Obama Concession to Iran: Russian Arms?

Posted on May 26, 2016May 26, 2016 by Denise Simon

Obama Admin Considers Permitting Advanced Russian Arms Sales to Iran

White House might not invoke laws triggering new sanctions

FreeBeacon: The Obama administration has the power to sanction key Russian arms sales to Iran, but has so far abstained from exercising this right under U.S. law, prompting some in Congress to question whether the administration is “acquiescing” to the arms sales in order to appease Iran, according to conversations with sources and recent congressional correspondence to the White House exclusively obtained by the Washington Free Beacon.

President Barack Obama has the authority under U.S. law to designate as illegal Russia’s contested sale to Iran of the S-300 missile system, an advanced long-range weapon that would boost the Islamic Republic’s regional military might.

However, the administration has declined for weeks to clarify its stance on new sanctions, despite expressing opposition to the sale. Administration officials have further declined to answer questions from the Free Beacon and other outlets about whether the president will consider taking action in the future.

The administration’s hesitance to act has prompted a new congressional inquiry, the Free Beacon has learned, and has sparked accusations that the White House is not exercising its sanction authority in order to prevent Iran from walking away from last summer’s nuclear deal.

Rep. Steve Chabot (R., Ohio) sent an inquiry to the White House about the matter more than a month ago. The White House has not responded.

“Given the series implications for the United States and our allies in the region, I respectfully request that you quickly determine that Russia’s transfer of S-300 surface-to-air missile systems advance Iran’s efforts to acquire ‘destabilizing numbers and types of advances conventional weapons’ and impose the necessary U.S. sanctions once the Russian delivery takes place,” Chabot wrote to the White House on April 7, according to a copy of the letter obtained by the Free Beacon.

Chabot outlined concern “that without such a determination the United States may be viewed as acquiescing to this transfer” of a major defensive weapons system to Iran.

Chabot told the Free Beacon on Thursday the administration has not responded to multiple inquiries about the potential designation.

“Despite multiple inquires to the U.S. Department of State, I still have not received a response on Russia’s S300 surface-to-air missile system transfer to Iran,” Chabot said. “This apparent dismissal leaves me wondering what exactly the Administration is hiding. I am really asking a simple question – is the introduction of a sophisticated weapon system into Iran, that has not been there previously, going to illicit the appropriate U.S. sanctions response? I am not sure why the Administration has found it so hard to come to a determination. The S300 is one of the most advanced anti-aircraft missile system’s in the world and significantly bolsters Iran’s offensive capabilities and stands as a serious hurdle to our efforts to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear armed state. This is absolutely a destabilizing conventional weapon system.”

When contacted for comment, a State Department official told the Free Beacon that the administration has not made a final determination about whether the S-300 sale would trigger additional U.S. sanctions.

“We’re continuing to closely follow reports concerning the delivery of the S-300 defensive missile system from Russia to Iran‎,” the official said. “We have not made a determination as to whether this delivery, if and when complete, would trigger any actions under U.S. authorities.”

“These systems would significantly bolster Iran’s offensive capabilities and introduce new obstacles to our efforts to eliminate the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon. I believe existing U.S. sanctions should be used to deter Russia from transferring this or other dangerous weapons systems to Iran,” Chabot said.

The sale is technically permitted under current United Nations resolutions governing weapons sales. However, the Obama administration has the right to veto the sale at the U.N. Security Council. The administration has not committed to doing so.

U.S. law also grants the president the right to designate such sales as illicit and therefore open to sanctions.

The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 grants the president authority to sanction the sale of “advanced conventional weapons” to Iran by any nation.

“U.S. law provides your administration with the authority to apply U.S. sanctions in response” to the sale, Chabot explains in his letter. “For example, the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and the Iran Sanctions Act provide authority for you to sanction individuals or countries that you determine are aiding Iran’s efforts to acquire or develop ‘destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.’”

Sanctions would kick in if the president decides that such a sale would destabilize the Middle East and shift regional balance.

“Iran’s acquisition of these systems would embolden Tehran to adopt a more threatening regional posture and to pursue offensive activities detrimental to regional stability in the belief that the systems would deter retaliation,” according to Chabot.

Reporters as well as lawmakers have attempted for weeks to get an answer from the administration about whether the president would make such a determination.

One foreign policy adviser who works closely with Congress on the Iran issue told the Free Beacon that the administration can no longer waffle on the issue.

“The administration tried to look the other way, but got called out for it by Congress. Then they spent a month and a half hoping that the whole thing would go away,” the source said. “Now I don’t know what they’re going to do, since it’s obvious that they’re letting Iran import advanced weapons in violation of U.S. law just to preserve the nuclear deal.”

Warning: Europe Terrorist Explosive Stockpiles

Posted on May 25, 2016May 25, 2016 by Denise Simon

Terrorists likely stockpiling explosives in EU, says Europol

The threat of terrorists attacks in the EU remains the top national security concern among member states, with some 211 foiled plots last year alone, according to a top EU security official.

The threat of another attack similar in scale to the Paris attack in November last year or in Brussels this past March has national authorities on edge. Manuel Navarrete Paniagua, the head of the European Counter Terrorism Centre at the EU police agency Europol, told euro-deputies on Monday (23 May) that terrorist cells in the EU were likely stockpiling explosives for later use.

“We have some information reported by the member states that terrorists groups are trying to establish large clandestine stockpiles of explosives in the European Union to be used eventually in large scale home attacks,” he said.

Related: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report

Paniagua was briefing MEPs in the civil liberties committee on the yet-to-be published EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE-SAT) compiled by Europol and member states.

The report is set for publication in a few weeks’ time.

Paniagua cited figures and broader conclusions due in the report, noting that “jihadist terrorism” remains the top threat to security in the European Union.

The latest attacks in the EU suggest much better coordination among the terrorists than previously thought. He said their combined use of explosives and firearms was also a novelty and a threat that is evolving rapidly.

Authorities have yet to nail down any single profile of a home-grown terrorist or foreign fighter.

But he said many have petty criminal backgrounds. He pointed out a significant proportion of foreign fighters have also been diagnosed with mental problems.

More than 4,000 so-called foreign fighters have been identified in the EU and entered into a Europol database.

“Using the terrorist financial tracking programme, we provided last year more than 2,700 leads regarding foreign terrorist fighters to the member states,” he said.

Some 1,057 people were also arrested last year on terrorism-related offences, he said.

He said there are also unconfirmed reports that some jihadist militants have set up training camps in the Western Balkans and some EU states.

Terrorists and migration flows

Other concerns related to terrorists exploiting the migration flows from Turkey and elsewhere to enter the European Union.

“We found no evidence of the systematic of using this flow to infiltrate terrorists into the European Union. But they do, they use it, we have some cases, some of the people that perpetrated the Paris attacks were eventually disguised in this immigration flow,” he said.

Paniagua said migrants were being victimised twice as result. First they flee terrorists and then again when the same attempt to infiltrate the EU by hiding among the refugees, he said.

“Again, we have no indication that this systematic,” he said.

Earlier this month, Europol announced it would deploy some 200 counter-terrorist and other investigators to migrant arrival centres known as hotspots in Italy and Greece.

Related: Implementing the European Agenda on Security:
EU action plan against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and explosives.

Of those, Europol said it would dispatch around 50 “at key points on the external border of the EU” to track down and help identify suspected criminals and terrorists.

A European Commission report earlier this month noted that Turkey is suspected to have around 1,300 Turkish citizens fighting alongside Islamic militant groups in Syria and Iraq.

It noted that the plan to lift visa restrictions on Turkish nationals “could potentially have an impact on the terrorist risk in the EU”.

*****

For the United States, the Warning from DHS in 2011

(U//FOUO) DHS Warning: Terrorists Making Explosives With Commercial Products

November 2, 2011

Terrorist Acquisition of Commercial Products for Improvised Explosive Device Production(U//FOUO) Recent plots and attacks in the Homeland and overseas demonstrate a continuing terrorist focus on acquiring commercially available materials and components that can be used in constructing improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Heightened public and state and local official awareness, as well as tightened legal controls, have made it more difficult to purchase certain products that contain explosive precursors in bulk quantities or concentrated forms. Operatives are now more likely to use surreptitious, though legal, methods—such as multiple purchases in smaller quantities—to acquire sufficient amounts to create explosives.

— (U) On 27 July 2011, investigators found precursor chemicals and other IED components, including smokeless powder, clocks, batteries, wires, and other items commonly used to make IEDs in the hotel room of a US Army soldier who allegedly sought to target military personnel.
— (U) The admitted perpetrator of the 22 July 2011 attacks in Oslo, Norway avoided law enforcement suspicion by acquiring through legal means the ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, nitromethane, and blenders he used in constructing IEDs.

(U//FOUO) Commercial products containing precursor materials may include:
— (U//FOUO) Fertilizer and first aid cold packs (ammonium nitrate).
— (U//FOUO) Swimming pool chemicals (calcium hypochlorite/hydrogen peroxide).
— (U//FOUO) Some types of water filtration/treatment systems (potassium permanganate).
— (U//FOUO) Beauty supply products (hydrogen peroxide and acetone).
— (U//FOUO) Industrial cleaning supplies (hydrochloric acid or sulfuric acid).

(U) Potential Indicators of suspicious purchases: Most commercial products suitable for constructing IEDs serve legitimate purposes. Consequently, it is often difficult to identify purchases or other activities that may be associated with terrorist intent to create explosives. No single indicator is likely to divulge suspicious purchases, but, depending on specific circumstances, a combination of the behaviors listed below may warrant reporting and investigation:

— (U) Attempts to purchase all available stock or materials in bulk, especially by individuals with no previous history of bulk purchases.
— (U) Payment or insistence on payment in cash for bulk purchases, or using a credit card in another person’s name.
— (U) Insistence on in-store pickup instead of store delivery of bulk purchase.
— (U) Use of rented or out-of-state vehicle to transport bulk purchases.
— (U) Smaller purchases of the same products at different locations within a short period of time.
— (U) Displays of nervous or suspicious behavior and evasive or vague responses to questions about intended use of products.

(U//FOUO) For additional information, please see DHS-FBI Joint Homeland Security Assessment “(U//FOUO) Use of Common Precursor Chemicals to Make Homemade Explosives,” 10 August 2010; and Roll Call Release “(U//FOUO) Indicators of Suspicious Acquisition of Beauty Supply Products,” 26 February 2010.

How the Military is Defeating Hackers

Posted on May 25, 2016May 25, 2016 by Denise Simon

Here’s how the US military is beating hackers at their own game

Paul Szoldra

US Soldiers Iraq Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall/USAF

TechInsiders: There’s an unseen world war that has been fought for years with no clear battle lines, few rules of engagement, and no end in sight.

But it’s not a shooting war; not a war where combatants have been killed or wounded — at least not yet.

It’s a war that pits nations against each other for dominance in cyberspace, and the United States, like other nations employing professional hackers as “cyber soldiers,” sees it as a battlefield just like any other.

“It’s like an operational domain: Sea, land, air, space, and cyber,” Charlie Stadtlander, chief spokesperson for US Army Cyber Command, told Tech Insider. “It’s a place where our presence exists. Cyber is a normal part of military operations and needs to be considered as such.”

As US military leaders warn of the growing progress of Russia, China, and North Korea in cyberspace, the Pentagon has ramped up its own efforts in what it calls the “cyber domain” after the release of a new cyber strategy in April 2015.

“This ephemeral space that’s all around us, literally, is a space where operations can be performed against us,” Frank Pound, a program manager who leads DARPA’s “Plan X” cyber warfare platform, told Tech Insider. “And how do we defend against that? How do we detect that?”

Building a cyber army

In its cyber strategy, the military proposed 133 teams for its “cyber mission force” by 2018, 27 of which were directed to support combat missions by “generating integrated cyberspace effects in support of … operations.” (Effects is a common military term used for artillery and aircraft targeting, and soldiers proclaim “good effect on target” to communicate a direct hit).

The cyber mission force will comprise some 4,300 personnel. But only about 1,600 of those would be on a “combat mission team” that would likely be considered to be taking an offensive hacking role. They are up against China’s own “specialized military network warfare forces,” North Korea’s secretive Bureau 121 hacker unit, other nation-states, hacktivists like Anonymous, and criminal enterprises alike.

They have been further tasked with breaking into the networks of adversaries like ISIS, disrupting communications channels, stopping improvised explosive devices from being triggered through cellphones, or even, as one Marine general put it, just “trying to get inside the enemy’s [head].”

Online hacks can lead to offline outcomes, and the military has become keenly aware of that power. In 2009, the US and Israel reportedly infected Iranian computers with the Stuxnet malware that destroyed roughly one-fifth of the country’s nuclear centrifuges. And as recently as February, hackers were used against ISIS as others fought on the ground, quite possibly for the first time ever.

“These are strikes that are conducted in the war zone using cyber essentially as a weapon of war,” Defense Secretary Ash Carter told NPR. “Just like we drop bombs, we’re dropping cyber bombs.”

As one Army officer said during a 2015 training exercise, the cyber war seems to just be getting started: “Future fights aren’t going to be guns and bullets. They’re going to be ones and zeroes.”

soldiers cyber command Brian Rodan/US ArmySoldiers work together during a training exercise in 2011.

‘Prepping the battlefield’

That the Pentagon would employ specialists to defend itself in cyberspace is not surprising, since government and military systems are attacked regularly by nations trying to read soldier’s email, or others who want to uncover personal details on millions who undergo background checks for security clearances.

But the defense of networks — while still an important function — has been supplanted in some cases by an offensive strategy. That is, soldiers hacking into computers overseas for intelligence or to disrupt the enemy on the battlefield — a kind of digital tit-for-tat.

“If there’s something that you can do to prep the battlefield before a kinetic attack or to disrupt defenses during kinetic attacks, why wouldn’t a combatant commander turn to that?” Stadtlander said.

Stadtlander couldn’t talk about ongoing operations that Army Cyber Command is involved in, mainly due to the unique nature of cyber warfare. An enemy who knows the US is developing a next-generation fighter jet might develop something in response that could take years, but with a cyberattack, a fix can be developed sometimes within days.

“The unique thing about cyber activity and defense is you’re talking about building a couple thousand lines of code or having a certain electronic device, or some sort of cyber capability. And just based on the nature of this space, a lot of times it can only be used once,” he said. “Once it’s known … it’s no longer a viable tool.”

Still, some insight into what the US military is capable of can be found within its own training manuals, presentations, and the few news stories by the military’s own writers. And it’s likely that hackers with Army Cyber Command, subordinate to US Cyber Command and NSA, benefit from top secret initiatives to infect “millions” of computers with malware in an effort aimed at “owning the net.”

“Denying the ability to coordinate, communicate, and assess,” Stadtlander said. “That’s an advantage that we might be able to leverage.”

Inside the Army’s cyber warfare ‘Bible’

Perhaps one of the most important publications on cyber warfare was released with little fanfare in Feb. 2014. Known as Army Field Manual 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities, it proclaimed itself as the “first doctrinal field manual of its kind,” unifying a number of other publications on network operations, electronic warfare, and intelligence into one 96-page document.

In FM 3-38, the Army defined offensive cyberspace operations as actions “intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace,” while noting they are to be carried out in support of command objectives and within legal frameworks.

But what can soldiers do in cyberspace that can affect what happens on the battlefield? Quite a bit, according to the manual.

us army cyber soldier US Army

“A cyberspace attack may be employed in conjunction with” other methods of attack “to deceive, degrade, destroy, and disrupt a specific enemy integrated air defense system or enemy safe haven,” it says.

As an example, the manual offers an early warning radar site as a target which, if soldiers can get inside the network, could possibly be destroyed or degraded.

That’s just what students trained for during an exercise in March, according to the Fort Gordon Globe. Acting just as they would on the battlefield, cyber soldiers patrolled to their objective — a simulated enemy air defense control system — then searched for their target’s wireless network so it could be exploited or neutralized.

There’s little need for stealth coating on aircraft when a guy behind a computer can disable the radar site for you. The manual also offers other systems Army hackers may consider breaking into, such as enemy telephone networks, servers, and smartphones.

“Even if you think about the way that IEDs are triggered,” Stadtlander said, using the acronym for improvised explosive devices. “Or an adversary’s [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], a lot of these are done through electronics and with internet connections.”

Getting into the Army’s ‘hacker university’

Located just southwest of Augusta, Georgia is Fort Gordon, an Army installation that brings together most of the service’s cyber warriors under one roof. In 2013, the Army chose the site as the home base of its Cyber Command after the unit was established in 2010.

Also home to a 604,000 square foot operations center for the National Security Agency, Gordon is where cyber warriors are taught their craft at what the Army calls its Cyber Center of Excellence. But before they get to the military’s “hacker university,” enlisted soldiers need to score high technical scores on the military entrance exam, and sign on for five years of service, instead of the normal four-year tour.

army cyber command US ArmyInsider Fort Gordon’s Cyber Operations Center.

Due to the classified nature of their work, cyber training is often conducted in secure compartmented information facilities (SCIFs) where cell phones and other outside recording devices are not allowed, and all soldiers will have to obtain a Top Secret clearance prior to being assigned to their unit.

Soldiers go through a lengthy period of training after basic training: Six months spent at the Navy’s Center for Information Dominance in Pensacola, Florida followed by six months at Fort Gordon.

Army officers go through their own training program at the Georgia base, called Cyber Basic Officer Leader Course. The course takes nearly nine months to complete and is the longest officer training program in the Army.

Enlisted soldiers train with members of all military branches over six months at the Navy’s Cyber Analysis Course, according to Bloomberg. Since students can come from a variety of skill sets and backgrounds, the first two-thirds of classroom time focuses on basic programming, mathematics, and how networks and operating systems function. But later on they learn the steps to research and infiltrate targets, defend networks, and even hack a simulated network with Metasploit, a common tool hackers have used since its release in 2004.

Meanwhile, officers receive similar training, though their position merits other coursework in leading operations as opposed to carrying them out. Though a cyber officer can likely step in and be more than capable, given the certifications they obtain, to include Cisco’s Certified Network Associate (CCNA) and the independent Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) credential.

“They are really valuably trained after that [schooling],” Stadtlander said.

So valuable in fact that the Army is seeing a challenge in retaining its talent from heavyweights in Silicon Valley.

Is hacking considered an ‘act of war’?

Chinese Army Hackers via Flickr

“There is no international standing or framework that is binding over any one nation-state in terms of offensive cyber operations,” Bradley P. Moss, a national security lawyer, told Tech Insider. “It’s whatever rules we put in place for ourselves.”

In essence, the US, China, Russia, and others are operating in a sort-of “digital Wild West” with few overarching guidelines outside of the Law of War that predates our interconnected world.

Cyber warfare continues unabated because there is no governing body such as the United Nations telling nations not to hack one another. Not that that would necessarily make a difference, as a 2014 UN report criticized mass surveillance programs employed by NSA and others as violating privacy rights “guaranteed by multiple treaties and conventions,” The Intercept reported.

Still, Moss explained that nations are less concerned with the legalities of hacking each other, and instead, worry about the potential diplomatic and political fallout should they be exposed.

“More or less, we all engage in some manner of warfare these days, we just don’t go to ‘war’ over it,” Moss said.

How foreign nations would likely respond to being hacked by the US is something that is considered before any offensive operation, according to a top secret presidential policy directive leaked by ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

The document, made public in 2013, listed cyber attacks resulting in “loss of life, significant responsive actions against the United States, significant damage to property, serious adverse US foreign policy consequences, or serious economic impact” as requiring presidential approval.

And for US military hackers who may be on a battlefield in Iraq, Syria, or elsewhere, their self-imposed rules for cyber attacks are clear:

“Military attacks will be directed only at military targets,” reads the Pentagon’s cyberspace operations document.

us army cyber command US Army

But what of cyber attacks that have potentially devastating effects on foreign nations, such as US-made worms that cause nuclear centrifuges to fall apart, or alleged Russian-made malware that knocks out power and heat to people in the dead of winter?

Are these “acts of war”?

“From a strictly legal matter, you could designate the US Army hacking the Russian Army’s [computer] system as an act of war,” Moss said. “Just as much as if we were to have infiltrated and damaged a Russian bomber, that would be an act of war.”

But, he added: “There’s nothing that necessarily stops us, except the political and diplomatic ramifications.”

With Money Infusion, Iran Funds PIJ

Posted on May 25, 2016May 25, 2016 by Denise Simon

Iran resumes funding for Palestinian Islamic Jihad

BTN: Iran recently decided to resume regular financial assistance to the Palestinian terrorist organization known as Islamic Jihad, Arabic-language newspaper Asharq al-Aswat reported on Wednesday.

The decision to transfer an annual sum of $70 million out of the Revolutionary Guards budget reportedly followed a visit by an Islamic Jihad delegation in Tehran last month – the first such visit in two years.

The talks resulted in an agreement to renew operations by Islamic Jihad’s military wing, the Quds Brigades. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ elite Quds Force, reportedly decided to appoint Khaled Mansour, considered loyal to Iran, as commander of the Quds Brigades in the Gaza Strip.

Iran’s funding resumed in March, Asharq al-Aswat reported, and Islamic Jihad has thus been able to pay two months’ worth of salaries to members after months of financial straits.

Reports in January said that Iran had ended its funding of Islamic Jihad, according to Israeli news site Walla News.

Despite being a Sunni organization, Islamic Jihad has remained on the side of the Iranian-led Shi’ite axis in the regional power struggle with Saudi-backed elements, and members have fought alongside Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in that country’s civil war.

Islamic Jihad Secretary General Ramadan Shalah said recently in a public statement that no Arab countries has supposed “the popular uprising in Palestine”, and that only Iran “helps the martyrs’ families.”

****

The entire Obama administration confirms this:

WASHINGTON/JP — Despite facing costly obstacles from the Syrian civil war, Iran continued its arming and funding of terror proxies targeting Israel throughout 2014 largely unabated, the US government found in a report released on Friday.

The State Department report— an annual accounting of organized terrorism worldwide— asserts that Iran has continued, if not expanded, its operations beyond its historical focus on Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, to a limited number of operations in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as to “various groups throughout the Middle East.”

“Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC),” the report reads. “These Palestinian terrorist groups have been behind a number of deaths from attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank.”

Much of Iran’s efforts throughout 2014 focused on maintaining its “resistance front” in Syria and Iraq, the report says, through its support for Shia governments and militias. The report notes of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC) presence on the ground in both countries.

The report notes of an Israeli naval raid that took place in March of that year on a cargo ship traversing the Red Sea, the Klos C, off the coast of Sudan, which was found bearing 40 M-302 rockets, 180 mortars, and approximately 400,000 rounds of ammunition hidden within crates of cement labeled “Made in Iran.”

“Although Hamas’s ties to Tehran have been strained due to the Syrian civil war, in a November 25 speech, Supreme Leader Khamenei highlighted Iran’s military support to ‘Palestinian brothers’ in Gaza and called for the West Bank to be similarly armed,” the report continues. “In December, Hamas Deputy Leader Moussa Abu Marzouk announced bilateral relations with Iran and Hamas were ‘back on track.'”

In the North, Iran continues providing Hezbollah— active in the fight in Syria as well as against the Jewish state from Lebanon— with “hundreds of millions of dollars. And the report claims Tehran is training “thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran.”

“General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC Aerospace Force, stated in November that ‘the IRGC and Hezbollah are a single apparatus jointed together,’ and Lebanese Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem boasted that Iran had provided his organization with missiles that had ‘pinpoint accuracy’ in separate November public remarks,” it states.

The State Department asserts that, in admitting its arming of Hezbollah, Iran is in open violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1747.

The report praises Israel’s response to terror threats throughout the year, which saw war with Hamas in Gaza over fifty days that summer.

“Israel was hit by a record volume of rocket and mortar fire from Gaza and the Sinai in 2014, according to the Israeli government, with more than 4,660 projectiles launched, most during the July-August conflict, at Israeli territory compared to 74 launchings in 2013 and 2,557 in 2012,” it says, referring to Israel as a “committed counterterrorism partner.”

“Militants from Gaza also infiltrated Israeli territory using tunnels in six separate attacks and, for the first time, by a sea-borne operation,” it continued. The report also praises Egypt for taking aggressive counterterrorism measures against Hamas and its tunnel operations in the Sinai.

It notes, briefly, that Iranian proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a concern.

DHS: Border Patrol/Coast Guard Drone Conflict

Posted on May 24, 2016May 24, 2016 by Denise Simon

But in 2015, the Office of Inspector General says the CBP drone program has essentially been grounded.

The IG report, the second audit of the program since 2012, found there is no reliable method of measuring the program’s performance and determined that its impact in stemming illegal
immigration has been minimal.

According to the CBP Fiscal Year Report, the drones flew about 10 percent fewer hours in 2014 than the previous year and 20 percent fewer than in 2013. The missions were credited with contributing to the seizure of just under 1,000 pounds of cocaine in 2014, compared to 2,645 in 2013 and 3,900 in 2012. But apprehensions of illegal immigrants between 2014 and 2013 fell despite the flood of more than 60,000 unaccompanied children coming across the border from Central America.

Combined with the decrease in productivity, the OIG report disclosed the staggering costs to run the program, more than $12,000 per hour when figuring fuel, salaries for operators, equipment and overhead. More from FNC.

Related: Coast Guard UAV System

Related: CBP and Coast Guard even share buildings

Bungling border agency can’t find drone records

WashingtonTimes: Homeland Security can’t find a single record of a request to fly drones to help the Coast Guard, the agency said this week in a letter to a top member of Congress — an admission that’s likely to add fuel to the guard’s request for its own fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles.

R. Gil Kerlikowske, commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, said his agency’s Air and Marine office records all requests, but for some reason it “could not locate any prior requests from the USCG” for unmanned aerial surveillance flights.

For Rep. Duncan Hunter, California Republican and chairman of a subcommittee that oversees the Coast Guard, the admission was the latest signal that the border agency isn’t treating its colleagues in the guard fairly.

“It’s baffling, really. This response goes to show just how disadvantaged the Coast Guard truly is under the DHS umbrella,” said Joe Kasper, Mr. Hunter’s chief of staff. “It’s impossible to excuse the terrible record keeping, but that aside — we know for a fact that the Coast Guard has made numerous requests for UAS support.”

Both the Coast Guard and CBP are part of the Homeland Security Department, and under the current arrangement the guard has to use CBP’s drones. That leaves the maritime mission hostage to the whims of border officials, who have their own missions, and who already struggle with logistics and maintenance problems that keep their fleet of drones grounded far too often.

Mr. Hunter is pressing for the Coast Guard to get its own ground-based drones, which it can assign on its own.

“The Coast Guard shouldn’t have to rely on CBP and vice versa. We know CBP is well intentioned, and it has its own mission, but that doesn’t help the Coast Guard beyond the joint operational space,” Mr. Kasper said.

Neither CBP nor the Coast Guard had substantive replies to requests for comment Tuesday afternoon, but in his letter, dated Monday, Mr. Kerlikowske insisted the two agencies “work side-by-side.”

He said even if Coast Guard requests aren’t recorded, there are clear instances when CBP was assisting the guard’s operations. He pointed to a Guardian drone that aided the Coast Guard Cutter Boutwell in making three interdictions over the last year.

“CBO and USCG are close partners and have been highly successful performing joint operations in support of DHS’s primary mission to protect the American people from terrorist threats,” Mr. Kerlikowske said.

He said they will try to improve operations.

But his agency has been promising better drone use for years, and has consistently fallen short, according to watchdog reports.

Just 5 percent of Drone flights were conducted in the southeast, meaning off the coast of Florida, according to a new report Tuesday by the Government Accountability Office. The rest of the time the drones were operating on the border with Canada or the landlocked southwest border with Mexico.

Homeland Security Inspector General John Roth last year called CBP’s drone program “dubious achievers,” saying hundreds of millions of dollars have been wasted to stock a fleet that often can’t even get into the air.

He put the cost of flying each drone at more than $12,000 an hour — five times the figure CBP had given.

“Notwithstanding the significant investment, we see no evidence that the drones contribute to a more secure border, and there is no reason to invest additional taxpayer funds at this time,” Mr. Roth said in releasing his report last year. “Securing our borders is a crucial mission for CBP and DHS. CBP’s drone program has so far fallen far short of being an asset to that effort.”