Ex-Guantanamo detainee now al Qaeda leader in Yemen

Posted on December 9, 2015December 9, 2015 by Denise Simon

15-12-08 Ibrahim Qosi

Ibrahim al Qosi, an ex-Guantanamo detainee, now serves as a leader and spokesman for al Qaeda in Yemen.By Thomas Joscelyn

LWJ: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a new video featuring a former Guantanamo detainee, Ibrahim Qosi, who is also known as Sheikh Khubayb al Sudani.

In July 2010, Qosi plead guilty to charges of conspiracy and material support for terrorism before a military commission. His plea was part of a deal in which he agreed to cooperate with prosecutors during his remaining time in U.S. custody. Qosi was transferred to his home country of Sudan two years later, in July 2012.

Qosi joined AQAP in 2014 and became one of its leaders. Qosi and other AQAP commanders discussed their time waging jihad at length in the video, entitled “Guardians of Sharia.”

Islamic scholars ensure the “correctness” of the “jihadist project,” according to Qosi. And the war against America continues through “individual jihad,” which al Qaeda encourages from abroad. Qosi also referred to al Qaeda’s policy of encouraging attacks by individual adherents and smaller terror cells. Indeed, AQAP’s video celebrates jihadists who have acted in accordance with this call, such as the Kouachi brothers, who struck Charlie Hebdo’s offices in Paris earlier this year. The Kouachi brothers’ operation was sponsored by AQAP.

The al Qaeda veterans shown in the video emphasized the importance of following the advice of recognized jihadist ideologues. Although AQAP’s men do not mention the Islamic State by name, they clearly have Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s group in mind. Al Qaeda has criticized the Islamic State for failing to follow the teachings of widely respected jihadist authorities, most of whom reject the legitimacy of Baghdadi’s self-declared “caliphate.”

Qosi’s appearance marks the first time he has appeared in jihadist propaganda since he left Guantanamo. His personal relationship with Osama bin Laden and time in American detention make him an especially high-profile spokesman.

A leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat assessment and other declassified files documented Qosi’s extensive al Qaeda dossier. In the threat assessment, dated Nov. 15, 2007, U.S. intelligence analysts described Qosi as a “high” risk to the U.S. and its allies.

“Detainee is an admitted veteran jihadist with combat experience beginning in 1990 and it is assessed he would engage in hostilities against U.S. forces, if released,” JTF-GTMO found.

In 1990, Qosi met two al Qaeda members who recruited him for jihad in Afghanistan.

Qosi was then trained at al Qaeda’s al Farouq camp, which was the terror group’s primary training facility in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. In 1991, Osama bin Laden relocated to Sudan and Qosi followed. He worked as an accountant and treasurer for bin Laden’s front companies, a role he would continue to fill after al Qaeda moved back to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.

JTF-GTMO found that after an attempt on bin Laden’s life in 1994, Qosi was chosen to be a member of the al Qaeda founder’s elite security detail. He was also picked to perform sensitive missions around that time.

For example, Qosi served as a courier and may have delivered funds to the terrorist cell responsible for the June 25, 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Qosi relocated to Chechnya that same year, before returning to bin Laden’s side in Afghanistan some time in 1996 or 1997.

“From 1998 to 2001,” JTF-GTMO’s analysts wrote, Qosi “traveled back and forth between the front lines near Kabul and Kandahar to help with the fight against the Northern Alliance.”

In Dec. 2001, the Pakistanis captured Qosi as he fled the Battle of Tora Bora. He was detained as part of a group dubbed the “Dirty 30” by U.S. intelligence officials. The “Dirty 30” included other members of bin Laden’s bodyguard unit, as well as Mohammed al Qahtani, the would-be 20th hijacker. Qahtani, who was slated to take part in the Sept. 11, 2001 hijackings, had been denied entry into the US just months before.

While detained at Guantanamo in 2003, Qosi was asked why he stayed true to bin Laden for so many years. According to JTF-GTMO, Qosi explained it was his “religious duty to defend Islam and fulfill the obligation of jihad and that the war between America and al Qaeda is a war between Islam and aggression of the infidels.”

Qosi made it clear in AQAP’s new production that he hasn’t changed his opinion in the twelve years since.

Meanwhile, directly after the Paris attacks attack, Obama snuck out several Gitmo detainees.

Five Yemeni detainees moved from Guantanamo Bay to United Arab Emirates hours after Paris attacks

Hours after a crew of suicide bombers ravaged Paris on Friday, the U.S. Defense Department quietly transported five Yemeni detainees who have kept in Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay for nearly 14 years to the United Arab Emirates.

The Pentagon waited until Sunday to reveal it released five inmates from Yemen, the military prison camp’s third-most populous nationality.

The five inmates, Ali Ahmad Muhammad al-Razihi, Khalid Abd-al-Jabbar Muhammad Uthman al-Qadasi, Adil Said al-Hajj Ubayd al-Busays, Sulayman Awad Bin Uqayl al-Nahdi and Fahmi Salem Said al-Asani, were never charged with a crime during their imprisonment.

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter reportedly informed Congress of the transfer more than a month ago, the Miami Herald reported.

It’s unclear if the move was related to Friday’s terrorist attacks in France.

The Emirates is one of nearly two dozen nations that have pitched in to resettle Guantanamo detainees since President Obama pledge to close the naval base in 2009 — though 107 inmates remain behind bars six years after his executive action.

Obama has made no indication he’ll veto a defense policy bill banning Guantanamo detainees from being transferred to the United States despite the Pentagon preliminary assessment picking prisons in Colorado, Kansas and South Carolina to house detainees domestically.

The release was a longtime coming for three of the inmates freed Sunday. Al-Busays, al-Qadasi and al-Nahdi were approved for release during former President George W. Bush’s administration.

Al-Razihi faced the possibility of lifetime imprisonment after being captured among a group of 30 militants, according to documents obtained by Wikileaks detailing the intelligence value and security threat of detainees. He was initially suspected of not only having a role in 9/11, but being a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden.

He was never charged and the Guantanamo Review Task Force approved his release in 2014, the Herald reported.

The same task force approved al-Asani’s release in 2010.

Hey Barack, THIS is NOT Contained

Posted on December 9, 2015December 9, 2015 by Denise Simon

DailyMail: Rapid rise of the death cult: Graphic shows the terrifying spread of ISIS across the globe in just two years as terror groups across South East Asia and Africa queue up to swear allegiance

In the past two years, dozens of groups operating across the globe have sworn loyalty to the barbaric extremists
It includes jihadis in Uzbekistan, the Philippines and low-lying Russia, while sleeper cells have been formed in Africa
Many of the groups have been operating for decades and are responsible for kidnappings, bombings and extortion
Aside from their brutality they have one common goal – the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law

The full scale of Islamic State’s influence can today be laid bare as it’s revealed dozens of terror groups worldwide have pledged their allegiance to the barbaric extremists.

From militia lurking in the jungles of the Philippines to sleeper cells training in the deserts of Libya, a vast array of groups are now claiming to be operating alongside the jihadis’ notorious black and white banner.

It is clear the groups have little in common except their desire to establish their own kingdoms governed by a traditional interpretation of Sharia law. But they are united by one other common principle – they will do anything to realise their goals.

It’s believed more than 40 international groups have pledged their support to ISIS and its ruthless leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (pictured)

Many of the rebel groups operating worldwide have sent fighters to battle with ISIS forces (pictured) in the Middle East, while others simply operate as a symbolic partner.

Among the atrocities to be attributed to these groups is the use of child soldiers, suicide bombings, gangland-style warfare, kidnappings and extortion.

Frighteningly, the vast majority of them have pledged their allegiance to ISIS either this year or in 2014, suggesting the group is enjoying a rapid growth of influence.

In total, a staggering 42 international groups are believed to have offered support or pledged affiliation to ISIS and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, according to the Global Terrorism Index, published last month by the Institute for Economics and Peace.

Some, such as Saudi Arabia’s Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, may be little more than rag-tag groupings of people inspired by the ISIS banner.

But others, such as Nigeria’s Boko Haram or the Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf, have been operating independently for many years and are among multiple well-established groups to swear loyalty to the organisation.

The degree to which these groups are linked to ISIS also varies – some have made only an offer of support or symbolic association. Others are thought to have sent fighters to the Middle East, or are groups established by ISIS that essentially operate as sleeper cells.

Dr Christina Schori Liang, a senior fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, told MailOnline ISIS had simply fostered a brand which was so effective other terror groups wanted to be associated with it.

She said: ‘They appear to others to be very high performance and this increases their legitimacy. If one market dries up they always have others they fall back upon and other terrorist groups can see that.

‘It offers these groups global recognition that they are part of one of the most effective terrorist organisations in the world. It’s just the idea that they’re part of a greater social movement.’

Using methods Dr Liang said were akin to a successful start-up company, ISIS has created its own markets – such as its illicit oil trade – while also spreading itself further to tap into other revenue.

Dr Liang said she feared ISIS and its vast array of affiliates would soon extend beyond their symbolic and ideological ties to start operating like a multinational company.

She explained: ‘It’s kind of like a mafia organisation. Everyone has their own business and if they co-operate more I can see them extending their businesses to one another – so it could enrich them even further.

‘I think of ISIS as always looking for new markets. They may not necessarily get into the [other groups’] market, but will take a piece of the cut.’

Africa

ISIS supporters in Africa include Boko Haram, the deadly Islamic militants operating in Nigeria who made headlines for the mass abduction of schoolgirls in 2014.

Such is the scale of terror the group inflicts on the country’s north-east, Boko Haram was recently named as the deadliest terror group operating today.

Although this requires discounting the estimated 20,000 battlefield deaths caused by ISIS, in terms of sheer acts of terror and wholesale slaughter, the group takes top spot.

Led by the mysterious Abubakar Shekau, the group pledged allegiance to ISIS in March this year. It has been suggested the brutal leader died several years ago but his profile is purposely kept alive as part of the Boko Haram ‘brand’.

The group earned notoriety when it kidnapped several hundred schoolgirls from the city of Chibok, in the country’s north-east. They were forced to convert to Islam and marry members of Boko Haram as slave brides.

Although the Nigerian army has this year recaptured much of the territory seized by Boko Haram in its six-year campaign to carve out an Islamic state, the militants have recently struck back with a surge of deadly raids and suicide bombings.

Some of its latest attacks occurred last month when a string of suicide bombers – now believed to have been children as young as 11 – blew themselves up, killing more than 40 people.

At the weekend, three female suicide bombers attacked a busy market on an island in Lake Chad, leaving at least 27 people dead and 90 injured.

A video posted online in January this year purported to show the leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, issuing a warning to the Cameroon government

The group carries out near-weekly attacks across north-east Nigeria, the latest of which was a series of suicide bombings perpetrated by children

Boko Haram received notoriety last year when it kidnapped several hundred schoolgirls (pictured) from the city of Chibok

Further north, ISIS-inspired splinter cells have been established in Egypt – where ISIS claimed to have destroyed the Russian Metrojet airliner over the Sinai province. Similar operations are thought to be operating in Tunisia, which has suffered three attacks this year, and Libya.

To the east, Sudan’s longstanding Islamic group Al-Attasam belKetab wa al-Sunna announced in July last year it would endorse ISIS.

The organisation broke with Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood in 1991 to establish a stricter Islamic movement. It is another of many groups to have once been aligned to Al-Qaeda, only to switch allegiance as ISIS gained in prominence.

However, ISIS-inspired groups are no longer limited to north African countries. In Mali the rebel group Al-Murabitoon was said to have declared its support for ISIS in May 2015.

This group was formed by the fearsome one-eyed Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who was battle-hardened in the wars against the Soviets in Afghanistan and then against the U.S.-led forces.

However – there remains some dispute about the authenticity of its allegiance after its declaration of support, which consisted of a radio recording, was rejected by Belmokhtar a few days later.

It is likely there is a rift within the organisation and Belmokhtar’s branch of the jihadis may still remain loyal to Al-Qaeda. The organisation claimed responsibility for the Bamako hotel attack last month that left 22 dead.

South East Asia

Just this week, ISIS released a recruitment song in Mandarin aimed at Chinese nationals. However, it’s not entirely clear who the song is directed at.

Insurgents within the country’s ethnic Uyghur population, who are thought to have joined ISIS in the past and are among the country’s 20million-strong Muslim population, do not speak Mandarin.

One of the more far-reaching groups to join the ISIS ranks in recent months is Abu Sayyaf – a small, mobile and deadly terror group which has formed a terrifying reputation within the long-standing Philippines insurgency.

Active across the country’s south, they are only one of many rebel groups attempting to carve out an independent Islamic province in the area.

The group is responsible for atrocities that include kidnapping, rape, extortion and drug trafficking and murder, and in July last year the group pledged allegiance to ISIS. It, like its Middle Eastern compatriots, specialises in kidnapping.

Abu Sayyaf militants are believed to be currently holding nine different hostages, including a Dutch man kidnapped three years ago, two Malaysians and a town mayor.

However, unlike ISIS, which routinely kills those it has taken captive, Abu Sayyaf takes a more practical approach to its kidnappings. They are carried out purely for financial gain, and the terrorists will happily spend several years drawing out negotiations in order to secure a ransom.

In 2004, the group was found to be responsible for the bombing of Superferry 14 – a passenger ship departing the country’s capital of Manila. Some 116 people were killed in the attack, and to date it remains the Philippines’ worst terrorist atrocity.

Although it has been classed as a terrorist organisation by a host of Western countries, Abu Sayyaf treads a fine line between ideological rebellion and criminal enterprise.

Meanwhile, the Bangasamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, led by Ameril Umbra Kato, was formed in 2010 when it broke away from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

It too, like a handful of other groups in the area, wants complete autonomy in the country’s south for a new Islamic state. Its leader and founder Kato died earlier this year from health-related issues – just months after the central government launched an operation to arrest him.

They were said to have pledged support to ISIS in August 2014.

Abu Sayyaf militants wearing bandannas and camouflage fatigues rest in the jungle armed with explosives and machine guns

In 2002, Abu Sayyaf militants took U.S. missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham hostage from a resort in Palawan, in the country’s west. A year later, Filipino army troops conducted a rescue operation in which Mr Burnham was killed

Members of the breakaway Muslim separatist group Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters stand guard on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. The group pledged its support to ISIS in August 2014

The group’s leader and founder Ameril Umbrakato (third from right) died earlier this year from health-related issues

Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (pictured), a rebel group operating in Indonesia, is thought to be the first in the country to swear loyalty to ISIS

Other groups in the country to have declared support for the Middle Eastern jihadis include Ansar al-Khilafah in the Philippines and Ma’rakat al-Ansar.

Next door, Indonesia’s feared Abu Wardah Santoso – the leader of the self-declared Mujahideen Indonesia Timor – remains his country’s most wanted man. According to local media, his group is believed to be Indonesia’s first to swear loyalty to ISIS and is responsible for killing civilians and several of the country’s anti-terror officers.

The third major terror organisation in the area linked to ISIS is Jemaah Islamiah – the group responsible for the 2002 Bali Bombings which killed 202 people.

While it has refrained from openly swearing loyalty or allegiance to its Middle Eastern counterparts, authorities believe the two organisations have close links and there may be up to 200 Indonesian or Malaysian members operating in Syria and Iraq.

Formed in Malaysia in the 1990s while its founders were seeking refuge from the Suharto dictatorship, it has a history of fostering operational links with other jihadi groups within the region.

The Middle East

Unsurprisingly, ISIS enjoys far reaching support closer to its self-declared caliphate in Syria and Iraq. This includes affiliates in Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The strength of many of these groups is difficult to determine, and some may be small clusters of ISIS-inspired jihadis, rather than organised terror cells.

However, its reach also extends much further north – to the lower reaches of Russia, where Islamic insurgencies battling Putin have switched over to join ISIS’s global enterprise.

ISIS in the Caucasus Province was created in June this year and lies in south-west Russia, amid a brewing insurgency Putin has battled for years in and around Chechnya.

Some have stated it is no surprise a group has been formed in the region. While it has a history of Islamic insurgency, ISIS is known to cherish the ferocity of the Chechen fighters within its ranks and they are considered prized recruits among the battalions fighting in Syria and Iraq.

Similar to some of the ISIS operations underway in north Africa, it appears to have been established solely as an ISIS cell and was not in existence in a different form prior to this.

However, its leader Rustam Asildarov was recruited from Vilayat Dagestan – a jihadi group created during the Second Chechen War.

It lays claim to areas surrounding Dagestan, Georgia and Chechnya, as well as a handful of provinces in Russia’s south that stretch up to Sochi where the 2014 Winter Olympics were held.

To its east in northern Afghanistan and Pakistan lies a group named the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Operating in the far northern reaches of the countries, and originally emanating from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the group in previous years has been closely allied to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

But this changed midway through 2015 when its leadership publicly switched its allegiance to ISIS.

It is the first Central Asian jihadi group to declare its allegiance to ISIS, though it is not clear if it is the same group referred to as ‘ISIS in the Kohrasan Province’.

This is the moment the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, now based around Afghanistan and Pakistan, publicly swore allegiance to ISIS

While its formative years in the 1990s were focused on establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, it has since spread south to combat Pakistani authorities and Western forces in Afghanistan.

The group was designated a terrorist organisation by the U.S. more than a decade ago for its links to Al-Qaeda and due to several high profile kidnappings.

It made headlines after taking a group of Japanese scientists hostage in 1999, and the following year four U.S. mountain climbers were captured. They later managed to escape.

Since 2012 it has been headed by Usman Ghazi when he succeeded a commander killed in a US drone strike.

In recent years the group has been linked to suicide bombings and several gun battles with authorities throughout the Central Asia region, while it also stands accused of drug smuggling. Last year it claimed responsibility for the attack on Karachi airport in Pakistan which killed 39 people.

Early this year, it released a video showing a beheading. Their victim was believed to have been one of 31 people they took hostage from a bus in Afghanistan.

Groups allied to the jihadis have also surfaced in the Gaza Strip – where their main target remains Israel. The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem was formed three or four years ago.

Compared to many other organisations, it declared its support for ISIS relatively early, in February 2014. Six months later, it had been designated a terrorist organisation by the U.S. for its rocket and IED attacks on Israel.

And in Saudi Arabia, a shadowy group calling itself Supporters of the Islamic State in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques has sworn its allegiance to ISIS.

Though Saudi Arabia has been subjected to ISIS-inspired attacks, it remains unclear how organised the group is, and whether it has received official backing from ISIS.

Last year the group claimed responsibility for the attack on Karachi airport in Pakistan, which killed 39 people

Originally emanating from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was another group to have once been aligned to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda

ISIS Master Plan Documents Located

Posted on December 8, 2015December 8, 2015 by Denise Simon

The Isis papers: a masterplan for consolidating power

24-page document, translated here, outlines principles for governing territory under the group’s control and strategy for becoming a viable state

Islamic State exercise training camp, northern Iraq. — Boys known as the ‘caliphate cubs’ hold rifles and Islamic State flags as they exercise at a training camp in Tal Afar, near Mosul, northern Iraq. Photograph: AP

Monday 7 December 2015 06.11 EST Last modified on Monday 7 December 2015 08.55 EST

Islamic State

Caliphate on the prophetic methodology

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful:

“No, by your Lord, they will not believe until they have you rule over them in what they have disagreed and find in themselves from what you have judged and willingly submit.”

Principles in the administration of the Islamic State – 1435AH [2103-2014]

Introduction

In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful

As for what follows:

After 50 years of jihad whose sides have fallen prostrate in the totality of the land, and the states gathered against the centres of the Sunni jihad in the world, God ennobled his true soldiers whom he selected to establish the caliphate state whose fortresses had fallen at the hands of global Zionism in al-Astana [Istanbul] 100 years ago. [Note: This is a reference to the end of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924].

Indeed the establishment of the Islamic State, its concept does not stand on the basis of a mujahid soldier fighting and bearing his arms, nor does it rest on da’wa [evangelising] in a mosque or a street, but rather it is a comprehensive system requiring the leaders of the ummah [Muslim nation] to realise its concepts.

So on the expansion of the Islamic State, the state requires an Islamic system of life, a Qur’anic constitution and a system to implement it, and there must not be suppression of the role of qualifications, skills of expertise and the training of the current generation on administering the state.

From the start of the uprising of blessed Syria against the Nusayris [derogatory for Alawites], the mujahideen came in great numbers out of zeal for their religion. But some of them harboured Arab nationalist and tribalist arrogance, and others a zeal and will without shari’a aims.

But it was inevitable that there would be an organisation of these numbers and their principles as a shari’i [Islamically legitimate] organisation accepting the current reality that the world marshalled against it from its soldiers and intelligence services.

And from then there would be the confrontation of altering the principles and selling out to which the first mujahideen [fighters] did not show deference in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and elsewhere.

And from then there would be the cultivation of educational and societal change with which the muhajireen [immigrants] co-existed and organisation of their ranks with the ansar [natives] – the people of the land.

And there were many challenges and difficulties that one would have to deal with according to its establishment and according to its special ideological programme, and one must deal with each one of them on an individual basis.

Chapter one

Announcement of the Islamic Caliphate

The announcement of the renewal of the caliphate in Iraq in the year 1427AH [2006] was the arbiter between division and separation as well as the glory of the Muslims. That year was tantamount to the hemiplegia for the idolatrous west that began preparing equipment and projects to strike any project of the Islamic State, and the announcement of the caliphate.

And the announcement of the caliphate was the result of the mujahideen’s realising the lack of advantage in fighting against the idolaters without the existence of a leader and caliph who could gather the Muslims under his banner and be a figure of strength for them.

America and its allies were able to destroy the caliphate project [ie the Islamic State of Iraq] to a great extent in Iraq after they established the Sunni Iraqi Sahwa forces [Sunni Awakening tribal forces that fought the Islamic State of Iraq] and struck the Sunni nursemaid [ie basis of Sunni support for the Islamic State of Iraq], by portraying it as a treacherous terrorist state of hypocritical political projects, with great marshalling of the media to accomplish that. The deeds of the soldiers of the state thus became limited to security operations to strike American targets and their allies.

After the arising of the blessed uprising of Syria, the Islamic State had a great role in striking the Nusayris in it and destroying the pillars of the rule of Assad in the heart of the command centres.

And it has therefore been the case that the lesson to be learned from the prior leaders of the state is the way to benefit from prior mistakes, and the means to preserve the revolutionaries of Syria on the jihadi trend while not moulding them in a western framework which that western support brings.

And in the second chapter is a statement on the administration of the muhajir (foreign) mujahid in particular and developing the creed of the Islamic State among the ansar in Syria.

The announcement of the caliphate in Syria was a powerful blow that the agents of the west who were set on the direction of the Sahwat of Iraq by whom the west thought that it could put an end to the Islamic caliphate project as it had weakened it in Iraq did not expect.

There were new modified problems that the leadership of the state was able to deal with, among them [Abu Muhammad] al-Joulani, [Note: the leader of al-Qaida in Syria formerly of Islamic State] announcement of his rejection of joining the Islamic State despite his allegiance to the caliph in Iraq, and in that he was trying to split the ranks and sabotage the project in subordination to his personal agendas bound with regional states, and his rejection was a confrontation for the Islamic project that God gave victory to despite the multitude of those discouraged and the callers to humiliation and servitude.

And the one who witnesses the events of Syria sees how God has given might to the Islamic State and lowered Joulani and those with him.

Chapter two

Organisation of the individual and group

With the entry of the second year of the uprising of Syria, the Shia militias of various nationalities entered Syria to fight at the side of the Nusayri-Rafidite [Assad] regime which flaunted its crimes with regards to the Sunnis, which led to a global Islamic uprising represented in the hijra [migration] of thousands of Muslim youths to fight in the rank of the Sunnis from the various regions of the land.

Thousands migrated to Syria to fight alongside the mujahideen, without their knowing the direction of any faction, its affiliation or private agendas.

It was necessary to prepare a sound programme in which the muhajireen might take refuge as their jihad is the result of the glory to Islam and the monotheists.

So the announcement of the caliphate was the obligation that gathers those arriving in the land of jihad, strengthens their hearts – and through it their minds are set – and gathers them over the difference of their colours under one banner, one word and one caliph

The majority of the first muhajireen came from the Gulf states and the Arabic Maghreb whose zeal for their religion urged them on, and among them were those with zeal for their Arab Sunni brothers without religious jihadist inhibition, and without there being for them prior expertise in global jihadi organisations.

After them was hijra [migration] from the states of the world after the announcement of the caliphate, as no disbelieving state has remained which hasn’t also suffered from the hijra [migration] of its youth to support the Islamic State which the soldiers of Joulani and the apostate Sahwa forces from the Free [Syrian] Army and others besides them rejected.

And after that, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ordered to establish a first camp which included the new muhajireen [immigrants] who had no deeply ingrained expertise and creed, near the prior borders for the Sykes-Picot “Iraq-Syria” lines.

And the camp included the organisation of the muhajir [immigrant] individual in the Islamic State and laying aside local tribalism and ignorance before him, and making his affiliation to the religion alone and under one banner.

And the camp included nurturing the spirit of the brothers between the muhajireen and the ansar through laying aside the prior identity for the muhajir, and making him a resident in the Islamic State with his family without feelings of estrangement or distinguishing between him and his brothers from the muhajireen and the ansar.

And without Islam it is not possible for this change to be included which encountered difficulty in the beginning on account of place affiliation that the mujahideen felt on the day of their fight with the Free Army Sahwa and inclinations of nationalism and ethnic division which was making the muhajir lose his zeal to fight alongside them.

And there resulted from the camp the formation of joint fighting groups between the muhajireen and the ansar established on the basis of the leadership of the individual most capable of bearing responsibility, having prior expertise and the military and sharia [law] tests of the camp.

And there also resulted from the camp the formation of groups composed of the muhajireen from the western states in particular in view of the difficulty of linguistic communication in the beginning and launch stage and in view of the mutual understanding and precedence of coordination between some of the muhajireen from Chechnya and France to fight in single cells without the existence of any distinction for members from those besides them [ie there was no differential treatment on the basis of ethnic identity].

And it was inevitable that Arabic character should precede over the character of the muhajireen, for the language of the Qur’an is Arabic, and the prophetic hadiths [sayings] are in Arabic and the customs of Islamic society were Arabic in great part, and in view of the nature of the local society of the peoples of Syria it was inevitable that Arabic character should be cultivated in the language and religious culture in the muhajireen and laying aside the foreign identity that bears in its hidden nature hostility to Islam, its culture and its roots.

For unifying the life of the mujahid and his language and culture is the guarantor for unifying the rank of the mujahideen and realising their total belonging in the Islamic State that includes muhajireen from every corner of the earth.

Chapter three

Administration of the camps

The preparatory camp is the first home and school of the mujahid in which his military and jihadi training sessions take place and he undergoes sufficient education in matters of his religion, life and jihad.

And according to the plans of the Islamic State to nurture the caliphate generation, the camps are divided into three types:

1. Continuation camps

And these are special camps for the mujahideen who lead in the jihad and those who are masters of expertise in managing and planning the battle in beginning and end. And the camp includes physical preparation for 15 days. And that is in a training session every year, and the mujahid through that camp comes upon the latest arts of using weapons, military planning and military technologies currently put forth in battles and weapons whose use by the enemy are anticipated, along with detailed commentary on the technologies of enemy use of the weapons, areas of their use, their strength and how the soldiers of the state can take advantage of them.

2. First preparation camps

For the mujahid on the day he joins the Islamic State, whether as a muhajir or from the ansar: and the camp includes sharia sessions through which the mujahid studies the fiqh [jurisprudence] of the rulings, Islamic doctrine, al-wala’ and al-bara’ [loyalty and disavowal], in addition to the arts of fighting and the arts of using weapons, with screening of every mujahid in a specialty in which he excels and completing his camp according to his skill in specific weapons.

3. Preparation camp for children

The camp includes sharia sessions in fiqh of doctrine and rulings, with special sessions in Islamic society and manners, and training on bearing light arms and the principles of use.

Outstanding individuals are selected from them for security portfolio assignments, including checkpoints, patrols and the various Amniyat units [internal security units].

And the camps administration is responsible for planning, aims and results, and as the results of the camp should be in alignment with the aims and principles of the Islamic State, it has been necessary to establish a centre for the administration of the camps whose tasks are as follows:

1. Preparing special sharia sessions in the camps in coordination with the al-Buhuth and al-Eftaa [fatwa – legal opinion] committee.

2. Preparing educational programmes to teach the Arabic language and recitation of the Qur’an in coordination with the Diwan al-Ta’aleem [department of education] for every province.

3. Preparing military programmes teaching the types of weapons and military tactics with the supervision of the military commander in every province.

4. Studying expenditures and allowances for every camp whose study and analysis are to be completed by the military leader or wali [governor] of every area according to the needs connected with every wilaya [province] and submitting the study to the wali.

5. Overseeing the selection of the educational and training staff in the camp.

6. Putting in place detailed planning and programmes on the course of the battle.

7. Tracking the supervision of the camp according to the defined programmes.

8. Assessing the camp session and raising a report to the officials concerning the readiness of the session after the camp.

Chapter four

Direction administration

The mujahid [soldier] remains in need of direction and tracking after his completion of the special training session for him, for spiritual direction is the foundation of his success in every matter he undertakes and the mujahid’s direction in every stage will consist of reminding him of the aims of the Islamic State and hadiths [prophetic sayings] on the virtue of the mujahid and persevering and continuing despite the difficulty of the path of jihad.

1. Direction before the battle

And here the military commander for the mission or the sharia official accompanying him should undertake it, and the direction should be a little before the launching of the mujahid to battle through mentioning hadiths on the virtue of jihad and endurance on encountering the enemy as well as following the decisions and instructions of the field commander during the battle, along with the virtue of martyrdom in the path of God to raise the banner of Islam and the caliphate and the virtue of the one struck with wounds in the land of the battle. All this should be done during the readying and preparation for the battle. And the director oversees the mujahideen in all their moments until their absence from him in the battle.

And the director should not be discouraged, having doubts, hesitating or cowardly because he is the example that the mujahid summons whenever the furnace of the battle flares up.

2. Direction after the battle:

In the event of victory, the director summons what came from the Prophet from sayings on the virtue of the mujahid and their feelings that what they have accomplished aspires to be in the service of their religion and creed, with their being reminded to embrace the instructions coming from the battle leadership from the rulings of spoils and not adopting any decision to plunder the wealth of the people except by its rights and by explicit order from the commander responsible.

In the event of being broken, the direction should be on patience, reckoning and steadfastness on meeting the enemy while not heeding those having doubts and those who spread rumour and terror in the ranks of the soldiers.

3. Lasting direction:

Remaining on activity and steadfastness with the mujahid in all his states and lessons in al-wala and al-bara [loyalty and disavowal] as well as fiqh, Islamic creed and listening to and obeying the amir [leader].

The staff of direction in every province should be from the cream of the crop of free sharia and military officials who have the ability to argue, convince and encourage as well as from the soldiers around whom the group have congregated and should be possessors of confidence among them.

Chapter five

Organisation of the provinces

The Sykes-Picot agreement and after them the indirect rule of the west over the states of Islam tried to place administrative borders drawing social, madhhabist and ethnic differences in every region, and deepening the roots of the differences between the Sunni Muslims.

Thus the distinction of the Sunnis from the Shia in the provinces of Iraq and oversight of the centres of administration in every Sunni region, and even the appointment of officials in the Sunnis’ regions from the filth of the Rafidites have been clear, while the regions have been entrusted under the rule of [their own] Kurdish and Shia sects independent in decision-making from the ruling presidency as we have seen in Kirkuk and Irbil and in even smaller regions including from them in the cursed Najaf and Karbala and that have enjoyed “religious” administrative independence, unannounced.

All those divisions have also forbidden the Sunnis from the simplest of their rights while making the Nusayris masters of the sea, and the Shia in Iraq the kings of oil and the merchant pathways, and the Yazidi Kurds the sheikhs of the mountains while the Druze have become masters over the mountains overseeing Israel.

All that has not merely been a coincidence, but it was a dirty political decision in order to implement a tightening stranglehold on the Sunnis and make them the most remote people and strip them of all assets for advancement or thinking of a rightly-guided Islamic State.

If we were to see today the borders of the Islamic State and the borders of the Sunnis regions, we would see them torn apart, besieged and persecuted, for there are the Shia from the south of Iraq, the Nusayris from the west of Syria and the communist Kurdish parties to their north, and the Druze to their south.

So it is no surprise that today we see the bloodshed flowing in the land of Syria and Iraq.

So it has been from the law and sound mind to redraw the borders of the provinces and give lengthy consideration to every development that occurs in the region. Thus we protect the power of the Sunnis and strengthen its expansion and focal points, and then special teams can be deployed for fundamental change in the structuring of the regions that are subject to the rule of the Islamic State.

And that was what the companions [of the Prophet Muhammad] and after them the caliphs pursued against every heretic community: that is, dispersing their groupings so there no longer remained any impeding opinion, strength or ability, and the Muslim alone remains the master of the state and decision-making and no one is in conflict with him.

And in what there is no doubt is the fact that among the assets of the ummah [Islamic nation] are: its wealth, the nature of its land, its inhabitants and its water. And in everything is distinction:

1. Wealth of the state

It is the principal component and source of financing for all internal and external operations, and the existence of secure financial resources whose value does not change in every time and place is a must – and the need of the people for them should be clear with the nations unable to do without them despite the existence of the impediments that prevent their use and purchase from the land of the state.

This includes oil and gas and what the land possesses including gold as currency that does not deteriorate or decline, as well as trade routes from which they have no wealth and all of it should be the intervention of the Islamic State as a powerful side in all their plans and such that they cannot pretend that it has no existence and might.

2. The nature of its land

The state cannot remain without the existence of the land that allows for its continuation and expansion, for the assets of the land are – the mountains, the agricultural lands, the sea and the river – for these natural assets are what makes the Islamic State acquire its importance and the importance of location, and the agreement of the west in Sykes-Picot were established on the basis of depriving the Sunnis from those assets, as the mountains were granted to the Kurds, Druze and Alawites, while the sea was granted to the Rafidites and Nusayris, while the river and what surrounds it in investment for the Jews and the agricultural lands under their administration.

And that was a new setback that was added to all the ambitions in establishing the Islamic State and freeing it from servitude of the filthy Nusayris and the disbelieving Rafidites [Alawites and Shia]. When there is no asset for them the enemy have been shut on their openings from every side.

3. The traitorous governments have tried to mislead the Sunni peoples in every Arab land, as corrupt programmes were introduced for them and there spread among them the love of vice, bonds, bribery, usury and abandoning worship and forgetting the rulings of jihad. So the Sunnis in Syria have lived in a new ignorance after ignorance during the French occupation of their land as there was the Alawite government that planted its vices in every house, permitted the forbidden and made forbidden development and civilisation.

But after the uprising undertaken by the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria and their getting rid of the servitude to the tyrants began the second plan that requires implementing the “demographic” change in their regions and expelling the Sunnis from their areas, for it has been what we saw in Fallujah, Aleppo, Homs, Tikrit and other areas besides them from the regions of the Sunnis many of whose people have suffered during their presence in their land.

Indeed they realise that the Islamic State cannot renew the ummah’s blood without a human member capable of always producing, and there was the alluring of the best of its youth and plundering the land with hijra outside their areas and liquidating many of them.

And today it is necessary to have a studied plan that responds in kind and brings about like change in the profane abode of disbelief, expelling its people and killing its people until there is no base for them and the land is for God and his servants.

And in turn implementing the plans that include the return of the Muslim youth to their land and bringing together the skills from the land of the Muslims, and the going out of the state for specialised staff in their fields if they are not of those of the pact in Islam [ie Jews and Christians].

Chapter six

Administration of wealth

Indeed the might of the Islamic State can only be through its being free entirely from all bonds of tyranny that the west possesses as means of leverage against it, and it moves them according to its need and whim based on knowing from it the need of the mujahideen for support, wealth and weapons.

Jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria have lived through long bonds of humiliation pledged on conditional western support, until they seized wide areas of the land and possessed all assets of advancement.

And all of that is on account of the ignorant administration that controls them and keeps them under western guardianship for all their activities, wars and expansion.

Indeed the Islamic State’s seizure of vast areas includes all assets of advancement that does not suffice without the existence of an administration managing the interests and managing the crises. So it is necessary for a plan to be put in place including the might of the state and its independence as we specify in the following points:

– Preserving the capabilities [personnel and infrastructure] that managed the production projects under the prior governments, whilst taking into account the need to place strict oversights and an administration affiliated with the Islamic State.

– Placing specialists in accounting and oversight over all production directorates in the Islamic State including establishments of oil, gas, archaeological areas and factories for manufacturing and production.

– Preserving additional reserves that ensure the continuation of operation in one successive arrangement in all circumstances.

– Regulating expenses through a comprehensive administration including collective expenses and collective production without singling out a province or group by provision of estimates exceeding their needs in normal circumstances.

– Establishing factories for local military and food production and independence from the monopoly of arms dealers for materials of necessity and cutting them off in the event of contravening the interests.

– Realising local needs and providing for them within the borders of the state in isolated safe zones and connecting trade routes inside the state through principal centres and beneficiary wings.

– Reducing excess expenditure through the administration of the province; it must operate independently and be able to take its own decisions in matters concerning the province.

– Relying on external business as a principal source of income through the openings of the state to the other side without an intermediary. Direct exchange has better guarantees than the monopoly of the intermediary for business transactions and means of connection.

Chapter seven

Administration of the projects

In parallel with military preparation in the lines of fighting and the camps, a committee is to be put in place to administer production projects and put in place plans to implement new investment projects.

The one who invests in the lands of the state is to be given comprehensive protection according to the agreement that arises with the observance of the interests of the Islamic State in production, exporting and prices.

The independence of the investor from the administration of the province is a more preferred means for the administration of the wealth, increasing local production and improving the capability of the producing material, and regulating the time and expenditure. And it will [also] be a better guarantee against losses resulting from any sizeable investment project.

For the independent foundation is outside the limits of liability that arise for those projects that are affiliated with a province of the Islamic State.

And it is not right for the investor according to the law, to hand over the production to those who have no right to it and they [those who have the right to it] are the ones determined in an agreement by the administration that is entrusted over the project and overseeing its organisation by the province in which the project is established.

And such an agreement is stipulated on determining the beneficiaries and the means of profit with the guarantee of the [Islamic] State to convey the products internally to the borders of the Islamic State without exposing them to any risk.

And it is not allowed to invest in the following projects:

1. Oil products

It is not allowed for a person who has no pledge of allegiance on his neck to the caliph to invest in an oil or gas field or what has arisen from their trajectory, but it is allowed besides that to produce derivatives after buying the crude products from the fields of the Islamic State, just as it is allowed to sell and deal in them inside and outside the state.

2. Gold and antiquities

It is not allowed to excavate for gold and antiquities except by expressed agreement from the resources department, and all transferred and stored materials will be confiscated for the interest of the treasury.

And it is allowed to deal in gold not excavated from the ground according to the well-known aharia frameworks with immediate effect.

3. Weapons

It is forbidden to establish factories to produce weapons and materials particular to them without granting of any explicit permits for the situation, just as it is forbidden to establish shops to sell public weapons besides personal weapons and deal in them without prior knowledge and agreement from the responsible military amir in the wilaya.

As for the other principal goods that also come under the crux of people’s lives, the officials must know about all means of operation and production like dealing in water, flour and livestock.

Chapter eight

Administration of education

Education is the foundation upon which Islamic society is built, and it is the division that makes the Muslims differ in their lives from the rest of the paths of disbelief.

The previous Ba’athist and Shia governments tried to deviate the Muslim generation from their path through their educational programmes that concord with their governments and political whims.

The programmes focused on glorifying the ruling authorities and discarding differences between sects, stripping Sunnis of their identity.

And among the most important of their goals were:

1. Focusing on glorifying and eternalising the leaders and taking refuge in God and inserting them into hidden shirk [idolatry] through immortalising ephemeral, temporary personalities.

2. Spreading the aims of their parties and their ideas whilst distancing the nurtured from Islamic thought, because the ruling party considers itself the pulse of society and the symbol of its endurance, while Islamic principles are for the mosque only and between man and his Lord with severe proceedings against all those who tried to do away with party thinking or modify it.

3. Discarding the difference with the disbelieving sects, and considering co-existence with them as the true societal bond that the ummah must operate in accordance with in order to preserve its goals, while in reality protection is implemented for the rights of all the communities of disbelief while oppressing the Sunnis and their principles.

4. Spreading the culture of moral dissolution by promoting it through expressions of civilisation and exchanges of cultures with the west.

And thus it was that the ummah entered into labyrinths of confusion that made it forget its glory, its strength and its past, while the prior Islamic caliphates were portrayed as being a foreign occupation that arose on the basis of ignorance and the decline of the ummah and nationalism.

– And among the aims of the Islamic programme in the Islamic State:

1. Implanting Islamic values in society as well as sound, sharia-based societal manners and customs.

2. Correcting the erroneous narrations that the prior programmes had implanted about the prior caliphs and imams.

3. Developing Islamic society on the basis of manners and on sharia.

4. Raising a knowledgeable Islamic generation capable of bearing the ummah and its future without needing the expertises of the west.

So it is also that the Islamic school is one of the houses of worship, whose aims are confined to acquiring knowledge also, but also it is an educational nurturing ground that raises the individual with comprehensive development of mind and body.

And in it there should be training facilities for mind, body and vocation, as successful programmes cannot rely on what is written between the lines, without practical training on all given subjects.

Also it is the case that the interest in the Arabic language and its use in daily life for the individual is an important matter in the Islamic State as is distancing from vulgar expressions that were put forward in society in a well-considered plan to guarantee the forgetting of the Islamic identity for society.

Chapter nine

Administration of relations

External relations are the first foundation for building every nascent state, and they are among the foundations that show the strength and might of the state. They should constitute for it a general stance in everything that happens in the world with the people of Islam and be for it an external hand protecting its dealings.

And the Prophet (peace be upon him) was considered the master of the global Islamic message; it was necessary for him to be acquainted with what was happening around him in the neighbouring states, and knowing their latest affairs and thus inviting them to Islam. And indeed the messenger (God’s peace and blessings be upon him and his family) established his proficiency and skill in external movements through viewing at a distance and personifying the just of the just, and appropriate evaluation of matters as well as outstanding ability in the operation of recruiting to Islam.

Indeed external relations are key to knowing the international politics surrounding the Islamic State, and alliances should be as a guarantee of force and leverage that the Islamic leadership can use in all its matters with the external world.

According to sharia politics, the leadership is not allowed to adopt decisions to ally with a state or implement an agreement with it if that violates sharia politics, as agreed on by the majority of ulama [religious scholars] and symbols of jihad. So indeed every agreement must include the following:

1. The internal sovereignty of the Islamic State and not allowing for other states to intervene in matters of Islamic rule or the general politics of the Islamic State.

2. Protecting the borders of the Islamic State from every mushrik [idolater], disbeliever, aggressor and even friend, for no army or other force is allowed to enter the borders of the Islamic State whatever the pretext.

3. A provision that the [Islamic] State should be witness to good treatment of Muslims in its lands and mutual affection with Muslims in other areas of the world, and that it is not allowed to deal with another state that has a history of hostility to Islam’s spread, the building of mosques and oppression of Muslims in its lands.

4. A provision that the agreement should first be in the interest of the Muslims, not in the interest of the disbelievers.

5. That the agreement should not include any future provisions touching on the freedom and sovereignty of the Muslim state, and no bonds of debt or conditions of harmful exploitation even if in the future with regards to the matters of the state.

6. That there should be for the Muslims their rights and freedoms within the state that is to enter into an agreement with us.

7. That all points of the agreement should be clear to the imam [the caliph] and those with him.

And in the event of the nullification of any one of the conditions or lack of their provision, it is not allowed for the imam to enter the ummah and the Muslims into dubious bonds that oppress the ummah and the fate of its development.

Chapter ten

Administration of media

Indeed everything that I have previously mentioned constitutes practical steps on the ground and [so] there must be a principal means to promote them that should be comprehensive. All of its ideas and activities should be advertised in the interest of the aforementioned practical steps. That will not be realised without media foundations that are branched out and comprehensive in operation within one administration and background.

So there should be one media foundation branched out within multiple pockets according to the following outline:

1. The Base Foundation:

To be directly affiliated with the Diwan al-Khilafa [office of the caliph] or Majlis al-Shura [advisory council] of whoever so represents them, and the official for it should be connected by his relations with the military commander, [chief] security official and the caliph himself. The office will put implement the main media principles and tasks and it should be supervising the distribution of the media offices in the provinces and the media foundations that take a name and are independent from the administration of the provinces [ie so-called auxiliary agencies and foundations mentioned below].

And the Base Foundation defines the priorities of publication and broadcasting as well as the media campaigns, just as it directly supervises through a committee the activities of the offices and undertakes inspection campaigns in the provinces and activist places.

The foundation also sets the preparation of media staff, their expenses and requirements and receives monthly reports on the activities of every office.

2. The provincial media

And in every province there should be a media office affiliated with the governor himself and in coordination with the military and security official in its region, and its director should be in direct contact with the media official in the Base Foundation.

And among the offices’ tasks are covering the military operations and their results, with issues concluding the end of every great military operation or distinguished operations for the soldiers of the state, as well as services’ facilities, implementing sharia rulings and the course of life in the province.

Also the office should be interested in implementing tasks of printing and distribution or supervising them within the province.

3. Auxiliary agencies and foundations:

It is suggested that production foundations or auxiliary agencies are established according to the mother office’s needs and interests.

The auxiliary office specialises in tracking military and services coverage in a province or number of provinces without there being in the name of the foundation or its symbol something to directly link it with the Islamic State.

The auxiliary foundations are not to be allowed to cover security operations or implementations of [judicial] rulings.

These are general suggestions placed for you by the poor slave of God, the servant of the Islamic State, in order to be a lighthouse by which there is guidance, as well as general and prompt systems of organisation.

And the administrative cadres will receive training sessions on operating according to the following programme.

Abu Abdullah al-Masri.

Islamic State blueprint

ISIS Speaks Mandarin? Threatening Who Now?

Posted on December 8, 2015December 8, 2015 by Denise Simon

Remember when during the Bush administration, we captured enemy combatants on the battlefield that were known as Uighurs? They were sent to Gitmo and under Barack Obama they were released? Remember when only in recent weeks that Barack Obama said that Islamic State was contained?

How to Say ‘Islamic State’ in Mandarin

ForeignPolicy: New Chinese-language propaganda seems to ignore Uighurs, the group Beijing says has the most terrorist connections.

On Dec. 6, the Islamic State released a slick recording of a Mandarin Chinese-language song glorifying jihad, in what seems to be a direct attempt to recruit Chinese Muslims to the terrorist group’s cause. “Awaken, Muslim brothers! Now is the time to wake up,” proclaims the song in Chinese. “It’s our dream to die on this battlefield.”

Although the Islamic State recording is — horrifyingly — catchy, it is unlikely to make it far on the Chinese-language Internet. The nation’s ruling Chinese Communist Party enforces strict online censorship, filtering in real time posts that it deems destabilizing or overtly critical of the government.

The Islamic State has targeted China on several occasions. In July 2014, Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi called out China as a country that oppresses its Muslims. In December 2014, the Chinese state-run Global Times reported that 300 Uighurs, a largely Muslim Turkic-speaking ethnic minority that mostly lives in the northwest Chinese region of Xinjiang, had left China to join the militant organization, though there is no way to verify that statistic. And on Nov. 18, the Islamic State announced that it had executed its first Chinese hostage, a Beijing native named Fan Jinghui.

But this new recruitment effort indicates that the Islamic State is not just interested in Uighurs, but in all of China’s Muslims, including the Hui, Chinese speakers whose features are often indistinguishable from the majority Han ethnic group. It’s unlikely this latest song is actually attempting to recruit Uighurs, many of whom speak Mandarin poorly or not at all, particularly those in Xinjiang’s rural southern regions.

Chinese authorities have put particular blame for extremist violence within the country on Uighur separatists, a group that has often chafed under what many feel to be the imposition of Mandarin on their culture and historic homeland. The Chinese government has sought to connect the simmering insurgency among some Uighurs in Xinjiang with international terrorism and more recently with the Islamic State. After November attacks in Paris killed 130 and wounded hundreds, including one Chinese citizen, Beijing called on Western powers to recognize Xinjiang, and recent violent attacks in several cities throughout China, as an important front in the global war on terror. Beijing has denounced the failure of Western countries to do so as a “double standard” on terrorism.

Outside observers and Uighur advocacy groups maintain, however, that the Chinese government conflates dissidents and separatists with terrorists, and Chinese authorities have not publicly released evidence establishing a direct connection between high-profile domestic attacks within China and outside terrorist organizations.

THE Smoking Gun Email on Benghazi

Posted on December 8, 2015December 8, 2015 by Denise Simon

Some things speak for themselves, this is one of them and timing is everything. It is now a proven fact, the natural order of business by Barack Obama, his inner circle and the same with Hillary Clinton is to lie and obstruct investigations and justice. Now, the consequence? That is up to us…..we have demands to make here in retribution for death and dishonesty. What say you?

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JudicialWatch-obtained email: DoD had forces ready on 9/11/12 “assuming principals agree.” Guess they didn’t.

New Benghazi Email Shows DOD Offered State Department “Forces that Could Move to Benghazi” Immediately – Specifics Blacked Out in New Document

“They are spinning up as we speak.” U.S. Department of Defense Chief of Staff Jeremy Bash Tuesday, September 11, 2012, 7:19 PM

(Washington, DC) – Judicial Watch today released a new Benghazi email from then-Department of Defense Chief of Staff Jeremy Bash to State Department leadership immediately offering “forces that could move to Benghazi” during the terrorist attack on the U.S. Special Mission Compound in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012. In an email sent to top Department of State officials, at 7:19 p.m. ET, only hours after the attack had begun, Bash says, “we have identified the forces that could move to Benghazi. They are spinning up as we speak.” The Obama administration redacted the details of the military forces available, oddly citing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption that allows the withholding of “deliberative process” information.

Bash’s email seems to directly contradict testimony given by then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2013. Defending the Obama administration’s lack of military response to the nearly six-hour-long attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Panetta claimed that “time, distance, the lack of an adequate warning, events that moved very quickly on the ground prevented a more immediate response.”

The first assault occurred at the main compound at about 9:40 pm local time – 3:40 p.m. ET in Washington, DC. The second attack on a CIA annex 1.2 miles away began three hours later, at about 12 am local time the following morning – 6 p.m. ET.

The newly released email reads:

From: Bash, Jeremy CIV SD [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 11, 2012 7:19 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Sherman, Wendy R; Nides, Thomas R
Cc: Miller, James HON OSD POLICY; Wienefeld, James A ADM JSC VCJCS; Kelly, John LtGen SD; martin, dempsey [REDACTED]
Subject: Libya

State colleagues:

I just tried you on the phone but you were all in with S [apparent reference to then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton].

After consulting with General Dempsey, General Ham and the Joint Staff, we have identified the forces that could move to Benghazi. They are spinning up as we speak. They include a [REDACTED].

Assuming Principals agree to deploy these elements, we will ask State to procure the approval from host nation. Please advise how you wish to convey that approval to us [REDACTED].

Jeremy

Jacob Sullivan was Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the time of the terrorist attack at Benghazi. Wendy Sherman was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the fourth-ranking official in the U.S. Department of State. Thomas Nides was the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources.

The timing of the Bash email is particularly significant based upon testimony given to members of Congress by Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. embassy in Tripoli at the time of the Benghazi terrorist attack. According to Hicks’ 2013 testimony, a show of force by the U.S. military during the siege could have prevented much of the carnage. Said Hicks, “if we had been able to scramble a fighter or aircraft or two over Benghazi as quickly as possible after the attack commenced, I believe there would not have been a mortar attack on the annex in the morning because I believe the Libyans would have split. They would have been scared to death that we would have gotten a laser on them and killed them.”

Ultimately, Special Operations forces on their own initiative traveled from Tripoli to Benghazi to provide support during the attack. Other military assets were only used to recover the dead and wounded, and to evacuate U.S. personnel from Libya. In fact, other documents released in October by Judicial Watch show that only one U.S. plane was available to evacuate Americans from Benghazi to Tripoli and raise questions about whether a delay of military support led to additional deaths in Benghazi.

The new email came as a result of a Judicial Watch Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit filed on September 4, 2014 (Judicial Watch v. U.S. Department of State (No. 1:14-cv-01511)), seeking:

Records related to notes, updates, or reports created in response to the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. This request includes, but is not limited to, notes taken by then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton or employees of the Office of the Secretary of State during the attack and its immediate aftermath.

“The Obama administration and Clinton officials hid this compelling Benghazi email for years,” said Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “The email makes readily apparent that the military was prepared to launch immediate assistance that could have made a difference, at least at the CIA Annex. The fact that the Obama Administration withheld this email for so long only worsens the scandal of Benghazi.”

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