$1.7 Billion to Iran to be Spent this Way?

Posted on September 1, 2016September 1, 2016 by Denise Simon

Iran ‘is running covert war in Syria costing BILLIONS from top secret spymaster HQ near Damascus airport’, with 60000 fighters

Iran is shoring up the Syrian regime from a secret HQ in Damascus nicknamed ‘the Glasshouse’ – and commanding a huge covert army in support of Assad, according to leaked intelligence passed by activists to MailOnline.
The National Council of Resistance of Iran ( NCRI ) claims that the theocratic state’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has spent billions in hardware for its ally Bashar al-Assad in the last five years – and runs operations on the ground from a five-floor monolith near Damascus airport.
The Iranian HQ, which plays a pivotal role in supporting Assad’s regime alongside Russia, contains intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and has vaults packed with millions of dollars in cash flown in from Tehran, claims the NCRI.
The allegations are contained in a dossier of reports apparently leaked by senior sources inside Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and collated by the dissident activists who oppose the Iranian regime.
The dossier – which was described as ‘credible’ by intelligence experts – makes the bold claims that Iran controls the biggest fighting force in Syria; has military bases throughout the splintered state; and has amassed a war-chest far greater than feared in support of Bashar Assad.

Much more to this story found here.

Six Key Unanswered Questions About the $1.7 Billion Ransom Payment to Iran

Over the past several weeks, the Obama administration has dodged questions, invented excuses, and misled the public to spin the apparent $1.7 billion ransom payment to Iran. So far this has left us with more questions than answers, particularly as it relates to the $1.3 billion “interest” payment.

As Speaker Ryan said earlier this month, “The president owes the American people a full accounting of his actions and the dangerous precedent he has set.”

Here are six key questions the president still needs to answer:

1. Why was the $1.3 billion transferred through an unknown central bank while the $400 million was paid in cash?

2. Why were these payments made separately?

3. Why wasn’t the $400 million paid through the central bank?

4. Was the $1.3 billion wired or paid in cash?

5. Was there a license issued to the unnamed central bank to shield it from sanctions under the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations?

6. Is there a formal settlement agreement from the dispute at the Hague Tribunal?

The House will consider legislation later this month to address this dangerous ransom payment.

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Khamenei: We will develop our defensive and offensive capabilities. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the development of Iran’s “defensive and offensive capabilities” an “inalienable and clear right” during a meeting with officials from the Defense Ministry. Khamenei noted that developing weapons of mass destruction “including chemical and nuclear weapons” is prohibited but added that “besides these restrictions, there are no limitations on the development of our defensive and military capabilities. Advancing in these domains is our duty.”

President Hassan Rouhani called for enhanced defensive power through military and private sector collaboration; he also declared that Iran can purchase and sell weapons as it sees fit. The Defense Ministry unveiled an advanced short-range ballistic missile. The Iranian and British embassies reopened in Tehran and London after a four-year closure.

President Rouhani underlined the importance of integrating the military and private industry in order to advance the nation’s defensive capabilities. He also emphasized that Iran’s military doctrine is predicated on defense in an effort to allay concerns shared by some Arab states over the regime’s conventional capabilities. Rouhani reassured his domestic audiences that the nuclear deal will not limit Iran’s defense capacity, claiming: “We will sell and buy weapons whenever and wherever we deem it necessary… we will not wait for permission…or any resolution.” Defense Minister IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan stressed that Iran will not waver from its determination to strengthen its defense capabilities. The Defense Ministry, meanwhile, introduced the Fateh 313 precision-guided missile, which runs on solid fuel with a reported range of 500 kilometers.

National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission member Mohammad Esmail Kowsari criticized the Rouhani administration for failing to strengthen the economy, claiming: “Mr. Rouhani made promises to the people regarding the improvement of the economic situation, but today, not much has emerged.” The former senior IRGC commander stated, “Unfortunately, the current government does not tolerate fair criticism…”

British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond traveled to Iran on August 23 to reopen his country’s embassy in Tehran. Hammond and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif held a joint press conference to mark the resumption of Tehran-London ties. The British Foreign Secretary also met with President Rouhani and other senior Iranian officials.

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Undersecretary for Strategic Affairs Ali Hosseini Tash rejected a recent Associated Press report alleging that he signed a secret agreement with the IAEA, which purportedly allows Iran to use its own inspectors to monitor the Parchin military site.

Secret Side Iran Deals Revealed and Confirmed

Posted on September 1, 2016September 1, 2016 by Denise Simon

Note: Further side deals may occur and hat tip to Reuters. Expect immediate hearings when Congress returns. There is no shame with this administration including Barack Obama, John Kerry and Ben Rhodes.

JCPOA Exemptions Revealed

INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

REPORT

By David Albright and Andrea Stricker

September 1, 2016

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) placed detailed limitations on facets of Iran’s nuclear program that needed to be met by Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016.1 Most of the conditions were met by Iran. However, we have learned that some nuclear stocks and facilities were not in accordance with JCPOA limits on Implementation Day, but in anticipation the Joint Commission had earlier and secretly exempted them from the JCPOA limits. The exemptions and in one case, a loophole, involved the low enriched uranium (LEU) cap of 300 kilograms (kg), some of the near 20 percent LEU, the heavy water cap, and the number of large hot cells allowed to remain in Iran. One senior knowledgeable official stated that if the Joint Commission had not acted to create these exemptions, some of Iran’s nuclear facilities would not have been in compliance with the JCPOA by Implementation Day.

1 The Institute for Science and International Security was neutral on whether or not the JCPOA should be implemented.

Recently the Joint Commission created a Technical Working Group to consider further exemptions to Iran’s stock of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium. This cap is set at 300 kg of LEU hexafluoride but Iran apparently has or could exceed the cap if no further exemptions are granted by the Joint Commission.

The decisions of the Joint Commission have not been announced publicly. The Obama administration informed Congress of key Joint Commission decisions on Implementation Day but in a confidential manner. These decisions, which are written down, amount to additional secret or confidential documents linked to the JCPOA. Since the JCPOA is public, any rationale for keeping these exemptions secret appears unjustified. Moreover, the Joint Commission’s secretive decision making process risks advantaging Iran by allowing it to try to systematically weaken the JCPOA. It appears to be succeeding in several key areas.

Given the technical complexity and public importance of the various JCPOA exemptions and loopholes, the administration’s policy to maintain secrecy interferes in the process of establishing adequate Congressional and public oversight of the JCPOA. This is particularly true concerning potentially agreement-weakening decisions by the Joint Commission. As a matter 2 | P a g e

of policy, the United States should agree to any exemptions or loopholes in the JCPOA only if the decisions are simultaneously made public.

Exemptions

The exemptions in effect on Implementation Day include:

1) Allowing more than 300 kg of about 3.5 percent low enriched uranium hexafluoride or equivalent mass if the LEU was in the following forms:

 Low level solid waste;

 Low level liquid waste; and

 Sludge waste.

The amount of LEU hexafluoride equivalent involved in this exemption is unknown, although these amounts if not exempted would have placed Iran over the 300 kg cap, according to one knowledgeable senior official.

2) Near 20 percent LEU in “lab contaminant” that was judged as unrecoverable. Iran had agreed in the JCPOA that all near 20 percent LEU would be in fuel elements; subsequently modified to irradiated fuel elements, albeit in many cases only lightly irradiated. The amount of LEU in the lab contaminant is unknown. The basis for judging the near 20 percent LEU unrecoverable is not known.

3) A number of large hot cells. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed for 15 years to only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters.2 The reason is that hot cells with these dimensions could not in practical terms be used in plutonium separation efforts involving irradiated fuel. The JCPOA also stated that larger hot cells could be operated with the approval of the Joint Commission. However, prior to Implementation Day, the Joint Commission agreed to allow Iran to continue operating 19 large hot cells in three Tehran locations and one Karaj location which are in excess of the six cubic meter limitation. Although the hot cells are used in the production of medical radionuclides they can be misused for secret, mostly small-scale plutonium separation efforts and raise serious questions over the rigorousness of this JCPOA exemption on hot cells. A related question is whether the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regularly inspects all these exempted hot cells. Moreover, Iran is

2 According to the JCPOA, “For 15 years, Iran will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions less than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. These will be co-located with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-destructive PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement mechanism established by this JCPOA. For 15 years, Iran will develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded cells or shielded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters in volume and specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, only after approval by the Joint Commission.” 3 | P a g e

believed to be seeking to exploit this exemption as a precedent to further increase its number of hot cells with volumes greater than six cubic meters.

Heavy Water Loophole

The Joint Commission also decided on or prior to Implementation Day that Iran would be allowed to export heavy water in excess of the JCPOA’s 130 tonnes cap for sale on the open market even though Iran did not have a buyer for this heavy water. The Joint Commission allowed Iran to store large amounts of heavy water in Oman that remained under Iran’s control, effectively allowing Iran to exceed its cap of 130 tonnes of heavy water as it continues to produce heavy water at its Arak facility.3 As discussed in an earlier Institute report, this heavy water loophole in the JCPOA was poorly considered.4 As discussed in the report, the Institute learned that the Department of Energy’s purchase of 32 tonnes of this heavy water unfairly disrupted and negatively affected a nascent, needed North American supply chain of heavy water. The Institute warned that the loophole also risked legitimizing Iran as a nuclear supplier when it had done nothing yet to prove it would abide by international norms relating to nuclear trade or halt illicit nuclear procurements. Moreover, the deal will only encourage Iran to continue exceeding the JCPOA heavy water cap for financial gain. One surprising development is that the Arak heavy water production plant produced significantly more heavy water than expected during several months following Implementation Day. Arak produced at a rate exceeding 25 tonnes per year, compared to the expected rate of 16 tonnes per year expected prior to Implementation Day.

3 One reviewer raised the question of whether this precedent could be applied to LEU, where it would be located outside of Iran even though no buyer had been found.

4 Albright and Stricker, “U.S. Purchase of Iran’s Heavy Water: Discouraging a Dangerous Nuclear Supplier,” Institute Report, May 23, 2016. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Heavy_Water_Purchase_23May2016_final.pdf

5 David Albright, “Update on Iran’s Stocks of 3.5 Percent Low Enriched Uranium: Blocking unjustified exemptions to the 300 kilogram cap,” Institute Report, May 23, 2016, Rev. May 27, 2016. http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Update_on_Irans_Stocks_of_35_Percent_LEU_May_23_2016_Final_rev_may_27_2016.pdf

Newly Formed LEU Exemption Working Group

In July 2016 the Joint Commission established a Technical Working Group to evaluate, apparently among other stocks, the fate of approximately 100-200 kg of less than 3.67 percent LEU in the Enriched UO2 Powder Plant (EUPP).5 This plant converted LEU hexafluoride into uranium oxide and has been mothballed under the JCPOA. Although almost all of the LEU oxide produced at this plant was shipped out of Iran, a fraction was left in the process lines and tanks on Implementation Day. This LEU was not exempted on Implementation Day and was counted as part of the 300 kg LEU cap.

Russian Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna Vladimir Voronkov told TASS in July 2016 prior to an impending Joint Commission meeting: “There are two issues that need to be addressed. These are the difficulties with enriched uranium 4 | P a g e

accumulated during the enrichment in the pipes and other devices. What has been discovered exceeds the allowed limit of 300 kilograms. And the second issue is heavy water.”6

6 “Meeting of Iran-P5+1 commission on nuclear deal to be held in Vienna July 19,” TASS Russian News Agency, July 14, 2016. http://tass.ru/en/world/888165

7 With regard to domestic fuel fabrication, the JCPOA states: “Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies and its intermediate products manufactured in Iran and certified to meet international standards, including those for the modernised Arak research reactor, will not count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided the Technical Working Group of the Joint Commission approves that such fuel assemblies and their intermediate products cannot be readily reconverted into UF6. This could for instance be achieved through impurities (e.g. burnable poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or through the fuel being in a chemical form such that direct conversion back to UF6 would be technically difficult without dissolution and purification. The objective technical criteria will guide the approval process of the Technical Working Group. The IAEA will monitor the fuel fabrication process for any fuel produced in Iran to verify that the fuel and intermediate products comport with the fuel fabrication process that was approved by the Technical Working Group.”

It is unknown if the Joint Commission has decided to allow Iran to exceed the 300 kg cap while the Technical Working Group evaluates this issue. However, the pattern that appears to have emerged is that Iran will likely move to violate the cap if it is not granted an exemption.

The JCPOA is silent on the issue of exempting from the 300 kg cap already existing LEU that had been produced in Iran. In fact, US officials told Institute staff in the summer of 2015 that Iran was fully expected to empty the EUPP of LEU and send it all out of the country or dilute it to natural uranium.

Although the JCPOA explicitly created exemptions to the 300 kg cap, such as Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel assemblies for use in Russian-supplied reactors in Iran, these exemptions do not appear to cover the exemption of any remaining LEU in the EUPP. According to the JCPOA, “All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the international market and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran.”

The JCPOA envisions that Iran may make LEU fuel domestically in the future and contains a mechanism to exempt that LEU from the cap as long as Iran meets stringent conditions. To that end, the JCPOA states: “The Joint Commission will establish a Technical Working Group with the goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in Iran while adhering to the agreed stockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 % enriched UF6 or the equivalent in different chemical forms).” However, the exemptions specified in the JCPOA are intended for future fuel fabrication, and do not appear applicable to LEU processed in the EUPP prior to Implementation Day.7 The JCPOA intended that existing, domestically produced LEU enriched up to 3.67 percent would be subject to the 300 kg cap and not exempted.

However, the Joint Commission has taken a different approach and has already exempted existing LEU as part of bringing Iran into compliance with the JCPOA on Implementation Day. Moreover, it did so without relying on the Technical Working Group as called for in the JCPOA. 5 | P a g e

Now, there is concern that the newly formed Technical Working Group will lay the basis to exempt more LEU from the cap. Moreover, the intention appears to be to conduct these discussions and the associated decision making about LEU exemptions in secret, without any public scrutiny.

These exemptions matter because the LEU may be recoverable by Iran in a breakout to produce highly enriched uranium, thereby lowering breakout times. Separating LEU from its chemical constituents in such products is typically straightforward.

While Iran and its allies may today view the LEU as non-recoverable, that view does not appear to be a sufficient standard to meet the JCPOA conditions or prevent the LEU’s use in a breakout. A country intent on breaking out and making highly enriched uranium as national priorities may make an entirely different calculation about the LEU’s worth and devote considerable effort to recovering the LEU, such as during a push to acquire nuclear weapons in a crisis.

Any discussion of such an important issue as exempting LEU from the 300 kilogram cap or from export should be public and subject to more rigorous oversight. The exemption process and the Joint Commission decisions should be transparent; the current arrangement has been overly secret and amounts to the generation of additional secret or confidential arrangements directly linked to the JCPOA that do not have adequate oversight and scrutiny. Moreover, the process in general raises the question of whether Iran is exploiting the exemption mechanism, outside of any public oversight, to systematically weaken as many JCPOA limitations as possible. The US administration should insist that the exemption process and decisions be public and transparent.

Russia Blocking UN Sanctions on Syrian Chemical Attacks

Posted on September 1, 2016September 1, 2016 by Denise Simon

Russia blocks UN move to sanction Syria for chemical attacks

Russia’s UN ambassador questioned whether a UN report had provided evidence of President Assad’s chemical weapons attacks

MiddleEastEye: Russia blocked a move by the United Nations on Tuesday to sanction Syria for the government’s alleged use of chemical weapons in the country’s brutal civil war.

Britain and France called for UN sanctions after a UN-led investigation found that President Bashar al-Assad’s forces had carried out at least two chemical attacks, one in 2014 and one in 2015.

Following a closed-door Security Council meeting the Russian ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, said he had “very serious questions” about the findings and suggested the panel should continue its work.

“There are a number of questions which have to be clarified before we accept all the findings of the report,” Churkin said.

Previous reports from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had concluded that toxic gases have been used as weapons in Syria’s five-year war, but stopped short of identifying the perpetrators.

The panel of inquiry, known as the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), for the first time pointed the finger of blame at the Assad government for chemical weapons use after years of denial from Damascus.

The British and French ambassadors described the use of chemical weapons against civilians as a war crime, while US ambassador Samantha Power called for quick action to ensure those responsible “pay a price.”

Churkin, however, made clear he was unconvinced by the JIM report.

“There is nobody to sanction in the report,” Churkin said. “It contains no names, no specifics, no fingerprints.”

“Clearly there is a smoking gun. We know that chlorine was most likely used, but there are no fingerprints on the gun,” he said.

The panel found that the Syrian government had dropped chemical weapons on two villages in northwestern Idlib province: Talmenes on 21 April, 2014 and Sarmin on 16 March, 2015.

In both instances, Syrian air force helicopters dropped “a device” on houses that was followed by the “release of a toxic substance,” which in the case of Sarmin matched “the characteristics of chlorine.”

Chlorine use as a weapon is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Syria joined in 2013, under pressure from Russia, Assad’s ally.

No evidence

Syrian ambassador Bashar Jaafari rejected the findings, saying the panel lacked “physical evidence” to support its conclusions that chlorine barrel-bombs were dropped on civilians.

The report was “totally based on witnesses presented by terrorist armed groups,” Jaafari told reporters.

French ambassador Francois Delattre called for a “quick and strong Security Council response” that would include “imposing sanctions on those who are responsible for these acts.”

The council will be “looking at the imposition of sanctions and some form of accountability within international legal mechanisms,” said British Ambassador Matthew Rycroft.

The report also found that the Islamic State had used mustard gas in an attack on the town of Marea in northern Aleppo province in August 2015.

Human Rights Watch called on the council to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court for war crimes and to urgently impose sanctions.

Britain, France and the United States said such a step remained an option, even though Russia and China blocked ICC referral in 2014.

“Russia and China don’t have a leg to stand on by continuing to obstruct the Security Council on Syria sanctions and ICC referral,” said Louis Charbonneau, UN director at Human Rights Watch.

“The Security Council diminishes its importance if it doesn’t take strong action against demonstrated use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government.”

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Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations has dismissed as flawed the findings of a UN-mandated investigation blaming Syrian forces for the use of chemical weapons, saying the report is based on “false testimonies.” Per the Iran Project

Last week, a report carried out by the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the UN and the OPCW claimed that Syrian forces had used chlorine in two separate attacks against militants in 2014 and 2015.

The investigation was launched based on the UN Security Council’s Resolution 2235, which called for determining which party used chemical arms in Syria.

Syria rejected the allegations, with Ja’afari saying on Tuesday that the conclusions of the report “lack any physical evidence, whether by samples or attested medical reports that chlorine was used.”

The Syrian diplomat also said the report was “totally based on witnesses presented by terrorist armed groups.”

Russia, which has been backing the Syrian government in its war against the terrorists, also cast doubt on the report.

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Per the United Nations website:

24 August 2016 – United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today submitted a joint UN-Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) report to the Security Council outlining in-depth investigation into, as well as the findings, assessments and conclusions of, nine selected cases related to incidents involving the use of chemicals weapons in Syria.

According to a statement issued today by Mr. Ban’s spokesperson, the UN chief is looking forward to the Council’s consideration of the report.

The report will be available publicly shortly thereafter, the statement added.

The methods of work and the investigation of the specific cases are described in the report’s annexes.

According to the statement, the UN chief also expressed appreciation to the Joint Investigative Mechanism’s Leadership Panel and its staff, as well as to the OPCW and the Office for Disarmament Affairs for their continued support to the Mechanism.

He further thanked the Member States of the UN for their assistance to the Mechanism, including financial support.

The joint body, established by the Security Council in August 2015 for a period of one year with a possibility of future extension, is tasked with identifying “individuals, entities, groups, or governments involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical,” in Syria, according to the Council, which reiterated that those responsible must be held accountable.

That body differs from the OPCW-UN Joint Mission on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons, and which was formally established in August 2013. It completed its mandate and wrapped up operations on 30 September 2014. From now on, the OPCW mission in Syria will continue to deal with the destruction of chemical weapon production facilities and clarification of certain aspects of the Syrian initial declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention .

State Dept: Country Reports on Terrorism 2015

Posted on August 31, 2016August 31, 2016 by Denise Simon

Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela, all in our hemisphere get major passes from the State Department.

Related reading: The 50 most violent cities in the world

Related reading: The world’s most dangerous and safest countries revealed Interactive map for rankings is found here.

Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.

Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.

Chapters

–Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Europe Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview
–Chapter 2. Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview
–Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
–Chapter 4: The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism
–Chapter 5: Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)
–Chapter 6. Foreign Terrorist Organizations
–Chapter 7. Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

Annexes

–National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information [ PDF version ]
–Terrorism Deaths, Injuries and Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens Overseas in 2015

Full Report

–Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 (PDF)

Court Reverses Jury Decision on PLO Attack, 11 Americans Died

Posted on August 31, 2016August 31, 2016 by Denise Simon

Circuit Reverses $655M Award Against PLO for Terror Attacks

Hamblett/NewYorkLawJournal: A $655 million award against the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority for attacks that killed or wounded members of 11 American families in Israel has been thrown out by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The circuit held this morning that there was no personal jurisdiction over the action, where a jury found after a seven-week trial in 2015 that the PLO and the Authority, acting through their employees, perpetrated the attacks or provided material support for those who did.

The decision was a big setback for lawyers who have been working for years to win damages for families under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §2333(a). The jury before Judge George Daniels in the Southern District of New York awarded the plaintiffs $218.5 million, an amount automatically tripled to $655.5 million under the Act.

Judges Pierre Leval and Christopher Droney and Southern District Judge John Koeltl, sitting by designation, said Daniels erred in finding personal jurisdiction in Sokolow v. Palestinian Liberation Organization, 15-3135.

The decision rejected the arguments of Arnold & Porter partner Kent Yalowitz, who told the circuit in April that jurisdiction should lie and justice be done for the “11 American families whose loved ones were murdered and maimed by the defendants” because the goal of the PLO and the Authority was to influence the foreign policy of the United States through coercion and intimidation—a key part of the Anti-Terrorism Act.

Yalowitz said the evidence was clear that the defendants were involved in the attacks, either through their own employees or through assistance to their allies within Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (NYLJ, April 13).

But Mitchell Berger, a partner at Squire Patton Boggs, got the better of the argument, telling the judges that case law was clear that “you have to find the brunt of the injury” in the United States to sue in an American courtroom.

The case was bought by 36 plaintiffs and four estates seeking compensation for death and injuries that occurred in a series of attacks, including the July 31, 2002, Hebrew University bombing carried out by Hamas that killed nine people, four of them U.S. citizens.

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During the second Intifada, numerous American citizens were murdered by terrorist attacks.

In 2004, the families of several deceased victims sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Southern District of New York under the Antiterrorism Act. The families claim the PLO and PA organizations financed and orchestrated the following seven attacks:

(1) The January 8, 2001 shooting attack on Varda Guetta and her son Oz;

(2) The January 22, 2002 shooting attack on Shayna Gould and Shmuel Waldman;

(3)The January 27, 2002 suicide bombing attack on the Sokolow family;

(4) The March 21, 2002 suicide bombing attack on Alan Bauer and his son Yehonatan;

(5) The June 19, 2002 suicide bombing attack on Shaul Mandelkorn;

(6) The July 31, 2002 Hebrew University Cafeteria bombing which killed David Gritz, Benjamin Blustein, Diane Carter and Janis Coulter;

(7) The January 29, 2004 suicide bombing attack on a bus which killed Yechezkel Goldberg.

The plaintiffs seek up to $3 billion in damages from attacks between January 2001 and February 2004 by the PLO. In September 2008, U.S. District Judge George Daniels rejected the PLO’s argument that the attacks were acts of war rather than terrorism. Trial began in January 2015 and on February 23, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The defense has been found liable for $218.5 million, an amount set to be tripled to $655.5 million.

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Case documents for Sokolow et al. v. PLO et al.