Category Archives: Terror

What you Need to Know About the Visa Waiver Program

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There are 38 countries that participate in the State Department Visa Waiver Program. There are very few conditions for people traveling to the United States from those countries to enter our country. There are countless problems with this program most of which is those that over-stay and never go home.

Europe has an unspeakable problem with Islamic State sympathizers and those from the UK are allowed to travel to the U.S. without any real conditions.

To make America safer immediately a first step is to suspend this program immediately and for at least two years.

Have no fear…yeah sure. The program is getting tighter security measures.

DHS Announces Security Enhancements to Visa Waiver Program

By: Amanda Vicinanzo, Senior Editor

Just days ago, Adil Batarfi, one of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) senior commanders, issued a threat against America and the West if they continue to blasphemy Islam. Amid these continued calls for terrorist attacks on the homeland, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced new security enhancements to the US Visa Waiver program (VWP).

The VWP is administered by DHS and enables eligible citizens or nationals of designated countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. The VWP constitutes one of a few exceptions under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in which foreign nationals are admitted into the United States without a valid visa.

To enhance the security of the program, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced a number of additional or revised security criteria for all participants—both current and new members— in the VWP. The new criteria include the following:

  • Required use of e-passports for all Visa Waiver Program travelers coming to the United States;
  • Required use of the INTERPOL Lost and Stolen Passport Database to screen travelers crossing a Visa Waiver country’s borders; and
  • Permission for the expanded use of U.S. federal air marshals on international flights from Visa Waiver countries to the United States.

“As I have said a number of times now, the current global threat environment requires that we know more about those who travel to the United States,” Johnson said. “This includes those from countries for which we do not require a visa.”

Johnson said the new enhancements build on a number of changes implemented last September. DHS required travelers from the 38 VWP countries where a visa is not required for US entry to provide additional passport data, contact information and other potential names or aliases in their travel application submitted via the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) before they could travel to the US.

DHS took steps to improve the program in the wake of the adoption of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2178 last September, which urged member nations to do more to address the growing threat of foreign terrorist fighters.

“The security enhancements we announce today are part of this department’s continuing assessments of our homeland security in the face of evolving threats and challenges, and our determination to stay one step ahead of those threats and challenges,” Johnson said. “And, it is our considered judgment that the security enhancements we announce today will not hinder lawful trade and travel with our partners in the Visa Waiver Program. These measures will enhance security for all concerned.”

Homeland Security Today reported earlier this year that lawmakers have become concerned that the program could be used as a gateway for terrorists to enter the United States. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, called the VWP the “Achilles’ heel of America,” saying citizens from visa waiver countries could travel to Syria to fight for jihadist groups and return home to conducts attacks.

A UN report from earlier this year revealed that the number of foreign fighters leaving their home nations to join extremist groups in Iraq, Syria and other nations has hit record levels, with estimates of over 25,000 foreign fighters coming from nearly 100 countries.

Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, has raised similar concerns. During an interview with CBS’ “Face the Nation,” McCaul said, “We have a visa waiver-free system where they can fly in the United States without even having a visa. We need to look at all sorts of things like that.”

However, defenders of the program believe VWP is critical to national security. At a speech at The Heritage Foundation, former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff made the case for continuing the VWP.

“Now is not the time to handicap or dismantle our intelligence collection programs … that have literally been at the cornerstone of protecting the United States since 2001.” VWP is “a plus-plus for our national security and our economic security,” Chertoff said.

IRS: Lois Lerner, Texas and Abraham Lincoln

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Lerner Lincoln Email

From the Federalist:

“As you can see, the Lone Star State is just pathetic as far as political attitudes are concerned,” Lerner’s friend Mark Tornwall wrote in 2014.

“Look my view is that Lincoln was our worst president not our best,” Lerner responded, according to USA Today. “He should’ve let the south go. We really do seem to have 2 totally different mindsets.”

Finance Committee Releases Bipartisan IRS Report

Committee Concludes Two-Year Investigation into the IRS’s Treatment of Tax-Exempt Organizations

WASHINGTON – Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) today released the Committee’s bipartisan investigative report detailing their investigation into the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) treatment of organizations applying for tax-exempt status after the Committee voted to report out the findings in a closed executive session.  As required by law, members were briefed by Committee staff with 6103 authority to review private taxpayer information in a number of closed-door briefings on the findings and recommendations of the report before the vote.

“This bipartisan investigation shows gross mismanagement at the highest levels of the IRS and confirms an unacceptable truth: that the IRS is prone to abuse,” Hatch said.  “The Committee found evidence that the administration’s political agenda guided the IRS’s actions with respect to their treatment of conservative groups.  Personal politics of IRS employees, such as Lois Lerner, also impacted how the IRS conducted its business.  American taxpayers should expect more from the IRS and deserve an IRS that lives up to its mission statement of administering the tax laws fairly and impartially – regardless of political affiliation. Moving forward, it is my hope we can use this bipartisan report as a foundation to work towards substantial reforms at the agency so that this never happens again. ”

“The results of this in-depth, bipartisan investigation showcase pure bureaucratic mismanagement without any evidence of political interference,” said Wyden.  “Groups on both sides of the political spectrum were treated equally in their efforts to secure tax-exempt status.  Now is the time to pursue bipartisan staff recommendations to ensure this doesn’t happen again.”

Bipartisan findings of the report include:

  • During the years 2010 to 2013, IRS management failed to provide effective control, guidance and direction over the processing of applications for tax-exempt status.
  • Top IRS managers did not keep informed about the applications involving possible political advocacy and thereby forfeited the opportunity to provide the leadership that the IRS needed to respond to the legal and policy issues presented by these applications.
  • Lois Lerner, who headed the Exempt Organizations Division, became aware of the Tea Party applications in early 2010, but failed to inform her superiors about their existence.  While under Lerner’s leadership, the Exempt Organizations Division undertook no less than seven poorly planned and badly executed initiatives aimed at bringing the growing number of applications from Tea Party and other groups to decision.  Every one of those initiatives ended in predictable failure and every failure resulted in months and years of delay for the organizations awaiting decisions from the IRS on their applications for tax-exempt status.
  • The Committee also found that the workplace culture in the Exempt Organizations Division placed little emphasis or value on providing customer service.
    • Few if any of the managers were concerned about the delays in processing the applications, delays that possibly harmed the organizations ability to function for their stated purposes.
  • The Committee made a number of recommendations to address IRS management deficiencies as follows:
  • The Hatch Act should be revised to designate all IRS, Treasury and Chief Counsel employees who handle exempt organization matters as “further restricted.”  “Further restricted” employees are precluded from active participation in political management or partisan campaigns, even while off-duty.
  • The IRS should track the age and cycle times of applications for tax-exempt status to detect backlogs early in the process and allow management to take steps to address those backlogs.
  • The Exempt Organizations Division should track requests for assistance from both the Technical Branch and the Chief Counsel’s office to ensure the timely receipt of that assistance.
  • A list of over-age applications should be sent to the Commissioner on a quarterly basis.
  • Internal IRS guidance should require that employees reach a decision applications no later than 270 days after the IRS receives that application.  Employees and managers who fail to comply with these standards should be disciplined.
  • Minimum training standards should be established for all managers within the EO Division to ensure that they have adequate technical ability to perform their jobs.

Issuance of the report was delayed for more than a year after the IRS belatedly informed the Committee that it had not been able to recover a large number of potentially responsive documents that were lost when Lois Lerner’s hard drive crashed in 2011.

  • By failing to locate and preserve records, making inaccurate assertions about the existence of backup data, and failing to disclose to Congress the fact that records were missing, the IRS impeded the Committee’s investigation.  These actions had the effect of denying the Committee access to records that may have been relevant and, ultimately, delayed the investigation’s conclusion by more than one year.

A table of contents for the appendix can be found here. The appendicies can be found below:

Part 1 here.

Part 2 here.

Part 3 here.

Part 4 here.

A timeline can be found here.

Additional views from Chairman Hatch can be found here. A summary can be found here.

Additional views from Ranking Member Wyden can be found here. A summary can be found here.

 

Background:

On May 20, 2013, the leaders of the Senate Finance Committee sent a detailed, 41-question document request to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking information about the alleged targeting by the IRS of certain social welfare organizations applying for tax-exempt status based on those organizations’ presumed political activities. That letter marked the beginning of a bipartisan investigation by the Committee into the IRS’ activities related to the review of tax-exempt applications and related issues raised by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) in his May 14, 2013, report.

In June 2014, the Committee learned that Lois Lerner had experienced a hard drive failure in 2011, which raised questions about the IRS’s ability to produce all the documents necessary to complete the Senate Finance Committee investigation. As a result, Chairman Hatch and Ranking Member Wyden asked TIGTA to investigate the matter. Specifically, TIGTA looked into: 1) what records the IRS lost; 2) if there was any attempt to deliberately destroy records, or otherwise impede congressional and federal investigations; and 3) whether any of the missing information can be recovered.

TIGTA provided their findings to the Committee on June 30, 2015.

Upon completing the report, Committee investigators had interviewed more than 32 current and former IRS and Treasury employees and reviewed nearly 1.5 million pages of documents.

SHE is the ISIS Recruiter Deployed by Russia?

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Isis launches Russian-language propaganda channel

Islamic State’s social media and video efforts have stepped up, part of a region-wide effort to sign up youths to fight take up the black flag. RFE/RL reports

The Guardian: The militant group Islamic State has stepped up its Russian-language propaganda efforts, another sign it is becoming more powerful in the post-Soviet countries.

The Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said recently that 2,000 Russian nationals are currently fighting in Syria or Iraq. In June, the country’s security council chief, Nikolai Patrushev, said that there was “no possibility” of stemming the tide of fighters.

Though Russian-speaking Islamic State (Isis) militants have put out their own messages for some time, in recent weeks a new Russian-language wing, Furat Media, has emerged, with Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr accounts broadcasting under a river-themed logo.

It was through Furat that the militant group declared the establishment of a province in the North Caucasus, inside the Russian Federation itself. The propaganda wing also issued a professionally produced video, Unity Of The Mujahideen Of The Caucasus, which included interviews with Russian-speaking militants in Iraq and Syria. Dozens more are available for download from the site.  Read more here.

 

Main Russian IS Recruiter ‘Identified In Turkey,’ But Who Is One-Legged Akhmet?

Radio Free Europe: Russia’s security services claim to have established the identity of the main recruiter of Russian nationals to the Islamic State (IS) militant group, according to the Russian tabloid Life News, which has close ties to the country’s security services.

The man in question is a 30-year-old Chechen nicknamed One-Legged Akhmet, Life News reported on August 4.

Among those purportedly recruited by One-Legged Akhmet and his
Among those purportedly recruited by One-Legged Akhmet and his “team” are Russian student Varvara Karaulova (above) and Maryam Ismailova. Karaulova was detained in Turkey and returned to Russia, where prosecutors did not press charges; Ismailova remains at large.

However, details in the Life News report and in a subsequent August 7 report by the Caucasian Knot blog suggest that the individual in question could be an ethnic Chechen who has previously appeared alongside Russian-speaking IS militants in a video shot in IS-controlled territory.

According to the Life News report, two of One-Legged Akhmet’s subordinates — Yakub Ibragimov, 23, from Chechnya and Abdulla Abdulayev from Makhachkala in Daghestan (aka The Uzbek) — have already been detained in Turkey.

But One-Legged Akhmet remains at large.

The report did not give a name for One-Legged Akhmet or say where in Chechyna he is from, saying that his name has not been released because security forces from Russia and Turkey are seeking him.

However, the report did provide information about his alleged activities.

One-Legged Akhmet was responsible for recruiting Russian citizens from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the North Caucasus and facilitating their travel from Turkey into Syria, according to Life News.

Among those purportedly recruited by One-Legged Akhmet and his “team” are Russian student Varvara Karaulova and Maryam Ismailova. Karaulova was detained in Turkey and returned to Russia, where prosecutors did not press charges; Ismailova remains at large.

Life News quoted an anonymous member of Russia’s law-enforcement authorities who said that Turkish and Russian police had “established IS recruitment and delivery channels for Russians.”

“Under their scheme, people are first recruited over the Internet, after which they are met in Istanbul. Then, One-Legged Akhmet and his subordinates produced fake documents in a few days and transported [the recruits] across the Turkey-Syria border,” the source was quoted as saying.

Discrepancies?

On July 28, Turkish and Azerbaijani media reported that the authorities in Turkey had arrested three men who were accused of being members of IS. According to these reports, one of the men was named Abdullah Abdulayev and had introduced himself as IS’s Emir of Istanbul.

It is not clear whether the Abdulla Abdulayev, referred to as an Azerbaijani in the Turkish media reports, is the same individual that Life News has identified as being from Daghestan.

One-Armed Akhmed

While details of One-Legged Akhmet remain murky, the alleged suspect’s name is very reminiscent of that of another notorious IS militant from Chechnya.

Akhmed Chatayev, also known as Akhmed Shishani or One-Armed Akhmed, emerged in Syria in late 2014 or early 2015 alongside leading figures in IS’s North Caucasian contingent.

Chatayev was previously granted refugee status in Austria. He was arrested by Georgian forces in 2012 in connection with the Lopota Gorge incident, in which an armed group clashed with Georgian special forces. Chatayev was later released after a court found him innocent. (His lawyers say he lost his arm as a result of torture by Russian security forces, while Russia says he was disabled while fighting in Chechnya.)

An anonymous member of the Caucasian diaspora in Turkey told the Caucasian Knot news website on August 7 that the leader of the Istanbul cell was a Chechen who had been involved in the 2012 Lopota Gorge incident and had lost a leg. However, the source also said that the armed group had been attempting to travel to Syria, which is a theory that has not been advanced previously.

There has also been no official notification from the Turkish government about the detention of a Russian citizen, a Russian consular representative in Ankara told the Caucasian Knot.

Regardless of whether Chatayev is the shadowy individual suggested by Life News, given his links in Europe and the North Caucasus and his associations with senior Russian-speaking IS figures in Syria and Iraq, it is likely that he is involved in recruitment for IS. Certainly, Abu Jihad, the ethnic Karachai with whom Chatayev appears in a video shared by IS earlier this year, is involved in IS recruitment via his work heading IS’s Russian-language propaganda outlet, Furat Media.

It is unknown whether Chatayev is still in Syria — he has not appeared in IS videos for some months — or whether he is in Turkey.

Obama Chose Kerry Over Hillary to Begin Iran Talks

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The opening salvo was much earlier, yet in earnest, the talks with Iran began in 2011 and it appears, Obama’s campaign team were tooling the talks to perhaps be part of his re-election campaign. It was already decided that Hillary was out and Kerry was in as Secretary of State.

Pathetic when we need to find some back-end truths from Iran, a terror nation. Read on readers, this is a fascinating summary with clear citations and annotations.

Iranian Senior Officials Disclose Confidential Details From Nuclear Negotiations: Already In 2011 We Received Letter From U.S. Administration Recognizing Iran’s Right To Enrich Uranium

By MEMRI: Iranian officials recently began to reveal details from the nuclear negotiations with the U.S. since their early stages. Their statements indicate that the U.S. initiated secret negotiations with Iran not after President Hassan Rohani, of the pragmatic camp, was elected in 2013, but rather in 2011-2012, in the era of radical president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[1] The disclosures also indicate that, already at that time, Iran received from the U.S. administration a letter recognizing its right to enrich uranium on its own soil. Hossein Sheikh Al-Islam, an advisor to the Majlis speaker, specified that the letter had come from John Kerry, then a senator and head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Iranian vice president and top negotiator Ali Akbar Salehi said that Kerry, while still a senator, had been appointed by President Obama to handle the nuclear contacts with Iran.

The following are initial details from these disclosures; a full translation is pending.   

Khamenei: Bilateral Talks Began In 2011, Were Based On U.S. Recognition Of Nuclear Iran

In a speech he delivered on June 23, 2015, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that the American administration had initiated the nuclear talks with Iran during Ahmadinejad’s term in office, based on a U.S. recognition of a nuclear Iran: “The issue of negotiating with the Americans is related to the term of the previous [Ahmadinejad] government, and to the dispatching of a mediator to Tehran to request talks. At the time, a respected regional figure came to me as a mediator [referring to Omani Sultan Qaboos] and explicitly said that U.S. President [Obama] had asked him to come to Tehran and present an American request for negotiations. The Americans told this mediator: ‘We want to solve the nuclear issue and lift sanctions within six months, while recognizing Iran as a nuclear power.’ I told that mediator that I did not trust the Americans and their words, but after he insisted, I agreed to reexamine this topic, and negotiations began.”[2]

Hossein Sheikh Al-Islam: Kerry Sent Iran A Letter Via Oman Recognizing Iran’s Enrichment Rights

In an interview with the Tasnim news agency on July 7, 2015, Hossein Sheikh Al-Islam, an advisor to Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, said that John Kerry had relayed a letter to Tehran recognizing Iran’s enrichment rights: “We came to the [secret] negotiations [with the U.S.] after Kerry wrote a letter and sent it to us via Oman, stating that America officially recognizes Iran’s rights regarding the [nuclear fuel] enrichment cycle. Then there were two meetings in Oman between the [Iranian and U.S.] deputy foreign ministers, and after those, Sultan Qaboos was dispatched by Obama to Khamenei with Kerry’s letter. Khamenei told him: ‘I don’t trust them.’ Sultan Qaboos said: ‘Trust them one more time.’ On this basis the negotiations began, and not on the basis of sanctions, as they [the Americans] claim in their propaganda.”[3]

Salehi: Obama Appointed Senator Kerry To Handle The Nuclear Dossier Vis-à-vis Iran; Later He Was Appointed Secretary Of   State

Iranian Vice President Ali Akbar Salehi and head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, who was restored to the nuclear negotiation team this year, served as Iran’s foreign minister in 2010-2013. In interviews he has given on Iranian media since April 2014, he too claimed that the Americans initiated the secret talks with Iran in 2011-2012, and stressed his role in jumpstarting the process from the Iranian side. In a comprehensive interview with the daily Iran on August 4, 2015, he elaborated on the secret contacts initiated by the Americans. The following are excerpts from the interview:

Interviewer: “Why was Oman chosen as a mediator [in the contacts with the U.S.]?”

Salehi: “We have very good relations with Oman. When [Supreme Leader] Khamenei recently mentioned ‘a respected regional figure,’ he was obviously referring to the Omani leader. Oman is also respected by the West, and it had mediated between America and Iran on several previous occasions, for instance in the affair of the American mountain climbers who were arrested in Iran [in 2009]… When [Iranian deputy Foreign Minister] Qashqavi was there [in Oman], an Omani official gave him a letter in which he announced that the Americans were willing to hold negotiations with Iran and that they were very interested in solving the challenging [crisis] between Tehran and Washington. We [Iranians] were willing to help facilitate the process, and it looked like a good opportunity had come up. The 2012 U.S. elections had not yet started back then, but Obama had already launched his reelection campaign. The Omani message came just as [Obama and Romney] were starting their race in the U.S. elections, but there was still time before the elections [themselves]. At that stage I did not take the letter seriously.”

Interviewer: “Why didn’t you take it seriously? Because it was delivered by a mid-level Omani official?”

Salehi: “Yes. This fact concerned us, because the letter was hand-written and back then I was not familiar with that official. After a while, Mr. Souri, who was the CEO of an Iranian shipping [company], visited Oman to promote various shipping interests and talk with Omani officials.”

Interviewer: “This was how long after the delivery of the letter?”

Salehi: “He came to me about a month or two after the first letter was delivered, and said to me: ‘Mr. Salehi, I visited Oman to promote shipping interests, and an Omani official conveyed to me that the Americans were willing to enter secret bilateral negotiations on the nuclear dossier.’ It was clear that they wanted to launch negotiations…”

“The Omani official whose message Souri was relaying was one Isma’il, who had just been appointed an advisor to the Omani leader and who still holds a position in the Omani foreign ministry. He had good relations with the Americans, and Omani officials trusted him [too]. I said to Souri: ‘We are not at all certain to what extent the Americans are serious, but I’ll give you a note. Go tell them that these are our demands. Deliver [the note] during your next visit to Oman.’ On a piece of paper I wrote down four clearly-stated points, one of which was [the demand for] official recognition of the right to enrich uranium. I thought that, if the Americans were sincere in their proposal, they had to accept these four demands of ours. Mr. Souri delivered this short letter to the mediator, stressing that this was the list of Iran’s demands, [and that], if the Americans wanted to resolve the issue, they were welcome to do so [on our terms], otherwise addressing the White House proposals to Iran would be pointless and unjustified.

“All the demands presented in this letter were related to the nuclear challenge. [They were] issues we had always come up against, like the closing of the nuclear dossier, official recognition of [the right to] enrichment, and resolving the issue of Iran’s past activities under the PMD [possible military dimensions] heading. After receiving the letter, the Americans said, ‘We are definitely and sincerely willing, and we can resolve the issues that Iran mentioned.'”

Interviewer: “With whom did the Americans hold contacts?”

Salehi: “They were in contact with Omani officials, including the relevant figure in the Omani administration. He was a friend of U.S. Secretary of State [John Kerry]. Back then Kerry was not yet secretary of state, he acted as head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In any case, we received from the Americans a positive response and message. We came to the conclusion that we could prepare [to take] further steps on this issue.  That’s why I asked the Omanis to relay to Iran an official letter that I could present to the officials in Iran. I assessed we had a good opportunity and that we could take advantage of it… They did so, and I presented the official letter that was received to the regime officials and went to the [Supreme] Leader to detail to him the process that had been conducted…

Interviewer: “What was the American position in the first meetings that took place between Iran and the P5+1 during Rohani’s presidency?”

Salehi: “After Rohani’s government began working [in August 2013] – this was during Obama’s second term in office – a new [round of] negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 was launched. By this time, Kerry was no longer a senator but had been appointed secretary of state. [But even] before this, when he was still senator, he had already been appointed by Obama to handle the nuclear dossier [vis-à-vis Iran] and later [in December 2012] he was appointed secretary of state. Before this, the Omani mediator, who was in close touch with Kerry, told us that Kerry would soon be appointed secretary of state. In the period of the secret negotiations with the Americans in Oman, there was a more convenient atmosphere for obtaining concessions from the Americans.  After the advent of the Rohani government and the American administration [i.e., after the start of Obama’s second term in office], and with Kerry as secretary of state, the Americans expressed a more forceful position. They no longer displayed the same eagerness to advance the negotiations. Their position became more rigid and the threshold of their demands higher. But the situation on the Iranian side changed too, since a very professional team was placed in charge of the negotiations with the P5+1…”[4]

‘Nuclear Iran’ Website: Three Rounds Of Talks With The U.S. Took Place Before Iran’s 2013 Elections

The “Nuclear Iran” website, which is affiliated with Iran’s former nuclear negotiation team and which supports the ideological camp, reported on April 20, 2014 that “Two additional conditions, out of the four conditions [set out by Khamenei], were that foreign minister [Salehi] himself not take part in the talks, and that the negotiations yield tangible results at an early [stage]. The policy for these negotiations was set out by a committee of three figures, [all of them] senior government officials, though Ahmadinejad himself did not have much of a role in it. The main strategy in these negotiations was [handing] America an ultimatum and exposing its insincerity and untrustworthiness. Before the 2013 presidential elections, three rounds of talks took place in Oman, and at these talks the Americans officially recognized Iran’s [right] to enrich [uranium]…”[5]

 

Endnotes:

[1] This is in contrast to what was implied by U.S. President Obama on July 14, 2015, when he announced the nuclear deal with Iran in a speech that began with the words “After two years of negotiations…” Whitehouse.gov, July 14, 2015.

[2] Leader.ir, June 23, 2015. Ahmad Khorshidi, a relative of Ahmadinejad’s, told the website Entekhab in 2014 that negotiations between Tehran and Washington did not start during President Rohani’s term. He said that during the Ahmadinejad period, there were three rounds of talks between the sides, which were also attended by then-foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi. Entekhab.ir, June 11, 2014.

[3] Tasnim (Iran), July 7, 2015.

[4] Iran (Iran), August 4, 2015.

[5] Irannuc.ir, April 20, 2014.

Putin Officially Stakes Exclusive Claim to the Artic

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Without even so much as a whimper from anyone in Washington DC, Putin made his final submission to the United Nations in writing claiming expanded sovereignty of Russia for the Artic.

This was tried before by Russia and it was denied in 2001.

The question is why is the United Nations the final approval authority for such a claim under which the matter is governed by the Law of the Seas?

Obama’s feeble position on the Artic

In May 2013, President Obama published the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, defining the desired end state as an Arctic Region stable and free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner. In November 2013, the Secretary of Defense published the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, identifying two supporting objectives to the National Strategy:

• Ensure security, support safety, and promote defense cooperation;
• Prepare for a wide range of challenges and contingencies.

In support of National and Department of Defense aims, the Navy will pursue the following strategic objectives:

• Ensure United States Arctic sovereignty and provide homeland defense;
• Provide ready naval forces to respond to crisis and contingencies;
• Preserve freedom of the seas; and
• Promote partnerships within the United States Government and with international allies and partners.

Full detail here.

Russia’s Application Summary to the United Nations

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Federation signed 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“Convention”) on 10 December 1982 (then the USSR) and ratified it on 26 February 1997. The Convention entered into force for the Russian Federation on 11 April 1997. In accordance with Article 77 of the Convention, the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf exist ipso facto and ab initio.

This Submission of the Russian Federation, which is made on the basis of Article 76.8 of the Convention, is a partial revised submission and covers the part of the Arctic Ocean region. The area under consideration was included in the first Submission of the Russian Federation (made on 10 December 2001) in respect of the extended continental shelf, which was considered at the 11th session of the Commission from 24 to 28 June 2002.

Recommendations relating to the Arctic Ocean adopted at that session of the Commission (L. Recommendations / D. Summary of recommendations. Central Arctic Ocean) say: 154/166. The Commission recommends that the Russian Federation make a revised submission in respect

of its extended continental shelf in the Central Arctic Ocean based on the findings contained in these recommendations.

155/167. The Commission recommends that the Russian Federation follow the scientific and technical advice contained in its Scientific and Technical Guidelines, and as indicated in the various sections of these Recommendations of the Commission.

156/168. The Commission recommends that according to the materials provided in the submission the Lomonosov Ridge cannot be considered a submarine elevation under the Convention.

157/169. The Commission recommends that, according to the current state of scientific knowledge, the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge Complex cannot be considered a submarine elevation under the Convention.

Guided by the provisions of the Rules of Procedure and the STG, and also taking into account the practice of the Commission, the Russian Federation reserves the right to introduce amendments and additions to this partial revised Submission that can be based on new or additional research data and may provide changes to the presented OLCS line of the Russian Federation.

1. EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN

This partial revised Submission of the Russian Federation for establishment of the OLCS in the Arctic Ocean is made to include in the extended continental shelf of the Russian Federation, in accordance with article 76 of the Convention, the seabed and its subsoil in the central Arctic Ocean which is natural prolongation of the Russian land territory.

The basis for the extension of rights to the extended continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean is the identity of the submitted areas to the continental shelf, as well as the OLCS position under Article 76 of the Convention at a distance of more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In the case of the Russian Federation, this distance coincides with the boundary of the Russian exclusive economic zone. Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Federal Act “On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation”(No. 191, dated December 17, 1998) states that:

PARTIAL REVISED SUBMISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN RESPECT OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN

The outer limit of the exclusive economic zone is established at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, unless otherwise is stipulated by the international treaties of the Russian Federation.

Requirements of Paragraph 1 of Article 75 of the Convention provide that:

Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 74 shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Where appropriate, such limit lines or delimitation lines may be substituted by a list of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum.

The line of the Russian exclusive economic zone is shown on the chart of Central Arctic Basin (admiralty No. 91115), publication of the Department of Navigation and Oceanography of the Russian Ministry of Defense in 2014.

The list of straight baseline points was approved by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 15 January 1985 and published in the book “Maritime Legislation of the Russian Federation” (1994) by the Main Department of Navigation and Oceanography (admiralty No. 9055). An English translation of the said list has been officially handed over to the UN Secretary General and placed on the UN website (see List of straight baseline points 4450 “RUS_1985_Declaration”).

The List contains coordinates of the straight baseline endpoints. The position of the normal baselines adjoining the straight baselines in this document is recorded with the text: “onwards along the low-water line up to the base point …. No.”.

The area of the seabed of the Arctic ocean (Fig. 1), considered in this revised partial submission and relevant to the OLCS determination of the Russian Federation under article 76 of the Convention, covers the geomorphological continental shelf of the Russian Arctic marginal seas, part of the Eurasian basin (Nansen basin and Amundsen, the Gakkel ridgeThe Arctic Ocean seabed area considered in this partial revised Submission that for establishment of the OLCS of the Russian Federation under Article 76 of the Convention includes the geomorphological shelf of the Russian Arctic marginal seas, part of the Eurasian Basin (the Nansen, Amundsen basins and the Gakkel Ridge), and the Central Amerasian Basin consisting of the Makarov Basin and Complex of the Central Arctic Submarine Elevations, which includes the Lomonosov Ridge, Podvodnikov Basin, Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, Mendeleev and Chukchi basins, and Chukchi Plateau.

Partial revised Submission of the Russian Federation on the establishment of the OLCS in the Arctic Ocean proceeds from the scientific understanding that the constituent parts of the Complex of the Central Arctic Submarine Elevations, namely the Lomonosov Ridge, Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, and Chukchi Plateau, and separating them the Podvodnikov and Chukchi Basins have the continental origin and belong to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin under paragraph 6 of Article 76 of the Convention, which are not subject to distance limit of 350 nautical miles from the baselines.

The submitted OLCS line under Article 76 of the Convention in accordance with this partial revised Submission is shown on the schematic map included in the Executive Summary (Fig. 1). A more detailed description of the claimed OLCS is given below in the corresponding section of the Executive Summary.

In accordance with Paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 of the STG, all distances in the partial revised Submission of the Russian Federation for establishment of the OLCS in the Arctic Ocean are given in nautical miles (M) or metres (m).

Many more details and the full Russian document is found here.