Category Archives: Terror

Obama Defers to Ban Ki MoonBat

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Gigantic global policy decisions are always deferred to the United Nations. Only recently did residents of Detroit appeal to the United Nations in the case of water. Countless residents in Detroit were not paying for water and it was shut-off so an appeal was made to the UNI declaring water is a right and no one needs to pay.

The U.N. has become dangerous. It has failed to disarm terrorist states like Iran, Iraq and the Sudan, and it has failed to halt nuclear proliferation in outlaw nations like North Korea, China and Iran. If the U.N. did not pose a danger to the future of America, we could just be amused by its failures and move on. But what’s amazing is how the U.N. has continued to exist as the defeats accumulate.
This is no small matter. This body is supposed to enforce world order, but it aids and abets mass murderers and genocide. It places some of the most despicable governments you can think of — Libya, Cuba, Sudan, China, Venezuela, Zimbabwe — on its Human Rights Council, which is supposed to uphold the highest standards in human rights protection. Yet the council is controlled by African and Middle Eastern countries, which vote in blocs and protect one another from criticism over their own human rights violations.

During the process of the P5+1 discussions with Iran on their nuclear program, Barack Obama has telegraphed that he is going to bypass Congress and take the framework/agreement to the United Nations for ratification. The scandals at the hands of the United Nations are historic and countless including the Oil for Food Program. The United States provides 22% of the United Nations budget and more than 27% of the UN Peacekeeping operations.

So it screams credulity on the causes of why all deference is delivered to the United Nations. Let’s go deeper.

Ban Ki Moon, age 70 is the Secretary General of the United Nations. The short bio on Ban Ki Moon reads as follows:

Ban Ki-moon is the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations. His priorities have been to mobilize world leaders around a set of new global challenges, from climate change and economic upheaval to pandemics and increasing pressures involving food, energy and water. He has sought to be a bridge-builder, to give voice to the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people, and to strengthen the Organization itself.

“I grew up in war”, the Secretary-General has said, “and saw the United Nations help my country to recover and rebuild. That experience was a big part of what led me to pursue a career in public service. As Secretary-General, I am determined to see this Organization deliver tangible, meaningful results that advance peace, development and human rights.”

Beyond the historic tragedy in human history, the Holocaust, there is yet another tragedy that is all but forgotten in history and Ban Ki Moon was derelict in his duty, the Khmer Rouge.

Justice Squandered: Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen was preparing to fight a civil war in 1997 when a senior United Nations official stopped by to ask if he’d like help putting the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge on trial. With a figurative wave of the hand, Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge commander himself, said in effect: Sure, go ahead. At that moment, his mind was obviously elsewhere.

Eventually, he and his co­–prime minister, Norodom Ranariddh—the opposition in this little internal war—separately signed an agreement asking the UN for help staging a trial. But then, after Hun Sen defeated Ranariddh and became the nation’s sole leader, he probably looked back and realized that agreeing to a trial was one of the greatest mistakes he had ever made. After all, he and most of his colleagues in government were former Khmer Rouge officers themselves.

So, Hun Sen set out to sabotage the idea he had agreed to. And now, ten years after the court opened for business, he has largely succeeded.

Today, the court is saddled with charges of rampant corruption and malign Cambodian government interference in its operations. Several judges and staff members have quit in disgust. Its reputation is now so bad that donors have largely stopped giving money, so the court is broke. And the trials have dragged on for so long that defendants are growing ill and dying.

Theary Seng, who was left an orphan after the Khmer Rouge killed her parents, became the court’s first “civil party” victims’ representative. She withdrew from the proceedings in 2011, saying the trial had become “an irredeemable political farce.”

The problems began cropping up just as soon as the UN and the Cambodian government began negotiating the trial’s terms in the months following that initial agreement in 1997. Hun Sen and his aides threw up one objection after another. They professed concern about national stability. They complained about infringement upon Cambodian sovereignty. They insisted that any trial take place in home courts—even though Hun Sen knew full well that his court system was thoroughly corrupt. In fact, reforming the courts had been on his own campaign agenda during the most recent election. Today, that has still not been done.

“If foreigners have the right to lack confidence in Cambodian courts,” Hun Sen said defiantly, “we have the right to lack confidence in an international court.” But the UN continued to object to the government’s obstructive pronouncements and refused to use judges handpicked by, and utterly beholden to, Hun Sen and his aides.

“It became such a difficult, convoluted, lengthy, very, very difficult process,” said Kent Wiedemann, the US ambassador to Cambodia at that time, largely because “as far as the UN was concerned, there was no Cambodian qualified to participate in the tribunal in any meaningful way. The secretary general wanted to appoint judges with eminent standing in the international community.”

Finally, Kofi Annan, then secretary general of the UN, threw up his hands and said he’d had enough. Hun Sen must “change his position and attitude,” he declared, and “send a clear message that he is interested in a credible court, a credible tribunal which meets international standards.” Until that day came, Annan announced, the United Nations was backing out of the discussions.

Ten months later, however, the UN General Assembly stepped into the debate and rescinded Kofi Annan’s previous order. It passed a resolution directing “the secretary general to resume negotiations without delay, to conclude an agreement with the Government of Cambodia, based on previous negotiations, to try those suspected of being responsible for the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge.”

So it was that the UN and Cambodia commenced negotiations over how the court would be structured, and eventually they agreed to establish a hybrid court with both Cambodian and international judges and prosecutors. They called it the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (widely known as the ECCC) to differentiate it from Cambodia’s debased domestic court system.

David Scheffer, who was the US ambassador at large for war crimes issues, visited Cambodia and came up with the compromise that made the negotiations succeed. Under Scheffer’s plan, a majority of the trial judges could be Cambodian. But no decision could be reached unless at least one international judge agreed as well. That formula settled six years of tortured, acrimonious debate. Finally, the court opened for business in 2003.

Two years later, David Tolbert, a United Nations lawyer working at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, got a call. Could he please go to Cambodia and try to straighten out the war crimes courtroom there? Nothing was moving. The court was stuck.

Tolbert, a tall, garrulous North Carolinian with a world-weary manner, was to bring his experiences in the heart of the world’s worst recent genocidal moments to Cambodia, where a past genocide was being litigated. The problems he found there were altogether different from the ones he had been dealing with. The court had been trying to organize itself for several years, but Tolbert says that when he arrived, “it had no administrative leadership, particularly with respect to court management, including translation and interpretation and the witness-protection program.”

The international side had essentially given over judicial management to the Cambodian side. But, Tolbert says, “there was really very little judicial management in place. The Cambodian staff in charge had virtually no knowledge or experience, as most had no judicial background. And yet there were a large number of them,” hundreds in fact. What’s more, Cambodian human rights groups alleged that each of the Cambodian judges had paid a large bribe to get his seat on the court’s bench, which would not be at all unusual in that state.

Tolbert concluded that there was no way a trial could proceed at that point. He spent a few weeks drawing up a series of recommendations to get the process moving. Then he returned to Yugoslavia.

In 2008, when the new UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, asked Tolbert to step back into the Khmer Rouge trial, he quickly found that five years after the agreement to set up the court, “very little progress had been made. I proposed reducing the budget by 35 percent. The staff was bloated. They had 15 gardeners, which looked like a job-creation program to me.” He also quickly found that Cambodia’s endemic corruption had reared its head in the courthouse, where Cambodian employees were required to turn over a portion of their paychecks to their supervisors.

All during Hun Sen’s battle with the United Nations about the trial, he had been trying to ensure that the UN did not set up an autonomous body inside his country that he could not manipulate to protect himself and his fellow former Khmer Rouge friends. But as he and the rest of the world soon discovered, the Khmer Rouge trial presented a new and different liability. It exposed Cambodia’s way of doing business—incompetent, indolent, rapacious, corrupt—for everyone in the world to see, like a dollhouse with no back wall.

Despite all of that, the court proceeded with the trial of Kaing Guek Eav, widely known as “Duch”—the commander of S-21, the prison and interrogation and torture center in Phnom Penh, where fifteen thousand people died. On July 26, 2010, the court convicted Duch of crimes against humanity and sentenced him to thirty-five years in prison—by almost every reaction, an exceedingly light sentence for a man who oversaw the torture and deaths of so many thousands of innocent civilians. Even with that, he won’t serve the full thirty-five years. After subtracting his time already spent in jail, more for cooperation and good behavior, and still more for a period of illegal detention in a military jail, the court left him with nineteen years to serve. On the day the judge sentenced Duch, he was sixty-seven years old, meaning he could conceivably walk out of prison a free man one day.

After that, the court took up what it called Case 002, four senior Khmer Rouge leaders who were to be tried together. At the same time, more than a dozen legal investigators, foreigners on the UN payroll, were researching new suspects. And in the fall of 2009, the court announced that it intended to charge roughly half a dozen additional suspects. These were labeled cases 003 and 004.

But Hun Sen, implacably opposed, almost instantly went on the offensive. The prime minister was already well known for his “colorful” quips. For example, he had labeled anyone criticizing the trial’s Cambodian judges as “not human; they are animals,” who “even want to seduce their own parents.” Now, referring to the additional defendants, he insisted, “This will not happen on my watch. The UN and the countries that supported Pol Pot to occupy Cambodia’s seat at the UN from 1979 to 1991 should be tried first. They should be sentenced more heavily than Pol Pot.”

Then later that year, undeterred by its illogic, he took up a new line of argument. “If you want a tribunal, but you don’t want to consider peace and reconciliation, and war breaks out again, killing two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand people, who will be responsible?” he asked. “Finally, I have got peace in this country, so I will not let someone destroy it. The people and the nation will not be destroyed by someone trying to lead the country into instability.”

No one bothered to point out that during the Duch trial, there was no unrest, no protest, no sign of any trouble at all. In fact, the vast majority of Cambodians were largely unaware that the trial was under way. Eighty percent of the people live in the countryside, most of them with no modern conveniences such as radio or television. They’re uniformly preoccupied with finding enough food to feed their families each day. The trial was on during the day, when they were at work in the rice paddies. The few who did have car battery–powered televisions, if they had time to watch them, most likely just wanted to be entertained.

Some of the handful who did watch, largely in urban areas, were outraged by the treatment the defendants were getting—three meals a day, hand-delivered; living in air-conditioned cells; sleeping on actual beds with mattresses, a luxury in Cambodia. Bou Meng, a Khmer Rouge survivor, remarked: “I am extremely envious of Duch and the treatment he receives. I don’t understand why the court treats him so well, much better than me.” But most preferred to ignore the trial.

One reason was that many older Cambodians were beset with traumatic mental illnesses, including post-traumatic stress disorder, still lingering after the horrors of the Khmer Rouge years. (In one clinical study of Cambodian refugees who came to the United States in the early 1980s and now live in Long Beach, California, sixty-two percent were diagnosed with PTSD—twenty-five years after their trauma.) The last thing most people in Cambodia wanted to do was watch someone on TV describing their years of horror.

Hun Sen blocked several past and present Cambodian officials from testifying, despite subpoenas from the court. And a Cambodian judge he appointed to the ECCC had a documented history of accepting bribes in exchange for verdicts while he presided over a Cambodian court.

But while Hun Sen’s frontal attacks may have been little noticed by most Cambodians, they had a strong effect in the courtroom. One international judge resigned, blaming government interference in the proceedings, as did half of one defendant’s defense team. A reserve justice, Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, who is Swiss, was promoted to fill the empty judge’s chair, per ECCC protocol. Kasper-Ansermet then tweeted that he looked forward to hearing cases 003 and 004. That was enough to do him in.

On obvious orders from the prime minister’s office, his domestic co-judge refused to work with Kasper-Ansermet. He was denied use of court cars and drivers. He was not given access to the official stamps used to validate affidavits and other court records. And the Cambodian government’s Supreme Council of Magistracy refused to approve his appointment—even though this domestic body answerable to Hun Sen had no authority to involve itself in the appointment of international judges.

After less than six months, Kasper-Ansermet resigned because, as he said, he was unable to work with rampant Cambodian obstructionism. Nearly all of the international investigators quit, too.

 

For many legal experts today, the ECCC remains an embarrassment to the international legal system. Since its inception in 2003, the court has tried only one individual for the horrific genocide carried out by the Khmer Rouge: Kaing Guek Eav, or Duch, giving him a sentence so light that many Cambodians were appalled. Just one conviction and the court reports that it has already spent $208.7 million over the last ten years. Last year it asked for another $92 million from international donors to fund operations going forward.

But by all accounts donor fatigue has set in alongside disillusionment with Cambodian corruption and obstructionism, and very little money has been raised. In fact, this spring the court’s Cambodian staff went on strike because they had not been paid since last November. Without staff, including court reporters, transcribers, and translators, the court could not function. It shut down. Finally the court management promised to pay them—“sometime soon.” The staff went back to work but vowed to quit for good if the promise was not kept. Still, as international court officials repeatedly pointed out, the Cambodian government was responsible for paying these people. Apparently it was not unhappy to see the court shut down.

That was hardly the only problem. The four former Khmer Rouge leaders in case 002—Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, Ieng Thirith, and —looked likely to be the final defendants. But all of them were already so old that they were making the case moot.

Last September, Ieng Thirith, minister of social action in the Pol Pot regime, was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, so severe that she could not function in the courtroom. She was released. Then in March 2013, Ieng Sary, her husband and former minster of foreign affairs, died. He was eighty-seven years old.

That left only eighty-six-year-old Nuon Chea, who was known as “Brother No. 2” after Pol Pot, and Khieu Samphan, eighty-one, former president of the so-called Democratic State of Kampuchea. Both are frail and sickly.

The court has said it will need another year to complete these trials. Whether there will ever be a verdict, and if there is, whether the remaining defendants will live to see it, are questions on everyone’s mind. Also, we can’t know what deleterious acts Hun Sen may still have planned.

As the Cambodian government’s Office of the Royal Prosecutor recently put it: The prime minister “has an obligation to ensure political stability and the well being of the Kingdom of Cambodia,” suggesting that Hun Sen can do whatever he wants about the trial and say his actions are intended to assure “stability.”

But Ou Virak, president of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights, is pessimistic—like so many Cambodians. “This really is a case of now or never,” he said. “Both the ECCC’s reputation and justice for victims of the Khmer Rouge are in the last-chance saloon.”

One last question: Where was Jane Fonda on the Khmer Rouge?

Iran Parameter Framework by the Numbers

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To see the Iran parameters framework by the numbers and with charts, click here.

In what represents the worst aspect of this flawed deal, Obama has placed responsibility for verification of the agreement back on the United Nations. This is a hazardous repeat of the flawed UN response to Iraq’s proliferation after the Gulf War. Simply put, the UN Security Council will have veto powers over anything Iranian and nuclear when it comes to verification. This gives Beijing, and even more Moscow, a critical lever over the process.

We’ve seen this movie before, with Iraq in the 1990s. Charles Duelfer, who led the UN’s nuclear inspection regime in Iraq from 1993 to 2000, has termed this the “fatal flaw” of Obama’s deal, and that may be charitable. Yeltsin’s Russia was not very cooperative about Baghdad’s nuclear game-playing, and we should expect Putin’s Kremlin, which is engaged in Cold War 2.0 against the West, to be anything but helpful.

While Tehran and Moscow have no love for each other, between mutual fear and loathing, they both hate the West more, and any deal that puts Putin’s Kremlin in a verification role over Iran’s nuclear program is a farce, not to mention a strategic delusion. At worst, this may give a strategic partnership between Russia and Iran, which has been growing slowly, a new life, with an explicitly anti-Western focus. None of this can be mistaken for good news for the West.

After years of painstaking effort, the Obama administration has managed to craft a framework agreement with Iran. In the next three months, this structure is meant to be filled out with details regarding the scale of Iran’s enrichment capacity and the stages of sanctions relief. If the devil is in the detail, much mischief may await us.

 

However, even before all this happens, the Iranian nuclear drama is proving to be one of the most curious arms control episodes in history. As the scale of American concessions becomes evident, the White House and its defenders seldom justify the emerging accord strictly on terms of the proliferation threat that remains. Their response is often limited to claiming that an admittedly imperfect agreement is still preferable to the alternatives. And the alternatives are usually painted in hysterical terms with Iran surging toward the bomb, the sanctions regime collapsing and an isolated United States helplessly watching all this unfold. Not for the first time, the Obama administration is demonstrating a poor understanding of Iran’s strategies, the resilience of the sanctions regime and the nature of the international system.

By this time the essential contours of the agreement are all obvious. The accord will leave Iran with a sizeable enrichment capacity and none of its facilities will be shuttered as was once contemplated. The agreement’s most important sunset clause will be 10 years upon whose expiration, all essential restriction on Iran’s enrichment infrastructure will collapse. In essence, Iran can then move toward an industrial-size nuclear program similar to that of Japan. This means that the Islamic Republic will be in a position to manufacture numerous bombs on short order. The ballistic missiles, which are an essential part of any nuclear weapons program, will be excluded from the deal. And previous Iranian experiments with the military dimension of nuclear energy are postponed from scrutiny. Thus, any verification regime will not be informed by the history of Iran’s clandestine program.

The proponents of this deal have to account for why they are not bothered by such a large residual enrichment capacity. Why do they think a sunset clause is a wise idea? Why do they believe ballistic missiles should be ignored and how can once craft an intrusive verification system that has no historical memory? An arms control agreement has to be justified first and foremost on technical grounds and whether it meets the essential non-proliferation standards.

The path that the proponents of this accord have chosen is to avoid such questions and take refuge in the world of ominous alternatives. One of their favorite talking points is to suggest that coercion has not forestalled Iran’s nuclear path and that since 2003 as sanctions were imposed Iran has gone from 200 to 19,000 centrifuges. They neglect to mention that only approximately 9,500 of those machines are operational. Thus, during this period Iran increased its capacity by an average of 800 centrifuges a year. Although this is hardly ideal it is not an unmanageable situation. The notion that without this agreement Iran would immediately surge to a bomb is belied by the evidence that the proponents of this accord present.

Beyond that what is often missed is that Iran’s ingenious strategy is to advance its program incrementally and not provocatively. Iran has always been cautious to step and not leap forward. This way as Iran’s program inches forward, the international community routinely accedes to its new gains. In absence of an agreement, Iran will certainly take measures to advance its program, but those moves are likely to be cautious and incremental so to avoid a military reaction.

It is often suggested that should there be breakdown in the talks, the sanctions regime will collapse. The European states and Asian powers will rush back into Iran in defiance of American prohibitions. This notion ignores the fact that U.S. sanctions are secondary in nature, meaning that if there is European bank or an Asian firm that wishes to invest in Iran then it will lose its access to the U.S. market. There is no way that such firms will risk losing access to a U.S. economy estimated at $16.8 trillion dollars for sake of an Iranian economy of $368 billion. To be frank, the U.S. sanctions can success even if there is a perception that they are unfair. That is one of the advantages of being a superpower with the largest economy in the world.

None of this means the Iran deal is beyond repair. In the next three months, Secretary of State John Kerry has an opportunity to craft an agreement that addresses some of the deficiencies of the framework accord. He may wish to reconsider the wisdom of such a shortened sunset clause. The need for Iran to come clean on all its previous attempts at nuclear weaponization is critical if the agreement is to have a reliable inspection regime. And the ballistic missiles that are already part of UN resolutions should be addressed as part of this agreement and not separately. Finally, there has to be a mechanism in place for how to deal with Iranian violations. The history of arms control suggests that violations are rarely prosecuted and reversed in a timely manner.

Should he do so, he would have forged a deal that reliably restrains Iran’s nuclear appetite, enjoys bipartisan support at home and is embraced by our allies in the region. And that agreement would be worthy of the appellation historic.

Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/iran-deal-flaws-116655.html#ixzz3WHp3dOpf

In the Artic, NATO vs. Putin

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4/3/2015 – OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, Neb.  — Two B-52 Stratofortresses from the 5th Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base, N.D., and a pair from the 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale Air Force Base, La., completed today simultaneous, roundtrip sorties from their U.S. bases to the Arctic and North Sea regions, respectively.

The training mission, coined POLAR GROWL, allowed the aircrews to hone their navigation skills and enhanced their ability to work with Allied partners, while demonstrating U.S. Strategic Command capacity.

“These flights, demonstrating the credible and flexible ability of our strategic bomber force in internationally-recognized flight information regions, are the culmination of months of planning and coordination,” said Adm. Cecil D. Haney, U.S. Strategic Command commander. “They are one of many ways we demonstrate interoperability, compliance with national and international protocols and due regard for the safety of all aircraft sharing the air space.”

Each of the two legs of POLAR GROWL provided unique training opportunities, all while testing the bomber force’s command and control apparatus’ ability to support two synchronized flight paths. The bomber crews flying the North Sea route participated in dissimilar air intercept maneuvers with fighter aircraft flown by the Royal Canadian Air Force, the U.K.’s Royal Air Force and the Royal Netherlands Air Force. In addition to conducting dissimilar air intercept maneuvers with Royal Canadian Air Force fighters, bomber crews on the Arctic leg of the mission transited around the North Pole, providing the crews invaluable training in polar navigation.

“Today’s dynamic global security environment is an interdependent world where international partnerships are foundational,” Haney continued. “Exercises and operations such as these bomber flights enable and enhance relationships with our Allies and partners, and allow others to understand what capabilities U.S. Strategic Command brings to the equation.”

The U.S. regularly conducts combined training and theater security cooperation engagements with Allies and partners. The combined training provided in POLAR GROWL follows the participation of B-52s in NATO Exercise NOBLE JUSTIFICATION in October 2014 and the deployment of B-52s and B-2s to RAF Fairford, U.K., in June 2014, both of which provided occasions to train alongside U.S. Allies and partners.

“The long-range nature of the mission, coupled with the opportunity to interact, in real-time, with Allied aircraft was an invaluable experience that simply can’t be replicated out of the cockpit,” said Maj. Nathan Barnhart, 343rd Bomb Squadron instructor radar navigator. “Training like this ensures we are ready to respond to any and all mission directives across the globe.”

Flown in support of both U.S. European Command and U.S. Northern Command, POLAR GROWL was specifically designed to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Allies and enhancement of regional security, and not directed at any country.

Additionally, U.S. forces conduct all flights in accordance with the procedures outlined in the International Civil Aviation Organization international standards and recommended practices. By conducting flights that follow the ICAOs fundamental objectives, regional safety is enhanced to prevent any chance of misunderstanding.

The B-52 Stratofortress is capable of delivering large payload of precision nuclear or conventional ordnance over long ranges, while also providing decision makers the ability to rapidly project military power and generate decisive effects.

*** The United States and NATO is performing these operations because of Putin.
For the interactive map go here.
Russia has been ramping up its military presence in the Arctic, reopening abandoned Soviet-era bases, boosting its troop presence, building new facilities, and refurbishing infrastructure and air fields across a region that stretches from Russia’s borders with Norway and Finland to the seas off Alaska. The push reflects a new emphasis under President Vladimir Putin on the Arctic as a region of strategic importance that is also rich in oil and gas reserves.
The push comes as melting sea ice opens up those Arctic energy resources, prompting a scramble by Russia and other Arctic nations — Denmark, Canada, the United States, and Norway – to stake competing territorial claims. Mouse over and click each dot to see details of Russia’s Arctic expansion.
***
Putin is being quite shrewd while Jens Stoltenberg, the newly assigned Secretary General of NATO was real stupid.

Oslo (AFP) – Russian ships docked at what was once a secret Norwegian naval base in the Arctic have prompted concern from the NATO country’s former top military leaders, anxious about its resurgent eastern neighbour roaming nearby.

 

Norway’s jagged Arctic coastline has regained its strategic importance since tensions between Russia and NATO members have spiked to levels not seen since the fall of the Soviet Union.

The rocky relations have led some to criticise the shutting down of Olavsvern Naval Base, a massive complex burrowed into a mountain near the northern town of Tromsoe, that has been closed since 2009.

Shuttering it was driven by the then seemingly reduced threat from Moscow and its massive Northern Fleet based on Russia’s nearby Kola Peninsula.

“We sold the only base worthy of the name that we had up there. It’s pure madness,” former vice admiral Einar Skorgen, who commanded Norway’s northern forces, told AFP.

Skorgen and other critics say Norway has robbed itself of a crucial foothold in the far north, forcing its submarines to travel hundreds of extra miles from their bases to defend the region.

On top of that, three Russian ships have spent the winter docked deep within the mountain hideaway, once a closely guarded military facility.

“We are the only country along with Russia to have a permanent presence in the Barents Sea, where we share a common border. Obviously our navy should be stationed there, including our submarines,” Skorgen said.

“If the ships aren’t there where they are needed, they might as well be scrapped altogether.”

The way the base changed hands and ended up being rented to Russian research vessels — some of them seismic survey ships reportedly linked to state-owned energy giant Gazprom — has added further fuel to their anger.

When no buyers answered the armed forces’ initial advert on Norway’s version of eBay, a Norwegian businessman clinched the deal in 2013 for a mere 40 million kroner ($5 million, 4.6 million euros) — a steal given that NATO ploughed nearly 4 billion kroner into its construction.

“There are no longer any secrets surrounding this base,” said its new landlord Gunnar Wilhelmsen.

“Not since the military and NATO agreed to put it on sale over the Internet, along with photographs of every nook and cranny.”

– Historic ‘blunder’ –

Nonetheless, the potential for Russian military activity aboard research vessels has many military experts worried, particularly former top-ranking officers who are more prone to speaking their mind.

“Russia is a country where the state has a say over all commercial or semi-state business. It’s clear, very few people know what happens on these vessels,” said retired vice admiral Jan Reksten, formerly second in command of the Norwegian military.

He said the sale of Olavsvern was “a double loss” as “Norway’s armed forces lost an important base and now there are Russian vessels docked there.”

In an ironic twist to the tale, the decision to close the base was taken by the leftist government of Jens Stoltenberg, who has gone on to become NATO’s current secretary general and who has warned countries not to lower their guard when it comes to Russia.

Kjell-Ola Kleiven, a blogger writing on security issues in Norway, calls the affair the “biggest blunder in recent history” in an oil-rich country which boasts the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund.

“With 7,000 billion kroner in the bank,” he wrote, “you would have thought that the Norwegian nation had the means and savvy to retain ownership of Olavsvern base.”

Despite the protests, Norway’s current right-wing government has shown no signs of reversing the decision made by its predecessors.

“There are no plans to re-establish military installations in Olavsvern,” Audun Halvorsen, political advisor to the defence minister, told AFP in an email.

“The owner of the site can use it as he sees fit and the armed forces do not have the authority to impose restrictions, nor any mandate to monitor civilian ships that dock there,” he added.

“Any suspected irregular activity is a matter for the police and legal authorities.”

Who is that Woman Standing Next to You?

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How One Philadelphia Woman Tweeted Her Way to Federal Terrorism-Related Charges

April 3, 2015 In the case of one Philadelphia woman with aspirations to join the Islamic State, retweets do equal endorsements.

The Justice Department charged Keonna Thomas, 30, on Friday with “knowingly attempting to provide material support and resources, including herself as personnel, to a designated foreign terrorist organization,” the Islamic State. Starting about two years ago, Thomas—who also went by two aliases, Fatayat Al Khilafah and YoungLioness—allegedly began communicating with known jihadi fighters online and using social media to advocate on the terrorist organization’s behalf.

If convicted, Thomas faces 15 years in prison.

Thomas is the third American woman in two days to be charged with a crime related to terrorism. But whereas the two New York City women charged Thursday were operating in real life, it seems Thomas’s activity online tipped off investigators.

Much of the criminal complaint against Thomas focuses on her Twitter habits, detailing several incriminating tweets and retweets. (All claims are alleged until proven in court.) Here’s a sampling from the indictment:

• On December 17, 2013, Thomas retweeted a message by another user that read ” ‘Happiness is the day of my martyrdom’ – Sheikh Khalid al Husainan.’ ” On January 4, 2014, she tweeted, “Only thing I’m jealous of is when I see the smiles of shuhadda,” which refers to martyrs.

• On January 30, 2014, Thomas retweeted a photograph of an individual carrying an AK-47, with an accompanying message that read: “Sponsor a Mujahid,” a jihadi fighter.

• On April 4, 2014, she posted images of a gun, skull, and flames on Twitter, along with a message: “I need a permanent vacation that can only mean one thing.”

• On June 23, 2014, she tweeted: “When you’re a mujahid, your death becomes a wedding.”

• By December 2014, Thomas’s Twitter rhetoric had escalated, and she had begun to email with a known Islamic State fighter overseas. On December 2, Thomas wrote a message that read: “If we truly knew the realities … we all would be rushing to join our brothers in the front lines pray ALLAH accept us as shuhada,” or martyrs. Four days after, she reposted a photo of a young boy armed with an AK-47. The image was accompanied by a message that read: “And if I were in Shaam,” referring to Syria, “I wouldn’t be pleased till I became soldier of the Islamic State.”

• In February of this year, Thomas applied for a U.S. passport. The same month, she emailed the Islamic State fighter to say that she had deactivated her Twitter account in preparation for her travel to Syria. “[D]on’t want to draw attention of the kuffar [non-believers] and it mess my plans and they take my pass port and i get stuck here.”

In March, Thomas purchased an electronic visa to Turkey, a common transit point for people trying to reach Syria from Europe, but she never made it to either country. She had broken the most important rule of the 21st century. No, not the rule against trying to join an overseas terrorist group that has repeatedly threatened your country and its allies (although that’s really bad). Thomas broke the first tenet of the Internet: Don’t tweet something you wouldn’t want on the front page of The New York Times.

Final Details on Today’s Iran Framework

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Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
 Enrichment
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Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
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Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
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Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
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All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
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Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
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Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
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Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
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Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only  – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
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Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
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Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
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Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
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Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
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Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
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Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to  by the P5+1.
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For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
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The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
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Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
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Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
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Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows  production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will  be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
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All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be  placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
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A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of
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certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
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Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
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Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
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Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
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Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
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Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
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The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
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Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
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Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
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Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
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Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
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Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
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U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
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The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
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All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
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However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and  ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
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A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
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If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
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U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
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For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development  – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
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For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
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Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
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Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.