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General Odierno was a guest at The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. There was a fascinating question and answer session between the General and Fox News Catherine Herridge.
Some of the points made by General Odierno included: Odierno says at FDDWF that Obama decision to pull US troops from Iraq became “self-inflicted wound.”
[U.S.] lost its intelligence network when we withdrew from Iraq
What I worry most about ISIS is that they are growing fast and their perception of success
We can defeat the ISIS military, but we need a solution for what happens next after success
I am not sure we have capabilities to respond to crisis on five continents
We’ve loss capability [in latest defense cuts]
Today it is harder and harder to have a unified Iraq because of Iranian influence
Kurds have fought heroically and we need to train them and provide economic support
Airstrikes have some impact but will not solve all problems as we must enable force on the ground and having people on the ground would enable our air capabilities to be more successful
When our military left [Iraq] we lost political influence in the country and region
The whole time [U.S.] were there the Syrian government was complicit with al Qaeda
I worry [U.S.] have isolationist tendencies and the next president needs to strengthen our [diplomatic] relationships the rest of the world wants the U.S. involved
FNC: It will take a coalition of 50,000 troops on the ground to defeat the Islamic State, according to the former army chief of staff who spent more than four years serving in Iraq and who is credited, along with retired General David Petraeus, with being the architect of the successful 2007 troop surge there.
“Probably around 50,000,” said Gen. Raymond T. Odierno during a panel discussion moderated by Fox News for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Odierno, who received the George P. Shultz award for distinguished service, emphasized the 50,000 would not all be U.S. troops, but the coalition would need to be U.S.- led.
While the general, who commanded all U.S. forces from 2008 to 2010, said he supports a unified country, he added the U.S. government needs to consider whether Iraq has already been divided into three sectors by the sectarian violence — Shia, Sunni and Kurd. Odierno fingered the newly emboldened Iran as a primary agitator.
“Today, I think it’s becoming harder and harder to have a unified Iraq,” he said. “And the reason is I believe the influence of Iran inside of Iraq is so great, they will never allow the Sunnis to participate in a meaningful way in the government. If that doesn’t happen, you cannot have a unified Iraq.”
Odierno, who argued for leaving 20,000 troops in Iraq but met resistance from several senior Obama administration officials as well as then Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki, said the decision to pull out became a self-inflicted wound.
The withdrawal made it harder, if not impossible, for the U.S. government to independently assess what was happening on the ground, at a time when the alienation of the Sunni population fueled the rise of ISIS.
“We lost what we call our human intelligence network on the ground,” he said. “I mean we used to have a pretty significant human intelligence operation. So as we pulled out, our U.S. military, we lose it. So we have to depend on Iraqis, which they collect intelligence, but they do it a little bit differently than we do and they look for different things.”
Speaking at the CIA Wednesday, President Obama touted the air campaign against ISIS, though Odierno said air power can only go so far, and working with the local Iraqis was the cornerstone of the surge.
When he was in Iraq, Odierno had first-hand knowledge of the ISIS leader Omar al-Baghdadi, who, at the time was a nondescript bomb maker with control over small Baghdad neighborhoods.
“We had captured him a couple of times, released him. He then fled to, I think, Syria. And then he shows (up) – and all of a sudden, I see him on TV making a pronouncement that he’s the head of ISIS,” Odierno recalled. “You have these individuals who’ve grown up now fighting the U.S. or whatever – an insurgency – and that becomes their life. And so they continue to grow and grow and grow and some of them become leaders of a movement, which is what he did.”
The retired general continued to sound the alarm about military cuts, saying the army has “lost capability” at a time when the likelihood of responding to threats on five continents is not hypothetical.
At the same time, the number of American troops dropped from over 100,000 to 50,000. In 2015, the White House sent 450 military advisers to train and assist Iraqi forces battling ISIS, with 5,000 troops.
Fox News’ William Turner contributed to this report.
Saudi Arabian King Salman’s visit to Egypt is an expression of the warming of ties since al-Sisi became president in June 2013. Morsi’s overthrowing and declaration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in December 2013 were welcomed by Riyadh and immediately rewarded with a tremendous $12 billion aid package from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE.
Yet with King Abdullah’s passing in January 2015 it seemed that the two states were growing apart. The media was quick to point out disagreements on issues such as the countries’ approaches to Yemen, the Muslim Brotherhood and Syria. However, despite tactical disagreements, the two countries strategically continued to share common interests vis-à-vis regional threats and challenges.
Therefore, Salman’s visit is a testament to the strong relationship – one might even say the alliance – between the two countries. Historically, cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt has been a permanent feature of the Arab state system despite short periods of rivalry. The visit is consequential, primarily for Egypt. According to Egyptian media, no fewer than 36 agreements worth $25 billion were signed during the visit, including establishing a Saudi investment fund worth $16 billion, Saudi aid to rebuild Sinai (including creating a free-trade zone), building a university, and erecting a bridge to connect Sinai and Saudi Arabia. The bridge will allow countless tourists and pilgrims, as well as goods, to cross from one continent to the next. Like the Suez Canal expansion, this project will also contribute significantly to the Egyptian economy.
That Sinai is the focus of governmental aid is not surprising, because it is meant to be part of Cairo’s response to the challenge posed by the radical jihadi organizations. The regime understands full well that the answer to the problems in Sinai is not purely military. Rather, it involves improving the lives of the peninsula’s inhabitants.
During the visit, it was announced that the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, located at the entrance of the Gulf of Eilat, would be handed over to the Saudis, who previously controlled them. In 1950, the Saudis decided to lease the islands to Egypt in order to facilitate the Arab boycott and maritime quarantine of Israel. The islands were conquered by Israel in 1956 and again in 1967 but returned to Egypt after the 1979 peace agreement. Therefore, the current agreement will return them to the rightful owners. Israel has no reason to be concerned, despite the islands’ strategic importance, as Saudi Arabia has not been involved in previous wars with Israel and has no incentive to threaten it. More on the summary here.
*****
Meanwhile the United States has an estimated 700 troops in the Sinai and this has been an area of hostilities with the Islamic State cell operating there. Discussions have been underway to remove our 700 troops but a final decision has not been made rather they could just be moved further south and replaced with technology. The Sinai is of major significance to Egypt for tourism, something that Egypt relies on for revenue and to show stability in the region.
The Pentagon has notified Egypt and Israel that it is reviewing its peacekeeping operations in Egypt’s violence-wracked Sinai Peninsula.Officials said they are looking into the possibility of technology replacing the work of around 700 US peacekeepers in the region.”I don’t think anyone’s talking about a [complete] withdrawal,” Pentagon spokesperson Jeff Davis told a press conference on Tuesday.”I think we’re just going to look at the number of people we have there and see if there are functions that can be automated or done through remote monitoring.”However, a spokesperson for the White House on Tuesday maintained that Washington’s “commitment to this treaty and this mission has never been stronger.”Israel, which fears attack from within Egyptian territory in the restive Sinai Peninsula, last year protested proposals to cut back peacekeeping forces in the region, saying such a move would “reward terrorism”.
At issue here is why stop with declassifying these 28 pages, why no declassify the complicity of Iran and a few of the 9/11 attackers? One thing leads to another.
Kroft/CBS: In 10 days, President Obama will visit Saudi Arabia at a time of deep mistrust between the two allies, and lingering doubts about the Saudi commitment to fighting violent Islamic extremism.
It also comes at a time when the White House and intelligence officials are reviewing whether to declassify one of the country’s most sensitive documents — known as the “28 pages.” They have to do with 9/11 and the possible existence of a Saudi support network for the hijackers while they were in the U.S.
For 13 years, the 28 pages have been locked away in a secret vault. Only a small group of people have ever seen them. Tonight, you will hear from some of the people who have read them and believe, along with the families of 9/11 victims that they should be declassified.
Bob Graham: I think it is implausible to believe that 19 people, most of whom didn’t speak English, most of whom had never been in the United States before, many of whom didn’t have a high school education– could’ve carried out such a complicated task without some support from within the United States.
Steve Kroft: And you believe that the 28 pages are crucial to this? Understand…
Bob Graham: I think they are a key part.
Former U.S. Senator Bob Graham has been trying to get the 28 pages released since the day they were classified back in 2003, when he played a major role in the first government investigation into 9/11.
Bob Graham: I remain deeply disturbed by the amount of material that has been censored from this report.
At the time, Graham was chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and co-chair of the bipartisan joint congressional inquiry into intelligence failures surrounding the attacks. The Joint Inquiry reviewed a half a million documents, interviewed hundreds of witnesses and produced an 838 page report — minus the final chapter which was blanked out — excised by the Bush administration for reasons of national security.
“I remain deeply disturbed by the amount of material that has been censored from this report.”
Bob Graham won’t discuss the classified information in the 28 pages, he will say only that they outline a network of people that he believes supported the hijackers while they were in the U.S.
Steve Kroft: You believe that support came from Saudi Arabia?
Bob Graham: Substantially.
Steve Kroft: And when we say, “The Saudis,” you mean the government, the–
Bob Graham: I mean–
Steve Kroft: –rich people in the country? Charities–
Bob Graham: All of the above.
Graham and others believe the Saudi role has been soft-pedaled to protect a delicate relationship with a complicated kingdom where the rulers, royalty, riches and religion are all deeply intertwined in its institutions.
Bob Graham
CBS News
Porter Goss, who was Graham’s Republican co-chairman on the House side of the Joint Inquiry, and later director of the CIA, also felt strongly that an uncensored version of the 28 pages should be included in the final report. The two men made their case to the FBI and its then–director Robert Mueller in a face-to-face meeting.
Porter Goss: And they pushed back very hard on the 28 pages and they said, “No, that cannot be unclassified at this time.”
Steve Kroft: Did you happen to ask the FBI director why it was classified?
Porter Goss: We did, in a general way, and the answer was because, “We said so and it needs to be classified.”
Goss says he knew of no reason then and knows of no reason now why the pages need to be classified. They are locked away under the capital in guarded vaults called Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, or SCIFs in government jargon. This is as close as we could get with our cameras — a highly restricted area where members of Congress with the proper clearances can read the documents under close supervision. No note-taking allowed.
Tim Roemer: It’s all gotta go up here, Steve.
Tim Roemer, a former Democratic congressman and U.S. ambassador to India, has read the 28 pages multiple times. First as a member of the Joint Inquiry and later as a member of the blue-ribbon 9/11 Commission which picked up where Congress’ investigation left off.
Steve Kroft: How hard is it to actually read these 28 pages?
Tim Roemer: Very hard. These are tough documents to get your eyes on.
Roemer and others who have actually read the 28 pages, describe them as a working draft similar to a grand jury or police report that includes provocative evidence — some verified, and some not. They lay out the possibility of official Saudi assistance for two of the hijackers who settled in Southern California. That information from the 28-pages was turned over to the 9/11 Commission for further investigation. Some of the questions raised were answered in the commission’s final report. Others were not.
Steve Kroft: Is there information in the 28 pages that, if they were declassified, would surprise people?
Tim Roemer: Sure, you’re gonna be surprised by it. And, you’re going to be surprised by some of the answers that are sitting there today in the 9/11 Commission report about what happened in San Diego, and what happened in Los Angeles. And what was the Saudi involvement.
Much of that surprising information is buried in footnotes and appendices of the 9/11 report — part of the official public record, but most of it unknown to the general public. These are some, but not all of the facts:
In January of 2000, the first of the hijackers landed in Los Angeles after attending an al Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The two Saudi nationals, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, arrived with extremely limited language skills and no experience with Western culture. Yet, through an incredible series of circumstances, they managed to get everything they needed, from housing to flight lessons.
Tim Roemer: L.A., San Diego, that’s really you know, the hornet’s nest. That’s really the one that I continue to think about almost on a daily basis.
During their first days in L.A., witnesses place the two future hijackers at the King Fahd mosque in the company of Fahad al-Thumairy, a diplomat at the Saudi consulate known to hold extremist views. Later, 9/11 investigators would find him deceptive and suspicious and in 2003, he would be denied reentry to the United States for having suspected ties to terrorist activity.
Tim Roemer: This is a very interesting person in the whole 9/11 episode of who might’ve helped whom– in Los Angeles and San Diego, with two terrorists who didn’t know their way around.
Phone records show that Thumairy was also in regular contact with this man: Omar al-Bayoumi, a mysterious Saudi who became the hijackers biggest benefactor. He was a ghost employee with a no-show job at a Saudi aviation contractor outside Los Angeles while drawing a paycheck from the Saudi government.
Steve Kroft: You believe Bayoumi was a Saudi agent?
Bob Graham: Yes, and–
Steve Kroft: What makes you believe that?
Bob Graham: –well, for one thing, he’d been listed even before 9/11 in FBI files as being a Saudi agent.
On the morning of February 1, 2000, Bayoumi went to the office of the Saudi consulate where Thumairy worked. He then proceeded to have lunch at a Middle Eastern restaurant on Venice Boulevard where he later claimed he just happened to make the acquaintance of the two future hijackers.
Tim Roemer: Hazmi and Mihdhar magically run into Bayoumi in a restaurant that Bayoumi claims is a coincidence and in one of the biggest cities in the United States.
Steve Kroft: And he decides to befriend them.
Tim Roemer: He decides to not only befriend them but then to help them move to San Diego and get residence.
In San Diego, Bayoumi found them a place to live in his own apartment complex, advanced them the security deposit and cosigned the lease. He even threw them a party and introduced them to other Muslims who would help the hijackers obtain government IDs and enroll in English classes and flight schools. There’s no evidence that Bayoumi or Thumairy knew what the future hijackers were up to, and it is possible that they were just trying to help fellow Muslims.
The very day Bayoumi welcomed the hijackers to San Diego, there were four calls between his cell phone and the imam at a San Diego mosque, Anwar al-Awlaki, a name that should sound familiar.
The American-born Awlaki would be infamous a decade later as al Qaeda’s chief propagandist and top operative in Yemen until he was taken out by a CIA drone. But in January 2001, a year after becoming the hijackers’ spiritual adviser, he left San Diego for Falls Church, Virginia. Months later Hazmi, Mihdhar and three more hijackers would join him there.
Tim Roemer: Those are a lot of coincidences, and that’s a lot of smoke. Is that enough to make you squirm and uncomfortable, and dig harder– and declassify these 28 pages? Absolutely.
Perhaps, no one is more interested in reading the 28 pages than attorneys Jim Kreindler and Sean Carter who represent family members of the 9/11 victims in their lawsuit against the kingdom. Alleging that its’ institutions provided money to al Qaeda knowing that it was waging war against the United States.
Jim Kreindler: What we’re doing in court is developing the story that has to come out. But it’s been difficult for us because for many years, we weren’t getting the kind of openness and cooperation that we think our government owes to the American people, particularly the families of people who were murdered.
The U.S. government has even backed the Saudi position in court–that it can’t be sued because it enjoys sovereign immunity. The 9/11 Commission report says that Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of al Qaeda funding through its’ wealthy citizens and charities with significant government sponsorship. But the sentence that got the most attention when the report came out is this:
“We have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization.”
Attorney Sean carter says it’s the most carefully crafted line in the 9/11 Commission report and the most misunderstood.
Sean Carter: When they say they found no evidence that senior Saudi officials individually funded al Qaeda, they conspicuously leave open the potential that they found evidence that people who were officials that they did not regard as senior officials had done so. That is the essence of the families’ lawsuit. That elements of the government and lower level officials sympathetic to bin Laden’s cause helped al Qaeda carry out the attacks and help sustain the al Qaeda network.
Yet, for more than a decade, the kingdom has maintained that that one sentence exonerated it of any responsibility for 9/11 regardless of what might be in the 28 pages.
Bob Kerrey: It’s not an exoneration. What we said–we did not, with this report, exonerate the Saudis.
Former U.S. Senator Bob Kerrey is another of the 10-member 9/11 Commission who has read the 28 pages and believes they should be declassified. He filed an affidavit in support of the 9/11 families’ lawsuit.
Bob Kerrey: You can’t provide the money for terrorists and then say, “I don’t have anything to do with what they’re doing.”
Steve Kroft: Do you believe that all of the leads that were developed in the 28 pages were answered in the 9/11 report? All the questions?
Bob Kerrey: No. No. In general, the 9/11 Commission did not get every single detail of the conspiracy. We didn’t. We didn’t have the time, we didn’t have the resources. We certainly didn’t pursue the entire line of inquiry in regard to Saudi Arabia.
Steve Kroft: Do you think all of these things in San Diego can be explained as coincidence?
John Lehman: I don’t believe in coincidences.
John Lehman, who was secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, says that he and the others make up a solid majority of former 9/11 commissioners who think the 28 pages should be made public.
John Lehman: We’re not a bunch of rubes that rode into Washington for this commission. I mean, we, you know, we’ve seen fire and we’ve seen rain and the politics of national security. We all have dealt for our careers in highly classified and compartmentalized in every aspect of security. We know when something shouldn’t be declassified. An the, this, those 28 pages in no way fall into that category.
Lehman has no doubt that some high Saudi officials knew that assistance was being provided to al Qaeda, but he doesn’t think it was ever official policy. He also doesn’t think that it absolves the Saudis of responsibility.
John Lehman: It was no accident that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis. They all went to Saudi schools. They learned from the time they were first able to go to school of this intolerant brand of Islam.
Lehman is talking about Wahhabism, the ultra conservative, puritanical form of Islam that is rooted here and permeates every facet of society. There is no separation of church and state. After, oil, Wahhabism is one of the kingdom’s biggest exports. Saudi clerics, entrusted with Islam’s holiest shrines have immense power and billions of dollars to spread the faith. Building mosques and religious schools all over the world that have become recruiting grounds for violent extremists. 9/11 Commissioner John Lehman says all of this comes across in the 28 pages.
John Lehman: This is not going to be a smoking gun that is going to cause a huge furor. But it does give a very compact illustration of the kinds of things that went on that would really help the American people to understand why, what, how, how is it that these people are springing up all over the world to go to jihad?
Tim Roemer: Look, the Saudis have even said they’re for declassifying it. We should declassify it. Is it sensitive, Steve? Might it involve opening– a bit, a can of worms, or some snakes crawling out of there? Yes. But I think we need a relationship with the Saudis where both countries are working together to fight against terrorism. And that’s not always been the case.
A phone call or a strongly worded letter yet from the White House? nah
WASHINGTON, April 13 (Reuters) – The White House is aware of Russian planes flying dangerously close to a U.S. guided missile destroyer in the Baltic Sea on Tuesday and continues to be concerned about such behavior, a spokesman said on Wednesday.
“The White House is aware of the incident,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest told reporters at a daily briefing. “This incident … is entirely inconsistent with the professional norms of militaries operating in proximity to each other in international water and international airspace.”
MilitaryTimes: In one of the most aggressive actions in recent memory, Russian warplanes conducted “simulated attacks” on the a U.S. Navy vessel in the Baltic Sea on Tuesday, repeatedly flying within 30 feet of the ship, according to a defense official.
Sailors aboard the destroyer Donald Cook said the aircraft flew low enough to create wake in the sea waters surrounding the ship, and the ship’s commanding officer said the incident was “unsafe and unprofessional,” the defense official said.
“This was more aggressive than anything we’ve seen in some time,” according to the defense official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because U.S. officials have not officially disclosed the incidents.
Sailors aboard the ship described the Sukhoi Russian Su-24 as “wings clean,” meaning there were no visible bombs or armaments on the aircraft, the defense official said.
The nature of the overflight as a “simulated attack” may violate a 1973 treaty between the U.S. and Russia that specifically prohibits this type of maneuver, the defense official said.
The maneuver was one of several aggressive moves by Russian aircraft on Monday and Tuesday.
Shortly after leaving the Polish port of Gdynia, near Gdansk, on Monday, the Donald Cook at was sea in international waters conducting flight operations with a Polish helicopter, part of routine joint training exercises with the NATO ally.
During those flight operations, a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 combat aircraft appeared and conducted about 20 overflights, coming within 1,000 yards of the ship at an altitude of about 100 feet, the defense official said. In response, the commander of the Donald Cook suspended flight operations.
On Tuesday, the Donald Cook was underway in the Baltic Sea when a Russian helicopter —a Ka-27 Helix —made seven overflights and appeared to be taking photographs of the U.S. Navy ship, the defense official said.
Shortly after the helicopter left the area, an Su-24 began making “very low” overflights with a “simulated attack profile,” the defense official said. The aircraft made a total of 11 passes.
The ship’s commander repeatedly tried to make radio contact with the Russian aircraft but received no response, the defense official said.
After a formal investigation, the incident may prompt the U.S. government to formally lodge a complaint — or “demarche” — with Moscow, the defense official said.
While Russian aircraft during the past couple of years have conducted numerous aggressive overflights that Navy officials deemed “unprofessional,” the incident on Tuesday was the first to be deemed “unsafe,” the defense official said.
In 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty aimed at preventing incidents at sea. That treaty specifically prohibits “simulating attacks,” according to the U.S. State Department’s website.
The aircraft likely came from a Russian military installations in Kalingrad, an enclave of Russian territory on the Baltic Coast nestled between Poland and Lithuania.
In recent months, there have been key developments and insights regarding the notable number of Belgians fighting in Syria and Iraq. A recruitment organization whose existence was unearthed during a series of trials turned out to be one of the most active; the direct implication of the so-called Zerkani network in the Brussels and Paris attacks also makes it the most dangerous one. This analysis serves as an update to my May 2015 article in Terrorism Monitor “How Belgium Became a Top Exporter of Jihad,â and points out significant differences with other Belgian jihadist networks, as well as uncovers the nuances of their links with one another (Terrorism Monitor, May 29, 2015).
About a year ago, the neo-Islamist movement Shariah4Belgium was invariably named as the most significant factor behind the tremendous number of Belgian fighters in the Syrian-Iraqi conflict (Terrorism Monitor, May 29, 2015). According to the latest estimates, that figure can be as high as 589 by now. With 80 of the militants clearly linked to Shariah4Belgium, the networkâs importance remains. The Zerkani network comes close, however. Hardly known twelve months ago, the Zerkani network appears to have sent at least 59 people to the jihad in Syria and Iraq (Pieter Van Ostaeyen, April 3). Three of these Zerkani jihadists have played a direct role in Europe’s latest terrorist attacks: Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Chakib Akrouh were perpetrators in Paris, while Najim Laachraoui participated in Brussels and is also suspected of being the bomb maker for both plots (Emmejihad, March 22).
The Zerkani Networkâs Origins
The Zerkani network is named after Khalid Zerkani, a 42-year-old Moroccan who was living in the Brussels municipality of Molenbeek. Before sentencing him to twelve yearsâ imprisonment on July 29 of last year, the judge described him as a “cynical guru.” According to the written judgment of the trial, Zerkani not only indoctrinated very young people up to the point where they were willing to sacrifice themselves, but also encouraged them to commit a slew of petty crimes in order to pay for their journey to death. [1] Though practicing Muslims are not allowed to steal from another, theft among the Zerkani network was whitewashed as taking âghanimaââ the spoils of war. That principle is said to have been introduced into the network by Reda Kriket, a Frenchman living in Belgium who was arrested shortly after the Brussels attacks on suspicion of yet another terrorist plot (Marianne, March 25).
It is not entirely clear whether Zerkani himself has ever been part of the terrorist plots in which his recruits had a role. It is possible that he only aimed at recruiting for a war abroad. The Belgian terrorists responsible for attacking the West after he recruited them may well have been selected and groomed for their deadly European missions behind Zerkani’s back. There are strong indications however, that Zerkani also plotted for that kind of action. As early as 2012, conversations about the need of attacks in the West were overheard by Belgian security services during a meeting in which he took part (Emmejihad, January 26). Moreover, Zerkani did not only recruit for the Syrian jihad; prior, he was linked to at least seven people convicted in Belgium for their cooperation with al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organization based in Somalia. [2]
Zerkaniâs Key Social Ties
Fatima Aberkan, a 55-year-old mother who has sent four of her own sons to the Syrian jihad, was convicted at the same trial as Zerkani. The judge described her as the âpasionaria of the jihad,â highlighting her enormous role in both the indoctrination of recruits and in organizing the logistics of their departure to war. Fatima Aberkan used to be the closest friend of Malika El Aroud, Europe’s most notorious female terror convict to date (Marie Claire, May 15, 2009). It was Aberkan who served as a go-between (with her e-mail address [email protected], to be more precise) for El Aroud and the latter’s second husband, Moez Garsallaoui, after his departure from Belgium in 2007 to become a high ranking member of al-Qaeda in the Afghan-Pakistani border zone. Aberkan was also responsible for providing Nizar Trabelsiâwho was convicted for plotting against the U.S. Air Force base in the Belgian town of Kleine Brogel and later rendered to the U.S.âwith a mobile phone in prison, adding to existing suspicions of a plot to set him free. [3]
Aberkan’s brother Abdelhouaid, was also convicted as a member of Zerkani’s network, notably for his role in the 2001 assassination of the Afghan anti-Taliban commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud. He was responsible for driving El Aroud’s first husband, Dahmane Abd al-Satter, to the airport for the assassination, which was a suicide mission, and was considered to be preparation for the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. (LeMonde, April 19, 2005).
Zerkani’s modus operandi could hardly differ more from that of Shariah4Belgium. The latter was notorious for its highly visible actions, such as public demonstrations and preaching sessions in crowded shopping streets. Zerkani’s organization had no website, no logo, and no distinctive name. Recruiting was done under the guise of offering community sporting activities, while further indoctrination happened in old-fashioned backrooms. While Shariah4Belgium’s leader Fouad Belkacem participated in televised debates and disseminated his sermons via YouTube, even the grainiest picture of Zerkani is extremely hard to locate. Zerkani was always sure to use someone elseâs phone while calling abroad, and conversely, he had others in his network carry his phone to avoid being traced and geo-located. According to the court judgment mentioned above, Zerkaniâs wariness supplemented the belief that he was trained in the famous Afghan-Pakistani terrorist camps, âas unconfirmed reports claim.â [4]
While most of the people Shariah4Belgium recruited between 2012 and the first months of 2014 were incorporated in the local militia âMajlis Shura al-Mujahideenâ of the Syrian commander Amr al-Absi, Zerkani’s early recruits landed within the âKatibat al-Muhajireen,â which was led at the time by the ethnic-Chechen commander Tarkhan Batirashvili, better known as Abu Omar al-Shishani. Both groups were based in the outskirts of Aleppo and cooperated with one another, meaning that Belgian fighters of both networks interacted with each other regularly. Soon after the establishment of the so-called Islamic State (IS), al-Absi and al-Shishani pledged allegiance to the IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. But as was the case with the Shariah4Belgium recruits, several Zerkani members instead joined rival Jabhat al-Nusra, also known as al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. What happened later in terms of individual affiliations is difficult to ascertain, though it appears most of the Zerkani recruits finally joined the Islamic Stateâsimilar to the many Shariah4Belgium members who had joined IS before them.
A remarkable characteristic of the Antwerp-based and mainly Dutch-speaking Shariah4Belgium is that it ostensibly lacked any link with older networks of the Belgian jihad. Apart from a few links with the remnants of the âGroupe Islamique Combattant Marocainâ (GICM), Shariah4Belgium does not seem rooted in Belgium’s extremist past (Emmejihad, June 7, 2014). This could not be more different from the Zerkani network, which operates almost exclusively in French-speaking circles in Brussels.
Although Shariah4Belgium and the Zerkani network have their dissimilarities, they are connected to a certain degree. The recent arrest of Shariah4Belgium convict Bilal El Makhoukhi, 27, in connection to the Brussels attacks, may have resulted from members of both networks having met each other at the Syrian front (De Redactie, April 9) as well as in Belgium. The man at the intersection of the two groups is Jean-Louis Denis, 41. He ran his own recruitment cell for the Syrian jihad, posing as a benefactor distributing food to the homeless near the Brussels âGare du Nordâ railway station. Denis was sentenced to ten years in jail in January 2016 for these charges (Le Soir, January 29). According to the outcome of this trial, he not only publicly declared himself to be the leader of the Brussels chapter of Shariah4Belgium, but even claimed to be in the running to replace its overall leader, Fouad Belkacem, after Belkacemâs arrest in June 2012. [5]
Denis was particularly successful as a recruiter, attracting people who wanted to join the jihad from as far as Martinique. However, he lacked the necessary contacts to get his recruits across Syrian borders. Therefore, he often relied on the social network structures that Zerkani had built. Based upon evidence presented at his trial, it was Denisâs lieutenant, Mohamed Khemir, 37, who served as most important go-between. At least once, Khemir accompanied Zerkani when he brought a young French recruit to the Brussels airport to travel to Syria. Zerkani, Khemir, and Denis were often present at the same meetings, and little by little, both groups almost seemed to merge. In the end, Denisâs entourage looked more like a chapter of Zerkani’s network than as a part of Shariah4Belgium, but left behind a significant number of jihadists who were influenced by both. [6]
Conclusion
Hardly known a year ago, Belgium’s Zerkani network has now been revealed to be the country’s most dangerous jihadist group. Led by the enigmatic Moroccan, Khalid Zerkani, it has sent at least 59 recruits to Syria and Iraq. Most of them have ended up within the terrorist group Islamic State, and at least three have returned to Western Europe to commit the deadly Paris and Brussels terrorist attacks. The modus operandi of the network differs greatly from that of Shariah4Belgium, the more renowned and equally as significant group fueling the high number of Belgian jihadists, though connections between the groupsâboth in Belgium and in the battlefieldâare undoubtedly present.
Guy Van Vlierden is a journalist for the Belgian newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws, specializing in issues relating to terrorist and extremism.
Notes:
[1] Judgment of the ‘Tribunal de Première Instance Francophone de Bruxelles’ issued on July 29, 2015 – in the possession of the author.
[2] Mentioned in the judgment of July 29, 2015 – cfr. Supra
[3] Mentioned in Italian court papers in the possession of the author; Mentioned in the judgment of July 29, 2015 – cfr. Supra.
[4] Mentioned in the judgment of July 29, 2015 – cfr. Supra.
[5] Judgment of the Tribunal de Premi̬re Instance Francophone de Bruxelles issued at January 29, 2016 Рin the possession of the author.
[6] All details mentioned in the judgment of January 29, 2016 – cfr. Supra.
