Category Archives: ISIS ISIL Islamic State Caliphate

America First – A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again

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Read the proposed budget here from the White House.

Image result for trump proposed budget CrayNews

Reuters: President Donald Trump will ask the U.S. Congress for dramatic cuts to many federal programs as he seeks to bulk up defense spending, start building a wall on the border with Mexico and spend more money deporting illegal immigrants.

In a federal budget proposal with many losers, the Environmental Protection Agency and State Department stand out as targets for the biggest spending reductions. Funding would disappear altogether for 19 independent bodies that count on federal money for public broadcasting, the arts and regional issues from Alaska to Appalachia.

Image result for trump proposed budget BusinessInsider

Trump’s budget outline is a bare-bones plan covering just “discretionary” spending for the 2018 fiscal year starting on Oct. 1. It is the first volley in what is expected to be an intense battle over spending in coming months in Congress, which holds the federal purse strings and seldom approves presidents’ budget plans.

Congress, controlled by Trump’s fellow Republicans, may reject some or many of his proposed cuts. Some of the proposed changes, which Democrats will broadly oppose, have been targeted for decades by conservative Republicans.

In addition to the fiscal year 2018 request, a copy of a supplemental budget for fiscal year 2017 obtained by Reuters shows the administration plans to ask for $30 billion for the Department of Defense and $3 billion for the Department of Homeland Security.

The funds would be allocated this year to cover procurement of military technology such as F-35 fighter aircraft and drone systems, begin construction on the U.S.-Mexico border wall and increase detention space for migrants. Congress likely will consider the supplemental request by April 28, when the current regular funding expires.

Moderate Republicans already have expressed unease with potential cuts to popular domestic programs such as home-heating subsidies, clean-water projects and job training.

OPEN FOR DISCUSSION

Trump is willing to discuss priorities, said White House budget director Mick Mulvaney, a former South Carolina congressman who made a name for himself as a spending hawk before Trump plucked him for his Cabinet.

“The president wants to spend more money on defense, more money securing the border, more money enforcing the laws, and more money on school choice, without adding to the deficit,” Mulvaney told a small group of reporters during a preview on Wednesday.

“If they have a different way to accomplish that, we are more than interested in talking to them,” Mulvaney said.

Democrats criticized the proposal as lacking in detail and said it would be devastating to American families.

“President Trump is not making anyone more secure with a budget that hollows out our economy and endangers working families,” said House of Representatives Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi. “Throwing billions at defense while ransacking America’s investments in jobs, education, clean energy and lifesaving medical research will leave our nation weakened.”

Trump wants to spend $54 billion more on defense, put a down payment on his border wall, and breathe life into a few other campaign promises. His initial budget outline does not incorporate his promise to pour $1 trillion into roads, bridges, airports and other infrastructure projects. The White House has said the infrastructure plan is still to come.

The defense increases are matched by cuts to other programs so as to not increase the $488 billion federal deficit. Mulvaney acknowledged the proposal would likely result in significant cuts to the federal workforce.

“You can’t drain the swamp and leave all the people in it,” Mulvaney said.

The Department of Homeland Security would get a 6.8 percent increase, with more money for extra staff needed to catch, detain and deport illegal immigrants.

WALL MONEY

Trump wants Congress to shell out $1.5 billion for the border wall with Mexico in the current fiscal year – enough for pilot projects to determine the best way to build it – and a further $2.6 billion in fiscal 2018, Mulvaney said.

The estimate of the full cost of the wall will be included in the full budget, expected in mid-May, which will project spending and revenues over 10 years.

Trump has vowed Mexico will pay for the border wall, which the Mexican government has flatly said it will not do. The White House has said recently that funding would be kick-started in the United States.

The voluminous budget document will include economic forecasts and Trump’s views on “mandatory entitlements” – big-ticket programs like Social Security and Medicare, which Trump vowed to protect on the campaign trail.

Trump asked Congress to slash the EPA by $2.6 billion or more than 31 percent, and the State Department by more than 28 percent or $10.9 billion.

Mulvaney said the “core functions” of those agencies would be preserved. Hit hard would be foreign aid, grants to multilateral development agencies like the World Bank and climate change programs at the United Nations.

Trump wants to get rid of more than 50 EPA programs, end funding for former Democratic President Barack Obama’s signature Clean Power Plan aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions, and cut renewable energy research programs at the Energy Department.

Regional programs to clean up the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay would be sent to the chopping block.

Community development grants at the Housing Department – around since 1974 – were cut in Trump’s budget, along with more than 20 Education Department programs, including some funding program for before- and after- school programs.

Anti-poverty grants and a program that helps poor people pay their energy bills would be slashed, as well as a Labor Department program that helps low-income seniors find work.

Trump’s rural base did not escape cuts. The White House proposed a 21 percent reduction to the Agriculture Department, cutting loans and grants for wastewater, reducing staff in county offices and ending a popular program that helps U.S. farmers donate crops for overseas food aid.

Russian Special Forces now in Libya

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Image result for Khalifa Haftar libya oil ports Haftar was protected by and lived in the U.S., becoming a citizen. We dispatched him to Libya to launch an interim government. Now he and Egypt both have turned to Russia for full control and support, Putin has complied, happily. John Kerry, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama are not responding to calls on line 4. Hah…

BBC: Forces loyal to Libyan military strongman Khalifa Haftar say they have retaken key oil-rich areas in the country’s east.

Ground, sea and air forces were engaged in the fight for sites at Ras Lanuf, Sidra and Ben Jawad from a rival Islamist militia, a spokesman said.

Meanwhile, Russia has denied reports that it has deployed special forces to the region in support of Gen Haftar. {See below, emphasis added}

Libya has been in chaos since the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi in 2011.

The oil terminals had been seized by the Benghazi Defence Brigades (BDB) – a mix of militias that includes Islamists – earlier this month, which then handed them over to the Petroleum Facilities Guard, affiliated to the UN-backed unity government based in Tripoli.

Gen Haftar is allied to an administration based in the eastern city of Tobruk, which is challenging the authority of the UN-backed government.

Russia moving special forces into Libya

U.S. sources claim Russia moving special forces into Libya to aid Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar.

U.S., Egyptian and diplomatic sources say that Russia has apparently been moving special forces to an airbase in western Egypt near the border with Libya in recent days, according to a report by Reuters.

Image result for Khalifa Haftar Newsweek

The U.S. is concerned that such a Russian deployment may signify Russian support for Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar, who suffered a setback on March 3 when the Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB) attacked oil ports controlled by his forces.

U.S. officials claimed that their surveillance units had observed Russian special operations forces and unmanned aircraft at Sidi Barrani, which is about 100 km from the Egypt-Libya border. The apparent Russian deployments have not been previously reported.

The Russian defense ministry did not respond to these claims on Monday and Egypt denied the presence of any Russian contingent on its soil.

Mohamed Manfour, commander of the Benina air base near Benghazi in Libya, denied that Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) had received military assistance from the Russian state or from Russian military contractors, and said there were no Russian forces or bases in eastern Libya.

Over the past two years a number of Western countries, including the U.S., have sent special operations forces and military advisors into Libya. The U.S. also carried out air strikes to support a successful Libyan campaign last year to oust ISIS from its stronghold in the city of Sirte.

Russia has shown increasing involvement in Libya in recent months and appears to be taking steps to back Haftar to lead the battle-torn kingdom, which has been split between local warlords in the aftermath of a 2011 NATO-backed uprising against the late leader Muammar Gaddafi, who was an ally of Russia. Several dozen armed private security contractors from Russia operated until February in a part of Libya that is under Haftar’s control.

The top U.S. military commander overseeing troops in Africa, Marine General Thomas Waldhauser, told the U.S. Senate last week that Russia was trying to exert influence in Libya to strengthen its leverage over whoever ultimately holds power.

“They’re working to influence that,” Waldhauser told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday. Asked whether it was in the U.S. interest to let that happen, Waldhauser said: “It is not.”

Russian involvement in Libyan affairs appears to be growing at a time when it is limiting its operations in Syria to attempts to force a resolution without taking charge of the country. Waldhauser believes that this is Russia’s eventual goal in Libya, which will enable it to gain leverage there in the event that Haftar gains control of the country. It is also eyeing Libya’s oil fields as a source of economic opportunities.

Image result for libya oil ports

Russia, however, says that its primary objective in the Middle East is to contain the spread of violent Islamist groups.

Meanwhile who is Khalifa Belqasim Haftar? (Wikipedia file)

Haftar was born in eastern Libya. He served in the Libyan army under Muammar Gaddafi, and took part in the coup that brought Gaddafi to power in 1969. He commanded the Libyan contingent against Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.[3] In 1987, he became a prisoner of war during the war against Chad. While held prisoner, he and his fellow officers formed a group hoping to overthrow Gaddafi. He was released around 1990 in a deal with the United States government and spent nearly two decades in the United States, gaining U.S. citizenship.[4] Haftar lived comfortably in Virginia, relatively close to CIA headquarters, from the early 1990s until 2011.[5] In 1993, while living in the United States, he was convicted in absentia of crimes against the Jamahiriya and sentenced to death.

Haftar held a senior position in the forces which overthrew Gaddafi in the 2011 Libyan Civil War. In 2014 he was commander of the Libyan Army when the General National Congress (GNC) refused to give up power in accordance with its term of office. Haftar launched a campaign against the GNC and its Islamic fundamentalist allies. His campaign allowed elections to take place to replace the GNC, but then developed into a civil war.

Haftar’s campaign attracted opponents to the GNC to join him as well as armed groups including Zintan‘s al-Qaqaa and Sawaaq brigades, regional military police, the Saiqa special forces group in Benghazi, the Libyan air force and Ibrahim Jadhran’s federalist militias.[6]

Haftar has been described as “Libya’s most potent warlord,” having fought “with and against nearly every significant faction” in Libya’s conflicts, and as having a “reputation for unrivalled military experience”.

***

Internal rivalries based on region, city, tribe, political factions, ethnicity, and militia membership have supplanted dictatorial repression. The costs of this multi-layered disunity are stark: Libya has lost billions of dollars in potential revenues due to fights over control of the oil sector. And nearly 5,000 people have been killed due to the instability since 2014, when Libya formally divided politically.

Perhaps the most immediate barrier to implementation is the role of General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Although Secretary of State John Kerry did not mention him by name in his statement in Vienna after the meeting to support Libya on May 16, Haftar was clearly on his mind when he said battles of individuals serving their own interests undermined Libya’s security, and that Libya was at a crossroads between a fate of chaos fueled by personal rivalries or unity and peace. Article Eight of the current agreement stipulates that the Presidency Council should be the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army, in control of all senior-level security official appointments and dismissals. In effect, this provision would give the Presidency Council control of Haftar’s fate. The pro-Haftar eastern government has made removal of this article one of its few conditions for recognizing the Government of National Accord (GNA).

This impasse underscores the need for Libyans to decide once and for all what relationship the military should have with civilian institutions in Libya, and specifically what role Haftar can or will play in the future of Libya. This has also been a difficult impasse for Western governments to navigate, harkening to a recurring Middle East policy battle between prioritizing counter-terrorism and security, and longer-term interests like political stability, rule of law and human rights. Haftar has contributed to counter-terrorism efforts against groups like Islamic State, especially in Benghazi, while undermining Libya’s long-term stability. More here from May of 2016.

U.S. Military Footprint in Syria Expands

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The hunt for ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also continues in earnest. Raqqa is now surrounded by Kurdish and Free Syrian forces and Mosul is crumbling, a military official told ABC News, promising al-Baghdadi’s death at the hands of the U.S.-led coalition is “just a matter of time.”

In Syria, coalition military forces conducted eight strikes consisting of 11 engagements against ISIS targets:

— Near Abu Kamal, two strikes destroyed a wellhead and an oil inlet manifold.

— Near Raqqa, two strikes engaged an ISIS tactical unit, destroyed two vehicles, and suppressed an ISIS tactical unit.

— Near Dayr Az Zawr, two strikes destroyed four tactical vehicles, four ISIS-held buildings, two wellheads, two engineering equipment pieces and a tank.

— Near Manbij, two strikes destroyed a vehicle and an artillery system.

Related reading: US-backed forces in Syria have isolated ISIS’s last stronghold in the country

All strikes are conducted by fighter, attack, bomber, rotary-wing or remotely piloted aircraft; rocket-propelled artillery; and some ground-based tactical artillery when fired on planned targets, officials noted.

U.S. Special Forces have been on the move in northern Syria, deploying near the city of Manbij over the weekend to act as a buffer between American-backed Syrian militias and forces controlled by Turkey. Photos have emerged of U.S. Stryker vehicles configured for the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment and specialized Humvees used by Special Forces moving near the city, and U.S. officials confirmed that the American presence around the city had been beefed up. The Ankara-backed Free Syrian Army militia — bolstered by Turkish special forces — moved on Manbij last week, as Turkish officials said they wanted to clear the Kurdish YPG out of the area. Local Syrian forces and the U.S. military deny that the Kurdish forces are near the city.

On a recent trip to northern Syria, FP’s Paul McLeary spent time with both U.S. Special Forces and their local allies near the city, and found the Syrians clearly worried about the Turkish threat. The view from Baghdad. Speaking with FP on Monday, spokesman for the U.S. military command in Baghdad Col. John Dorrian said the American troop presence in Syria and Iraq hasn’t grown, despite the movement of more U.S. troops to Manbij. “There are adequate forces in the area” to handle the situation and “reassure our allies and our partners,” he said. The Manbij Military Council has also said that it turned back a Russian convoy of armored vehicles and troops that tried to enter the area, but Dorrian said he hasn’t seen any increase in Russian troops or aircraft around the city.
“Until now, U.S. military commanders have ruled out anything beyond some artillery support and an advisory role for U.S. special operations forces. But some officials and administration advisors are open to at least considering the idea of using conventional forces in a full-fledged combat role.”

  US SOF base at cement plant between Manbij, Raqqa.

A Syrian MiG-23 crashed in Turkey and the pilot is now claiming he was shot down.  Reuters reports that the pilot, who was rescued by Turkish authorities, says he was downed while flying over Idlib. The Islamist rebel group Ahrar al-Sham has claimed responsibility for downing the aircraft although the assertion has yet to be independently verified. The rescue by Turkey marks yet another sign of the turnaround in relations between Ankara, the Assad regime, and its supporters. In November 2015, a Turkish F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24 carrying out operations over Syria after it violated Turkish airspace, leading to a lengthy and bitter dispute between Turkey and Russia.

***

On Sunday, Syrian forces pushed ahead with their military campaign against the Takfiri Jabhat Fatah al-Sham group, formerly known as al-Nusra Front, in the Dar’a al-Balad neighborhood of the southwestern city of Dara’a, managing to retake several blocks of buildings, Syria’s official news agency, SANA, reported.

Large groups of the militants were killed in the areas of al-Masri, al-Karak and al-Arba’een.

Separately, the Syrian government forces targeted Daesh (ISIL or ISIS) positions on the southern outskirts of al-Qassr village in the northeastern countryside of Sweida province, leaving dozens of the terrorists dead and injured.

Additionally, the Daesh militants suffered serious setbacks in the western city of Deir ez-Zor after the army and its allies shelled their positions in the areas of al-Bogheiliyeh, Hatla, al-Sannof, al-Rwad, al-Sinaa and al-Rushdiye in the province.

Syria has been gripped by civil war since March 2011 with various terrorist groups, including Daesh, currently controlling parts of it.

 

Terrorists in U.S. Several Years Before Being Radicalized, then Canada

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The Homeland Security report is based on unclassified information from Justice Department press releases on terrorism-related convictions and attackers killed in the act, State Department visa statistics, the 2016 Worldwide Threat Assessment from the U.S. intelligence community and the State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.

The three-page report challenges Trump’s core claims. It said that of 82 people the government determined were inspired by a foreign terrorist group to carry out or try to carry out an attack in the United States, just over half were U.S. citizens born in the United States. The others were from 26 countries, led by Pakistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq and Uzbekistan. Of these, only Somalia and Iraq were among the seven nations included in the ban.

Of the other five nations, one person each from Iran, Sudan and Yemen was also involved in those terrorism cases, but none from Syria. It did not say if any were Libyan.

The report also found that terrorist organizations in Iran, Libya, Somalia and Sudan are regionally focused, while groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen do pose a threat to the U.S.

The seven countries were included in a law President Barack Obama signed in 2015 that updated visa requirements for foreigners who had traveled to those countries. More here from Associated Press.

Then we have the gullible Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau who has invited Middle Eastern migrants, asylees and refugees in a welcome to Canada. Yet the intelligence and security authorities in Canada have a different position.

Terrorism

The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and Al Qaeda (AQ) continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada.

Infographic: A terrorism timeline of incidents involving Canadians between October 20, 2014 and September 30, 2016. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Terrorism timeline

Terrorism Timeline

As of December 31, 2016

  • October 20, 2014
    CAF member killed in a ramming attack in Saint-Jean-Sur-Richelieu
  • October 22, 2014
    CAF member fatally shot at the Canadian War Memorial in Ottawa
  • January 14, 2016
    Canadian killed in an attack on a Starbucks in Jakarta, Indonesia
  • January 16, 2016
    6 Canadians killed during an attack on their hotel in Burkina Faso
  • March 14, 2016
    2 CAF members stabbed at a CAF recruiting centre in Toronto
  • April 25, 2016
    Canadian beheaded by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines
  • June 12, 2016
    Canadian beheaded by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines
  • June 25, 2016
    Canadian killed in an attack on the Somali parliament, Somalia
  • December 18, 2016
    Canadian killed in an attack in Karak, Jordan
2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to CanadaThe principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and Al Qaeda (AQ) continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada.

As in recent years, the Government of Canada has continued to monitor and respond to the threat of extremist travellers, that is, individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity. The phenomenon of extremist travellers—including those abroad, those who return, and even those prevented from travelling—poses a range of security concerns for Canada. As of the end of 2016, the Government was aware of approximately 180 individuals with a nexus to Canada who were abroad and who were suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. The Government was also aware of a further 60 extremist travellers who had returned to Canada.

The threat environment has also evolved beyond Canada’s borders. Daesh has continued to dominate the landscape in the Middle East, where other terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah also operate. Elsewhere in the Middle East, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the civil conflict in Yemen to capture territory there and strengthen itself. In addition, 2016 saw Daesh’s expansion in Africa, and Boko Haram (now rebranded as a Daesh affiliate in West Africa) continues to pose a major threat to regional stability. In South and Southeast Asia, Daesh expansionism and entrenched regional groups shaped the threat environment.

Canadians and Canadian interests are also affected. Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel, government officials and private citizens are under constant threat in certain regions. In September 2015, two Canadians were kidnapped in the Philippines. Both were killed by their captors in the spring of 2016. In January 2016, an AQ-affiliated group based in Mali attacked a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing six Canadians. That same month, attackers linked to Daesh targeted a coffee shop in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing one Canadian. In June 2016, a Somali government minister with Canadian citizenship was killed in an Al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also in June, 15 Nepalese security guards who protected the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan in Kabul were killed when terrorists targeted the bus that was transporting them to work.

International Cooperation

The international security environment continues to result in increased threats to Canada and its interests, both domestically and abroad. Ongoing conflicts in several regions of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Eastern Europe and elsewhere show no signs of abating and continue to have serious national and international security implications. Worldwide incidents of terrorism, espionage, weapons proliferation, illegal migration, cyber-attacks and other acts targeting Canadians—directly or indirectly—remain ever present. Since the bulk of such threats originate from (or have a nexus to) regions beyond Canada’s borders, CSIS needs to be prepared and equipped to investigate the threat anywhere.

Additionally, certain security threats continue to evolve. Over the past several years, the globalization of terrorism, fueled by elaborate online propaganda videos by extremist groups, has expanded the breadth of radicalization. In some instances, individuals influenced by extremist ideology and driven by a need to feed their sense of belonging have travelled (or attempted to travel) abroad to participate in terrorist activity. Others may continue to support their extremist ideology through training, fundraising, recruitment and attack planning within Canada. As the threat posed by ‘foreign fighters’ is international in scope, a global reach is an absolute necessity in efforts to track and thwart threats to Canada and its allies posed by such individuals.

Furthermore, while the international focus has been on countering terrorism, espionage threats remain ever present and have become far more complex due to continuing advancements in technology and the globalization of communications. On the cyber front, foreign governments and hackers continue to exploit the Internet and other means to target critical infrastructure and information systems of other countries.

Such threats cannot be countered in isolation, and CSIS must remain adaptable in order to keep abreast of developments in both the domestic and international spheres. Despite differences in mandate, structure or vision, security intelligence agencies around the globe are all faced with very similar priorities and challenges. To meet the Government of Canada’s priority intelligence requirements, CSIS maintains a well-established network of relationships with foreign agencies. In accordance with s.17(1)(b) of the CSIS Act, all such arrangements are authorized by the Minister of Public Safety and supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These arrangements provide CSIS access to timely information linked to a number of threats and allow the Service (and, in turn, the Government of Canada) to obtain information which might otherwise not be available.

As of March 31, 2016, CSIS had established over 300 foreign arrangements in some 150 countries. Of those, 69 remain defined as ‘Dormant’ (due to a lack of need for engagement or exchanges for a period of one year or more), while nine remained defined as ‘Restricted’ due to concerns over the affected agencies’ respect for human rights or its reliability. The human rights reputations of foreign agencies with which CSIS engages is not something which the Service takes lightly. In order to mitigate potential risks of sharing information, CSIS regularly assesses its foreign relationships and reviews various government and non-government human rights reports for all countries with which the Service has implemented ministerially approved arrangements, always cognizant of the fact that our first responsibility is to the Canadian people and their safety. CSIS opposes in the strongest possible terms the mistreatment of any individual by a foreign agency. The Service must and does comply with Canada’s laws and legal obligations in sharing information with foreign entities, and expects the same from its foreign counterparts.

Terrorist Group Profiles

The Cyber Threat

Cyber threats from hostile actors continue to evolve. State-sponsored entities and terrorists alike are using Computer Network Operations (CNO) directed against Canadian interests, both domestically and abroad. Canada remains both a target for malicious cyber activities, and a platform from which these hostile actors conduct CNO against entities in other countries.

Infographic: Graphic depicting Canadian sectors vulnerable to cyber threats. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Canadian sectors at risk

The Cyber Threat

  • Energy and utilities
  • Information and communication technology
  • Finance
  • Health
  • Food
  • Water
  • Transportation
  • Safety
  • Government
  • Manufacturing
These state-sponsored and terrorist CNO actors are increasing in number, capability and aggression, and have access to a growing range of tools and techniques that they can employ to accomplish their mission. As these tools and techniques evolve and become more complex, so too do the challenges of detecting and attributing CNO.

Moreover, despite the fact that they originate in the virtual realm, the consequences of CNO can be very real. For example, in December 2015, a cyber-attack conducted against three Ukrainian power companies resulted in a power outage that left hundreds of thousands of people in the dark. The type of systems the actors exploited in this attack is used by energy companies worldwide. Should such destructive cyber-operations be targeted against similar systems in Canada, they could potentially affect any and all areas of its critical infrastructure.

Unfortunately, CNOs are not uncommon and agencies at all levels of government in Canada have faced this threat. The Government of Canada witnesses serious attempts to penetrate its networks on a daily basis.

CSIS is also aware of state-sponsored cyber-espionage and influence activities targeting the private sector in Canada and abroad. The targets of these attacks often fall within Canada’s advanced technology sector and throughout the critical infrastructure spectrum. Universities engaged in advanced research and development have also been subjected to CNO. In addition to stealing intellectual property, one of the objectives of state-sponsored CNO is to obtain information which will give their own companies a competitive edge over Canadian firms. This could impact investment or acquisition negotiations involving Canadian companies and the Government of Canada, and, in turn, lead to lost jobs, revenue, and market share. Ultimately, cyber-espionage negatively impacts Canada’s economy as a whole.

In responding to these threats, CSIS relies on specialized collection techniques to report on state-sponsored cyber-espionage or cyber-terrorism activity. For instance, by analyzing networks or malware behind CNOs, the Service can uncover clues that help identify the origins of the cyber-attacks (known as “attribution”).

The Service also maintains relationships with domestic and foreign agencies to provide the Government of Canada with the most up-to-date intelligence regarding the cyber threats facing Canada and who is behind them.

Security Screening program

The CSIS Security Screening program represents one of the most visible of the Service’s operational sectors. It helps defend Canada and Canadians from threats to national security emanating from terrorism and extremism, espionage, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Security screening prevents persons who pose these threats from entering or obtaining status in Canada, or from obtaining access to sensitive sites, government assets or information. In addition, through its government screening program, CSIS assists the RCMP with the accreditation process for Canadians and foreign nationals seeking access to or participating in major events in Canada.

2014-2015 2015-2016

Note: Figures have been rounded
**Individuals claiming refugee status in Canada or at ports of entry

Infographic: Statistics on the security screening program at CSIS for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 fiscal years. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Statistics from the security screening program

Statistics from the security screening program

Immigration and Citizenship Screening Programs
Requests received* 2014-2015 2015-2016
Permanent resident applications 33,900 56,500
Refugees (front-end screening)** 10,200 13,500
Citizenship applications 185,600 124,000
Temporary resident applications 46,600 56,700
Total 276,300 250,700

*Note: Figures have been rounded
** Individuals claiming refugee status in Canada or at ports of entry

Government Screening Programs
Requests received* 2014-2015 2015-2016
Federal government departments 53,700 51,200
Site access
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) 10,700 21,400
Transport Canada (Marine and Airport) 40,400 43,700
Parliamentary precinct 1,200 4,300
Nuclear facilities 8,700 12,700
Provinces 210 220
Others 3,400 4,600
Foreign screening 610 580
Special events accreditation 35,600 87,400
Total 154,520 226,100

* Figures have been rounded

Long description of infographic: Statistics for the 2015 Pan Am Games

Statistics for the 2015 Pan Am Games

In fiscal years 2014-2015 and 2015-2016, CSIS completed 119,000 requests for the accreditation of applicants to the Toronto 2015 Pan Am/Parapan Am Games.

Read more about the CSIS Security Screening program

The CSIS Security Screening program also played a key role in achieving the Government of Canada’s goal to resettle 25,000 refugees from Syria by February 29, 2016. Between November 2015 and February 2016, CSIS conducted screening investigations on the applicants selected for resettlement in Canada. CSIS continues to work closely with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) to provide timely security advice regarding permanent resident applicants who could represent a threat to Canada’s national security, while ensuring legitimate refugees are screened and resettled in a timely manner.

A Unique Workplace

The people of CSIS are committed to ensuring a Service that is nimble, flexible and innovative, and takes responsible risks in the delivery of its mandate and in the pursuit of its strategic outcome.

As of March 31, 2016
Infographic: the make-up of CSIS workforce and awards received. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Statistics related to CSIS’ workforce and awards received

A Unique Workplace

Service population

  • 3,200+ employees
  • women 48%
  • men 52%

Employment equity

  • member of visible minorities 15%
  • women 48%
  • aboriginal peoples 2%
  • persons with disabilities  4%

Language

  • foreign language 18%
  • unilingual 32%
  • bilingual 69%

Awards and recognition

  • Canada’s top 100 employers – 8th consecutive year
  • National Capital Region’s top employers – 9th consecutive year
  • Canada’s top employers for young people – 1st year

Recruiting

Recruiting the right talent to deliver on our mandate remains a key priority for the Service and the CSIS recruiting website, csiscareers.ca represents the cornerstone of our efforts. During 2014-2016, there were over 2 million hits to the site resulting in close to 90,000 applications being submitted.

Infographic: Statistics from csiscareers.ca and the total applications received during 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. Long description below.

Visit the CSIS recruiting site(External link)

Long description of infographic: Statistics from the CSIS recruiting site

Statistics from the CSIS recruiting site

Hits to csiscareers.ca
Hits to website Applications received
2014-2015 1,116,335 44,598
2015-2016 916,379 45,166

CSIS. smart career choice visit our website

The Service prioritizes a diverse workforce which allows us to better understand the demographics of the Canadian communities we protect, therefore better equipping us to collect relevant and accurate intelligence. Our recruiting team includes a diversity recruiter who liaises with a variety of community leaders across the country, and attends diversity job fairs and networking events in an effort to attract applicants from designated groups such as visible minorities, Aboriginal peoples and persons with disabilities.

In addition, a partnership has been established with Public Safety, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Correctional Service Canada (CSC), Communication Security Establishment (CSE) and Department of National Defence to share best recruiting practices and hold joint initiatives.

Academic Outreach

The Academic Outreach (AO) program at CSIS seeks to promote conversations with experts from a variety of disciplines and cultural backgrounds working in universities, think tanks and other research institutions in Canada and abroad.

Infographic: Statistics related to the Academic Outreach program for 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: Academic Outreach statistics

Academic Outreach statistics

Academic Outreach statistics
2014-2015 2015-2016
Expert briefings 46 38
Visiting experts 101 110
Workshops and seminars 12 17
Conferences 2 1
Publications 2 3

Infographic: Academic Outreach publications from 2014-2016. Long description below.

Political Stability in West and North Africa - Highlights from the Conference Pitfalls and Promises: Security Implications of a Post-revolutionary Middle East - Highlights from the Conference Russia and the West: The Consequences of Renewed Rivalry - Highlights from the Workshop Brittle Might? Testing China's Success - Highlights from the Conference Foreign Fighters Phenomenon and Related Security Trends in the Middle East - Highlights from the Workshop

Long description of infographic: Publications from Academic Outreach

Publications from Academic Outreach

Academic Outreach publications 2014–2016

In 2014-2015, AO hosted a conference that brought together multi-disciplinary experts from several countries. The conference was entitled “A Brave New World: Exploring the Evolving Nature of Cyber-conflict” and examined cyber threats facing Canada and its Western allies, our adversaries and their intent, as well as countermeasures that could help mitigate the proliferation of cyber conflict. In 2015-2016, we hosted another conference, “Brittle Might? Testing China’s Success”, which explored the challenges facing modern China, assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the country’s leadership, examined Beijing’s involvement in global affairs and debated China’s trajectory in the coming years.

The international conferences, however, represent only one component of the AO program. We also hosted a number of in-depth briefings on other topics of interest. For instance, one reviewed the global banking sector’s experience at identifying money laundering and terrorist financing activity. Another expert explored the phenomenon of radicalization in Western countries, while another guest specialist assessed the capabilities of Shia militias operating in Iraq and Syria.

During the period of review,  outside experts engaged CSIS staff on discussions covering a range of security and strategic issues, including Russia’s strategy towards the Arctic; the uses and limitations of ‘big data’ for intelligence analysis; Boko Haram’s campaign of violence in Nigeria; and the regional consequences of the conflict in Iraq and Syria on Lebanon.

Checks and Balances

The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) is an external independent review body that reports to Parliament on CSIS’ operations. It does so through its three core functions: certifying the CSIS Director’s annual report to the Minister of Public Safety, carrying out in-depth reviews of CSIS activities and conducting investigations into public complaints about CSIS. CSIS’ External Review and Liaison Unit (ER&L) manages the Service’s relationship with SIRC, ensuring that it receives all of the necessary information required to fulfil its mandate.

Infographic: Statistics related to SIRC reviews and complaints made to SIRC. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: SIRC reviews and complaints 2014-2015 and 2015-2016

SIRC reviews and complaints 2014-2015 and 2015-2016

Reviews

N0 of SIRC reviews

  • 2014-2015: 8
  • 2015-2016: 10

Average n0 of documents per review

  • 5,000 short review
  • 15,000 thematic review

Briefings by Service employees per review

  • 5-10 briefings

Average duration of a review

  • 3-6 months

Complaints

N0 of new complaints to SIRC

  • 2014-2015: 11
  • 2015-2016: 17

Average n0 of documents per complaint

  • 100-1,000 simple cases
  • 3,000-13,000 complex cases

Average n0 of service witnesses providing testimony to SIRC

  • 3-5 witnesses
Each year, SIRC provides a research plan identifying the reviews it plans to undertake. For each review, ER&L works closely with SIRC to ensure it has the documents it needs and to arrange briefings by CSIS employees. ER&L manages the correspondence between SIRC and the Service during a review as well as the Service’s response to the resulting report. These reviews, reflected in SIRC’s Annual Public Report, provide comprehensive assurance to Parliament and the Canadian public about the Service’s exercise of its authorities.

ER&L is also the primary point of contact for all stakeholders on public complaints made to SIRC and ensures that SIRC’s legal counsel has the information required for complaint investigations. When an investigation involves a hearing, ER&L assists Department of Justice legal counsel in preparing the CSIS case, including preparation of submissions, exhibits and arranging witnesses to testify at hearings.

ER&L coordinates CSIS responses to SIRC on questions, requests, recommendations, and correspondence. While CSIS is not required to accept all SIRC recommendations, they are reviewed carefully and CSIS responds in writing and these responses are reflected in SIRC’s Annual Report. In ensuring continuity and transparency, ER&L tracks progress and reports to SIRC on CSIS’ implementation of actions recommended by SIRC.

CSIS Internal Audit Branch / Disclosure of Wrongdoing and Reprisal Protection

The Internal Audit (IA) Branch is led by the Chief Audit Executive (CAE), who reports to the CSIS Director and to the CSIS External Audit Committee (AC). The IA Branch is subject to the Treasury Board Policy on Internal Audit, the Internal Auditing Standards for the Government of Canada as well as the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

The CAE provides assurance services to the Director, Senior Management and the AC, as well as independent, objective advice and guidance on the Service’s risk management practices, control framework, and governance processes. The CAE is also the Senior Officer for Disclosure of Wrongdoing.

The AC examines CSIS’ performance in the areas of risk management, control and governance processes relating to both operational activities and administrative services. By maintaining high standards in relation to its review function in particular following-up on the implementation of management action plans derived from audit recommendations, the AC supports and enhances the independence of the audit function.

In the capacity of Senior Officer for Disclosure of Wrongdoing, the CAE is responsible for administering the Internal Disclosure of Wrongdoing and Reprisal Protection Policy. The Policy provides a confidential mechanism for employees to come forward if they believe that serious wrongdoing has taken place. It also provides protection against reprisal when employees come forward, and ensures a fair and objective process for those against whom allegations are made.

Access to Information and Privacy

The mandate of the Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Unit is to fulfill the Service’s obligations under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. The Service’s Chief, ATIP is entrusted with the delegated authority from the Minister of Public Safety Canada to exercise and perform the duties of the Minister as head of the institution.

Infographic: ATIP statistics for the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 fiscal years. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: ATIP statistics

ATIP statistics

98+% on-time completion rate

Privacy Act requests

  • 2014-2015: 486
  • 2015-2016: 1,212

Access to Information Act requests

  • 2014-2015: 366
  • 2015-2016: 669

Informal requests

  • 2014-2015: 298
  • 2015-2016: 329
As the custodian of expertise related to the Service’s obligations under the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act, the ATIP Unit processes all requests made under the relevant legislation and responds to informal requests for information. In doing so, the unit must balance the need for transparency and accountability in government institutions while ensuring the protection of the Service’s most sensitive information and assets.

Financial Resources

The Financial Resources table below provides a snapshot of CSIS expenditures over the last 6 years (from 2010-2011 to 2015-2016).

Infographic: Bar graph of CSIS expenditures over the last six years. Long description below.

Long description of infographic: CSIS expenditures from 2010-2016

 

Iranian Militia Anti-American Propaganda, Iraq/U.S. Injuries

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General Votel is floating the request for more troops or assets in Syria, while U.S. troops have come “under fire” and have “returned fire” in and around Mosul as allied forces try to retake the city from ISIS, a U.S. military spokesperson said on Wednesday.

Image result for u.s. troops mosul isis US troops injured by ISIS near Mosul frontlines  Related image Related image

Iran-Backed Militiamen Playing Leading Role in Western Mosul, Spreading anti-U.S. Propaganda

As the Iraqi government announced on Sunday the launch of an offensive to regain control of western Mosul from the Islamic State, Iran-backed Iraqi militia units are playing a leading role in the military operations in the region, the Iranian media reports. According to Fars News Agency, an outlet affiliated with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (I.R.G.C.), the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) militiamen today cleared the road between the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Tal Afar from the Islamic State. Fars News also quotes Hashd- al-Shaabi spokesperson Ahmad al-Assadi as saying: “The forces of the 26th Brigade of the Hashd al-Shaabi have reached the village of al-Sahabi and have gained the control of the main road.”

Comment: The prominent role of Shiite militia units in military operations in western Mosul has been a matter of grave concern for regional Sunni states and Iraqi lawmakers, who have expressed the concern that Iran-backed sectarian groups may engage in revenge killings and human rights abuses against the region’s largely Sunni population once the Islamic State is defeated. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu in a press conference today again warned that the participation of PMF units in western Mosul could further inflame sectarianism in Iraq.

The Iran-supported groups’ leading role also poses security risks to the U.S. military advisers that are helping the Iraqi forces battling the Islamic State. Over the past two days, Iran-linked Iraqi militia groups have launched a vicious propaganda campaign against the United States and the I.R.G.C.-affiliated media outlets have dutifully circulated their conspiracy theories. For example, Fars News today quoted Jawad al-Talabwi, the commander of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, one of the most powerful Iraqi militia group that has close links with the I.R.G.C.’s Quds Force, as accusing the U.S. military of providing assistance to the Islamic State terrorists in the city of Tal Afar.

The PMF consists of militia forces largely from Shiite but also other Iraqi ethnic and religious groups. While some PMF units are Iraqi nationalists and follow Iraq’s top cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, many prominent groups within PMF have close ties with Qassem Suleimani, the head of the IRGC’s elite Quds Force. What makes Sunnis particularly worried is that, despite PMF’s diversity, it is the Iran-backed militia units within the PMF – such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization – that are playing the most prominent role in western Mosul.

Last November, Iraq’s parliament approved a law legalizing the PMF as separate military corps – a decision some Sunni Iraqi politicians and lawmakers derided as a Shiite “dictatorship.” But while the PMF is now an integral part of the Iraqi armed forces, some PMF units still receive their guidance from Soleimani rather than the Iraqi government. Many PMF units have also been accused of committing rights abuses – including war crimes such abductions, extrajudicial killings, torture and property destruction.

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Colonel John Dorrian, from Baghdad, the spokesperson for Operation Inherent Resolve. Feb. 22, 2017

The Syrian Democratic Forces continue their advance along two axes north and east of Raqqa. Our SDF partners on the ground have liberated more than 800 square kilometers and more than 100 villages since they began reclaiming and clearing the land to the east of Raqqa on February 4th. We’re now seeing signs that ISIS fighters, its leaders in Raqqa, are beginning to feel the pressure. Specifically, they’re becoming increasingly paranoid. They’ve increased population control measures in Raqqa by seeking to remove or destroy televisions, searching houses for mobile phones and satellite dishes in order to maintain control of news and access to information about their losses. These are not the actions of an enemy who feel they’re winning, and that’s because they’re not. We’re seeing reflections of pessimism among mid-level commanders and this world view is spreading to the rank-and-file fighters.

We’re also commonly seeing reports of ISIS arresting and executing their fighters who try to abandon the fight or are suspected of collaborating with forces trying to liberate areas that ISIS controls. We’re hearing typical reports that ISIS leaders understand their fate in Raqqa and they’re moving their own families out of Raqqa and into towns and villages in the countryside, even as they detain civilians who attempt to do the same.

Moving to Iraq, the Iraqi security forces have begun their advance into west Mosul with the Iraqi federal police advancing from the south and the Iraqi army advancing to their west, further isolating the enemy inside the city. Along the way, the ISF have encountered moderate resistance, which we expect to stiffen as they approach the more densely populated areas. The ISF is moving through ISIS disruption zones, where they encounter indirect fire from ISIS mortars and artillery pieces, and small-arms fire from ISIS fighting positions.

As of close of business yesterday, the coalition had destroyed 23 mortar and artillery pieces that the enemy would have used to complicate the ISF advance in the first three days of operations. We used air and artillery strikes, including HIMARS, to take these enemy weapons off the battlefield. This sets conditions for the ISF to retake Mosul airport and then begin moving toward a more dense urban terrain. We do expect a very tough fight in west Mosul, but the area that ISIS controls around the city is shrinking steadily with each passing day. Conditions have been set for ISIS’s defeat through their significant effort to reduce their command and control, their weapons, and their financial resources. As always, we take every opportunity that we can to remove ISIS leadership figures from the battlefield. I’m going to give you a quick update on some of the more recent ones around Mosul.

In Iraq, Haqqi Ismail Hamid al-Mmri, a Daesh terrorist leader, was killed by a coalition precision airstrike February 13th in Mosul. He’s a legacy al-Qaida Iraq member and had a leadership role in ISIS security networks in Mosul, further loosening the grip of ISIS on the population of the city. Al-Mmri’s death is the most recent of the coalition’s steady pressure on Daesh leaders in Mosul. Since the beginning of 2017, our precision airstrikes have also remove Abu Abbas al-Quaryshi, a Daesh terrorist leader who coordinated the movement of VBIEDs and suicide bombers in Iraq, and Abdullah Sulaymani al-Jaburi, another Daesh leader responsible for anti-aircraft defense assets within Mosul. Abu Abbas al-Quaryshi, a Daesh terrorist leader and nearly a dozen of his associates, were killed in the same coalition precision airstrike on January 12th in Mosul.

The legacy al-Qaida Iraq operative coordinated and facilitated the movement of VBIEDs and suicide bombers around Iraq. He was involved in multiple high-profile and mass-casualty attacks, including attacks in Baghdad Province killing innocent civilians. The death of al-Quaryshi will degrade Daesh’s operations in Baghdad Province and disrupt the facilitation of VBIEDs and suicide bombers inside Iraq. Because of his extensive connections, it will be difficult for the terrorist group to replace him in their command structure. And finally, Abdullah Sulaymani al-Jaburi, a Daesh terrorist leader responsible for the group’s anti-aircraft defense assets within Mosul, was killed by a coalition precision airstrike January 4th in Mosul. His death will degrade Daesh’s ability to defend the extremist control of Mosul from the coalition’s persistent airstrikes on their leaders and their — and the advancing Iraqi security force’s liberation of the city.