China Gave Trump an Ultimatum to Deal with N. Korea?

Posted on May 7, 2017May 7, 2017 by Denise Simon

BEIJING – China urged the United States to sack the head of the U.S. Pacific Command in return for exerting more pressure on North Korea amid concerns over its growing nuclear and missile threats, a source close to U.S.-China ties said Saturday.

The Chinese leadership headed by President Xi Jinping made the request, through its ambassador in the United States, to dismiss Adm. Harry Harris, known as a hard-liner on China, including with respect to the South China Sea issue, the source said.

Adm. Harry Harris, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, addresses the Lowy Institute think tank in Sydney last December. | AFP-JIJI

China’s envoy to the United States, Cui Tiankai, conveyed the request to the U.S. side, to coincide with the first face-to-face, two-day meeting between President Donald Trump and Xi in Florida from April 6, but the Trump administration likely rejected it, the source said.

China is a longtime economic and diplomatic benefactor of North Korea.

As the head of Pacific Command, Harris, who was born in Japan and raised in the United States, plays a vital role in the security of the region.

He was responsible in ordering last month the dispatch of the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier to waters near off the Korean Peninsula in a show of force amid signs the North was preparing to test-fire another ballistic missile or conduct a sixth nuclear test.

The Trump administration has called for exerting “maximum pressure” on North Korea to prod it to give up its nuclear and missile programs. The administration has said all options — including a military strikes — remain on the table.

Harris has pushed for the U.S. deployment of the advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system to South Korea. China has opposed the deployment, saying it could undermine its security interests and the strategic balance of the region.

He has also called for continuing U.S. “freedom of navigation” operations in the contested South China Sea. Overlapping territorial claims, as well as land construction and militarization of outposts in disputed areas in the sea, remain a source of tension in the region.

According to the source, Cui also asked the Trump administration not to label China as a currency manipulator. As per the request, the United States did not label China as such, in light of Beijing’s role in helping Washington deal with the North Korean issue.

*** Related reading: 2013 Study Finds North Korea Has Indigenous Capabilities to Produce Nuclear Weapons

An example of the open-source evidence used for Kemp’s study: A 2011 image from a television broadcast in North Korea showing Kim-Jong Il inspecting a flow-forming machine located in an underground tunnel. This type of machine is able to produce centrifuge rotors for North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program.

***

Is the United States partners in the Asia Pacific region ready to deal with 5000 tunnels and an underground operation?

The entrance of an ‘intrusion tunnel’ under the DMZ between South and North Korea, Telegraph

North Korea’s Secret Strategy in a War with America: Go Underground

North Korea, one of the most secretive countries in the world, is no stranger to building underground military facilities. Whether a tunnel dug under the demilitarized zone designed to pass thousands of troops an hour, or bunkers to accommodate the regime’s leadership, North Korea has built extensive underground facilities designed to give it an edge in wartime.

One of the earliest examples of North Korean underground engineering was the discovery of several tunnels leading from North Korea under the demilitarized zone to South Korea. The first tunnel was located in 1974, extending one kilometer south of the DMZ. The tunnel was large enough to move up to two thousand troops per hour under the DMZ. A U.S. Navy officer and South Korean Marine corporal were killed by a booby trap while investigating the tunnel. Thanks to a tip from a North Korean defector, an even larger tunnel was discovered in 1978, a mile long and nearly seven feet wide.

Since then at least four tunnels have been discovered, with reinforced concrete slabs, electricity for lighting and fresh air generation, and narrow railway gauges to shuttle dirt and rock back to the tunnel entrance. Collectively, the four tunnels would have likely been able to move a brigade’s worth of troops an hour under South Korea’s defenses.

It’s difficult to determine how many tunnels exist. One report says that Kim Il-sung, the founder of the North Korean state and Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, ordered each of the ten frontline combat divisions to dig two tunnels. If completed, that would theoretically mean another dozen or so tunnels remain undiscovered. A former South Korean general, Han Sung-chu, claims there are at least eighty-four tunnels—some reaching as far as downtown Seoul. The South Korean government does not believe Han’s numbers—nor the claimed ability to reach Seoul—are credible. A forty-mile tunnel would reportedly generate a seven-hundred-thousand-ton debris pile, which has not been picked up by satellite. Despite the warnings, the last major tunnel was discovered in 1990 and South Korea seems to believe that the tunneling danger has passed.

If it has passed, it may be because North Korea has decided to tunnel in different ways. The North Korean People’s Liberation Army Air Force is believed to have three different underground air bases at Wonsan, Jangjin and Onchun. The underground base at Wonsan reportedly includes a runway 5,900 feet long and ninety feet wide that passes through a mountain. According to a defector, during wartime NK PLAAF aircraft, including MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, would take off from conventional air bases but return to underground air bases. This is plausible, as one would expect North Korean air bases to be quickly destroyed during wartime.

Another underground development is a series of troop bunkers near the DMZ. A North Korean defector disclosed that, starting in 2004, North Korea began building bunkers capable of concealing between 1,500 and two thousand fully armed combat troops near the border. At least eight hundred bunkers were built, not including decoys, meant to conceal units such as light-infantry brigades and keep them rested until the start of an invasion.

Other underground facilities are believed to have been constructed to shelter the North’s leadership. According to a South Korean military journal, the United States believes there are between six thousand and eight thousand such shelters scattered across the country. This information was reportedly gathered from defectors in order to hunt down regime members in the event of war or government collapse.

North Korea is believed to have hundreds of artillery-concealing caves just north of the DMZ. Known as Hardened Artillery Sites, or HARTS, these are usually tunneled into the sides of mountains. An artillery piece, such as a 170-millimeter Koksan gun or 240-millimeter multiple-launch rocket system, can fire from the mouth of the cave and then withdraw into the safety of the mountain to reload. These sites are used to provide artillery support for an invasion of South Korea or direct fire against Seoul itself. As of 1986, and estimated two hundred to five hundred HARTS were thought to exist.

According to a report by the Nautilus Institute, North Korea is also thought to have “radar sites in elevator shafts that can be raised up like a submarine periscope; submarine and missile patrol boat bases in tunnels hewn in rock; tunnels a kilometer or more in length for storing vehicles and supplies, or to hide the population of a nearby city.”

How would the United States and South Korea deal with these underground facilities in wartime? First, it would have to locate the facilities. These facilities are hard to spot via satellite, and gleaning information from defectors is perhaps the best way to learn about them in peacetime. Once war commences, signal intelligence will pick up radio transmissions from previously unknown underground locations, enemy troops will from concealed positions or tunnel entrances, and artillery counter-battery radars will fix the positions of HARTS. It is likely that, despite advance preparations, many of these positions will be a surprise to Washington and Seoul.

Once located, there are three ways of dealing with the sites. The first and safest way to deal with them is to bomb them from above. This presents the least risk to allied forces, but it will also prove difficult to determine whether air or artillery strikes have had good effect. The use of bombs or artillery shells may cause cave-ins that prevent allied forces from entering an underground complex and exploiting any intelligence found inside.

Another option is to simply station troops outside tunnels and shoot anyone who ventures outside. While also a safer option, an underground complex will always have multiple exits—the tunnels Kim Il-sung ordered his divisions to dig were to each have four or five exit points. The most thorough way to deal with the tunnels would be to enter them. This would be by far the most effective way to deal with regime holdouts, but also the most dangerous.

Pyongyang’s eventual defeat in any wartime scenario is a given, but its underground headquarters, fortifications and troop depots have the potential to not only enhance the Korean People’s Army’s ability to mount a surprise attack, but also to prolong the war, confounding the high-tech armed forces of its adversaries. Such underground shelters, wherever they are, will likely be the site of the endgame phase of the war, as the regime is driven underground by rapidly advancing allied forces. Only then will we discover the true extent of North Korea’s extensive underground empire.

Syria: Memorandum signed, De-escalation Zones are NOT Safe Zones

Posted on May 7, 2017May 7, 2017 by Denise Simon

This is terrifying for the Syrian people that remain in country and just as bad as the millions of refugees, noted to be about 11 million that have fled the country. Their hopes of ever returning to their home country fades each day.

It is also notable that the United States and coalition countries do have boots on the ground in Syria and the matter of an offensive operation to liberate Raqqa Syria, the headquarters for Islamic State is not even mentioned in this newly signed document. There is no mention of the United States operations in Syria along with other allied countries. Are the skies to be conflicted again? Any mention of the use of U.S. operations out of Incirlik, Turkey? Nope.

Some will read this and reply that the United States has no interest in Syria. As long as refugees and migrants continue to arrive across the United States each month and as long as there are more than 1000 open terror cases being investigated by the FBI and DHS, we DO have a dog in this hunt.

“The functioning of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as the administration of the security zones shall be ensured by the forces of the Guarantors by consensus”

6 May 201712:41

Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic Official website of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2746041

The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey as guarantors of the observance of the ceasefire regime in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter referred to as “Guarantors”):

-guided by the provisions of UNSC resolution 2254 (2015); -reaffirming their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic; -expressing their determination to decrease the level of military tensions and to provide for the security of civilians in the Syrian Arab Republic, have agreed on the following.

1.the following de-escalation areas shall be created with the aim to put a prompt end to violence, improve the humanitarian situation and create favorable conditions to advance political settlement of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic:

– Idlib province and certain parts of the neighbouring provinces (Latakia, Hama and Aleppo provinces); -certain parts in the north of Homs province; -in eastern Ghouta; -certain parts of southern Syria (Deraa and Al-Quneitra provinces).

The creation of the de-escalation areas and security zones is a temporary measure, the duration of which will initially be 6 months and will be automatically extended on the basis of consensus of the Guarantors.

2.Within the lines of the de-escalation areas:

-hostilities between the conflicting parties (the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the armed opposition groups that have joined and will join the ceasefire regime) with the use of any kinds of weapons, including aerial assets, shall be ceased; -rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access shall be provided; -conditions to deliver medical aid to local population and to meet basic needs of civilians shall be created; -measures to restore basic infrastructure facilities, starting with water supply and electricity distribution networks, shall be taken; -conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons shall be created.

3.Along the lines of the de-escalation areas, security zones shall be established in order to prevent incidents and military confrontations between the conflicting parties.

4.The security zones shall include:

– Checkpoints to ensure unhindered movement of unarmed civilians and delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as to facilitate economic activities;

– Observation posts to ensure compliance with the provisions of the ceasefire regime.

The functioning of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as the administration of the security zones shall be ensured by the forces of the Guarantors by consensus. Third parties might be deployed, if necessary, by consensus of the Guarantors.

5.The Guarantors shall:

-take all necessary measures to ensure the fulfillment by the conflicting parties of the ceasefire regime; -take all necessary measures to continue the fight against DAESH/ISIL, Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaeda or DAESH/ISIL as designated by the UN Security Council within and outside the de-escalation areas; -continue efforts to include in the ceasefire regime armed opposition groups that have not yet joined the ceasefire regime.

6.The Guarantors shall in 2 weeks after signing the Memorandum form a Joint working group on de-escalation (hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Working Group”) composed of their authorized representatives in order to delineate the lines of the de-escalation areas and security zones as well as to resolve other operational and technical issues related to the implementation of the Memorandum.

The Guarantors shall take steps to complete by 4 June 2017 the preparation of the maps of the de-escalation areas and security zones and to separate the armed opposition groups from the terrorist groups mentioned in para.5 of the Memorandum.

The Joint Working Group shall prepare by the above-mentioned date the maps of the de-escalation areas and security zones to be agreed by consensus of the Guarantors as well as the draft Regulation of the Joint Working Group.

The Joint Working Group shall report on its activities to the high-level international meetings on Syria held in Astana.

The present Memorandum enters into force the next day after its signing.

Done in Astana, 4 May 2017 in three copies in English, having equal legal force.

Signatures

Islamic Republic of Iran Russian Federation Republic of Turkey

***

Russia is telling the entire Western world they are in control and alleges full cooperation and approval not only from the United Nations but claims the Trump administration has also agreed. Read on as it also shows maps of the ‘de-escalation zones’.

Russian Defense Ministry Held A Briefing Titled “Principles Of Implementation Of The Memorandum On Syria De-Eescalation Zones Signed In Astana”

Russian Defence Ministry held a briefing titled “Principles of implementation of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones signed in Astana”

Speech of the Deputy Defence Minister of Russia

Lieutenant General Alexander Fomin

Good day, ladies and gentlemen!

The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation is holding a briefing on the main points and principles of implementation of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones signed in Astana.

The event is participated by the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate – the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy and Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov.

As you know, yesterday, after two-day negotiations held in Astana, plenipotentiaries from Russia, Iran and Turkey signed a Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones.

For reference:

The Russian party was represented by the Special envoy of the President of the Russian Federation on the settlement of the Syrian conflict A. Lavrentiev.

The Turkish party was represented by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey S. Onal.

Iran is represented by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran H. Ansari.

First, we should briefly inform you about the preparation of the agreement, its participants and ideas.

The document had been elaborated by the Russian Defence Ministry upon the direct order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces Vladimir Putin to maintain the ceasefire on the territory of Syria.

The adoption of the Memorandum had been preceded by a thorough work with all the participants of the negotiation process.

The political settlement in Syria had been numerously discussed by the President of the Russian Federation with the leadership of Turkey, the USA and other states.

In particular, de-escalation zones were negotiated in the course of the talks with the Heads of Russia and Turkey on May 3 in Sochi.

The Russian Defence Minister held bilateral talks with Ministers of Defence of Iran, Turkey, Syria and Israel.

Intelligence services and foreign affairs departments cooperated with each other permanently. A large work was done in order to convince the Syrian leadership and leaders of armed opposition formations to take measures aimed to deescalate the conflict.

Constructive attitude of Iran and Turkey, which had supported building up of the ceasefire regime, has played an important role in operative development of the Memorandum.

Position of the United States positively influenced on establishment of the de-escalation zones. The US supported measures aimed to reduce violence in Syria, improvement of humanitarian situation and creation of conditions promoting political settlement of the conflict.

António Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, supported the signing of the Memorandum. He welcomed decisions on stoppage of use of weapons and increasing of opportunities for providing humanitarian aid to the population.

Efforts of Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Envoy to Syria, are highly appreciated. Staffan de Mistura jointly with a group of high-qualified experts had arrived in Astana to support the negotiations.

Memorandum is a landmark document, implementation of which will allow to separate the opposition from the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra.

Free access in the de-escalation zones for providing medical, product and other assistance to the Syrian population will be granted.

Recovery of infrastructural objects will be organized.

All these issues will create conditions for safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Implementation of the Memorandum will allow to stop warfare and civil war in Syria.

That is why the document is important for political settlement of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Not everybody appreciates it. At the same time, its signing supported by all main interested players: the UN, the US administration, the leadership of Saudi Arabia and other countries. That is a guarantee of its implementation.

The Memorandum comes into effect tomorrow, i.e. from 00.00 May 6, 2017.

Speech of the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate

Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

Command staff of the Russian force grouping has taken a complex of measures, which had provided favourable conditions for signing the Memorandum.

Starting from May 1, the Russian Aerospace Forces have stopped operating in the de-escalation zones determined by the Memorandum.

On May 2 and 3, The Russian Centre for reconciliation of opposing sides jointly with leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic organized delivery of a humanitarian convoy of the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in Duma and the Eastern Ghouta region.

Military police units of the Russian Armed Forces escorted the 51-automobile convoy. Four unmanned aerial vehicles covered the moving convoy.

Russian military servicemen detected and neutralized a suicide bomber armed with 10-kilogram explosives and grenades. They handed him over to representatives of the Syrian security service.

The Memorandum provides creation of four de-escalation zones in the Syrian Arab Republic.

First one is most extensive located in the north of Syria. It includes the Idlib province as well as north-eastern areas of the Latakia province, western areas of the Aleppo province, and northern areas of the Hama province. There are more than 1 million people in the zone. 14,500-men strong armed formations are controlling this zone.

The second one is in the north of the Homs province. It includes al-Rastan and Tell Bisa as well as nearest areas controlled by the opposition groups. The groups consist of up to 3,000 insurgents. There are about 180,000 civilians in the zone.

The third one is Eastern Ghouta. About 9,000 insurgents are controlling it.

About 690,000 civilians live in Eastern Ghouta. The Syrian authorities have deployed eight checkpoints for their transfer. In the morning, most civilians leave Eastern Ghouta for Damascus for earning money, and, in the evening, they come back.

This zone does not include the area of Kabun controlled by insurgents of Jabhat al-Nusra. The Damascus city, and the Russian Embassy in particular, are shelled from there. Operation aimed to eliminate terrorists in this area is continued.

The fourth zone is located in the south of Syria and includes areas of the Daraa and Quneitra provinces. This zone is mainly controlled by units of so-called Southern Front (15,000 men strong). Up to 800,000 civilians live there.

The Memorandum provides additional de-escalation zones if necessary.

In the de-escalation zones, warfare between the government troops and armed opposition units joined or are to join the ceasefire regime is being stopped.

This refers to use of all types of weapons, including aviation strikes.

Special attention is paid to control implementation of the ceasefire regime.

In order to prevent incidents and combat actions between the opposing sides along the de-escalation zone borders, security lanes are established. These lanes include posts for observation of reconciliation regime and checkpoints for controlling movement of civilians without weapons, delivery of humanitarian aid, and support of economical activity.

Operation of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as control over security zones will be provided by personnel from Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Forces from other countries can be involved under agreement of state-guarantors.

Command staff of the Russian grouping under the leadership of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces is determining the number of necessary checkpoints and observation posts as well as forces supporting their operation.

Within two weeks, representatives of state-guarantors will form a Joint working group. The group will present borders of the de-escalation zones and safety lanes as well as maps for separating formations of armed opposition from terrorist groupings by July 4, 2017.

It is to be stressed that signing of the Memorandum on creation of the de-escalation zones in the Syrian Arab Republic does not stop fighting against terrorists of the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

State-guarantors undertake to continue fighting against formations of these and other terrorist organizations in the de-escalation zones as well as provide assistance to the government troops and armed opposition in fighting insurgents in other areas of Syria.

After establishing of the de-escalation zones, the government troops will be sent to continue offensive on the ISIS formations in the central and eastern parts of Syria as well as to liberate areas located along the River Euphrates.

The Russian Aerospace Forces will support these actions.

Speech of the Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate

of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces

Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov

Ladies and gentlemen!

Active preliminary work with our partners has contributed to the results of negotiations in Astana. To this purpose, the working group of the Russian Defence Ministry held a meeting with the leadership of Syria on April 25 in Damascus and on April 26 – in Ankara with representatives of Turkey and leaders of armed formations of the opposition.

In the course of the meetings, we have explained in detail to our partners the methods of creation of safety zones, the mechanism of control over the implementation of the agreements, organization of the humanitarian access and restoration of the peaceful life.

Delegations of the Russian Defence Minister conducted the same work simultaneously in Tehran and Amman.

Just in the course of the preliminary work, we managed to enlist support of guarantor states and the opposing sides for our initiatives.

These activities ensured constructive work of the representatives from Turkey, Iran, the UN and the Syrian government at the meeting in Astana.

The lack of trust between the representatives of the Syrian government and the oppositions gave rise to some difficulties in the course of negotiations.

Despite the intention of all the delegations to sign the document, the initial points of view of the parties differed. First, that concerned the issues of security of the civil population in the de-escalation zones and organization of control over the implementation of the ceasefire agreements by the parties.

The peculiarity of negotiations in Astana is the fact that the opposition was represented by field commanders who really control the situation “on the ground”, but not politicians or emigrants.

Despite the conflict with the government troops, these people realize their responsibility for the future of the united Syrian state.

In the course of frank talks, common methods of stabilization of the situation in Syria were elaborated. We managed to agree on Memorandum with the field commanders of 27 detachments active in the de-escalation zones.

The constructive position of representatives from Iran and Turkey played an important role in achieving agreements as both countries as guarantor states had incurred the responsibility for implementation of the ceasefire.

The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General Staffan de Mistura made an important contribution to the most tough periods of negotiations. He held several meetings with opposition representatives and convinced them of the importance of the Memorandum for stabilization of the situation in Syria.

It is also important that the results of the talks in Astana are considered by Staffan de Mistura as an influential contribution to the political dialogue in Genève.

The UN experts have rendered considerable assistance, their peace-making experience, practical recommendations were took into account during the elaboration of the Memorandum.

The high level of organization of negotiations provided by the leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan also contributed to the success of the talks. During each stage of the conversations all the delegations were provided with support by our Kazakh colleagues.

In the near future, the main efforts will be concentrated on the establishment of a Joint working group for de-escalation, preparation of maps with coordinates of safe margins and buffer zones and their negotiation with the partners.

The reports on the activities of the Group will be heard during the international meetings on the Syrian conflict settlement within the Astana process.

Moreover, the mechanism of effective control over the implementation of agreements mentioned by Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy will be elaborated jointly with the partners. This work has already been started.

We plan to continue the work with partners on elaboration of additional trust-building measures for the opposing sides. First of all, this concerns the liberation of persons retained forcibly by both sides of the conflict as well as the humanitarian mine clearance.

We expect further interaction with our partners within the Astana process, the observer countries as well as the support of international organizations, first of all the UN.

Thank you for your attention.

Media representatives’ questions

Yekaterina Babayeva, reporter, KSB TV-channel (Republic of Korea) – a question to Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

– After the adoption of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones, where will the main efforts of the Aerospace Forces be concentrated for elimination of terrorist groupings?

Sergei Rudskoy:

– De-escalation zones will allow the government troops to release many units. The Russian Aerospace Forces will continue supporting the Syrian Armed Forces while eliminating illegal armed groups of the ISIL international terrorist organization.

The main efforts will focused on the development of the offensive in the east from Palmyra and further lifting a siege of the Deir ez-Zor city, which is besieged for over three years as well as on the liberation of the north-eastern territories in the Aleppo province along the Euphrates River.

Yaroslav Kurashov, reporter of NHK TV-channel (Japan), a question to Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov

Which measures are prescribed for the violators of the Memorandum?

Stanislav Gadjimagomedov:

First, a thorough investigation will be held. According to the results, the measures applied to the violators will be defined. Among them – neutralization by fire.

Alexey Konopko, reporter of the Россия-24 TV-channel, a question to Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

– Is Russia planning to recommence the Memorandum between Russia and the USA on prevention of incidents in the air space over Syria?

Sergei Rudskoy:

– This agreement is an effective means of prevention of incidents in the air. After the US cruise missile strike against the Shayrat Air Base, the Russian party has suspended its participation in this agreement.

The question of returning to the cooperation within the Memorandum on prevention of incidents in the air space over Syria will be discussed in the course of bilateral contacts with the American colleagues in the nearest future.

Antonio Rondon Garcia, reporter of the Prensa Latina (Cuba), a question to Lieutenant General Alexander Fomin

– Is it planned to extend the number of participants in the de-escalation process?

Alexander Fomin:

Yes, it is. Now we are working on this issue with Jordan and a number of other states.

In the conclusion, I would like to thank you for responding to our invitation.

Traditionally, the Russian Defence Ministry pays great attention to the covering of its activities by the media. We will continue informing you about the most important events including the Syrian topic.

Taking the opportunity, I would like to congratulate all of you with the upcoming Victory Day and to wish you peaceful sky.

Thank you for your attention.

Iraq: Sallyport Global = Sex Trafficking, Alcohol, Lax Security

Posted on May 5, 2017May 5, 2017 by Denise Simon

Sheesh…..typical for a government contractor and in Iraq.

U.S. Firm in Iraq Overlooks Smuggling, Security for F-16s

WASHINGTON (AP) — The two American investigators felt a sense of foreboding that Sunday as they headed to an emergency meeting with their boss on the Iraqi air base. But they didn’t expect to be surrounded by armed guards, disarmed, detained against their will — and fired without explanation.

It was March 12 — less than two months ago. Robert Cole and Kristie King were in Iraq working as investigators for Sallyport Global, a U.S. company that was paid nearly $700 million in federal contracts to secure Balad Air Base, home to a squadron of F-16 fighter jets as part of the U.S.-led coalition to annihilate the Islamic State.

** Click here for video

Cole and King had spent more than a year together in Iraq investigating all manner of misconduct at Balad and beyond.

They’d uncovered evidence that Sallyport employees were involved in sex trafficking , they said. Staff on base routinely flew in smuggled alcohol in such high volumes that a plane once seesawed on the tarmac under the weight. Rogue militia stole enormous generators off the base using flatbed trucks and a 60-foot crane, driving past Sallyport security guards.

Managers repeatedly shut down Cole and King’s investigations and failed to report their findings to the U.S. government that was footing the bill, the investigators said.

Right before they were fired, Cole and King had opened an investigation into allegations of timesheet fraud among Sallyport employees. In a call with Sallyport lawyers, they said, they were advised to keep two sets of books about potential crimes and contract violations.

“One for the government to see and one for the government not to see,” King told The Associated Press.

The company said that the investigators misinterpreted the instructions.

In a statement to the AP, Sallyport said it follows all contracting rules at the base, home to the F-16s that are a key to the fight against the Islamic State.

“Sallyport has a strong record of providing security and life support services in challenging war zones like Iraq and plays a major but unheralded role in the war against ISIS,” Chief Operating Officer Matt Stuckart wrote. “The company takes any suggestion of wrongdoing at Balad very seriously.”

More than 150 documents obtained by AP, as well as interviews with more than a half-dozen former or current Sallyport employees, show how a contractor ran amok after being hired for lucrative and essential combat support operations. The investigators and other witnesses describe grave security breaches and illegal schemes that went unreported until the government asked about them.

The point behind requiring contractors to employ their own investigators was to limit the waste and corruption that has marred federal security contracting going back to the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.

The Pentagon’s own auditors, who were frequently on the base 50 miles north of Baghdad, were not told of the serious problems until early this year, a potential violation of law. The Pentagon auditors’ reports, obtained by the AP, detail dozens of more minor infractions. That gap illustrates the limits of U.S. oversight for billions of dollars in contracts run by companies that have cashed in on the fight to protect Americans from extremism.

The Defense Department declined to comment.

The morning of March 12, King had gone to church and was still carrying her Bible when she and Cole walked into the office foyer for the meeting with the boss. To their astonishment, they were immediately surrounded by armed security guards and forced to turn over the 9 mm pistols they both routinely carried on the job.

The boss, David Saffold, informed them they were being fired but wouldn’t say why.

“We knew too much,” King told AP in an interview at her home in Amarillo, Texas. “They want to cover it up and move on because it’s a huge amount of money.”

BODYGUARD OR TERRORIST?

In 2004, Rob Cole was a retired California police officer and licensed private investigator when he decided to go to Iraq for a series of contracting jobs. Like many U.S. contractors working in hazardous regions, he went because the work paid a lot more than he could make back home.

Americans have been at Balad on and off since 2003. Sallyport’s parent company, Michael Baker International, announced in 2014 its subsidiaries had been awarded $838 million for work on the base.

Cole’s first job at Balad was cut short in June 2014, a month after he arrived, when the Islamic State group began sweeping across Iraq and Syria. The extremists ultimately made it to the gates of Balad, which was evacuated.

When the Americans went back, they found a looted base largely under the control of Iranian-backed Shiite militias that were supporting the Iraqi government, according to former employees. A former senior manager told the AP that Sallyport reached an understanding with the militias that they would not enter the flight and residential areas. He declined to be named because he wasn’t authorized to discuss the matter and didn’t want to be blacklisted from future jobs.

Cole, now 62, returned to Balad in May 2015, as Sallyport was preparing for the arrival of American F-16s sold to the Iraqi government. Sallyport’s mission, along with its parent company, was to keep the base operating smoothly, train the Iraqis, and most importantly maintain security on the base, where thousands of Iraqis and hundreds of contractors work.

The federal contract required investigations into potential crimes and violations involving the company’s work at Balad. That was Cole and King’s assignment.

“They wanted someone to be competent enough to process an investigation, if there was a crime, or if someone turned up dead,” King said. “The way it was put to me: If someone turned up with a knife in their back, who are you going to call?”

From the start, it was clear that much was awry on the base. Despite the urgency of fighting IS, the delivery of the F-16s had been delayed by months amid security concerns. It would be catastrophic if IS seized the base and its multimillion-dollar jets.

On July 13, 2015, four F-16s flew in from Arizona, the first of 36 fighter jets that the U.S. planned to deliver.

Brett McGurk, then the U.S. deputy envoy for the international coalition against IS, hailed the arrival in a tweet.

“After years of preparation & training in the U.S., Iraqi pilots today landed the 1st squadron of Iraqi F16s in #Iraq,” he wrote.

The first security breach came in less than 24 hours: A long black skid mark on the tarmac was reported. It stopped about 45 yards from the nose of one of the fighter jets. A truck had plowed through a rope barrier in the “no-go” zone, where lethal force is authorized to protect the planes. For more than 10 minutes, no one even responded as the vehicle drove away, according to reports citing surveillance video.

That turned out not to be a terrorist. But Cole says the out-of-control truck was a harbinger. He noted the lax protection for the F-16s in his report and forwarded it to the chief of security, Steve Asher. Under the requirements of the contract, Cole’s report should have then made its way to the Pentagon. But he says Asher kept a lid on the incident.

Three months later, in October 2015, Cole reported another security breach, the theft of a Toyota SUV that Sallyport had assigned to bodyguards to drive VIPs around the base. Cole eventually uncovered a plot by three Iraqi Sallyport staff working with a dangerous Iran-backed militia, known as Kataib Imam Ali.

The Shiite militia was an ongoing headache, politically connected and operating outside the law, with sidelines in theft and gunrunning. It has ties to the leader of the umbrella militia Popular Mobilization Forces, which is on the U.S. list of designated terrorists.

To Cole’s astonishment, the prime suspect threatened to join the militia during his interrogation. He was a Sallyport bodyguard. In fact, the investigators later found a photo of him on his Facebook page, dressed in black militia garb and a patch indicating his allegiance to the group.

He is “viewed by the Investigations Unit as a hard-core recruit to become a terrorist who poses a serious threat to all personnel on this base,” Cole wrote in another report.

The Toyota was recovered within a few days, but Cole was ordered off the case. In an interview with AP, the former senior manager defended the company’s order, saying negotiations with the militias were highly sensitive and had to be handled with Iraqi cooperation. Still, the suspect was supposed to be banned from the base, and Cole later saw the man walking around freely.

GUMMY BEARS SOAKED IN VODKA

The longer Cole was on the base, the more he suspected that management was turning a blind eye to criminal activity.

On the books, Balad is a dry base, where alcohol is restricted. But in reality the booze was everywhere and everyone knew it. Finding out how it got there led to more troubling questions.

A Sallyport employee who worked in the air terminal reported in late 2015 that co-workers were involved in a smuggling scheme. They were bringing in cases and cases of water bottles filled with liquor that they’d sneaked onto planes flying in from Baghdad.

According to investigative documents and people who watched the smuggling in action, three empty suitcases would routinely be loaded onto a flight to Baghdad. Each time, the bags came back with plastic water bottles filled with liquor. When they were unloaded, the bags were not searched but taken directly outside to be picked up — a serious security risk in a war zone.

“You could be putting a bomb in there,” said one former employee who witnessed the smuggling. “You’ve got people just going rogue.” He spoke only on condition of anonymity because he didn’t want to imperil his new job with a different overseas contractor.

Steve Anderson, who worked on flight logistics, says he was pressured to sign off on faked flight manifests that omitted passenger names and falsified the weight of cargo to cover for the alcohol smuggling and other infractions — a violation of international flight regulations. The planes were getting so weighed down he was worried about flight safety.

“They were playing Russian roulette with the passengers’ lives — including mine,” Anderson said.

Think Tank Predicted Russian Cyberwar v. United States

Posted on May 3, 2017May 3, 2017 by Denise Simon

Washington, D.C., May 3, 2017 – A Rand Corporation 1967 paper predicted many of the cyber dilemmas faced by policy makers today, and a 2017 expanded analysis of the “GRIZZLY STEPPE” hacking by Russian cyber operators disclosed key findings about the techniques the hackers used and ways to mitigate them, according to the National Security Archive publication today of 40+ highlighted primary sources from the critically-praised “Cyber Vault” at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/cybervault.

Compiled and edited by noted intelligence historian Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, the Cyber Vault collection of primary sources is growing by a dozen or more documents every week, and includes the declassified briefings provided by the National Security Agency to the George W. Bush and Barack Obama transition teams in 2000 and 2009, respectively. The collection also includes a 2016 order from the U.S. Cyber Command to set up a unit with the mission of debilitating and destroying computer and communications operations of the terrorist group ISIS.

The Cyber Vault team obtained the 2016 order under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The project has filed scores of other FOIA and declassification requests as part of a multi-year documentation contribution to the growing field of cyber studies, with the support of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

The 2000 transition briefing explicitly foreshadowed the Edward Snowden controversy, warning the new White House team that the 4th Amendment-protected communications of Americans were inextricably mixed with those of foreigners on the Internet. The 2016 U.S. Cyber Command order established a joint task force designed to bring the resources of the Defense Department, Intelligence Community, and Justice Department to bear against the terrorist group that the Trump administration has since designated its top foreign policy priority.

Cyber Vault Highlights

By Jeffrey T. Richelson

On March 30, 2016, the National Security Archive opened its Cyber Vault, a repository of documents on all aspects of cyber activity – including computer network defense (and other other aspects of cybersecurity), computer network attack, and computer network exploitation. The more than 750 documents currently in the vault have been drawn from a variety of sources – Freedom of Information Act releases, websites of both U.S. federal and state government organizations, courts, foreign government organizations, NATO, government contractors, think-tanks, advocacy groups, and media websites (including Wikileaks and those that posted documents provided by Edward Snowden).

In addition to relying on a multitude of sources to populate the Cyber Vault, the Archive has sought to accumulate a diverse set of documents – which has guided its collection strategy. As a result, the Cyber Vault includes significant documents from the 1960s and each subsequent decade, on cyber organization, on policy and strategy, on domestic and foreign cyber activities, on cybersecurity requirements, and on cyber crimes and the related investigations. Also included are intelligence assessments and theses. The documents also represent a spectrum of classifications, from unclassified, to formerly classified, and – in the cases of Wikileaks and Snowden documents – currently classified documents. Many of the documents cut across a number of categories.

Among the documents represented from the 1960s and 1970s are two seminal papers. One is Willis Ware’s 1967 effort, Secrecy and Privacy in Computer Systems (Document 1), written for the RAND Corporation, and one of the very first systematic approaches to information leakage, security, and privacy. The other (Document 2), produced by a staff member of Britain’s signals intelligence agency, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), represents the initial development of public key cryptography – although it was not declassified until years after the concept had been made public by American mathematicians.

That document is also one of several illustrating or concerning foreign government cyber efforts. A much more recent GCHQ product (Document 29) was one of the documents provided to Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras by Edward Snowden – a briefing on efforts to deanonymize users of The Onion Router (TOR) network, which had been developed by members of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (Document 32) as a means of protecting online communications. Chinese cyber organization, policy, and operations are covered, collectively, by two documents – an unclassified paper (Document 36) produced under the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and a Top Secret codeword NSA briefing (Document 24) on the People Republic of China’s computer network exploitation activity. Current Russian cyber activities are discussed in an extract (Document 35) from the controversial “Trump Dossier,” written by a former British Secret Intelligence Service officer.

Other documents concern hostile cyber activities from an earlier era. One, from 1998 (Document 12) provides information to the then director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, concerning the SOLAR SUNRISE investigation concerning intrusions into at least 11 unclassified DoD Computer systems at various locations in the United States. Another FBI memo (Document 13), concerns a 1999 investigation into intrusions into computer systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, and Germany – an investigation which took some of the investigators to Moscow. In a newly released portion, it discusses possible response to intrusions – including the creation of “honeypots” containing “beacon” files.

In addition to being the victim of intrusions, the U.S. has also debated and formulated policy, granted authority over, and conducted intrusions in pursuit of national security objectives. In March 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen assigned the responsibility for computer network attack and exploitation to the National Security Agency in a short memo (Document 10). During that Spring a senior NSA official addressed the issue of cyberwar in a Secret article (Document 11) in a NSA journal. Many years later, according to a number of accounts, U.S. and Israeli cyber personnel were able to penetrate industrial control systems associated with the Iranian nuclear program and damage centrifuges that could produce weapons-grade material. While there have been no publicly released executive branch documents concerning the “Stuxnet” operation, it has been the subject of reports by RAND and the Congressional Research Service. (Document 26).

Concern over possible Russian intrusion into U.S. computer systems related to elections became a significant subject of discussion in the 2016 presidential election. Apprehensions over the possibility of such intrusions go back at least a decade. A December 2007 report (Document 20) was commissioned by Ohio’s Secretary of State, and contained disturbing results about the vulnerability of Ohio’s electronic voting systems. In the wake of a poorly-received, brief analysis of alleged Russian cyber activity related to the 2016 election, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center produced more detailed examination (Document 41) of the GRIZZLY STEPPE activity.

By the time the DHS report was issued, President Trump had been presented with a draft executive order on cybersecurity (Document 40 ), which would undoubtedly have been the first of a significant number of presidential actions on cybersecurity – just as President Obama had signed a number of cyber-related executive orders and presidential directives, including one (Document 34) that established a Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. Ultimately, the Trump draft order became the first in a series of drafts, and no order has yet been signed.

Covert Operations Training for N. Korea Nuclear Sites?

Posted on May 3, 2017May 3, 2017 by Denise Simon

As Iran attempted to launch a cruise missile from a submarine in the Strait of Hormuz on Tuesday, the test failed, two U.S. officials told Fox News.

An Iranian Yono-class “midget” submarine conducted the missile launch. North Korea and Iran are the only two countries in the world that operate this type of submarine.

In February, Iran claimed to have successfully tested a submarine-launched missile. It was not immediately clear if Tuesday’s test was the first time Iran had attempted to launch a missile underwater from a submarine.

CHINA has called for all of its citizens to return from North Korea immediately as a US citizen is detained for allegedly trying to overthrow the country’s regime.

The Korea Times reports that the Chinese embassy in North Korea began advising Korean-Chinese residents to return to China.

A Korean-Chinese citizen told Radio Free Asia he was advised to ‘stay a while’ in China, and stated: ‘The embassy has never given such a warning. I was worried and left the country in a hurry.’

But he said most Chinese citizens in North Korea had opted not to heed the warning. More here.

US Commandos Set to Counter North Korean Nuclear Sites

Neutralizing Pyongyang’s nuclear, chemical arms warfighting priority, SOCOM commander says

Gertz: U.S. special operations forces are set to conduct operations against North Korean nuclear, missile, and other weapons of mass destruction sites in any future conflict, the commander of Special Operations Command told Congress Tuesday.

Army Gen. Raymond A. Thomas stated in testimony to a House subcommittee that Army, Navy, and Air Force commandos are based both permanently and in rotations on the Korean peninsula in case conflict breaks out.

The special operations training and preparation is a warfighting priority, Thomas said in prepared testimony. There are currently around 8,000 special operations troops deployed in more than 80 countries.

“We are actively pursuing a training path to ensure readiness for the entire range of contingency operations in which [special operations forces], to include our exquisite [countering weapons of mass destruction] capabilities, may play a critical role,” he told the subcommittee on emerging threats.

“We are looking comprehensively at our force structure and capabilities on the peninsula and across the region to maximize our support to U.S. [Pacific Command] and [U.S. Forces Korea]. This is my warfighting priority for planning and support.”

Disclosure of the commander’s comments comes as tensions remain high on the peninsula. President Trump has vowed to deal harshly with North Korea should another underground nuclear test be carried out. Test preparations have been identified in recent weeks, U.S. officials have said.

Trump said on Sunday that China appears to be pressuring North Korea but that he would be upset if North Korea carries out another nuclear test.

“If he does a nuclear test, I will not be happy,” he said on CBS Face the Nation. Asked if his unhappiness would translate into a U.S. military response, Trump said: “I don’t know. I mean, we’ll see.”

Gen. Thomas’ testimony did not include details of what missions the commandos would carry out.

A spokesman for the Special Operations Command referred questions about potential operations in Korea to the Pacific Command.

Special forces troops would be responsible for locating and destroying North Korean nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, such as mobile missiles. They also would seek to prevent the movement of the weapons out of the country during a conflict.

Additionally, special operations commandos could be used for operations to kill North Korean leaders, such as supreme leader Kim Jong Un and other senior regime figures.

Special operations missions are said by military experts to include intelligence gathering on the location of nuclear and chemical weapons sites for targeting by bombers. They also are likely to include direct action assaults on facilities to sabotage the weapons, or to prevent the weapons from being stolen, or set off at the sites by the North Koreans.

A defense official said U.S. commandos in the past have trained for covert operations against several types of nuclear facilities, including reactors and research centers. Scale models of some North Korean weapons facilities have been built in the United States for practice operations by commandos.

The most secret direct action operations would be carried out by special units, such as the Navy’s Seal Team Six or the Army’s Delta Force.

Thomas said the command in January took over the role of coordinating Pentagon efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction from the Strategic Command. The mission includes stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and dealing with the aftermath of such weapons’ use.

North Korea is believed to have around 20 nuclear devices and is developing nuclear warheads small enough to be carried on long-range missiles. It also has stockpiles of chemical weapons and biological warfare agents.

Many of North Korea’s nuclear facilities are believed to be located underground in fortified locations spread around the country.

The last rotation of special operations forces to South Korea took place in February when parts of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the 75th Ranger Regiment joined South Korean troops for training.

The training took place in mountainous parts of South Korea in a bid to simulate the rough terrain commandos would experience during operations in North Korea. Other training took place on the seas.

Gen. Thomas, in his testimony, identified North Korea as one of five “current and enduring” military threats outlined in a new military strategy produced by Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The four other threats are terrorism, Russia, Iran, and China.

Asked about the new strategy, a Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman said the latest national military strategy is secret. “A classified [National Military Strategy] will make it more difficult for adversaries to develop counter-strategies and also enables the chairman to give the best military advice to the president and secretary of defense,” Navy Capt. Greg Hicks said.

The command “has recently focused more intently on the emerging threat that is of growing concern to us as well as most of our DoD teammates—the nuclear threat of an increasingly rogue North Korea,” Thomas said.

“Although previously viewed as a regional threat, North Korea’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, facilitated by a trans-regional network of commercial, military, and political connections, make it a threat with global implications,” the four-star general added.

South Korea’s special operations forces are said to be highly trained but lack the advanced equipment used by American commandos, such as stealth helicopters and aircraft as well as other high technology and advanced weaponry.

A Pentagon report on North Korea’s military published in February 2016 states that North Korea continues to advance its nuclear program.

The North Koreans announced in September 2015 that the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon including a uranium enrichment plant and a reactor that were upgraded for the purpose of building nuclear forces, the report said.

Pacific Command commander Adm. Harry Harris said in congressional testimony last week that North Korea is an immediate threat to the security of the United States and the Asia Pacific region.

“With every test, Kim Jong Un moves closer to his stated goal of a preemptive nuclear strike capability against American cities, and he’s not afraid to fail in public,” Harris said.