Has Anyone Asked Obama about the Perfume Letter?

This will make you miss GW Bush.

Related reading: The General Accounting Office comprehensive response to Senator Dianne Feinstein on the factors to transfer detainees to the homeland facilities.

The base is self-sufficient.

– Desalination plant produces 1.2 million gallons of water per day

– Power plant produces more than 350,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity per day.

– Wind Turbines

o On average 2-3 percent of the base’s electric energy per day comes from the Naval Station’s four 262 ft. tall, three-blade turbines.

o Each of the turbines produces 950 kilowatts of electricity.

o The wind turbines save approximately 250,000 gallons of diesel fuel per year.

Major Units and Tenant Commands:

– Naval Hospital

– Marine Corps Security Force

– Personnel Support Activity

– Naval Atlantic Meteorology and Oceanography Command Detachment

– Naval Media Center Detachment

– Department of Defense Education Activity – W.T. Sampson Schools

– International Organization for Migration

– The GEO Group

– Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Southeast, Public Works Detachment

– Fleet & Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Jacksonville Detachment, GTMO

– Joint Task Force Guantanamo (Detention Center)

– U.S. Coast Guard Aviation Detachment – Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

The Disgraceful Gitmo Exodus

Obama’s terrorist-release program

WeeklyStandard: As Barack Obama prepared to enter the final year of his presidency, he sat down for an interview with Olivier Knox to discuss a bold new policy change. He had announced a year earlier that the United States would be ending its decades-long isolation of Cuba and seeking rapprochement with the authoritarian Communists who run the island nation 90 miles from Florida. In this December 14, 2015, interview, Obama described his new approach in greater detail. The change he proposed dominated headlines for days.

There was other big news in the interview—though this the media didn’t treat as such. The president declared that he remained committed to closing the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, despite strong objections from Republicans and some Democrats. Obama had campaigned in 2008 on closing Guantánamo and as one of his first acts upon taking the oath of office signed Executive Order 13492 directing his national security team to shutter the facility within a year:

The detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by this order shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order. If any individuals covered by this order remain in detention at Guantánamo at the time of closure of those detention facilities, they shall be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

Almost seven years later, much to Obama’s frustration, the facility remained open. Closing it had proved much more challenging than Obama had theorized as a candidate trying to win an election and a new president acting on his idealism. It turned out that the jihadists who remained in Guantánamo were there for a reason. Many of them were truly, as the cliché had it, “the worst of the worst.” Al Qaeda leaders, top Taliban officials, the men who planned the 9/11 attacks, veteran jihadists caught plotting follow-on attacks on U.S. interests, and even those al Qaeda operatives believed to be charged with carrying out the next wave of assaults on the U.S. homeland.

The news in the president’s interview wasn’t that he intended to make good on his promise to close Guantánamo, however belatedly. It was instead the president’s attempt to mislead the American people to accomplish his controversial objective.

“I am absolutely persuaded, as are my top intelligence and military advisers, that Guantánamo is used as a recruitment tool for organizations like ISIS,” Obama said, endeavoring to create a national security rationale for closing the detention facility. “And if we want to fight them, then we can’t give them these kinds of excuses.”

This isn’t true. There is virtually no evidence that jihadists use Guantánamo as a significant recruiting tool, and national security experts from across the political spectrum who have tested the claim have judged it false.

He wasn’t finished. “Keep in mind that between myself and the Bush administration hundreds of people have been released and the recidivism rate—we anticipate, we assume that there are going to be—out of four, five, six hundred people that get released—a handful of them are going to be embittered and still engaging in anti-U.S. activities and trying to link up potentially with their old organizations,” Obama said.

That wasn’t true. When Obama made this claim, 653 detainees had been released. Of that group, 196 had been confirmed (117) or suspected (79) of returning to jihadist activity upon their release. Those numbers came from the office of the director of national intelligence and represent the U.S. government’s official count of Guantánamo recidivism. Nearly one-in-three former detainees returned to the fight, not a “handful,” as the president suggested.

There was more. “The bottom line is that the strategic gains we make by closing Guantánamo will outweigh, you know, those low-level individuals who, you know, have been released so far.”

Again, false. The U.S. government—under George W. Bush and Barack Obama—has released dozens of veteran jihadists whose terror résumés include senior positions in al Qaeda and like-minded groups. And of course Obama had himself transferred five senior Taliban officials to Qatar in order to secure the release of Bowe Bergdahl.

So, at a time of escalated threat levels from international terrorists, the president of the United States is releasing dangerous jihadists against the advice of the military and intelligence professionals who have studied the threat for years, and he’s lying to the American people to downplay the threat.

That’s news. And yet a review of press briefing transcripts from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House over the two weeks after Obama’s claims shows that his interview didn’t generate a single follow-up question. Not one.

Hence the president, having paid no cost for misleading the American people on such a crucial matter of national security, is moving forward undeterred. Vice President Joe Biden, at a press conference in Stockholm late last month, said his “hope and expectation” is that Guantánamo will be closed by January 20, 2017.

In recent weeks, the Obama administration has transferred from Guantánamo al Qaeda operatives who were working directly for the men who planned the 9/11 attacks. Obama’s Periodic Review Board has approved for transfer a veteran jihadist who was identified in the 9/11 Commission report as an individual who “recruited 9/11 hijackers in Germany.” The administration is preparing to release or transfer many remaining jihadists judged by U.S. military and intelligence professionals to be “high-risk” detainees who would almost certainly return to the fight if freed.

As the administration’s urgency increases, so will its deception. And so, too, will the dangers to the American people.

The ‘Karachi Six’

On September 11, 2002, Pakistani forces stormed three al Qaeda safe houses in Karachi. Their targets were Ramzi Binalshibh, the point man for the 9/11 hijackings one year earlier, and Hamza al Zubayr, who was planning to attack hotels frequented by Americans. Both Binalshibh and Zubayr worked for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the chief architect of 9/11. At Binalshibh’s safe house, the residents held knives to their own throats in a desperate attempt to stall their enemies’ advances. Their gambit failed and Binalshibh, a native of Yemen, was captured. Elsewhere in Karachi, at another al Qaeda guesthouse, Zubayr was killed during an intense firefight that lasted hours.

In all, 10 people were captured during the raids. The detainees included six other Yemenis who were later dubbed the “Karachi Six” by U.S. intelligence officials. Five of them were detained at Zubayr’s safe house after the shootout with Pakistani forces. One of them was captured alongside Binalshibh. All six were transferred to Guantánamo on October 28, 2002.

Three days after the raids, on September 14, 2002, President George W. Bush praised the operations in Pakistan during a press conference with Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. “We’re making progress in the war against terror,” Bush said. “I tell the American people all the time that we’re doing everything we can to protect our homeland by hunting down killers one person at a time.” The president added: “Thanks to the efforts of our folks, and people in Pakistan, we captured one of the planners and organizers of the September the 11th attack that murdered thousands of people.”

That was then.

Since the beginning of this year, at least five members of the “Karachi Six” have been approved for transfer by the Obama administration. Two of them, including the man captured at the side of this planner and organizer of the September 11th attack—Ramzi Binalshibh—were sent to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in August. When the Department of Defense announced their transfer from Guantánamo, along with 13 others, it thanked the UAE “for its humanitarian gesture and willingness to support ongoing U.S. efforts to close the Guantánamo Bay detention facility.” The implication was clear: It was inhumane for the United States to continue holding the jihadists.

A senior UAE official tells The Weekly Standard that the men will be kept in a military facility that allows them internal freedom of movement but includes “strict monitoring” to ensure that they cannot escape.

The Pentagon said nothing about the dangers posed by the detainees. Nor was there any mention of the fact that the decision to transfer them reversed years of warnings from U.S. military and intelligence professionals about the Karachi Six.

U.S. intelligence analysts had assessed that the Karachi Six were slated to take part in terrorist attacks ordered by KSM and orchestrated by Zubayr and Binalshibh. At a minimum, the professional analysts concluded, they were part of the support network that helped with Zubayr’s plotting against American targets in Karachi. But intelligence officials thought these al Qaeda operatives may have been involved in something even more troubling: KSM’s plans to target the American homeland once again. Whatever their specific plans, there was broad consensus among U.S. military and intelligence officials—based on extensive intelligence reporting from multiple U.S. intelligence agencies, including in-person interrogations with other senior al Qaeda leaders—that the men captured in Pakistan on September 11, 2002, were dangerous al Qaeda operatives determined to attack the United States and its interests.

Then, suddenly, in late 2015, the Obama administration reversed these conclusions, describing four of the Karachi Six as merely “low-level” or “low-ranking” fighters. Multiple publicly available documents illustrate how the Obama administration changed the analysts’ assessments.

In 2008, Joint Task Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO), which oversees the detention facility, deemed each member of the “Karachi Six” a “high” risk, “likely to pose a threat to the U.S., its interests, and allies.” JTF-GTMO recommended that they remain in the Defense Department’s custody. The leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessments authored for each of the six opened with this line:

Detainee is assessed to be an al Qaeda operative who planned to participate in terrorist operations targeting US forces in Karachi, Pakistan (PK), and possibly inside the United States.

But the Obama administration changed the assessment on precisely this point beginning in late 2015.

In files submitted to a Periodic Review Board (PRB), which was authorized by Obama in 2011 to evaluate the Guantánamo detainees’ cases on a regular basis, the administration’s representatives conceded that the Karachi Six were transferred to Guantánamo “based on concerns that they were part of an al Qaeda operational cell intended to support a future attack.” But, the administration argued, they probably “did not play a major role in the attack plotting in Karachi.”

The Obama administration’s unclassified submission for each of the six jihadists includes these lines (or similar language):

Based on a review of all available reporting, we judge that this label [ed: Karachi Six] more accurately reflects the common circumstances of their arrest and that it is more likely the six Yemenis were elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al Qaeda planners considered potentially available to support future operations.

The file for one of the six, Ayoub Murshid Ali Saleh, who was transferred to the UAE in August, explicitly notes the Obama administration’s disagreement with previous U.S. intelligence analyses (emphasis added):

Our review of available intelligence indicates that he probably did not play a major role in terrorist operations, leading us to disagree with previous US government assessments that he was involved in a 2002 plot to conduct an attack in Karachi, Pakistan.

The language here matters. The Obama administration does not claim that the change in the assessment on Saleh was based on new information, but a “review of available intelligence.” In other words, they looked at the same information that has driven U.S. intelligence assessments since 2002 and decided it no longer meant what the intelligence professionals had concluded.

Just months after these files were submitted to the PRB, at least five of the Karachi Six were approved for transfer. In four of the unclassified decisions, the PRB wrote (emphasis added):

In making this determination, the Board noted that the detainee’s degree of involvement and significance in extremist activities has been reassessed to be that of a low-level fighter

“Low-level” fighters. Remember that phrase as we delve into the details.

The reporting cited in JTF-GTMO’s files and other documents does not support the administration’s revised conclusion. Instead, the mosaic of intelligence portrays a very different picture: All six were working for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or KSM’s men, including some of the same operatives who planned and facilitated the 9/11 attacks.

During the raid in which Zubayr was killed and five members of the Karachi Six were captured, the Pakistanis recovered a crucial document known as the “perfume letter.” The missive, which was written by KSM in May 2002 and addressed to Zubayr, was given this name because of its cryptic reference to “perfumes.” U.S. officials initially suspected that this code word referred to chemical weapons or poisons, but they later concluded that KSM meant military-grade explosives.

The “perfume letter” would become a key piece of evidence in the dispute between Democrats on the Senate Intelligence Committee and the CIA over the value of the intelligence collected in the agency’s enhanced interrogation program. The CIA claimed that intelligence from harsh interrogations thwarted an al Qaeda plot against American targets in Karachi in 2003. In the so-called Feinstein report, Democratic senators and their staffers argued that the U.S. government already knew about the al Qaeda threat in Karachi from the “perfume letter.”

“Dear Brother, we have the green light for the hotels,” KSM wrote to Zubayr. KSM added that Zubayr should consider “making it three instead of one.” Consistent with al Qaeda’s modus operandi of conducting simultaneous suicide operations against multiple targets, KSM wanted Zubayr to strike three hotels housing Americans at once.

“By early October 2002,” the Feinstein report reads, “the CIA had completed a search of the names identified in the ‘perfume letter’ in its databases and found many of the individuals who ‘had assigned roles in support of the operation’ were arrested by Pakistani authorities during the [September 11, 2002,] raids” (emphasis added). While it is not clear based on public reporting which members of the Karachi Six are directly named in the “perfume letter,” if any, only four other individuals were arrested during the raids.

And there is no doubt that Zubayr, the letter’s recipient, was in charge of the Karachi Six. One of them, Shawki Awad Balzuhair, identified Zubayr as the Karachi Six’s “operational leader.” According to the JTF-GTMO files, Balzuhair explained that Zubayr was “unconditionally accepted as the leader of the group given his stature in al Qaeda” and his experience as a “senior military trainer” at the Farouq camp, which was Osama bin Laden’s primary training facility in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Balzuhair has been approved for transfer from Guantánamo.

According to the Feinstein report, another senior al Qaeda operative named Walid Bin Attash, also known as “Khallad,” was specifically identified in the “perfume letter.” Khallad was directly involved in the USS Cole bombing in October 2000. He also helped al Qaeda prepare to hijack airliners leaving Southeast Asia for the United States prior to the 9/11 hijackings. Al Qaeda originally intended to commandeer planes headed for America’s West Coast as part of the 9/11 plot, but bin Laden canceled Khallad’s portion of the plan. Months later, Khallad went to work with KSM and KSM’s nephew, Ammar al Baluchi (also a key figure in the 9/11 attacks), on the anti-American plots in Pakistan. Khallad and Baluchi, both of whom were captured in 2003, planned to use the explosives left behind by Zubayr and his men in their own operations.

The intelligence cited by JTF-GTMO tied Khallad and Baluchi directly to the Karachi Six. Balzuhair told U.S. officials that Khallad, “visited the apartment” where he and the others lived “roughly every two weeks” and was their “primary facilitator in Karachi,” as well as “their link to senior people in al Qaeda.” Balzuhair also said that Baluchi “visited to bring money, clothing, and assistance.” Additional evidence cited in the leaked JTF-GTMO files indicates that the Karachi Six were working directly for KSM and his subordinates.

Bashir Nasir Ali al Marwalah was transferred to the UAE in August. The JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Marwalah notes that he was captured alongside Binalshibh, the man Bush cited in the days after the raid as a key planner of the 9/11 attacks.

The file includes another stunning detail. After KSM himself was captured months later, in March 2003, he was questioned about another letter he authored that was recovered during the Karachi raids. In this second letter, KSM “instructed” Binalshibh “to tell an individual named Jafar al-Tayyar to be ready for travel.”Al Tayyar means “the pilot.” And “Jafar al-Tayyar” is better known as Adnan al Shukrijumah, who was eventually killed during a counterterrorism operation in northern Pakistan in late 2014.

For American counterterrorism officials, the true identity of “Jafar al-Tayyar” was one of the biggest mysteries in 2002 and early 2003. Both the FBI and the CIA frantically tried to track him down after he was identified as the potential ringleader for al Qaeda’s next wave of attacks inside the United States. CBS News reported in March 2003 that U.S. officials thought he could be the “next Mohammad Atta”—a reference to the lead hijacker on 9/11.

KSM was dismayed that his “Jafar al-Tayyar” letter had fallen into American hands. “When [KSM] was confronted with the letter during a custodial interview,” according to JTF-GTMO, “he was surprised that the letter existed, as detainee [Marwalah] was supposed to destroy important documents and correspondence.” JTF-GTMO’s analysts surmised that KSM’s “comment indicates that detainee [Marwalah] had access to operation planning and coordination through his handling of the correspondence.”

The Obama administration’s reassessment elided this straightforward conclusion, and the evidence that led to it, claiming curiously that Marwalah’s “role in al Qaeda operational plotting is unverified.”

KSM’s letters weren’t the only incriminating evidence recovered during the Karachi raids. Authorities also found and analyzed two laptop hard drives. According to JTF-GTMO’s threat assessments, the hard drives “contained images of instrument approach charts for major US and European airfields, along with flight simulator software.” An analysis by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) concluded that the data on the hard drives could be used to plan another hijacking or to assist in the targeting of aircraft with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). JTF-GTMO’s analysts concluded it was “probable” Jafar al-Tayyar (Shukrijumah) was “utilizing the data from the hard drives” in his “operational planning.”

Another document scooped up during the raids is especially difficult to explain away. The Obama administration’s PRB summary notes in passing that Marwalah’s “last will and testament” were “found in the Karachi raids” and “included a martyrdom statement.” JTF-GTMO’s memo describes this document as Marwalah’s “last will before a suicide operation.” And JTF-GTMO’s analysts added a commonsense observation: “The presence of the document indicates that detainee [Marwalah], and probably the group [Karachi Six] as a whole, were in the final stages of planning suicide terrorist operations.”

Why else would Marwalah have written his “martyrdom” message if he wasn’t preparing to die? The Obama administration, in its eagerness to rewrite the history of the Karachi Six, didn’t offer an alternative explanation in its unclassified summary.

That’s not all. Some members of the Karachi Six, including Said Salih Said Nashir, told authorities that they had personally met with KSM. Curiously, Nashir is the only one of the six whose PRB decision has not yet been released to the public. In its unclassified summary for Nashir’s case, the administration claimed he wasn’t part of Zubayr’s plot in Karachi. But Nashir was hardly exonerated. Instead, the administration claimed Nashir “was probably intended by al Qaeda senior leaders to return to Yemen to support eventual attacks in Saudi Arabia,” but “may not have been witting of these plans.” The summary also notes that Nashir has “admitted to a close association with some of [al Qaeda’s] external operations planners and senior leadership, including” Khallad.

In sum, there is abundant evidence that the Karachi Six were working directly for senior al Qaeda operatives, including KSM and his immediate subordinates. Five of them lived with Zubayr, who was plotting against American hotels in Karachi.

Even if one were inclined to accept the Obama administration’s spin on the evidence about the Karachi Six, that revisionism doesn’t support the conclusion that they were harmless innocents. The administration itself argued it was “more likely” the Karachi Six “were elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al Qaeda planners considered potentially available to support future operations.” Of course, unlike many of the Yemenis from this “large pool,” these six were actually living with the “senior al Qaeda planners” responsible for the Karachi plots. And one of them had already said his goodbyes as a willing “martyr.”

Tellingly, the Obama administration previously found that the Karachi Six should remain in U.S. custody. In January 2010, President Obama’s Guantánamo Review Task Force concluded that all six should be detained under the law of war, because they were “too dangerous to transfer, but not feasible for prosecution.” It was only under the Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, established by President Obama on March 7, 2011, that five of them were eventually granted transfer. It turns out that is an all too frequent occurrence. (In response to detailed questions about the Karachi Six and the transfers to the UAE, Pentagon spokeswoman Lt. Col. Valerie Henderson said, “Detainee-related information is derived from multiple sources, some of which was gathered by the Intelligence Community through sensitive sources and methods and cannot be discussed publicly. The Department of Defense is constantly reviewing its detainee-related information for accuracy and updating its records as appropriate.”)

Transferring Detainees ‘too dangerous to transfer’

To simplify: President Obama created two different entities to evaluate Guantánamo detainees and the risks they present to the United States. Both bodies—first Obama’s task force and later the Periodic Review Board—were conceived to further the president’s oft-expressed objective of closing the detention facility. As the end of Obama’s presidency draws near, and the urgency of closing Guantánamo increases, Obama’s PRB is finding ways to transfer many of the same detainees that Obama’s own task force previously said were too dangerous to transfer.

The PRB’s web page describes the body as “a discretionary, administrative interagency process” that was established “to review whether continued detention of particular individuals held at Guantánamo remains necessary to protect against a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.”

To date, according to a review of government filings conducted by The Weekly Standard, the PRB has issued a ruling in 52 cases. Thirty-three detainees have been approved for transfer by the PRB. The PRB determined that continued detention of 19 Guantánamo detainees “remains necessary” to protect the “security of the United States.” This means that the PRB has approved Guantánamo detainees for transfer in nearly two-thirds of the cases it has heard.

This is a stunning success rate for these particular detainees. To put it in perspective, keep in mind that Obama’s own Guantánamo Review Task Force previously assessed all 52 of these detainees and determined that none of them—not one of them—should be transferred or released. Twenty-eight of the 33 detainees approved for transfer by the PRB had been deemed “too dangerous to transfer but not feasible for prosecution” by Obama’s task force. The remaining five approved for transfer by the PRB were referred for prosecution by Obama’s task force. But instead of being prosecuted, they have either already been transferred or will be.

To add some additional perspective, keep in mind that Obama’s task force decided that nearly two-thirds of the 240 detainees remaining at Guantánamo as of January 2009 could be transferred. The task force made it clear that the detainees approved for transfer were not deemed innocent. Nor were they considered non-threats. Instead, Obama’s task force concluded that the security risks they posed could be adequately mitigated. In many of these cases, Obama’s task force decided to transfer detainees who had been deemed “high” risks by the military and intelligence professionals at JTF-GTMO. That is, Obama’s task force was willing to accept the dangers these detainees’ presented to further the president’s desire to close Guantánamo.

Regardless, even Obama’s task force drew the line at transferring the detainees who have been evaluated by the PRB. But roughly two out of every three of them have won transfer under the PRB process.

Simply put: The Obama administration is transferring many of the detainees the administration itself previously deemed to be the worst of the worst—including at least five members of the Karachi Six and the man long suspected of recruiting some of the 9/11 hijackers.

Al Qaeda’s Forrest Gump?

The 9/11 Commission published its final report in 2004. The lengthy account connects the dots on the key al Qaeda figures who carried out the most devastating terrorist attack in history. On page 165 of the report, readers are introduced to a Mauritanian named Mohamedou Ould Slahi, who is described as a “significant al Qaeda operative.” Slahi was “well known to U.S. and German intelligence, though neither government apparently knew he was operating in Germany in late 1999,” the commission’s report explained. Slahi’s presence in the heart of Europe proved to be crucially important. An appendix to the report makes clear why: Slahi “recruited 9/11 hijackers in Germany.”

Indeed, Slahi facilitated the travel to Afghanistan of the aforementioned Ramzi Binalshibh and at least two of the 9/11 hijackers. (Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker, used the same route as those three, but apparently didn’t receive instructions from Slahi directly.) The four jihadists who traveled to Afghanistan on Slahi’s advice are known to history as the Hamburg Cell. Three of them piloted hijacked planes on 9/11. Al Qaeda probably could not have pulled off the attacks without them.

Slahi was detained in late 2001 and shipped to Guantánamo in 2002. He has been held at the facility ever since. As reflected in the 9/11 Commission report, U.S. intelligence professionals have long considered him to be a key al Qaeda recruiter.

On July 14, 2016, the PRB approved Slahi for transfer, finding that “continued law of war detention of the detainee is no longer necessary to protect against a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.” Essentially, the PRB believed Slahi and his advocates when they said he wanted to begin his life again in peace. The PRB’s unclassified decision cited Slahi’s “candid responses” to its questions, including “recognition of his past activities,” but didn’t provide any further details. The PRB believes there are “clear indications of a change in [Slahi’s] mindset.” He will be transferred.

Slahi’s detention at Guantánamo has long been controversial because he was treated harshly during interrogations. Slahi was one of a few detainees subjected to a special interrogation regime in Cuba. Human rights activists and anti-Guantánamo zealots have not been content to denounce the manner in which Slahi was questioned; they have turned Slahi into something of a living martyr. They claim he was essentially the jihadist Forrest Gump. According to his advocates, even though Slahi admittedly swore allegiance to al Qaeda in the early 1990s and repeatedly assisted various al Qaeda operatives through the years thereafter, he somehow wasn’t really an al Qaeda man. They’ve characterized his meeting with the Hamburg Cell as a jihadist sleepover—innocent and misunderstood. Slahi himself pitches a version of this sanitized story in his widely acclaimed autobiography, Guantánamo Diary, which is a New York Times bestseller.

President Obama’s Guantánamo Review Task Force concluded in 2010 that Slahi should remain in detention under the law of war, because he was too dangerous to transfer. But the administration didn’t fight hard to keep him in detention during the PRB process. The administration’s unclassified summary for the PRB notes: “He facilitated the travel of future 9/11 operational coordinator Ramzi [Binalshibh] .  .  . and two future 9/11 hijackers to Chechnya via Afghanistan in 1999.” This is mostly accurate, but leaves out a key point. According to the 9/11 Commission, Binalshibh and the others wanted to join the jihad in Chechnya. It was Slahi who convinced them to go to Afghanistan for training first.

The leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Slahi references a constellation of other al Qaeda personalities in his life. For instance, Slahi showed up in Montreal in November 1999, just weeks before Ahmed Ressam, who was trained in Afghanistan and relocated to Montreal, began his journey for Los Angeles. Ressam intended to detonate a car bomb packed with explosives at the LAX airport as part of the “Millennium Plot.” Ressam was arrested in mid-December 1999 before he could complete his mission. JTF-GTMO’s analysts concluded that Slahi “had prior knowledge” of Ressam’s plan and had “contact with extremist cells in Canada planning for that attack.” Slahi disputes this, and the government’s PRB summary doesn’t mention the connection.

Court documents show that, in January 1997, Slahi sent a fax to a known al Qaeda operative named Christopher Paul. In it, Slahi asked for Paul’s help in finding “a true Group and Place” for “some Brothers” who wanted to wage jihad. The fax is significant because Slahi sent it years after he and his boosters now claim that he had forsworn al Qaeda. In 2008, Paul pleaded guilty in an American court to conspiring to bomb targets in Europe and the United States.

Slahi also routinely consorted with a relative, a jihadist known as Abu Hafs al Mauritani, who was once one of al Qaeda’s most senior ideologues. The administration noted in its PRB summary that Slahi “established a broad network of terrorist contacts while living in Germany, Canada, and Mauritania.” (Again, Slahi’s advocates portray his terrorist network as a benign Rolodex of acquaintances who just happened to be al Qaeda.) While “most of his extremist contacts have since been detained or killed,” Abu Hafs al Mauritani is “currently residing in Mauritania.” Abu Hafs “could provide him [Slahi] with an avenue to reengage, should he decide to do so,” the administration noted. Abu Hafs is also referenced in the 9/11 Commission report as one of a handful of bin Laden subordinates who may have opposed the suicide hijackings, although he later praised them. Abu Hafs was also suspected of involvement in earlier terrorist plots.

Judging by his Twitter feed (@AbuHafsMuritani) and Facebook page, Abu Hafs remains committed to jihad. In recent tweets, for example, he lamented the death of an al Qaeda military commander in Syria and praised the battlefield gains of al Qaeda front groups fighting Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Mauritania is not exactly committed to keeping men such as Abu Hafs and Slahi under wraps. Files recovered in Osama bin Laden’s compound show that al Qaeda negotiated a truce with the government of Mauritania. In exchange for not committing any terrorist attacks inside the country, al Qaeda was given free rein to proselytize.

Perhaps Slahi won’t rejoin al Qaeda’s ranks once he is let go. But he doesn’t have to in order to damage American interests. The U.S. government doesn’t consider ex-Guantánamo detainees turned anti-American propagandists to be recidivists. But there is no question that they go far beyond any legitimate criticisms of the United States in making up lies about America, their time in Cuba, and their own biographies. Slahi could easily fill this role; his book is already an international sensation. Slahi was undoubtedly subjected to rough, coercive interrogations. The world will continue to hear that part of the story, probably with some exaggerations. And Slahi’s claim of innocence will go largely unchallenged.

The Guantánamo Blame Game

The linchpin of President Obama’s argument for closing Guantánamo is that it is a major recruiting mechanism for terrorists. In December 2010, Obama claimed that Guantánamo is “probably the number one recruitment tool that is used by” al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. “And we see it in the websites that they put up. We see it in the messages that they’re delivering,” Obama added. He made a similar argument at a press conference on December 18, 2015, saying, “We see how Guantánamo has been used to create this mythology that America is at war with Islam.” The Obama administration still has not offered any empirical evidence to substantiate this argument. Anyone even casually familiar with jihadist propaganda knows that Guantánamo is infrequently mentioned and is not part of any significant recruiting theme. Ayman al Zawahiri, the head of al Qaeda, has released five messages since early August. He didn’t mention Guantánamo once.

But Obama clings to this argument as a national security rationale for closing Guantánamo. He has claimed that Guantánamo “was an explicit rationale for the formation of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” or AQAP. Like so many of Obama’s claims about Guantánamo, this is false.

At no point in time did AQAP’s leaders, some of whom were once held at Guantánamo, say that the facility was the reason they launched their organization. If anything, AQAP’s history shows the dangers of releasing known al Qaeda operatives from Guantánamo. One current AQAP leader is Ibrahim al Qosi, who was transferred in 2012. Qosi was a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden before he was captured. JTF-GTMO’s assessment of Qosi described him as “an admitted al Qaeda operative and one of Usama bin Laden’s (UBL) most trusted associates and veteran bodyguard.”

In fact, in May, AQAP’s Inspire magazine directly rebuked Obama on his claim that the facility is a key recruitment tool, arguing that al Qaeda talks about many issues and Guantánamo wasn’t nearly at the top of their list. Inspire cited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as other issues, as far more important from a recruiting standpoint and chastised Obama for being pro-Israeli.

As the Islamic State rose in power, Obama shifted his argument, claiming that it, too, was using Guantánamo as a major recruiting tool. Once again, the administration has provided no evidence this is true. Because the Islamic State rarely mentions Guantánamo in its propaganda, the administration shifted attention to the group’s use of orange jumpsuits in its snuff videos. This is supposedly a subtle, indirect reference to Guantánamo. The Islamic State is not known for its subtlety, of course, and it has never said that it uses orange jumpsuits because of Guantánamo. Orange jumpsuits are ubiquitous, the standard garb in prisons around the globe, including the Iraqi facilities where many of leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s loyalists were once held. The Islamic State puts its victims in other colors, too, and there is no apparent logic behind which color is used. Moreover, the administration says nothing of the fact that Obama’s own policies, including the air campaign in Iraq and Syria, are explicitly mentioned in these gruesome productions.

After the Islamic State struck in Paris last November, killing and wounding hundreds of people, Obama went so far as to cite Guantánamo: “It’s part of how they rationalize and justify their demented, sick perpetration of violence on innocent people. And we can keep the American people safe while shutting down that operation.” Once again, not true. The Islamic State did not use Guantánamo to justify the Paris massacres. Nor has the administration pointed to a single attack—out of thousands carried out by the Islamic State around the globe—that was rationalized or justified on the basis of Guantánamo.

The fifteenth issue of the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine, released earlier this year, carried an article aptly titled “Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You.” For starters: “We hate you, first and foremost, because you are disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah—whether you realize it or not—by making partners for Him in worship, you blaspheme against Him, claiming that He has a son, you fabricate lies against His prophets and messengers, and you indulge in all manner of devilish practices.” Dabiq‘s editors listed many other reasons, including our “secularism and nationalism,” our “perverted liberal values,” and our “Christianity and atheism.” They did include a generic mention of the imprisonment and “torture” of Muslims around the world, but only after listing Obama’s drones and many other reasons, and even then there was nothing—not a word—about Guantánamo.

208 Recidivists—and Counting

“The existence of Guantánamo,” the president claimed in 2009, “likely created more terrorists around the world than it ever detained.” But the president has not shown, and cannot demonstrate, that Guantánamo has “created” as many as the 208 recidivists who have now been freed. Just this past week, the office of the director of national intelligence released its latest estimate of the number of “confirmed” and “suspected” recidivists. Most of them, 188, were transferred during the Bush years. But the growth in the number of recidivists over time demonstrates the flaws in Obama’s thinking. In January 2009, the month Obama was inaugurated, the Pentagon counted 61 recidivists. Today, that figure is nearly three and a half times larger.

Intelligence officials tell The Weekly Standard that those estimates are undoubtedly low. And there is little question that those numbers will grow—though we likely won’t know the details until after Obama leaves office. Sources familiar with the negotiations on Guantánamo transfers tell TWS that when Obama administration officials have insisted on a timeframe for host-country tracking of detainees, the requirements for monitoring soften considerably after January 2017.

In at least one case, the transfer of six detainees to Uruguay in December 2014, five of them “high-risk” detainees, the recipient country had announced in advance that it would not track the detainees. President José Mujica accused the United States of “kidnapping” the jihadists and abusing their human rights and, in a May 2014 interview with the Washington Post, declared that he would not monitor the high-risk detainees after the transfer. “We are not the jailers of the United States government or the United States Senate. We are offering solidarity on a question that we see as one of human rights.”

In other cases, just as Obama administration officials have misled the American people about the threats presented by Guantánamo detainees, they’ve also misled the diplomatic partners who have agreed to receive them.

On January 6, 2016, Mahmmoud Omar Mohammed Bin Atef and Khalid Mohammed Salih al Dhuby were transferred to Ghana. U.S. intelligence determined that both men were committed jihadists. Bin Atef, in particular, was assessed as a “high risk” detainee “likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.” According to JTF-GTMO, he was “a fighter in Usama bin Laden’s former 55th Arab Brigade and is an admitted member of the Taliban” who had trained in al Qaeda’s notorious Farouq camp. In addition, Bin Atef had “participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces.” Unlike many detainees who renounce jihadism—or pretend to—Bin Atef “continues to demonstrate his support of UBL and extremism” and “has threatened to kill US citizens on multiple occasions including a specific threat to cut their throats upon release.”

When the transfer to Ghana was announced, however, a statement from the government in Accra claimed the men “were detained in Guantánamo but have been cleared of any involvement in terrorist activities and are being released.”

It’s almost as if the U.S. intelligence assessment and the statement from Ghana are describing different people. How does this happen? Jojo Bruce-Quansah, the information minister at Ghana’s embassy in Washington, D.C., told us at the time that the U.S. government provided assurances that Bin Atef was “never involved in terrorism” and presented little risk. “If that assurance was not there,” he said, there is “no way” his government “would have taken the detainees.” A spokesman for the National Security Council declined to comment on whether the U.S. government provided Ghana with the full intelligence assessment of Bin Atef.

It’s not clear today whether the Obama administration will succeed in closing Guantánamo. What is clear is that, in attempting to do so, the president is willing to free dangerous terrorists and mislead the American people and our diplomatic partners.

Did Jeh Johnson Pay $500,000 to Head DHS?

Was it one of the Islamic organizations supportive of Barack Obama that funneled the money for Jeh Johnson to pass on to the DNC that allowed Jeh Johnson to assume his Secretary role at DHS? There is no proof, but the question needs to be asked. Mr. Johnson was invited and accepted a role in a recent ISNA Convention directly after the DNC convention.

Click here for the video. Also mentioned in this event were Jesse Jackson and Senator Dick Durbin. This is not the first rodeo for Jeh Johnson when it comes to solidarity with Islamic groups as noted here, where he spoke at the All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) Center. As a reminder, the ADAMS Center:

MIM: Mohammed Magid’s failure to condemn the attacks on America could be because his boss and benefactor, ADAMS chairman Ahmed Tontonji is:

“… an Iraqi-born citizen of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and a key target of Operation Green Quest. Totonji was also named as a defendant in a $1 trillion lawsuit filed by more than 600 relatives of people who died in the 9/11 attacks
He acted as a co-founder and officer of the Saudi-founded/Saudi-funded (and now defunct) SAAR Trust. Additionally, he served as Vice President of the Safa Group and the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT).Officials have linked the non-profit IIIT to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda (…)

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CJR: The Executives of the ADAMS Center are very closely aligned with CAIR National.  CAIR Executives often flip flop and join one another’s terrorist supporting organization.  The ADAMS Center and CAIR National have previously been investigated and/or raided by the FBI.  Why would the FBI recruit from Islamic terror organzations for sensitive positions, such as FBI Special Agents and FBI Analysts.  The positions require a Top Secret clearance.

The answer is there is no good reason to recruit from terrorist organizations and supporters of terrorist.  FBI Special Agent Amylynn Errera, Washington Field Office sent the email to Farooq Syed, ADAMS Center.  Farooq then forwarded the email about FBI positions to members of their internal group of supporters.  I was provided a copy by a source.
The FBI sends these job opening to Islamic terror supporters, yet I would make a multi-million dollar bet that no one from the Tea Party, ACT For America, and dozens of other conservative groups are provided an up front notice of sensitive job positions in the FBI.  There are good people within the FBI, but the majority are not properly trained in regards to Islamic terrorism issues.  Then there are some who knowingly have relationships with organizations that pose a threat to our national security.
The ADAMS Center has previously been raided for their support of terrorism (RAID ON ADAMS CENTER).  I encourage readers to contact Special Agent Amylynn Errera and ask her why Islamic terror supporters (per the FBI’s own allegations) are being recruited for TOP SECRET positions within the FBI.  Her contact information is at the bottom of the email she sent to the ADAMS Center. More here.

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In terms of the Counterjihad movement, the corruption of the American administration creates several problems.  If high posts are for sale, they might not be occupied by the best people.  Worse, though, they might be bought by the wrong people.  The sale of high offices allows a means of influence on our government that is not accountable to the people, especially given that it was handled secretly — and by a political party, not a formal branch of government.

For example, consider the case of Department of Homeland Security czar Jeh Johnson.  Johnson is a career public servant.  Yet he was able to come up with over half a million dollars in cash to donate to the DNC — and then “feigned disbelief” when he got the job of leading the Homeland Security agency.

How has he used this post?  Oddly enough, we were just talking about that the other day.  Johnson decided to appear at the conference of a known Muslim Brotherhood front organization, while “fully aware” of its terrorist ties.

As CJ first reported Sunday, ISNA had been considered off-limits to such high-level appearances since the U.S. Justice Department in 2008 designated the group as an unindicted co-conspirator in the largest terrorist financing case in U.S. history and a front organization for the radical Egypt-based Muslim Brotherhood.

Johnson’s spokesman Neema Hakim told CJ that, despite ISNA’s terrorist ties and radical background, Johnson agreed to appear at the event because he considered it an “opportunity” to conduct outreach with the American Muslim community.

“DHS and the secretary are fully aware of past evidence and allegations concerning ISNA and carefully considered them before accepting ISNA’s invitation,” Hakim said.

While there, he shared a stage with a Holocaust denier and a known leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Nor was this the only occasion on which he has made moves amenable to the Brotherhood. In June, he testified before Congress admitting that his agency had scrubbed references to Islam from counter-terror materials that they produced.  He claimed to have “no idea”how that happened.

Earlier in June, Johnson downplayed the role of a radical Islamist community in the Pulse nightclub shootings.  He said that shooter Omar Mateen “was ‘self-radicalized’ without any religious, ideological or operational support from friends, family or others in the Muslim community.” Yet it turned out that Mateen had ties to a known radical imam, one who had served as a bodyguard for the “blind sheikh” who carried out the first World Trade Center attacks.  Perhaps it was worth considering that Mateen might have targeted the gay nightclub in part because of the harsh language his mentor used towards “f****ts” in America, and Islam’s duty towards them?

To be clear, we at CounterJihad have no idea where Jeh Johnson got all that money.  We have no evidence establishing a causal relationship between the inexplicably large donation from a career public servant and his subsequent support of Brotherhood outlets, or the Brotherhood’s agenda.  We cannot even be certain that the documents establishing the donation are themselves fully genuine.  We have to be suspicious of them at first face, given that they passed through the hands of pro-Russian actors. More details here.

Unexplored Territory with Russia for the White House

U.S. intelligence agencies are expanding spying operations against Russia on a greater scale than at any time since the end of the Cold War, U.S. officials said.

The mobilization involves clandestine CIA operatives, National Security Agency cyberespionage capabilities, satellite systems and other intelligence assets, officials said, describing a shift in resources across spy services that had previously diverted attention from Russia to focus on terrorist threats and U.S. war zones.

U.S. officials said the moves are part of an effort to rebuild U.S. intelligence capabilities that had continued to atrophy even as Russia sought to reassert itself as a global power. Over the past two years, officials said, the United States was caught flat-footed by Moscow’s aggression, including its annexation of Crimea, its intervention in the war in Syria and its suspected role in hacking operations against the United States and Europe.

U.S. spy agencies “are playing catch-up big time” with Russia, a senior U.S. intelligence official said. Terrorism remains the top concern for American intelligence services, the official said, but recent directives from the White House and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) have moved Russia up the list of intelligence priorities for the first time since the Soviet Union’s collapse. More from the Washington Post.

Centcom commander: ‘Trust deficit’ with Russia

(CNN) Strains in the US-Russia relationship were on full display Wednesday as officials across Washington aired their concerns about Moscow — a partner on some fronts, a problem on others, perhaps best described as a US “frenemy.”

White House officials, cabinet members and military officials raised questions about how committed Russia is to a nascent Syrian ceasefire agreement, pointed to its invasion of Ukraine as a violation of the international order, spoke about their distrust of Moscow and flatly labeled it a “bad actor” in cyberspace.
“The Russia relationship is extraordinarily complex,” said Vice Adm. Frank Pandolfe, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“It’s a country that counts and we are working to fashion a relationship that works with them,” Pandolfe said at a security conference arranged by the Institute for the Study of War. He cited areas where Washington and Moscow have cooperated — on the Iran nuclear deal, on sanctioning North Korea and most recently on the ceasefire arrangement in Syria.
“And yet,” Pandolfe said, “there’s another side to this relationship and that’s the transgressions.”
Lisa Monaco, President Barack Obama’s assistant for Homeland Security, on Wednesday addressed one of the most recent suspected transgressions — the apparent role of Russian hackers in a breach of Democratic National Committee emails.
“Look, we know Russia is a bad actor in cyber space, just as China has been, just as Iran has been,” Monaco said in remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She said that “folks will have to stay tuned” as to whether Russia would be “named and shamed” for the attacks.
She added a warning: “Nobody should think that there is a free pass when you are conducting malicious cyber activity, just like they shouldn’t think there is a free pass on terrorists.”
Defense Secretary Ash Carter, who has repeatedly expressed skepticism about Russia’s intent in Syria, offered a measured response when asked about the ceasefire plan Wednesday in Austin, Texas.
“We’ve got a ways to go to see whether it will be implemented,” Carter said, “but if it is, it will mean that the suffering of the Syrian people is eased. It will mean that Russia gets on the right side of things in Syria, not on the wrong side, and that’s good news.”
Some of the military’s highest-ranking officers, speaking at the Institute of War’s security conference, were less circumspect about Russia’s role in the ceasefire, a deal reached Friday between Secretary of State John Kerry and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Under that agreement, if calm holds until Monday, the US and Russia would establish a joint operations center to target ISIS fighters in Syria. It would require the US military to share information with Russian forces and has drawn some resistance from the Pentagon.
Asked about the agreement, Pandolfe responded, “This isn’t an agreement of trust. There is a deficit of trust. And I think we all understand why that is.”
The top US military commander in the Middle East, Gen. Joseph Votel, described himself as “very realistic” about the prospects of US-Russian cooperation and also pointed to “a trust deficit.”
“It is not clear to us what their objectives are,” said Votel, commander of US Central Command, who praised the agreement for providing an opportunity to reduce the violence in Syria. The Russians “say one thing and then they don’t necessarily follow up on that.”
The Centcom commander explained that the arrangement was taking the military into relatively new territory.
“We don’t have lot of experience with this,” he said, adding that they would have to start very deliberately, establishing a process and “ways of passing information back and forth.”
It remains to be seen whether the cooperative effort will work, he said. “I trust that our political leadership will do the right things and make the right calls about whether we should continue to do this or whether we should step away,” Votel said.

Towns of Refugees in America/Jordan and the Dollars

white-house-refugees

 

 

 

 

This Syrian conflict was in the hands of several governments to solve before this historic humanitarian crisis. Now, the Obama administration has turned the destiny of a country and millions over to Russia and Iran. There is no relief or end in sight. There is a truce/cease fire underway but no combatant from any side is moving while the humanitarian wake of destruction and refugee crisis is global. Not a single solution has been drafted by all world leaders to stop the death and hostilities.

Related reading: The Refugee Haven South of Seattle

Nearly 40% of Tukwila’s population is foreign-born. Go here for a sample U.S. town photo essay.

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John Kerry and USAID to Syria:

U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry announces nearly $439 million in new U.S. Government (USG) humanitarian funding for Syria and neighboring countries.

United Nations (UN) convoys reach all 18 UN-designated besieged areas in Syria with emergency relief assistance.

Syrian Democratic Forces offensive to retake Menbij town in Aleppo Governorate from ISIL displaces an estimated 47,000 people.

On July 12, Secretary Kerry announced nearly $439 million in new humanitarian funding for Syria and neighboring countries, bringing total USG humanitarian assistance to date to nearly $5.6 billion. The announcement included nearly $255.6 million from State/PRM and $77.6 million from USAID/FFP to support humanitarian efforts in Syria and neighboring countries, as well as more than $105.3 million from USAID/OFDA for humanitarian assistance activities inside Syria.

Numbers At A Glance

13.5 million

People in Need of Humanitarian Assistance in Syria

6.5 million

IDPs in Syria

4 million

People Reached per Month by USG Assistance in Syria

4.8 million

Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries

2.7 million

Syrian Refugees in Turkey

1 million

Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

657,433

Syrian Refugees in Jordan

249,395

Syrian Refugees in Iraq

Humanitarian Funding

To Syria Humanitarian Response
FY 2012 – FY 2015

USAID/OFDA $976,897,915
USAID/FFP $1,860,224,887
State/PRM $2,731,442,290
TOTAL $5,568,565,092

Advocacy from the International Syria Support Group’s (ISSG) Humanitarian Assistance Task Force has helped the UN and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) access a number of areas unreached by humanitarian agencies in years, including the besieged towns of Darayya and Douma in Rif Damascus Governorate.

As of July 5, UN interagency convoys and humanitarian airdrops had delivered emergency assistance, including emergency food rations and monthly food parcels, nutrition supplements, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) items, health and medical supplies, and other relief commodities, to more than 941,800 people in hard-to-reach, besieged, and other priority cross-line locations throughout Syria.

USAID/FFP partner the UN World Food Program (WFP) conducted 65 high-altitude humanitarian airdrops to the besieged city of Dayr az Zawr between April 10 and July 7, delivering more than 1,157 metric tons (MT) of food assistance and nearly 37 MT of nutrition supplements for approximately 110,000 people. On July 8, WFP initiated airlifts from Damascus to the city of Qamishli in Al Hasakah Governorate, marking the first of 25 planned rotations to deliver emergency food commodities to populations in the city.

Northern Syria

Persistent armed conflict, compounded by Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) and Government of the Russian Federation (GoRF) aerial attacks, continues to negatively affect millions of Syrians, particularly in Aleppo Governorate. Despite the SARG announcement of a 72-hour ceasefire on July 6 for the Eid al-Fitr holiday, SARG forces advanced on the strategically located Mallah Farms in Aleppo on July 7. The SARG also increased airstrikes and shelling on Castello road—the primary supply route into opposition-held eastern Aleppo city—and the adjacent Aleppo towns of Anadan, Haritan, Kafr Hamra and Khan al-Assal, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). SARG forces had nearly encircled eastern Aleppo city as of July 8, effectively entrapping more than 300,000 civilians.

Military advances by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and increased aerial bombardment on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-held town of Menbij in Aleppo had prompted the displacement of at least 47,000 civilians from the city and surrounding villages as of July 8, according to OCHA. An estimated 65,000 others remain in the town, which was nearly encircled by the SDF as of early July. The majority of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have fled toward northern towns in Menbij sub-district, Abu Qalqal sub-district to the south of Menbij, the Jarablous border crossing with Turkey, and to opposition-controlled areas of Aleppo. OCHA estimates that an additional 216,000 people could be at risk of displacement in Menbij District if SDF make additional territorial gains. Relief organizations have expressed concern regarding their ability to provide emergency humanitarian services to the affected population due to the limited reach of the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in ISIL-controlled areas in Menbij and other areas of Aleppo.

On May 27, ISIL initiated a rapid offensive in northern Aleppo’s Azaz corridor, capturing the strategic towns of Jibreen and Kafr Kalbein and causing significant displacement of civilian populations. Although armed opposition groups had recaptured Kafr Kalbein and Jibreen from ISIL forces as of June 8, the violence had prompted approximately 16,150 people to flee within and from Azaz sub-district and 6,000 people to flee to Aleppo’s Afrin District as of early June. The UN estimates that 306,000 people reside in the Azaz corridor, including at least 163,000 IDPs.

While the conflict in Azaz forced humanitarian organizations to limit staff movement and temporarily halt some emergency response activities in the area, WFP successfully distributed pre-positioned food rations for more than 30,000 IDPs, and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided health services in IDP transit areas.

On June 12, SARG–GoRF airstrikes hit a local market and the only remaining bakery in the city of Idlib, Idlib Governorate, killing at least 20 civilians, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Between May 30 and June 9, an escalation of SARG–GoRF airstrikes in and near the city of Idlib displaced more than 15,000 people to neighboring towns and villages, OCHA reported. The increase in airstrikes around the city of approximately 250,000 civilians resulted in the temporary suspension of education activities and the nationwide routine immunization campaign, as well as the closure of local markets in Idlib. Humanitarian organizations operating in the Idlib sub-districts of Bennish, Idlib, and Maar Tamsrin provided new arrivals with ready-to-eat food rations, safe drinking water, and other emergency relief items, according to OCHA.

As of mid-June, SARG military operations in the southern countryside of Ar Raqqa Governorate had displaced an estimated 9,000 people from several villages south of Ath-Thawrah town to Western Salhabyeih and Kderian towns in the eastern countryside of Ar Raqqa, according to the UN.

Southern and Western Syria

On July 3, a barrage of bombs hit the Khan Eshieh Palestinian refugee camp in Rif Damascus, destroying a childfriendly space that provided education, psychosocial support, recreation, and hygiene awareness activities for up to 1,000 children in the camp, according to the UN. The airstrikes also killed three people and wounded five others in the area, according to international media. USG partners UNICEF and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which provide humanitarian assistance to the camp’s residents, including 9,000 Palestinian refugees, issued a press statement condemning the escalation of violence and called on the parties to the conflict to protect the lives of Palestinian refugees and all civilians. The ongoing insecurity has severely constrained humanitarian access to Khan Eshieh since 2013.

The UN reports that clashes between the ISIL-affiliated Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and opposition groups had displaced up to 12,000 people in western Dar’a Governorate between February and early June. Ash Shajara District in Yarmouk Valley is the most-affected district in Dar’a, where relief agencies continue to provide humanitarian assistance despite insecurity and related access challenges.

SARG forces have continued to bombard the besieged town of Darayya in Rif Damascus with aerial attacks and ground assaults since the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the town on June 9. From June 8 to 16, SARG forces dropped an estimated 300 barrel bombs on the town, according to local media.

On May 23, ISIL carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Latakia and Tartus governorates, killing between 80 and 150 people and wounding at least 100 others, according to international media reports. The SARG controls the majority of Latakia and Tartus, which host a large Alawite population, as well as Russian military bases. Nearly 378,000 people are in need of humanitarian assistance and approximately 23,700 people live in collective centers in Latakia, according to the UN’s 2016 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO). In Tartus, the HNO identified more than 258,500 people in need of humanitarian assistance. Relief organizations maintain sufficient resources to respond to these caseloads in both governorates.

The total population living in both UN-designated hard-to-reach and besieged locations in Syria rose to nearly 5.5 million people as of June 23—an increase of approximately 900,000 people since January 2016. The UN added the neighborhood of Al Wa’er in the city of Homs, Homs Governorate, to the list of besieged areas on May 27, increasing the number of people living under siege from 408,200 people to an estimated 592,700 people. In late June, the UN revised the number of people living under siege from 592,700 people in 19 locations to 590,200 people in 18 locations due to a re-evaluation of population estimates in Rif Damascus’ Kafr Batna sub-district and the removal of the Rif Damascus town of Zabadin from the list of besieged areas. The UN also revised the total number of people living in hard-to-reach areas, including besieged locations, from fewer than 4.1 million people to nearly 4.9 million people due to the designation of Aleppo’s Kobane town and new locations in northern Ar Raqqa and northern and central Al Hasakah governorates as hard-to-reach, as well as re-evaluations of population estimates in other locations.

On June 9, the UN and SARC delivered emergency food aid to the besieged town of Darayya for the first time since the town came under SARG siege in 2012. The nine-truck interagency convoy delivered food and wheat flour for approximately 2,400 people, roughly half the estimated population, as well as other emergency relief supplies for 4,000 people, according to the UN.

On June 10, a UN interagency convoy delivered emergency food, wheat flour, and nutrition supplies to approximately 24,000 people in the besieged city of Douma in Rif Damascus’ Eastern Ghouta region for the first time since May 2014. The convoy also delivered health, hygiene, and other emergency relief items for approximately 40,000 people.

On June 23 and 27, the UN completed two convoys to the hard-to-reach town of Sheikh Maqsoud in Aleppo, delivering nutrition, health, and hygiene items, as well as other humanitarian supplies, for approximately 22,500 people. In addition, a 30-truck interagency convoy delivered food and nutrition items for 50,000 people in Afrin District on June 16.

With recent interagency convoys to Darayya and Douma, at least one UN interagency convoy had reached all 18 besieged locations between February and June, with some locations reached multiple times. Yarmouk neighborhood in Damascus is the only besieged location that UN interagency convoys have not reached directly; however, UNRWA has assisted 19,000 people in Yarmouk indirectly through 30 convoys carrying emergency relief items to the nearby neighborhoods of Babilla, Beit Sahm, and Yalda since January 2016; however, the last such convoy occurred on May 25.

Persistent advocacy from the ISSG’s Humanitarian Assistance Task Force since February has enabled the UN, in collaboration with the SARC and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to conduct 94 humanitarian assistance convoys and 65 airdrops in Syria, delivering relief assistance to an estimated 941,825 people as of July 5. Accessed populations include 354,150 people in 18 besieged areas, 537,675 people in more than 14 hard-to-reach locations, and 50,000 people in priority cross-line areas. Although insufficient, the number of people reached in hard- to-reach and besieged locations to date in 2016 represents a significant increase as compared to 2015 when the UN delivered humanitarian aid to only 30,000 people in two besieged areas. The improvement can be attributed to increased cross-line deliveries by both UN agencies and NGOs, including USG partners.

The UN and greater international humanitarian community continue to request immediate access to provide life-saving assistance to approximately 62,000 people besieged in Idlib’s Al Fu’ah and Kafrayya towns and the Rif Damascus towns of Madaya and Al Zabadani to prevent a further deterioration of the food security situation in the four towns.

Across Syria, WFP provides food to more than 4 million people every month through road transport, cross-line convoys, high-altitude airdrops, and cross-border food deliveries. Between April 10 and July 7, WFP conducted 65 high-altitude humanitarian airdrops to the besieged city of Dayr az Zawr, delivering more than 1,157 MT of food assistance, including nearly 37 MT of nutrition supplements, for approximately 110,000 people. To date, the assistance delivered via airdrops has provided every registered household with a complete monthly food parcel, sufficient to support a family of five for one month.

Active fighting in eastern Aleppo and Ar Raqqa and the closure of border crossings between Al Hasakah Governorate and Iraq and Turkey between January and mid-June have disrupted internal supply routes to Al Hasakah, contributing to a deteriorated food security and humanitarian situation in the governorate. On July 8, WFP airlifted 40 MT of emergency food commodities, including bulgur, pulses, salt, sugar, and vegetable oil, to the town of Qamishli in Al Hasakah Governorate. The delivery also included Plumpy’doz, a specialized nutrition product used to treat and prevent child malnutrition. WFP is prioritizing more than 75,000 people to receive food assistance, primarily displaced families living in shelters and unfinished buildings, as well as female-headed households. The UN estimates that 275,000 people in Al Hasakah are in need of humanitarian assistance but have been cut off from food and other basic supplies for more than six months.

On June 1, a seven-truck SARC convoy delivered limited food and nutrition supplements for 2,500 people in Al Wa’er, where vulnerable populations are in urgent need of emergency relief assistance, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Needs and Population Monitoring initiative. Al Wa’er had not received large-scale humanitarian assistance from the UN since March 2016 due to SARG denials of UN requests to deliver aid. The population lacks access to outside markets, and a general absence of basic supplies and food commodities has led to a deteriorated food security situation. Local health facilities lack medical supplies, two area hospitals are operating at limited capacity with intermittent access to electricity, and IOM reported a number of cases of malnutrition among children, as well as a high frequency of respiratory infections. SARG forces have severely restricted civilian movement and humanitarian access to Al Wa’er since 2013.

As of June, the national average price of a standard food basket had increased by 9 percent as compared to April, according to a WFP mobile vulnerability analysis and mapping survey, primarily due to the start of Ramadan and intensified conflict throughout the country. In May, intensified clashes and airstrikes severely disrupted supply routes to Aleppo, Al Hasakah, Hamah, and Idlib governorates, resulting in higher prices and a limited availability of many staple foods. The price of standard food baskets in Aleppo, Al Hasakah, and Idlib had increased by 13.8 percent, 32.6 percent, and 36 percent, respectively. Standard food baskets in Dayr az Zawr Governorate continue to register the highest prices at 112,384 Syrian pounds, or approximately $239.

In the besieged Rif Damascus towns of Arbin, Darayya, Madaya, Saqba, and Al Zabadani, as well as Dayr az Zawr, poor households lack adequate access to safe drinking water, and many local bakeries remain non-operational, according to WFP. At the governorate level, households from Aleppo, Hamah, and Rif Damascus exhibited the highest incidence of inadequate food consumption in March. In addition, the survey results indicate that food consumption frequency and dietary diversity is worse among households displaced within the past year.

Through cross-border activities from Turkey, members of the Food Security and Livelihood (FSL) Cluster—the coordinating body for humanitarian food security and livelihood activities, comprising UN agencies, NGOs, and other stakeholders—reached more than 1 million people in northern Syria with emergency food assistance and 1 million people with bread and flour deliveries in May. Nearly 57,000 people in northern Syria also benefited from food vouchers, cash-for-work programs, and other livelihoods activities implemented by the FSL Cluster.

As of June 2016, Physicians for Human Rights had documented 365 attacks on nearly 260 health facilities in Syria, as well as the deaths of 738 medical workers since the beginning of the conflict in 2011. Of these attacks, SARG forces were responsible for at least 289, resulting in an estimated 667 medical personnel killed.

Since May 1, the UN and its partners have received increasing reports of attacks on health care facilities, including the destruction of a hospital in Tartus on May 23, as well as attacks on three medical facilities in eastern Aleppo city between June 8 and 14; two of the health facilities in eastern Aleppo collectively provide nearly 5,000 consultations per month. In addition, SARG–GoRF airstrikes on a Médecins Sans Frontières-supported hospital killed 15 people and wounded 20 others on June 13.

Members of the Health Cluster provided more than 5,800 people in Syria with medical referrals and more than 46,400 people with outreach consultations in May, according to OCHA. In addition, Health Cluster members supported nearly 26,900 minor and major surgeries and provided medical training to more than 640 doctors, nurses, and midwives in northern Syria.

With the support of local committees, the Health Cluster initiated repair operations in May for health facilities damaged or rendered inoperable during April, according to OCHA. Relief agencies rehabilitated the first floor of Al Quds hospital, allowing for the resumption of emergency healthcare services for civilians in eastern Aleppo city. Two other damaged health facilities in Aleppo also resumed medical activities.

With support from UNICEF, an international NGO completed an underground wastewater network in Jordan’s Za’atri refugee camp in mid-June. The completed project, which began in November 2015, provides all 80,000 camp residents with access to private toilets and septic tanks, reducing health hazards and improving WASH conditions in the camp. In addition, the NGO conducted hygiene promotion and community mobilization activities to raise hygiene awareness among community members.

The Bab Al-Nayrab water station in Aleppo, damaged by airstrikes on April 29, resumed water pumping operations in early May. As of May 22, the station was pumping water to an estimated 20,000 households in the western Aleppo city and some neighborhoods in eastern Aleppo city, according to the UN.

Approximately 3.7 million Syrian children have been born since the conflict began in 2011, including more than 151,000 children born as refugees, according to a UNICEF report. The report estimates that the conflict is affecting 8.4 million children—more than 80 percent of all Syrian children—either within the country or as refugees. In addition to severe protection issues, UNICEF cites education as a primary concern for conflict-affected children, noting that more than 2.8 million Syrian children are not attending school.

Up to 250,000 children residing in besieged areas have inadequate access to education, food, health services, or safe drinking water, according to a recent report from Save the Children. The report notes that conditions have worsened in recent months and that children are dying due to a lack of food and medicine—which, in some cases, is stored in warehouses directly outside the besieged area. According to the report, more than 20 percent of aerial bombardments in 2015 occurred in areas now categorized by the UN as besieged and more barrel bombs are dropped in besieged areas than other locations. Save the Children has urged an immediate end to siege tactics by parties to the conflict and called for sustained humanitarian access, free movement of civilians, and medical evacuations. The NGO also called for the de-linking of access negotiations from cessation of hostilities negotiations.

In January and February, WoS Protection Sector members reached nearly 261,000 people, including nearly 90,000 people via cross-border operations from Turkey, with prevention, mitigation, response, and capacity building programs—such as case management services, frontline responder training, and psychosocial support. Gender-based violence interventions have reached 38,600 people, already exceeding the figure targeted in the 2016 HRP. The WoS Protection Sector aims to provide protection support to 7.2 million people within Syria in 2016.

Iraq

In mid-June, Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government authorities reopened the Fishkhabour border crossing between Iraq and Syria’s Al Hasakah Governorate to cross-border humanitarian and commercial traffic and to individuals in need of medical assistance seeking to enter Iraq, according to USG partners.

Jordan

The number of Syrian refugees stranded on the Jordanian side of the Syria–Jordan border, in an area known as the berm, has tripling in recent months to more than 80,000 people, including an estimated 70,000 people at the Rukban border crossing point and at least 10,000 people at the Hadalat border crossing point, as of late June. The population at the berm includes large numbers of extremely vulnerable people—more than half are children.

Moreover, the security situation at the berm has deteriorated considerably. On June 21, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated at a Jordanian military outpost near Rukban, resulting in the death of seven Jordanian military personnel. The attack prompted the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to declare the entire Jordan–Syria border a closed military zone and to close the border temporarily, hindering relief activities.

Lebanon

On June 27, suicide bombers attacked the predominantly Christian village of Al Qaa in Lebanon, near the Lebanon– Syria border, killing five people and wounding more than 12 others, according to international media reports. Al Qaa is also located near the Mashareeh Al-Qaa area, which hosts informal Syrian refugee settlements. Although anti-refugee rhetoric has escalated and local authorities have imposed curfews for refugees, USG sources report that relief agencies have not received any reports of violence against Syrian refugees.

On March 15, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) announced an additional €445 million—nearly $500 million—in humanitarian assistance for individuals affected by conflict in Syria. The funding will support life-saving projects, including emergency food assistance and health care services, implemented by response organizations in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Syria. Since 2012, ECHO has contributed more than $2 billion toward response activities benefitting individuals affected by the conflict.

Following the commencement of peaceful demonstrations against the SARG in March 2011, President Bashar alAsad pledged legislative reforms. However, reforms failed to materialize, and SARG forces loyal to President alAsad began responding to demonstrations with violence, leading armed opposition groups to retaliate.

At a November 2012 meeting in Doha, Qatar, Syrian opposition factions formed an umbrella organization—the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, also known as the Syrian Coalition (SC). The USG recognized the coalition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people on December 11, 2012. On March 19, 2013, the SC established the Syrian Interim Government, which opposes the SARG and is based in decentralized locations throughout opposition-held areas of Syria.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 2139 on February 22, 2014, pressing the SARG and other armed actors to allow unfettered humanitarian access for relief aid workers in Syria. The resolution identified priority areas for emergency relief aid, and the UN is releasing monthly reports tracking progress on implementing the resolution’s objectives and access gains, as well as persistent access impediments.

On July 14, 2014, the UNSC unanimously adopted UNSCR 2165, authorizing UN cross-border and cross-line delivery of humanitarian aid to conflict-affected populations without SARG approval. The resolution permits the UN’s use of four border crossings from Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq—in addition to other crossings already in use by UN agencies—for delivery of humanitarian assistance into Syria. The resolution also establishes a monitoring mechanism under the authority of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and with the consent of the neighboring countries to ensure that deliveries across these border points contain only humanitarian items. In December 2015, the UNSC unanimously adopted UNSCR 2258, which renewed the mandate of UNSCR 2191 and will remain active until January 10, 2017.

UNRWA has registered approximately 560,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, with more than 80 percent living in and around Damascus. Intense fighting in and around Palestinian camps and neighborhoods has significantly affected Palestinian refugees in Syria. UNRWA estimates that approximately 60 percent of Palestinian refugees are displaced within Syria, with a further 110,000 Palestinian refugees are displaced to neighboring countries. Syria also hosts an estimated 24,000 Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers, primarily in the greater Damascus area, as well as more than 3,200 refugee persons of concern from other countries.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ODNI Report on Released Gitmo Detainees

In an attempt to prevent the closure, Congress is now voting on a bill preventing further transfers of inmates until a new defense policy bill is passed.

Currently, 61 detainees still remain at the detention camp, following the release of 15 in August, the largest single transfer under the Obama administration. Additionally, 16 others have been cleared for transfer.

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Wednesday, September 14, 2016

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states:

(a) “The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of,

(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and

(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

(b) Updates – Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.”

Section 307 (a) (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense.

**

Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2016
Total Pre-22 January 2009a Post-22 January 2009
Detainees Transferred 693* 532 161
Confirmed of Reengaging 122 of 693 (17.6%) 113 of 532 (21.2%) 9 of 161 (5.6%)**
Dead – 30 of 122 29 1
In custody – 25 of 122 25 0
Not in custody – 67 of 122 59 8
Suspected of Reengagingb 86 of 693 (12.4%) 75 of 532 (14.1%)** 11 of 161 (6.8%)**
Dead – 3 of 86c 2 1
In custody – 18 of 86 18 0
Not in custody – 65 of 86 55 10

a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

b The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses five additional detainees are suspected of reengagement.

c Due to a coding error this number was previously reported as 4.

*An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado.

**Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order.

Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism.

Based on trends identified during the past eleven years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations could pose problems. While enforcement of transfer conditions may deter reengagement by many former detainees and delay reengagement by others, some detainees who are determined to reengage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit probably at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions.

Section 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged.

Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements.

Definition of “Confirmed” Activities. A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.

Definition of “Suspected” Activities. Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.