of its land

The state cannot remain without the existence of the land that allows for its continuation and expansion, for the assets of the land are – the mountains, the agricultural lands, the sea and the river – for these natural assets are what makes the Islamic State acquire its importance and the importance of location, and the agreement of the west in Sykes-Picot were established on the basis of depriving the Sunnis from those assets, as the mountains were granted to the Kurds, Druze and Alawites, while the sea was granted to the Rafidites and Nusayris, while the river and what surrounds it in investment for the Jews and the agricultural lands under their administration.

And that was a new setback that was added to all the ambitions in establishing the Islamic State and freeing it from servitude of the filthy Nusayris and the disbelieving Rafidites [Alawites and Shia]. When there is no asset for them the enemy have been shut on their openings from every side.

3. The traitorous governments have tried to mislead the Sunni peoples in every Arab land, as corrupt programmes were introduced for them and there spread among them the love of vice, bonds, bribery, usury and abandoning worship and forgetting the rulings of jihad. So the Sunnis in Syria have lived in a new ignorance after ignorance during the French occupation of their land as there was the Alawite government that planted its vices in every house, permitted the forbidden and made forbidden development and civilisation.

But after the uprising undertaken by the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria and their getting rid of the servitude to the tyrants began the second plan that requires implementing the “demographic” change in their regions and expelling the Sunnis from their areas, for it has been what we saw in Fallujah, Aleppo, Homs, Tikrit and other areas besides them from the regions of the Sunnis many of whose people have suffered during their presence in their land.

Indeed they realise that the Islamic State cannot renew the ummah’s blood without a human member capable of always producing, and there was the alluring of the best of its youth and plundering the land with hijra outside their areas and liquidating many of them.

And today it is necessary to have a studied plan that responds in kind and brings about like change in the profane abode of disbelief, expelling its people and killing its people until there is no base for them and the land is for God and his servants.

And in turn implementing the plans that include the return of the Muslim youth to their land and bringing together the skills from the land of the Muslims, and the going out of the state for specialised staff in their fields if they are not of those of the pact in Islam [ie Jews and Christians].

Chapter six

Administration of wealth

Indeed the might of the Islamic State can only be through its being free entirely from all bonds of tyranny that the west possesses as means of leverage against it, and it moves them according to its need and whim based on knowing from it the need of the mujahideen for support, wealth and weapons.

Jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria have lived through long bonds of humiliation pledged on conditional western support, until they seized wide areas of the land and possessed all assets of advancement.

And all of that is on account of the ignorant administration that controls them and keeps them under western guardianship for all their activities, wars and expansion.

Indeed the Islamic State’s seizure of vast areas includes all assets of advancement that does not suffice without the existence of an administration managing the interests and managing the crises. So it is necessary for a plan to be put in place including the might of the state and its independence as we specify in the following points:

– Preserving the capabilities [personnel and infrastructure] that managed the production projects under the prior governments, whilst taking into account the need to place strict oversights and an administration affiliated with the Islamic State.

– Placing specialists  in accounting and oversight over all production directorates in the Islamic State including establishments of oil, gas, archaeological areas and factories for manufacturing and production.

– Preserving additional reserves that ensure the continuation of operation in one successive arrangement in all circumstances.

– Regulating expenses through a comprehensive administration including collective expenses and collective production without singling out a province or group by provision of estimates exceeding their needs in normal circumstances.

– Establishing factories for local military and food production and independence from the monopoly of arms dealers for materials of necessity and cutting them off in the event of contravening the interests.

– Realising local needs and providing for them within the borders of the state in isolated safe zones and connecting trade routes inside the state through principal centres and beneficiary wings.

– Reducing excess expenditure through the administration of the province; it must operate independently and be able to take its own decisions in matters concerning the province.

– Relying on external business as a principal source of income through the openings of the state to the other side without an intermediary. Direct exchange has better guarantees than the monopoly of the intermediary for business transactions and means of connection.

Chapter seven

Administration of the projects

In parallel with military preparation in the lines of fighting and the camps, a committee is to be put in place to administer production projects and put in place plans to implement new investment projects.

The one who invests in the lands of the state is to be given comprehensive protection according to the agreement that arises with the observance of the interests of the Islamic State in production, exporting and prices.

The independence of the investor from the administration of the province is a more preferred means for the administration of the wealth, increasing local production and improving the capability of the producing material, and regulating the time and expenditure. And it will [also] be a better guarantee against losses resulting from any sizeable investment project.

For the independent foundation is outside the limits of liability that arise for those projects that are affiliated with a province of the Islamic State.

And it is not right for the investor according to the law, to hand over the production to those who have no right to it and they [those who have the right to it] are the ones determined in an agreement by the administration that is entrusted over the project and overseeing its organisation by the province in which the project is established.

And such an agreement is stipulated on determining the beneficiaries and the means of profit with the guarantee of the [Islamic] State to convey the products internally to the borders of the Islamic State without exposing them to any risk.

And it is not allowed to invest in the following projects:

1. Oil products

It is not allowed for a person who has no pledge of allegiance on his neck to the caliph to invest in an oil or gas field or what has arisen from their trajectory, but it is allowed besides that to produce derivatives after buying the crude products from the fields of the Islamic State, just as it is allowed to sell and deal in them inside and outside the state.

2. Gold and antiquities

It is not allowed to excavate for gold and antiquities except by expressed agreement from the resources department, and all transferred and stored materials will be confiscated for the interest of the treasury.

And it is allowed to deal in gold not excavated from the ground according to the well-known aharia frameworks with immediate effect.

3. Weapons

It is forbidden to establish factories to produce weapons and materials particular to them without granting of any explicit permits for the situation, just as it is forbidden to establish shops to sell public weapons besides personal weapons and deal in them without prior knowledge and agreement from the responsible military amir in the wilaya.

As for the other principal goods that also come under the crux of people’s lives, the officials must know about all means of operation and production like dealing in water, flour and livestock.

Chapter eight

Administration of education

Education is the foundation upon which Islamic society is built, and it is the division that makes the Muslims differ in their lives from the rest of the paths of disbelief.

The previous Ba’athist and Shia governments tried to deviate the Muslim generation from their path through their educational programmes that concord with their governments and political whims.

The programmes focused on glorifying the ruling authorities and discarding differences between sects, stripping Sunnis of their identity.

And among the most important of their goals were:

1. Focusing on glorifying and eternalising the leaders and taking refuge in God and inserting them into hidden shirk [idolatry] through immortalising ephemeral, temporary personalities.

2. Spreading the aims of their parties and their ideas whilst distancing the nurtured from Islamic thought, because the ruling party considers itself the pulse of society and the symbol of its endurance, while Islamic principles are for the mosque only and between man and his Lord with severe proceedings against all those who tried to do away with party thinking or modify it.

3. Discarding the difference with the disbelieving sects, and considering co-existence with them as the true societal bond that the ummah must operate in accordance with in order to preserve its goals, while in reality protection is implemented for the rights of all the communities of disbelief while oppressing the Sunnis and their principles.

4. Spreading the culture of moral dissolution by promoting it through expressions of civilisation and exchanges of cultures with the west.

And thus it was that the ummah entered into labyrinths of confusion that made it forget its glory, its strength and its past, while the prior Islamic caliphates were portrayed as being a foreign occupation that arose on the basis of ignorance and the decline of the ummah and nationalism.

– And among the aims of the Islamic programme in the Islamic State:

1. Implanting Islamic values in society as well as sound, sharia-based societal manners and customs.

2. Correcting the erroneous narrations that the prior programmes had implanted about the prior caliphs and imams.

3. Developing Islamic society on the basis of manners and on sharia.

4. Raising a knowledgeable Islamic generation capable of bearing the ummah and its future without needing the expertises of the west.

So it is also that the Islamic school is one of the houses of worship, whose aims are confined to acquiring knowledge also, but also it is an educational nurturing ground that raises the individual with comprehensive development of mind and body.

And in it there should be training facilities for mind, body and vocation, as successful programmes cannot rely on what is written between the lines, without practical training on all given subjects.

Also it is the case that the interest in the Arabic language and its use in daily life for the individual is an important matter in the Islamic State as is distancing from vulgar expressions that were put forward in society in a well-considered plan to guarantee the forgetting of the Islamic identity for society.

Chapter nine

Administration of relations

External relations are the first foundation for building every nascent state, and they are among the foundations that show the strength and might of the state. They should constitute for it a general stance in everything that happens in the world with the people of Islam and be for it an external hand protecting its dealings.

And the Prophet (peace be upon him) was considered the master of the global Islamic message; it was necessary for him to be acquainted with what was happening around him in the neighbouring states, and knowing their latest affairs and thus inviting them to Islam. And indeed the messenger (God’s peace and blessings be upon him and his family) established his proficiency and skill in external movements through viewing at a distance and personifying the just of the just, and appropriate evaluation of matters as well as outstanding ability in the operation of recruiting to Islam.

Indeed external relations are key to knowing the international politics surrounding the Islamic State, and alliances should be as a guarantee of force and leverage that the Islamic leadership can use in all its matters with the external world.

According to sharia politics, the leadership is not allowed to adopt decisions to ally with a state or implement an agreement with it if that violates sharia politics, as agreed on by the majority of ulama [religious scholars] and symbols of jihad. So indeed every agreement must include the following:

1. The internal sovereignty of the Islamic State and not allowing for other states to intervene in matters of Islamic rule or the general politics of the Islamic State.

2. Protecting the borders of the Islamic State from every mushrik [idolater], disbeliever, aggressor and even friend, for no army or other force is allowed to enter the borders of the Islamic State whatever the pretext.

3. A provision that the [Islamic] State should be witness to good treatment of Muslims in its lands and mutual affection with Muslims in other areas of the world, and that it is not allowed to deal with another state that has a history of hostility to Islam’s spread, the building of mosques and oppression of Muslims in its lands.

4. A provision that the agreement should first be in the interest of the Muslims, not in the interest of the disbelievers.

5. That the agreement should not include any future provisions touching on the freedom and sovereignty of the Muslim state, and no bonds of debt or conditions of harmful exploitation even if in the future with regards to the matters of the state.

6. That there should be for the Muslims their rights and freedoms within the state that is to enter into an agreement with us.

7. That all points of the agreement should be clear to the imam [the caliph] and those with him.

And in the event of the nullification of any one of the conditions or lack of their provision, it is not allowed for the imam to enter the ummah and the Muslims into dubious bonds that oppress the ummah and the fate of its development.

Chapter ten

Administration of media

Indeed everything that I have previously mentioned constitutes practical steps on the ground and [so] there must be a principal means to promote them that should be comprehensive. All of its ideas and activities should be advertised in the interest of the aforementioned practical steps. That will not be realised without media foundations that are branched out and comprehensive in operation within one administration and background.

So there should be one media foundation branched out within multiple pockets according to the following outline:

1. The Base Foundation:

To be directly affiliated with the Diwan al-Khilafa [office of the caliph] or Majlis al-Shura [advisory council] of whoever so represents them, and the official for it should be connected by his relations with the military commander, [chief] security official and the caliph himself. The office will put implement the main media principles and tasks and it should be supervising the distribution of the media offices in the provinces and the media foundations that take a name and are independent from the administration of the provinces [ie so-called auxiliary agencies and foundations mentioned below].

And the Base Foundation defines the priorities of publication and broadcasting as well as the media campaigns, just as it directly supervises through a committee the activities of the offices and undertakes inspection campaigns in the provinces and activist places.

The foundation also sets the preparation of media staff, their expenses and requirements and receives monthly reports on the activities of every office.

2. The provincial media

And in every province there should be a media office affiliated with the governor himself and in coordination with the military and security official in its region, and its director should be in direct contact with the media official in the Base Foundation.

And among the offices’ tasks are covering the military operations and their results, with issues concluding the end of every great military operation or distinguished operations for the soldiers of the state, as well as services’ facilities, implementing sharia rulings and the course of life in the province.

Also the office should be interested in implementing tasks of printing and distribution or supervising them within the province.

3. Auxiliary agencies and foundations:

It is suggested that production foundations or auxiliary agencies are established according to the mother office’s needs and interests.

The auxiliary office specialises in tracking military and services coverage in a province or number of provinces without there being in the name of the foundation or its symbol something to directly link it with the Islamic State.

The auxiliary foundations are not to be allowed to cover security operations or implementations of [judicial] rulings.

These are general suggestions placed for you by the poor slave of God, the servant of the Islamic State, in order to be a lighthouse by which there is guidance, as well as general and prompt systems of organisation.

And the administrative cadres will receive training sessions on operating according to the following programme.

Abu Abdullah al-Masri.

 

Islamic State blueprint

 

 

 

ISIS Speaks Mandarin? Threatening Who Now?

Remember when during the Bush administration, we captured enemy combatants on the battlefield that were known as Uighurs? They were sent to Gitmo and under Barack Obama they were released? Remember when only in recent weeks that Barack Obama said that Islamic State was contained?

How to Say ‘Islamic State’ in Mandarin

THE Smoking Gun Email on Benghazi

Some things speak for themselves, this is one of them and timing is everything. It is now a proven fact, the natural order of business by Barack Obama, his inner circle and the same with Hillary Clinton is to lie and obstruct investigations and justice. Now, the consequence? That is up to us…..we have demands to make here in retribution for death and dishonesty. What say you?

Embedded image permalink

JudicialWatch-obtained email: DoD had forces ready on 9/11/12 “assuming principals agree.” Guess they didn’t.

New Benghazi Email Shows DOD Offered State Department “Forces that Could Move to Benghazi” Immediately – Specifics Blacked Out in New Document

“They are spinning up as we speak.” U.S. Department of Defense Chief of Staff Jeremy Bash Tuesday, September 11, 2012, 7:19 PM

(Washington, DC) – Judicial Watch today released a new Benghazi email from then-Department of Defense Chief of Staff Jeremy Bash to State Department leadership immediately offering “forces that could move to Benghazi” during the terrorist attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012. In an email sent to top Department of State officials, at 7:19 p.m. ET, only hours after the attack had begun, Bash says, “we have identified the forces that could move to Benghazi. They are spinning up as we speak.” The Obama administration redacted the details of the military forces available, oddly citing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption that allows the withholding of “deliberative process” information.

Bash’s email seems to directly contradict testimony given by then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2013. Defending the Obama administration’s lack of military response to the nearly six-hour-long attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Panetta claimed that “time, distance, the lack of an adequate warning, events that moved very quickly on the ground prevented a more immediate response.”

The first assault occurred at the main compound at about 9:40 pm local time – 3:40 p.m. ET in Washington, DC.  The second attack on a CIA annex 1.2 miles away began three hours later, at about 12 am local time the following morning – 6 p.m. ET.

The newly released email reads:

From: Bash, Jeremy CIV SD [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 7:19 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Sherman, Wendy R; Nides, Thomas R
Cc: Miller, James HON OSD POLICY; Wienefeld, James A ADM JSC VCJCS; Kelly, John LtGen SD; martin, dempsey [REDACTED]
Subject: Libya

State colleagues:

I just tried you on the phone but you were all in with S [apparent reference to then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton].

After consulting with General Dempsey, General Ham and the Joint Staff, we have identified the forces that could move to Benghazi. They are spinning up as we speak. They include a [REDACTED].

Assuming Principals agree to deploy these elements, we will ask State to procure the approval from host nation. Please advise how you wish to convey that approval to us [REDACTED].

Jeremy

Jacob Sullivan was Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the time of the terrorist attack at Benghazi.  Wendy Sherman was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the fourth-ranking official in the U.S. Department of State. Thomas Nides was the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources.

The timing of the Bash email is particularly significant based upon testimony given to members of Congress by Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. embassy in Tripoli at the time of the Benghazi terrorist attack. According to Hicks’ 2013 testimony, a show of force by the U.S. military during the siege could have prevented much of the carnage. Said Hicks, “if we had been able to scramble a fighter or aircraft or two over Benghazi as quickly as possible after the attack commenced, I believe there would not have been a mortar attack on the annex in the morning because I believe the Libyans would have split. They would have been scared to death that we would have gotten a laser on them and killed them.”

Ultimately, Special Operations forces on their own initiative traveled from Tripoli to Benghazi to provide support during the attack.  Other military assets were only used to recover the dead and wounded, and to evacuate U.S. personnel from Libya.  In fact, other documents released in October by Judicial Watch show that only one U.S. plane was available to evacuate Americans from Benghazi to Tripoli and raise questions about whether a delay of military support led to additional deaths in Benghazi.

The new email came as a result of a Judicial Watch Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit filed on September 4, 2014 (Judicial Watch v. U.S. Department of State (No. 1:14-cv-01511)), seeking:

  • Records related to notes, updates, or reports created in response to the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. This request includes, but is not limited to, notes taken by then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton or employees of the Office of the Secretary of State during the attack and its immediate aftermath.

“The Obama administration and Clinton officials hid this compelling Benghazi email for years,” said Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “The email makes readily apparent that the military was prepared to launch immediate assistance that could have made a difference, at least at the CIA Annex.  The fact that the Obama Administration withheld this email for so long only worsens the scandal of Benghazi.”

###

Congressional Report: Bowe Bergdahl Prisoner Swap, FUBAR

Judicial Watch reports:

Judicial Watch today released a new batch of emails of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton connected to the Benghazi attack. Included is an email chain showing that Clinton slept late the Saturday after the Benghazi attack and missed a meeting that her staff had been trying to set up about sensitive intelligence issues, including the Presidential Daily Brief, on a day she was to make a slew of phone calls to foreign leaders.

There was also an interesting detail in an email concerning Bowe Bergdahl’s father’s concern over “Crusader paradigm.”

The documents contain an email passed to Clinton in the days following the Benghazi attack in which the father of alleged Army deserter Bowe Bergdahl anguishes over the “‘Crusade’ paradigm” which he says “will never be forgotten in this part of the world.”

You may remember Mr. Bergdahl from Obama’s over-the-top, tin-eared, and inappropriate Rose Garden ceremony announcing the exchange of Bowe Bergdahl, who has since been charged with desertion and misbehavior before the enemy, for five top Taliban leaders.

Congress: Bowe Bergdahl Swap Was FUBAR

DailyBeast: The Pentagon insists that trading an American captive for five Taliban fighters was the “best deal we could get.” An unreleased Congressional report says that’s nonsense.
A new congressional report is critical of the Obama administration’s decision to trade five Taliban prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay for Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl. And the report ascribes a political motivation to the prisoner swap, according to two sources familiar with the document’s contents.Administration officials have long said that the exchange of Taliban prisoners for Bergdahl, who disappeared from his base in eastern Afghanistan in 2009 and was held for five years by a Taliban affiliate, was conducted under a long-standing tradition of trading prisoners at the end of military hostilities.

“We have an unwavering commitment and patriotic duty to leave no man or woman in uniform behind on the battlefield,” a senior administration official told The Daily Beast, without commenting directly on the report, which was written by the Republican staff of the House Armed Services Committee. (The Democrats were reviewing the document Monday evening.)

“We had a near-term opportunity to save Sergeant Bergdahl’s life, and we were committed to using every tool at our disposal to secure his safe return,” the official said.

But before the Bergdahl trade, senior U.S. intelligence officials had also told members of Congress that the Taliban fighters were likely to return to hostilities against the United States if they were released. The fighters were placed under house arrest in Qatar for one year, but that did little to dampen criticism that the administration had taken a risk releasing the men.

The new report is likely to reignite the controversy around the administration’s decision and Bergdahl’s case, which has figured in a vitriolic presidential election season. The sources said that it raises the question of whether the administration was motivated to release the five prisoners as a way of reducing the prisoner population at Guantanamo. The Obama administration has been searching for a place to house the remaining prisoners outside the island prison, and the issue has become a political albatross for the president, who promised from his first days in office to close the facility.

The leading Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, has repeatedly called Bergdahl a traitor who abandoned his post and endangered other troops who tried to rescue him. Trump has even suggested Bergdahl should have been shot in the head.

The swap has also been roundly criticized by Republican lawmakers, including Sen. John McCain, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who said recently that Bergdahl was “clearly a deserter” and promised hearings if the Army chose to follow the advice of one of its lawyers that Bergdahl should serve no jail time and shouldn’t face disciplinary actions.

In March, the Army charged Bergdahl, 29, with desertion and misbehaving before the enemy. He’s currently serving at Ft. Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas.

The full scope of the House Armed Services Committee report, which hasn’t been previously reported, was unclear. But sources said it examines the U.S. government’s efforts to win Bergdahl’s release. Those efforts have also been criticized by current and former officials for not ensuring that the various agencies of government that play a role in hostage rescue were working in concert.

Two Defense Department officials confirmed to The Daily Beast that the Pentagon has been providing information to the committee for its report. However, they said they hadn’t seen the document, which is expected to be released Tuesday.

However, those officials denied any suggestion that the Defense Department’s goal was anything but Bergdahl’s safe return. The five-for-one prisoner swap “was the best deal we could get for Bergdahl,” a senior defense official said.

But there were efforts underway at the time to bring Bergdahl home as well as other Americans held by the same group that had imprisoned him, the Taliban-aligned Haqqani network.

“The five-for-one swap was the starting point for what’s become the administration’s backdoor effort to thin out the inmate population at Gitmo,” Joe Kasper, a spokesperson for Rep. Duncan Hunter, told The Daily Beast. Hunter, a member of the Armed Services Committee, has been a leading critic of the administration’s hostage recovery efforts and is particularly critical of the Bergdahl exchange.

“What we’ve always known—and hopefully this report provides the right validation—is that the five-for-one swap was a less than half-baked idea that was favored by the State Department and the rest of the administration to the detriment of other, more acceptable and viable options,” Kasper said, referring to attempts to rescue Bergdahl as well as other American hostages held along the border with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Some Defense officials conceded that the release of the five Taliban prisoners did help reduce the population at Guantanamo Bay by bypassing the approval of often reluctant defense secretaries who have refused to release detainees to other countries. But the officials stressed that emptying the prison was never a primary goal.

The Government Accountability Office has already determined that the swap broke federal law because the administration didn’t provide adequate notice to Congress.

According to one source familiar with the committee’s work, the report’s authors examined other efforts to rescue Bergdahl, including a failed operation by a non-Defense Department agency. Two sources familiar with the operation said that agency was the FBI. In February 2014, the Bureau sent personnel to the Pakistan side of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to wait for Bergdahl, who they erroneously believed was about to be freed.

Bergdahl’s lawyer, Eugene Fidell, declined to comment about the House Armed Services Committee report, saying he was not familiar with it. A spokesperson for the committee also declined to comment.

While lawmakers have objected to the trade, it wasn’t exactly a surprise at the time. U.S. intelligence officials briefed members of Congress on a potential swap at least two years earlier, said a former senior intelligence official who was directly involved in the talks.

The official and a colleague told lawmakers that the five Taliban prisoners were likely to return to hostilities if they were freed.

But at the time, the administration also sought to portray the swap as part of a broader effort to bring hostilities with the Taliban to a close, and not just a one-time prisoner exchange, the former official said. A trade was worth the potential controversy, the logic went, if it helped bring peace to Afghanistan.

“We were really talking about getting into negotiations with the Taliban over ending the war. This was briefed [to Congress] in the context of a confidence-building measure,” the former official said.

But that plan got derailed, he noted, when Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, became enraged over U.S. attempts to negotiate with the Taliban.

The plan to ultimately do the trade for Bergdahl was drawn up by a working group of deputy-level officials, led by then-White House deputy national security adviser Denis McDonough, the former official said. Principal-level officials were “heavily involved” in the process and eventually signed off on the swap, he said.

McDonough is now Obama’s chief of staff.

Privately, officials told The Daily Beast that the deal for Bergdahl was fraught with politics. Some thought that without Bergdahl’s release, the U.S. couldn’t withdraw all troops from Afghanistan, which was the administration’s plan around the time of the deal. Obama has since decided to keep a residual military force of about 9,800 personnel in Afghanistan through much of 2016, in light of the rapid gains made by jihadist militants from ISIS after the U.S. withdrew combat forces from Iraq.

The military’s efforts to rescue Bergdahl at the time of his disappearance, amid suspicions he walked off base, made his capture divisive from the beginning. Some of Bergdahl’s fellow soldiers have said that the Army risked lives trying to rescue a potential deserter. President Obama announced the trade and Bergdahl’s release in a May 2014 Rose Garden address, flanked by Bergdahl’s parents.

Other efforts were underway to bring Bergdahl home as part of a broader effort to rescue Americans held hostage by Islamic militants in the region along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It’s not clear to what extent the House Armed Services Committee report examines them, but they have figured prominently in congressional testimony.

In June, Lt. Col. Jason Amerine, a decorated combat veteran and Green Beret, testified at a Senate hearing that while serving in the Pentagon, he and his colleagues had designed a plan to trade Bashir Noorzai, an Afghan drug dealer serving a prison sentence in California, for American and Canadian hostages, including Caitlin Coleman and her husband, Canadian Joshua Boyle, who were kidnapped while hiking in Afghanistan in 2012. Coleman gave birth to a child while in captivity.

Warren Weinstein, an American contractor, was also part of the planned trade.

But the State Department intervened and stopped the deal, Amerine testified. Instead, the administration traded the five Taliban prisoners only for Bergdahl.

Weinstein was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan this year.

The Daily Beast reported this month that at least one more American is being held by the Haqqani network.

Amerine said that the FBI accused him of misconduct for sharing what it claimed was classified information about the possible multi-prisoner deal with Hunter, the congressman and hostage-rescue critic. Amerine was eventually cleared of all accusations of wrongdoing and given the Legion of Merit before retiring from the Army last month.

The release of Bergdahl may have opened a kind of Pandora’s Box, signaling to hostage takers that the United States was willing to trade a disproportionate amount of its own prisoners for American citizens.

For instance, before he was released from a U.S. maximum-security prison this year, Ali Saleh Al-Marri, a confessed al Qaeda sleeper agent, was offered up in a potential prisoner swap that would have freed two Americans held abroad.

The Daily Beast previously reported that the proposal was floated in July 2014 to the then-U.S. ambassador in Qatar by an individual acting on behalf of that country’s attorney general. According to two individuals with direct knowledge of the case, the proposition was made shortly after the Obama administration traded the five Taliban fighters for Bergdahl.

A U.S. official said at the time that Al-Marri’s release was part of an agreement with Qatar and that no exchange ever occurred.

After San Bernardino Massacre, Who Isn’t Cooperating

Fmr. FBI Counterterrorism Agent: We’ve Received ‘Nearly Zero Help’ from U.S. Muslim Community Since 9/11

Though President Barack Obama claimed that America must “enlist Muslim communities” to combat terrorism in his Sunday evening Oval Office address, former FBI Counterterrorism Agent John Guandolo said on Monday’s Breitbart News Daily (6AM-9AM EST on Sirius XM Patriot channel 125) that since 9/11, “we collectively have received nearly zero help from the Muslim Community.”

Breitbart: Guandolo, who pointed out on Friday’s Breitbart News Daily that a “vast majority” of U.S. mosques and Islamic centers are a part of a much larger “jihadi network,” told host and Breitbart News Executive Chairman Stephen K. Bannon that though Muslim community leaders “certainly give the air as if they are helping,” if one looks at the “major Islamic organizations, the major Islamic centers in the United States,” they have “condemned all of the counter-terrorism policies and they’ve gotten the government to kowtow to them, to turn only to them for advice.”

“And what advice do they give them?” Guandolo asked. “That Islam doesn’t stand for this and that everything you’re doing is the reason for what happened—9/11 is your fault because of your policies.”

As Breitbart News reported, Los Angeles CAIR director Hussam Ayloush said last week just days after the San Bernardino terrorist attacks that America is “partly responsible” for the San Bernardino terrorist attacks because “some of our foreign policy” is “fueling extremism.”

Last night, Obama said that “if we’re to succeed in defeating terrorism we must enlist Muslim communities as some of our strongest allies, rather than push them away through suspicion and hate.”

Guandolo said he doesn’t necessarily agree with the idea that “we have to work with the Muslim community in order to solve this problem here in the United States,” but “if you are going to work with the Muslim community, the U.S. government” should not be “exclusively working with Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood entities without exception” like it is doing now. Guandolo named the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the Islamic Society of North America, the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), and the Muslim American Society.

“Those are who they’re working with and others that are Muslim Brotherhood or ideologically directly aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood,” he added, pointing out that Attorney General Loretta Lynch spoke at the Muslim Advocates—another such organization—last Thursday.

Guandolo said Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson is speaking about Muslim civil rights on Monday evening at The Adams Center in Sterling, Virginia, which is associated with the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). He said evidence presented at the Holy Land terrorism-funding trial revealed that ISNA is “the nucleus of the Muslim Brotherhood here” and “directly funds Hamas leaders and organizations overseas.” He also pointed out that the Holy Land Foundation, the largest Islamic charity in America, was a “Hamas organization at the time it was indicted and Hamas is an inherent part of the Muslim Brotherhood.”

He said it will be nearly impossible to so successfully combat terrorists “so long as the U.S. government… emboldens and empowers Muslim Brotherhood organizations here.”

“If you expect FBI and others to aggressively pursue them, it’s not going to happen because our leaders — President, Secretary of State, national security adivsers, generals at the Pentagon—are are turning to their advisers who in fact are Muslim Brotherhood leaders to say what should we and what shouldn’t we do,” he said.

Guandolo said “it gets down to the local ground level where our behavior becomes insane and we do things like” tell FBI agents to take their socks off while arresting people at mosques so “you’re arresting somebody in your socks. It’s not only insane but there’s an officer-safety issue as well.” He added there was absolutely “no real logic about what happened in San Bernardino” when the F.B.I. allowed the media to rummage through the home of the San Bernardino terrorists and said “this kind of mindset” entered the FBI because of Muslim leaders who are advising the federal government on Islam and terrorism.

Bannon mentioned that this mindset dates back to the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations and Guandolo said during the Clinton administration in the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood published their “strategic plan for North America and then their implementation manual which implements the plan” in order to start “the real forward push to get their plan implemented.” He said those documents were discovered in a 2004 raid of a Hamas leaders’s home in Annandale, Virginia.

Guandolo also informed listeners that the Muslim Brotherhood has been in the United States since the 1960s because the “very first Islamic organization in America”—the Muslim Students Association—was created by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s in order to “recruit Jihadis on college campuses and on every major college campus in America.”

According to Guandolo, “if you even hint at shutting them down, then you’re immediately a racist or an Islamophobe.”

“The story that is told in between is the story of an Islamic network in the U.S. that was not just established by random Muslims coming here,” he said.

He also called out Saudi Arabia for being the top financier of Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and al-Qaeda projects in the United States. Guandolo said these organizations build lavish mosques that can hold thousands of people in areas where there are only 12 Muslims because their strategy is to claim ground “up to three miles around the mosque.” He said the Saudis help these organizations purchase homes in the area at substantially above-market prices in order to “occupy that space around that mosque.”

Guandolo runs the understandingthethreat.com site and is the author of Raising a Jihadi Generation.

*** Since the Farook and Malik family, the killers of San Bernardino are from Pakistan, it is prudent to look deeper at the genesis of terror there.

Tom Rogan, NRO: Someone screamed at us to get down and hide below the desks,” he said, adding that the gunmen shouted “Allahu Akbar” before opening fire. “Then one of them shouted, ‘There are so many children beneath the benches, go and get them.’ I saw a pair of big black boots coming toward me.” —

Shahrukh Khan, 16, a victim of the Peshawar school attack, speaking to Agence-France Presse Welcome to the world of the Pakistani Taliban: Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP). Blending Deobandi fanaticism with warped Pashtunwali traditionalism, despising individual freedom and intellectual curiosity, these fanatics found an Army school in Peshawar to be a tempting target. Some might be shocked by this attack, but I am not. This kind of rampage has been coming.

This summer, I warned that Pakistani politicians and security officials were juggling with fire in their flirtation with the TTP. Led by Fazlullah, an unrepentant psychopath, the TTP has escalated its atrocities. Attacking Christian and Shia Muslim religious sites, cafés, and women (Fazlullah directed the attack on the now-famous schoolgirl Malala), the TTP, like the Islamic State, seeks a return to medieval authoritarianism.
So now Pakistan has its 9/11 moment. Facing the loss of more than 140 children, will it end its dalliance with terrorists? The early signs are somewhat hopeful. Recognizing the pure horror of this attack, Pakistani politicians of all stripes have reacted with outrage. Imran Khan, for example, sent out tweets that suggested his support for military reprisals. While that might seem an obvious reaction, Khan up until now has played to the TTP for his own interests while blaming America for Pakistan’s problems.
Defeating the TTP, however, will take more than a few highly publicized military actions in the coming days. It will require a sea change in Pakistani politics. Supported by networks of local patrons and propelled by paranoia over Afghanistan, Kashmir, and India, powerful members of the Pakistani establishment have long regarded the TTP and other terrorist groups as proxies for their own interests. Consider the undeniable support of Pakistan’s primary intelligence service, the ISI, for the Haqqani network, a group responsible for killing NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. Want to understand that relationship? Watch Homeland. Pakistan has been toughening its stance against the TTP over the past year, but this attack is a symptom of Pakistan’s fatal hesitancy to directly confront TTP. Pakistan’s future now rests on the pivot between those who recognize that these terrorists cannot be leashed and those who see them as tools to use for their own ends. This isn’t just a Pakistani concern. Given that India’s new prime minister doesn’t easily tolerate Pakistani support of terrorist groups, the TTP has the potential to spark a war between India and Pakistan — two nuclear powers. And despite recent signs of hope in Afghanistan, the American military there will have to be on watch. We must also be on guard for new TTP plots against the homeland, because the group will probably attempt to emulate the Islamic State in its reach. This is no small concern. After all, TTP was responsible for the Times Square car-bomb plot, and is supported by a small but sizeable element of Britain’s Pakistani community. Western politics also matter here. With so many in the West more concerned with the rights of terrorists than the realities of the threat we face, we must isolate those who would tie our hands in this fight. Start with U.N. special rapporteur Ben Emmerson. Last week, Emmerson demanded prosecutions against CIA officers who have saved American lives. And last year Emmerson issued a ludicrous report that condemned the CIA drone program in Pakistan — the same program that has smashed groups like TTP and that prevent the export of jihadist atrocities to the West. Above all, we must take heed of what December 15 proved — if further proof is needed. Monday morning, hundreds of children woke up full of hope. Tuesday morning, their coffins and the rows of their names on a list of the deceased reveal the bloody price of Islamist fanaticism. Pakistan and the world must honor their memory with our resolve. —