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The First Refugee Resettlement Program, Medina

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Medina—The First Muslim Refugee Resettlement Program

Kilpatrick ~CrisisMagazine: With all the talk about the Syrian refugees, one point is often overlooked. Much of the debate focuses on the question of whether or not the refugees can be reliably vetted. If they can be certified as one hundred percent terrorist-free, then, presumably, the resettlement can safely proceed.

But even if every terrorist could be excluded from the ranks of the refugees, a problem would remain. Many analysts are concerned that the resettlement program might facilitate the growth of terrorist-tolerant communities in America. By “terrorist-tolerant” I don’t mean that its members are thinking every minute about what they can do to support jihad, but rather that they have come to take for granted things that aren’t assumed in other societies.

Terror, for instance. Nonie Darwish, a former Muslim who grew up in Egypt, puts it this way:

One of the reasons that the so-called moderate Muslims have become irrelevant … is that over the centuries they have become tolerant of Islamic terrorism and considered it as part of normal life.

“Life under Sharia itself is a life under terror,” observes Darwish. And that daily low-level terrorism accustoms Muslims to view it as something “like a natural disaster or part of life that must be tolerated.”

So, although a Syrian refugee may have no personal taste for terror, he can be surprisingly tolerant of it. A 2007 public opinion poll of Syrians revealed that 75 percent of those polled supported financial aid for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and “Iraqi fighters” (at that time, mostly al-Qaeda). Need it be mentioned that all these groups are designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. government? A more recent poll of 1,365 Syrians found that one out of five considered ISIS to be a positive influence on the country. And living in the West doesn’t seem to change these attitudes. A 2014 opinion poll showed that 27 percent of the French population in the 18-24-year-old demographic supported ISIS. Assuming a random sample, and assuming that the majority of pro-ISIS respondents were Muslim, that would mean that the vast majority of young French Muslims support ISIS.

That kind of supportive environment is a factor that’s often overlooked in the debate over Syrian refugees. As defenders of the resettlement program like to point out, terrorists can get into the U.S. by other means than by mingling with refugees. But once here, they need a network to support them and give them cover. And the network itself can only function if the larger community is willing to look the other way.

Europe is now dotted with such networks—in the Paris suburbs, in the Brussels borough of Molenbeek, in the Neukölln district of Berlin, and in numerous other places. There is evidence that similar networks already exist in nascent form in the U.S. Beyond the question of whether terrorists will mix in with refugees lies a larger question about the refugee resettlement program. Will it contribute to a strengthening of our society, or will it lead instead to the strengthening and expansion of terror-supportive networks?

Whether or not a particular group of refugees has been infiltrated by ISIS, there remains the fact that many refugees subscribe to the same general worldview held by members of the Islamic State. After all, they’ve been steeped in the same cultural-religious milieu that produced the terrorists. Many of them will take it for granted that Islam is the supreme religion, that Muhammad was the perfect man, and that Jews and Christians are unclean. They may be averse to committing violence, but they may find it perfectly understandable if other Muslims resort to violence in order to avenge a real or perceived insult to Islam. Although that mindset is alien to us, it shouldn’t be incomprehensible. At the time that a death fatwa was issued against the author Salman Rushdie, I remember talking with several Catholics who felt quite sympathetic to the Ayatollah Khomeini (who issued the fatwa), and rather unsympathetic to Rushdie and his “blasphemous” attitude toward religion.

Given their cultural background, it’s reasonable to expect that Sunni Muslim refugees will bring with them a set of beliefs and attitudes conducive to the incubation of terrorism. Even if there were a foolproof method for excluding active terrorists from their midst, there is no way of vetting for future terrorists—young Muslims who at some point in their development decide that ISIS or some similar movement is the logical conclusion of all they have been taught.

This “conversion” to radical Islam can come quite suddenly. Mohamed Abdelslam, the brother of two of the Paris terrorists, told reporters that his brothers began to change roughly six months before the attack, when they, “stopped drinking and started praying.” Likewise, the radicalization of Mohammod Youssuf Abdulazeez, the Chattanooga jihadist who killed five servicemen, could not easily have been forecast. To his classmates and teachers, he seemed like a normal American boy, and if he had problems, they were of the normal young American male variety—pot-smoking, heavy drinking, and fast driving. Unlike other young Americans, however, he would have been exposed—either at home or on Islamist websites—to the belief that one can wipe out one’s sins by an act of martyrdom.

This “sudden conversion syndrome” to more radical forms of Islam is increasingly common among Muslim youth. But, as I said, it’s not easy to predict. If you’re a government official whose job it is to vet refugees, how can you know if the smiling fourteen-year-old boy standing in front of you and surrounded by his polite and pleasant family is going to go radical three years down the line?

Absent other information and unfair as it may seem, his family’s culture has to be taken into account. To some extent, we are all creatures of our culture, and Islamic cultures seem to produce a disproportionate number of terrorists. Contemporary Western culture, on the other hand, seems to produce a disproportionate number of naïve egocentrics who are incapable of imagining that other cultures may be radically different from their own. Their tendency is to automatically project their own values and attitudes on to all they see.

But, as should now be clear to anyone willing to look, Islamic culture is not simply a colorful variation of our own. In those places where traditional Islam is the governing principle—whether in the Islamic State, or in parts of Pakistan, Indonesia, or Nigeria—the same disdain for non-Muslims and their religions can be found. This attitude is common not just among terrorists, but also among ordinary Muslims. By all accounts, the fifteen Muslim migrants who threw twelve Christians overboard during a Mediterranean crossing were not terrorists, they were simply Muslims who took offense when some of the Christians began to pray. Some of the Muslims who attacked Christians in European refugee camps appear to have been members of ISIS, but others were not. Blind to the differences in culture, European officials initially put Christian and Muslim migrants together in the same camps. With a bit more cultural awareness under their belts, they came to the politically incorrect conclusion that the two groups had to be housed separately. A less violent example of Islamic contempt for other cultures was provided by the Turkish soccer fans who booed and chanted when, during a Turkish-Greek soccer match, a moment of silence was requested for the victims of the Paris massacre.

As concerns the Syrian refugee crisis, Christians are regularly reminded that the Holy Family were once refugees in Egypt. Yes, but the culture brought into the world by the Holy Family is worlds apart from the one introduced six centuries later by Muhammad.

Let’s not forget that the Holy Family were once refugees. But in regard to the present crisis there’s another and perhaps more appropriate analogy to consider: Muhammad and his followers were also once refugees. He and his group of about 100 men, women, and children had long overstayed their welcome in Mecca. According to Muslim chroniclers, they had to flee in order to avoid persecution. Fortunately for Muhammad, the more “enlightened” citizens of Medina extended an invitation to the Muslims to come and live in their city. It is not recorded whether or not they held up large “welcome refugees” banners as is now the custom at European train stations, but they soon enough experienced the kind of regrets that Europeans are now having. Muhammad gradually acquired wealth and converts, and within a half-dozen years he was the master of Medina. Those Medinans who were not exiled or slaughtered were thoroughly subjugated. Muhammad then used Medina as the launching pad for his conquest of all Arabia. Within a century of his death, his followers had conquered nearly half of the civilized world.

The relevant analogy for our society is not the flight to Egypt, but the flight to Medina and the subsequent colonization of that city by the Muslims. A similar process of cultural conquest by migration is now underway in Europe. Citizens of the United States would be well-advised to monitor the situation over there before embarking on their own ill-considered experiment in welcoming the stranger.

Russians Working at Islamic State Gas Plant

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Why Are Russian Engineers Working at an Islamic State-Controlled Gas Plant in Syria?
Moscow says it’s at war with the jihadist group — but both sides aren’t opposed to cutting economic deals amid the bloodshed.


FPM: Officially, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government and his Russian allies are at war against the Islamic State. But a gas facility in northern Syria under the control of the jihadi group is evidence that business links between the Syrian regime and the Islamic State persist. According to Turkish officials and Syrian rebels, it is also the site of cooperation between the Islamic State and a Russian energy company with ties to President Vladimir Putin.

The Tuweinan gas facility, which is located roughly 60 miles southwest of the Islamic State’s de facto capital of Raqqa, is the largest such facility in Syria. It was built by Russian construction company Stroytransgaz, which is owned by billionaire Gennady Timchenko, a close associate of Putin. The company’s link to the Kremlin is well-documented: The U.S. Treasury Department previously sanctioned Stroytransgaz, along with the other Timchenko-owned companies, for engaging in activities “directly linked to Putin” amidst the confrontation over Ukraine.

The story of the controversial plant involves the Assad regime, Russian-Syrian businessmen, the Islamic State, and moderate Syrian groups, which together tried to activate the facility for the financial and logistical benefits it could provide for them.

The Syrian government originally awarded the contract to construct the Tuweinan facility to Stroytransgaz in 2007. The construction utilized a Syrian subcontractor, Hesco, which was owned by Russian-Syrian dual national George Haswani. Last November, the Treasury Department sanctioned Haswani for allegedly brokering oil sales between the Islamic State and the Assad regime, charges he denies.

The partnership between Hesco and Stroytransgaz goes far beyond this one deal. The companies have worked in joint projects in Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, and the UAE since 2000, according to Haswani’s son-in-law, Yusef Arbash, who runs Hesco’s Moscow office.

Construction continued slowly until a coalition of Syrian rebel groups seized the facility in a joint operation with the al Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front in January 2013. Abu Khalid, a member of the Qwais al-Qarani brigade, which was a part of the rebel coalition, said that when they entered the area, Russian engineers and advisors had already fled, leaving Syrian employees behind. “We decided to protect this plant; we thought it is belonging to Syrian people since it was owned by the Syrian state,” he said.
The Islamic State has been in control of the facility since early 2014.

A senior Turkish official said that after its seizure, Stroytransgaz, through its subcontractor Hesco, continued the facility’s construction with the Islamic State’s permission.

 

Syrian state-run newspaper Tishreen published a report appearing to corroborate this claim. In January 2014, after the facility was captured by the Islamic State, the paper cited Syrian government sources, saying that Stroytransgaz had completed 80 percent of the project and expected to hand over the facility to the regime during the second half of the year. The article didn’t mention that the facility was under the control of the Islamic State.

According to David Butter, an associate fellow at London-based Chatham House, who has seen a letter written by George Haswani explaining the details of the project, the facility’s first phase of production started towards the end of 2014, and it became fully operational during 2015. “Some of the natural gas goes to the Aleppo power station, which operates under the Islamic State’s protection, and the remainder is pumped to Homs and Damascus,” he said.

Abu Khalid said that Russian engineers still work at the facility, and Haswani brokered a deal with the Islamic State and the regime for mutually beneficial gas production from the facility. “IS allowed the Russian company to send engineers and crew in return for a big share in the gas and extortion money,” he said, using an acronym for the Islamic State and attributing the information to Syrian rebel commanders fighting the Islamic State in the area. “Employees of the Russian company were changing their shifts via a military base in Hama governorate.”

Haswani has rejected the Treasury Department’s allegations that he worked as a middle man in oil deals between the Islamic State and the Assad regime. But he has never denied Hesco’s continued work on the gas facility after the Islamic State captured it.

The details of the Tuweinan deal brokered between the Islamic State and Hesco was first reported by the Syrian media collective Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently in October 2014. The group claimed that Hesco signed an agreement with the Islamic State promising to leave a larger chunk of the profit to them. In October 2015, the Financial Times reported that the gas produced in the plant was sent to the Islamic State-held thermal power plant in Aleppo. The deal provides 50 megawatts of electricity for the regime, while the Islamic State receives 70 megawatts of electricity and 300 barrels of condensate. The engineers who worked at the plant told the Financial Times that Hesco also sends the Islamic State roughly $50,000 every month to protect its valuable equipment.

While Syria remains politically fractured, the deal at the Tuweinan gas facility shows that the rival parties are still cutting economic agreements amid the war. Aron Lund, editor of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s website Syria in Crisis, said that similar gas and oil arrangements exist all over Syria. “You have them between the IS and the regime, but also between IS and rival Sunni Arab rebels, between the Kurds and the regime, Kurds and rebels, the rebels and the regime, and so on,” he said. “You have lots of informal trade connections that emerge among armed groups, smugglers, or private business to fill the gaps between the various sides as the country falls apart, while national institutions, infrastructure, and much of the economy will necessarily remain shared.”

Finally Listing ISIS Leaders Terrorists?

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Treasury Sanctions Key ISIL Leaders and Facilitators Including a Senior Oil Official
2/11/2016

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the designations of senior ISIL oil official Faysal al-Zahrani, foreign fighter facilitator Husayn Juaythini, and senior ISIL official Turki al-Binali pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which targets terrorists and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism.  These designations support President Obama’s strategy to degrade and destroy ISIL.  These designations also further Treasury’s efforts to attack ISIL’s finances and disrupt its ability to profit from illicit oil sales within its territory in Iraq and Syria by inhibiting these individuals from accessing the international financial system.  They also support work by the broader counter-ISIL Coalition, including Operation Tidal Wave II, which consists of deliberate targeting and precision airstrikes in Iraq and Syria to disrupt ISIL’s control of oil-related resources.  As a result of today’s actions, any property or interest in property of the individuals designated by Treasury within U.S. jurisdiction is frozen.  Additionally, transactions by U.S. persons involving the designated individuals are generally prohibited.
 al Binali
“Treasury and our partners worldwide are aggressively targeting ISIL’s ability to earn and make use of its money, and we are making progress on many fronts,” said Adam J. Szubin, Acting Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  “Today’s action targets key ISIL leadership figures responsible for oil and gas production, foreign terrorist fighter recruitment and facilitation, and other financial facilitation.”
In a speech on Monday at Chatham House in London, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Daniel Glaser highlighted the recent progress that the U.S. government has made in weakening ISIL’s ability to generate wealth and disrupt its ability to make use of the money it raises.
The Treasury Department announces this action in advance of the first-ever joint session of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL’s Counter ISIL Finance Group (CIFG), which is taking place on February 14 in Paris.  The CIFG is co-chaired by Italy, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and has 37 participating member states and organizations.  The group focuses on enhancing international collaboration to disrupt the financial and economic activities of ISIL.  The FATF is the international standard-setting body for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.  It develops recommendations and promotes effective implementation of key anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism measures that deprive terrorist groups, like ISIL, of access to the international financial system.  The purpose of the FATF-CIFG joint session is to bring together the leading international bodies focused on ISIL financing to more effectively share information and coordinate efforts.  The session will focus on recent ISIL financial activity, ongoing efforts to deny ISIL access to the international financial system, strategies to prevent ISIL from financing its branches or foreign fighters, and recent United Nations Security Council Resolutions that facilitate efforts to disrupt ISIL’s finances.
Faysal Ahmad ‘Ali al-Zahrani
Treasury designated Faysal Ahmad ‘Ali al-Zahrani for acting for or on behalf of ISIL and for providing financial support to ISIL.  In July 2014, al-Zahrani joined ISIL’s natural resources ministry, which oversees ISIL’s trade in oil and gas.  As of May 2015, al-Zahrani was the ISIL oil and gas division official for Al Barakah Governorate, Syria, serving directly under ISIL oil and gas emir for Syria Fathi Awn’ al-Murad la Tunisi, also known as Abu Sayyaf, who was killed by Coalition special forces in a raid in eastern Syria that same month.  Prior to Abu Sayyaf’s death in May 2015, al-Zahrani regularly transferred funds to him.  As of June 2015, al-Zahrani supervised the daily activities of the workforce of an ISIL-managed oil production plant in Rukaybah, al-Hasakah Province, Syria, and by August 2015 was in charge of all ISIL oil and gas activities in al-Hasakah Province, which included supervising oil auctions to local merchants.  Following the May 2015 death of a separate ISIL oil official, who previously oversaw a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) production site on the Rukaybah oil production plant compound, al-Zahrani assumed control and oversight of VBIED production.  As of December 2015, al-Zahrani remained responsible for ISIL oil and gas activities in the areas around Shaddadi, al-Hasakah Province, Syria.
In his role as head of ISIL’s oil and gas division in Al Barakah, Syria, al-Zahrani oversaw the activities of seven ISIL oil and gas officials and, as of January 2015, held control of at least five oil fields.  Based on the profits generated from oil fields in Al Barakah governorate, al-Zahrani sent the ISIL treasury tens of millions of dollars in oil and gas revenues between September 2014 and March 2015.
Husayn Juaythini
Treasury designated Husayn Juaythini for providing support and services to ISIL by facilitating communications and the movement of foreign terrorist fighters and conducting financial activities in support of ISIL.  Juaythini travelled to Syria in September 2014 to pledge allegiance to ISIL and was tasked to return to Gaza and establish a foothold for ISIL there.  Juaythini was the link between ISIL leader and U.S.- and UN-designated Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and armed groups in Gaza, and had money that he was using to build an ISIL presence in Gaza.
Juaythini not only maintains ties with ISIL, but as of mid-2014 was deputy head of the extremist group and U.S.-designated SDGT Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC).  In 2013, Juaythini attempted to acquire supplies for the MSC in the environs of Jerusalem to conduct attacks against Israel and help the group overcome financial difficulties.  He also worked with a Libya-based facilitator, who served as the primary money and weapons facilitator for Juaythini’s activities in Gaza.  As of January 2015, Juaythini was instrumental in fostering connections between Gaza- and Libya-based terrorists, and facilitating their travel to Syria.
Turki Mubarak Abdullah Ahmad al-Binali
Treasury also designated Turki al-Binali for acting for or on behalf of ISIL as early as May 2015. Binali is a recruiter for ISIL foreign fighters, and provides literature and fatwas for ISIL training camps and has written several pamphlets to recruit more fighters to ISIL, including the first call for Muslims to pledge allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph.  As of March 2014, Binali led an ISIL support network actively recruiting Gulf nationals to join ISIL in Syria.
Further, in November 2014, Binali was appointed to the post of chief religious advisor for ISIL.  In late June 2015, Binali announced on social media that ISIL’s next attack, following its bombing of a Shia mosque in Kuwait days earlier, would be in Bahrain.
On January 31, 2015, the Bahraini government revoked Binali’s citizenship.
***
Counter Terrorism Designation
2/11/2016
Page Content
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OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL

Specially Designated Nationals List Update
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

AL-BINALI, Turki Mubarak Abdullah Ahmad (a.k.a. AL BINALI, Turki Mubarak Abdullah; a.k.a. AL-BENALI, Turki; a.k.a. AL-BIN’ALI, Turki; a.k.a. AL-BIN’ALI, Turki Mubarak; a.k.a. “ABU DERGHAM”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu Human”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu Human Bakr ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz”; a.k.a. “AL-ATHARI, Abu-Bakr”; a.k.a. “AL-BAHRAYNI, Abu Hudhayfa”; a.k.a. “AL-MUDARI, Abu Khuzayma”; a.k.a. “AL-SALAFI, Abu Hazm”; a.k.a. “AL-SULAMI, Abu Sufyan”); DOB 03 Sep 1984; POB Al Muharraq, Bahrain; nationality Bahrain; Passport 2231616 (Bahrain) issued 02 Jan 2013 expires 02 Jan 2023; alt. Passport 1272611 (Bahrain) issued 01 Apr 2003; Identification Number 840901356 (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).
AL-ZAHRANI, Faysal Ahmad ‘Ali (a.k.a. AL ZAHRANI, Faysal Ahmad Bin Ali; a.k.a. ALZAHRANI, Faisal Ahmed Ali; a.k.a. “AL-JAZRAWI, Abu-Sara”; a.k.a. “AL-SAUDI, Abu Sarah”; a.k.a. “AL-ZAHRANI, Abu-Sarah”; a.k.a. “ZAHRANI, Abu Sara”); DOB 19 Jan 1986; alt. DOB 18 Jan 1986; nationality Saudi Arabia; Passport K142736 (Saudi Arabia) issued 14 Jul 2011; alt. Passport G579315 (Saudi Arabia) (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).
JUAYTHINI, Husayn (a.k.a. ALJEITHNI, Hussein Mohammed Hussein; a.k.a. AL-JU’AITNI, Abu Mu’ath; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhamad Husayn; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad; a.k.a. AL-JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad Husayn; a.k.a. JU’AYTHINI, Husayn Muhammad Husayn); DOB 03 May 1977; POB Al-Nusayirat refugee camp, Gaza; Passport 0363464 (individual) [SDGT] (Linked To: ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT).

Syria: Cessation of Hostilities? Huh?

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Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and U.S. State Department Secretary John Kerry announce an accelerated and expanded delivery of humanitarian relief in Syria and also a nationwide cessation of hostilities within a week.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, right, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov attend a news conference after the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) meeting in Munich, Germany, Feb. 12, 2016.

It is complicated…..

The working group of 17 countries meeting in Munich agreed “to implement a nationwide cessation of hostilities to begin in a target of one week’s time,” he said.

They also agreed to immediately “accelerate and expand” humanitarian aid to the war-torn country.

“Sustained delivery will begin this week, first to the areas where it is most urgently needed… and then to all the people in need throughout the country, particularly in the besieged and hard to reach areas,” Kerry said.

He also said peace talks between rebels and the Syrian government would resume in Geneva “as soon as possible”.

VOA: Kerry told reporters early Friday in Munich that the cessation of hostilities will not apply to terrorist groups, including Islamic State, al-Nusra and others. He said the 17-nation International Syria Support Group has agreed that a task force co-chaired by the U.S. and Russia will work to “determine the modalities of a long-term reduction in violence.”

The top U.S. diplomat added on a cautionary note that the ISSG meeting has produced commitments on paper, but that the real test will be if all the parties honor their commitments.

The support group also agreed to “accelerate and expand” delivery of humanitarian assistance, starting with key troubled areas and then widening to provide increased humanitarian aid to the entire country. Read the full summary here.

 

Meanwhile, Assad has won and so has Islamic State….

If Assad Wins, Islamic State Wins

Bloomberg: The civilians fleeing Aleppo don’t prove definitively that, with Russian backing, President Bashar al-Assad will win the Syrian civil war. But it’s certainly time to game out that scenario and ask: What would victory look like to Assad? And what will happen to the other regional actors engaged in this fight?

The decisive element to consider is whether Assad needs to defeat Islamic State to be a winner. If the answer is yes — and if Assad could do it — the world would probably breathe a sigh of relief, and accept Assad’s victory, despite its extraordinary human costs and egregious violations of human rights.

But Assad will probably calculate that he doesn’t need to beat Islamic State, just contain it so that it doesn’t constitute an existential threat to his regime. That would put Islamic State well on its way to becoming a statelet, accepted by its neighbors for lack of will to defeat it. The long-term consequences for the world would be high, but Assad’s regime would be substantially better off.

For now, Assad appears to be moving toward at least a limited victory over the ill-organized Free Syrian Army forces around Aleppo. It isn’t rocket science. He’s combining intense air support from Russian planes with ground forces drawn from what remains of the Syrian army.

The Battle of Aleppo has been going on since 2012. What’s changed in this round is the intensity of Russian airstrikes. Republican presidential candidate Ted Cruz may have said that he wants to carpet bomb Islamic State to find out if sand can glow in the dark, but it’s Russian President Vladimir Putin who’s following a version of that strategy against the Syrian opposition.

It’s still conceivable that the Free Syrian Army could rally, but it doesn’t look likely. That would mean Assad could consolidate control over Aleppo and whatever number of people remains there. The population was some 2.5 million before the war, and it’s certainly much smaller now.

Over time, opposition fighters could in theory infiltrate back and attempt an insurgency. If Assad can’t spare sufficient troops to hold Aleppo, the Free Syrian Army might stage a comeback. But it would be doing so from a much reduced position, and the war-weary public might very well be unwilling to support  it.

Once the formula of intense Russian bombing plus Syrian ground troops has been shown to be a success, Assad and Putin will repeat it over whatever Syrian territory remains in Free Syrian Army or Syrian Kurdish hands. It is entirely reasonable to think it would succeed again.

That will lead to a major strategic crossroads. Assad and Putin will at least be tempted to try their winning formula against Islamic State.

Putin would love to show the world that he can succeed where the West has failed. Beating the Sunni militant group would significantly improve Russia’s global military prestige. Added to his taking of Crimea, it would make Putin the first Russian leader in more than a generation to win wars, which will also burnish his domestic reputation. It might be possible to achieve all this without Russian ground troops. And if airstrikes aren’t enough, Putin can simply blame the Syrian ground forces for being inadequate.

The upside for Assad would be a return to something not unlike the status quo before the Sunni uprising against him — but with a smaller national population with fewer Sunni Arabs, because many will remain in Turkey and Europe as refugees.

At one time, it seemed unimaginable that the Assad regime could return to national control. But that doesn’t seem quite as unrealistic now. Iran would favor and support Assad, as it always has. Now that Iran’s regional position has improved as a result of the nuclear deal with the U.S. and the lifting of economic sanctions, Iran would be better placed than ever to support Assad.

The Israelis have looked Islamic State in the face and concluded they’d rather have Assad than total chaos. Turkey had warm relations with Assad and was establishing open borders with Syria until the uprising broke those ties. As a geostrategic matter, Turkey would eventually take Assad back into the fold, whatever its continuing anger about the massacres he’s perpetrated. Even Saudi Arabia, which sees the Assad regime as the cat’s-paw of its rival Iran, would be prepared to live with Assad if it meant a return to regional stability.

The great risk for Assad in taking on Islamic State is the possibility of overreach. Even if he has enough troops to beat the militants, he might not be able to hold down the rest of the country. And if Islamic State forces flee Syria into Iraq, which would be the rational thing for them to do, they could come back and harass whatever forces Assad left behind. Unlike the Free Syrian Army, Islamic State would have a base from which to pursue an insurgency. It also has ideologically motivated troops with some combat experience. What’s more, Assad simply may not want to govern Sunnis area in Syria that have either sided with Islamic State or accepted its rule as a practical matter.

Assad therefore might decide that he’d be better off with a de facto border that Islamic State respects out of self-interest. If he leaves the group alone and is left alone in exchange, he can re-establish some semblance of sovereignty in much of Syria, surely his No. 1 priority. Essentially, Islamic State becomes everyone else’s problem, not Assad’s.

This scenario seems to me more likely than a serious Syrian countermilitant push. It would leave Islamic State as a threat to Iraq, to regional security and the rest of the world. The possibility of Islamic State as a long-term, de facto state looms.

ISIS, Islamic State has a Help Desk

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The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) uses a 34-page manual to instruct its followers on how to stay invisible on the Internet.

The Arabic document was translated and released this week by analysts at the Combating Terrorism Center, an independent research group at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. It includes warnings to avoid Instagram because it is owned by Facebook, and Dropbox because former secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sits on its board of investors. Famous government leaker Edward Snowden has also criticized Dropbox over its privacy, the document notes.

Users are also directed to use Apple’s encrypted FaceTime and iMessage features over regular unencrypted text and chat features. More here.

New ISIS ‘help desk’ to aid hiding from authorities

TheHill: The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has opened up a new technical “help desk” that instructs terrorists on how to hide from Western authorities, according to researchers.

The Electronic Horizon Foundation (EHF) was launched on Jan. 30 as a joint effort of several of the top ISIS cybersecurity experts, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) said in a new report.

While researchers have previously uncovered an ISIS “help desk” and 34-page manual that help extremists encrypt their communications, MEMRI said the EHF takes these services to an “alarming” new level.

“Jihadis have long sought technical information, which has been confined in the past to various password-protected jihadi forums,” said the MEMRI report, shared exclusively with The Hill. “However, the freedom and ease by which they can now obtain that information is alarming, especially when such information is shared over private and secure channels.”

The EHF operates on the encrypted messaging platform Telegram but also maintains a Twitter account that disseminates information and directs followers to its secure Telegram channel.

The group’s self-stated goal is clear: “Spreading security and technical awareness among the monotheists.”

According to an announcement celebrating the EHF launch, ISIS has spent a year establishing the group with the goal of “unifying the technical and security efforts, and uniting the ranks of the mujahideen’s supporters.”

It brings together several technical support entities, such as the Information Security channel on Telegram and the “Islamic State Technician,” an ISIS security specialist thought to be behind a leading password-protected technical forum.

The announcement, which the MEMRI translated, was also direct that the EHF had been formed “due to the electronic war and tight surveillance imposed by the Western intelligence apparatuses over Internet users, and their tracking and following of the mujahideen and their supporters, and targeting them based on their data and information, which they share over the Internet.”

EHF pledged to provide resources to help combat this surveillance.

“It is time to face the electronic surveillance, educate the mujahideen about the dangers of the Internet, and support them with the tools, directives and security explanations to protect their electronic security, so that they don’t commit security mistakes that can lead to their bombardment and killing,” the announcement said.

As of early this week, the EHF Telegram account had over 2,200 members.

MEMRI said EHF has not posted much yet, “but it is expected to take the lead nonetheless in content posted as time goes by.”

If the group follows in the footsteps of its creators, its content will be “defensively-oriented,” such as tutorials on mobile phone security, instead of “offensively-oriented,” such as instructions on launching cyberattacks, MEMRI said.

In the wake of the terror attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, Calif., law enforcement officials have cautioned that potential terrorists are increasingly using encryption to hide from investigators, a phenomenon they call “going dark.”

The warnings have led to some calling for legislation that would guarantee government access to encrypted data, although momentum on Capitol Hill for such a bill has cooled in recent months.

“I don’t think we’re any closer to a consensus on that than we were, I think, six months ago,” Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), the House Intelligence Committee’s top Democrat, said last week. “Or if there is a consensus, it is that a legislative solution, I think, is very unlikely.”

 

IS Encryption Guide by AlyssaBereznak