Category Archives: Iran Israel

Grover, Grover, Grover, You’re Busted Dude

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The internet is an interesting tool. It is especially fascinating that some crafty people can go backwards in the internet cache and capture evidence.

What say you Grover this time? To all the Republicans, to the Democrats, to the Conservative Union, to Congress and to the NRA….take notice. To the IRS, to policy makers, to the lobby groups, the terrorists are among us due to you. It should be noted, this was during the Clinton administration.

A PARTICULAR HAT TIP TO GLENN BECK, THANK YOU SIR. Great work to Tom Trento for his stick-t0-it’ned-ness.

NEWLY DISCOVERED DOCUMENT EXPOSES NORQUIST’S LIES
A newly discovered document proves that Grover Norquist, top GOP moneyman, sponsored in October 23rd 2000 an anti-Israel pro-HAMAS and pro-Hezbollah rally in front of the White House in Lafayette Park. The rally was run and led by the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist Abdul Rahman al-Amoudi who pleaded guilty to financing terrorism and conspiracy to assassinate then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.  Al-Amoudi is currently serving a 23 year sentence in federal prison. Al-Amoudi who is co-founder of the Islamic Institute with Grover Norquist is seen on video in the Oct 23 rally screaming his support for al-Qaeda and Hezbollah both of which are specially designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).

The newly discovered document found on the Islamic Institutes website in their weekly Friday brief demonstrably proves that Norquist’s organization was the organizational and contact body for the event dubbed: “March and Rally in Washington Against Israeli Aggression,” and states:

On October 23, 2000, there will be a march and rally in front of the White House in Washington, D.C., to protest Israel’s aggression against the Al-Aqsa Mosque and its escalating use of violence toward the Palestinian people. The march and rally are being organized by the National Task Force for the Crisis in Jerusalem (NTFCJ), a coalition of national American Muslim organizations of which the Islamic Institute is a part. The march begins at 11:00am at Freedom Plaza, and will move to Lafayette Park in front of the White House where a rally will begin at 12:00pm.

It is highly important that the Muslim community in the U.S. demonstrates a show of solidarity by attending this event. A strong presence will emphasize the call of American Muslims for peace and justice in Jerusalem and Palestine. Buses are being chartered nationwide to bring supporters to Washington. For further information, contact the Islamic Institute via phone or e-mail, or the American Muslim Council at (202) 789-2262(202) 789-2262.
Members of the NTFCJ are: the American Muslim Council, the American Muslim Alliance, American Muslims for Jerusalem, the Council on American Islamic Relations, the Islamic Circle of North America, the Islamic Institute, the Islamic Society of North America, the Muslim American Society, the Muslim Public Affairs Council, and the Muslim Student Association.

When asked by Glenn Beck if he (Grover Norquist) sponsored the event Norquist replied that it was a mistake by and intern and that his organization, the Islamic Institute, had no direct involvement or planning of the rally – a direct contradiction of the Organizations weekly brief.

Clearly the Islamic Institute was the primary sponsor, primary planner, primary organizer and primary leader of the anti-Israel in October of 2000 and in possible violation of 18 U.S. Code § 2339A – Providing material support to terrorists.

Friday’s 4pm Show:

HEY, US CONGRESS – “THROW THE TERRORISTS OUT!”

4.13.15

On Monday April 13 and Tuesday 14 Muslim Terrorists walking around the United States Congress will demand that our elected Representatives change federal law thereby making it harder to investigate Muslim terrorists. I know, crazy stuff, but it is happening right in broad daylight! Thank Allah that we at The United West are experts at investigating Muslim Brotherhood terrorists and exposing their influence operations for all Americans to understand and properly respond. To accomplish this we are launching a five-part investigative series entitled: “Muslim Terrorists Lobby 114th Congress.” Our show today focuses on what the Members of the 114th Congress should do when the terrorists enter their offices. And what is that? THROW THEM OUT THE DOOR! Why in the world should an elected Member of Congress give any time to KNOWN terrorists who have a written agenda that includes destroying the essence of the Capitol building in which they are meeting! Watch this show as it is FULL of critically important information to help all Americans properly, professionally and legally DEFEAT this Muslim Brotherhood political influence operation.

 

Slight (White) House Mocks Netanyahu

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The Iranian Supreme Leader, Khamenei is throwing sand in the gear of the P5+1 framework agreement lead by U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry.

He is not only non-committal on the matter but what is worse he has taken the same posture as the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Zarif, stating that ALL sanctions must be lifted before anything will go forward. This is a morning after additional dynamic, putting John Kerry and the White House in damage control.

But it is actually worse.

Iran: We’ll Start Using Advanced Centrifuges After Deal Signed

Iran’s negotiator in the nuclear negotiations and its nuclear chief revealed on Tuesday that after a final deal is signed by a June 30 deadline on the framework reached last week, Iran will unleash its most advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment, threatening a quick turnover in producing a nuclear weapon.

Iran’s semi-official FARS news agency reported on a closed meeting held Tuesday by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) chief Ali Akbar Salehi, in which they briefed members of Iran’s parliament on the deal being finalized.

In their statements, they said Iran’s most advanced IR-8 centrifuges will be used as soon as the deal removing world sanctions against Iran begins.

The report noted the two said the advanced centrifuges enrich uranium 20 times faster than the current IR-1 models, meaning they would radically reduce the breakout time needed for Iran to obtain a nuclear arsenal.

In the meeting Zarif and Salehi told the parliament “that the country would inject UF6 gas into the latest generation of its centrifuge machines as soon as a final nuclear deal goes into effect by Tehran and the six world powers,” according to the report.

“The AEOI chief and the foreign minister presented hopeful remarks about nuclear technology R&D which, they said, have been agreed upon during the talks, and informed that gas will be injected into IR-8 (centrifuges) with the start of the (implementation of the) agreement,” Iranian MP Javad Karimi Qoddousi was quoted as saying by the site.

Qoddousi also said the Iranian foreign ministry will present a “fact sheet” showing Iran’s version of the agreement to parliamentarians in the next few days.

Iranian and US versions of the framework have shown numerous contradictions, with the issue of advanced centrifuges being primary among them.

The US version claims Iran agreed to not use its advanced centrifuges, including IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 or IR-8. However, the Iranian text says “on the basis of solutions found, work on advanced centrifuges shall continue on the basis of a 10-year plan,” apparently contradicting the American version.

This point is crucial, as experts have anticipated that under the deal Iran will be able to develop its centrifuge technology and reach a point where it can make a three week dash to obtain a nuclear weapon.

Israel has pointed out that of the 17 states with peaceful nuclear programs, none enrich uranium as Iran is being allowed to continue doing by the deal.

The statements come after US President Barack Obama admitted in an interview that as a result of the deal, Iran will be able to reach a “zero” breakout time by 2028, meaning it could produce nuclear weapons immediately whenever it wanted to.

Some interesting notes:

1. Iran collectively owes an estimated $119 billion in restitution for past terror acts and refuses to pay it stating the Foreign Sovereignty Act.

2. Iran also states that there will be no monitoring of their facilities.

3. The base line standard on the Iranian nuclear program performed by the IAEA was so long ago that a current report on the uranium enrichment and centrifuges is impossible to report.

4. The inspections mentioned in the recent framework are to be performed by the United Nations Security Council, who are not only not qualified, but Russia has a veto vote on that council.

Meanwhile, the White House has taken to a satire agenda, mocking Israel. This does not make for good policy, good governance or good relationships. Shame on the Slight (White) House.

White House tweet pokes fun at Israel on Iran nuke deal

The White House is taking another swipe at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, defending the Iran nuclear deal by posting a diagram of a nuclear bomb on Twitter similar to one used by the Israeli leader to warn against an agreement.

The administration’s tweet of a cartoon bomb is accompanied by a list of consequences of not striking a deal, including “resumed production of highly enriched uranium” and “no limits on stockpile of enriched uranium.” The supposed benefits of a deal include “no production or stockpile of highly enriched uranium.”

The sketch closely resembles one held up by Mr. Netanyahu during a speech in 2012 at the United Nations, when he warned that Iran’s push to develop a nuclear weapon must be stopped at all costs. His drawing of a bomb included a red line at the top to show how close Iran was to completing a nuclear device.

The White House diagram also includes a red line and proclaims, “Under the framework for an Iran nuclear deal, Iran uranium enrichment pathway to a weapon will be shut down.”

Mr. Netanyahu is an outspoken opponent of the framework agreement announced last week, in which sanctions against Iran will be lifted in exchange for scaling back Tehran’s nuclear program. President Obama’s push for an agreement with Iran has raised tensions in what was already an uneasy relationship with Mr. Netanyahu.

 

 

 

Iran Parameter Framework by the Numbers

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To see the Iran parameters framework by the numbers and with charts, click here.

In what represents the worst aspect of this flawed deal, Obama has placed responsibility for verification of the agreement back on the United Nations. This is a hazardous repeat of the flawed UN response to Iraq’s proliferation after the Gulf War. Simply put, the UN Security Council will have veto powers over anything Iranian and nuclear when it comes to verification. This gives Beijing, and even more Moscow, a critical lever over the process.

We’ve seen this movie before, with Iraq in the 1990s. Charles Duelfer, who led the UN’s nuclear inspection regime in Iraq from 1993 to 2000, has termed this the “fatal flaw” of Obama’s deal, and that may be charitable. Yeltsin’s Russia was not very cooperative about Baghdad’s nuclear game-playing, and we should expect Putin’s Kremlin, which is engaged in Cold War 2.0 against the West, to be anything but helpful.

While Tehran and Moscow have no love for each other, between mutual fear and loathing, they both hate the West more, and any deal that puts Putin’s Kremlin in a verification role over Iran’s nuclear program is a farce, not to mention a strategic delusion. At worst, this may give a strategic partnership between Russia and Iran, which has been growing slowly, a new life, with an explicitly anti-Western focus. None of this can be mistaken for good news for the West.

After years of painstaking effort, the Obama administration has managed to craft a framework agreement with Iran. In the next three months, this structure is meant to be filled out with details regarding the scale of Iran’s enrichment capacity and the stages of sanctions relief. If the devil is in the detail, much mischief may await us.

 

However, even before all this happens, the Iranian nuclear drama is proving to be one of the most curious arms control episodes in history. As the scale of American concessions becomes evident, the White House and its defenders seldom justify the emerging accord strictly on terms of the proliferation threat that remains. Their response is often limited to claiming that an admittedly imperfect agreement is still preferable to the alternatives. And the alternatives are usually painted in hysterical terms with Iran surging toward the bomb, the sanctions regime collapsing and an isolated United States helplessly watching all this unfold. Not for the first time, the Obama administration is demonstrating a poor understanding of Iran’s strategies, the resilience of the sanctions regime and the nature of the international system.

By this time the essential contours of the agreement are all obvious. The accord will leave Iran with a sizeable enrichment capacity and none of its facilities will be shuttered as was once contemplated. The agreement’s most important sunset clause will be 10 years upon whose expiration, all essential restriction on Iran’s enrichment infrastructure will collapse. In essence, Iran can then move toward an industrial-size nuclear program similar to that of Japan. This means that the Islamic Republic will be in a position to manufacture numerous bombs on short order. The ballistic missiles, which are an essential part of any nuclear weapons program, will be excluded from the deal. And previous Iranian experiments with the military dimension of nuclear energy are postponed from scrutiny. Thus, any verification regime will not be informed by the history of Iran’s clandestine program.

The proponents of this deal have to account for why they are not bothered by such a large residual enrichment capacity. Why do they think a sunset clause is a wise idea? Why do they believe ballistic missiles should be ignored and how can once craft an intrusive verification system that has no historical memory? An arms control agreement has to be justified first and foremost on technical grounds and whether it meets the essential non-proliferation standards.

The path that the proponents of this accord have chosen is to avoid such questions and take refuge in the world of ominous alternatives. One of their favorite talking points is to suggest that coercion has not forestalled Iran’s nuclear path and that since 2003 as sanctions were imposed Iran has gone from 200 to 19,000 centrifuges. They neglect to mention that only approximately 9,500 of those machines are operational. Thus, during this period Iran increased its capacity by an average of 800 centrifuges a year. Although this is hardly ideal it is not an unmanageable situation. The notion that without this agreement Iran would immediately surge to a bomb is belied by the evidence that the proponents of this accord present.

Beyond that what is often missed is that Iran’s ingenious strategy is to advance its program incrementally and not provocatively. Iran has always been cautious to step and not leap forward. This way as Iran’s program inches forward, the international community routinely accedes to its new gains. In absence of an agreement, Iran will certainly take measures to advance its program, but those moves are likely to be cautious and incremental so to avoid a military reaction.

It is often suggested that should there be breakdown in the talks, the sanctions regime will collapse. The European states and Asian powers will rush back into Iran in defiance of American prohibitions. This notion ignores the fact that U.S. sanctions are secondary in nature, meaning that if there is European bank or an Asian firm that wishes to invest in Iran then it will lose its access to the U.S. market. There is no way that such firms will risk losing access to a U.S. economy estimated at $16.8 trillion dollars for sake of an Iranian economy of $368 billion. To be frank, the U.S. sanctions can success even if there is a perception that they are unfair. That is one of the advantages of being a superpower with the largest economy in the world.

None of this means the Iran deal is beyond repair. In the next three months, Secretary of State John Kerry has an opportunity to craft an agreement that addresses some of the deficiencies of the framework accord. He may wish to reconsider the wisdom of such a shortened sunset clause. The need for Iran to come clean on all its previous attempts at nuclear weaponization is critical if the agreement is to have a reliable inspection regime. And the ballistic missiles that are already part of UN resolutions should be addressed as part of this agreement and not separately. Finally, there has to be a mechanism in place for how to deal with Iranian violations. The history of arms control suggests that violations are rarely prosecuted and reversed in a timely manner.

Should he do so, he would have forged a deal that reliably restrains Iran’s nuclear appetite, enjoys bipartisan support at home and is embraced by our allies in the region. And that agreement would be worthy of the appellation historic.

Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/iran-deal-flaws-116655.html#ixzz3WHp3dOpf

Final Details on Today’s Iran Framework

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Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
 Enrichment
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Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
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Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
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Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
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All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
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Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
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Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
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Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
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Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only  – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
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Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
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Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
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Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
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Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
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Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
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Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to  by the P5+1.
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For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
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The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
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Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
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Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
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Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows  production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will  be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
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All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be  placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
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A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of
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certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
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Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
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Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
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Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
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Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
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Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
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The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
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Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
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Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
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Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
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Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
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Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
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U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
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The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
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All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
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However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and  ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
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A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
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If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
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U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.
Phasing
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For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development  – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
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For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
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Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
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Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.

Iran Nuclear Framework (MOU) Achieved

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This is NOT a final deal, it is only a Memorandum of Understanding that has a date of June 30 attached to it. That of course is an organic date also. There are ‘snap-back’ sanctions threats in place IF the IAEA determines that Iran has violated conditions.  What major question that remains is what are the real cures to Iran violating the conditions by the IAEA.

Iran still will have 5000-6000 centrifuges spinning and those provide Iran less than a year for a break-out condition, meaning a weapon can still be gained.

• The basis for an agreement for a peaceful Iranian nuclear program and a lifting of sanctions against that nation has been reached, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini announced Thursday in Switzerland. “We have reached solutions on key parameters of a joint comprehensive plan of action,” she said.

• Iran’s enrichment capacity and stockpile would be limited, and Iran’s sole enrichment facility would be at the Natanz nuclear facility, Mogherini said. Other nuclear facilities would be converted for other uses, she said.

• Under the agreement, the nuclear facility at Fordow would be converted to a nuclear physics and technology center and the facility at Arak would be redesigned as a heavy-water research reactor that will not produce weapons-grade plutonium.

• The European Union would terminate all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions against Iran, and the United States would do the same once Iran’s implementation of the agreement is confirmed, according to announcements of the deal.

• The United Nations would terminate all previous resolutions sanctioning Iran, and would incorporate other restrictions for an agreed-upon period, according to Thursday’s announcements.

Lausanne, Switzerland (CNN)The United States and other world powers have agreed on the general terms of a deal meant to keep Iran’s nuclear program peaceful, a major breakthrough after months of high-stakes negotiations.

The deal, announced Thursday evening in Switzerland, calls for Iran to limits its enrichment capacity and stockpile in exchange for the European Union lifting economic sanctions that have hobbled Iran’s economy.

Iran also agreed to enrich nuclear materials only at one plant, with other nuclear facilities converted for other uses, said Federica Mogherini, foreign policy chief for the European Union.

The United States would lift many sanctions on Iran after Iran’s implementation of the agreement is confirmed.

Leading negotiators announced the deal in a news conference in Lausanne, Switzerland, where they have been meeting for months.

Negotiators must resolve additional details of a final deal by the end of June. The announcement marks the end of a round of talks that started last week.

They were supposed to reach a framework for a deal by Tuesday but stretched the talks into Thursday.

The world powers involved in the talks were the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and Germany.

The talks, aimed at reaching a preliminary political deal on Iran’s nuclear program, blew past their initial, self-imposed deadline of late Tuesday as Iranian and U.S. negotiators struggled to find compromises on key issues.

But the negotiators doggedly continued their work in Lausanne, trying to overcome decades of mistrust between Tehran and Washington.

The mutual mistrust has been a serious problem in the talks, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said earlier Thursday.

“I believe respect is something that needs to be exercised in practice and in deeds, and I hope that everyone is engaging in that in mutual respect,” he said.

‘A few meters from the finishing line’

Iran wants swift relief from punishing sanctions that have throttled its economy. And Western countries want to make sure any deal holds Iran back from being able to rapidly develop a nuclear weapon.

The Obama administration needed something solid enough it can sell to a skeptical Congress, which has threatened to impose new sanctions on Iran. The potential deal is also coming under sustained attack from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.