Meet ISIS’ Special Operations Unit, Katibat al-Battar

Tip of the Spear? Meet ISIS’ Special Operations Unit, Katibat al-Battar

Bellingcat: On a mild November night last year, nine EU citizens roamed the streets of Paris with guns and explosives, murdering and injuring hundreds of civilians. In the days and weeks afterward, France declared emergency laws, Britain voted to expand the bombing of ISIS in Syria and ISIS supporters launched their own social media response on Twitter with #PrayforRaqqah.

But many of the most important questions around Paris remain unanswered. Where did these men come from? Were they part of a group? Who instructed them to commit these acts?

The following investigation reveals that a little-known group of battle-hardened and highly capable Libyans are the common factor behind many of the major terrorist attacks in Europe and North Africa since 2014.

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Meet Katibat Al-Battar Al-Libi

When groups of Libyans involve themselves in foreign jihads, the West normally suffers. From the jihad in 1980s Afghanistan, through to running al-Qa’ida in Pakistan in the 2000s, Libyans fighters have played a significant role in most recent jihadist conflicts. As recently as 2007, the US Naval Academy at West Point released a study of seized Islamic State personnel files, which were found in a US Army raid in Iraq. To the author’s surprise, a disproportionate number of fighters were Libyan, and specifically from the town of Dernah, in the northeast Libya. Almost 20% of the Islamic State’s fighters in Iraq were Libyan, and of that figure, over 60% of them were from Dernah. According to the study, the city and its surrounds contained ‘the greatest concentration of jihadi terrorists anywhere on the planet’.

Unsurprisingly then, in 2012 as the Arab Spring caught fire, entire brigades of fighters from Dernah were among the first foreign fighters to arrive in Syria. Rather than immersing themselves with ISIS or Jabat al-Nusra, the Libyans created their own unit, Katibat al-Battar al-Libi, with the catching slogan ‘بالذبح جئناكم’ or; ‘We came to slaughter you’. Battar is a reference to one of the Prophet’s swords – known for its impact on the neck of his enemies. The group’s inaugural 2012 video is available here. Many of the Libyan members of KBL were seasoned veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan; battle-hardened fighters.

Over time, as ISIS’ power grew in Syria, KBL sensibly pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. With its cadre of experienced fighters, KBL began fighting for the ISIS cause in Syria and Iraq. In January 2015, KBL captured and brutally killed dozens of Peshmerga. Arabic media reports in July 2015 that 350 KBL fighters supported the ISIS presence in Baiji, Iraq, where a prominent leader, Abu Dujana Al-Libi was killed.

Blogs holding ISIS content indicate that KBL was one of the first groups in Syria to participate effectively in both fighting and relief work, playing a fundamental role in ISIS’ capture of Taftanaz airport and Khan Tuman.  Various reports estimate KBL’s strength in Syria from the low hundreds to over 1400. The group began life as a semi-autonomous commando unit fighting under the overall ISIS banner, but has clearly since expanded its role to include relief work in Syria and mass training camps in Libya (see below).

The group’s role as an elite unit of ISIS would have huge consequences for the Syrian war, but also for Europe, Libya and North Africa.

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Europeans mix with KBL

In 2013 and 2014, European fighters began travelling to Syria in larger numbers. With its sterling reputation in Syria growing, KBL became an attractive group for Francophone fighters, specifically Belgians, French and Tunisians. Although the exact reason is unknown, one explanation for Belgians joining KBL is language; many Belgian-Moroccans are from eastern Morocco, whose Maghrebi dialect is very similar to Libyan Arabic.

During 2014, KBL records indicate a considerable number of Belgians died fighting for KBL in Syria. In addition to the domestic campaign, it appears that during 2014, KBL decided to expand its operations to Europe. One of the most prominent Belgians within KBL at the time was Abdelhamid Abaaoud. In order to evade the authorities, Abaaoud faked his own death in a published list of KBL martyrs, and he appears in social media with a number of KBL individuals during 2014.

Abaaoud was at the centre of a string of terrorist plots in Europe, before the Paris attacks in November 2015. It is likely that KBL introduced the concept of ‘Inghimasi’ operations to Abaaoud, and it is possible, if not probable that KBL – via Abaaoud – assisted, sponsored or directed at least four terrorist attacks in Europe in 2014-2015;

What is clear is that a considerable number of Europeans, Tunisians and Moroccans joined Katibat al-Battar as the group’s legend in Syria grew. Many of these fighters died in Syria or Iraq, fighting for Islamic State. However, in hindsight, the mixing of EU passport holders with perhaps the most violent, ruthless and capable group of Libyans in Syria dramatically escalated the terrorist threat to Europeans, both at home and abroad.

 

From Libya to Syria, and back again

Whilst KBL’s Belgians were busy in Syria plotting internal and external attacks, dozens of experienced KBL fighters returned to Dernah in Libya, creating the first ISIS province outside of Syria and Iraq – Wilayat Barqa. Some KBL fighters reorganised themselves under the Islamic Youth Shura Council. An ISIS delegation from Raqqah, including the Yemeni Abu Bara al-Azdi and the Saudi Abu Habib Al-Jazrawi visited IYSC in September 2014 and collected allegiances from IYSC aligned fighters.

KBL’s headquarters are now believed to be in Dernah, with secondary branches in Syria and Iraq. Online videos of KBL fighters generally indicate possession of small arms, mortars and vehicle mounted anti-aircraft. A KBL affiliated Facebook group has also been identified; the group’s icon is Jihadi John.

Reports indicate that the group runs training camps in Libya focused on assassinations, mass murder, weapons training and bomb-making. KBL’s is also reported to have an operations room in Dernah for terrorist activities in Tunisia.

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According to several sources, the activities of KB are distributed across three teams:

  • Guarding IS leaders; this is mostly made up of Tunisian nationals and elements from the dissolved Iraqi Baath regime;
  • Liquidation Teams: in charge of assassinating those who refuse to pledge allegiance to Al-Baghdadi; unverified reports point to KBL’s involvement in the killing of Ansar Al-Sharia’s former leader, Mohamed Zahawi;
  • Mass Casualty ‘Inghimasi’ Operations: Inghimasi are well-trained terrorists who carries both light arms and explosives and fights until he runs out of ammunition. Though this information cannot be entirely verified, KBL affiliated fighters are thought to have played a role in the Tunisian attacks at the Bardo Museum and in Sousse

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(Source: akherkhabaronline.com)

KBL are reportedly actively working in attracting young Tunisians to take part in fighting, following an initial training phase in its Libyan training camps. Nevertheless, the group’s strategies aimed at recruiting Western/European nationals remain ambiguous, particularly following the suspension of its official social media accounts.

The Age of the “Inghimasiyun”

Since joining ISIS, KBL have fostered and grown the concept of the Inghimasi; which is the jihadi equivalent of the kamikaze or the Nazi einsatzgruppen. The concept has gripped ISIS, who now broadcast their Inghimasi as heroes. Whilst there is no smoking gun pointing to KBL’s specific role in ‘Inghimasi’ style attacks at the Brussels museum, Paris, Sousse, the Corinthia hotel or the Bardo Museum in Tunis, it is important to note a) the modus operandi is entirely consistent with KBL’s Inghimasi operations b) many of the operatives were Tunisians and Belgians and c) All of these attacks came after KBL’s arrival in Dernah, in March 2014.

 

Going forward

One of the most important questions remains unanswered; to what extent are KBL subservient to ISIS, and do they retain a degree of operational autonomy? The evidence suggests KBL, moreso than ISIS, assisted or directed many of the major terrorist attacks in the past few years. Logically, then, from a Western perspective, Katibat al-Battar are the most dangerous unit within ISIS.

Perhaps of most concern to the West is KBL’s freedom to operate in Libya, with its Wilayat Barqa ISIS enclave. Whilst fighting other militias and subject to occasional airstrikes, the group is under far less pressure in Libya than its colleagues in Syria and Iraq.  It could be argued ISIS’ Libya branch presents a greater terrorist threat to Europe than its Syrian counterpart: mass training camps, proximity to Europe and the tourist beaches of Africa, and most importantly, operational pedigree – honed during years of conflict in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

GW Bush’s Nitro Zeus to Stop Iran, Obama?

Due to the Iran nuclear talks and eventual deal, this whole story while accurate it appears, may be an actual leak for the sake of legitimizing Iran.

 David Sanger and Mark Mazzetti report on the February 16, 2016 New York Times website that “in the early years of the Obama administration, the United States developed an elaborate plan for a cyber attack on Iran, in case the diplomatic effort to limit its nuclear program failed; and, led to a military conflict, according to a upcoming documentary film, and interviews with military and intelligence officials involved in the effort.”

 
     “The plan, code-named NITRO ZEUS, was devised to disable Iran’s air defenses, communications systems; and, crucial parts of the power grid,” the Times noted; but, was shelved when the nuclear deal with Iran was concluded.  The Times adds that “NITRO ZEUS was part of an effort to assure POTUS Obama that he had alternatives, short of a full-scale war — if Iran lashed out at the United States, or its allies in the region.  At its height, officials say, the planning for NITRO ZEUS involved thousands of American military and intelligence personnel, spending tens of millions of dollars; and, placing electronic implants in Iranian computer networks to “prepare the battlefield,” in the parlance of the Pentagon.” 
 
    FC:  The White House was no doubt hoping to dissuade Israel from conducting a pre-emptive military strike against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, while the nuclear negotiations with Iran were nearing a conclusion.  Left unanswered in the Times article was any mention of Israel’s cooperation and/or participation in the NITRO ZEUS planning and ultimate execution.  Was Israel made aware of the plan?; but, not invited to participate?  Were they a full partner and expected to contribute to the operation if it had occurred?  Or, did the White House attempt to keep Israel out of any knowledge or participation in the effort?
     Mr. Sanger and Mr. Mazzetti note that in addition to NITRO ZEUS, “American intelligence agencies developed a separate, far more narrowly focused cyber plan to disable Iran’s Fordo nuclear enrichment site, which Iran built deep inside a mountain near the [religious] city of Qom.  The attack [on Fordo] would have been a covert operation,” which would have required POTUS approval.
 
 
   “Fordo has long been considered one of the hardest targets in Iran, buried too deep for all but the most powerful bunker-buster [bombs] in the American military arsenal,” Mr. Sanger and Mr. Mazzetti write.  “Thev proposed [covert] intelligence operation called for the insertion of a computer “worm” into the facility — with the aim of frying Fordo’s computer systems — effectively delaying, or destroying the ability of Iranian centrifuges to enrich uranium at the enrichment site.  It was intended as a follow-up to “OLYMPIC GAMES,” the code-name of a cyber attack [never acknowledged] by the United States and Israel that destroyed 1,000 Iranian nuclear centrifuges; and [at least], temporarily disrupt [nuclear fuel] production at Natanz, a far larger; but, less protected enrichment site.”  This operation involved the use of the STUXNET cyber worm; and is considered by many the first military use of a cyber weapon of mass disruption.
 
     Mr. Sanger and Mr. Mazzetti note that “the existence of NITRO ZEUS was uncovered in the course of reporting for “Zero Days,” a documentary that will be shown Wednesday [today] at the Berlin Film Festival.  Directed by Alex Gibney, who is known for other documentaries, including the Oscar-winning, “Taxi To The Dark Side,” about the [alleged] use of torture by American interrogators; and, “We Steal Secrets: The Story Of Wikileaks.”
     “Zero Days,” describes the escalating conflict between Iran and the West, in the years leading up to the agreement, and discovery of the cyber attack on the Natanz enrichment plant; and, the debates inside the Pentagon over whether the United States has [had] a workable [cyber] doctrine for the use of a new form of weaponry — whose ultimate effects are [still] only vaguely understood,” the Times noted.
    “For the seven-year old United States Cyber Command, which is still building its cyber “special forces,” and deploying them throughout the world, the Iran project [which involved infusing electronic implants at key digital ‘choke-points] was perhaps its most challenging program yet,” Mr. Sanger and Mr. Mazzetti write.  “This was enormous, and [an] enormously complex program [operation],” said one participant who requested anonymity because the program is still [highly] classified.  “Before it was developed, the U.S. had never assembled a combined cyber, kinetic attack plan on this scale,” the official added.
     “While U.S. Cyber Command would have executed NITRO ZEUS, the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Tailorerd Access Operations Unit (TAO) was responsible for penetrating the adversary’s [Iran’s] networks, which would have required piercing, and maintaining a presence in a vast number of Iranian networks, including the country’s air defenses and its transportation and command control centers,” The Times noted.
     “It is a tricky business, the war planners say, because their knowledge of how networks are connected in Iran, or any other hard target, is sketchy, and collateral damage is always hard to predict.  It is easier to turn off power grids, for example, than to start them up again.”  And, there is the critical and fundamental issue of restoring trust in the system by the people — something which is often difficult to do — just ask Target.  They have managed; but, it took a while.
     The covert operation to sabotage Fordo was challenging to say the least, since this was a clandestine Iranian nuclear enrichment facility, buried inside a mountain and no doubt heavily guarded and very difficult to breach.  Very difficult, but not impossible.  As The Times noted, some of the stolen NSA documents purloined by fugitive Edward Snowden allegedly demonstrate how computer worms and cyber viruses can be secretly inserted — remotely — into a targeted network — even if disconnected from the Internet.  I commented on article yesterday on how to steal secret keylogger data from a disconnected/stand-alone computer in another room.  Needless to say, Mr. Snowden greatly aided our adversaries and the Islamic State and al Qaeda, others with his reckless and destructive leaks.  CIA Director john Brennan admitted in a CBS 60 Minutes interview on Sunday that the Paris attackers used encrypted communications to plan, orchestrate, and launch their attack, an operational technique that allowed them to ‘remain dark’ thus prevent or undermine our ability to ferret out and hopefully prevent their operations.  In the aftermath of the Snowden leaks, these groups substantially enhanced their encryption software; as evidenced in both Paris and San Bernardino.
     For the life of me, I cannot figure out why some within the U.S. government thought disclosing this alleged operation was in our national security interests and beneficial for everyone to know.  If the report is true, it betrays extremely sensitive tactics, techniques, and procedures.  As the age old saying goes, “one cannot vanquish one’s enemies, by telegraphing one’s punches.”  Okay, nukes aside.  There are those who argue that a deterrent capability only works, if the opponent believes you can actually do what you say you can.  But, the cyber world is vastly different from the kinetic, military weaponry world, as revealing an offensive cyber capability is likely to render the digital weapon useless beyond the initial public disclosure and use.  Hackers, malcontents, others will take pleasure in being the first to reverse engineer the cyber weapon and post their findings on the open net for all to see — and, take appropriate counter-measures.  One also has to assume that North Korea, among others, is now aware of how their own networked nuclear infrastructure could be vulnerable and take pre-emptive steps to remedy their vulnerabilities. More details from the NYT’s here.

Deadly explosion in Turkish capital Ankara

PM cancels visit to Brussels following blast in capital Ankara. All security agencies and personal put on high alert in Ankara as intelligence warns of more explosions. Turkish officials have put a Broadcast ban  on the explosion in Ankara, only official statements allowed are allowed to be broadcast.

CBS: ANKARA, Turkey A large explosion, believed to have been caused by a bomb, injured several people in the Turkish capital on Wednesday, according to media reports.

The governor of Ankara said at least five people have been killed and 10 others injured in the explosion. Mehmet Kilicer said Wednesday officials believe the explosion was caused by a car bomb.

Private NTV said the explosion occurred during rush hour in an area close to where military headquarters are located as a bus carrying military personnel was passing by. Several cars caught fire, the report said. Ambulances were seen rushing toward the scene.

The explosion caused a large fire and dark smoke could be seen billowing from a distance.

Police told The Associated Press they are investigating the cause of the explosion.

The Turkish capital has been targeted with bombings often in recent months as the government finds itself wrapped up in the conflict in neighboring Syria, all while battling the ISIS threat as well as an ongoing insurgency from Kurdish militants.

In December of last year, a bomb left above a subway station in the capital injured five. Officials blamed Kurdish separatists.

In October of last year, a bomb at a peace rally in the capital killed dozens. Officials blamed ISIS for the blast.

Saudi Arabia to deploy jets to Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base

Saudi Arabia is locked in two other proxy wars with Iran in Yemen and Bahrain.

“I believe Iran and Saudi Arabia can have shared interests in Syria”.

Saudi Arabia’s relations with Iran hit a new low in January after the Saudis executed a prominent Shiite cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, leading Iranian protesters to ransack and set fire to the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Reengagement means to the Saudi leader, aggressive USA support for the kingdom’s efforts to shape the Middle East and North Africa in its image.

Syria has been gripped by foreign-backed militancy since March 2011.

Saudi intervention in Syria would, in contrast to Yemen, which the kingdom sees as a proxy war, bring Saudi troops in closer proximity to Russian forces and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

It’s a high-stakes gamble that would create the ideal powder keg, from which the U.S. would be unable to stand aside.

The agreement was signed on Friday following a meeting of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) in the German city of Munich.

But doubts have emerged over its viability, especially because it did not include IS or Al-Qaeda’s local branch, which is fighting alongside other rebel groups in several areas.

In many ways, the Saudi offer, whether implemented or not, constitutes a master stroke.

US Secretary of State John Kerry complained that the vast majority of Russia’s attacks in Syria were against “legitimate opposition groups” rather than IS jihadists. U.S. officials have repeatedly insisted that any ground force would have to be Arab-led.

He criticised Saudi Arabia for trying to exclude Iran from peace talks.

The Saudi gamble ironically fits neatly with the strategy of the Russian and Iranian-backed regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Saudi Arabia is said to be furious that their main regional rival, Iran, has been allowed to consolidate its power bases in both Iraq and Syria because of the civil wars in both countries and under the cover of an global air campaign supposedly targeting ISIL.

“Turkey and Saudi Arabia may launch an operation (against IS) from the land”, he added, the paper said.

The Saudi offer of ground troops exploits an increasingly untenable situation.

Turkey hosts more than 2.5 million Syrian refugees and tens of thousands more have massed at its borders after a fierce government offensive around Aleppo.

Cavusoglu spoke to the Yeni Şafak newspaper after addressing a security conference in Munich, Germany, where the Syrian crisis was one of the top issues on the agenda.

Saudi Arabia is to deploy military jets and personnel to Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base in the south of the country, Ankara said.

Syria President Bashar Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin. To turn the tide, it needs a United States that is engaged and willing to do its bit. Saudi Arabia subsequently cut all ties with Iran.

“Iran is our neighbor”, he said.

Stolen: Fears of ISIS ‘Dirty Bomb’

‘Highly dangerous’ radioactive material stolen, sparking fears of Isis ‘dirty bomb’

Independent: Iraq is searching for “highly dangerous” radioactive material stolen last year amid fears it could have fallen the hands of Isis jihadis.

The material, stored in a protective case the size of a laptop, went missing from a US-owned storage facility in Basra last November, according to leaked environment ministry documents.

An unnamed senior security official with knowledge of the theft said: “We are afraid the radioactive element will fall into the hands of Daesh (Isis).

“They could simply attach it to explosives to make a dirty bomb”.

Click here for a photo essay 74 photos.

The document, dated 30 November and addressed to the ministry’s Centre for Prevention of Radiation, describes “the theft of a highly dangerous radioactive source of Ir-192 with highly radioactive activity belonging to SGS from a depot…in the Rafidhia area of Basra province”.

An anonymous senior environment ministry official based in the city told Reuters the device contained up to 10 grams (0.35 ounces) of Ir-192 “capsules”, a radioactive isotope of iridium also used to treat cancer.

The material is classed as a Category 2 radioactive by the International Atomic Energy Agency – meaning it can be fatal to anyone in close proximity to it in a matter of days or even hours.

So far there is no indication that the material has fallen into the hands of Isis – who do not control this part of southern Iraq – but they have begun using chemical weapons.

The terror group attacked Kurdish forces with mustard gas during a battle near Erbil – capital of the Kurds’ autonomous region in Iraq last August.

It is believed to be the first time chemical weapons have been used in the country since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

A “dirty bomb” combines nuclear material with conventional explosives to contaminate an area with radiation, in contrast to a nuclear weapon, which uses nuclear fission to trigger a vastly more powerful blast.

A security official said the initial investigation suggested the perpetrators had specific knowledge of how to handle the material and how to gain access to the facility.

Ramadi.jpg

An Iraqi pro-government soldier standing in the ruins of Ramadi. Isis currently only controlled territory in the north and west of the country

There were “No broken locks, no smashed doors and no evidence of forced entry”.

An operations manager for Iraqi security firm Taiz, which was contracted to protect the facility, declined to comment, citing instructions from Iraqi security authorities.

A spokesman for Basra operations command, responsible for security in Basra province, said army, police and intelligence forces were working “day and night” to locate the material.

Two Basra provincial government officials said they were told to work with local hospitals to identify possible victims on 25 November.

One said: “We instructed hospitals in Basra to be alert to any burn cases caused by radioactivity and inform security forces immediately”.

Additional reading here.

Who is Fighting in Syria and Who Wins?

A mind-boggling stew of nations is fighting in Syria’s civil war

MilitaryTimes: Armies and militias from more than a dozen countries have joined the Syria conflict, making for a mind-boggling and dangerous stew of shifting and competing alliances.

Even as a proposed cease-fire is scheduled to begin as early as this week, more nations are escalating their roles in the nearly 5-year-old civil war: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey said they may send ground troops to fight.

Here’s how different countries are currently aligned:

Pro-Syrian government

Forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar Assad are backed by two nations, Russia and Iran, and many Shiite militias from across the region who are organized by Iran. The combatants include:

Syrian government troops

Iran

Afghan Shiite militia

Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militia

Iraqi Shiite militia

Russia. Russian airstrikes target the Islamic State and what Russia says are other “terrorist” groups. But the U.S. military says most Russian airstrikes are aimed at opposition groups threatening Assad’s forces.

Anti-Syrian government

Many rebel forces fighting to overthrow the Syrian government are backed by arms, funds and airstrikes by a U.S.-led coalition. The CIA vetted Syrian rebel groups and helped train them in Jordan to use advanced anti-tank weapons against Assad’s forces. Saudi Arabia and Qatar supplied the weaponry and funds. These rebels are being supported by:

Jordan

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

Qatar

United Arab Emirates

United States

Israel, on Syria’s southern border, provides some assistance to rebel forces fighting the Syrian government and has also launched airstrikes against Syrian and Hezbollah targets to prevent the transfer of “game changing” technology and weapons to Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist group.

Anti-Islamic State 

The U.S.-led coalition conducting airstrikes against Islamic State forces in Syria and Iraq includes:

Australia

Bahrain

Canada

France

Jordan

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom.

Russia is not part of the U.S.-led coalition, though it has also hit Islamic State positions.

Other fighters

Kurdish militia from Turkey, Iraq and Syria are fighting the Islamic State, also known as ISIL or ISIS. But the Kurds are sometimes aligned with the Syrian government and seen as a threat by Turkey, which has fought for years against a Kurdish separatist movement threatening its territorial sovereignty. Syrian Kurds are backed by Russia, the United States and Iraqi Kurdish groups.

The Islamic State, a vicious al-Qaeda spinoff, and Jabhat al Nusrah, al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria that works with many Sunni Arab opposition groups in Syria, have attracted foreign fighters from across the Arab world and Europe. Both have expanded during the chaos in Syria.

Who wins in the end?

AEI: The Syrian ceasefire agreement of February 11 is a big win for the Russians and the Syrian regime. Russia, Iran, and Syria are in the midst of a major military offensive that has allowed them to besiege Aleppo and has them poised to make gains across the battlefield. This so-called “cessation of hostilities” agreement allows them to consolidate and prepare for further advances, while preventing the opposition that the US ostensibly supports from attempting to undo any of their gains.

It does not require the Assad coalition to allow humanitarian access to the hundreds of thousands they have just trapped in and around Aleppo itself, and it leaves them fully in control of what humanitarian aid goes to the other areas they themselves are besieging and deliberately starving. It was concluded without the participation of the opposition, and is thus an imposition of a truce on the fighters the US is theoretically supporting at a moment when they have lost vital ground.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Secretary of State John Kerry and UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura (L-R) arrive for a news conference in Munich, Germany, February 12, 2016. REUTERS/Michael Dalder.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Secretary of State John Kerry and UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura (L-R) arrive for a news conference in Munich, Germany, February 12, 2016. REUTERS/Michael Dalder.

The Russians, moreover, define all of the opposition groups in northern Syria as either ISIS or Jabhat al Nusra. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said today,

… if liberation of the city that has been taken by illegal armed groups can be qualified as aggression, then, well, yeah, probably. But to attack those who have taken your land is necessary – is a necessary thing. First of all, this has been done by Jabhat al-Nusrah, and also the western suburbs of Aleppo are still being controlled together with Jabhat al-Nusrah by Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham.

The Russians will read this agreement as letting them continue operations against all opposition groups in Aleppo and  continue their encirclement, siege, and targeting of that city.  They will therefore continue to weaken the non-Jabhat al Nusra, non-ISIS opposition now concentrated in Aleppo, and likely strengthen the hands of the terrorist organizations they purport to be attacking.

This “cessation of hostilities” also continues the policy of requiring the opposition to make concessions in order to get the regime temporarily to stop committing what the UN has called crimes against humanity.

This agreement is a ceasefire in the manner of the Minsk agreements that shaped the supposed ceasefires in Ukraine — ceasefires that have been nominally in effect throughout all of the major Russian and separatist military offensives since February 2015. The Russians posed as a neutral third party when in fact they are a belligerent in the conflict, and have continued to escalate and de-escalate military operations in Ukraine in order to extract concessions from the Ukrainian government.

Not only will this Syrian “cessation of hostilities” also fail, but it will fail in a way that further alienates the non-ISIS, non-al Qaeda Sunni opposition groups and populations on which any meaningful political settlement of the conflict in accord with America’s vital national security interests must rely.