Category Archives: Middle East

Hacking, the Cheap Nuke Against France

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The widespread global hacking goes unreported both by the victim and by the media. The depths of destruction are not only hard to measure but identifying the hack is just as difficult.

When hacking is visual for all the world to see, it becomes an epic event and more is expected. Hacking is dark, cheap, highly targeted and often leaves only traces that a full team of experts must investigate for months to find. Ask France.

ISIL carries out ‘unprecedented’ hack of French TV network

PARIS // French television network TV5Monde was forced to broadcast only pre-recorded programmes on Thursday after an “unprecedented” hack by self-proclaimed ISIL militants, who also hijacked its websites and social networks.

The Paris-based company, whose programmes are broadcast in more than 200 countries worldwide, was the target of a cyberattack that is “unprecedented for us and unprecedented in the history of television,” TV5Monde boss Yves Bigot said.

“Since 5:00am, we have only been able to put out a single programme on all our channels. For the moment, we are unable to produce our own programmes. We won’t be back up until 2pm,” Mr Bigot added.

“When you work in television… and you find out that your 11 channels are down, of course that’s one of the most dreadful things that can happen to you,” he said.

The hackers took control of the station and its social media operations late Wednesday, blacking out the TV channels and posting documents on its Facebook page purporting to be the identity cards and CVs of relatives of French soldiers involved in anti-ISIIL operations, along with threats against the troops.

“Soldiers of France, stay away from the Islamic State! You have the chance to save your families, take advantage of it,” read one message on TV5Monde’s Facebook page. “The CyberCaliphate continues its cyberjihad against the enemies of Islamic State,” the message added.

TV5Monde regained control of its social networks by 2:00am on Thursday but television broadcasts were likely to take hours, if not days, to return to normal. The attack would have required weeks of preparation, Mr Bigot added.

Its website was still offline at 11am and displaying an “under maintenance” message.

Prime minister Manuel Valls said the hack was an “unacceptable attack on the freedom of information and expression”, voicing “total solidarity with the editorial staff.”

Senior government members flocked to the station to show their support, with interior minister Bernard Cazeneuve saying: “We are up against determined terrorists … we are determined to fight them.”

Foreign minister Laurent Fabius said: “Everything is being done to find those who carried this out, punish them, re-establish the programmes and prevent cyberterrorists threatening freedom of expression in the future.”

The hackers had accused French president Francois Hollande of committing “an unforgivable mistake” by getting involved in “a war that serves no purpose”.

“That’s why the French received the gifts of Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher in January,” it said on the broadcaster’s Facebook page, referring to attacks by gunmen in Paris on the satirical magazine and Jewish supermarket that left 17 people dead over three days.

France is part of a US-led military coalition carrying out air strikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, where the jihadist group has seized swathes of territory and declared a “caliphate”.

Close to 1,500 French nationals have left France to join the militants’ ranks in Iraq and Syria, where they represent almost half the number of European fighters present, according to a report released last Wednesday by the French Senate.

Extremists have become increasingly adept at using the internet to spread propaganda and attack media outlets.

In February, the Twitter feed of Newsweek was briefly hacked and threats were made against president Barack Obama’s family.

And in the immediate aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, hackers claiming to be Islamists hijacked hundreds of French websites, flooding them with militant propaganda.

“We are putting out an emergency programme so that we’re not left with a black screen. We don’t have emails. The whole IT system is down,” TV5Monde’s human resources director, Jean Corneil, said.

The UK Just Went Stupid with MEND

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To read the Manifesto, click here. Of particular note is page 25, spelling out how the UK is and has been in debt to Qatar, which has bought and paid for epic influence in England’s politics.

Zahir Mahmood is another Islamist preacher on the circuit of MEND, the Islamist political agitation group.  Like Yasir Qadhi and Abu Eesa Niamatullah, Mahmood is an excellent match for MEND.

Consider Mahmood’s enthusiastic backing for Hamas. He was a leader of Viva Palestina, George Galloway’s Hamas support operation. Here he is, very excited, at a Viva Palestina rally.

And the other thing is that we cannot allow the perverted narrative to remain the norm. Hamas are not terrorists. They’re freedom fighters, they’re defending their country.
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Alhamdulillah, Ismail Haniyeh [the Hamas leader in Gaza], the prime minister of Palestine, has given all those who went on the convoy Palestinian passports. We are Palestinian nationals! [the audience applauds].

Muslim group with links to extremists boasts of influencing election

A group suspected of being a front for Islamic extremists claims it can control as many as 30 seats in the general election and boasts of acting a “kingmaker”

A front group for Muslim extremists which wants to let British Muslims fight in Syria has boasted that it is “negotiating with the Tory and Labour leadership” to secure some of its demands.

Muslim Engagement and Development (Mend) has built links with both parties – and been chosen as an “official partner” by the Electoral Commission for May’s poll – after claiming to promote “democratic engagement” by Muslims. However, it is actually a facade to win political access and influence for individuals holding extreme, bigoted and anti-democratic views.

Labour’s shadow equalities minister and vice-chair of its national policy forum, Kate Green, spoke at a Mend event last Friday addressed by a man, Abu Eesa Niamatullah, who has called British people “animals,” demanded that women should not work, attacked democracy and said that “the Creator is the one who should decide what the laws should be.”

Baroness Warsi, the former Tory chairman, also spoke at the event.

In new recordings heard by this newspaper, Sufyan Ismail, Mend’s chief executive, describes the group’s strategy to act as “kingmaker” in next month’s election and claims it can control as many as 30 seats.

One Tory candidate in a winnable seat was repeatedly approached by a well-known Muslim figure offering large sums of money for his campaign if he signed up to Mend’s “Muslim manifesto.” The manifesto was launched last month at an event in Parliament attended by at least ten Labour and Conservative MPs, though there is no evidence any of them were paid by Mend. Lynton Crosby, the Conservative campaign director, has attended Mend events.

Mend’s director of engagement, Azad Ali, is an extremist who has supported the killing of British troops, praised the al-Qaeda ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki and said that “democracy, if it means at the expense of not implementing the Sharia, of course no-one agrees with that.”

Mend is holding a series of events this weekend with other extremist, anti-democratic speakers and has close links to the pro-terrorist lobby group Cage.

In a talk seen by the Telegraph at the Zakariyya Central Mosque in Bolton, Mr Ismail said a strong performance by the group’s chosen candidates could make it easier for British citizens to fight in Syria.

“David Cameron recently said that British Jews fighting for the IDF [Israeli army] will not be prosecuted,” Mr Ismail said.

“But British Muslims going to Syria fighting against Assad… will definitely face interrogation. Now do you think that if we landed those 20 seats or 30 seats, he [Cameron] would have the audacity to say that to the Muslim community? Not a chance!”

Mr Ismail also claimed that British society “hates us” and that British law specifically allowed violence against Muslims while protecting other groups.

“It’s not a crime to use violent or threatening words or behaviour [against Muslims],” he said.

“It’s perfectly OK under UK law to hate Islam and Muslims, it’s not a problem…if you’re Muslim, [the law says] you can take liberties big time, that’s why women are getting their hijabs ripped off.”

In fact, there were 550 prosecutions for religiously-aggravated hate crime – most of it anti-Muslim – last year and hundreds more for anti-Muslim crimes under the standard laws against assault and vandalism.

Mr Ismail claimed that a 2013 arson attack which destroyed a Muslim community centre in Muswell Hill had been condoned by the rest of society, saying: “Did you hear one politician condemn it? Even one politician? When was the last time you saw a church burnt to the ground – I bet you can’t think of one.”

The attack was widely condemned by politicians of all parties, including the London mayor, Boris Johnson, who described it as “cowardly” and “pathetic,” the Northern Ireland secretary and local MP, Theresa Villiers, who called it “despicable” and “an attack on all of us” and the shadow home secretary, Yvette Cooper, who said it was a “hate crime.”

At least a dozen churches or church buildings have been burnt to the ground in arson attacks in recent years, and many others seriously damaged.

Mr Ismail also claimed that there were “500 physical attacks” on Muslims, “mainly women,” in London in 2013.

This was the total number of alleged Islamophobic crimes reported to police that year, the vast majority of which were not physical attacks on people.

He cited cases up to eight years old as showing that there was a wave of serious violence happening against Muslims “now” and stated that anti-Muslim hate crime had risen by “more than just about any other hate crime you can imagine.”

In fact, it has risen by less than many other forms of hate crime, including anti-Semitic and homophobic crime, both of which are also far greater per head of population.

The demand to legalise Syria fighters does not appear in Mend’s “Muslim manifesto.”

But the manifesto does demand that Whitehall builds links, cut under the coalition government, with non-violent Islamists.

It also says that “insulting” Islam should be made a criminal offence.

Mend strongly supports Cage and has held joint meetings with it, including in Manchester on November 28 last year. In another talk, at a mosque in Cheadle, Cheshire, Mr Ismail said Cage and another group linked to Syrian jihadis, IERA, “do a really good job.”

As well as Mr Niamatullah, the group also promotes Haitham al-Haddad, a hate preacher who describes democracy as “filthy” and says that “all the kuffar [an insulting term for non-Muslims] will go to hellfire.”

Haddad adds, however, that Muslims are “allowed to vote for a kafir [infidel] system in order to avoid a bigger kafir system taking power.”

Mr Ismail, a tax avoidance millionaire worth a reported £65 million, told the Bolton meeting how the group had organised to “batter the Israeli lobby” in the Commons.

Referring to the election, he said: “Right now, we are negotiating with the Labour leadership, we are negotiating with the Tory leadership and insh’allah [God willing] will start with the Lib Dem leadership as well, where we have a list of manifesto pledges.

“The Muslim vote is worth ten ordinary votes because… we are heavily concentrated in a few areas,” he said.

“Anybody who can give any one party 10, 20, 30 seats, like we can, they have to listen to you.”

Tory sources said Mr Crosby wanted nothing further to do with Mend and did not know why the group was approved to hold a fringe meeting.

However, the party did not respond to questions about Mend’s claim to be in “negotiations” with its leadership.

A Labour spokesman denied any negotiation, saying: “We receive submissions and requests from hundreds of organisations, but it is completely wrong to suggest Mend has any influence over Labour’s manifesto process.”

 

Iran Parameter Framework by the Numbers

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To see the Iran parameters framework by the numbers and with charts, click here.

In what represents the worst aspect of this flawed deal, Obama has placed responsibility for verification of the agreement back on the United Nations. This is a hazardous repeat of the flawed UN response to Iraq’s proliferation after the Gulf War. Simply put, the UN Security Council will have veto powers over anything Iranian and nuclear when it comes to verification. This gives Beijing, and even more Moscow, a critical lever over the process.

We’ve seen this movie before, with Iraq in the 1990s. Charles Duelfer, who led the UN’s nuclear inspection regime in Iraq from 1993 to 2000, has termed this the “fatal flaw” of Obama’s deal, and that may be charitable. Yeltsin’s Russia was not very cooperative about Baghdad’s nuclear game-playing, and we should expect Putin’s Kremlin, which is engaged in Cold War 2.0 against the West, to be anything but helpful.

While Tehran and Moscow have no love for each other, between mutual fear and loathing, they both hate the West more, and any deal that puts Putin’s Kremlin in a verification role over Iran’s nuclear program is a farce, not to mention a strategic delusion. At worst, this may give a strategic partnership between Russia and Iran, which has been growing slowly, a new life, with an explicitly anti-Western focus. None of this can be mistaken for good news for the West.

After years of painstaking effort, the Obama administration has managed to craft a framework agreement with Iran. In the next three months, this structure is meant to be filled out with details regarding the scale of Iran’s enrichment capacity and the stages of sanctions relief. If the devil is in the detail, much mischief may await us.

 

However, even before all this happens, the Iranian nuclear drama is proving to be one of the most curious arms control episodes in history. As the scale of American concessions becomes evident, the White House and its defenders seldom justify the emerging accord strictly on terms of the proliferation threat that remains. Their response is often limited to claiming that an admittedly imperfect agreement is still preferable to the alternatives. And the alternatives are usually painted in hysterical terms with Iran surging toward the bomb, the sanctions regime collapsing and an isolated United States helplessly watching all this unfold. Not for the first time, the Obama administration is demonstrating a poor understanding of Iran’s strategies, the resilience of the sanctions regime and the nature of the international system.

By this time the essential contours of the agreement are all obvious. The accord will leave Iran with a sizeable enrichment capacity and none of its facilities will be shuttered as was once contemplated. The agreement’s most important sunset clause will be 10 years upon whose expiration, all essential restriction on Iran’s enrichment infrastructure will collapse. In essence, Iran can then move toward an industrial-size nuclear program similar to that of Japan. This means that the Islamic Republic will be in a position to manufacture numerous bombs on short order. The ballistic missiles, which are an essential part of any nuclear weapons program, will be excluded from the deal. And previous Iranian experiments with the military dimension of nuclear energy are postponed from scrutiny. Thus, any verification regime will not be informed by the history of Iran’s clandestine program.

The proponents of this deal have to account for why they are not bothered by such a large residual enrichment capacity. Why do they think a sunset clause is a wise idea? Why do they believe ballistic missiles should be ignored and how can once craft an intrusive verification system that has no historical memory? An arms control agreement has to be justified first and foremost on technical grounds and whether it meets the essential non-proliferation standards.

The path that the proponents of this accord have chosen is to avoid such questions and take refuge in the world of ominous alternatives. One of their favorite talking points is to suggest that coercion has not forestalled Iran’s nuclear path and that since 2003 as sanctions were imposed Iran has gone from 200 to 19,000 centrifuges. They neglect to mention that only approximately 9,500 of those machines are operational. Thus, during this period Iran increased its capacity by an average of 800 centrifuges a year. Although this is hardly ideal it is not an unmanageable situation. The notion that without this agreement Iran would immediately surge to a bomb is belied by the evidence that the proponents of this accord present.

Beyond that what is often missed is that Iran’s ingenious strategy is to advance its program incrementally and not provocatively. Iran has always been cautious to step and not leap forward. This way as Iran’s program inches forward, the international community routinely accedes to its new gains. In absence of an agreement, Iran will certainly take measures to advance its program, but those moves are likely to be cautious and incremental so to avoid a military reaction.

It is often suggested that should there be breakdown in the talks, the sanctions regime will collapse. The European states and Asian powers will rush back into Iran in defiance of American prohibitions. This notion ignores the fact that U.S. sanctions are secondary in nature, meaning that if there is European bank or an Asian firm that wishes to invest in Iran then it will lose its access to the U.S. market. There is no way that such firms will risk losing access to a U.S. economy estimated at $16.8 trillion dollars for sake of an Iranian economy of $368 billion. To be frank, the U.S. sanctions can success even if there is a perception that they are unfair. That is one of the advantages of being a superpower with the largest economy in the world.

None of this means the Iran deal is beyond repair. In the next three months, Secretary of State John Kerry has an opportunity to craft an agreement that addresses some of the deficiencies of the framework accord. He may wish to reconsider the wisdom of such a shortened sunset clause. The need for Iran to come clean on all its previous attempts at nuclear weaponization is critical if the agreement is to have a reliable inspection regime. And the ballistic missiles that are already part of UN resolutions should be addressed as part of this agreement and not separately. Finally, there has to be a mechanism in place for how to deal with Iranian violations. The history of arms control suggests that violations are rarely prosecuted and reversed in a timely manner.

Should he do so, he would have forged a deal that reliably restrains Iran’s nuclear appetite, enjoys bipartisan support at home and is embraced by our allies in the region. And that agreement would be worthy of the appellation historic.

Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/iran-deal-flaws-116655.html#ixzz3WHp3dOpf

Who is that Woman Standing Next to You?

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How One Philadelphia Woman Tweeted Her Way to Federal Terrorism-Related Charges

April 3, 2015 In the case of one Philadelphia woman with aspirations to join the Islamic State, retweets do equal endorsements.

The Justice Department charged Keonna Thomas, 30, on Friday with “knowingly attempting to provide material support and resources, including herself as personnel, to a designated foreign terrorist organization,” the Islamic State. Starting about two years ago, Thomas—who also went by two aliases, Fatayat Al Khilafah and YoungLioness—allegedly began communicating with known jihadi fighters online and using social media to advocate on the terrorist organization’s behalf.

If convicted, Thomas faces 15 years in prison.

Thomas is the third American woman in two days to be charged with a crime related to terrorism. But whereas the two New York City women charged Thursday were operating in real life, it seems Thomas’s activity online tipped off investigators.

Much of the criminal complaint against Thomas focuses on her Twitter habits, detailing several incriminating tweets and retweets. (All claims are alleged until proven in court.) Here’s a sampling from the indictment:

• On December 17, 2013, Thomas retweeted a message by another user that read ” ‘Happiness is the day of my martyrdom’ – Sheikh Khalid al Husainan.’ ” On January 4, 2014, she tweeted, “Only thing I’m jealous of is when I see the smiles of shuhadda,” which refers to martyrs.

• On January 30, 2014, Thomas retweeted a photograph of an individual carrying an AK-47, with an accompanying message that read: “Sponsor a Mujahid,” a jihadi fighter.

• On April 4, 2014, she posted images of a gun, skull, and flames on Twitter, along with a message: “I need a permanent vacation that can only mean one thing.”

• On June 23, 2014, she tweeted: “When you’re a mujahid, your death becomes a wedding.”

• By December 2014, Thomas’s Twitter rhetoric had escalated, and she had begun to email with a known Islamic State fighter overseas. On December 2, Thomas wrote a message that read: “If we truly knew the realities … we all would be rushing to join our brothers in the front lines pray ALLAH accept us as shuhada,” or martyrs. Four days after, she reposted a photo of a young boy armed with an AK-47. The image was accompanied by a message that read: “And if I were in Shaam,” referring to Syria, “I wouldn’t be pleased till I became soldier of the Islamic State.”

• In February of this year, Thomas applied for a U.S. passport. The same month, she emailed the Islamic State fighter to say that she had deactivated her Twitter account in preparation for her travel to Syria. “[D]on’t want to draw attention of the kuffar [non-believers] and it mess my plans and they take my pass port and i get stuck here.”

In March, Thomas purchased an electronic visa to Turkey, a common transit point for people trying to reach Syria from Europe, but she never made it to either country. She had broken the most important rule of the 21st century. No, not the rule against trying to join an overseas terrorist group that has repeatedly threatened your country and its allies (although that’s really bad). Thomas broke the first tenet of the Internet: Don’t tweet something you wouldn’t want on the front page of The New York Times.

Final Details on Today’s Iran Framework

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Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
 Enrichment
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Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
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Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
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Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
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All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
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Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
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Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
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Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
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Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only  – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
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Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
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Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
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Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
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Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
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Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
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Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to  by the P5+1.
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For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
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The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
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Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
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Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
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Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows  production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will  be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
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All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be  placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
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A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of
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certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
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Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
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Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
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Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
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Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
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Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
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The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
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Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
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Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
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Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
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Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
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Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
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U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
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The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
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All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
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However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and  ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
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A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
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If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
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U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
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For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development  – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
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For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
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Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
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Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.