Category Archives: Terror

Life in Raqqa, Syria After Islamic State is Defeated

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While the United States and coalition forces were providing military support in many forms to the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian Democratic Forces to destroy Islamic State, Russia has officially declared the exclusive victory.

Further, against the countless pro-Assad factions including Iranian militia and Russian forces, Bashir al Assad will remain in power and adhere to all edits from Moscow and Tehran.

The history city of Aleppo fell to Islamic State but such was not going to be the case again for Raqqa, the declared home for the terror group. Christians, Alawites and Druze all lived in Raqqa.

Yet how do Syrians and children find life and normalcy upon their return to Raqqa?

What remains is a modern day Hitleresque condition of destruction.

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RAQQA, Syria—The municipal soccer stadium here was always called “The Black Stadium” because of its dark concrete construction, but that name took on a whole new meaning when it became an arena for horror under the rule of the so-called Islamic State.

Today, ISIS is gone and the bleachers are draped with the flags of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This was the final redoubt of a handful of ISIS fighters, and when it fell last Friday, victory over that terror organization in its de facto capital was declared complete. But much of the city is destroyed, and for the few people who’ve made it back, memories of what life here was like are hard to retrieve.

“Before, we would play football matches here, before it came under Daesh [ISIS] control,” Issa Xabur, a 42-year-old civilian who once lived in Raqqa, told The Daily Beast as we explored precincts where the spectacle of death replaced the spectacle of sport. “The stadium became known for beheading people,” said Xabur. “It was used as a prison. Eighty percent of the people that were imprisoned here were killed.”

In the locker rooms, showers, and gym beneath the stadium, ISIS created cells and torture chambers for its feared security arm, known as the Amni.

One can still find graffiti written by prisoners and fighters. Some of it is in Russian, some in Arabic, some in English.

On one shattered wall, we read that “Hussam Alkjwan was killed in 25/2/2016.” We don’t know why. Beneath it in broken English, perhaps written by a jailer, is a list of reasons why someone could be arrested:

If you are reading this there’s four main reasons why you are Here!

1-You did the crime and caught Red Handed!

2-Using Tweeder [Twitter] GPS Locations! Or having GPS Locations switched upon turned ‘ON’ the Mobile Phone

3-Uploading videos and photos from a Sensitive Wifi internet source, i.e. You need your Amirs permission

4-A suspect! Off the street! The Police have good reason to do this!

It didn’t matter what you did or did not do, the ISIS police had “good reason” to bring you in.

And it didn’t matter that you might be waiting in this hole to die. You were supposed to keep the faith:

Be Patience, Be Patience, Be Patience!

The Enemy of the Muslims, Sataan will do every Whispering while [unclear]

Trust in Allah and lots of remembering of Allah, Dua [prayers] to Allah! …

Issa Xabur himself was arrested several times by ISIS and spent five days in this Black Stadium prison. “I couldn’t talk to anyone,” he told The Daily Beast. “They were hitting people with tires, and hanging people from the roof. People from Tunisia were responsible for torturing,” he said.

In the prison beneath the stadium we see iron cables and plastic straps used to tie people down. Other reporters have come across primitive exercise machines turned into bloodied instruments of torture. And in these dark corridors, mingled with the smell of dust and concrete, there is still the smell of human death.

“People were arrested when they were accused of being unbelievers, or of dealing with the coalition or the regime,” Xabur said.

Then, suddenly it’s evident that journalists are not the only ones interested in visiting the liberated stadium.

“Who are you working for?” demands a local SDF commander who seems to come out of nowhere. I am told to switch off my camera, and three soldiers in U.S. uniforms come into the prison to check it out. A few hours later, another group of U.S. soldiers arrives at the Black Stadium with cameras and a video drone.

Zagros, a Kurdish fighter with the SDF, sees a certain irony in all this U.S. military tourism. “The U.S. soldiers did not fight in the city of Raqqa,” he tells me. They provided support from behind the lines. “Now they come to see the prison.”

The situation for civilians in the last days of the Raqqa campaign was very difficult.

“We went as a group to a Daesh leader, who told us if you leave, we will kill you,” said Walid, 45, as we talked in a mosque. “There was no water or food, and we drank water that was not suitable for drinking,” he added.

“Whenever ISIS left a house, they booby-trapped it. My wife and mother died, but I am still alive. We were not allowed to leave during the liberation campaign.”

Ali, 21, is in the Ain al Issa refugee camp. He left Raqqa months ago after being imprisoned more than 10 times by ISIS, he says.

“I saw them killing the people with my own eyes. They tortured people, cut their hands, and heads,” he said.

By some accounts, in the final days of battle, after many Syrian members of ISIS were allowed out of the city under a truce, the few dozen foreign fighters in the Black Stadium held hundreds, or even thousands, of people as human shields. Ali thinks that the captured foreign fighters that held civilians hostage should be executed.

“They should be killed, because if they return [to their home countries], they will create problems as they did here,” he said.

ISIS flyers scattered around the city already are covered with dust, but they are easy enough to read. They show the many punishments ISIS carried out for spying, homosexuality, and theft.

Jihan Sheikh Ahmed, the official spokesperson for the SDF Raqqa campaign, left Raqqa before it came under ISIS control. “But my family lived for two years under Daesh rule,” she says. “It was a nightmare for them and for the people. [They] could not breathe freely or live freely. The children could not play in the street, and they terrorized the people by cutting their heads and thus imposing themselves in the name of the caliphate.”

The Black Stadium was not the only venue for atrocity. There was also Naim Square in the heart of the city.

“I was from Raqqa,” said a woman SDF commander during a celebration of the city’s liberation by women fighters in Naim Square. In the old days, she said, “we were coming to Naim Square to eat ice cream and take a walk. But after Daesh came here and announced its ‘state’ in this place, they spread killing among the people and instilled terror among them. Moreover, they brought children to watch the killings to terrorize their hearts.”

Nearby wrought iron fences were used like the pikes of old, to hold severed heads.

ISIS also enslaved many Yazidi women when they captured the town of Sinjar in August 2014. The region was the heartland of the non-Muslim minority. A few dozen of them were liberated in Raqqa when the SDF came in.

“They [ISIS] brought Yazidi women to Raqqa, to sell them here, kill our people, and cut off their hands and hang them here,” said the woman commander.

Even some ISIS wives who are now being held in a refugee camp in Ain al Issa feel sorry for the Yazidi women.

Aisha Khadad, a Syrian English teacher, was married to an imprisoned French ISIS member and said she rarely saw a slave out in the open in Raqqa. “They were sold to the emirs,” she said, and the emirs live mostly in Iraq.

“I was so sad for them,” Khadad told The Daily Beast. “Suddenly a man comes to your house who wants to rape you and use you as a slave.” And under the ISIS regime he had every right to do that.

SDF spokesperson Jihan Sheikh Ahmed now promises that they will change the mentality of the people of Raqqa who lived through these horrors.

“We want to return the children to their childhood, and when we beat Daesh, the hope of life is beginning to grow in the people again, and we want the people to understand that Daesh will never return, and when life returns to Raqqa, many things will change,” she said.

However, she added that it could take time for civilians to return. “They [ISIS] planted a lot of mines here, so we will form a military zone for two months to remove the mines, and then we start rebuilding the city,” she concluded.

When leaving the city, I could still see the human bones of victims of ISIS that were executed near the clock tower in Raqqa, and an ISIS flag still was flying over a destroyed building near the clock tower. And it made me think, “Even time will not erase all the wounds here.”

 

McCain/Graham Knew About Niger

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McCain and Graham both stated they were unaware of the operations in Niger, much less the other countries located in West Africa. The United States has an estimated 7000 troops operating in about 50 countries in Africa. Militant Islam has no boundaries globally.
The mission of both Islamic State, al Qaeda and associated terror groups is to embed soldiers, sympathizers and moles in villages across various regions globally where they know the United States is operating with intelligence teams, hearts and minds missions and train and assist operations. The enemy knows these operations well due to previous tactics and operations in both Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.
U.S. troops often pay village elders and chieftans for information or clues in efforts to locate specific terrorist soldiers or to validate intelligence.
Such was the case in Niger. Predictions are such that Morocco and the Sinai are worse.

U.S. officials increasingly believe that the military unit ambushed by an Islamic State militant group (ISIS) affiliate in Niger was attacked as the result of being set up by people in a village sympathetic to local jihadis.

Details about the October 4 attack that left four U.S. soldiers—all Green Berets—dead are only now being revealed.

The militants were likely tipped off by at least one accomplice who may have lived within the local population, U.S. officials briefed on the case told NBC News. Almou Hassane, the mayor of the village in question, Tongo Tongo, told Voice of America that “the attackers, the bandits, the terrorists have never lacked accomplices among local populations.”

Nigerien authorities have detained the chief of the village, Mounkaila Alassane, adding to the suspicion that the dozens of ISIS-affiliated militants who attacked the unit had prior information about the soldiers’ movements.

A joint U.S. and Nigerien patrol spent the evening near the Malian border before the attack. Local reports indicate that the purpose of their mission may have been to locate an associate of Abu Adnan al-Sahraoui, a member of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, or ISGS, the affiliate suspected of the ambush.

“They must have spent the night in the northwest of Tongo Tongo,” Hassane said.

The soldiers met with elders of the village, which they knew was likely sympathetic toward ISIS, and officials told NBC News that villagers made efforts to delay the Green Berets’ departure.

When the soldiers left the village in unarmored vehicles, dozens of jihadis launched a sneak attack with machine-gun fire and then mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. The soldiers exited their vehicles and started to fire back, but were outnumbered and outgunned. They tried to retreat but were ambushed again a mile away.

On Monday, General Joseph Dunford, the U.S. military’s top officer, said he wanted to uncover what happened, for the public and for the relatives of those killed in the attack.

“We owe you more information; more importantly, we owe the families of the fallen more information,” Dunford said. “Did the mission change? It’s a fair question.”

He said the troops did not call for help from French special forces until an hour after coming into contact with the enemy in Niger. He said a U.S. drone responded in “minutes” but did not fire. He would not comment on whether it was armed or not.

“I make no judgment as to how long it took them to ask for support,” Dunford said. “I don’t know that they thought they needed support prior to that time. I don’t know how this attack unfolded. I don’t know what their initial assessment was of what they were confronted with.”

French jets arrived one hour after the call for assistance but did not strike because they did not have accurate intelligence about the combatants on the battlefield and were not liaising with the U.S. military. Dunford said at present there was no indication that the soldiers were acting outside their remit or orders from their superiors.

“I don’t have any indication right now to believe or to know that they did anything other than operate within the orders that they were given,” Dunford said. “That’s what the investigation’s all about. So I think anyone that speculates about what special operations forces did or didn’t do is doing exactly that—they’re speculating.”

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara is a relatively new and local branch of ISIS that has conducted several small attacks in the region, particularly in Burkina Faso, which neighbors Niger. The jihadi affiliate gave its allegiance to ISIS and the group accepted its bayah, or pledge, in October 2016.

The ISIS affiliate in the area that stretches across six African countries from Senegal to Chad is overshadowed by more dominant radical Islamist groups, in this case Al-Qaeda’s affiliates—Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine and Al-Mourabitoun.

UN/Harvard Comprehensive WMD Programs in N Korea/ISIS

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Primer:

A North Korean mining firm, reputed to be a front for Pyongyang’s weapons development programs, attempted to ship materiel to Syrian officials tied to the country’s chemical weapons program, according to a confidential United Nations assessment of international sanctions against the North.

Details of the U.N. findings, first reported by Reuters, found officials from Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation {KOMID) had sent a pair of shipments of unknown contents to members of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre or SSRC. The Syrian government organization has been responsible for developing chemical and biological weapons for regime in Damascus since the 1970’s.

The shipments never arrived in Syria after being intercepted by international authorities from U.N. partner nations, Reuters reports. “Two member states interdicted shipments destined for Syria. Another member state informed the panel that it had reasons to believe that the goods were part of a KOMID contract with Syria,” the U.N. review states.

KOMID has repeatedly trafficked in materials associated with ballistic missile development and other conventional arms programs, and was blacklisted by the U.N. security council as a result of those activities, Reuters reports.

As a result, the U.N. “is investigating reported prohibited chemical, ballistic missile and conventional arms cooperation between Syria and [North Korea],” the report states. More here.

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Quoting the South Korean Defense Ministry, it said: ‘North Korea has 13 types of biological weapons agents which it can weaponize within ten days, and anthrax and smallpox are the likely agents it would deploy.’

***

Harvard produced a report with the summary in part that reads:

Amidst the growing threat of North Korea’s nuclear program, the assas-
sination of Kim Jong-Un’s half-brother via VX nerve agent in February
2017 brought renewed interest in North Korea’s other weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs—chemical and biological weap-
ons. If used on a large scale, these weapons can cause not only tens of
thousands of deaths, but also create panic and paralyze societies. Nev-
ertheless, the vividness of the nuclear threat has overshadowed other
weapons programs, limiting the attention and policy input that they
deserve. This paper focuses on North Korea’s biological weapons (BW).
Accurately assessing the threat from North Korea’s biological weapons
is challenging. Whereas North Korea has publicly declared its will to
become a nuclear power many times, it has been less overt about its
intention or capability for biological weapons. BW capabilities are
inherently hard to detect and measure. While nuclear programs can
be monitored by the number of nuclear tests and the success of missile
tests, weaponizing and cultivating pathogens can stay invisible behind
closed doors. Moreover, equipment used for BW production are often
dual-use for agriculture, making external monitoring and verification
virtually impossible. Limited information on North Korea’s BW pro-
gram leads to a low threat perception that may undermine preparation
and response efforts. The full 46 page report is here.

A German newspaper reported last week that at least one European intelligence agency has already warned that the Islamic State is exploring the use of chemicals for attacks in Europe. Such an eventuality would be a radical departure from prior attacks by the Islamic State in the West. In the past, the militant group has shown a strong preference for low-tech means of dispensing violence, such as firearms, vehicles and knives. But it has utilized chemical substances in Iraq and Syria, and its technical experts have amassed significant knowledge about weaponized chemicals.

Last week, several European and American counter-terrorism experts participated in a bioterrorism preparedness exercise in Berlin. Codenamed WUNDERBAUM, the exercise was one of several anti-terrorism drills that have taken place in the German capital this year alone. But last week’s drill was the first with an exclusive focus on preparing for a bioterrorist attack. German authorities insisted that the drill was not sparked by concrete intelligence of a pending biological or chemical attack. But the Berlin-based national newspaper Die Welt claimed on Friday that it had information about at least one such warning by a European intelligence agency. The paper did not name the agency, but said that “a foreign intelligence agency” had warned European security authorities of a possible terrorist attack by the Islamic State using chemical weapons. According to Die Welt, the warning was “explicit” and cautioned that the Sunni militant group may be preparing to use improvised bombs utilizing chemicals, including toxic gasses. The warning was communicated to European intelligence agencies, including Germany’s said Die Welt.

How likely is such a scenario? Terrorist groups tend to be conservative in their use of lethal technologies. They typically opt for time-tested methods using explosives or firearms, because these have a higher of success in comparison to more sophisticated, hi-tech weapons. The latter are also more expensive to build and require scientific and technical capabilities that are not typically available to terrorist organizations. Militants are usually strapped for cash, and are not science-savvy, so exceptions to this general trend are rare. But the Islamic State is different. Ever since it made its eventful appearance in 2013, the group has experimented with a variety of chemicals, including nerve agents. It is known that it initiated a modest chemical weapons program, headed by Iraqi engineers who were trained under Iraq’s late ruler, Saddam Hussein. One of them, Abu Malik, was killed in an American airstrike in early 2015. Another, Sleiman Daoud al-Afari, who headed the Islamic State’s chemical weapons program, was captured by US Special Forces in northern Iraq in March of last year.

The Islamic State’s rapid loss of territory in the past year has delivered serious blows to the group’s military infrastructure. Its chemical weapons program, which was targeted early on by the US, Iran and other belligerents, is now almost certainly defunct. But many of its engineers and technical experts are still at large, as are those who were trained by them during the group’s heyday in Iraq and Syria. Despite its continuing retreat, the Islamic State is still capable of employing chemicals that are relatively easy to procure, such as chlorine, hydrogen sulfide, or even various fertilizers, to construct explosives or nerve agents. Last summer, members of a terrorist cell with connections to the Islamic State were arrested in Sydney, Australia. By the time they were arrested, they had already procured significant quantities of hydrogen sulfide and had even tested the chemical, in an apparent preparation for a large-scale attack.

The Australian case shows that the Islamic State is not averse to the tactical use of chemical weapons in terrorist attacks. As the militant group’s self-proclaimed caliphate is disintegrating, and its leaders feel like they have nothing left to lose, the deployment of unconventional terrorist technologies should not be excluded as a tactical option for the organization. Western counter-terrorism officials should actively and immediately prepare for such an eventuality.

***

Russia Takes Over Kurds Oil Pipeline, Hillary?

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LONDON/MOSCOW (Reuters) – Russia’s biggest oil company, Rosneft (ROSN.MM), has agreed to take control of Iraqi Kurdistan’s main oil pipeline, boosting its investment in the autonomous region to $3.5 billion despite Baghdad’s military action sparked by a Kurdish vote for independence.

The move appears to be part of a strategy by President Vladimir Putin to boost Moscow’s Middle Eastern political and economic influence, which was weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Rosneft said it would own 60 percent of the pipeline, with current operator KAR Group retaining 40 percent. Sources familiar with the deal said Rosneft’s investment in the project was expected to total about $1.8 billion.

That comes on top of $1.2 billion that the Russian firm, which has struggled to raise Western loans due to U.S. sanctions, lent Kurdistan earlier this year to help fill holes in its budget. Rosneft also agreed to invest another $400 million in five exploration blocks. More here

You remember Rosneft right? That Russian oil conglomerate that donated big dollars to the Clinton Foundation during the Uranium One deal and even the NYT’s reported it.

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(Reuters) – A senior Iranian military commander repeatedly warned Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq to withdraw from the oil city of Kirkuk or face an onslaught by Iraqi forces and allied Iranian-backed fighters, Kurdish officials briefed on the meetings said.

Major-General Qassem Soleimani, commander of foreign operations for Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards, traveled to Iraq’s Kurdistan region to meet Kurdish leaders at least three times this month before the Baghdad government’s lightning campaign to recapture territory across the north.

The presence of Soleimani on the frontlines highlights Tehran’s heavy sway over policy in Iraq, and comes as Shi’ite Iran seeks to win a proxy war in the Middle East with its regional rival and U.S. ally, Sunni Saudi Arabia.

Soleimani met leaders from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the two main Kurdish political parties in northern Iraq, in the city of Sulaimania the day before Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered his forces to advance on Kirkuk, according to a PUK lawmaker briefed on the meeting.

His message was clear: withdraw or risk losing Tehran as a strategic ally.

“Abadi has all the regional powers and the West behind him and nothing will stop him from forcing you to return back to the mountains if he decides so,” the lawmaker quoted Soleimani as telling the PUK leadership.

The Iranian general evoked late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s massive attack on a Kurdish rebellion in 1991, when almost the entire Kurdish population fled northern Iraq to the mountains, the PUK lawmaker said.

“Soleimani’s visit … was to give a last-minute chance for the decision-makers not to commit a fatal mistake,” said the lawmaker, who like others interviewed in this story declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

Commanders of the Iraqi Kurdish forces, known as the Peshmerga, have accused Iran of orchestrating the Shi’ite-led Iraqi central government’s push into areas under their control, a charge senior Iranian officials have denied.

But Iran has made no secret of its presence in Iraq.

“Tehran’s military help is not a secret anymore. You can find General Soleimani’s pictures in Iraq everywhere,” said an official close to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.

“Now, beside political issues, Kirkuk’s oil is a very key element for Iran, which is an OPEC member. Control of those oil fields by Iran’s enemies would be disastrous for us. Why should we let them enter the oil market?.”

“THERE WILL BE CONFLICT”

Kirkuk fell to Iraqi government forces on Monday. Their offensive followed a referendum last month in which the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region voted to secede from Iraq against Baghdad’s wishes.

Kurds have sought an independent state for almost a century, after colonial powers divided up the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and left Kurdish-populated territory split between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

But Iraq’s two main Kurdish parties have been at odds over both the referendum and the approach to the crisis in Kirkuk, which the Kurds consider to be the heart of their homeland.

The PUK, a close ally of Iran, accused its rival, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), of putting the Kurds at risk of military intervention and isolation by pushing hard for the vote, which won wide approval for independence.

Soleimani has been allied to the PUK for years, but the referendum has drawn him even closer to Kurdish politics and expanded Iran’s reach in Iraq beyond the Baghdad government.

The Iranian general is no stranger to conflicts in Iraq, which fought an eight-year war with Iran in the 1980s. He has often been seen in footage from the frontlines, and Iran has long helped Baghdad to carry out its military strategy through paramilitary Shi’ite militias which it funds and arms.

Before the referendum, Soleimani suggested to Kurdish leaders that holding a vote on secession — which Iran feared would encourage its own Kurdish population to agitate for greater autonomy — would be risky.

“The Iranians were very clear. They have been very clear that there will be conflict, that these territories will be lost,” said one prominent Iraqi Kurdish politician who met Soleimani ahead of the Sept. 25 referendum.

On Oct. 6, barely a week after the vote, Soleimani attended the funeral of PUK leader Jalal Talabani. Again, he wanted to make sure even his closest Kurdish allies understood the dangers of not withdrawing from Kirkuk, officials said.

A senior Iranian diplomat in Iraq and an official in Iran close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s office said Soleimani met with Kurdish leaders after Talibani’s funeral and urged them to withdraw from Kirkuk and in exchange Tehran would protect their interests.

Soleimani met with one of Talabani’s sons, Bafel, a few days after his father was buried, one of the PUK officials said.

“Soleimani said Abadi should be taken very seriously. You should understand this,” the official said.

An Iranian source in Iraq said Soleimani was in Kirkuk two nights before the Iraqi government offensive for “a couple of hours to give military guidance.” Iraqi intelligence sources said Tehran sent a clear signal to the PUK.

“We understand from our sources on the ground that neighboring Iran played a decisive role in making the PUK chose the right course with Baghdad,” one Iraqi intelligence official told Reuters.

KURDISH DIVISIONS

Tensions over the referendum and Kirkuk have deepened divisions between the two main political parties in northern Iraq. The KDP accused the PUK of betraying the Kurdish cause by capitulating to Iran and striking a deal to withdraw.

“The Talabani clan were behind the offensive on Kirkuk. They asked Qassem (Soleimani) for help and his troops were there on the ground,” said a source close to Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government and head of the KDP.

“It is becoming clear that Iran is directing the operations to destroy the KDP.”

The PUK strongly denies this. Talabani’s son Bafel accused the KDP of missing a zero-hour chance to avoid losing Kirkuk by failing to reach a deal over a military base which Iraqi government forces had demanded to take back.

“Unfortunately we reacted too slowly. And we find ourselves where we are today,” Bafel told Reuters.

Two other Kurdish political sources gave a similar account.

Iran and Soleimani offered early assistance to northern Iraq’s Kurds in the fight against Islamic State, a rallying point for the Kurdish community. But after the devastating loss of Kirkuk, Iraqi Kurds have been left disillusioned.

“They (both PUK and KDP leaders) just make decisions on their own and play with people’s lives. In the end, we pay the price,” said pensioner Abdullah Ahmed in Sulaimania.  “This is a disaster for everyone. Everyone was united against Daesh (Islamic State). Now they are back just looking out for themselves.”

 

IAEA not Allowed to Inspect Iran Sites per Moscow

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But Obama and Kerry told us they could….is there more than one version of the JCOA?

As the Trump administration calls for stricter monitoring of the Iranian nuclear agreement, officials in Iran insist they are complying with its terms and will not allow international inspectors into military sites.

Iran, which agreed in 2015 to grant inspectors broad access to nuclear-related facilities in exchange for the removal of severe economic sanctions, accuses President Trump of trying to sabotage what he has called the United States’ “worst deal.”

Trump has argued that Iran is violating the agreement struck under President Obama, although he has offered no evidence to support his claim and his administration has twice certified to Congress that Iran is in compliance.

But Trump administration officials looking for a way to increase pressure on Iran have begun to zero in on military facilities that they say could be used for nuclear-related activities barred under the agreement.

The IAEA, in its most recent report in June, said Iran was meeting its obligations under the pact. Experts say inspectors rely on intelligence reports and other information to determine whether sites they have not visited are being used for potentially illicit purposes. More here.

*** What about those snapback sanctions Obama told us about? The NYT’s wrote that the snapback sanctions were easy. What is the response of those American lobby groups that Obama hired on behalf of the Iran deal.

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***

Map of Iran's nuclear sites photo and more on each location courtesy of BBC

Inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations organization tasked with monitoring Iran’s nuclear facilities, have not requested access to military sites since the agreement went into effect, according to experts monitoring the process.

The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister refers to Section T – while ignoring that, as the Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, Olli Heinonen notes, the IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council resolution 2231 to request access to sites and equipment associated with Section T.

This resolution “requests the Director General of the IAEA
to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s
nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under
the JCPOA.” In addition, the resolution states: “The International Atomic
Energy Agency will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary
nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA.”
An excerpt from his article follows the TASS item.]

Fuss around IAEA inspections of Iranian military facilities contrived –
Russian diplomat
If the other participants are eager to discuss the issue, Moscow “will be
ready to discuss it” presenting its stance, Sergei Ryabkov said
Russian Politics & Diplomacy
October 22, 0:10 UTC+3
http://tass.com/politics/971962

 

MOSCOW, October 22. /TASS/. Certain countries substitute notions in talks on
expanding inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at
the Iranian military facilities creating contrived fuss around the issue.
However, Russia says that the IAEA is not authorized to carry out such
inspections, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told TASS on
Saturday.

“I would like to say absolutely clear and directly that acquiring some false
topicality the theme of the IAEA work on Section T (about Iran’s military
facilities – TASS) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) over
the Iran nuclear program has no topicality for us although it is a talking
point now,” he said.

In particular, Moscow says that the IAEA “has not been authorized to carry
out such inspections and cannot be tasked because Section T highlights the
issues out of the agency’s competence,” Ryabkov said.

“Nevertheless, we can hear another thing. As in the issue of the Iran
missile program, some of our counterparts prefer to call black white and
vice versa,” the high-ranking diplomat said. “We cannot get them to
understand this evident logic and obvious truth.”

“Since they are insisting, we say if you cannot do without discussions on
the theme, it should be raised at the Joint Commission when the next session
is convened,” Ryabkov said.

If the other participants are eager to discuss the issue, Moscow “will be
ready to discuss it” presenting its stance, he said.

JPCOA and US

On July 14, 2015, Iran and six international mediators (the United Kingdom,
Germany, China, Russia, the United States, and France) reached a deal on
Iran’s nuclear program. On January 16, 2016, the parties to the deal
announced beginning of its implementation. Under the deal, Iran undertakes
to curb its nuclear activities and place them under total control of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange of abandonment of the
sanctions imposed previously by the United Nations Security Council, the
European Union and the United States over its nuclear program.

Last week, US President Donald Trump announced Washington’s new strategy
against Teheran. Thus, it says that the United States will seek to offset
Iran’s destabilizing influence and will call on the international community
to get consolidated for exerting pressure on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard (IRGC, Iran’s most powerful security and military organization). Apart
from that, the US blacklisted the IRGC as an organization supporting
terrorism. Donald Trump refused to confirm Iran observed the agreement on
the nuclear program and promised changes to the document.
========================
Verifying Section T of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Iranian Military Site Access
Essential to JCPOA Section T Verification
by David Albright and Olli Heinonen
August 31, 2017
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/verifying-section-t-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal
…
The IAEA has the authority under UN Security Council resolution 2231 to
request access to sites and equipment associated with Section T. This
resolution “requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the
necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments
for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA.” In addition,
the resolution states: “The International Atomic Energy Agency will be
requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as
detailed in this JCPOA.”
…
Recommendations

 

The United States should assemble, if it has not already done so, its own
lists of equipment and locations relevant to Section T. It should also
prepare lists suitable for sharing with the IAEA or Joint Commission.
Similarly, U.S. allies should share relevant information with the IAEA. If
it has not done so, the IAEA should create a baseline of Section T
activities and equipment.

The United States and its allies should press the IAEA to develop and
establish an effective, credible verification regime under Section T that
includes requests to access military sites. The United States and the EU3
should also raise Section T and the likely need for approvals of such
equipment and activities by Iran at the next Joint Commission meeting.
Toward that goal, Iran should declare to the IAEA its sites and equipment
subject to Section T verification and approvals.
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Olli Heinonen is Former Deputy Director General of the IAEA and head of its
Department of Safeguards. He is a Senior Advisor on Science and
Nonproliferation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.