Category Archives: Military

Mosul Iraq now (Satellite) and in the Future

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These satellite photos reveal the scorched Earth that ISIS is leaving behind in the battle for Mosul

BusinessInsider: As a crucial battle continues over the control of Mosul, Iraq — one of the last Islamic State (ISIS) strongholds in the country — militants are taking a play from the “scorched Earth” playbook.

Photos released Wednesday by UrtheCast reveal the extent of oil fires and infrastructure damage inflicted by ISIS followers.

The satellite imaging company used its Deimos-2 spacecraft to take the image below, though it also operates an ultra-high-definition video camera on a Russian module of the space station.

Below is an infrared view of the Mosul District taken by UrtheCast on October 18:

D2_20161018_Oil_Fires_Full_Med UrtheCast

A zoomed-in view shows how militants are lighting the large fires inside populated areas and destroying nearby buildings:

mosul oil fires close up urthecast UrtheCast

This is how UrtheCast described the scence in an emailed press release:

“The smoke covers part of the city Qayyarah, about 35 miles south of the city of Mosul, along the West Bank of the Tigris River. Mosul is the last stronghold of the extremist group ISIS in Iraq — and it’s here in Qayyarah where people flee to from Mosul, and where military forces are staged.”

For reference, this is where the fires in this image are happening, and where the main city of Mosul is located:

mosul oil fires urthecast Google Maps/Business Insider

According to a New York Times dispatch from Mosul by Bryan Denton and Michael R. Gordon, the intention of the oil fires is to provide a screen:

“Thick funnels of black smoke began rising from the towns — a past tactic used by the Islamic State militants, setting oil barrels aflame to try to screen them from American airstrikes. The strikes came anyway, sending shock waves through the haze.”

UrtheCast’s new photos also show how ISIS militants are destroying infrastructure in the area.

The view below shows a bridge that was recently demolished to slow the advance of Kurdish and Iraqi security forces:

mosul destroyed bridge urthecast UrtheCast

The international coalition that is fighting ISIS hopes to secure villages surrounding Mosul and reach the city’s center in weeks.

But soldiers face roadside bombs, networks of secret tunnels, suicide bombers, civilians being used as human shields, and other grave threats.

Shi’a Militias in Mosul and Beyond

Bottom Line Up Front: 

• Shi’a militias are a significant component of the forces attempting to recapture Mosul from the Islamic State, but the Iraqi government seeks to keep their role limited.

• The U.S. has insisted that Shi’a militias not enter the city of Mosul because of their sectarian impulses, linkages to Iran, and the likelihood of adverse reaction from the city’s mostly Sunni inhabitants.

• The commanders of the Iraqi Shi’a militias will likely have substantial influence over which coalition forces remain in Iraq over the longer term.

• After the Islamic State is militarily defeated in Iraq, the Iraqi government will likely work to demobilize the Shi’a militias by integrating them into the Iraqi Security Forces.

SoufanGroup: As with many other cities in Iraq previously liberated from the so-called Islamic State, Shi’a militia forces comprise a substantial portion of the Iraqi forces fighting to retake the city of Mosul. The Shi’a militias, which operate under an umbrella known as the ‘Popular Mobilization Units’ (PMUs), account for around 25,000 fighters of the total Iraqi force—which numbers nearly 100,000. In the prior battles, Shi’a militias entered the mostly Sunni cities, such as Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah, and conducted many abuses against the local population as retribution for alleged ‘collaboration’ with the Islamic State. While Shi’a militia involvement perhaps sped up Iraqi military advances, it set back the longer term political reconciliation that is vital to permanently defeating the Islamic State. To prevent a recurrence of such actions, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi—with strong backing of U.S. military commanders in Iraq—is requiring the PMUs to only advance on Mosul from the west and help capture the city of Tal Afar, and to refrain from advancing into Mosul itself. This requirement builds on the U.S. policy of providing minimal help to the PMUs, and then only to those militias that are not advised or armed by Iran.  

The political strength of the largest Shi’a militias—which are backed by Iran—raises the question of whether they will comply with Abadi’s directive. In mid-October, one key Iran-backed Shi’a militia leader, Asa’ib Ahl al Haq’s Qais Khazali, vowed that his forces would enter Mosul ‘in vengeance against the slayers of Hussein’—a reference to the original Sunni-Shi’a split in the early Islamic community. An area that Shi’a militia commanders and Abadi do agree, however, is in opposing the U.S. position of giving Turkey—a Sunni power—a combat role in the battle for Mosul. The broad Iraqi opposition to Turkish involvement in the Mosul fight goes beyond sectarian differences to longstanding Iraqi fears about Turkey’s territorial ambitions in northern Iraq, particularly Mosul. Iraq’s Kurds—in an uneasy partnership with Baghdad to fight the Islamic State—are also wary that Turkey may seek to maintain a military presence in Iraq after Mosul is liberated, perhaps for no other reason than to intimidate Iraqi Kurdish leaders from pursuing a planned referendum on full independence for Iraqi Kurdistan.     

Abadi’s opposition to the U.S. stance on a Turkish contribution to the battle for Mosul illustrates the significant political influence the Shi’a militia commanders and their allies enjoy. Many Shi’a militia commanders have close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) from their time in the Iran-backed struggle against Saddam Hussein. IRGC-QF commander-in-chief Qasem Soleimani is in overall command of the Shi’a militia units in the Mosul battle, and has substantial influence inside the Iraqi government.

Soleimani and the Shi’a commanders will undoubtedly play a major role in determining whether foreign forces remain in Iraq after the Islamic State is expelled from Iraqi territory. Consistent with Iran’s position, these figures have insisted that no U.S. troops remain in Iraq after the Islamic State is defeated. Further, these commanders have support from another powerful Iraqi Shi’a leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, who responded to the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 by organizing the militia precursor from which many of the current militias split off. Sadr displayed his power over the summer of 2016 by twice sending his followers to storm the Iraqi parliament building in the heavily-fortified ‘Green Zone’ to demand government reform and efforts against official corruption. Although Sadr no longer enjoys Tehran’s unquestioned support and many Shi’a militia commanders are no longer loyal to him, his ability to determine outcomes in Iraq should not be underestimated.  

Poised against the Shi’a hardliners is Abadi, who appears to recognize that a U.S. military presence will be needed in Iraq for some time after the Islamic State is defeated. To tamp down hardline Shi’a opposition to a continuing U.S. presence, Abadi plans to weaken the hardliners’ base of support by disbanding the PMUs as a separate force. Over the summer, Abadi advanced a plan to integrate the PMUs into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) directly, although his plan attracted skeptics who argue that doing so would simply move factionalism into the ISF, rather than eliminate it entirely. That plan would also entail expenditures that Iraq can ill afford with oil prices at current levels. The more likely option is that Abadi will seek to demobilize the PMUs and encourage militia leaders to return to participating in the political process. Should he take that route, Abadi’s success in doing so will likely determine the long-term stability of Iraq.

Declarations of the Syrian Coalition for Aleppo vs. Russia

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Segment 2 of this broadcast is with 2 Syrians in Aleppo describing conditions and the bombardment by the Assad regime and Russia.

Hundreds of people in the besieged parts of Aleppo on Thursday took to the streets to protest against Russia’s planned ‘evacuation’ of besieged parts of the city. Protestors called for toppling the Assad regime and the ousting of the Russian and Iranian invaders from Syria.

The residents saw in the brief pause of the Russian bombing campaign an opportunity to express their defiance to the Russian onslaught on their city. Protesters gathered in Alshaar neighborhood, waving banners and shouting slogans-in Arabic and English-expressing their opposition to Russia’s plans and their insistence on remaining in the city.

Many protestors said they had no plans to leave the city despite the ferocious onslaught by the Assad regime and its allies. “Even though the regime and Russia have mercilessly bombarded us, we’re not going to leave,” one of the protesters told reporters.

On Thursday, the Syrian Coalition said that the proposal put forward by the United Nations on Aleppo is flawed and is not based on the relevant UN resolutions on Syria, stressing that the proposal was made whilst mass forced displacement operations are being currently carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs.

Secretary of the Syrian Coalition’s political committee Riad Hasan said that the UN proposal on Aleppo talks about the evacuation of rebel fighters from eastern Aleppo while ignoring the delivery of humanitarian aid or guarantees for protection of the aid convoys.

Hasan stressed that the UN proposal and the meetings held in Geneva on Wednesday completely ignored the main cause of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Aleppo, namely the continued war crimes by the Assad regime and its Russian allies. The Assad regime and Russia’s air forces carry on with their relentless bombing campaign on Aleppo, targeting mainly vital civilian facilities such as hospitals and bakeries and using internationally banned weapons against civilian areas.

Hasan said that the UN special envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura called for the exit of Fatah al-Sham Front fighters from Aleppo while turning a blind eye to the presence of 18,000 mercenaries belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization militias who are fighting alongside regime forces in Aleppo and committing the most heinous war crimes in the city and its countryside.

Member of the Coalition’s political committee Riad Seif said that the main goal of the Russian aerial campaign on Aleppo is to force civilians living in the rebel-held parts to leave their homes as part of the massed forced displacement campaign carried out by the Assad regime in different areas including the Damascus suburbs of Moadamiya, Qudsayya, and Daraya. Although Fatah al-Sham Front does not have any presence in these suburbs, its residents were forced to agree to an evacuation deals under the threat of besiegement and starvation.

Seif pointed out that “Russia is directly responsible for undermining chances of a political solution and for the collapse of previous truces as its intervention in Syria is aimed at assisting the regime in its mass forced displacement policy and at propping up the Assad regime.” (Source: Syrian Coalition)

The Syrian Coalition and the Free Syrian Army said the United Nations has become a tool in the hands of Russia which uses it to serve its plans. In a joint statement released on Friday, the Syrian Coalition and the FSA groups said that the UN continues to ignore Russia’s crimes and its violations of international law in Syria.

The statement described the initiative put forward by the UN to resolve the situation in Aleppo as flawed and said that it plays into the Assad regime’s plans to empty the city of its indigenous population.

The Coalition and FSA groups reaffirmed support for any serious initiative aimed at lifting the sieges; allowing the delivery of humanitarian aid to the besieged areas, including Aleppo; the evacuation of the wounded and sick; and the full implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2254 (2015) and other relevant resolutions.

The statement urged the UN to make “a thorough and real reconsideration of its positions and performance on Syria after the election of a new secretary-general.”

“The UN has been treating the executioner and the victim as equals, and its positions on Syria has helped the Assad regime and the Iranian-backed terrorist militia to execute their plans and provided a cover for Russia’s war crimes for which there has been so far no condemnation,” the statement added.

The statement pointed out that the UN initiative does not include any provision dealing with the delivery of humanitarian aid and is focused on the evacuation of a limited number of the most critically wounded.

“Meanwhile, the Russian invaders and the Assad regime have put increased pressure on the residents of eastern Aleppo through military operations and security measures to force them to leave their homes along with the rebel fighters. Therefore, the UN initiative is flawed, and instead of preventing forced displacement, it plays into the Assad regime’s plans to empty Aleppo of its indigenous population.”

The Coalition and FSA made it clear that the initiative was made whilst mass forced displacement operations are being carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs of Moadamiya, Qudsaya, and Alhama in a repeat of the Daraya scenario. “All this has taken place amid complete silence by the United Nations which has so far failed to act in line with its responsibility to protect civilians.”

“Moreover, the UN initiative does not offer any guarantees for the safety of the wounded or their carers, thus putting them at the risk of being arrested or killed by the Assad regime.”

The statement concluded by stressing that the UN has a responsibility of to stop the serious military escalation by Russia in Aleppo as well as other parts of Syria and its use of internationally banned weapons, including bunker-buster bombs, napalm, incendiary bombs, and chemical weapons. “Crimes of genocide and war crimes against Syrian women and children must no longer be tolerated and its perpetrators must be punished.” (Source: Syrian Coalition)

Rosoboronexport, Putin and Iran, N. Korea and Syria

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On November 4, 2000, the Rosoboronexport Unitary enterprise was set up by Decree №1834 of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, as the sole state intermediary agency for Russia’s military exports/imports.

In 2015: WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The United States has imposed sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies, including Russian state-owned arms exporter Rosoboronexport, for violating a U.S. law restricting weapons trade with Iran, North Korea and Syria.

The U.S. State Department published a notice of the sanctions in the Federal Register on Wednesday. They were later condemned by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Moscow will take countermeasures in response to new U.S. sanctions, Interfax reported late on Wednesday, citing a commentary on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website.

The State Department’s notice did not specify how each company had run afoul of the United States’ Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, but the act prohibits the trade with those three countries of goods, services, or technology used to make weapons of mass destruction or cruise or ballistic missiles.

Russia has supported Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a 4 1/2-year-old civil war that has killed more than 200,000 people and displaced millions, including by supplying him with military gear.

Iran and North Korea are under United Nations arms embargoes.

The sanctions announced on Wednesday prohibit the U.S. government from procuring goods or services from the listed entities, as well as selling them defense-related goods and services. Additionally, no new licenses will be granted to export certain controlled goods to the listed entities, and any existing such licenses will be suspended.

Many of the entities targeted on Wednesday already faced multiple rounds of U.S. sanctions.

One of the individuals listed was Chinese businessman Li Fangwei, also known as Karl Lee. He has already been sanctioned for allegedly supplying Iran’s ballistic missile program in violation of an embargo. He denied the allegations in a 2013 interview with Reuters.

The companies sanctioned also included China’s BST Technology and Trade Co, which had previously been sanctioned by the United States in 2013, the Russian Aircraft Corp, and two North Korean firms. The Sudanese Armed Forces were also listed in the notice, as well as the overseas arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, called the Qods Force, and its commander, Qassem Soleimani.

Related reading: Rosoboronexport Naval Inventory

Related reading: Rosoboronexport Ground Force Inventory

**** It gets worse and U.S. voters need to take notice as to why any relationship with Moscow is sitting on the knife’s edge.

 

(Paris)– France should reconsider allowing Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state-owned arms trading company, to participate in Euronaval, a major international arms show being held outside of Paris from October 17 to 21, 2016, human rights groups EuroMed Rights and Human Rights Watch said today. The arms show is sponsored by the French Defense Ministry.

FRANCE SYRIA statement photo Russia Rosoboronexport 15 Oct 2016
The office building of Rosoboronexport company in Moscow, Russia, March 1, 2016.

© 2016 Reuters

Human rights organizations have called for the United Nations Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Syria, and for Rosoboronexport in particular to stop supplying arms to Syria in light of compelling evidence that the Syrian government is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

“France is leading the call on ending violations in Syria but at the same time allowing Russia, which is complicit in those violations, to promote its weapons and land new deals,” said Michel Tubiana, president of EuroMed Rights. “It’s not acceptable to do business as usual with a company arming a government engaged in systematic atrocities against its own people.”

More than 90 exhibitors from 70 countries are expected to attend the Euronaval arms show, including Rosoboronexport. Rosoboronexport said in October, 2015, that it is continuing to supply arms to the Syrian government despite its record of serious international human rights and humanitarian law violations.

Under international law, providing weapons to Syria while its forces are known to be committing war crimes and crimes against humanity may translate into aiding and abetting the commission of those crimes. Any arms supplier could bear potential criminal liability as an accessory to those crimes and could face prosecution. In addition to Rosoboronexport, all other suppliers of arms to Syria should be subject to scrutiny.

The Russian government began conducting military operations in Syria on September 30, 2015. Since then, Russian-Syrian airstrikes have hit civilian objects and caused civilian casualties, Syrian-Russian joint military operations have extensively used internationally banned cluster munitions, and there has been an increase in the use of incendiary weapons in Syria. Since September 19, 2016, Russian-Syrian forces have bombarded opposition-controlled parts of the city of Aleppo. The attacks included the use of indiscriminate barrel bombs, cluster munitions, and incendiary weapons, and damaged or partially destroyed at least five hospitals in six separate attacks.

In November 2015, the Rosoboronexport chief executive officer, Anatoly Isaikin, indicated that Russia’s military involvement in Syria was “good testimony for Russian armaments.” Media reports indicate that Russian airstrikes in Syria actually have contributed to buyer interest in weaponry from Rosoboronexport and could result in billions of dollars in new contracts.

Given its role in Syria, Rosoboronexport should not be allowed to promote itself and seek new contracts at Euronaval, the organizations said. Should Rosoboronexport be permitted to participate in the arms show, all arms show participants, including official delegations and private arms brokers, should decline to negotiate any new deals with Rosoboronexport.

**** Need more?

From UANI:

“Russia has offered Iran its latest Antey-2500 missiles, the head of Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec said on Monday according to media reports, after a deal to supply less powerful S-300 missiles was dropped under Western pressure. Sergei Chemezov said Tehran was now considering the offer, TASS news agency reported. Russia scrapped a contract to supply Iran with S-300 surface-to-air missiles under Western pressure in 2010, and Iran later filed a $4-billion international arbitration suit against Russia in Geneva, but the two countries remain allies.” (Reuters, “Russian offers Iran latest anti-aircraft missiles: TASS,”

2/23/15)

—

“Russia’s government-run weapons manufacturer is supplying equipment for Iran’s missile program, intelligence documents recently presented to the US Congress indicate. According to intelligence estimates, this does not represent official cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, but rather demonstrates the inability of the Russian government to prevent state firms from engaging in illegal trade with the Islamic Republic. The Russian firm in question is Rosoboronexport, which supplied Iran with defensive missile systems in 2006 and continues to maintain business ties with Iran in the missile sector.” (YnetNews, “Russian manufacturer selling missile equipment to Iran,” 6/11/12)

—

“For two years, the United States regarded Rosoboronexport, Russia’s official weapons exporter, as an international pariah for selling arms to Iran and Syria. Then, in 2010, the U.S. suddenly lifted sanctions against it. By June of this year, the reversal was complete: the Pentagon awarded the company a no-bid contract worth upwards of $1 billion… Rosoboronexport, whose annual revenues have grown to nearly $9 billion, had only recently been removed from the list of companies sanctioned by the U.S. State Department for violating U.S. laws prohibiting the sale of weapons to Iran and Syria. Among the suspected sales were surface-to-air missiles to Iran. But after sanctions were lifted, the Army went full steam ahead with plans to sole-source a $375 million contract to the Russian arms agency, now arguing that it was the only legitimate vendor of Russian armaments.” (Wired, “Russian Firm Got No-Bid Pentagon Contract After Selling Arms to Iran,” 8/31/11)

—

“Russia’s state arms export agency said Monday that it is supplying Iran with defensive weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, but did not say whether they include the sophisticated long-range S-300 missiles…Rosoboronexport said in a statement that ‘only weapons of a defensive nature are being supplied to Iran, including anti-aircraft weaponry.’ It added that, previously, Tor-M1 air-defense systems were supplied to Iran.” (AssociatedPress, “Russia giving Iran only defensive weapons,” 12/22/08)

—

“Rosoboronexport contracted with Iran late July to modernize 30 Su-24 front bombers which may bear tactic nuclear weapons. The contract is to be executed by Sukhoi.” (Kommersant, “Sanctions Imposed on Russian Companies Linked to Iran,” 08/05/2006)

In summary:

MOSCOW — The United States imposed sanctions against Russian state arms export agency Rosoboronexport and four Russian defense industry enterprises — including the MiG aircraft corporation — for alleged violations of a nonproliferation and missile technology control regime.

The State Department announced the sanctions in a notice posted on the Federal Register. Twenty-three firms across the world, including entities based in China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, had violated the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), it said.

“These entities were sanctioned based on credible information that they have been involved in the transfer or purchase to or from Iran, North Korea or Syria of goods, services or technology listed on multilateral export control lists, US national control lists, or other items that could make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction or missile proliferation,” said US Embassy Moscow spokesman Will Stevens.

The move prevents any US company or government agency from doing business with the sanctioned Russian defense entities, which include Russia’s state arms export agency Rosoboronexport.

Rosoboronexport is the doorway between Russia’s defense industry and foreign export customers. The agency claimed to have delivered $13.2 billion in military exports last year, and at the MAKS airshow last week said Russia’s export backlog amounts to $40 billion.

The famous MiG aircraft company was among those Russian companies singled out in the latest sanctions action — which closely coincided with the Department of Commerce announcing a new round of economic sanctions in response to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The other three companies on today’s list were high-precision weapons maker Instrument Design Bureau (KBP) Tula; a rocket and missile design bureau near Moscow known as NPO Mishinostroyenia — the same bureau that designed the USSR’s SS-19 ICBM; and the Katod company in Novosibirsk.

Katod manufactures, among other things, night vision goggles that were sold in the US; the sanctions cut the company off from that market.

In comments carried by the TASS news agency on Wednesday, Katod CEO Vladimir Loktionov mocked the sanctions against his company as a sign that Russian night-vision technology intimidated US competitors.

“So, Russia doesn’t just pump oil, it can also do something that can compete with American companies,” Loktionov said, brushing off any impact the sanctions might have by claiming the majority of its customers are in the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union or one of the BRICS nations.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry was furious with the sanctions — both from the State and Commerce departments — responding in a statement later on Wednesday that the US is trying “to punish us for the rigorous pursuit of [our] national interests, and for the free choice of the inhabitants of Crimea and Sevastopol,” to join Russia last year.

 

 

Obama Directs Intelligence to be Shared with Cuba

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Ah what?

In part from CubaToday: Diaz-Balart, a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said Cuba shares intelligence with Russia and Iran, among others. Earlier this year, Gen. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Cuba was among four countries that pose the greatest espionage threat to the United States. The others were Russia, China and Iran.

“The threat from foreign intelligence entities, both state and non-state, is persistent, complex and evolving,” Clapper testified in a February hearing on “Worldwide Threats.” “Targeting collection of U.S. political, military, economic and technical information by foreign intelligence services continues unabated.”  

Over the course of five decades, Fidel Castro built one of the world’s most active intelligence services, whose missions included spying on U.S. military facilities in South Florida and infiltrating leading Cuban exile organizations in Miami. More here.

Previously on this site, it was published that Cuba’s largest source of revenue is stealing and selling intelligence and secrets to enemies of the United States.

Now it appears, Barack Obama is not finished with his new friends in Cuba and handing off gifts to them.

Today, I approved a Presidential Policy Directive that takes another major step forward in our efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. This Directive takes a comprehensive and whole-of-government approach to promote engagement with the Cuban government and people, and make our opening to Cuba irreversible.  Read more here.

It gets worse…..

China and Russia have maintained a sophisticated spy base in Cuba for many years.

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
October 14, 2016

Presidential Policy Directive — United States-Cuba Normalization

October 14, 2016

 

SUBJECT: United States-Cuba Normalization

I. Introduction

On December 17, 2014, I announced that the United States would chart a new course with Cuba, ending an outdated policy that had failed to advance U.S. interests and support reform and a better life for the Cuban people on the island over several decades. Under the new policy, the United States expands and promotes authorized engagements with Cuba to advance cooperation on areas of mutual interest, and increase travel to, commerce with, and the free flow of information to Cuba. The objective of the new policy is to help the Cuban people to achieve a better future for themselves and to encourage the development of a partner in the region capable of working with the United States to confront regional challenges, such as climate change, disease, and illicit trafficking.

Endogenous changes underway in Cuba offer opportunities to advance U.S. interests and shift away from an embargo, which is an outdated burden on the Cuban people and has impeded U.S. interests. My Administration has repeatedly called on the Congress to lift the embargo. United States policy is designed to create economic opportunities for the Cuban people; promote respect for human rights; further advances on regional security and defense issues, such as health, law enforcement, and migration; and pursue cooperation with the Cuban government that can strengthen our leadership in the hemisphere. We recognize Cuba’s sovereignty and self-determination and acknowledge areas of difference. We seek to address such differences through engagement and dialogue, and by encouraging increased understanding between our governments and our peoples.

The large Cuban-American community in the United States has an integral role to play in normalization, and in reconciliation between members of the diaspora who left Cuba and those who remain on the island. Normalization necessarily extends beyond government-to-government rapprochement — it includes rebuilding bridges between individuals and families.

This directive: (1) describes the U.S. vision for normalization with Cuba and how our policy aligns with U.S. national security interests; (2) assesses progress toward normalization; (3) describes the current and foreseen strategic landscape; (4) describes priority objectives for normalization; and (5) directs actions required to implement this PPD.

II. Vision for United States-Cuba Normalization

The vision of the United States for U.S.-Cuba normalization is guided by the following national security interests, as described in the 2015 National Security Strategy:

  • The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.
  • A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
  • Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
  • A rules-based international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity.

Our vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization reflects my Administration’s support for broad-based economic growth, stability, increased people-to-people ties, and respect for human rights and democratic values in the region. In the long-term, the United States seeks the following end-states:

1. Enhanced security of the United States and U.S. citizens at home and abroad. We seek to ensure U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba are safe and secure and the United States is protected from: those seeking to exploit increased connectivity for illicit ends, irregular migration, and natural or man-made hazards. Our policy advances bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including diplomatic, agricultural, public health, and environmental matters, as well as disaster preparedness and response, law enforcement, migration, and other security and defense topics. Our policy also supports increased cooperation with Cuba on regional initiatives on behalf of these interests.

2. A prosperous, stable Cuba that offers economic opportunities to its people. Increased travel and economic interconnectedness supports improved livelihoods for the Cuban people, deeper economic engagement between our two countries, as well as the development of a private sector that provides greater economic opportunities for the Cuban people. Efforts by the Cuban authorities to liberalize economic policy would aid these goals and further enable broader engagement with different sectors of the Cuban economy. United States policy helps U.S. businesses gain access to Cuban markets and encourages the sustainable growth of the Cuban economy. The U.S. private sector, scientific and medical researchers, agriculture industry, foundations, and other groups have new avenues for collaboration that can provide opportunities for Cuban entrepreneurs, scientists, farmers, and other professionals. At the same time, increased access to the internet is boosting Cubans’ connectivity to the wider world and expanding the ability of the Cuban people, especially youth, to exchange information and ideas. The United States is prepared to support Cuban government policies that promote social equality and independent economic activity.

3. Increased respect for individual rights in Cuba. Even as we pursue normalization, we recognize we will continue to have differences with the Cuban government. We will continue to speak out in support of human rights, including the rights to freedoms of expression, religion, association, and peaceful assembly as we do around the world. Our policy is designed to support Cubans’ ability to exercise their universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, with the expectation that greater commerce will give a broader segment of the Cuban people the information and resources they need to achieve a prosperous and sustainable future. In pursuit of these objectives, we are not seeking to impose regime change on Cuba; we are, instead, promoting values that we support around the world while respecting that it is up to the Cuban people to make their own choices about their future.

4. Integration of Cuba into international and regional systems. We seek Cuban government participation in regional and international fora, including but not limited to, those related to the Organization of American States (OAS) and Summit of the Americas to advance mutually held member objectives. We believe that a Cuba that subscribes to the purposes and standards of such fora will benefit, over time, from bringing its domestic economic and political practices in line with international norms and globally accepted standards. Our policy strengthens the U.S. position in international systems by removing an irritant from our relationships with our allies and partners and gaining support for a rules-based order.

III. Progress Toward United States-Cuba Normalization

Since the United States announced on December 17, 2014, that it would chart a new course with Cuba, we have re-established diplomatic relations and have made progress toward the normalization of our bilateral relationship. We opened our respective embassies, six U.S. cabinet secretaries visited Havana, four Cuban ministers visited the United States, and I became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Cuba since 1928. We established a Bilateral Commission to prioritize areas of engagement, and we concluded non-binding arrangements on environmental protection, marine sanctuaries, public health and biomedical research, agriculture, counternarcotics, trade and travel security, civil aviation, direct transportation of mail, and hydrography. We launched dialogues or discussions on law enforcement cooperation, regulatory issues, economic issues, claims, and internet and telecommunications policy.

Given Cuba’s proximity to the United States, increased engagement by U.S. citizens, companies, and the nongovernmental sector holds extraordinary promise for supporting our national interests. Bearing in mind the limits imposed by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (LIBERTAD) Solidarity Act of 1996 (“Libertad Act”) and other relevant statutes, the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce implemented six packages of regulatory amendments to the Cuba sanctions program, easing restrictions on travel, trade, and financial transactions. United States individuals, firms, and nongovernmental organizations are availing themselves of these regulatory changes to visit Cuba, and authorized travel to Cuba increased by more than 75 percent from 2014 to 2015. Future U.S. citizen travel will be supported by scheduled air service, which began in August 2016, and the first U.S. cruise liner visited Cuban ports in May 2016. We also commenced direct transportation of mail between our two countries, and U.S. telecommunications firms established direct voice and roaming agreements with Cuba. For its part, the Cuban government has continued to pursue incremental economic reforms and launched more than 100 public Wi-Fi hotspots across the island.

These developments lay the foundation for long-term engagement with Cuba that advances U.S. interests. But we have a great deal more to do to build on that foundation based on a realistic assessment of the strategic landscape surrounding normalization.

IV. Strategic Landscape

Cuba is experiencing several transitions in areas such as leadership, the economy, technological development, civil society, and regional and global integration. Cuba’s leaders recognize the need to transition to the next generation, but they prioritize gradual, incremental changes to ensure stability.

Cuba has important economic potential rooted in the dynamism of its people, as well as a sustained commitment in areas like education and health care. Yet the Cuban government faces significant economic challenges, including eliminating its dual-exchange-rate system, making its state-run enterprises more efficient and transparent, developing a financial system that provides expanded services to individuals and the private sector, and reducing its reliance on foreign subsidies. Cuba remains highly dependent on food and energy imports, yet must cope with limited sources of hard currency to pay for import needs. Significant emigration of working age Cubans further exacerbates Cuba’s demographic problem of a rapidly aging population.

A series of statutes limits U.S. economic engagement with Cuba, precluding a complete lifting of restrictions on U.S. travel to Cuba, prohibiting United States Government export assistance and the provision of U.S. credit for Cuban purchases of agricultural commodities, and requiring that the embargo not be suspended or terminated unless the President determines that a transition or democratically elected government has come to power in Cuba.

Due to Cuba’s legal, political, and regulatory constraints, its economy is not generating adequate foreign exchange to purchase U.S. exports that could flow from the easing of the embargo. Even if the U.S. Congress were to lift the embargo, Cubans would not realize their potential without continued economic reform in Cuba. Cuban government regulations and opaque procurement practices hamper transactions with U.S. companies that would be permitted under U.S. law.

Normalization efforts have raised Cubans’ expectations for greater economic opportunities. With an estimated 1 in 4 working Cubans engaged in entrepreneurship, a dynamic, independent private sector is emerging. Expansion of the private sector has increased resources for individual Cubans and created nascent openings for Cuban entrepreneurs to engage with U.S. firms and nongovernmental organizations. We take note of the Cuban government’s limited, but meaningful steps to expand legal protections and opportunities for small- and medium-sized businesses, which, if expanded and sustained, will improve the investment climate.

Cuba is not a member of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, which could provide expertise and potentially finance economic reforms and viable investment projects.

Although Cuba has reached agreement with several creditor nations on bilateral debt relief through restructuring and forgiveness, it remains in default to the United States Government on pre-Cuban revolution bilateral debts and does not participate in international capital markets. Cuba and the United States are both members of the World Trade Organization (WTO); however, neither country applies the agreement to the other because of the U.S. embargo toward Cuba.

Rapprochement has enabled us to increase our engagement with Cuba on regional issues such as the Colombia peace process and healthcare in Haiti, and has undermined an historic rallying point for regimes critical of the United States. Although Cuba has expressed no interest in participating in the OAS, it did attend the Summit of the Americas in 2015. We also welcome engagement between Cuba and other U.S. allies from around the world, including our European and Asian treaty allies. At the same time, we recognize that Cuba and the United States will continue to have differences on many regional and global issues.

U.S. engagement with the Cuban government will also be constrained by Cuba’s continued repression of civil and political liberties. We anticipate the Cuban government will continue to object to U.S. migration policies and operations, democracy programs, Radio and TV Marti, the U.S. presence at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, and the embargo. The United States Government has no intention to alter the existing lease treaty and other arrangements related to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, which enables the United States to enhance and preserve regional security.

In this strategic environment, the policies and actions the United States pursues to advance our vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization will significantly shape the future of bilateral and regional relations, as well as our shared security and prosperity.

V. Six U.S. Objectives for the Medium-Term U.S.-Cuba Relationship

To advance the four end-state goals associated with our strategic vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization, the United States will move concurrently on the following six priority objectives:

1. Government-to-Government Interaction

We will continue high-level and technical engagement in areas of mutual interest, including agriculture, the economy and small businesses, transportation, science and technology, environment, climate, health, law enforcement, migration, national security, disaster preparedness and response, and counterterrorism. Through the Bilateral Commission, we will identify and prioritize areas of collaboration and engagement that advance our end-state goals. Stronger diplomatic ties will enable constructive engagement on bilateral differences, including our democracy and broadcasting programs, while protecting our interests and assets, such as the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. We will utilize engagement to urge Cuba to make demonstrable progress on human rights and religious freedom. As the United States and Cuban governments build trust through more frequent engagement, we will increasingly conduct working-level interactions between Cuban ministries and U.S. agencies and departments that lessen the need for high-level conversations on routine matters. Given the lack of diplomatic relations over the past several decades, we will seek broad engagement across the Cuban government, including ministries and local officials. When appropriate and legally available, we will engage with Cuba to normalize trade relations fully.

2. Engagement and Connectivity

The United States will continue to encourage people-to-people linkages through government and privately sponsored exchanges, including those involving educational, cultural, business, science, environment, technology, and sports. As permitted by law, we will continue to support the development of scheduled and chartered air service and maritime links, including ferries. An ongoing partnership with the Cuban-American community is of particular importance given Cuban-Americans’ strong family and socio-cultural ties, as well as their natural role as citizen-ambassadors. We will facilitate opportunities for Cuban-Americans to rebuild and create new bonds with family to support reconciliation. To facilitate Cuba’s goal of increasing its internet access from 5 percent to 50 percent of the population by 2020, we will seek the establishment of a bilateral working group to expand internet connectivity. We will seek opportunities that enable U.S. foundations and universities to establish linkages with Cuba.

3. Expanded Commerce

The United States Government will seek to expand opportunities for U.S. companies to engage with Cuba. The embargo is outdated and should be lifted. My Administration has repeatedly called upon the Congress to lift the embargo, and we will continue to work toward that goal. While the embargo remains in place, our role will be to pursue policies that enable authorized U.S. private sector engagement with Cuba’s emerging private sector and with state-owned enterprises that provide goods and services to the Cuban people. Law enforcement cooperation will ensure that authorized commerce and authorized travelers move rapidly between the United States and Cuba. Although we recognize the priority given to state-owned enterprises in the Cuban model, we seek to encourage reforms that align these entities with international norms, especially transparency.

United States regulatory changes have created space for the Cuban government to introduce comparable changes. In tandem with the Department of the Treasury’s regulatory change to expand Cuba’s access to the U.S. financial system and U.S. dollar transit accounts, the Cuban government announced in early 2016 plans to eliminate the 10 percent penalty on U.S. dollar conversion transactions, subject to improved access to the international banking system. We will sustain private and public efforts to explain our regulatory changes to U.S. firms and banks, Cuban entrepreneurs, and the Cuban government.

4. Economic Reform

While the Cuban government pursues its economic goals based on its national priorities, we will utilize our expanded cooperation to support further economic reforms by the Cuban government. Recent exchanges among financial service institutions and regulators have provided greater mutual understanding of our respective financial system and economic priorities. We will undertake government-to-government dialogues to discuss options for macro- and microeconomic reform, with the goal of connecting the changes in U.S. policy with Cuban reforms in a manner that creates opportunity for U.S. firms and the Cuban people.

If and when the Congress lifts the embargo, my Administration will engage with the Congress and stakeholders on preparatory commercial and economic exchanges and dialogues. My Administration would then similarly engage the Congress on the substance and timing of a new bilateral commercial agreement to address remaining statutory trade requirements.

5. Respect for Universal Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms, and Democratic Values

We will not pursue regime change in Cuba. We will continue to make clear that the United States cannot impose a different model on Cuba because the future of Cuba is up to the Cuban people. We seek greater Cuban government respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms for every individual. Progress in this area will have a positive impact on the other objectives. We will encourage the Cuban government to respect human rights; support Cuba’s emerging, broad-based civil society; and encourage partners and nongovernmental actors to join us in advocating for reforms. While remaining committed to supporting democratic activists as we do around the world, we will also engage community leaders, bloggers, activists, and other social issue leaders who can contribute to Cuba’s internal dialogue on civic participation. We will continue to pursue engagements with civil society through the U.S. Embassy in Havana and during official United States Government visits to Cuba. We will seek to institutionalize a regular human rights dialogue with the Cuban government to advance progress on human rights. We will pursue democracy programming that is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies around the world. We will utilize our increased ability to engage regional partners, both bilaterally and through regional bodies, to encourage respect for human rights in Cuba. We will consult with nongovernmental actors such as the Catholic Church and other religious institutions. Finally, we will work with the European Union and likeminded international organizations and countries to encourage the Cuban government to respect universal values.

6. Cuban Integration into International and Regional Systems

We will expand dialogue with Cuba in the organizations in which it already holds membership, such as the WTO and the World Customs Organization (WCO), and we will encourage Cuba to move toward rules-based engagement, subject to statutory requirements. We will encourage Cuba to bring its legal framework, particularly its commercial law, in line with international standards. We will encourage Cuba to meet WCO standards for supply chain security. To the extent permitted by and consistent with applicable law, we will facilitate integration into international bodies, including through the use of technical assistance programs. We will pursue cooperation with Cuba on regional and global issues (e.g., combating the Ebola outbreak and the Colombia peace process). Ending the embargo and satisfying other statutory requirements relating to trade will allow the United States to normalize trade relations with Cuba.

VI. Policy Implementation

1. Roles and Responsibilities

To facilitate the effective implementation of this directive, departments and agencies will have the following roles and responsibilities, consistent with the relevant legal authorities and limits:

The National Security Council (NSC) staff will provide ongoing policy coordination and oversight of the implementation of this PPD and the overall Cuba strategy as necessary.

The Department of State will continue to be responsible for formulation of U.S. policy toward and coordination of relations with Cuba. This includes supporting the operations of Embassy Havana and ensuring it has adequate resources and staffing. Other responsibilities include the issuance of nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, refugee processing, promotion of educational and cultural exchanges, coordination of democracy programs, and political and economic reporting. State will continue to lead the U.S.-Cuba Bilateral Commission and coordinate a number of dialogues, such as the Law Enforcement Dialogue, annual migration talks, and meetings to resolve outstanding claims.

State will continue to co-lead efforts with the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure democracy programming is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies. State will coordinate efforts to advance science and technology cooperation with Cuba. State will support telecommunications and internet access growth in Cuba and provide foreign policy guidance to the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury on certain exports, financial transactions, and other license applications.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN), in coordination with State, will oversee multilateral issues involving Cuba at the United Nations. USUN will identify areas of possible collaboration with Cuba that could help foster a more collaborative relationship between the United States and Cuba at the United Nations. The USUN will also participate in discussions regarding the annual Cuban embargo resolution at the United Nations, as our bilateral relationship continues to develop in a positive trajectory.

The Department of the Treasury is responsible for implementation of the economic embargo restrictions and licensing policies. The Treasury will continue its outreach to help the public, businesses, and financial institutions understand the regulatory changes. The Treasury will continue to review and respond to public questions and feedback on regulations and public guidance that could be further clarified and to discuss with State any novel license requests that the Treasury receives from the public to determine whether such requests are consistent with the regulatory changes and existing law. The Treasury will make use of available channels for bilateral dialogue to understand Cuba’s economic and financial system and encourage reforms and will continue to engage in dialogue with the Cuban government about our regulatory changes.

The Department of Commerce will continue to support the development of the Cuban private sector, entrepreneurship, commercial law development, and intellectual property rights as well as environmental protection and storm prediction. If statutory restrictions are lifted, Commerce will promote increased trade with Cuba by providing export assistance to U.S. companies. In the meantime, Commerce will continue a robust outreach effort to ensure that U.S. companies understand that U.S. regulatory changes provide new opportunities to obtain licenses or use license exceptions to increase authorized exports to Cuba, including to Cuban state-owned enterprises that provide goods and services to meet the needs of the Cuban people. Additionally, Commerce will continue to engage in dialogue with the Cuban government about our regulatory changes, as well as the need for simplification of the Cuban import process, transparency in Cuban business regulations, and other steps that will lead to full realization of the benefits of our regulatory changes.

The Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to take steps to expand the defense relationship with Cuba where it will advance U.S. interests, with an initial focus on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and counternarcotics in the Caribbean. The DOD will support Cuba’s inclusion in the inter-American defense system and regional security and defense conferences, which will give Cuba a stake in hemispheric stability. The DOD will continue to make contingency preparations and support the capacity of the Department of Homeland Security and State to address mass migration and maritime migration issues pursuant to Executive Orders 12807 and 13276 and consistent with other applicable interagency guidance and strategy.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will engage, together with the Department of Justice, with the Cuban government to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime. In support of U.S. security and foreign policy objectives, DHS will develop protocols for investigative cooperation with Cuba in coordination with other departments and agencies. The DHS will strengthen the security and efficiency of cross-border supply chains and travel systems in support of people-to-people engagement and authorized U.S. trade with the Cuban private sector. The DHS will safeguard the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, to include the facilitation of lawful immigration and ensure protection of refugees. The Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Government lead for a maritime migration or mass migration, with support from the Secretaries of State and Defense, will address a maritime migration or mass migration pursuant to Executive Orders 12807 and 13276 and consistent with applicable interagency guidance and strategy.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) will engage, together with DHS, with the Cuban government to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime. The DOJ will work with Cuba to expand security and law enforcement cooperation, increase information sharing, and share best practices with Cuban counterparts. This work will build upon, and strengthen, current law enforcement cooperation with Cuba under the umbrella of the U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue and its various working groups, which focus on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, cybercrime, human trafficking, and other areas of criminal activity.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) will continue to engage with the Cuban government, entrepreneurs, small businesses, and cooperative enterprises. The SBA will support exchanges with the Cuban government in areas of mutual interest, particularly on formalization of small businesses and to spur the growth of new enterprises.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative will provide trade policy coordination in international fora and, consistent with statutory requirements and restrictions, prepare for negotiations to normalize and expand U.S.-Cuba trade.

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) will work to increase U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba by building market opportunities, improving the competitive position of U.S. agriculture, and building Cuba’s food security and agricultural capacity, while protecting plant, animal, and human health. USDA will work with the Government of Cuba to advance cooperation outlined in the U.S.-Cuba agricultural memorandum of understanding signed in March 2016. The USDA will build the U.S.-Cuba trade and development relationship to the extent permitted by and consistent with applicable law.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in accordance with the June 2016 memorandum of understanding between HHS and the Ministry of Public Health of the Republic of Cuba, will collaborate with Cuban counterparts in the areas of public health, research, and biomedical sciences, including collaboration to confront the Zika virus, dengue, chikungunya, and other arboviruses. The HHS will promote joint work, such as development of vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics; partner with Cuba to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks; collaborate in the field of cancer control, treatment programs, and joint research; and exchange best practices related to access to healthcare.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) will coordinate with departments and agencies the United States Government’s response to unplanned environmental occurrences, such as natural or manmade disasters. The USAID will co-lead efforts with State to ensure that democracy programming is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) will continue to develop air and surface transportation links between the United States and Cuba in support of transportation providers, authorized travelers, and commerce, while providing required regulatory and safety oversight of transportation providers and systems.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) will support broader United States Government efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, with Intelligence Community elements working to find opportunities for engagement on areas of common interest through which we could exchange information on mutual threats with Cuban counterparts.

The Department of the Interior (DOI) will continue cooperation with Cuba on marine protected areas and continue to engage Cuban counterparts to finalize arrangements on wildlife conservation, terrestrial national protected areas, and seismic records.

2. Congressional Outreach

Strong support in the Congress for U.S.-Cuba normalization would contribute to the speed and success of the aforementioned goals, particularly with respect to the embargo and adequate embassy staffing. We will seek to build support in the Congress to lift the embargo and other statutory constraints to enable expanded travel and commerce with Cuba and accelerate normalization. We will regularly engage with Members of Congress and staff on challenges and opportunities in Cuba, advocate for United States Government policies and sufficient staff and resources to implement the aforementioned goals and policy priorities, and encourage and facilitate congressional travel to the region.

3. Monitoring and Oversight

The Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), or its future equivalent, will have primary responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the implementation of this policy. The NSC staff will convene regular IPC and Deputies Committee meetings as necessary to monitor implementation and resolve obstacles to progress. The following departments and agencies will designate senior individuals responsible for managing policy implementation in their agency: State, the Treasury, Commerce, DOD (Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff), DHS, DOJ, USDA, HHS, DOT, USUN, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, USAID, SBA, and DNI.

4. Previous Guidance

Executive Order 13276, Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented Aliens Interdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region, dated November 15, 2002, and Executive Order 12807, Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, dated May 24, 1992, remain in effect.

BARACK OBAMA

Former NSA Contractor Stole 50,000 Gigabytes of Data

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NYT’s/WASHINGTON — Investigators pursuing what they believe to be the largest case of mishandling classified documents in United States history have found that the huge trove of stolen documents in the possession of a National Security Agency contractor included top-secret N.S.A. hacking tools that two months ago were offered for sale on the internet.

The criminal complaint filed September 13, 2016 is here.

They have been hunting for electronic clues that could link those cybertools — computer code posted online for auction by an anonymous group calling itself the Shadow Brokers — to the home computers of the contractor, Harold T. Martin III, who was arrested in late August on charges of theft of government property and mishandling of classified information.

Harold T. Martin III and his wife Deborah Shaw in an undated photo. Deborah Shaw

But so far, the investigators have been frustrated in their attempt to prove that Mr. Martin deliberately leaked or sold the hacking tools to the Shadow Brokers or, alternatively, that someone hacked into his computer or otherwise took them without his knowledge. While they have found some forensic clues that he might be the source, the evidence is not conclusive, according to a dozen officials who have been involved in or have been briefed on the investigation.

All spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss it publicly.

An anonymous hacker group, calling itself the Shadow Brokers, announced in August a sale of computer codes stolen from the National Security Agency.

Mr. Martin, an enigmatic loner who according to acquaintances frequently expressed his excitement about his role in the growing realm of cyberwarfare, has insisted that he got in the habit of taking material home so he could improve his skills and be better at his job, according to these officials. He has explained how he took the classified material but denied having knowingly passed it to anyone else.

 

“As a contractor, he gets to see a slice of the overall picture,” said one person familiar with the exchanges, summarizing Mr. Martin’s explanation. “He wanted to see the overall picture so that he could be more effective.”

Mr. Martin’s home in Glen Burnie, Md., with car parked outside. Nate Pesce for The New York Times

The material the F.B.I. found in his possession added up to “many terabytes” of information, according to court papers, which would make it by far the largest unauthorized leak of classified material from the classified sector. That volume dwarfs the hundreds of thousands of N.S.A. documents taken by Edward J. Snowden in 2013 and exceeds even the more voluminous Panama Papers, leaked records of offshore companies obtained by a German newspaper in 2015, which totaled 2.6 terabytes. One terabyte of data is equal to the contents of about one million books.

Image result for harold t martin nsa  NBCNews

F.B.I. agents on the case, advised by N.S.A. technical experts, do not believe Mr. Martin is fully cooperating, the officials say. He has spoken mainly through his lawyers, James Wyda and Deborah Boardman of the federal public defender’s office in Baltimore. They declined to comment before a detention hearing set for Friday in federal court.

Investigators discovered the hacking tools, consisting of computer code and instructions on how to use it, in the thousands of pages and dozens of computers and data storage devices that the F.B.I. seized during an Aug. 27 raid on Mr. Martin’s modest house in suburban Glen Burnie, Md. More secret material was found in a shed in his yard and in his car, officials said.

The search came after the Shadow Brokers leak set off a panicked hunt at the N.S.A. Mr. Martin attracted the F.B.I.’s attention by posting something on the internet that was brought to the attention of the N.S.A. Whatever it was — officials are not saying exactly what — it finally set off an alarm.

The release of the N.S.A.’s hacking tools, even though they dated to 2013, is extraordinarily damaging, said Dave Aitel, a former agency employee who now runs Immunity Inc., an information security company.

“The damage from this release is huge, both to our ability to protect ourselves on the internet and our ability to provide intelligence to policy makers and the military,” Mr. Aitel said.

The N.S.A.’s hacking into other countries’ networks can be for defensive purposes: By identifying rivals’ own hacking methods, the agency can recognize and defend against them, he said. And other countries, with some of the N.S.A.’s tools now in hand, can study past hacks and identify the attacker as the N.S.A., learn how to block similar intrusions, or even decide to retaliate, Mr. Aitel said.

Mr. Martin, 51, a Navy veteran who was completing a Ph.D. in information systems at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, has worked for several of the contracting companies that help staff the nation’s security establishment. After stints at the Computer Sciences Corporation and Tenacity Solutions, where he was assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, he joined Booz Allen Hamilton in 2009. He worked on that firm’s N.S.A. contract until 2015, when he was moved to a different Pentagon contract in the area of offensive cyberwarfare.

He has long held a high-level clearance and for a time worked with the N.S.A.’s premier hacking unit, called Tailored Access Operations, which breaks into the computer networks of foreign countries and which developed the hacking tools later obtained by the Shadow Brokers. According to one person briefed on the investigation, Mr. Martin was able to obtain some of the hacking tools by accessing a digital library of such material at the N.S.A.

theshadowbrokers @shadowbrokerss

@cyberwar@guardian@VICE@mashable@wired@kaspersky@symantec Equation Group – Cyber Weapon Auction http://pastebin.com/NDTU5kJQ 

****

One possibility investigators are considering is that Mr. Martin did not knowingly share the Shadow Brokers material but that it was physically stolen from him — conceivable given the descriptions of the chaos of his house, shed and car — or more likely, grabbed by hackers. But the forensic examination of Mr. Martin’s computers has so far turned up no evidence that he was hacked, officials say.

The F.B.I. is considering whether he might have sold the hacking tools or other materials for money. His annual salary in recent years has exceeded $100,000 and he owns his house without a mortgage. But he has long bought expensive suits and Rolex watches, according to an old acquaintance, and a person familiar with his finances says he has struggled with debt. Court records show one past lien, an $8,997 state tax bill imposed in 2000 and not paid off until 2014.

Some people who know Mr. Martin favor a psychological motive for taking the documents home — one that echoes what he is himself telling investigators: a drive to distinguish himself and prove that his computer knowledge was equal to that of the N.S.A.’s top operators.

“He always thought of himself like a James Bond-type person, wanting to save the world from computer evil,” said a person who knows him well but would not speak about him on the record for fear of being pulled into the criminal case.

Last year, commenting online on an article on the future of computer warfare, Mr. Martin struck a martial and patriotic tone.

“The battles ahead will require a special breed of warrior,” he wrote. “It’s really a calling, and something the individual has to want to do as a profession, due to the sacrifices required to be top flight in this new, electronic, version of the great game.”

Mr. Martin’s tone of confidence reflected his comfort in the world of computer experts. Mr. Aitel, who runs a popular email list on computer security called Daily Dave, said Mr. Martin regularly emailed the list and him privately, usually expressing his enthusiasm for a technical achievement: “Outstanding! You rock!” he wrote about one exploit, Mr. Aitel said.

For years, Mr. Martin struggled with obesity, and then had gastric bypass surgery and lost a lot of weight, according to acquaintances who did not want to be named because they also did not want to drawn into the investigation. But within a decade, he had gained most of it back, they said.

Not long before his arrest, Mr. Martin exchanged emails with Mr. Aitel about attending Mr. Aitel’s annual security conference, called Infiltrate, scheduled for April in Miami.

“He sounded completely normal,” Mr. Aitel said. “Making plans for the future.”