Category Archives: Military

The Core of the Hillary Server Controversy, Revealed

Posted on by

Once a year, those who handle classified information must attend a refresher class on dealing with classified material and the consequences of violating the rules governing classified material. My guess is Hillary and her circle of aides and protectors waived themselves from attending. Obama approved?

I guess there is a good reason it is called ‘Foggy Bottom’.

Spy agencies say Clinton emails closely matched top secret documents: sources

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – U.S. spy agencies have told Congress that Hillary Clinton’s home computer server contained some emails that should have been treated as “top secret” because their wording matched sections of some of the government’s most highly classified documents, four sources familiar with the agency reports said.

    The two reports are the first formal declarations by U.S. spy agencies detailing how they believe Clinton violated government rules when highly classified information in at least 22 email messages passed through her unsecured home server.

    The State Department has already acknowledged that the emails contained top secret intelligence, though it says they were not marked that way. It has not previously been clear if the emails contained full classified documents or only some information from them.

    The agencies did not find any top secret documents that passed through Clinton’s server in their full version, the sources from Congress and the government’s executive branch said.

    However, the agency reports found some emails included passages that closely tracked or mirrored communications marked “top secret,” according to the sources, who all requested anonymity. In some cases, additional classification markings meant access was supposed to be limited to small groups of specially cleared officials.

Under the law and government rules, U.S. officials and contractors may not transmit any classified information – not only documents – outside secure, government-controlled channels. Such information should not be sent even through the government’s .gov email network.

The front-runner for the Democratic nomination for president and former secretary of state has insisted she broke no rules. Clinton’s lawyer, David Kendall, did not respond to a request for comment. Clinton campaign spokespeople did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

Two sources said some of the top secret material was related to the CIA’s campaign of drone strikes against Islamist militants in the Middle East and South Asia.

That campaign has been widely reported by Reuters and other media outlets, but it officially is classified as a “Top Secret/Special Access Program” (SAP), meaning only a limited number of people whose names are on a special list are allowed to learn details about it.

One source said the reports identified some information in messages on Clinton’s server that came from human sources, such as confidential CIA informants, and some from technical systems, such as spy satellites or electronic eavesdropping.

The Clinton campaign criticized the State Department’s decision last month to withhold the 22 emails containing top secret information from the public, blaming it on “bureaucratic infighting” and “over-classification run amok.”

“As we have previously made clear, we are not going to speak to the content of the emails,” a State Department official said on Wednesday when asked about the intelligence agency reports.

Clinton’s use of a private server in her New York home for her government work is being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department’s and spy community’s internal watchdogs and several Republican-controlled congressional committees.

Two of the sources told Reuters that one of the reports on the emails came from the CIA. Three sources said the other report came from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), which analyzes U.S. spy satellite intelligence.

A spokesman for NGA did not immediately respond to requests for comment. CIA spokespeople declined to comment.

The two spy agencies’ reports were sent to Congress in the past few weeks by the intelligence community inspector general, an official government watchdog for multiple spy agencies.

The inspector general’s office has confirmed that it requested the reports from two intelligence agencies, but didn’t identify them.

    It was unclear what the congressional committees that received the classified reports, the House and Senate intelligence and foreign relations panels, will do with them. The contents cannot be discussed publicly. The committees requested intelligence reports in connection with their efforts to ensure that government secrets are appropriately protected.

Sidebar:

Everyone who handles Classified Material signs the SF-312 that outlines handling according to EO 13526 that requires an annual refresher course for originators of Classified Materials. Section 1 outlines handling. Section 4 is agreement to punishment if violation is discovered. Text of SF-312 below:

1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is marked or unmarked classified information, including oral communications, that is classified under the standards of Executive Order 13526, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security; and unclassified information that meets the standards for classification and is in the process of a classification determination as provided in sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4(e) of Executive Order 13526, or under any other Executive order or statute that requires protection for such information in the interest of national security. I understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States Government.

4. I have been advised that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; or termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised that any unauthorized disclosure of classified information by me may constitute a violation, or violations, of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of sections 641, 793, 794, 798, *952 and 1924, title 18, United States Code; *the provisions of section 783(b}, title 50, United States Code; and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory violation.

The IAEA’s Big Challenge of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Posted on by

  $150 billion or $50 billion, should take care of the financial shortfall. What say you?

The full GAO report here.

Will IAEA be able to verify Iran’s nuclear program

alMonitor: The UN nuclear agency will face “challenges” verifying Iran’s compliance with last year’s nuclear agreement, the US government watchdog said Feb. 23 in a new report that was immediately used as ammunition by critics of the deal.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) faces a budget and staffing shortfall that will require an extra $10 million per year for the next 15 years to monitor the deal, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The report goes on to detail the agency’s dependence on Iranian cooperation to access nuclear sites and the intrinsic difficulty in detecting undeclared activities such as weapons development and centrifuge manufacturing that do not leave a nuclear trace.

Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., said the report raises concerns about “the entity that we are putting all our marbles in.” He commissioned the report with Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., a fellow critic of the deal who also voted against it last year.

“Some of the preliminary findings cause concern for me about what the IAEA is capable of,” Menendez told Secretary of State John Kerry at a hearing on the department’s FY 2017 budget request. “The GAO [report] point[s] directly to future problems with monitoring, verifying and meeting requirements of the [Iran deal].”

Kirk used the report to call on Congress to prepare sanctions that can be imposed if Iran starts to cheat on its nuclear obligations. He and Menendez are pushing for the reauthorization of the Iran Sanctions Act, a decade-old law that expires at the end of the year.

“My biggest takeaway is lawmakers must come together in a bipartisan manner now to create an insurance policy for imposing crippling pressure if and when Iran once again cheats on nuclear inspections as it has so many times in the past,” Kirk said in a statement. “International inspectors, according to the GAO’s interim report, still face an ‘inherent challenge’ in detecting undeclared nuclear activities, including weapons development activities and centrifuge manufacturing. The report also cites concerns the IAEA’s decision to end investigations into Iran’s past nuclear weapons activities ‘could reduce the indicators at the IAEA’s disposal to detect undeclared activity.’ Indeed, GAO also warns the nuclear deal’s mechanism for IAEA inspectors to gain access to Iranian sites suspected of having undeclared nuclear activities remains ‘untested’ and cautions ‘it is too soon to tell whether it will improve access.’”

Among the concerns raised by the GAO report is the sheer amount of manpower the Iran deal will consume. The agency is expected to have to transfer 18 “experienced inspectors” and “nearly twice that number of other staff” to its Iran Task Force, the GAO concludes, raising concerns about proliferation in other countries.

The State Department is proposing a $191 million US contribution to the agency in its FY 2017 budget request, a $5 million increase over the current year, to help the agency meet its new obligations.

*** 

In part by Rubin at WaPo:

Last week the administration warned that a sale of Russian advanced jets to Iran would violate the United Nations ban on such equipment. Sanctions guru Mark Dubowitz tells me, “Congress should draw up a list of Russian and Iranian entities to be sanctioned, give the administration 30 days to impose sanctions on these entities, and, if there’s no action, move ahead with statutory designations of these entities.”

That thinking needs to be applied across the board, taking into account all aspects of Iran’s behavior. Iran acts with impunity because it is convinced (rightly) the administration will do nothing. If the White House won’t, then Congress must act. Full article here.

 

Report on MH 17, Shot Down at Russia/Ukraine Border

Posted on by

Anyone remember this tragedy that killed 283 passengers? German intelligence, the Ukraine government, the Dutch Safety Board, the Russian government all have a hand in the investigation. Who did order the BUK missile to shoot the plane down? Any consequences or reparations?

   

MH17 – Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade

Bellingcat: The report can be downloaded here stock_save_pdf

This report, MH17: Potential Suspects and Witnesses from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, presents information regarding the Russian brigade that we believe provided, and possibly operated, the Buk-M1 missile launcher that downed Malaysian Airlines Flight 17. In this post, we will summarize the role of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade and “Buk 3×2” in the downing of MH17 before providing a summary of the report. At the bottom of this post, an index is provided of Bellingcat’s previously published major research projects on the MH17 disaster.

Introduction

From June 23 to 25, 2014, Russia’s 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade transported several Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems to areas near the Russia-Ukraine border. Bellingcat has extensively covered this convoy of military vehicles over the past year and a half, including numerous reports on the 53rd Brigade’s most notable piece of cargo: Buk 3×2, the missile launcher that we believe downed MH17. You can trace the 53rd Brigade’s journey from its base in Kursk, Russia to near the Russia-Ukraine border on Storymap, through which you can watch the videos and photographs in which the convoy, including Buk 3×2, are captured.

There is no direct evidence indicating if it was Russian or separatist soldiers who operated Buk 3×2 when it was in Ukraine. However, considering the complexity of the Buk-M1 system, it is most likely that the Russian military did not transfer a Buk missile launcher to separatist commanders without some guidance or a Russian crew. In the likely case that the Buk 3×2 did come with a Russian crew, it is almost certain that they were from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, which was deployed at the border throughout the summer of 2014.

Bellingcat has published numerous reports indicating our confidence that the Buk-M1 system that most likely downed MH17 was the Russian Buk 3×2. In the six available photographs and videos of the Buk-M1 missile launcher in Donetsk, Zuhres, Luhansk, Torez, and Snizhne on the day of and after the airliner’s downing, numerous features on the Buk match uncommon features found on Buk 3×2. Many of these features can be seen in this comparison between Buk 3×2 (in Russia, June 2014) and the Buk seen in Donetsk, Ukraine on the day of the tragedy:

 

There are numerous other features on Buk 3×2 that match the Buk seen in eastern Ukraine on July 17 and 18, 2014 that indicate that it is definitely a Russian Buk, and more specifically 3×2. These features include:

  • H-2200 mark on the left side (a load-bearing code used in railways, and extremely common on Russian equipment, with only a few examples of it seen on Ukrainian tanks and none on Buks)
  • Cross hair symbol (gravity mark) next to H-2200, meant for stabilizing while loading onto railways
  • Visible unit designation, with a likely “3”, an obscured middle digit, and fairly clear “2”
  • Distinct marks on hull and side-skirt
  • Side-skirt damage pattern
  • Distinct white mark on right side-skirt, visible in July 18 Luhansk video and a June 23 video in Alexeyevka, Russia (see comparison here). The same white mark is visible on the other side skirt below the H-2200 mark, as seen in the above comparison video.

Summary of Report

The report contains five sections, each covering a different aspect of the 53rd Brigade and its activities in the summer of 2014.

The first section, “The 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,” describes the role of the brigade within the Russian military and its structure, including the unit designations of Buk-M1 systems within the brigade.

The second section, “Mobilization of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,” provides a detailed account of the deployment of the brigade throughout the summer of 2014. By studying the makeup of the convoy that transported Buk-M1 systems from Kursk, Russia to near the Russia-Ukraine border on June 23-25, we have established that the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade was responsible for the transport of Buk 3×2. The missile launcher designated Buk 3×2 replaced the 2nd Battalion’s missile launcher numbered 222, thus indicating that the officers and soldiers normally responsible for Buk 222 were the most likely candidates to operate its replacement, Buk 3×2. This second section also details another convoy in which equipment from the 1st Battalion was transported in the days following the MH17 disaster.

The third section, “Soldiers of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,” details the soldiers within the 53rd Brigade and the information provided by their public postings on social media. The soldiers of the 2nd Battalion provided a wealth of information, including photographs and written notes, describing their time on the Russia-Ukraine border in June and July, 2014. More extensive details are provided regarding the soldiers who were normally responsible for the Buk missile launcher numbered 222, which was replaced by Buk 3×2, which we believe downed MH17. Additional details are provided on soldiers of the 1st and 3rd Battalions in order to demonstrate that they likely had no involvement or knowledge regarding the transfer or operation of Buk 3×2 in Ukraine. The identities of all of these soldiers have been anonymized in this public version of the report, with their names changed and faces blurred, though an uncensored version with their true identities has been provided to the Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team (JIT).

The fourth section, “Cadets at the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,” describes a summer cadet training program at the Kursk base of the 53rd Brigade. Information provided by these cadets gives us additional understanding of the structure and operations of the brigade, in addition to ruling out numerous officers from any involvement with the MH17 disaster. The identities of all cadets have been anonymized, like with the soldiers in the previous section.

The final and most important section, “Commanders of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade,” provides extensive information regarding the leadership structure of the brigade and battalion that provided and possibly operated the likely murder weapon in the downing of MH17. We provide partially anonymized information regarding 14 officers of the 2nd Battalion of the 53rd Brigade, including the commanders of the Buk unit vehicles within the battalion. Sergey Borisovich Muchkaev, the commander of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, is closely detailed, along with his superiors, including Aleksey Zolotov of the Air Defense of the 20th Guards Army and Andrey Kokhanov of the Air Defense of the Western Military District. Ultimately, responsibility for the downing of MH17 from a weapon provided and possibly operated by the Russian military lies with the Ministry of Defense and the Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Forces, President Vladimir Putin.

Previous Major MH17 Investigations

Now China Deployed Fighter Jets to Disputed Islands

Posted on by

EXCLUSIVE: China sends fighter jets to contested island in South China Sea

FNC: EXCLUSIVE: In a move likely to further increase already volatile tensions in the South China Sea, China has deployed fighter jets to a contested island in the South China Sea, the same island where China deployed surface-to-air missiles last week, two U.S. officials tell Fox News.

The dramatic escalation comes minutes before Secretary of State John Kerry was to host his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, at the State Department.

Chinese Shenyang J-11s (“Flanker”) and  Xian JH-7s (“Flounder”) have been seen by U.S. intelligence on Woody Island in the past few days, the same island where Fox News reported exclusively last week that China had sent two batteries of HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles while President Obama was hosting 10 Southeast Asian leaders in Palm Springs.

Wang was supposed to visit the Pentagon Tuesday, but the visit was canceled. It was not immediately clear which side canceled the visit. Pentagon press secretary Peter Cook said a “scheduling conflict” prevented the meeting, when asked by Fox News at Tuesday’s press briefing.

When asked about the earlier Fox News story in Beijing, Wang said the deployment of the missiles was for “defensive purposes.”

Woody Island is the largest island in the Paracel chain of islands in the South China Sea.  It lies 250 miles southeast of a major Chinese submarine base on Hainan Island. China has claimed Woody Island since the 1950s, but it is contested by Taiwan and Vietnam.

Ahead of Wang’s visit to Washington, a spokeswoman likened China’s military buildup on Woody Island to the U.S. Navy’s in Hawaii.

“There is no difference between China’s deployment of necessary national defense facilities on its own territory and the defense installation by the U.S. in Hawaii,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Monday.

More than $5 trillion of worth of natural resources and goods transit the South China Sea each year.

Earlier Tuesday, the head of the U.S. military’s Pacific Command said China is “clearly militarizing” the South China Sea, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“You’d have to believe in a flat Earth to believe otherwise,” Admiral Harry Harris said.

China has sent fighter jets to Woody Island before. In November, Chinese state media published images showing J-11 fighter jets on the island, but this was the first deployment of fighter jets since the Chinese sent commercial airliners to test the runway at one of its artificial islands in the South China Sea.

The Pentagon sailed a guided-missile destroyer past a contested island in the South China Sea as a result.  Late last year, the U.S. military conducted a flight of B-52 bombers and another warship to conduct a “freedom of navigation” exercise.

The Chinese have protested the moves and vowed “consequences.”

On Monday, new civilian satellite imagery from CSIS showed a possible high frequency radar installation being constructed in late January.

The imagery shows radar installations on China’s artificial islands in the Spratley Island chain of reefs-Gaven, Hughes, Johnson South, and primarily on Cuarteron reefs—the outermost island in the South China Sea.

*** 

FNC: China apparently has been building radar facilities on some of the artificial islands it constructed in the South China Sea in a move to bolster its military power in the region, according to a report released Tuesday by a U.S.-based think tank.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) says the radars on the outposts of Gaven, Hughes, Johnson South and Cuarteron reefs in the disputed Spratly Islands “speak to a long-term anti-access strategy by China—one that would see it establish effective control over the sea and airspace throughout the South China Sea.”

The report was released one week after Fox News reported that China had deployed an advanced surface-to-air missile system as well as a radar system on Woody Island, part of the Paracel Island chain located north of the Spratlys.

The release of the report also coincides with the first day of a three-day visit to the U.S. by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during which the issue of competing South China Sea claims is expected to be discussed, as well as North Korea’s latest nuclear test.

Plan B for Gitmo? Plan A in Garbage Can

Posted on by

White House mum on Plan B after GOP rejects Gitmo plan

Examiner: A White House spokesman isn’t saying whether President Obama will try on his own to close the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in light of Republicans’ promise to ignore the closure plan he sent to Congress on Tuesday.

Press Secretary Josh Earnest said the administration wants to work with lawmakers on the details of closing down the facility built to hold suspected terrorists caught in the post-Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks dragnet. He underscored that Obama has already said that is his preference, rather than taking unilateral action.

“What we’re focused on right now is congressional consideration of a plan that they specifically asked for so that we can have a discussion about the best path forward,” Earnest said hours after the White House met the congressionally mandated deadline.

Earnest said the White House plan was lacking key details, such as where prisoners would be moved to, because Congress has barred the administration from spending money on seeking alternatives.

“What they have done thus far… is put in place barriers that have prevented the administration from moving forward,” Earnest lamented. “But by putting those barriers in place, they have led us down the path of a policy that wastes taxpayer dollars and makes the United States of America more vulnerable to terrorist organizations.”

Earnest said the immediate rejection of the administration’s plan by many Republicans is just the latest sign of the GOP’s unwillingness to work constructively on any issue.

“[T]here is this emerging trend … where Congress isn’t simply in a position of just saying, ‘No,'” he said. “Congress is actually refusing to engage … They’re refusing to do the basic function of their job,” Earnest said. He pointed to Republican intransigence on other matters, such as an authorization for use of military force against the self-proclaimed Islamic State, the president’s budget or expected inaction once he nominates someone to replace the late Justice Antonin Scalia.

“They’re doing just about everything, except for fulfilling their basic constitutional responsibilities,” Earnest said.

****

BI: There’s nothing subtle about Kansas Sen. Pat Roberts’ reaction to President Obama’s idea to close the terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Roberts literally threw it in the trash.

Pat RobertsVerified account ‏@SenPatRoberts 6h6 hours ago

., this is what I think of the “plan” to close and send terrorists to the United States.

***

Even Obama’s New Plan to Close Gitmo Can’t Say How It Will Happen

DailyBeast: The report states that detainees could be transferred to one of 13 U.S. other prisons, but it doesn’t say which ones. It also doesn’t explain how the administration calculated the $475 million price tag for building a new facility in the U.S. to hold detainees. Nor did it explain why moving detainees to U.S. soil reduce criticism across the world that the U.S. should stop holding such prisoners all together. Any construction of a new prison is unlikely to be completed in the next year, and any executive order would require funding and congressional approval. Moreover, none of the proposed costs associated with moving detainees to the U.S. are allocated in the current defense budget. For those reasons, the prison in Guantanamo is likely to remain open when Obama leave office in January 2017. Full article here.

Defense Department: The United States obtains two types of assurances from a receiving country: security assurances

(i.e., measures to sufficiently mitigate the threat posed by the detainee) and humane treatment

assurances (i.e., measures to ensure that the transfer comports with the U.S. Government’s

humane treatment policy). These assurances are obtained following consultations among

diplomatic, military, law enforcement, and intelligence professionals from the United States and

the receiving country.

This Administration works extensively with receiving governments to obtain their assurances

that appropriate security measures will be in place to substantially mitigate the risk that the

transferred individual will engage or reengage in any terrorist or other hostile activity that

threatens the United States or U.S. persons or interests. In particular, the Administration seeks

assurances from receiving governments that they will take certain security measures that, in the

U.S. Government’s experience, have proven to be effective in mitigating threats posed by former

detainees. The specific measures that are ultimately negotiated vary depending on a range of

factors, including the specific threat a detainee may pose, the geographic location of the

receiving country, the receiving country’s domestic laws, the receiving country’s capabilities and

resources, and, where applicable, the receiving country’s international legal obligations.

Importantly, the Administration will transfer a detainee only if it determines that the transfer is in

the national security interest of the United States, the threat posed by the detainee will be

substantially mitigated, and the transfer is consistent with our humane treatment policy. The

security assurances obtained from receiving countries generally cover:

  • restrictions on travel, which can include the denial of travel documents and other

measures to prevent transferred detainees from leaving the country (or specific cities or

regions in the country) for a specified period of time;

  • monitoring of the detainee, which may include physical and electronic monitoring, or

other measures available under the receiving country’s domestic laws;

  • periodic sharing of information concerning the individual with the U.S. Government,

including any information regarding attempts to travel outside of the receiving country;

and

  • other measures to satisfy the United States’ national security interests and to aid the

detainee in reentering society, such as medical support, skills training, language training,

enrollment of the detainee in a reintegration or rehabilitation program, family relocation,

and assistance in accessing a variety of public services.

 

In each case, the specific security assurances negotiated take into account the individual facts

and circumstances of the transfer, including the detainee’s specific threat profile, as well as the

capabilities and domestic legal authorities of the receiving government.

Approach to Transfers. Of the 147 detainees transferred during the current Administration: 81

have been transferred to countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula; 47 have

been transferred to countries in Europe and Asia, 13 have been transferred to the Americas; and

6 have been transferred to the South Pacific. The Administration generally aims to transfer

detainees to their home countries. Where that is not feasible, the Administration seeks

resettlement opportunities in third countries. The Administration intends to continue working to

secure transfer and security commitments from countries around the world, including transfers to

rehabilitation programs, so long as these arrangements satisfy security and humane treatment

requirements.  Full Pentagon summary here.