Category Archives: ISIS ISIL Islamic State Caliphate

The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda

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The Islamic State vs. al-Qaeda: The War within the Jihadist Movement

WotR: The post-Arab Spring period has seen extraordinary growth in the global jihadist movement. In addition to the Islamic State seizing a vast swathe of territory spanning Syria and Iraq and al-Qaeda establishing itself as a potent military force in the Syrian civil war, instability and unfulfilled expectations in numerous countries — including Egypt, Libya, Mali, Tunisia, and Yemen — have presented jihadists with unprecedented opportunities.

But even as the jihadist movement experiences rapid growth, it has also endured unprecedented internal turmoil. The Islamic State’s emergence marks the first time that leadership over the global jihadist movement has been seriously contested. Since that group’s expulsion from the al-Qaeda network in February 2014, a fierce competition between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda has defined the militant landscape. The United States has an opportunity to exploit and aggravate fissures within the jihadist community, but to do so successfully, it is essential to understand the differences in the modus operandi of these two rival jihadist groups.

Two Models of Revolutionary Warfare

Though al-Qaeda and the Islamic State share the same ultimate goal — establishing a global caliphate ruled by an austere version of sharia (Islamic law) — each group maintains a distinct approach to revolutionary warfare. Al-Qaeda has come to favor covert expansion, unacknowledged affiliates, and a relatively quiet organizational strategy designed to carefully build a larger base of support before engaging in open warfare with its foes. By contrast, the Islamic State believes that the time for a broader military confrontation has already arrived, and has loudly disseminated its propaganda to rally as many soldiers as possible to its cause. The group combines shocking violence with an effective propaganda apparatus in an effort to quickly build its base of support.

The Maoist and focoist schools of revolutionary thought provide a useful framework for understanding these groups’ differing strategies. Al-Qaeda exhibits a revolutionary strategy that is both implicitly and explicitly based on the works of Mao Tse-tung, while the Islamic State’s approach is more consonant with the focoist writings of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Régis Debray.

Interestingly, in 2010 Kenneth Payne published an article in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism arguing that al-Qaeda’s strategy was focoist in nature, based on a review of the group’s strategic literature and operations. Though al-Qaeda has exhibited both Maoist and focoist strands of thought, the fact that Payne’s argument was published in 2010 is significant: He wrote just on the cusp of the “Arab Spring” revolutions, which, as this article details, provided al-Qaeda the opportunity to make its Maoist-style turn that focused on the population more apparent. Ryan Evans’s argument, which was published in the CTC Sentinel the same year as Payne’s piece, has held up better over time. Evans discerned a shift in strategy between the efforts of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the later campaign of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and argued that AQAP’s more population-centric approach was forged by the group’s failures in Iraq. He noted that the shift in strategy in Yemen may herald “a larger turn for al-Qaeda globally toward a more Maoist attitude.”

Mao’s theory of revolution is rooted in the primacy of politics over warfare. In Mao’s view, a steadfast political foundation is necessary to allow guerrilla forces to create bases for logistics and operations and slowly build strength and momentum for the final conventional stage of warfare. Thus, according to Mao, before guerilla forces can initiate military action, they must first focus on “arousing and organizing the people,” and “achieving internal unification politically.” This stage is followed seamlessly by a stage of progressive expansion, followed by a third and final stage of decision — the destruction of the enemy.

Maoist revolutionaries continue to emphasize the political stage of organization and consolidation even as they pursue progressive expansion. Consistent with Maoist theory, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have focused on maintaining and expanding the group’s political support. Even in areas where al-Qaeda has engaged in open warfare, it has been somewhat restrained in its approach to civilian populations since the initiation of AQAP’s campaign in 2009 that Ryan Evans noted was a departure from the group’s Iraq model of insurgency. Thereafter, the group has adopted a phased implementation of its hardline version of sharia where it enjoys control or significant influence. The only one of al-Qaeda’s branches that explicitly did not fit this new model was AQI, which later was expelled from al-Qaeda’s network and adopted the new moniker of the Islamic State. (Al-Qaeda’s approach toward civilian populations can only be considered “restrained” in very relative terms, juxtaposed with the more oppressive and publicly violent tactics of the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda’s own previous approach.) Al-Qaeda’s adherence to a largely Maoist framework was shaped by its experience of being hunted by the United States and its allies for a decade and a half, and — as Evans argued — particularly by the defeat of its Iraqi affiliate. Al-Qaeda’s use of Maoist strategy is designed to be low-risk and to yield long-term results.

The focoist approach to revolutionary war contrasts sharply with the Maoist approach. First used successfully in Cuba in the early 1950s, focoism holds that the political foundation necessary for revolution can be crafted through violence. Guevara essentially flipped Mao’s theory by arguing that the use of violence against the state would inspire the peasants to rise up. Unlike Mao’s strategy, focoism accepts great risks in order to inspire support. The Islamic State has in many ways followed the focoist model; it believes in the power of violence to forge the political opinions of the Muslim masses. The Islamic State views al-Qaeda’s more deliberate approach as too slow. It appears happy to win today and lose tomorrow, as long as today’s win creates a large enough subject for propaganda.

This framework of Maoist versus focoist models of revolutionary warfare should not be seen as a complete explanation for either al-Qaeda or the Islamic State’s behavior. Neither group is perfectly Maoist or focoist, but using these models provides a useful paradigm for interpreting the strategic competition between the groups.

Al-Qaeda’s Population-Centric Approach

Al-Qaeda has taken advantage of two major opportunities driven by the unsuccessful revolution in Syria and the successful revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The first opportunity is that the regional upheaval created a growth environment for jihadism, and al-Qaeda has established a significant presence in places where it had previously been suppressed. The second opportunity is that as al-Qaeda expanded into new areas, it perceived an opening to repair its global image that had been badly damaged by AQI. Al-Qaeda has implemented a population-centric approach to increase its base of popular support by employing gradualism and cooperation with local actors. Al-Qaeda has also made use of popular front groups in its expansion. This is intended to reduce the organization’s exposure to counterinsurgent forces, including the United States and the Middle East’s Sunni regimes, and to avoid frightening or alienating local populations.

Popular support has become essential to al-Qaeda. While the group once conceptualized itself as exclusively a vanguard movement, it has come to view itself in recent years as a popular movement that needs the support or acquiescence of the populace. This transformation had begun prior to the Arab Spring. In 2005, then al-Qaeda deputy emir Ayman al-Zawahiri explained in a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI’s reckless emir, that “the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy … is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries. So, we must maintain this support as best we can, and we should strive to increase it.” As previously noted, AQAP’s approach in its first year of operations reflected this paradigm. But the transformation of al-Qaeda into a more broad-based movement was supercharged by the Arab Spring, which provided a critical opening for jihadism.

In the wake of those revolutions, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership pushed hard to regain the trust and support of local populations and avoid the mistakes that marred AQI’s Iraq campaign. In an undated letter that al-Qaeda’s masul aqalim (head of regions) Atiyah Abd al-Rahman wrote to Nasir al-Wuhayshi, AQAP’s emir, he noted that “the people’s support to the mujahedin is as important as the water for fish,” referencing Mao’s famous adage that “the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.” Wuhayshi in turn transmitted a similar message to the leadership of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, illustrating al-Qaeda’s coordinated efforts.

The most significant example of these changes came in September 2013, when Zawahiri, who became al-Qaeda’s emir following Osama bin Laden’s death in May 2011, released a document entitled “General Guidelines for Jihad” that made public al-Qaeda’s new population-centric approach. Zawahiri instructed affiliates to avoid conflict with Middle Eastern governments when possible, asserting that conflict with local regimes would distract from efforts to build bases of support. Zawahiri also instructed affiliates to minimize violent conflict with Shia and non-Muslim populations, and to abstain from attacks that could result in Muslim civilian casualties. Consonant with these changes to al-Qaeda’s operations, the organization has also launched a “rebranding” campaign (a subject we have addressed previously at War on the Rocks) designed to present the group as a more reasonable — and perhaps controllable — alternative to the Islamic State, and as a potential bulwark against Iranian encroachment.

Al-Qaeda’s strategy of covert expansion — its use of front groups and its embrace of a relatively low-key public profile — is another critical element in the group’s post-Arab Spring approach. In a letter recovered from his Abbottabad compound, bin Laden explained the rationale for preferring a low profile. He noted that when a branch’s affiliation with al-Qaeda “becomes declared and out in the open,” the group’s enemies escalate their attacks on it.

Al-Qaeda’s efforts in Tunisia exemplified its early post-Arab Spring strategy. Its expansion was spearheaded by a front organization called Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). Several high-profile salafi jihadists who had been released from prison when the regime of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was overthrown established the group. AST initially focused its resources on dawa (evangelism) by organizing dawa events, holding public protests, and dominating physical spaces near places of worship. AST also provided services, including food, clothing, and medical care, to impoverished communities, and developed a social media apparatus to publicize its dawa activities.

AST’s emphasis on dawa was characteristic of al-Qaeda’s early post-Arab Spring strategy. The group’s ideologues understood that they would have unprecedented opportunities to disseminate salafi jihadist ideology to the public. While the old dictators placed strict restrictions on religious expression, strategists foresaw fewer restrictions in post-autocratic environments. This strategic logic was expressed by Atiyah, who in February 2011 exhorted jihadists in post-revolutionary states to “spring into action and initiate or increase their preaching, education, reformation and revitalization in light of the freedom and opportunities now available in this post revolution era.”

As AST’s dawa gained traction, the group also began to engage in hisba violence targeting those who violated salafist religious norms. AST was initially methodical in its use of violence, striking targets such as prostitutes and establishments that served alcohol — which would be widely considered acceptable by those inclined toward religious fundamentalism. Moreover, AST refrained from claiming responsibility for these hisba attacks, creating the perception that this violence was organic to the Tunisian people. Through this approach, AST ensured that its use of violence did not cross a line that would provoke a government crackdown.

As it became more entrenched, AST eventually embraced jihadist violence, first facilitating Tunisians’ travel to foreign battlefields like Syria, Libya and Mali before eventually turning its guns against the Tunisian state. AST members were implicated in the 2013 assassinations of secularist politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohammed Brahmi. Less than a week after Brahmi’s July 2013 death, a jihadist ambush in Jebel el-Chaambi killed eight Tunisian soldiers, five of whom had their throats slit. These bloody incidents constituted a point of no return, and in August 2013 the government designated AST a terrorist organization and cracked down on the group.

It is not clear that AST’s leadership wanted the group’s violence to escalate so quickly. Indeed, it seems the group had not progressed far enough through Mao’s stages of revolutionary warfare by July 2013 to justify the initiation of open warfare. AST gave its local branches considerable autonomy, which may have contributed to violence escalating faster than the leadership wanted or anticipated. Despite this, al-Qaeda’s blueprint for Tunisia nonetheless demonstrates how its plans for the post-Arab Spring environment followed Maoist insurgent principles.

The Islamic State’s Bold, Boisterous Growth Model

The Islamic State’s strategy for supplanting al-Qaeda centers on two techniques. First, the group sought to portray al-Qaeda’s slower and more deliberate strategy as weakness and indecisiveness. Second, the Islamic State appealed to al-Qaeda’s affiliates by emphasizing its momentum and expansion with the aim of poaching groups, members, and potential recruits. In essence, the Islamic State’s approach is the opposite of al-Qaeda’s: While al-Qaeda has sought to minimize the amount of attention it receives in order to reduce its exposure to counterinsurgents, the Islamic State constantly seeks the spotlight, and touts its victories (real or invented) at every opportunity. The Islamic State is trying to transform al-Qaeda’s strategic methods into weaknesses.

One way the Islamic State has tried to distinguish itself from al-Qaeda is its approach to governance, particularly its implementation of sharia. The Islamic State’s ability to impose governance where it enjoys military power is essential to the caliphate’s legitimacy. Following its capture of territory in Iraq and Syria, the organization quickly set up governance structures and showcased its efforts to provide social services to local populations. Rather than building public support prior to fully enforcing its austere version of sharia, the Islamic State quickly implemented hudud punishments (sharia-prescribed corporal punishment). As such, coercive violence is a major component of the Islamic State’s governance. The organization has thrown people suspected of being gay off of roofs, beheaded those it deems traitors or apostates, cut off the hands of thieves, and stoned to death women accused of adultery.

By contrast, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have chosen a slower, more methodical imposition of sharia. The group’s guidelines emphasize a somewhat pragmatic approach aimed at winning over the population. Al-Qaeda leaders have instructed affiliates to tailor the implementation of sharia to local conditions, taking into consideration local customs and religious practices, and to implement sharia flexibly in its initial phases, forgiving minor transgressions during that period. Al-Qaeda’s gradualist approach has been on display in Syria, where its affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra has repealed bans on cigarette smoking, and has made public displays of punishing fighters who unjustly harm local residents. This approach should not be mistaken for moderation on Nusra’s part — there are compelling reports of the group’s continuing extremism, especially in its treatment of religious minorities — but Nusra has done a masterful job of concealing its atrocities and maintaining its local image as a populist entity.

Al-Qaeda’s population-centric approach has been a major target of derision for the Islamic State, which accuses al-Qaeda of abandoning true Islamic principles by giving “preference to popularity and rationalization.”

Overt and Covert Expansion

Military strategy is another area where the Islamic State and al-Qaeda differ. The Islamic State employs an aggressive approach to territorial conquest. The group’s willingness to employ force-on-force warfare enabled it to take major territory quickly: Overall, this tactic has borne fruit for the organization, but has also increased the Islamic State’s rate of attrition. As the Islamic State has experienced military setbacks, it has moved toward greater use of irregular warfare, a strategic shift that illustrates the group’s capacity for adaptation.

The Islamic State’s hybrid warfare strategy does not necessarily distinguish it from al-Qaeda, which has employed similar tactics in some theaters. What makes the Islamic State unique is the way it showcases its military operations, using virtually all of them as propaganda pieces. While one function of the Islamic State’s military actions is to showcase the group’s strength, al-Qaeda has systematically sought to conceal the size of its network and downplay its capabilities. The group has masked its involvement in emerging theatres of conflict and established covert relationships with unacknowledged affiliate organizations like AST.

Consequently, many analysts underestimate al-Qaeda’s strength, and counterinsurgent forces have allowed al-Qaeda front groups to thrive in some theaters. Concealing affiliates’ relationships with al-Qaeda allows these groups to gain public support and attract resources from individuals and entities that might otherwise be wary of assisting an overt al-Qaeda entity.

Al-Qaeda’s military approach and preference for more covert activities is shaped by its patient worldview. Ostentatious, tactical victories that expose the network to attack and undermine its long-term prospects are of little value to the organization from a strategic perspective. In an article published in al-Qaeda’s online magazine Resurgence, jihadist strategist Abu Ubaydah al-Maqdisi explained the rationale behind this policy of restraint:

A guerilla force may possess the capacity of inflicting huge blows on the enemy, but it may be better for it to restrain from doing so in situations when the reaction of the enemy may be overwhelming.

Essentially, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership wants the organization to slowly develop its capabilities and resources in preparation for a longer campaign. At the same time, al-Qaeda leadership instructs its affiliates to begin destabilizing state regimes. This two-pronged strategy of enhancing its capabilities and destabilizing enemy regimes positions al-Qaeda to capitalize on state weakness and collapse in the long term.

A New Jihadist Era

The Islamic State’s rise has reshaped the global jihadist landscape, which for nearly two decades was dominated by al-Qaeda. With the Islamic State seizing the world’s attention, the age of unipolarity within the jihadist movement is over, replaced by intense internal conflict. Each group is firm in the belief that its organizational model is superior to that of its opponent.

The transnational jihadist movement is likely to be shaped in the coming years by this competition. It is essential that the United States understand the two groups’ strategies and pay close attention as their approaches continue to evolve. The United States has tremendous opportunities to exploit the cleavages between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. But if we fail to understand the two organizations’ strengths, weaknesses, and strategic and tactical postures, the jihadist movement may emerge from this period of competition stronger than before.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the chief executive officer of Valens Global, a consulting firm that focuses on violent non-state actors. Nathaniel Barr is the research manager at Valens Global, where Bridget Moreng is an analyst. This article was adapted from their report (co-authored with War on the Rocks senior editor Jason Fritz) Islamic State vs. Al-Qaeda: Strategic Dimensions of a Patricidal Conflict, which was published by the New America Foundation in December 2015.

RapeFugee Operation Coordinated on Social Media

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It is a game and it has a name: ‘Taharrush gamea’

German Justice Minister: Cologne attacks planned in advance

Minister of Justice Heiko Maas has said he believes the sexual assaults in Cologne were ‘coordinated and prepared’ ahead of time. He also accused xenophobic groups of using the crimes to stir up hatred.

DW: Germany’s Justice Minister Heiko Maas was the latest high-profile politician to speak out about the string of sexual assaults in Cologne on Sunday. In an interview with the popular “Bild am Sonntag” newspaper, Maas voiced his suspicions that the crimes which have the whole country reeling were not the result of an opportunistic mob mentality but a thought-out, planned attack on the city’s women.

“No one can tell me that it wasn’t coordinated and prepared,” the minister said. “My suspicion is that this specific date was picked, and a certain number of people expected. This would again add another dimension [to the crimes].”

The newspaper provided details from official police reports citing the use of social networks by some north African migrant communities to encourage their fellows to join them in the square between the Cologne train station and the cathedral, where the now hundreds of incidents of molestation and pick-pocketing took place.

Maas was careful to echo his colleagues, however, when it came to warning the public against placing blame on the country’s immigrants, saying “to assume from somebody’s origin whether or not they are delinquent is quite reckless.” The minister added that it is “complete nonsense” to take these crimes as evidence that foreigners cannot be integrated into German society.

Maas lashes out at PEGIDA, AfD

In the interview, Maas also accused the far-right populists of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, along with the organizers of the xenophobic PEGIDA marches, of using Cologne for propaganda purposes.

“There is the only way they can explain how shamelessly they operate their sweeping campaign against foreigners,” Maas said, referring to Saturday’s PEGIDA demonstration at the Cologne train station, which was itself met with a flashmob of counter-protesters condemning racism and sexism.

All that being said, Maas added that “cultural background justifies or excuses nothing. There is no acceptable explanation [for the assaults]. For us, men and women have equal rights in all matters. Everyone who lives here must accept that.”

In the coming days, Maas’ Social Democrats (SPD) are expected to join coalition partners, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s (CDU) in presenting new laws to the Bundestag that would expedite the deportation of asylum seekers and migrants who commit crimes . The administration has received a hefty amount of criticism for ill-preparedness when dealing with the open-door policy it has adopted towards Europe’s migrant crisis.

Istanbul Suicide Bomber Entered Country as Syrian Refugee, Officials Say

Bomber identified as Nabil Fadli was fingerprinted, but information didn’t set off security alerts

WSJ: ISTANBUL—The Islamic State suicide bomber who killed 10 German tourists in the heart of Istanbul entered the country as a Syrian refugee without setting off security alerts, Turkish officials said Wednesday, highlighting concerns that extremists are using the migrant crisis to move around and carry out terrorist attacks.

Just to our North, comes 10,000 Syrian refugees in Canada.

Canada welcomes 10,000th Syrian refugee

Ottawa (AFP) – Canada has welcomed its 10,000th Syrian refugee, the government announced Wednesday, although almost two weeks behind schedule and far fewer than it had originally planned to resettle by now.

A planeload landed in Toronto late Tuesday, putting the number of arrivals of asylum seekers at 10,121 since November when Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberals took office.

In a statement, Immigration Minister John McCallum called it a “significant milestone” on the way to meeting the Liberal’s overall pledge to take in 25,000 Syrians.

“Many people have worked day and night to bring these refugees to Canada,” he said, “and Canadians have opened their communities and their hearts to welcome them.

“Canada continues to set an international example with its response to the worst refugee crisis of our time.”

Trudeau had promised during an election campaign last year to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees by December 31.

But after assuming power the target date was pushed to the end of February, following criticism that the government was moving too fast amid security concerns in the aftermath of deadly attacks in Paris, as well as due to logistical issues.

A new interim target of taking in 10,000 by December 31 was set, but only 6,000 Syrians travelling from camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey made it onto Canadian soil by year’s end.

The UN refugee agency estimates that more than four million Syrians have fled the civil war ravaging their country. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights puts the total number of dead at more than 260,000 people.

 

Saudi Arabia Reveals Iran Spy Ring and JPOA

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Saudi Cites Iran Spy Ring

ABU DHABI [MENL] — Saudi Arabia, amid a propaganda war, has reported an Iranian espionage presence in the Gulf Cooperation Council kingdom.

Officials said authorities have launched prosecution of four Iranians on charges of espionage. They said at least one of the defendants was accused of working for Iranian intelligence and recruited Saudi nationals.

This marked the second alleged Iranian spy cell dismantled in Saudi Arabia over the last year. Officials said a fifth Iranian was also accused of being part of the cell and linked to attacks in the Gulf Cooperation Council kingdom since 2003.

Officials said the fifth Iranian, sentenced to 13 years, was convicted of recruiting Saudis in Iran and sending them to fight in Afghanistan. The Iranian, who was not identified, was also charged with relaying funds for recruitment.

The Iranian espionage cell, reported in the Saudi-controlled media, was disclosed amid the crisis with Teheran fueled by Riyad’s execution of a leading Shi’ite cleric. The Saudi leadership has responded to Iranian condemnations by releasing information on Teheran’s executions of hundreds of dissidents over the last two years.

The Saudi media said the latest Iranian espionage cell stemmed from the arrival of an Iranian intelligence officer to the annual pilgrimage in the Saudi city of Mecca. The media said the cell, detected as early as 2014, also planned attacks but did not elaborate.

Riyad was said to have dismantled a previous Iranian cell in 2013. The Saudi media said the cell consisted of at least 27 alleged members, 24 of them Saudis and the rest nationals from Iran, Lebanon and Turkey.

Officials said Iran has sought to infiltrate Saudi Arabia from both the northern and southern border. On Jan. 8, the Saudi military battled hundreds of Iranian-backed Houthi fighters from neighboring Yemen, 35 of them were killed in the Raboua region.

“We are looking at additional measures to be taken if it [Iran] continues with its current policies,” Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir said on Jan. 9.

Meanwhile, there is little in the news about the JOPA, the P5+1 Iranian nuclear deal and there are good reasons…..lifting sanctions.

The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement

Congressional testimony by Mark Dubowitz

 

 

(1) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) major design flaws, which provide Iran with patient paths to nuclear weapons and greater ballistic missile, heavy weaponry, and economic capabilities;

(2) The interplay between the P5+1 economic sanctions “snapback” and Iran’s “nuclear snapback” in limiting the ability of the United States to impose sanctions (a) to address Iranian non-compliance with the JCPOA and, (b) to punish Iranian illicit conduct in a range of non-nuclear activities such as support for terrorism; and,

(3) How sanctions relief under the JCPOA benefits the most hardline elements in Iran including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

First, on so-called “Implementation Day,” Iran will receive substantial sanctions relief with which it can defend its economy against future sanctions pressure. Iran may also use sanctions relief to increase its support for terrorism and other rogue regimes and to expand its conventional military power. The JCPOA front-loads sanctions relief, providing Iran with access to around $100 billion in restricted oil revenues and reconnecting Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, back into the global financial system. Sanctions on Iran’s crude oil export transactions will be lifted, as will sanctions on key sectors of the Iranian economy including upstream energy investment and energy-related technology transfers, the auto industry, petrochemicals, and shipping, as well as the precious metals trade. This sanctions relief will enable Iran to build greater economic resilience against future pressure—both sanctions aimed at isolating other illicit financial conduct and so-called “snapback” sanctions in the event of Iranian nuclear non-compliance.

Then, after five years, or earlier if the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reaches a broader conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes, the international arms embargo will be lifted, meaning that Iran can also expand its conventional military capabilities and those of its proxies. Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, one of the other witnesses at this hearing, noted one week before the announcement of the JCPOA that lifting the arms embargo “would be a great mistake. Iran is selling arms, giving arms, fueling civil wars in Yemen, in Lebanon, in Syria and Iraq, and so those arms prohibitions on Iran are very important.”1 He also has explained that the arms embargo was put in place “for very good reason.” He continued that it is not in the interest of the United States “to see these arms embargos lifted from Iran. It is an issue that should not be part of these negotiations. … I think we ought to maintain these U.N. embargos.”2 In five years, however, they will disappear, giving Iran access to combat aircraft, attack helicopters, battle tanks, among other advanced weapons systems. Read the full testimony here.

 

Hagel: Obama Squandered 5 Years, ISIS Prevails

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It was always after a top ranking administration official leaves their post that larger truths are told. There was no love loss between the White House and the Pentagon when it came to previous defense secretaries under Barack Obama and this is especially the case with regard to former Secretary Chuck Hagel. It appears most of the division was born out of Hagel slowing walking approvals on transfers of Gitmo detainees. Yet there is more, where Hagel’s true message is to the next president: “Listen to the military”, which fundamentally says the Obama administration DID have real disdain for military leadership.

DefenseNews: WASHINGTON — Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said he believes the government of Iraq “squandered” the five-year stretch from 2008 to 2013, paving the way for the rise of the Islamic State group and the chaos of the last two years.

Speaking Monday in Washington, Hagel, who served in that role from 2013 to 2015, also hinted at dissatisfaction with how the Obama administration dealt with the Pentagon during his tenure, indicating that future administrations should lean more on the opinions of the uniformed personnel when weighing foreign policy decisions.

Asked to reflect on the situation in Iraq, Hagel showed disappointment and frustration with what happened once the US President George W. Bush signed a Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq in December 2008, which set off the clock for US forces to leave Iraq in the hands of the local government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

“We couldn’t run that government, we should have never tried, couldn’t impose our values,” Hagel said. “But I think the Iraqi leadership of that country so squandered five years, that allowed to happen what happened over the last two years.

“The breakdown in the Sunni-Shia relationship, the breakdown of the Shia-Kurd relationship, [the] prime minister did not fulfill any of the constitutional requirements and the promises he had made to bring Iraq together,” Hagel continued. “I don’t blame all that on him – there were forces that were probably bigger than he was able to deal with – but in my opinion, that’s what happened in Iraq. The five years were squandered, were wasted, and that’s what’s led to so much of the turmoil, the trouble, the chaos, the slaughter and the killing in Iraq today.”

Asked about the legacy of President Barack Obama on the eve of his final State of the Union speech, Hagel demurred, saying it was “nonsense” to judge Obama until years down the road, let alone before his administration has ended.

However, Hagel indicated dissatisfaction with the way the Obama administration has handled the Pentagon.

During the roundtable event hosted by the National Committee on US-China Relations, Hagel urged politicians to lean more on the advice of top DoD officials.

“I would say as someone who has walked on both sides of the street, the political side and the administration side, politicians have to listen more to our military,” Hagel said. “And I don’t mean changing the Constitution. I mean listen to our military. They get it better than most politicians on things like this. And some of the finest statesmen I’ve ever met in my life are in military uniform.”

Asked later what his biggest advice for the next president would be when dealing with the Pacific, Hagel limited his response to one word: “Listen.”

The comments come weeks after Hagel told Foreign Policy magazine that the Pentagon was hamstrung by interference from the Obama White House. Hagel is long-believed to have butted heads with National Security Adviser Susan Rice, something he did not dispel in that interview.

Asked Monday if he felt advice from the Pentagon had been ignored to the detriment of the Obama presidency, Hagel did not change his tune.

“Well, I’ve made some comments on this and I think the comment I made here, I’ll let that stand,” he said.

Obama Broke the Middle East Alliance and Equilibrium

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Imagine what the Obama administration is leaving as unfinished terror business for the next president and further, imagine what more can happen for the rest of 2016.

Shall we begin with HizBu’llah?

Russia Is Arming Hezbollah, Say Two of the Group’s Field Commanders

On the Syrian battlefield, Vladimir Putin’s planes and special forces work ever more closely with the Party of God—labeled ‘terrorist’ by Washington.
DailyBeast – BEIRUT — Lebanese Hezbollah field commanders with troops fighting in Syria tell The Daily Beast they are receiving heavy weapons directly from Russia with no strings attached. The commanders say there is a relationship of complete coordination between the Assad regime in Damascus, Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. At the same time they say the direct interdependence between Russia and Hezbollah is increasing.

The United States and the European Union have both listed Hezbollah as a terrorist organization with global reach and accuse it of serving Tehran’s interests. But there is more to it than that. Organized, trained, funded, and armed by Iran with Syrian help after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, it initially gained fame for suicide bombings hitting Israeli, French, and American targets there, including the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut where 241 American servicemen were killed in 1983.

Hezbollah is directly receiving long-range tactical missiles, laser guided rockets, and anti-tank weapons from Russia.

Badran/FDD: In response to the crisis in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, following the latter’s assault on the Saudi consulate and embassy in Iran, the Obama administration has taken to the media to unleash a furious rebuke. But the administration’s condemnation was not aimed primarily at Tehran; instead it’s been largely directed at America’s longstanding ally: Saudi Arabia.

Administration officials have charged that, by executing radical Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr, the Saudis have exacerbated sectarian tensions in the region and jeopardized U.S. policy in Syria. “This is a dangerous game they are playing,” an unnamed U.S. official told the Washington Post. “There are larger repercussions,” including damage to “counter-ISIL initiatives as well as the Syrian peace process.” This is a common thread that runs through the administration’s briefings against the Saudis, which reveals the White House’s backing of Iran’s regional position over and against the traditional U.S. alliance system.

The claim that the Saudis were damaging the supposed Syrian “peace process” sounds surreal on its face. But it is quite revealing, not just about how the White House defines success, but also about its overall policy in Syria.

The administration believes it has achieved a critical diplomatic feat by bringing Iran into the diplomatic talks over Syria and that this constitutes a major breakthrough in itself. “The United States has succeeded in leading the international effort to bring all sides together to try to bring about a political resolution inside of Syria,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest said in a briefing after the Saudi-Iranian spat. The way the administration sees it, for a true discussion to take place, all so-called “stakeholders” in Syria must be gathered around the table in order to reach a settlement.

The administration’s self-congratulation aside, it’s worth exploring what this means in practice. By declaring Iran a legitimate “stakeholder,” the White House is not only saying that Syria is a recognized Iranian sphere of influence, but it also is recognizing Iran’s “stake” as legitimate. In fact, President Obama stated explicitly last month that the solution in Syria should be one that allows the Iranians to ensure “that their equities are respected.”

This begs the question of what, exactly, is Iran’s “stake” or “equities” in Syria? The answer is straightforward: Iran’s interest is to maintain a logistical bridge to Hezbollah through which it could supply the group with missiles and arms, thereby enabling it to continue to threaten U.S. allies like Israel and destabilize the region. The White House’s legitimization of Iran as a stakeholder in Syria risks licensing Iran to continue arming Hezbollah.

But this was hardly the only cost of President Obama’s policy. The key for safeguarding Iranian interests in Syria is ensuring the continuity of the Syrian President Bashar Assad regime. And so, in order to obtain Iranian “buy-in,” the administration abandoned what’s supposed to be the main objective in Syria, which is the removal of Assad and his regime. Assad, the administration now concedes, gets to stay on for an indefinite period as part of an indeterminate “transitional period.” In other words, when it comes to Syria, not only did Obama force Iran down his allies’ throat — he also fully endorsed its position.

Now, to top it off, the administration is attacking the Saudis for supposedly jeopardizing a process designed to safeguard Iran’s unchanged objectives in Syria. As the White House sees it, the Saudis’ only job is to bring the Syrian opposition to the table essentially to sign a surrender. What’s more, as part of this process, Iran, which has underwritten and partaken in Assad’s mass slaughter, gets a say in determining which opposition groups are listed as terrorists.

When it comes to the case of Nimr, the radical Saudi Shiite cleric, the administration has applied the same core premise of its Syria policy — that Iran has legitimate “equities” in Arab countries that should be “respected.”

Since his execution, the administration has made a point of repeatedly disclosing that it had tried to intervene with the Saudis not to go ahead with Nimr’s execution. The administration is now saying that the Saudis were told that the Iranians would react negatively to Nimr’s execution. Hence, the Saudi decision, the administration is saying, was a wanton provocation of Iran.

The underlying premise of the administration’s position is not only that Iran has a legitimate claim to represent Arab Shiites but also that since it has claimed Nimr, a Saudi, as a protégé, the Saudi government should not touch him. Therefore, the message the administration was effectively sending the Saudis was that Iran has a say in domestic Saudi affairs.

The truth is that the Obama administration has been aligning with Iran’s regional position for a while now — certainly since the beginning of the Syrian revolution. With the nuclear deal now in hand, and with a year left in President Obama’s term, the White House is becoming explicit about this major shift in the historic U.S. position in the region.

The president’s position on the Saudi-Iranian row is a public announcement that his administration is dissolving its traditional alliance system, along with the regional order it had underwritten for decades, and embracing Iran instead.

*** The blame actually goes deeper on the migrant crisis:

Former Obama Adviser Dennis Ross: U.S. Inaction in Syria Led to Refugee Crisis and ISIS

Amb. Ross/Tower: The Obama administration’s failure to address the brutality of the Iran-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria led to a “vacuum” that allowed “a humanitarian catastrophe, a terrible refugee crisis, a deepening proxy war and the rise of ISIL in Iraq and Syria” to occur, Dennis Ross, a former White House adviser to President Barack Obama, wrote in Politico on Sunday.

Ross explained that the administration’s failure to act stemmed from a reluctance to repeat the mistakes that the United States made during the Iraq War, but added that Syria was different from Iraq, as Syria would involve aiding “an internal uprising” against Assad rather than an American invasion. According to Ross, Assad had turned the uprising against him into a sectarian conflict in the hope that his Alawite sect and other Syrian minorities would have a stake in his survival.

Soon, thereafter, it was transformed into a proxy war largely pitting Saudi Arabia and Turkey against Iran. A vacuum was created not by our replacing the Assad regime but by our hesitancy to do more than offer pronouncements—by overlearning the lessons of Iraq, in effect. And, that vacuum was filled by others: Iran, Hezbollah and Iran’s other Shia militia proxies; Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar; Russia; and ISIL. Unless the U.S. does more now to fill this vacuum, the situation will spin further out of control.

Ross observed that the vacuum in Syria was part of a greater American retreat in the Middle East, which “has helped to produce the increasing competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia.” Without fear of American action, he argued, Qassem Soleimani– the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps elite Qods Force– was transformed from a “shadowy figure” to one who was present at seemingly every major battle in Iraq and Syria. Eventually, given Iran’s continued aggressiveness and America’s passivity, Saudi Arabia sought to push back against Tehran on its own.

While Ross argued that the growing Iranian-Saudi tensions were not likely turn into a hot war, he noted that the escalation hurts efforts to address the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria. In addition, without the U.S. taking an active role in the Middle East, Russia actively entered and further complicated the fray. Until Moscow agrees to pressure Assad “to respect a ceasefire, stop the barrel bombs, and permit the creation of humanitarian corridors” to deliver food and aid to non-ISIS opposition groups, Ross wrote, there is no hope of getting Saudi Arabia or other Sunni nations to join the fight against ISIS.

In order to address the vacuum, Ross suggested that the U.S. take a number of steps to regain control of the situation without getting too deeply involved. These include putting “troops on the ground, including deploying spotters for directing air attacks, embedding forces with local partners perhaps to the battalion level, and using special operations elements for hit-and-run raids.”

 

In 2014, Ross noted that the administration’s growing closeness to Iran was concerning American allies in the Middle East. For “the Arabs, the fear is that the deal with come at their expense,” he explained. His recent suggestion that the administration must somehow restrain Iran’s client, Assad, before it can exert any influence in Syria demonstrates that this fear still remains intact.