White House Continues to Ignore Russian Aggressions and Violations

First, Russia has laid claim to territory in the Artic and the White House waved off any concern.

Then the White House left the matter of seizing the chemical weapons being used by Bashir al Assad in Syria to Russia while chlorine and napalm is being used to kill people in Syria today.

Then Russia and several other countries within BRICS have established a large fund and alternative currency system bypassing all Western monetary funds and the White House along with the U.S. Treasury looks the other way.

Russia has hacked into classified and protected government computer networks with no consequence even while Russia bombers have flown within airspace challenging NORAD with provocative aggressions.

Wait, there is more.

In part from the FreeBeacon:

The White House is blocking the release of a Pentagon risk assessment of Russia’s violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, according to a senior House leader.

Rep. Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, disclosed the existence of the Pentagon assessment last month and said the report is needed for Congress’ efforts to address the problem in legislation.

“As we look to the near-term future, we need to consider how we’re going to respond to Russia’s INF violations,” Rogers said in an Air Force Association breakfast July 8. “Congress will not continue to tolerate the administration dithering on this issue.”

Rogers said the assessment was conducted by chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey, and noted that it outlines potential responses to the treaty breach.

However, Rogers noted that the assessment “seems to stay tied up in the White House.”

At the Pentagon, spokesman Capt. Greg Hicks said: “The Chairman’s assessment of Russia’s Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violation is classified and not releasable to the public.”

Also from FNC in part:

Two Russian warships have docked in northern Iran for a series of naval training exercises with the Islamic Republic, according to Persian-language reports translated by the CIA’s Open Source Center.

The two Russian ships docked in Iran’s Anzali port on Sunday and will hold “joint naval exercises during the three-day stay of the warships in Iran,” according to a Persian-language report in Iran’s state-controlled Fars News Agency.

“The [Russian] warships, Volgodonsk and Makhachkala docked in Anzali Port [near the Caspian Sea], in the fourth naval zone, on the afternoon of 9 August,” the report says.

The war exercises come just weeks after Iran and global powers inked a nuclear accord that will provide Iran with billions of dollars in sanctions relief in return for slight restrictions on the country’s nuclear program.

Russian and Iran have grown close in recent years, with delegations from each country regularly visiting one another to ink arms deals and other agreements aimed at strengthening Iran’s nuclear program.

One last item but certainly not last, the Saudis have attempted several times to work with Russia on Syria with no viable solution.

Reuters:

Russia and Saudi Arabia failed in talks on Tuesday to overcome their differences on the fate of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a central dispute in Syria’s civil war that shows no sign of abating despite renewed diplomacy.

Russia is pushing for a coalition to fight Islamic State insurgents — who have seized swathes of northern and eastern Syria — that would involve Assad, a longtime ally of Moscow. But, speaking after talks in Moscow, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir reiterated Riyadh’s stance that Assad must go.

“A key reason behind the emergence of Islamic State was the actions of Assad who directed his arms at his nation, not Islamic State,” Jubeir told a news conference after talks with Russia’s Sergei Lavrov.

So, with these recent events, is the White House intimidated by Russia, cooperating with Russia or just ignoring Russia or perhaps a combination of all three and then exactly why. Your comments are invited.

 

SHE is the ISIS Recruiter Deployed by Russia?

Isis launches Russian-language propaganda channel

The Guardian: The militant group Islamic State has stepped up its Russian-language propaganda efforts, another sign it is becoming more powerful in the post-Soviet countries.

The Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said recently that 2,000 Russian nationals are currently fighting in Syria or Iraq. In June, the country’s security council chief, Nikolai Patrushev, said that there was “no possibility” of stemming the tide of fighters.

Though Russian-speaking Islamic State (Isis) militants have put out their own messages for some time, in recent weeks a new Russian-language wing, Furat Media, has emerged, with Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr accounts broadcasting under a river-themed logo.

It was through Furat that the militant group declared the establishment of a province in the North Caucasus, inside the Russian Federation itself. The propaganda wing also issued a professionally produced video, Unity Of The Mujahideen Of The Caucasus, which included interviews with Russian-speaking militants in Iraq and Syria. Dozens more are available for download from the site.  Read more here.

 

Main Russian IS Recruiter ‘Identified In Turkey,’ But Who Is One-Legged Akhmet?

Radio Free Europe: Russia’s security services claim to have established the identity of the main recruiter of Russian nationals to the Islamic State (IS) militant group, according to the Russian tabloid Life News, which has close ties to the country’s security services.

The man in question is a 30-year-old Chechen nicknamed One-Legged Akhmet, Life News reported on August 4.

Among those purportedly recruited by One-Legged Akhmet and his
Among those purportedly recruited by One-Legged Akhmet and his “team” are Russian student Varvara Karaulova (above) and Maryam Ismailova. Karaulova was detained in Turkey and returned to Russia, where prosecutors did not press charges; Ismailova remains at large.

However, details in the Life News report and in a subsequent August 7 report by the Caucasian Knot blog suggest that the individual in question could be an ethnic Chechen who has previously appeared alongside Russian-speaking IS militants in a video shot in IS-controlled territory.

According to the Life News report, two of One-Legged Akhmet’s subordinates — Yakub Ibragimov, 23, from Chechnya and Abdulla Abdulayev from Makhachkala in Daghestan (aka The Uzbek) — have already been detained in Turkey.

But One-Legged Akhmet remains at large.

The report did not give a name for One-Legged Akhmet or say where in Chechyna he is from, saying that his name has not been released because security forces from Russia and Turkey are seeking him.

However, the report did provide information about his alleged activities.

One-Legged Akhmet was responsible for recruiting Russian citizens from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the North Caucasus and facilitating their travel from Turkey into Syria, according to Life News.

Among those purportedly recruited by One-Legged Akhmet and his “team” are Russian student Varvara Karaulova and Maryam Ismailova. Karaulova was detained in Turkey and returned to Russia, where prosecutors did not press charges; Ismailova remains at large.

Life News quoted an anonymous member of Russia’s law-enforcement authorities who said that Turkish and Russian police had “established IS recruitment and delivery channels for Russians.”

“Under their scheme, people are first recruited over the Internet, after which they are met in Istanbul. Then, One-Legged Akhmet and his subordinates produced fake documents in a few days and transported [the recruits] across the Turkey-Syria border,” the source was quoted as saying.

Discrepancies?

On July 28, Turkish and Azerbaijani media reported that the authorities in Turkey had arrested three men who were accused of being members of IS. According to these reports, one of the men was named Abdullah Abdulayev and had introduced himself as IS’s Emir of Istanbul.

It is not clear whether the Abdulla Abdulayev, referred to as an Azerbaijani in the Turkish media reports, is the same individual that Life News has identified as being from Daghestan.

One-Armed Akhmed

While details of One-Legged Akhmet remain murky, the alleged suspect’s name is very reminiscent of that of another notorious IS militant from Chechnya.

Akhmed Chatayev, also known as Akhmed Shishani or One-Armed Akhmed, emerged in Syria in late 2014 or early 2015 alongside leading figures in IS’s North Caucasian contingent.

Chatayev was previously granted refugee status in Austria. He was arrested by Georgian forces in 2012 in connection with the Lopota Gorge incident, in which an armed group clashed with Georgian special forces. Chatayev was later released after a court found him innocent. (His lawyers say he lost his arm as a result of torture by Russian security forces, while Russia says he was disabled while fighting in Chechnya.)

An anonymous member of the Caucasian diaspora in Turkey told the Caucasian Knot news website on August 7 that the leader of the Istanbul cell was a Chechen who had been involved in the 2012 Lopota Gorge incident and had lost a leg. However, the source also said that the armed group had been attempting to travel to Syria, which is a theory that has not been advanced previously.

There has also been no official notification from the Turkish government about the detention of a Russian citizen, a Russian consular representative in Ankara told the Caucasian Knot.

Regardless of whether Chatayev is the shadowy individual suggested by Life News, given his links in Europe and the North Caucasus and his associations with senior Russian-speaking IS figures in Syria and Iraq, it is likely that he is involved in recruitment for IS. Certainly, Abu Jihad, the ethnic Karachai with whom Chatayev appears in a video shared by IS earlier this year, is involved in IS recruitment via his work heading IS’s Russian-language propaganda outlet, Furat Media.

It is unknown whether Chatayev is still in Syria — he has not appeared in IS videos for some months — or whether he is in Turkey.

Obama Chose Kerry Over Hillary to Begin Iran Talks

The opening salvo was much earlier, yet in earnest, the talks with Iran began in 2011 and it appears, Obama’s campaign team were tooling the talks to perhaps be part of his re-election campaign. It was already decided that Hillary was out and Kerry was in as Secretary of State.

Pathetic when we need to find some back-end truths from Iran, a terror nation. Read on readers, this is a fascinating summary with clear citations and annotations.

Iranian Senior Officials Disclose Confidential Details From Nuclear Negotiations: Already In 2011 We Received Letter From U.S. Administration Recognizing Iran’s Right To Enrich Uranium

By MEMRI: Iranian officials recently began to reveal details from the nuclear negotiations with the U.S. since their early stages. Their statements indicate that the U.S. initiated secret negotiations with Iran not after President Hassan Rohani, of the pragmatic camp, was elected in 2013, but rather in 2011-2012, in the era of radical president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[1] The disclosures also indicate that, already at that time, Iran received from the U.S. administration a letter recognizing its right to enrich uranium on its own soil. Hossein Sheikh Al-Islam, an advisor to the Majlis speaker, specified that the letter had come from John Kerry, then a senator and head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Iranian vice president and top negotiator Ali Akbar Salehi said that Kerry, while still a senator, had been appointed by President Obama to handle the nuclear contacts with Iran.

The following are initial details from these disclosures; a full translation is pending.   

Khamenei: Bilateral Talks Began In 2011, Were Based On U.S. Recognition Of Nuclear Iran

In a speech he delivered on June 23, 2015, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that the American administration had initiated the nuclear talks with Iran during Ahmadinejad’s term in office, based on a U.S. recognition of a nuclear Iran: “The issue of negotiating with the Americans is related to the term of the previous [Ahmadinejad] government, and to the dispatching of a mediator to Tehran to request talks. At the time, a respected regional figure came to me as a mediator [referring to Omani Sultan Qaboos] and explicitly said that U.S. President [Obama] had asked him to come to Tehran and present an American request for negotiations. The Americans told this mediator: ‘We want to solve the nuclear issue and lift sanctions within six months, while recognizing Iran as a nuclear power.’ I told that mediator that I did not trust the Americans and their words, but after he insisted, I agreed to reexamine this topic, and negotiations began.”[2]

Hossein Sheikh Al-Islam: Kerry Sent Iran A Letter Via Oman Recognizing Iran’s Enrichment Rights

In an interview with the Tasnim news agency on July 7, 2015, Hossein Sheikh Al-Islam, an advisor to Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, said that John Kerry had relayed a letter to Tehran recognizing Iran’s enrichment rights: “We came to the [secret] negotiations [with the U.S.] after Kerry wrote a letter and sent it to us via Oman, stating that America officially recognizes Iran’s rights regarding the [nuclear fuel] enrichment cycle. Then there were two meetings in Oman between the [Iranian and U.S.] deputy foreign ministers, and after those, Sultan Qaboos was dispatched by Obama to Khamenei with Kerry’s letter. Khamenei told him: ‘I don’t trust them.’ Sultan Qaboos said: ‘Trust them one more time.’ On this basis the negotiations began, and not on the basis of sanctions, as they [the Americans] claim in their propaganda.”[3]

Salehi: Obama Appointed Senator Kerry To Handle The Nuclear Dossier Vis-à-vis Iran; Later He Was Appointed Secretary Of   State

Iranian Vice President Ali Akbar Salehi and head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, who was restored to the nuclear negotiation team this year, served as Iran’s foreign minister in 2010-2013. In interviews he has given on Iranian media since April 2014, he too claimed that the Americans initiated the secret talks with Iran in 2011-2012, and stressed his role in jumpstarting the process from the Iranian side. In a comprehensive interview with the daily Iran on August 4, 2015, he elaborated on the secret contacts initiated by the Americans. The following are excerpts from the interview:

Interviewer: “Why was Oman chosen as a mediator [in the contacts with the U.S.]?”

Salehi: “We have very good relations with Oman. When [Supreme Leader] Khamenei recently mentioned ‘a respected regional figure,’ he was obviously referring to the Omani leader. Oman is also respected by the West, and it had mediated between America and Iran on several previous occasions, for instance in the affair of the American mountain climbers who were arrested in Iran [in 2009]… When [Iranian deputy Foreign Minister] Qashqavi was there [in Oman], an Omani official gave him a letter in which he announced that the Americans were willing to hold negotiations with Iran and that they were very interested in solving the challenging [crisis] between Tehran and Washington. We [Iranians] were willing to help facilitate the process, and it looked like a good opportunity had come up. The 2012 U.S. elections had not yet started back then, but Obama had already launched his reelection campaign. The Omani message came just as [Obama and Romney] were starting their race in the U.S. elections, but there was still time before the elections [themselves]. At that stage I did not take the letter seriously.”

Interviewer: “Why didn’t you take it seriously? Because it was delivered by a mid-level Omani official?”

Salehi: “Yes. This fact concerned us, because the letter was hand-written and back then I was not familiar with that official. After a while, Mr. Souri, who was the CEO of an Iranian shipping [company], visited Oman to promote various shipping interests and talk with Omani officials.”

Interviewer: “This was how long after the delivery of the letter?”

Salehi: “He came to me about a month or two after the first letter was delivered, and said to me: ‘Mr. Salehi, I visited Oman to promote shipping interests, and an Omani official conveyed to me that the Americans were willing to enter secret bilateral negotiations on the nuclear dossier.’ It was clear that they wanted to launch negotiations…”

“The Omani official whose message Souri was relaying was one Isma’il, who had just been appointed an advisor to the Omani leader and who still holds a position in the Omani foreign ministry. He had good relations with the Americans, and Omani officials trusted him [too]. I said to Souri: ‘We are not at all certain to what extent the Americans are serious, but I’ll give you a note. Go tell them that these are our demands. Deliver [the note] during your next visit to Oman.’ On a piece of paper I wrote down four clearly-stated points, one of which was [the demand for] official recognition of the right to enrich uranium. I thought that, if the Americans were sincere in their proposal, they had to accept these four demands of ours. Mr. Souri delivered this short letter to the mediator, stressing that this was the list of Iran’s demands, [and that], if the Americans wanted to resolve the issue, they were welcome to do so [on our terms], otherwise addressing the White House proposals to Iran would be pointless and unjustified.

“All the demands presented in this letter were related to the nuclear challenge. [They were] issues we had always come up against, like the closing of the nuclear dossier, official recognition of [the right to] enrichment, and resolving the issue of Iran’s past activities under the PMD [possible military dimensions] heading. After receiving the letter, the Americans said, ‘We are definitely and sincerely willing, and we can resolve the issues that Iran mentioned.'”

Interviewer: “With whom did the Americans hold contacts?”

Salehi: “They were in contact with Omani officials, including the relevant figure in the Omani administration. He was a friend of U.S. Secretary of State [John Kerry]. Back then Kerry was not yet secretary of state, he acted as head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In any case, we received from the Americans a positive response and message. We came to the conclusion that we could prepare [to take] further steps on this issue.  That’s why I asked the Omanis to relay to Iran an official letter that I could present to the officials in Iran. I assessed we had a good opportunity and that we could take advantage of it… They did so, and I presented the official letter that was received to the regime officials and went to the [Supreme] Leader to detail to him the process that had been conducted…

Interviewer: “What was the American position in the first meetings that took place between Iran and the P5+1 during Rohani’s presidency?”

Salehi: “After Rohani’s government began working [in August 2013] – this was during Obama’s second term in office – a new [round of] negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 was launched. By this time, Kerry was no longer a senator but had been appointed secretary of state. [But even] before this, when he was still senator, he had already been appointed by Obama to handle the nuclear dossier [vis-à-vis Iran] and later [in December 2012] he was appointed secretary of state. Before this, the Omani mediator, who was in close touch with Kerry, told us that Kerry would soon be appointed secretary of state. In the period of the secret negotiations with the Americans in Oman, there was a more convenient atmosphere for obtaining concessions from the Americans.  After the advent of the Rohani government and the American administration [i.e., after the start of Obama’s second term in office], and with Kerry as secretary of state, the Americans expressed a more forceful position. They no longer displayed the same eagerness to advance the negotiations. Their position became more rigid and the threshold of their demands higher. But the situation on the Iranian side changed too, since a very professional team was placed in charge of the negotiations with the P5+1…”[4]

‘Nuclear Iran’ Website: Three Rounds Of Talks With The U.S. Took Place Before Iran’s 2013 Elections

The “Nuclear Iran” website, which is affiliated with Iran’s former nuclear negotiation team and which supports the ideological camp, reported on April 20, 2014 that “Two additional conditions, out of the four conditions [set out by Khamenei], were that foreign minister [Salehi] himself not take part in the talks, and that the negotiations yield tangible results at an early [stage]. The policy for these negotiations was set out by a committee of three figures, [all of them] senior government officials, though Ahmadinejad himself did not have much of a role in it. The main strategy in these negotiations was [handing] America an ultimatum and exposing its insincerity and untrustworthiness. Before the 2013 presidential elections, three rounds of talks took place in Oman, and at these talks the Americans officially recognized Iran’s [right] to enrich [uranium]…”[5]

 

Endnotes:

[1] This is in contrast to what was implied by U.S. President Obama on July 14, 2015, when he announced the nuclear deal with Iran in a speech that began with the words “After two years of negotiations…” Whitehouse.gov, July 14, 2015.

[2] Leader.ir, June 23, 2015. Ahmad Khorshidi, a relative of Ahmadinejad’s, told the website Entekhab in 2014 that negotiations between Tehran and Washington did not start during President Rohani’s term. He said that during the Ahmadinejad period, there were three rounds of talks between the sides, which were also attended by then-foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi. Entekhab.ir, June 11, 2014.

[3] Tasnim (Iran), July 7, 2015.

[4] Iran (Iran), August 4, 2015.

[5] Irannuc.ir, April 20, 2014.

How Khamenei Secretly Coded the 15 Secret Iran Deals

The IAEA signing the secret side deal documents:

 

No for broadcast.  Private comments by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi  were quoted on Iranian news website  EPA/HERBERT NEUBAUER

It was rather like hand signals, encryption in voice conversation and other covert communications that were used to ensure top points were met in P5+1 and Iran negotiations. Still, Iran prevailed and outplayed John Kerry and the White House.

Most curious is what has come to be known about the Fordow nuclear facility and the centrifuges.

In part from the Guardian: In the JCPOA, a total of six 174-centrifuge cascades will remain in Fordow, a total of 1044 machines, in line with the Supreme Leader’s decree. However, only two cascades will spin, producing stable isotopes, rather than enriching uranium. The other four cascades will remain idle. This anecdote chimes with the accounts of Western negotiators who have said that while the Supreme Leader’s edicts frequently complicated proceedings in Vienna, both sides were able and ready to find creative ways around them.

In his comments, Araqchi confirms a detail about Fordow that Western governments have long claimed but that Tehran had never acknowledged, that the Iranian government only informed the UN atomic watchdog, the IAEA, of Fordow’s existence in 2009 after Tehran realised it had been discovered by Western intelligence agencies. More details are here.

Revealed: Iran’s 15 Deal Secrets

Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) has released details of a private meeting between Iran’s top nuclear negotiator and IRIB directors about the July 14 nuclear deal in Vienna. 

The meeting, which was off the record, took place at the end of July. On Saturday, August 1, the IRIB news site published the comments without the permission of Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s chief negotiator. 

Abbas responded immediately, saying the publication of the private conversation was “contrary to national interests and security” and “incompatible with professional ethics.” He also said that the published text contained numerous errors.

A few hours later, the IRIB site retracted the story, stating that the publication had been a mistake. Most of the other Persian-language sites that had republished the text also removed it following Araghchi’s objections.

During the private meeting, Araghchi had tried to not only rebut criticisms of the deal but to also convince IRIB directors that the nuclear agreement encompassed many important achievements. He told them that the media had little influence over the foreign ministry and that IRIB must play its part in ensuring the Iranian people did not become frustrated with the agreement.

Although his statements were removed, it was too late: the controversy had begun. 

But what exactly did Araghchi say that was so controversial? IranWire reviews some of the most salient points.

1. The Americans got what they wanted. 

Araghchi told IRIB directors that the Americans had one important demand that they needed to meet, and they succeeded: preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. “The main demand of the other side was to block Iran from getting nuclear weapons … We had no problem with that, and granted it to the enemy …meaning that we provided trust, trust that we will not be moving towards the bomb. We granted this to the other side in two ways, by accepting certain limitations and certain supervisions. The other side got what it wanted and can say that they prevented an Iranian atomic bomb.” But he said Iran had not conceded to anything it had not wanted to: “We gave up atomic bomb, a bomb which we did not want and considered forbidden.”

2. Iran arms Hezbollah.

Araghchi confirmed that Iran is arming Lebanese Hezbollah: “We said that we cannot stop giving arms to Hezbollah, and we’re not ready to sacrifice it to our nuclear program. So we will continue doing it.”

3. No deals over other issues in the region — but definitely debate.

Araghchi denied that there had been a deal over regional issues as part of the nuclear negotiations. But he did confirm that discussions took place and important connections had been made during negotiations. “Mr. Kerry said a few times: ‘you are the victim of your own successes in the region. You have had successes in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and have gained influence. Under these conditions, if we lift the arms embargo against you, we would kill the deal and we would no longer be able to defend it — not with our own allies, not with Arabs, not with Israel and not with Congress. There will be no deal. So we have to keep the arms embargo.’”

4. The possibility of US military action was real, and Iran took it very seriously.

Araghchi confirmed that over the past few years, reports of possible US military action against Iran were taken seriously. “For 10 years they [the Americans] tried everything and used military threats to a maximum level. Maybe people are not aware of the details, but our Revolutionary Guards and military friends know that there were nights in 85-86 [2006-2007] when we were worried that by the morning Iran would be surrounded,” he said. He added that several times they expected to awake to military operations unfolding around them.  He said military personnel met to analyse maps to see where military bases were located and “what planes were stationed where. An attack on Iran only depended on the political will of Mr. Obama, who could decide to strike, and they would.”

However, media agencies had queried this, pointing out that Obama became president in 2009. Although it might have been a simple misunderstanding — Araghchi could have simple been referring to the fact that Obama had expressed readiness to use military might, or at least threatened it: Obama did repeatedly emphasize that military action was “not off the table.”

5. Parliament approval is not compulsory.

During the meeting, Araghchi implicitly opposed the claim that Iranian parliament had to approve the Vienna agreement. But he did concede that parliament should be in a position to review the document. “According to its own resolution, parliament must review the agreement — not approve it. The Supreme Leader has stated that the legal process must be followed, but the few times that he mentioned this point, he did not refer to parliament. Nevertheless, the Islamic Consultative Assembly [parliament] will review it. However, I believe that parliamentary approval is not prudent, because the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) contains voluntary provisions, which will turn into compulsory obligations if it is approved by parliament … We have to announce our decision as soon as possible so that if the US Congress wants to reject the agreement, it will singlehandedly carry the weight of rejecting the agreement, and the failure of negotiations. In this case we won’t lose anything. We can return to our own program and the world will consider us to be justified.”

6. Ayatollah Khamenei was in the loop.

Contrary to some regime propaganda, Araghchi explained in detail that the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei was involved in every stage of the negotiations and the agreement: “He was very clear that all the general principles, frameworks and red lines must be decided and supervised by him. He even let his views be known about some of the details. When he first brought up the subject of 190,000 Separative Work Units, he showed that he was a master of the details. He intervened when it was necessary, and we were never poorer for that.

“Those who say that the Leadership has been sidestepped … are debasing the role of the leadership and are doing him an injustice. They don’t help the leadership in any way. It is unjust to him that we should think that he was not and hasn’t been involved in the process of negotiations, or that he hasn’t seen the agreement. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution was involved in the general framework and the red lines … During recent negotiations, a couple of times messengers brought us messages …The Supreme Leader expressly ordered that 1,000 centrifuges remain at Fordo [Iran’ underground nuclear enrichment facility]… We were worried sick that this wasn’t possible, because they [the Americans] wouldn’t consent to even one centrifuge in that location…What happened at the negotiations and how they came to consent to it is another story. It was a blessing from god.”

7. Even one ton of enriched uranium is enough to make a bomb

Araghchi also addressed Iran’s technological capability for developing an atomic bomb, and what impact it had on Iranian domestic politics. “Some friends claim that it would take us several years to fully restore our [nuclear] program. But it is important to note that these critics are not talking about returning to our current situation. It is not important to return to the situation where we have eight or 10 tons [of enriched uranium]. Even one ton is enough to make a bomb. Of course, we are not going down that road, and we consider the bomb to be forbidden … They [the Americans] are worried that future political developments in Iran could cause the re-activation of the program. They are afraid of this, so are trying not to be left empty-handed. They want to keep sanctions as long as possible, so both sides can continue the process of building trust.

8. A Preemptive Disclosure of Secret Activities.

Araghchi then went on to discuss Iran’s secret work at Fordow: “When they discovered Fordow, we were aware of this and knew that they wanted to make an announcmement about it, so we preempted this. Mr. Soltanieh [Ali Asghar Soltanieh, former chief nuclear negotiator] was ordered to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency; he disclosed this information in a letter to Mr. ElBaradei [director-general of the IAEA until November 2009].”

9. There will be losses, just as in war.

Araghchi compared the recent nuclear agreement with the Iran-Iraq war: “The troublesome details were the costs that we had to pay. But can you show us any [military] operations that did not entail similar troublesome details? When it came to successful operations, did we say how many tanks we lost or how many people were martyred instead of saying what we achieved? Would have we said, for example, ‘Mr. Commander, it was not 100 [martyrs], but 120’? During the Sacred Defense [the war with Iraq], several operations failed, but we never said we were defeated. At most, we said that we had not been victorious. This was the phrase you used in the news.”

10. The conflict with America continues.

Araghchi advocated for continued confrontation with the US, both politically and in the media: “People should not get the feeling that America is now our friend and that enmities are a thing of the past. This is definitely not the case. Our enmity against the US, and their enmity towards us, is not over. We have managed and solved just one bilateral issue. Otherwise, our hostility towards their tyrannical system and their enmity towards the Islamic Republic, its ideals and its values will continue. You must illustrate these points in every way possible, so that that people will not become frustrated. So  whenever American officials say anything negative about us, it should not be reported in a way that will make people feel we have been cheated or that they have shown us up.”  

11. “We felt alone.”

During the meeting, Araghchi took the opportunity to lash out at certain figures in Iran’s domestic politics: “Unfortunately, over the past two years, we have felt alone many times. We felt that we had to carry the whole weight, and that everybody else was just sitting and waiting to see what the foreign ministry would do. Even in the foreign ministry itself, when there were especially heavy pressures on the team, I distinctly noticed that the media distanced themselves from them; when the negotiations went well, they came closer.”

12. The nuclear program will be cost-effective “in time”.

Araghchi shared his own insights about nuclear weapons and the Iranian nuclear program: “If we had wanted the bomb, then JCPOA is an utter defeat. But if we are after internationally legitimate enrichment and a completely peaceful nuclear program, then this agreement is a great victory. I have always said that if we judge our nuclear program on purely economic criteria, it is a big loss — meaning that if we calculate the cost of the products, it makes no sense at all. But we paid these costs for our honor, our independence and our progress. We will not be bullied by others … Our program will follow the process of industrialization and will become cost-effective in time.”

13. The president’s brother communicated “in code”.

Araghchi’s comments about President Rouhani’s brother, Hossein Fereydoon, attracted considerable attention. “He was our liaison to the president and he took on this role during negotiations. But he was not directly involved in the negotiations. [When contacting the president] he could ask urgent questions in the Semnani dialect [an Iranian dialect difficult to understand and which was widely used during the Iran-Iraq war].” Araghchi said those on the margins of negotiations who communicated in Semnani were helpful because they could hold secret discussions in a language that could not be understood. Again, the reference to the Iran-Iraq war is significant. 

14. Hide and Seek with the IAEA

Araghchi did concede there was some shortcomings in Iran’s dealings with IAEA: “We failed at some points, and were late in informing them. Some of these past mistakes were combined with trumped-up charges and unfounded allegations to make a case against our country, which Mr. Amano [the IAEA chief] later referred to as ‘possible military dimensions’…A purely technical case was turned into a political issue. The  phrase possible military dimensions (PMD) was used. Cooperation with the agency and giving it more information made the situation worse. Ask our friends at the defense ministry. They are angry that these intelligence leaks made the situation worse. In the new cycle [of negotiations], I told our friends at the defense ministry: ‘I promise you that we will not add a word to the information previously given to the agency.’”

15. A Secret Roadmap with IAEA.

Araghchi provided new information about the confidential agreement between Iran and the IAEA: “A roadmap has been signed by Mr. Salehi [the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization] and Mr. Amano. For example, by August 15 we will provide [the IAEA] with a series of our own evaluations of PMD. The agency will review them and by October 15 the agency’s job will be done.” Aright said the team had no other issues with the agreement but that they would have to wait until December 15 for the final report from Amano. “We have made some predictions and there are a series of things that we must do, but we must wait for the agency to issue that report.”

Lifting Sanctions on Iran and Bypassing Iran Front Operations

Not only is the White House well aware of the front operations and hidden nefarious methods of the regime in Tehran, but aggressive sanctions and financial measures were taken by the U.S. Treasury to expose them with cooperation and approval by several intelligence agencies and Congress.

Now lifted…

So for the sake of the JPOA talks and signed agreements, several previous actions by the Obama administration have now been both overlooked and waived. This is key to understand the psychology of Barack Obama’s policy towards the Middle East and his presidential legacy, such that future aggressions and terror around the globe are assured.

 

Note the date as posted on the U.S. Treasury Department website.

Treasury Targets Assets of Iranian Leadership
6/4/2013

Action Identifies Massive Network of Front Companies Hiding Assets on Behalf of the Government of Iran’s Leadership
WASHINGTON –The U.S. Department of the Treasury is taking action today to expose a major network of front companies controlled by Iran’s leadership.  The Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), through two main subsidiaries, oversees a labyrinth of 37 ostensibly private businesses, many of which are front companies.  The purpose of this network is to generate and control massive, off-the-books investments, shielded from the view of the Iranian people and international regulators.  EIKO and its subsidiaries – one that manages and controls EIKO’s international front companies, and another that manages billions of dollars in investments – work on behalf of the Iranian Government and operate in various sectors of the Iranian economy and around the world, generating billions of dollars in profits for the Iranian regime each year.  EIKO and the 37 companies identified today are subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13599, which blocks the property of the Government of Iran.
“Even as economic conditions in Iran deteriorate, senior Iranian leaders profit from a shadowy network of off-the-books front companies,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.  “While the Iranian government’s leadership works to hide billions of dollars in corporate profits earned at the expense of the Iranian people, Treasury will continue exposing and acting against the regime’s attempts to evade our sanctions and escape international isolation.”
EIKO has made tens of billions of dollars in profit for the Iranian regime each year through the exploitation of favorable loan rates from Iranian banks and the sale and management of real estate holdings, including selling property donated to EIKO.  EIKO has also confiscated properties in Iran that were owned by Iranians not living in Iran full-time.  In addition to generating revenue for the Iranian leadership, EIKO has been tasked with assisting the Iranian Government’s circumvention of U.S. and international sanctions.  Because of this unique mission, EIKO has received all of the funding it needs to facilitate transactions through its access to the Iranian leadership. The following companies are all part of this elaborate scheme:
Tosee Eqtesad Ayandehsazan Company (TEACO)
In June 2010, Tosee Eqtesad Ayandehsazan Company (TEACO) was created as part of the Iranian strategy to circumvent U.S. and international sanctions.  EIKO uses TEACO as the primary mechanism to transact, manage, and control all of the international companies under EIKO’s control.  To maintain the appearance of being a private company, TEACO is ostensibly owned by private Iranian businessmen and investors; however TEACO’s board members were all chosen by EIKO.  TEACO acts on behalf of EIKO.  As of September 2011, EIKO negotiated business deals using TEACO subsidiaries.  For example, EIKO used an Iranian subsidiary of TEACO to negotiate a deal with a European company to build a factory in Iran.  In these business deals, the TEACO subsidiary directly negotiated with the foreign company.  If the foreign company did not move forward with the deal due to sanctions issues, the TEACO subsidiary would have TEACO take over the negotiations, rather than EIKO, because TEACO was less visibly connected to the Government of Iran.
As of December 2010, EIKO transferred Iranian-owned companies located in Central Europe from the EIKO-controlled Iranian company Rey Investment Company to TEACO.  TEACO planned to use these central European companies to facilitate international transactions in Europe otherwise prohibited by U.S. and international sanctions.  The companies were officially owned by Iranian expatriates with dual Iranian-European citizenship to conceal ties to the Iranian Government, EIKO, TEACO, and Rey Investment Company.
Tadbir Economic Development Company (Tadbir Group)
Tadbir Group, an investment company subordinate to EIKO, manages billions of dollars in investments, including on behalf of Iranian leadership figures.  Tadbir Group is one of the main holding companies belonging to EIKO.  Its subsidiaries include Tadbir Investment Company, Modaber (Tadbir Industrial Holding Company), Tadbir Construction Development Company and Tadbir Energy Development Group.  The Tadbir Group has used its subsidiaries to make significant investments in the Iranian economy, including an investment of over $100 million in Amin Investment Bank, and controls the Pardis Investment Company and Mellat Insurance Company in Iran.
Rey Investment Company
As of late December 2010, Rey Investment Company was worth approximately $40 billion. Rey Investment Company was formerly run by Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri, who previously served as the Iranian Minister of Intelligence and Security.  Rey Investment Company collected and invested donations obtained from Iranian Shi’a shrines.  However, amidst allegations of mismanagement and embezzlement of shrine donations from the company, the Iranian Government cut off its funding to the point of nearly bankrupting the company.  In mid-to-late 2010, Reyshahri was removed and control of Rey Investment Company was transferred to EIKO and its director.  EIKO subsequently appointed a new Managing Director of Rey Investment Company.
Reyco GmbH
Reyco was a German subsidiary of Rey Investment Company, although there were no public ties between Reyco and Rey Investment Company, TEACO, or the Iranian Government.  Reyco owned MCS Engineering and MCS International.  Reyco had the appearance of being a purely German company to circumvent sanctions restricting an Iranian Government-controlled entity’s ability to do business in Europe.  Reyco was eventually transferred to the control of TEACO from Rey Investment Company, and TEACO planned to use Reyco to purchase a bank for Iran in Germany.
MCS International GmbH (Mannesman Cylinder Systems)
Reyco subsidiary MCS International is a German company ostensibly owned by German nationals or Iranian expatriates with dual Iranian-European citizenship to conceal its ties to the Iranian Government, EIKO, TEACO, and Rey Investment Company.  MCS International was audited by TEACO in October 2010 and determined to be in poor financial standing.  However, EIKO management rescued MCS International from bankruptcy and insisted on keeping the company open because it viewed MCS International as key to facilitating business in Europe.  EIKO management viewed MCS International as being too important to EIKO’s international plans to allow it to go bankrupt and believed that it would be easier to rescue MCS International from bankruptcy than to create or acquire new foreign companies on behalf of EIKO due to U.S. and international sanctions.  EIKO subsequently ordered that responsibility for MCS International be transferred from EIKO-controlled TEACO to Iranian businessmen, who were sent to oversee the company.  Following this transfer, the two individuals owned the shares for MCS International, but answered directly to EIKO.
MCS Engineering (Efficient Provider Services GmbH)
Reyco and MCS International subsidiary MCS Engineering is a German company ostensibly owned by German nationals or Iranian expatriates with dual Iranian-European citizenship to conceal ties to the Iranian Government, EIKO, TEACO, and Rey Investment Company.  EIKO required that Iranians be used for management positions, preferably dual Iranian-European citizens, who could conceal the relationship between the company and the Iranian Government.
Golden Resources Trading Company L.L.C. (GRTC)
GRTC, a Dubai-based Iranian company, has been controlled by EIKO and used in early 2011 to inject 7.5 million Euros from EIKO into MCS International.  EIKO sent money through GRTC in Dubai for deposit into an account with a bank in Germany.  The Iranian Government has used GRTC to transfer money internationally to circumvent U.S. and international sanctions.  GRTC was responsible for the transfer of funds to Europe and Africa by EIKO, and its subsidiary, the Tadbir Group.  EIKO relied on GRTC to transfer money and secure letters of credit on behalf of Iranian-controlled companies in Europe and South Africa.  As of December 2010, control over GRTC was transferred from Rey Investment Company to TEACO by EIKO.  GRTC has represented a number of Iranian companies with affiliations to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. (IRGC) and has been used by the IRGC to procure needed equipment and supplies.
Cylinder System Ltd. (Cilinder Sistem DDO) 
Cylinder System Ltd. is a Croatia-based company that has been controlled by EIKO.  In October 2010, TEACO determined that Cylinder System Ltd. was poorly run, and EIKO ordered new management.  Cylinder System Ltd. was subsequently transferred under the control of TEACO from Rey Investment Company.  EIKO was also interested in procuring a bank in Central Europe and considered using Cylinder System Ltd. to facilitate this transaction.
One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd.
One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd. is a South Africa-based company that was owned by Rey Investment Company, but was subsequently transferred to TEACO’s control in order to avoid being linked to the Iranian Government.  EIKO managed One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd. and used the company to transfer funds from Iran internationally and to facilitate financial transactions through South Africa to circumvent U.S. and international sanctions.
One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd.
EIKO planned to use South Africa-based One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd. to purchase a bank and an insurance company.  EIKO managed One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd. through TEACO in order to avoid being linked to the Iranian Government.  The Iranian Government used One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd. to transfer money internationally and to facilitate financial transactions in circumvention of U.S. and international sanctions.  One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd. owned 49 percent of One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd., while the Government of Iran owned 51 percent.
Treasury is also imposing sanctions on additional companies in Iran that are owned or controlled by the Tadbir Group, Rey Investment Company, or their subsidiaries.  These companies are: Iran & Shargh Company, Iran & Shargh Leasing Company, Tadbir Brokerage Company, Rafsanjan Cement Company, Rishmak Productive & Exports Company, Omid Rey Civil & Construction Company, Behsaz Kashane Tehran Construction Co., Royal Arya Company, Hormuz Oil Refining Company, Ghaeed Bassir Petrochemical Products Company, Persia Oil & Gas Industry Development Co., Pars Oil Co., Commercial Pars Oil Co., Marjan Petrochemical Company, Ghadir Investment Company, Sadaf Petrochemical Assaluyeh Company, Polynar Company, Pars MCS, Arman Pajouh Sabzevaran Mining Company, Oil Industry Investment Company, and Rey Niru Engineering Company.
U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the entities listed today, and any assets those entities may have subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.
Identifying Information
Entity: Amin Investment Bank
AKA: AMINIB
Location: No. 51 Ghobadiyan Street, Valiasr Street, Tehran  1968917173, Iran
Website: http://www.aminib.com
Entity: Behsaz Kashane Tehran Construction Co.
AKA: Behsaz Kashaneh Co.
Location: No. 40, East Street Journal, North Shiraz Street, Sadra Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.behsazco.ir
Entity: Commercial Pars Oil Co.
Location: 9th Floor, No. 346, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Entity: Cylinder System L.T.D.
AKA: Cilinder Sistem D.O.O.
AKA: Cilinder Sistem D.O.O. Za Proizvodnju I Usluge
Location: Dr. Mile Budaka 1, Slavonski Brod  35000, Croatia
Alt. Location: 1 Mile Budaka, Slavonski Brod  35000, Croatia
Website: http://www.csc-sb.hr
Registration ID: 050038884 (Croatia)
Tax ID No.: 27694384517 (Croatia)
Entity: Execution Of Imam Khomeini’s Order
AKA: EIKO
AKA: SETAD
AKA: Setad Ejraei Emam
AKA: Setad-E Ejraei-E Farman-E Hazrat-E Emam
AKA: Setad-E Farman-Ejraei-Ye Emam
Location: Khaled Stamboli St., Tehran, Iran
Entity: Ghadir Investment Company
Location: 341 West Mirdamad Boulevard, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: P.O. Box 19696, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.ghadir-invest.com
Entity: Ghaed Bassir Petrochemical Products Company
AKA: Ghaed Bassir
Location: No. 15, Palizvani (7th) Street, Gandhi (South) Avenue, Tehran  1517655711, Iran
Alt. Location: Km 10 of Khomayen Road, Golpayegan, Iran
Website: http://www.gbpc.net
Entity: Golden Resources Trading Company L.L.C.
AKA: GRTC
Location: 9th Floor, Office No. 905, Khalid Al Attar Tower 1, Sheikh Zayed Road, After Crown Plaza Hotel, Al Wasl Area, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Alt. Location: Postal Box 34489, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Alt. Location: Postal Box 14358, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Entity: Hormoz Oil Refining Company
Location: Next To The Current Bandar Abbas Refinery, Bandar Abbas City, Iran
Entity: Iran & Shargh Company
AKA: Iran And East Company
AKA: Iran And Shargh Company
AKA: Iranoshargh Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Iran Va Shargh
Location: 827, North Of Seyedkhandan Bridge, Shariati Street, P.O. Box 13185-1445, Tehran  16616, Iran
Alt. Location: No. 41, Next To 23rd Alley, South Gandi St., Vanak Square, Tehran  15179, Iran
Website: http://www.iranoshargh.com
Entity: Iran & Shargh Leasing Company
AKA: Iran And East Leasing Company
AKA: Iran And Shargh Leasing Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Lizing-E Iran Va Shargh
Location: 1st Floor, No. 33, Shahid Atefi Alley, Opposite Mellat Park, Vali-E-Asr Street, Tehran  1967933759, Iran
Website: http://www.isleasingco.com
Entity: Marjan Petrochemical Company
AKA: Marjan Methanol Company
Location: Ground Floor, No. 39, Meftah/Garmsar West Alley, Shiraz (South) Street, Molla Sadra Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: Post Office Box 19935-561, Tehran, Iran
Entity: MCS Engineering
AKA: Efficient Provider Services Gmbh
Location: Karlstrasse 21, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen  46535, Germany
Entity: MCS International Gmbh
AKA: Mannesman Cylinder Systems
AKA: MCS Technologies Gmbh
Location: Karlstrasse 23-25, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen  46535, Germany
Website: http://www.mcs-tch.vom
Entity: Mellat Insurance Company
Location: No. 48, Haghani Street, Vanak Square, Before Jahan-Kodak Cross, Tehran  1517973913, Iran
Alt. Location: No. 40, Shahid Haghani Express Way, Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: No. 9, Niloofar Street, Sharabyani Avenue, Taavon Boulevard, Shahr-E-Ziba, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: 72 Hillview Court, Woking, Surrey  Gu22 7qw, United Kingdom
Alt. Location: No. 697 Saeeidi Alley, Crossroads College, Enghelab St., Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.mellatinsurance.com
Entity: Modaber
AKA: Modaber (A.K.A. Modaber Investment Company
AKA: Tadbir Industrial Holding Company
Entity: Oil Industry Investment Company
AKA: O.I.I.C.
Location: No. 83, Sepahbod Gharani Street, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.oiic-ir.com
Entity: Omid Rey Civil & Construction Company
AKA: Omid Development And Construction
AKA: Omid Rey Civil And Construction Company
AKA: Omid Rey Renovation And Development Co.
Website: http://www.omidrey.com
Entity: One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd.
AKA: One Class Incorporated
Location: Cape Town, South Africa
Entity: One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd.
AKA: One Vision 5
Location: 3rd Floor, Tygervalley Chambers, Bellville, Cape Town  7530, South Africa
Alt. Location: Canal Walk, P.O. Box 17, Century City, Milnerton  7446, South Africa
Registration ID: 2002/022757/07 (South Africa)
Entity: Pardis Investment Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Sarmayegozari-E Pardis
Location: Unit D4 and C4, 4th Floor, Building 29 Africa, Corner of 25th Street, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran
Entity: Pars MCS
AKA: Pars MCS Co
AKA: Pars MCS Company
Location: 2nd Floor, No. 4, Sasan Dead End, Afriqa Avenue, After Esfandiar, Crossroads, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: No. 5 Sasan Alley, Atefi Sharghi St., Afrigha Boulevard, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: Oshtorjan Industrial Zone, Zob-E Ahan Highway, Isafahan, Iran
Website: http://www.parsmcs.com
Entity: Pars Oil Co.
AKA: Pars Oil
AKA: Sherkat Naft Pars Sahami Aam
Location: No. 346, Pars Oil Company Building, Modarres Highway, East Mirdamad Boulevard, Tehran  1549944511, Iran
Alt. Location: Postal Box 14155-1473, Tehran  159944511, Iran
Website: http://www.parsoilco.com
Entity: Persia Oil & Gas Industry Development Co.
AKA: Persia Oil And Gas Industry Development Co.
AKA: Tose Sanat-E Naft Va Gas Persia
Location: 7th Floor, No. 346, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: Ground Floor, No. 14, Saba Street, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.pogidc.com
Entity: Polynar Company
Location: Polynar Company, No. 58, St. 14, Qanbarzadeh Avenue, Resalat Highway, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.polynar.com
Entity: Rey Investment Company
Location: 2nd And 3rd Floors, No. 14, Saba Boulevard, After Esfandiar Crossroad, Africa Boulevard, Tehran  1918973657, Iran
Website: http://www.rey-co.com
Entity: Rey Niru Engineering Company
AKA: Rey Niroo Engineering Company
Website: http://www.reyniroo.com
Entity: Reyco Gmbh
AKA: Reyco Gmbh Germany
Location: Karlstrasse 19, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen  46535, Germany
Entity: Rishmak Productive & Exports Company
AKA: Rishmak Company
AKA: Rishmak Export And Manufacturing P.J.S.
AKA: Rishmak Production And Export Company
AKA: Rishmak Productive And Exports Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Tolid Va Saderat-E Rishmak
Location: Rishmak Cross Rd., 3rd Km. Of Amir Kabir Road, Shiraz  71365, Iran
Entity: Royal Arya Co.
AKA: Aria Royal Construction Company
Location: Iran
Entity: Sadaf Petrochemical Assaluyeh Company
AKA: Sadaf Asaluyeh Co.
AKA: Sadaf Chemical Asaluyeh Company
AKA: Sadaf Petrochemical Assaluyeh Investment Service
Location: Assaluyeh, South Pars Special Economy/Energy Zone, Iran
Entity: Tadbir Brokerage Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Kargozari-E Tadbirgaran-E Farda
AKA: Tadbirgaran Farda Brokerage Company
AKA: Tadbirgaran-E Farda Brokerage Company
AKA: Tadbirgarane Farda Mercantile Exchange Co.
Location: Unit C2, 2nd Floor, Building No. 29, Corner Of 25th Street, After Jahan Koudak, Cross Road Africa Street, Tehran  15179, Iran
Website: http://www.tadbirbroker.com
Entity: Tadbir Construction Development Company
AKA: Goruh-E Tose-E Sakhteman-E Tadbir
AKA: Tadbir Building Expansion Group
AKA: Tadbir Housing Development Group
Location: Block 1, Mehr Passage, 4th Street, Iran Zamin Boulevard,  Shahrak Qods, Tehran, Iran
Entity: Tadbir Economic Development Group
AKA: Tadbir Group
Location: 16 Avenue Bucharest, Tehran, Iran
Entity: Tadbir Energy Development Group Co.
Location: 6th Floor, Mirdamad Avenue, No. 346, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.tadbirenergy.com
Entity: Tadbir Investment Company
Location: Tehran, Iran
Entity: Tosee Eqtesad Ayandehsazan Company
AKA: Teaco
AKA: Tosee Eghtesad Ayandehsazan Company
Location: 39 Gandhi Avenue, Tehran  1517883115, Iran
Entity: Zarin Rafsanjan Cement Company
AKA: Rafsanjan Cement Company
AKA: Zarrin Rafsanjan Cement Company
Location: 2nd Floor, No. 67, North Sindokht Street, West Dr. Fatemi Avenue, Tehran  1411953943, Iran
Website: http://www.zarrincement.com
To see a chart of Imam Khomeini’s international financial network, click this link