Category Archives: #StopIran

Obama: ‘No Boots in Iraq, er…Just Kidding’

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One keynote: There will be a selected coalition meeting on troop operations and most stupid and weird and perhaps expected, the White House is including Russia, who was never in the coalition but worse, the White House is including Iran…..WTH…right?

September of 2014, Islamic State taunted Barack Obama about fighting them on the ground in Iraq. The recommendation for troops was recommended today and the White House is likely to accept the request.

This will not be an easy procedure as there is only a 2 page thinly crafted AUMF, Authorization for Use of Military Force. Congress has not approved this since it was dispatched for countless reasons such as the timeline, the funding and the strategy. Another AUMF is in order to advance any operation barely defined by Secretary of Defense Carter.

The chief spokesman for the self-named “Islamic State” (IS), also known as Isis, has given the clearest indication yet that his fighters would actually welcome a ground war in Iraq and Syria against US troops.

In a 42-minute audio message uploaded to the internet the group’s Syrian-born spokesman, who has taken the adopted name of Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, mocks recent US air strikes and the moves to build an international coalition against Islamic State.

Addressing President Obama, the spokesman says: “Is this all you are capable of doing in this campaign of yours? Are America and all its allies… unable to come down to the ground?”

Statement on the U.S. Military Strategy in the Middle East and the Counter-ISIL Campaign before the Senate Armed Services Committee

10/27/2015 10:37 AM CDT

Statement on the U.S. Military Strategy in the Middle East and the Counter-ISIL Campaign before the Senate Armed Services Committee

Testimony as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Washington, D.C., October 27, 2015
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee: thanks for inviting us to come here before you to discuss our counter-ISIL campaign in Iraq and Syria, and along the way to address some of the concerns, Mr. Chairman, that you raised and to share with you, Senator Reed, some of the plans and initiatives that the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I are formulating for our campaign in both Iraq and Syria. This is the first time for me appearing before this Committee alongside Chairman Joe Dunford, who was just in the region last week, as was noted. I’m grateful to Joe for answering my and the President’s call to step down from what every Marine knows is a higher position – namely Commandant to the Marine Corps to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – and to this Committee for confirming Joe. Thank you. I’m glad to have you here with me today. Before I turn to the subject of today’s hearing, I want to reiterate – as I’ve said consistently since March and continue to believe – that Washington needs to come together behind a multi-year budget deal that supports our defense strategy, the troops and their families, and all elements of America’s national security and strength. I understand significant progress was made on this overnight and I am looking forward to reviewing the details, but I welcome this major positive development and applaud the members of this Committee for what you’re doing to help us get there. The Middle East presents a kaleidoscope of challenges, but there, as everywhere, our actions and strong military posture are guided by what’s in America’s interests. That’s our North Star. And amid this region’s complexity and uncertainty, those interests are to deter aggression; to bolster the security of our friends and allies, especially Israel; to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf; to check Iran’s malign influence even as we monitor the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; and, to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. This last one, ISIL, poses a threat to our people and to friendly countries not only in the Middle East but around the world. Today, I will first outline the changes in the execution of our strategy that we have considered, and are now pursuing militarily, to gather battlefield momentum in the fight against ISIL. Then I will address what Russia is doing in Syria, and why we won’t let it interfere with our campaign against ISIL. When I last spoke to this committee about our counter-ISIL campaign and its nine lines of essential military and non-military effort, I made three things clear about the military aspects – first, that we will deliver ISIL a lasting defeat; second, that truly lasting success would require enabling capable, motivated local forces on the ground, recognizing that this will take time and new diplomatic energy; and, third, that our strategy’s execution can and must and will be strengthened. All of that is still true. Our determination is unchanged, even as the situation continues to evolve, and we continue to adapt to execute our campaign more effectively. And today I’d like to elaborate on the third point and explain how we’re adapting our campaign to do more – reinforcing what we know works. The changes we’re pursuing can be described by what I call the “three R’s” – Raqqa, Ramadi, and Raids. Before I explain what they mean, let me also note that I took actions to streamline command-and-control of the counter-ISIL military campaign by assigning the entire effort to a single general officer, Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland, where in the urgency of the early phase of the campaign last year several layers were added to the general officer already present in Iraq. The first “R” is Raqqa, ISIL’s stronghold and administrative capital. We have been clear for some time that we need to keep up pressure on Raqqa, and that to that end we will support moderate Syrian forces fighting ISIL that have made territorial gains near Raqqa – indeed, some of them are within 30 miles of Raqqa today. The Syrian Arab Coalition, which we plan to strengthen through our new equipping approach – more on that in a moment – will work over time with other Syrian anti-ISIL forces to push towards Raqqa. To the south, we plan to further strengthen our partner, Jordan. And from the skies above, we expect to intensify our air campaign, including with additional U.S. and coalition aircraft, to target ISIL with a higher and heavier rate of strikes. This will include more strikes against ISIL high-value targets as our intelligence improves; also its oil enterprise, which is a critical pillar of ISIL’s financial infrastructure. As I said last Friday, we’ve already begun to ramp up these deliberate strikes. Part of this pressure includes our new approach to the Syria train-and-equip program. I, like President Obama and members of this committee, was disappointed with that program’s results. We accordingly examined the program this summer, and have since changed it. I use the word change – not end – change the program. While the old approach was to train and equip completely new forces outside of Syria before sending them into the fight, the new approach is to work with vetted leaders of groups that are already fighting ISIL, and provide equipment and some training to them and support their operations with airpower. This approach builds on successes that local Syrian Arab and Syrian Kurdish forces have made along Syria’s northern border to retake and hold ground from ISIL with the help of U.S. airstrikes and equipment resupplies. If done in concert as we intend, all these actions on the ground and from the air should help shrink ISIL’s territory into a smaller and smaller area and create new opportunities for targeting ISIL – ultimately denying this evil movement any safe haven in its supposed heartland. The second “R” is Ramadi, the capital of Iraq’s Anbar province, which serves as a critical example of the Abadi government’s commitment to work with local Sunni communities with our help to retake and hold ground from ISIL and in turn to build momentum to eventually go northward to Mosul. Under Prime Minister Abadi’s leadership, the Iraqis have begun to use American-made F-16s to support counter-ISIL operations, and have empowered capable battlefield commanders to step forward. As we see more progress towards assembling capable and motivated Iraqi forces under Baghdad’s control and including Sunni elements, we are willing to continue to provide more enabling capabilities and fire support to help them succeed. However, the Iraqi government and security forces will have to take certain steps militarily to make sure our progress sticks. We need to see more in the direction of multi-sectarian governance and defense leadership. For example, we’ve given the Iraqi government two battalions’ worth of equipment for mobilizing Sunni tribal forces; as we continue to provide this support, the Iraqi government must ensure it is distributed effectively. If local Sunni forces aren’t sufficiently equipped, regularly paid, and empowered as co-equal members of the Iraqi Security Forces, ISIL’s defeats in Anbar will only be temporary. The third and final “R” is raids, signaling that we won’t hold back from supporting capable partners in opportunistic attacks against ISIL, or conducting such missions directly, whether by strikes from the air or direct action on the ground. Last week’s rescue operation was led by Iraqi Kurdish forces, with U.S. advisers in support. One of those accompanying advisors, Master Sergeant Joshua Wheeler, heroically acted to ensure the overall success of the mission and lost his life in the process. The death of any service member is a tragedy, and as I told his family and teammates this weekend, we offer our condolences to Master Sergeant Wheeler’s loved ones for their loss. While our mission in Iraq is to train, advise, and assist our Iraqi partners, in situations such as that operation – where we have actionable intelligence and a capable partner force – we want to support our partners and we will. At the same time, the raid on Abu Sayyaf’s home, and strikes against Junaid Hussain and most recently Sanafi al-Nasr, should all serve notice to ISIL and other terrorist leaders that once we locate them, no target is beyond our reach As we’ve looked at how to gather momentum and adapt to the changing battlefield, some have discussed putting a buffer zone, humanitarian zone, or no-fly zone in Syria. We have analyzed various options and the political and military requirements of each. These options are complex and raise some challenges, which I am prepared to discuss in answer to your questions. Let me now turn to Russia’s involvement in Syria. To be clear, we are not cooperating with Russia, and we’re not letting Russia impact the pace or scope of our campaign against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. While we negotiated a document on safety of flight with the Russian Ministry of Defense, we do not align ourselves more broadly with their military actions, because instead of singularly attacking ISIL, as they said they were going to do, they are primarily attacking the Syrian opposition, as the Chairman has noted, which further fuels the tragic civil war there. Their actions suggest a doubling-down on their longstanding relationship with Assad – sending advisers, artillery, and aviation to enable and support the Assad regime and Iranian forces in attacking moderates who oppose the regime and are essential to Syria’s political transition. And it appears the vast majority of their strikes – by some estimates as high as 85 to 90 percent – use dumb bombs, which obviously increases the possibility of civilian casualties. So, as Russia acts in a coalition of two with Iran at its side, the United States will continue to strengthen our 65-nation global coalition. Even as we’ve reached an understanding with the Russians on safety protocols for coalition pilots over Syria, we will keep prosecuting our counter-ISIL campaign unabated. We will keep supporting the moderate Syrian opposition, along with our other commitments to friends and allies in the region. And, consistent with our strong and balanced approach towards Russian aggression elsewhere in the world, including NATO and Ukraine, we will keep the door open for Russia to contribute to efforts toward a political solution, in which – which in the final answer – analysis – is the only answer to the Syrian conflict. I have discussed the military strategy and accompanying campaign, but before I conclude, I remind the Committee that defeating ISIL and protecting America requires coordinated efforts across all of the so-called nine lines of effort – to include supporting effective governance in Iraq, enhancing intelligence collection, disrupting ISIL’s financing, countering ISIL’s messaging, stopping the flow of foreign fighters, providing humanitarian support, and protecting our homeland – where other departments and agencies of our government have the lead. Thank you.

U.S. Spy vs. Israeli Spy on Iran

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Some back story events leading up to the broken relationship between the Obama White House and Israel.

Spy vs. Spy, the Fraying U.S Israel Ties

WSJ: The U.S. closely monitored Israel’s military bases and eavesdropped on secret communications in 2012, fearing its longtime ally might try to carry out a strike on Fordow, Iran’s most heavily fortified nuclear facility.

Nerves frayed at the White House after senior officials learned Israeli aircraft had flown in and out of Iran in what some believed was a dry run for a commando raid on the site. Worried that Israel might ignite a regional war, the White House sent a second aircraft carrier to the region and readied attack aircraft, a senior U.S. official said, “in case all hell broke loose.”

The two countries, nursing a mutual distrust, each had something to hide. U.S. officials hoped to restrain Israel long enough to advance negotiations on a nuclear deal with Iran that the U.S. had launched in secret. U.S. officials saw Israel’s strike preparations as an attempt to usurp American foreign policy.

Instead of talking to each other, the allies kept their intentions secret. To figure out what they weren’t being told, they turned to their spy agencies to fill gaps. They employed deception, not only against Iran, but against each other. After working in concert for nearly a decade to keep Iran from an atomic bomb, the U.S. and Israel split over the best means: diplomacy, covert action or military strikes.

Personal strains between President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu erupted at their first Oval Office meeting in 2009, and an accumulation of grievances in the years since plunged relations between the two countries into crisis.

This Wall Street Journal account of the souring of U.S.-Israel relations over Iran is based on interviews with nearly two dozen current and former senior U.S. and Israeli officials.

U.S. and Israeli officials say they want to rebuild trust but acknowledge it won’t be easy. Mr. Netanyahu reserves the right to continue covert action against Iran’s nuclear program, said current and former Israeli officials, which could put the spy services of the U.S. and Israel on a collision course.

A shaky start

Messrs. Obama and Netanyahu shared common ground on Iran when they first met in 2007. Mr. Netanyahu, then the leader of Israel’s opposition party, the right-wing Likud, discussed with Mr. Obama, a Democratic senator, how to discourage international investment in Iran’s energy sector. Afterward, Mr. Obama introduced legislation to that end.

Suspicions grew during the 2008 presidential race after Mr. Netanyahu spoke with some congressional Republicans who described Mr. Obama as pro-Arab, Israeli officials said. The content of the conversations later found its way back to the White House, senior Obama administration officials said.

Soon after taking office in January 2009, Mr. Obama took steps to allay Israeli concerns, including instructing the Pentagon to develop military options against Iran’s Fordow facility, which was built into a mountain. The president also embraced an existing campaign of covert action against Iran, expanding cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency and Mossad, the Israeli spy agency.

Mossad leaders compared the covert campaign to a 10-floor building: The higher the floor, they said, the more invasive the operation. CIA and Mossad worked together on operations on the lower floors. But the Americans made clear they had no interest in moving higher—Israeli proposals to bring down Iran’s financial system, for example, or even its regime.

Some covert operations were run unilaterally by Mossad, such as the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, according to U.S. officials.

The first Oval Office meeting between Messrs. Obama and Netanyahu, in May 2009—weeks after Mr. Netanyahu became prime minister—was difficult for both sides. After the meeting, Mr. Obama’s aides called Ron Dermer, Mr. Netanyahu’s adviser, to coordinate their statements. Mr. Dermer told them it was too late; Mr. Netanyahu was already briefing reporters. “We kind of looked at each other and said, ‘I guess we’re not coordinating our messages,’ ” said Tommy Vietor, a former administration official who was there.

In 2010, the risk of covert action became clear. A computer virus dubbed Stuxnet, deployed jointly by the U.S. and Israel to destroy Iranian centrifuges used to process uranium, had inadvertently spread across the Internet. The Israelis wanted to launch cyberattacks against a range of Iranian institutions, according to U.S. officials. But the breach made Mr. Obama more cautious, officials said, for fear of triggering Iranian retaliation, or damaging the global economy if a virus spread uncontrollably.

Israel questioned whether its covert operations were enough, said aides to Mr. Netanyahu. Stuxnet had only temporarily slowed Tehran’s progress. “Cyber and other covert operations had their inherent limitations,” a senior Israeli official said, “and we reached those limitations.”

Mr. Netanyahu pivoted toward a military strike, raising anxiety levels in the White House.

The U.S. Air Force analyzed the arms and aircraft needed to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities and concluded Israel didn’t have the right equipment. The U.S. shared the findings, in part, to steer the Israelis from a military strike.

The Israelis weren’t persuaded and briefed the U.S. on an attack plan: Cargo planes would land in Iran with Israeli commandos on board who would “blow the doors, and go in through the porch entrance” of Fordow, a senior U.S. official said. The Israelis planned to sabotage the nuclear facility from inside.

Pentagon officials thought it was a suicide mission. They pressed the Israelis to give the U.S. advance warning. The Israelis were noncommittal.

“Whether this was all an effort to try to pressure Obama, or whether Israel was really getting close to a decision, I don’t know,” said Michéle Flournoy, who at the time was undersecretary of defense for policy.

Mr. Obama, meanwhile, was moving toward diplomacy. In December 2011, the White House secretly used then-Sen. John Kerry to sound out Omani leaders about opening a back channel to the Iranians.

At the same time, the White House pressed the Israelis to scale back their assassination campaign and turned down their requests for more aggressive covert measures, U.S. officials said.

The president spoke publicly about his willingness to use force as a last resort to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon—“I don’t bluff,” Mr. Obama said in March 2012—but some of Mr. Netanyahu’s advisers weren’t convinced.

In early 2012, U.S. spy agencies told the White House about a flurry of meetings that Mr. Netanyahu convened with top security advisers. The meetings covered everything from mission logistics to the political implications of a military strike, Israeli officials said.

Warning signs

U.S. spy agencies stepped up satellite surveillance of Israeli aircraft movements. They detected when Israeli pilots were put on alert and identified moonless nights, which would give the Israelis better cover for an attack. They watched the Israelis practice strike missions and learned they were probing Iran’s air defenses, looking for ways to fly in undetected, U.S. officials said.

New intelligence poured in every day, much of it fragmentary or so highly classified that few U.S. officials had a complete picture. Officials now say many jumped to the mistaken conclusion that the Israelis had made a dry run.

At the time, concern and confusion over Israel’s intentions added to the sense of urgency inside the White House for a diplomatic solution.

The White House decided to keep Mr. Netanyahu in the dark about the secret Iran talks, believing he would leak word to sabotage them. There was little goodwill for Mr. Netanyahu among Mr. Obama’s aides who perceived the prime minister as supportive of Republican challenger Mitt Romney in the 2012 campaign.

Mr. Netanyahu would get briefed on the talks, White House officials concluded, only if it looked like a deal could be reached.

The first secret meeting between U.S. and Iranian negotiators, held in July 2012, was a bust. But “nobody was willing to throw it overboard by greenlighting Israeli strikes just when the process was getting started,” a former senior Obama administration official said.

Israeli officials approached their U.S. counterparts over the summer about obtaining military hardware useful for a strike, U.S. officials said.

At the top of the list were V-22 Ospreys, aircraft that take off and land like helicopters but fly like fixed-wing planes. Ospreys don’t need runways, making them ideal for dropping commandos behind enemy lines.

The Israelis also sounded out officials about obtaining the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, the U.S. military’s 30,000-pound bunker-busting bomb, which was designed to destroy Fordow.

Mr. Netanyahu wanted “somebody in the administration to show acquiescence, if not approval” for a military strike, said Gary Samore, who served for four years as Mr. Obama’s White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction. “The message from the Obama administration was: ‘We think this is a big mistake.’ ”

White House officials decided not to provide the equipment.

Messrs. Obama and Netanyahu spoke in September 2012, and Mr. Obama emerged convinced Israel wouldn’t strike on the eve of the U.S. presidential election.

By the following spring, senior U.S. officials concluded the Israelis weren’t serious about a commando raid on Fordow and may have been bluffing. When the U.S. offered to sell the Ospreys, Israel said it didn’t have the money.

Former Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who championed a strike, said Mr. Netanyahu had come close to approving a military operation against Iran. But Israel’s military chiefs and cabinet members were reluctant, according to Israeli officials.

While keeping the Omani talks secret, U.S. officials briefed the Israelis on the parallel international negotiations between Iran and major world powers under way in early 2013. Those talks, which made little headway, were led on the U.S. side by State Department diplomat Wendy Sherman.

Robert Einhorn, at the time an arms control adviser at the State Department, said that during the briefings, Mr. Netanyahu’s advisers wouldn’t say what concessions they could live with. “It made us feel like nothing was going to be good enough for them,” Mr. Einhorn said.

U.S. spy agencies were monitoring Israeli communications to see if the Israelis had caught wind of the secret talks. In September 2013, the U.S. learned the answer.

Yaakov Amidror, Mr. Netanyahu’s national security adviser at the time, had come to Washington in advance of a Sept. 30 meeting between Messrs. Netanyahu and Obama.

On Sept. 27, Mr. Amidror huddled with White House national security adviser Susan Rice in her office when she told him that Mr. Obama was on the phone in a groundbreaking call with Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani.

Mr. Amidror had his own surprise. During a separate meeting in the Roosevelt Room, he told several of Mr. Obama’s top advisers that Israel had identified the tail numbers of the unmarked U.S. government planes that ferried negotiators to Muscat, Oman, the site of the secret talks, U.S. officials said.

Mr. Amidror, who declined to comment on the White House discussions, said that it was insulting for Obama administration officials to think “they could go to Oman without taking our intelligence capabilities into account.” He called the decision to hide the Iran talks from Israel a big mistake.

U.S. officials said they were getting ready to tell the Israelis about the talks, which advanced only after Mr. Rouhani came to office. During the Sept. 30 meeting with Mr. Netanyahu, the president acknowledged the secret negotiations. The secrecy cemented Israel’s distrust of Mr. Obama’s intentions, Israeli officials said.

Mr. Samore, the former White House official, said he believed it was a mistake to keep Israel in the dark for so long. Mr. Einhorn said: “The lack of early transparency reinforced Israel’s suspicions and had an outsize negative impact on Israeli thinking about the talks.”

Israel pushed for the U.S. to be more open about the Iran negotiations. Ms. Rice, however, pulled back on consultations with her new Israeli counterpart, Yossi Cohen, who took over as Mr. Netanyahu’s national security adviser, according to U.S. and Israeli officials.
In exchanges with the White House, U.S. officials said, Mr. Cohen wouldn’t budge from demanding Iran give up its centrifuges and uranium-enrichment program. Israeli officials said they feared any deviation would be taken by the U.S. as a green light for more concessions.

In one meeting, Mr. Cohen indicated Mr. Netanyahu could accept a deal allowing Iran to keep thousands of centrifuges, U.S. officials said. Soon after, Mr. Cohen called to say he had misspoken. Neither side was prepared to divulge their bottom line.

In November 2013, when the interim agreement was announced, Mr. Samore was in Israel, where, he said, the Israelis “felt blindsided” by the terms. U.S. officials said the details came together so quickly that Ms. Sherman and her team didn’t have enough time to convey them all. Israeli officials said the Americans intentionally withheld information to prevent them from influencing the outcome.

Listening in

As talks began in 2014 on a final accord, U.S. intelligence agencies alerted White House officials that Israelis were spying on the negotiations. Israel denied any espionage against the U.S. Israeli officials said they could learn details, in part, by spying on Iran, an explanation U.S. officials didn’t believe.

Earlier this year, U.S. officials clamped down on what they shared with Israel about the talks after, they allege, Mr. Netanyahu’s aides leaked confidential information about the emerging deal.

When U.S. officials confronted the Israelis over the matter in a meeting, Israel’s then-minister of intelligence said he didn’t disclose anything from Washington’s briefings. The information, the minister said, came from “other means,” according to meeting participants.

Ms. Sherman told Mr. Cohen, Israel’s national security adviser: “You’re putting us in a very difficult position. We understand that you will find out what you can find out by your own means. But how can we tell you every single last thing when we know you’re going to use it against us?” according to U.S. officials who were there.

Mr. Netanyahu turned to congressional Republicans, one of his remaining allies with the power to affect the deal, Israeli officials said, but he couldn’t muster enough votes to block it.

U.S. officials now pledge to work closely with their Israeli counterparts to monitor Iran’s compliance with the international agreement.

But it is unclear how the White House will respond to any covert Israeli actions against Iran’s nuclear program, which current and former Israeli officials said were imperative to safeguard their country.

One clause in the agreement says the major powers will help the Iranians secure their facilities against sabotage. State Department officials said the clause wouldn’t protect Iranian nuclear sites from Israel.

Michael Hayden, a former director of the CIA, said the U.S. and Israel could nonetheless end up at odds.

“If we become aware of any Israeli efforts, do we have a duty to warn Iran?” Mr. Hayden said. “Given the intimacy of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, it’s going to be more complicated than ever.”

Captagon, the Drug of Choice by Iran/Hezbollah

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Syria is now the number one exporter and producer of the stimulant drug Fenethylline, marketed under the brand name Captagon. Drug experts say the Middle Eastern country has overtaken production from regional players such as Lebanon – who has encountered a 90 per cent drop in production from 2011. The stimulant drug, created in the 1960s and once used to treat ADHD, is cheap to manufacture and has allegedly been used by government and anti-government forces to fund weapons for the civil war.

Lebanon busts 2 tons of amphetamine on Saudi private jet

BEIRUT (AP) — A Lebanese official says Beirut airport authorities have foiled one of the country’s largest drug smuggling attempts, seizing two tons of amphetamine Captagon pills before they were loaded onto the private plane of a Saudi prince.

The official said the prince and four others have been detained Monday. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was authorized to give official statements.

Captagon manufacturing thrives in Lebanon and war-torn Syria, which have become a gateway for the drug to the Middle East and particularly the Gulf.

The U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime said in a 2014 report that the amphetamine market is on the rise in the Middle East, with busts mostly in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria accounting for more than 55 percent of amphetamines seized worldwide.

*** In our 2013 study we revealed that Hezbollah operatives were trafficking in counterfeit medications, and in particular manufacturing and selling fake Captagon tablets, with Iranian assistance and guidance. It appears that sales of this counterfeit drug in the Middle East have only expanded since then, as Hezbollah has strengthened its cooperation with Syrian, Lebanese, Saudi and Palestinian drug dealers.

Hezbollah’s takeover of extensive territories in Lebanon, especially along the Syrian border in the Beka’a Valley region in the east of the country, has created pseudo-autonomous regions for the organization. The local population has effectively been subjugated to the terrorist group, with its norms and enforcement measures, and the Lebanese government kept away from these areas.

Hezbollah’s transformation into a major player in Lebanese politics, its participation in the coalition government and its control over key senior positions in the country’s government and apparatuses have only served to strengthen its freedom of action in the territories under its control.

Deeper dive:

Prior to the events in Syria, Hezbollah and al-Qaeda fighters had never met face to face. They clashed for the first time in the Syrian arena. For the Islamist fighters, Hezbollah is fighting under the influence of Captagon. Hezbollah fighters, on the other hand, believe their adversaries are “crazy, carrying spoons in their pockets in preparation for a meal with the prophet.”

“Hezbollah members are takfiris,” according to al-Qaeda fighters, and so are the members of the “international jihad” as perceived by their arch-enemy and many others. The two organizations had never fought each other before Syria. When the opportunity came, they clashed on several fronts in that country, in Ghouta, Aleppo, and Qalamoun. Both sides lost men and the upper hand went to Hezbollah. However, al-Qaeda’s fighters believe that “losing a battle does not mean losing the war…for we are the victorious sect.” The limited confrontation was a chance for both sides to create an image of the other.

Hezbollah’s fighters do not underestimate their opponents from al-Qaeda and vice versa. They both give their adversaries their dues, without ignoring the generally negative landscape. Speaking to Al-Akhbar, a Lebanese al-Nusra Front fighter, who used to be stationed at al-Sahl front and Rima Farms in Qalamoun said, “some Hezbollah fighters looked like they were possessed.”

“I was with a brother during the fighting,” he explained. “Hezbollah fighters were facing us within our line of fire. We would shoot at them but they would not back down. We hit three of them but they continued to descend. Only a crazy person would do that. Their courage is not normal. I admit that.” However, his companion interjected and said “it is certain that they are using drugs, Captagon.” But how about accusations of drug use by his side? “Pills are forbidden by our Sharia,” he declared. The reply came from the original interviewee: “Their side also forbids pills. Even if they were your enemies do not underestimate them. I saw them with my two eyes.”

News of the recent confrontations in Qalamoun is the talk of the town in a Bekaa village, which became a refuge for a good number of fighters fleeing the confrontations. What is constant, by everyone’s account, is that most fighters fled from the battles with the Syrian army and Hezbollah, with the exception of al-Nusra and the [Salafist] Green Brigade. Fighters from the two al-Qaeda related organizations lasted a few days, before withdrawing from one village to another. Despite this, there are many who boast about “individual heroism,” which did not impact the course of the battle.

A fighter who was injured in al-Sahl battle and transferred to a hospital in Ersal explained that Hezbollah used “heavy firepower, which made the sky rain fire. They also depended on traitors among us.”

“There are many differences between Hezbollah and al-Qaeda members,” explained a young man from West Bekaa who fought inside Syria. “They are also more numerous and their weapons are more modern and more powerful. They have warplanes, tanks, Burkan rockets, and other types of rockets, which we know nothing about. They also have their uniforms and meals, which cost thousands of [US] dollars. On the other hand, al-Qaeda fighters need to borrow money and pay for their weapons and ammunition from their own pockets.”

The Syrian army is also in possession of advanced weaponry. Why is the situation different with Hezbollah? “The party’s creed is corrupt, of course. But the blind faith of its soldiers makes them bolder during the battles,” he answered quickly. Does he know anything about the party? “The party is takfiri and will not hesitate to slaughter every one of us.” But you are the ones doing the butchering “to get closer to God.” He replied: “We butcher to terrorise our enemy and they also butcher.”

The picture does not look different in the other camp. “Al-Qaeda is a paper monster, magnified by the media,” a Hezbollah fighter told Al-Akhbar. The thirtysomething fighter, who participated in the battles of al-Qusayr and Qalamoun against the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Salafis, explained: “FSA members were amateurs. The Salafis were more vicious because of their ideology.” However, “they are unorganized and none of their fighters could withstand heavy fire, even if their hearts were made of stone.”

Another [Hezbollah] fighter in Qalamoun spoke about the “madness” of al-Qaeda fighters. “They attack by the dozens and get killed by the dozens, without interrupting their flow, until your finger gets tired from pulling the trigger,” he explained. But how did he recognize them as Islamists belonging to al-Qaeda? “From their long beards, shaved moustaches, and banner,” he replied. “They are only superior in their security operations, car bombs, and suicide bombers.”

A third member of Hezbollah spoke about “al-Qaeda’s mastery and its superiority in killing and brutality only in the areas they control. They have no chance in a direct confrontation with us.”

Some Hezbollah fighters do not see a difference between al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS). They believe “they are all takfiris and our battle with them is existential.” One fighter described “the unprecedented courage of some al-Qaeda fighters. They refused to surrender in a clash inside a hospital in Deir Atiya after we surrounded them…They kept fighting until they were all killed after one of them blew himself up on one of the hospital floors.”

Other Hezbollah fighters spoke about “individual acts of heroism by Islamist fighters. But ultimately, they do not fight as one.” Another explained: “There is no distribution of tasks or plans of attack or defense…Fighting for them is ‘hit-and-miss,’ although many are excellent in individual combat, due to the fighting experience they accumulated from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya.”

The clash between Hezbollah and al-Qaeda is a war that both sides are certain is a necessary evil. Despite acknowledging the adversary’s qualities, negative and positive, this will not change the fact they are both fighting an existential war. Each side is doing what it can to eliminate the other, but it is certain that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah are opposites and will never join each other.

Russia is WAY too close to Compromising Communications Cables

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Russian aggression and look who is in the White House…..chilling….

Submarine Cable Map

PopularScience: For the past five years, John Rennie has braved the towering waves of the North Atlantic Ocean to keep your e-mail coming to you. As chief submersible engineer aboard the Wave Sentinel, part of the fleet operated by U.K.-based undersea installation and maintenance firm Global Marine Systems, Rennie–a congenial, 6’4″, 57-year-old Scotsman–patrols the seas, dispatching a remotely operated submarine deep below the surface to repair undersea cables. The cables, thick as fire hoses and packed with fiber optics, run everywhere along the seafloor, ferrying phone and Web traffic from continent to continent at the speed of light.

The cables regularly fail. On any given day, somewhere in the world there is the nautical equivalent of a hit and run when a cable is torn by fishing nets or sliced by dragging anchors. If the mishap occurs in the Irish Sea, the North Sea or the North Atlantic, Rennie comes in to splice the break together.

On one recent expedition, Rennie and his crew spent 12 days bobbing in about 250 feet of water 15 miles off the coast of Cornwall in southern England looking for a broken cable linking the U.K. and Ireland. Munching fresh doughnuts (a specialty of the ship’s cook), Rennie and his team worked 12-hour shifts exploring the rocky seafloor with a six-ton, $10-million remotely operated vehicle (ROV) affectionately known as “the Beast.”

As  Russia scopes undersea cables, a shadow of the United States’ Cold War past

WaPo: On Sunday, the New York Times reported that Russian submarines and spy ships are operating near vital undersea fiber-optic cables that transmit the majority of the planet’s communication and economic data.

The fear, the report stipulates, is that Russia might be looking for weak spots that could be attacked and severed during a conflict.

Though the tactics and threat are reminiscent of the Cold War, the Russians appear to be taking a page out of the book that the U.S. Navy and the NSA wrote in the 1970s in a series of undersea wire-tapping missions that became known as Operation Ivy Bells.

Briefly mentioned in the Times report, Operation Ivy Bells is written about extensively in the book “Blind Man’s Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage” by Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew. The missions used submarines to listen in on previously untapped Soviet “hard-lines” to glean information about Soviet ballistic missile submarine deployments and strategy.

In 1970, at the height of the Cold War, James Bradley, the director of undersea warfare at the Office of Naval intelligence dreamed up one of the most daring submarine spy missions in modern history. He wanted to send the specially outfitted 350ft nuclear-powered submarine, the Halibut, to land over the ocean floor under the Sea of Okhotsk and tap a phone line that connected the Soviet submarine base at Petropavlovsk to its Pacific Fleet headquarters near Vladivostok.

Besides the risk of international incident if Halibut was caught or detected, there was no evidence that the phone line even existed. The only evidence that Bradley had was the notion that the sub base in Petropavlovsk was probably required to give constant updates back to its higher headquarters. So Bradley, sitting in his Pentagon office at 3 a.m., thought back to his childhood, racking his brain to figure out where the Soviets might have laid their cables.

According to “Blind Man’s Bluff,” Bradley, in his predawn stupor, recalled from his youth written signs that had been posted along the Mississippi River to mark undersea cables. The signs, posted along the shore, were meant to prevent passing from hooking the cables with their anchors.

With this in mind, Bradley reasoned that there had to be similar signs near the shallower points on the Sea of Okhotsk.

So, with Bradley’s childhood in mind, “the most daring acts of tele-piracy of the Cold War” was born.

After an extensive multi-year refit that began in the late 60s, Halibut was ready to depart from Mare Island Naval Shipyard outside of San Francisco for Okhotsk in 1972. One of the sub’s most noticeable additions was a giant hump mounted behind its conning tower, a hump that was publicly declared as a hangar for a deep sea rescue vehicle but was actually a “decompression and lockout chamber” for the team of divers that would exit the sub to tap the Soviet cables.

So in October 1972, the crew of Halibut made its way across the Pacific, its older nuclear reactor pushing her across the sea at just over 10 knots. First the spy sub moved north to the Aleutian Islands, then past the Bering Straight and into the Sea of Okhotsk. The captain of the Halibut, Navy Cmdr. Jack McNish, had not told the crew where it was going—only that they were leaving home for three months and that they were searching for the remnants of a new Soviet infared anti-ship missile that the United States was desperately seeking a counter-measure for.

Once inside the Sea of Okhotsk, the Halibut slowly patrolled with its periscope up, scanning the coastline for Bradley’s signage that would mark the cables. And then, after a week of patrolling with no luck, the Halibut found a sign on the northern shore of the Sea of Okhotsk that said something to the extent of “Do Not Anchor. Cable Here” in Russian.

The Halibut, after locating the sign, launched a specially designed submersible or “fish,” that then proceeded to search for the cables. The fish had a very basic video camera, and a higher definition camera. While the video was relayed in real-time back to the submarine, the film from the camera had to be retrieved from the fish and subsequently developed while the Halibut was near the surface so that the sub’s dark room could properly vent or “snorkel” the chemicals used to develop the film.

Hours after the fish’s launch, footage began to come back of foot-long bumps in the sand, a sort of Morse code etched in the sea bottom. The Halibut had found the cables.

According to “Blind Man’s Bluff,” the fish was then retrieved and the film developed, revealing the Soviet cables strewn along the seafloor.

After identifying the cables, McNish maneuvered the Halibut well outside the 3-mile territorial limit of the Soviet Union and located a spot just above the cable where he could lower the submarine’s two massive anchors in a sort-of hover.

Using specially designed rubber wet suits that fit loosely and were pumped full of hot water to counter the freezing temperatures of the Sea of Okhotsk, the divers departed the Halibut armed with pneumatic air-guns to blow debris off the cables and emergency oxygen bottles in case their “umbilical cords” that connected them back to the Halibut were severed.

The wire-tap, according to “Blind Man’s Bluff,” was three-feet long and composed of a tape recorder and a lithium ion battery. A connector would wrap around the cable and draw out the words and data through induction. There was no cutting into the cable.

For the next few hours the recording device attached to the cable relayed Soviet communications back to a select group of spies aboard the Halibut who would then, after the completion of the mission and a successful return to port, send the tapes to Fort Meade, Md, where they would be subsequently analyzed.

With the tap successful, the Halibut then moved to its secondary mission of locating the Soviet missile fragments before returning to port. With the mission a success, Bradley saw a future filled with taps around the globe that could record for months and years continuously, without the presence of an American sub to collect the data.

In August 1972, the Halibut departed once more for the Sea Okhotsk to repeat the tap. This time, however, the sub was rigged with explosives in case the sub and her crew were ever compromised. This time too, according to Blind Man’s Bluff, McNish told his crew about their actual mission and the risks it entailed.

In the years following more submarines would be outfitted like Halibut, and they too would conduct similar wire-taps. Operation Ivy Bells had begun.

 

Iran Defying Iran Deal, WH and Kerry Still Trust ‘Em

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Iran holds 4 Americans in their prisons, while the Obama administration says the track for talks to have them released was separate from the Iran talks. Yet, it must be know, the United States actually holds several Iranians in our prisons and one such detainee Iran wants back badly.

Iran wants it both ways as noted with this scientist they demand to be released.

An Iranian-American engineer has been sentenced to more than eight years in prison for sending sensitive U.S. military documents to his native Iran.

U.S. prosecutors say Mozaffar Khazaee, who had worked as an employee of U.S. defense contractors, stole and shared with Iran information on U.S. military jet engine programs over the span of several years.

Khazaee, a 61-year-old dual citizen, was arrested in January 2014 as he tried to leave the United States with sensitive military documents in his luggage.

A swap is likely part of the obscure talks with John Kerry and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif.

The matter of the PMD’s (Possible Military Dimension) sites are still in dispute and Iran declares they are defying the JPOA by stating they will not remove the uranium stockpile. They will also not repurpose the heavy water reactor, both of which are stipulations of the JPOA.

“Any action regarding Arak and dispatching uranium abroad … will take place after the PMD file is closed,” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei wrote in a letter to President Hassan Rouhani.

The letter, published on Khamenei’s website, approved implementation of a nuclear deal agreed with world powers in July, subject to certain conditions.

Meanwhile, the waivers are being signed to lift selected sanctions against Iran, demonstrating the White House, the State Department and the National Security Councils as well as those Democrats in Congress have not said a single word about the contraventions of the P5+1 Iran agreement.

NEW YORK (Reuters) – The United States approved conditional sanctions waivers for Iran on Sunday, though it cautioned they will not take effect until Tehran has curbed its nuclear program as required under a historic nuclear deal reached in Vienna on July 14.

“I hereby direct you to take all necessary steps to give effect to the U.S. commitments with respect to sanctions described in (the Iran deal),” U.S. President Barack Obama said in a memo to the secretaries of state, treasury, commerce and energy released by the White House press office.

Several senior U.S. officials, who spoke to reporters on condition of anonymity, said actual implementation of the deal was still at least two months away. In addition to Washington’s conditional orders to suspend U.S. nuclear-related sanctions, U.S. officials said the United States, China and Iran were re-emphasizing their commitment to the redesign and reconstruction of the Arak research reactor so that it does not produce plutonium.

The fate of the Arak reactor was one of the toughest sticking points in the nearly two years of negotiations that led to the July agreement.

Other steps Iran must take include reducing the number of uranium-enrichment centrifuges it has in operation, cutting its enriched uranium stocks and answering U.N. questions about past activities that the West suspects were linked to work on nuclear weapons.

Kerry noted that the IAEA had already said Iran had met its obligation to provide answers and access to the agency.

The Democrats, the White House and the State Department have a real talent for ignoring threats, facts and actions when it comes to reality.

It is beyond dispute that each item in question for Iran and the JPOA, Iran is rupturing the agreement and Barack Obama is ignoring the infractions. Perhaps someone should begin to ask Hillary about the JPOA since it was her State Department that deployed Jake Sullivan to open the Iran doors to these talks…what is she thinking now?