Germany’s Long History with Iran, Surfaced with Jimmy Carter

If you saw the movie Argo, well it appears very little of it was either true or purposely was designed to include Germany’s hidden relationship with Iran. Sheesh…things are for sure coming into play and full understanding given the recent Iran nuclear deal.

Iranian Hostage Crisis: West Germany’s Secret Role in Ending the Drama

By Klaus Wiegrefe

The day after the last day of his presidency, Jimmy Carter flew to Frankfurt to greet 52 American diplomats who had been held as hostages for about a year by radical students in United States Embassy in Tehran. Now they were being attended to in a US Air Force hospital in Wiesbaden, near Frankfurt, and Carter wanted to express his sympathy.

On Jan. 21, 1981, the ex-president had warm, but mysterious, words for his German hosts. At the time, Helmut Schmidt, a member of the center-left Social Democrats, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, of the liberal FDP, were leading West Germany in the former capital city of Bonn. The Germans, Carter said, “helped us in a way I can never reveal publicly to the world.”

The race to apportion credit began only moments after the words about Germany’s mysterious role had been uttered. Chancellor Schmidt allowed himself to be celebrated by the daily Süddeutsche Zeitung, which wrote that “Bonn appears to have played a decisive role.” Foreign Minister Genscher was lauded by the tabloid Bild, which claimed the “release had been negotiated at night at Genscher’s.” And Middle East negotiator Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski was praised in the daily Die Welt.

The occupation of the US Embassy and the 444-day hostage situation remains one of the most dramatic events of the post-World War II era. It represented the Western world’s first encounter with the radical Shiite movement of Ayatollah Khomeini, which was violating the rules of international law. A mob could be seen burning American flags on the embassy property, and for a time Iran and the US appeared to be on the verge of war. In the end, however, everyone claimed to have helped them to reach a peaceful solution.

The details of the German contribution, however, remained unclear. Now historian Frank Bösch, the director of the Center for Contemporary History in Potsdam and SPIEGEL have conducted research in German archives and spoken with period witnesses. This has revealed that the West German government at the time had a “smooth intermediary role,” as Bösch puts it. And one of the key figures, it turns out, is barely known: Gerhard Ritzel, the German ambassador in Tehran.

Witnesses from the time describe the small, portly native of the Odenwald region in central Germany, who died in 2000, as a very sly man. He’s also one whose career is rich in anecdotes. As a young diplomat in the 1950s, he pretended to trip at a reception in Bombay (now Mumbai) so that he could fall on top of a banquet table covered with colored rice kernels in the shape of a swastika. In India, the swastika is a symbol of luck and the thoughtless host had served it up in honor of his German guests. Before a meeting with Soviet diplomats, Ritzel ate sardines and drank his colleagues under the table.

Contact with the Opposition

When Ritzel took his post in Tehran in 1977, the shah, who had a good relationship with Bonn, was still in power. Iran was Germany’s largest source of oil and, in exchange, was pressing Schmidt and Genscher for the planned export of submarines, frigates and nuclear power plants.

At the time, Ritzel was also trying to establish contact with the fundamentalist Iranian opposition. They were adventurous meetings, which he told everyone about afterwards. Before the meetings, a car would pick him up in front of a hotel, and the driver would drop him off somewhere in Tehran with a note pressed into his hand. On it stood: “Wait here, a blue pick-up will come by.” He would then changed cars one more time and ultimately had to cross various courtyards and climb into an upper floor whose wall had been punctured by a mortar. There he met his interlocutors, a group that would soon be taking over power in Iran.

In January 1979, after millions of people demonstrated against him, the shah left Iran. A few weeks later, Khomeini returned from his Parisian exile and announced the beginning of an Islamic Republic.

Ritzel quickly came to terms with the regime change. The West feared that Iran could slip into the Soviet sphere of influence. Khomeini seemed to be the lesser evil — and the new regime didn’t appear to have much of a future. “The ayatollahs can’t govern the country in the long run,” Chancellor Schmidt prophesized in March 1979. He conveyed to Khomeini that Iran would remain an “important external trading partner, regardless of its form of government.”

Ritzel, however, seems to have truly liked Khomeini. The Shiite leader, he later claimed, was a “humanitarian.” He also argued that the West should be “thankful if he is around for many more years.”

Ritzel as Intermediary

The ambassador purposefully established contact with people in the “Imam’s” milieu. He profited from the fact that Khomeini was partly surrounded by men who had lived in the West Germany, including Sadeq Tabatabaei, who had completed his doctorate at the Ruhr University in Bochum. His sister had married one of the ayatollah’s sons.

Tabatabaei became a senior government official in Tehran and Ritzel’s main interlocutor. After the beginning of the hostage-taking on Nov. 4, 1979, he also became the Germany’s main source of hope in the quickly escalating crisis. Khomeini put his support behind the students, describing the United States as “the great Satan,” while President Carter imposed strict sanctions, demanding that his allies do the same and ordering the preparations for a military attack.

Ritzel was one of the few Western diplomats officials in Tehran would still listen to. In order to safeguard German export interests, the government in Bonn wanted a quick end to the crisis. Ritzel obtained permission for a delegation from the International Red Cross to visit the hostages. He had newspapers brought to the imprisoned Americans, including a January 1979 issue of DER SPIEGEL featuring Khomeini on the cover at the top of the stack. When the revolutionary leader wanted to convince the shah to face the “complaints of the Iranian people,” the relevant letter was given to Ritzel. The shah, however, refused to accept it.

The situation in Tehran was confusing for the Americans, because self-described middlemen were constantly popping up. The Americans first approached Ritzel in May 1980. Together with Genscher, he flew to Vienna to meet with then US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie. There, Muskie and Ritzel had a one-on-one conversation, and when Tabatabaei found out about it, the Iranian declared that he could be of service to the German ambassador.

At the request of the Americans, the German Foreign Ministry passed Ritzel’s situation reports on to the US. The Iranians were worried that a retaliatory military attack would take place if the hostages were released. They also wanted back the deposits of $12 million that Carter had had frozen in US banks and access to the shah’s fortune, which they believed to be in the US. On May 27, the US Embassy in Bonn communicated that Ritzel should tell the Iranians that Carter would “seriously consider” a declaration to this effect.

Ritzel’s Savvy Ploy

In order to get the ayatollahs to compromise, the resourceful Ritzel undertook a journey to the spiritual leader of the holy city of Mashhad. He politely asked for the terms “truth,” “justice” and “hospitality” to be interpreted for him from an Islamic perspective.

After three days of religious-spiritual debate, the ayatollah asked the visitor why he had really come to visit. Ritzel’s honest answer: He was looking for arguments for the release of the hostages. “I will think about this,” answered the cleric. Soon after, a messenger arrived at Ritzel’s, with a document from the cleric for Khomeini that indirectly frowned upon the hostage-taking. Years later, Genscher raved about how the diplomat had created a “basis for the trust” on the part of the Iranians in the German government.

On Sept. 9, Tabatabaei offered to meet with a US delegation in West Germany. Under Khomeini’s instruction, he asked that Germany keep the minutes for the meeting, and that Genscher “be involved” in the discussions for as long as possible.

One week later, the secret negotiations between Tabatabaei and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher began in the guest house of the German Foreign Ministry in Bonn under Genscher’s leadership. Christopher was surprised when he met Tabatabaei: A good-looking man in his mid-thirties wearing flannel pants and a sporty tweed blazer. He hadn’t thought that a representative of the Khomeini regime could look like that.

His demands, however, posed problems for the US emissaries. Ultimately, Washington couldn’t take control over the now-dead shah’s funds. American creditors were also demanding compensation for confiscated Iranian assets.

But Christopher did offer a guarantee that the US would not attack and held out the prospect that approximately $6 billion in gold and other assets would be released. The gold was to be handed over with the help of the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank. Christopher also agreed to “help overcome banking secrecy” to access the shah’s fortune. Genscher added that this seemed “exceptionally far-reaching and very substantial,” and that his government could not offer anything on that scale. Even years later, Christopher still seemed convinced that without the help of the foreign minister, the discussions would have fallen apart at this point.

Carter noted in his diary that, for the first time, he was certain that he was “in direct contact” with Khomeini.

An agreement seemed to be close. Over the following weeks, Ritzel met with Tabatabaei almost every day. For reasons of secrecy, the latter was now referred to as “the traveler” in German documents.

Sudden Twist

In early October, the Americans deposited drafts for legislative decrees — with which Carter wanted to resolve the disputed points — in the US Embassy in Bonn. Genscher helped where he could. He offered to Tabatabaei that Germany would take on the “role of guarantor when it comes to Americans’ adherence of their obligations.” He agreed to “positively influence public opinion about Iran” and suggested meetings in Berchtesgaden, Germany, or Saudi Arabia.

Then, suddenly, the Iranian side froze up again, for reasons that have been widely speculated. The American election was set to take place on Nov. 4 — did Khomeini want to prevent Carter from getting a boost in the election if the hostage drama came to an end? Or had another group gotten the upper hand in the power struggle in Tehran?

In any case, Tabatabaei delivered alarming news on Nov. 9. He said he was in danger of being arrested and that Ritzel needed to make sure that all documents testifying to Tabatabaei’s role were destroyed.

That fear ended up being exaggerated: Tabatabaei, who died earlier this year, was later named special envoy. But when the Iranians took up negotiations with the United States again in November, they bypassed him and his German connection. Algeria ended up helping release the Iranian billions and on Jan. 20, 1981, the hostages were flown out of the country. US President Carter’s praise for the Germans, however, endured. Without their prior mediation, Historian Bösch says, the agreement wouldn’t have worked out. Even the suggestion to include Algeria came from Bonn. According to the records, it came from Helmut Schmidt.

U.S. Germany to Remove Missile Defense Systems from Turkey

WTH??? Anyone who believes the reasons for these decisions needs to think again.
I personally will throw in my reason, it is part of the Iran Deal where under the P5+1, John Kerry and Wendy Sherman along with The White House gave up yet another major item….missile defense. Iran and the IRGC must be delighted.
Berlin:  Germany on Saturday said it would withdraw its two Patriot missile batteries from Turkey early next year, ending its role in a three-year NATO mission to help bolster the country’s air defences against threats from Syria’s civil war.

The German army, known as the Bundeswehr, said on its website that the mandate for the mission would run out on January 31, 2016, and would not be renewed.

Germany will also call back around 250 soldiers who are currently deployed in southeastern Turkey as part of the mission, the statement said.

“Along with our NATO partners, we have protected the Turkish people from missile attacks from Syria,” Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen was quoted as saying in the statement.

“We are ending this deployment in January 2016,” she said, adding that the main threat in the crisis-wracked region now came from the Islamic State group.

Turkey turned to its NATO allies for help over its troubled frontier after a mortar bomb fired from Syrian territory killed five Turkish civilians in the border town of Akcakale in 2012.

The United States, the Netherlands and Germany each sent Patriot missile batteries in response. Germany’s Patriot missile system is based in the Turkish town of Kahramanmaras, some 100 kilometres (60 miles) from the Syrian border.

Originally used as an anti-aircraft missile, Patriots today are used to defend airspace by detecting and destroying incoming missiles. NATO deployed Patriot missiles in Turkey during the 1991 Gulf war and in 2003 during the Iraqi conflict.

FNC: The U.S. military is pulling its Patriot missiles from Turkey this fall, the U.S. Embassy in Ankara announced Sunday.

It is unclear if the decision to pull the missiles is in response to Turkey’s unannounced massive airstrike against a Kurdish separatist group in northern Iraq on July 24. The strike endangered U.S. Special Forces on the ground training Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, angering U.S. military officials.

The U.S. military was taken completely by surprise by the Turkish airstrike, which involved 26 jets, military sources told Fox News.

Patriot missiles have been upgraded in recent years to shoot down ballistic missiles, in addition to boasting an ability to bring down enemy aircraft. The U.S. military has deployed these missiles along Turkey’s border with Syria.

When a Kurdish journalist asked the Army’s outgoing top officer, Gen. Raymond Odierno, about the incident over northern Iraq at his final press conference Wednesday, Odierno replied: “We’ve had conversations about this to make sure it doesn’t happen.”

The Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, has been listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department. It is influenced by Marxist ideology and has been responsible for recent attacks in Turkey, killing Turkish police and military personnel. A separate left-wing radical group was responsible for attacking the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul last week.

State Department and Pentagon officials have said in recent days that Turkey has a right to defend itself against the PKK.

A senior military source told Fox News that Turkey is worried about recent gains by Syrian Kurds, some affiliated with the PKK. But the group is seen as an effective ground force against ISIS, helping pinpoint ISIS targets for U.S. warplanes.

The Turks, however, worry Syrian Kurds will take over most of the 560-mile border it shares with Syria.

Currently, ISIS controls a 68-mile strip along the Turkey-Syria border, but Turkey does not want Kurdish fighters involved in the fight to push out ISIS from this portion of the border because it would enable the Kurds to control a large swath of land stretching from northern Iraq to the Mediterranean. Right now Syrian Kurds occupy both sides of the contested 68-mile border controlled by ISIS.

Of the 30 million Kurds living in the Middle East, 14 million reside in Turkey. They are one of the world’s largest ethnic groups without its own country.

Despite Turkey being listed among the 62-nation anti-ISIS coalition, it has yet to be named as a country striking ISIS in the coalition’s daily airstrike report.

A week ago, after months of negotiations, the U.S. Air Force moved six F-16 fighter jets to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey from their base in Italy and several KC-135 refueling planes. Airstrikes against ISIS in Syria soon followed.

The decision to allow manned U.S. military aircraft inside Turkey came days after an ISIS suicide bomber killed dozens of Turkish citizens.

Part of Turkey’s reluctance to do more against ISIS is because Turkey wants the U.S. military to take on the regime of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. But that is not U.S. policy.

“We are not at war with the Assad regime,” Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis said recently.

The animosity between Turkey and Syria goes back decades. In 1939, Turkey annexed its southern most province, Hatay, from Assad family land. Syria has never recognized the move and the two countries have been at odds ever since.

There was no immediate reply from the Pentagon or State Dept. when contacted by Fox News asking what prompted the decision to pull the U.S. missiles from Turkey.

N. Korea Increasing Uranium Production and Weapons Stockpiles For Iran?

A central plank of the Obama administration’s case for the nuclear deal just concluded by the P5+1 powers is that the agreement closes off “all pathways” by which the Iranian regime could acquire a nuclear capability, at least for the coming decade.

That, however, simply isn’t true. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the new nuclear bargain is officially called, only addresses the overt means by which Iran might go nuclear. A covert path to the bomb, entailing the procurement of materiel from foreign suppliers, still remains open to Iran, if it chooses to take that route.  If it does, the Islamic Republic will invariably look to Asia. That’s because over the past three decades, Iran and the Stalinist regime of the Kim dynasty in North Korea have erected a formidable alliance—the centerpiece of which is cooperation on nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities.

As long ago as 1985, the two countries had already launched cooperative missile development, with Iran helping to underwrite North Korea’s production of 300-kilometer-range Scud-B missiles. Their interaction expanded in the 1990s, when Iran and North Korea began joint development of Iran’s Shahab medium-range missile, which is closely based on North Korea’s own nuclear-capable No Dong. More details here.

Recent Imagery Suggests Increased Uranium Production in North Korea, Probably for Expanding Nuclear Weapons Stockpile and Reactor Fuel

By

Summary

North Korea is expanding its capacity to mine and mill natural uranium. Recent commercial satellite imagery shows that, over the past year, Pyongyang has begun to refurbish a major mill located near Pyongsan that turns uranium ore into yellowcake.[1] The renovation suggests that North Korea is preparing to expand the production of uranium from a nearby mine.

The question is: What will North Korea do with this uranium? One possibility is that North Korea will enrich the uranium to expand its stockpile of nuclear weapons. Another is that Pyongyang plans to produce fuel for the Experimental Light Water Reactor under construction at its Yongbon nuclear scientific research facility as well as future light-water reactors based on that model.

A major challenge in estimating the size of North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile is uncertainty about whether Pyongyang has additional centrifuge facilities for enriching uranium. While such facilities may be hard to detect, the expansion of mining and milling near Pyongsan may allow observers to estimate the size of North Korea’s enrichment infrastructure based on its demand for uranium. Closer scrutiny of North Korea’s uranium resources, including its other declared mines and mills as well as suspected sites, may help arrive at more accurate estimates of this key capability.

North Korea’s Uranium Infrastructure

While wonks have turned their pointy heads toward North Korea’s nuclear reactors, reprocessing facility and enrichment capabilities, all of these capabilities depend on a supply of natural uranium. Uranium, whether natural or enriched, is the essential fuel for nuclear reactors that produce plutonium and can also be enriched to produce nuclear weapons.

The North Koreans like to brag about how much uranium they have. One North Korean publication described the DPRK’s uranium resources as “infinite.” And poor Andrea Berger, a non-proliferation expert at the Royal United Services Institute in London, even got a lecture on the subject from a North Korean official.

As it turns out, though, North Korea’s uranium resources are probably paltry, which means that we may be able to locate and monitor a relatively small number of sites. That, in turn could help us get a better grip on the North’s ability to produce reactor fuel and bombs. Thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars now have access to internal Soviet and Warsaw Pact documents describing North Korea’s efforts to seek assistance in developing its uranium resources.

North Korea asked the Soviet Union for help in the field of the uranium prospecting as early as 1948. The request is described in an internal Soviet memo, translated by the Wilson Center’s North Korea International Documentation Project, which suggests such prospecting be postponed.[2] North Korea kept bugging the Soviets, though. By the early 1960s, the Soviets had completed a survey, but concluded North Korean uranium deposits were too poor for exploitation. Two Soviet specialists told their Ambassador in Pyongyang: “Korean uranium ore is not rich and is very scarce. The mining and processing of such ore will be extremely expensive for the Koreans.”[3] As it turns out, the North Koreans didn’t care that the uranium was extremely expensive. If you wonder whether Kim Il Sung wanted a bomb or not, his abiding interest in a domestic source of uranium at any cost is a hint.

The memos also include technical information. One memo, reporting on a 1979 North Korean effort to acquire uranium mining equipment from Czechoslovakia (hey, remember Czechoslovakia?) states: “[T]he DPRK has two important uranium quarries. In one of these two places, the uranium content of the ore is 0.26 percent, while in the other it is 0.086 percent.”[4] Based on other information released by the Soviet Union, it appears these mines are near Pakchon and Pyongsan, with Pyongsan likely having the higher quality ore.[5] In 1985, the North Koreans were still pressing the Soviets to speed up prospecting for new sources of ore.

In 1992, the DPRK declared, as part of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), two uranium mines (the Wolbisan Uranium Mine and the Pyongsan Uranium Mine) and two mills for concentration (the Pakchon Uranium Concentrate Pilot Plant and the Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant). While there are naturally questions about whether this declaration was complete, the claim of two uranium mines appears consistent with the Soviet surveys.

The IAEA also released videos of Hans Blix, the former Swedish Foreign Minister and then the head of the international organization, visiting both mills. I was able to use the videos to locate both mills and, as best I can tell, the location of these sites was not in the public domain until now:

  • Pakchon Uranium Concentrate Pilot Plant (39°42’34.73″N, 125°34’8.57″E)
  • Pyongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant (38°19’4.56″N, 126°25’57.43″E)

Figure 1. North Korea’s Uranium Concentrate Plants.

Image: Google Earth.

Figure 2. Overview of the Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Uranium Concentration Plant.

Image includes material Pleiades © CNES 2015. Distribution Airbus DS / Spot Image, all rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Mill

Pyongsan is believed to the most important uranium mine and mill in North Korea. (The other mill, near Pakchon, was described as a pilot facility.) Commercial satellite imagery from Digital Globe and Airbus Defense and Space show the layout of the mine and mill that turns uranium ore into yellowcake. The mine is connected to the mill by a conveyor belt that brings uranium ore into the mill for processing. The various structures within the mill are connected to one another allowing the uranium to be processed in stages (see figure 2 for schematic of a typical mill). Finally, the mill is connected to a large pond where tailings are dumped.

Figure 3. Schematic of a typical mill.

Photo: Energy Information Administration.

While North Korea has operated the facility intermittently over the past decade, new spoil and tailings appeared sometime between 2006-2011, suggesting that the North resumed uranium mining and milling during that period after what appears to have been a lull of many years. This uranium may have been fabricated into new fuel rods for the 5 MWe gas graphite reactor. North Korea had only 2,500 fresh fuel rods for this reactor—less than a third of a full load. (North Korea also had 12,000 rods that had been fabricated for the never completed 50 MWth reactor, which could be converted into reactor fuel.) The uranium might also have been converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) that could be enriched to build nuclear weapons, either at the enrichment plant that the North constructed and revealed to Americans visiting Yongbyon in 2010 or at a covert site. Based on the size of the spoil pile and the tailings, it may be possible to make a rough estimate of how much uranium was recovered, but this estimate would be very approximate. However, North Korea seems to be mining more uranium to meet what may be increasing needs for fuel or bombs.

Many more details here with satellite imagery.

Conclusion

Pyongyang appears to be modernizing a key facility associated with the production of uranium yellowcake. This suggests that North Korea intends to mine and mill a significant amount of uranium that could serve as fuel for expanding its nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as for providing fuel for future light-water reactors that may be in the planning phase. Mapping and monitoring North Korea’s infrastructure for producing uranium can help estimate the size of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program which is otherwise shrouded in secrecy.

Obama Prematurely Removed Trade Restrictions with Iran

It must have been some waivers that government officials signed that allowed renewed trade with Iran despite no trade under the Bush Administration and in most cases going back to the Carter administration.

Full details on lifted sanctions with Iran is found here.

The exception for the waiver appears to be under the guise of ‘humanitarian reasons’. So exactly how would Marlboro/Philip Morris or Coca Cola exactly be allowed for humanitarian reasons? I don’t know either but read on….the story gets worse.

U.S. Boosts Trade to Iran, Despite Sanctions

WSJ:

The Standard Chartered affair has laid bare a transatlantic rift between the U.S. and Europe over Iran sanctions.

U.K.-listed bank Standard Chartered agreed Tuesday to pay a $340 million sum to a New York regulator to settle allegations it broke U.S. money-laundering laws in handling Iranian customers’ transactions.

The allegations, which were made public by the New York state Department of Financial Services last week, led some U.K. political figures to accuse the regulator of seeking to undermine London as a financial center.

Now there are more grumblings this side of the pond as European companies realize they suffer more from recent Iran restrictions than their U.S. counterparts–and that such advantage may stem in part from better corporate access to decision-makers in Washington than in Brussels.

The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday morning that U.S. exports to Iran were increasing despite mounting enmity between both sides, while European Union exports to Tehran were falling.

Oral-B mouth wash, made by Procter & Gamble Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio, is still on display at local corner shops in Iran—the company confirms it still sells to Iran legally. Coca-Cola Co.’s Coke soft drink is sold in cafes and supermarkets. The Atlanta-based multinational says its syrup is still being legally exported to Iran and bottled by Khoshgovar Co., whose commercial manager Valid Nejati confirmed the information. “There have been no issues” with receiving payments, a Coca-Cola spokesman said.

To be sure, the penalties enforced against European banks for breaching sanctions on Iran were not focused on trade in foodstuffs, as a U.S Treasury official points out.

But European companies say their banks are increasingly refusing to handle letters of credit because they fear they could run into trouble in the U.S. because financial sanctions there have become so complex.

By contrast, the growth of U.S. sales to Iran largely stems from a decision in October to replace the previous cumbersome approval process with a blanket license for non-sanctioned food items, says Michael Burton, a Washington-based sanctions lawyer at Arent Fox.

While some European cereal traders say they can’t find banks to issue letters of credit for Iran, the U.S. this year restarted wheat exports to the Islamic Republic after a two-year gap.

As of last year, the vast majority of U.S. goods were medical preparations or equipment—31%– , pulpwood and woodpulp—25% and agricultural goods and food–17%

But U.S. permits even extend to goods such as cigarettes, though they are not covered by the blanket license and are subject to more stringent control than foodstuffs.

In April, Philip Morris International Inc. obtained a specific licence from the U.S. Treasury, “to sell cigarettes to customers for import into Iran,” a spokesman for the company said, although it has yet to make use of the authorization.

But expect no miracle to explain why Iranians may be allowed to buy Marlboros but not drive the new Peugeot in the future. To put it simply: when it comes to pleading its case with decision-makers, Corporate America does it better.

Mr. Burton also said U.S. companies benefit from well established channels in Washington to plead for sanctions exemptions, while their European peers, “don’t have the same mechanism to lobby the EU bureaucracy.”

For instance, Washington-based lobby group USA*Engage has successfully campaigned for the extension of a humanitarian exemption for food, agricultural products and medical goods from Iran sanctions.

Richard Sawaya, the director of USA* Engage, said “we have been in perpetual conversation with lawmakers and the Treasury,” on keeping the exemption. The primary aim of USA*Engage is humanitarian, but it can also benefit U.S. companies, Mr. Sawaya said, adding its focusis not limited to Iran.

USA*Engage is an offshoot of the Washington-based National Foreign Trade Council, whose board includes Procter & Gamble. More reading here.

*** Don’t go away yet…now due to the Iran deal concluded, the United States is on the hook to help Iran sell its oil.

Washington, 7 August (Argus) — The US administration is taking steps to ensure that Tehran’s oil customers can continue to purchase Iranian crude during an interim period before a nuclear agreement can be fully implemented and sanctions lifted.

The US Treasury and State departments late today issued guidance for how they will handle Iranian oil and petrochemical exports in the wake of a 14 July agreement the US and its P5 + 1 negotiating partners reached with Tehran. That accord swaps sanctions relief for nuclear concessions.

During the nuclear negotiations, Iran’s oil exports have been limited to 1mn-1.1mn b/d, down from 2.5mn b/d before the sanctions were imposed in 2012. Six countries — China, India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey — buy oil from Iran.

Under US law, President Barack Obama is authorized to impose sanctions on banks in countries that refuse to reduce their purchases of Iranian oil significantly. The US is pledging not to impose sanctions on financial institutions in those countries. And the US will not target non-US companies that help facilitate those purchases.

Obama on 5 August questioned the feasibility of trying to cut Beijing off from the US financial system, since the Chinese “happen to be major purchasers of our debt.” He warned such an effort “could trigger severe disruptions in our economy” and raise questions about the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency.

The US also will allow 14 companies to export petrochemicals from Iran. US administration officials estimate it will take six to nine months before compliance with the nuclear provisions can be assured and sanctions can be lifted.

The Republican-controlled Congress is scheduled to vote by 17 September on a resolution of disapproval to demonstrate their unhappiness with the nuclear agreement. That measure is likely to pass, prompting President Barack Obama to veto the resolution. Obama will need 34 Democrats in the Senate or a third of the House of Representatives to sustain his veto.

But Obama is suffering Democratic defections. Yesterday, New York senator Charles Schumer, who in 2017 is expected to become the Democrats’ new leader in the Senate, said yesterday he will oppose the deal.

Iran produced 2.88mn b/d in July, up from 2.85mn b/d in June, making it Opec’s third largest oil producer. Iranian officials have said repeatedly their oil sector needs $150bn-$200bn in new investment. US officials estimate

 

ISIS Hacking Division Takes on Military and Govt Personnel

Alleged ISIS leak compromises hundreds of U.S. military & intelligence emails — Dept of Defense is ‘looking into it’

The top of the page containing the leak appears to show an unconfirmed link to ISIS

Above: The top of the page containing the leak appears to show an unconfirmed link to ISIS

A Twitter account claiming to be the “IS Hacking Division” has published what appears to be an extensive directory of government emails, passwords, credit cards, phone numbers, and addresses spanning U.S. military departments and divisions, the FBI, U.S. embassies, the Library of Congress, U.S. city officials, the British Embassy, the FTC, and NASA, as well as possible personnel at Wells Fargo.

VentureBeat is able to confirm that the U.S. Department of Defense is “looking into” this alleged hack. We’ve also independently verified that at least several of the items included on that list contained accurate information, but that several of the people were not aware that the leak had occurred.

Other details in the document appear inaccurate or outdated; it lists two Intel Corporation email accounts which apparently do not exist in Intel’s “company email directory,” an Intel spokesperson told VentureBeat.

IS hacking division tweet

The content was published onto a site entitled “zonehmirrors.org,” a domain which was registered under the name Redi Alberto in the city of Lugano, Switzerland.

ISIS Group Claims to Have Hacked Information on U.S. Military Personnel
NBC: A hacker group claiming to be affiliated with the terror organization ISIS on Tuesday posted what it said was the personal information of hundreds of members of the military and government personnel, and urged terrorists to carry out attacks.

Flashpoint Intelligence, a global security firm and NBC News consultant, said it could not authenticate the claim by the so-called “Islamic State Hacking Division” or the accuracy of the information. Islamic State is another name by which ISIS is known.
The Twitter account used has been affiliated with infamous ISIS fighter Abu Hussain Al Britani, Flashpoint said. The account has since been suspended.

The group claimed the information contained names, emails, passwords, and phone numbers of personnel that included individuals from the Air Force, the Marines, NASA and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. There is no indication as to how old the information is, or whether the email addresses and passwords are still valid.

“We are aware of the report but cannot confirm credibility at this time,” a spokesperson for the Department of Defense said in an email. “The safety of our service members is always a primary concern.”

The group had previously claimed it hacked American servers and distributed information on military personnel, but analysts believe that claim was overstated, and the information was instead culled from freely available social media accounts, Flashpoint said.
T he information released Tuesday also included the purported credit card information of several U.S. State Department officials as well as screenshots of private Facebook messages between purported U.S. servicememebers.

Flashpoint analysts said the “hack” — if true — could be significant as it would represent a growing effort by pro-ISIS groups to distribute personal information that could be used in lone-wolf attacks.

The list of those hacked with names, locations, government divisions, embassies and P/W’s is here.  I was just notified that the original link has been taken offline, after some searching I located this link. http://tu3ek4yox26tber2.onion.nu/   Consider the risk if you choose to open it.