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The summary below translates into a few questions. Why does Secretary of State John Kerry continue to legitimize Iran and to bring the country on equal footing globally as they are a rogue nation? The next question, will the White House continue to ignore Iran’s history of terrorism?
At the dawn of 2015, the U.S. has yet to articulate a comprehensive foreign-policy strategy to counter the influence and territorial gains of Islamic State, the terrorist group that emerged last year — and poses a dangerous and vexing threat to stability across the Middle East and North Africa. By the Pentagon’s admission, we neither understand the underlying ideology of the merciless group nor have a grasp of all the players in the region who have aggravated the crisis.
Indeed, the fog of war seems to have muddied Iran’s role in this dark chapter of regional affairs. Is Tehran an ally or a nemesis in the fight against Islamic State? At least initially, the U.S. believed that Iran could play a constructive role in combating a mutual adversary. Secretary of State John F. Kerry, touting the age-old axiom “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” suggested that Iran could be part of the solution.
The only trouble is that Iran is a major part of the challenges we face.
Islamic State, also known by the acronym ISIS, rose out of the sectarian conflict that exploded in Iraq in 2004, shortly after the U.S.-led occupation. Iran immediately backed Shiite Muslim militant factions with training, money, weapons and intelligence, sparking a vicious Sunni Muslim militant counter-reaction that nourished Al Qaeda and, later, ISIS. The rise to power of Nouri Maliki, an inept and corrupt Shiite prime minister with strong ties to Tehran, sealed Iraq’s fate not only as a breeding ground for Sunni extremism, but as an Iranian satellite state.
Iran now has more than 7,000 Revolutionary Guards and elite Quds Force members in Iraq, according to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian opposition organization. The killing of Iranian military advisor Hamid Taqavi, a brigadier general in the Revolutionary Guard, in December in Samarra put an exclamation point on the scope and significance of the Revolutionary Guard’s presence in Iraq. As the most senior commander of the Quds Force to die abroad since the Iran-Iraq war ended 26 years ago, Taqavi played a key role in Tehran’s training and control of Shiite militias in Iraq.
Amnesty International has pointed to the presence of Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq as a key source of instability and sectarian conflict there. In an October report called “Absolute Impunity, Militia Rule in Iraq,” Amnesty found that the growing power of Shiite militias has contributed to a “deterioration in security and an atmosphere of lawlessness” and that the Shiites “are ruthlessly targeting Sunni civilians … under the guise of fighting terrorism, in an apparent bid to punish Sunnis for the rise of the ISIS and for its heinous crimes.”
Iranian clerics’ paranoia over domestic discontent has made meddling in regional countries, Iraq in particular, a cornerstone of Tehran’s foreign policy and survival strategy. Speaking at Taqavi’s funeral, top Iranian security official Ali Shamkhani said, “Taqavi and people like him gave their blood in Samarra so that we do not give our blood in Tehran.”
Iran’s reasons for “fighting” ISIS diverge considerably from U.S. objectives. Whereas we seek a stable and nonsectarian government in Iraq, the mullahs’ interests are best served by the ascension of a subordinate Shiite leadership, enabling them to use the neighbor to the west as a springboard for their regional hegemonic, anti-Western designs. The Iranian government sees an opening in the turmoil in Iraq for consolidating its grip on that country, weakened by the ouster of Prime Minister Maliki.
Iran’s role in the civil war in Syria is following a similar dynamic: Through its proxy Hezbollah — the Shiite Muslim political and paramilitary organization — Iran has served as Syrian President Bashar Assad’s battering ram against his people, killing and enraging Sunnis and fueling ISIS’ exponential growth.
Aiding and abetting Iran’s destructive role in Iraq or Syria would be a strategic mistake for the U.S. that only exacerbates a profound crisis. It is a dangerous irony to even consider allying with Iran — which the U.S. State Department still considers the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism — to fight the terrorism inspired by ISIS.
Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi, who is well versed in the agenda and ambitions of Tehran’s mullahs, rightly describes a potential Western alliance with Iran against ISIS as akin to “jumping from the frying pan into the fire.” The eviction of the Iranian government from the region, especially from Syria and Iraq, must be part of the U.S. strategy for countering ISIS and resolving the sectarian divides that drive extremism throughout the region, Rajavi says.
She’s right. The U.S. must think beyond ISIS to what kind of region will be left in its smoldering wake. As the U.S. weighs its policy options, any scenario that leaves Iran in control of large swaths of the region must be rejected outright. Gen. Hugh Shelton served as the 14th chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
U.S. troops serving at the Al Asad air base in Iraq are being targeted with “regular” mortar and rocket fire from Islamic State (IS) terrorists, according to the Pentagon.
The increasingly dangerous situation for the 320 U.S. troops serving at the base is raising concern among Pentagon officials, according to Defense Department spokesman Col. Steven Warren.
While no soldiers have been injured by the IS attacks, the rockets and mortars are landing around the base’s perimeter, according to CNN.
The Pentagon will not say if it is changing base security measures to account for the increased risk, according to CNN.
People often are unaware that they’re accidentally posting their location on Facebook Inc. (FB) or Twitter Inc.’s (TWTR) social sites. One would be ISIS jihadist from New Zealand found that out the hard way.
IBRABO, a Canadian open source intelligence research firm, posted details of how a would-be Jihadi calling himself the “Kiwi Jihadi” accidentally revealed his current location and his locations during the past few months of 2014, months he’s spent serving the so-called “Islamic State” (ISIS), a group behind much of the brutal violence in Syria in Iraq.
Posting to his Twitter account, @M_Taylor_Kiwi, the “Kiwi Jihadi” boasted of his exploits with ISIS. But he also inadvertently shared months of maps detailing ISIS hideouts he spent time at. He deleted the Tweets — more than 40 — when he grew wise that they were geotagged and might have revealed his location. But iBrabo had already mapped his movements in glorious detail.
So far, that effort has been funded through a war budget that’s not subject to the same budget caps as the Defense Department’s base budget. It’s likely to continue to be funded this way, even though both Democrats and Republicans have referred to this fund as a “slush fund” for the Pentagon.
“Right now, the cost for operations in Iraq are coming out of Overseas Contingency Operations,” Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work said Tuesday at the Council on Foreign Relations. “For the foreseeable future, we believe that is the case.”
Work and others have made the case that funding the war against ISIS through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget is the best option available since Congress has no plans this year to put an end to sequestration.
Islamic State (Isis) has claimed it has an annual budget of $2bn (£1.31bn) for 2015 and an estimated surplus of $250m (£163m) which will act as the group’s war chest against the West.
In an interview with Arabic outlet Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, religious leader Naji Abdullah from Mosul claimed that the group is using the budget as part of wider plans to develop and expand its self-proclaimed “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria.
Another senior religious figure in the city of Mosul, Sheikh Abu Saad al-Ansari, said its first-ever budget would help those in poverty, the disabled and families of Islamic State (IS) fighters who have been killed in operations conducted by the US-led coalition or Iraqi forces.
According to The Economist, the group already pay its fighters a $400 a month, more than any Syrian rebel group or the Iraqi government pays its own fighters.
With the $250m surplus left after projected expenditure, the group plans to use the money to beef-up its fight against the US-led coalition which has been conducting air strikes against IS positions in both Iraq and Syria while arming Kurds in northern Iraq, according to The Washington Times.
As well as the announcement of an annual budget, the group has reportedly opened its own bank, known as the “Islamic Bank”, where customers are able to receive a loan or deposit their money.
Iraq expert Fouad Ali told Al-Araby that the announcement of a budget and an Islamic bank were propaganda tactics to “undermine the morale of the coalition and the Iraqi government”.
The group’s revenue is believed to come from kidnapping, taxes, oil revenues and extortion.
The announcement of the new budget or Islamic bank could not be independently verified by IBTimes UK.
In June last year, the militants launched an offensive across northern and western Iraq, capturing large swathes of land around vital cities such as Ramadi and Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, where they robbed $450m from the central bank.
The Palestinian Authority leadership has authorized several missions in recent days. They are looking to join the following organizations:
Of particular note is the International Criminal Court of which the United States is not a signatory. The purpose of the PA’s move is to bring charges against Israel.
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas signed a request Wednesday to join the International Criminal Court, a move that would establish a new avenue for action against Israel after the UN Security Council rejected a resolution which aimed to establish a timetable for a full Israeli pullout from the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
“We want to complain about the harm caused to us and to our land,” Abbas said before signing the treaties. “But who shall we complain to? The Security Council refused our request. Where will we go? To the international organizations.”
Abbas said the Palestinians seek a fair solution to the conflict based on international principles, and that such a solution would help quell regional unrest. “We do not want anything more, but we will not settle for less,” he said. “Tonight we sign 20 different international treaties, even though we have the right to join any international institutions.”
The Palestinians hope ICC membership will pave the way for war crimes prosecutions against Israeli officials. Abbas did not specify Wednesday when he planned to file complaints against Israel, or the specifics of such intended complaints, which it may be feasible to file within the next few weeks.
Meanwhile, Israel is taking the offense and building their own case such that Abbas may want to rethink this strategy.
The Tel Aviv-based Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center said all of the combatant casualties were members of Hamas’s military wing, the Izzadin Al-Kassam Brigades.
“The names did not show up in other casualty lists publicized by organizations affiliated with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority,” said the Center, which is a part of the Israeli Intelligence and Heritage Commemoration Center, founded by leading members of the Israeli intelligence community.
According to the study, 52% of Palestinian casualties from the conflict were terrorists and 48% civilians.
A report released on Thursday said the newly identified combatant casualties belonged one of the following categories: Some were terrorists left behind in Israel after being killed in fire fights with IDF units during the summer war, others were of terrorists buried under tunnels or the ruins of buildings bombed by the IDF, and others were terrorists who died of their injuries in hospital and were not identified during hostilities.
“We believe that the 50 names, identified by us, represent a partial list and that there many other terrorists whose names are not included in the various casualty lists,” the Center added.
Prominent names on the list include members of the Al-Kassam Brigade’s naval commando unit, which is a part of Hamas’s Al-Nahba elite forces.
Four naval commandos, killed in Israeli territory during the July 8 Hamas raid on Zikim beach, are missing from Palestinian casualty lists, and appear in the list of 50 casualties.
So do the names of ten members of the Al-Kassam Brigades killed in Israeli territory during a cross-border raid on Kibbutz Nir Am on July 21.
The attempt to censor the names “stem from Hamas’s policy of deliberate concealment, in order to serve the diplomatic, media, and legal campaigns against Israel,” Dr. Reuven Erlich, head of the Terrorism and Intelligence Center, told The Jerusalem Post.
He urged international bodies that cite on Palestinian casualty lists to be wary, calling Palestinian casualty lists “not serious.
On the other hand, the report said, Hamas makes domestic use of the deaths of its operatives, despite their absence from formal casualty lists, by publicizing inside Gaza detailed information on them and the circumstances in which they were killed.
“This is in order to satisfy the families of those killed, to serve the glorification of Hamas’s military capabilities, and strengthen the myth of a ‘victory’ over Israel,” it stated.
The study cited an Israeli security source as saying that out of the 2,140 Palestinian casualties, some died of natural causes and accidents.
The source identified 886 names on the lists as terrorists, most (67%) from Hamas. Islamic Jihad casualties formed 22% of the identified terrorists killed. The remainder – 11% – belong to smaller terror organizations operating in the Gaza Strip.
Out of 712 noncombatant casualties identified by the center, 345 were children and 268 were women.
A third category of 542 casualties cannot be identified at this stage, the Center said.
“Destination airport, and Guess What’s on the Menu?” is the title to the opening spread of the cover story about how to bomb passenger planes in the slick, professionally designed new issue of Inspire magazine published by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Releasing the digital magazine on Christmas Eve is unlikely a coincidence; it’s the 5th anniversary of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 as it was on its landing approach to Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.
The entire issue is devoted to inspiring lone wolf jihadists in the US and the West, and especially urges attacks on commercial passenger planes. A lengthy section provides detailed instructions on how to build a new bomb AQAP purports can be “hidden” not only on aircraft, but also to blow up other targets with the intent of causing ripples throughout US and Western economies.
“Previously,” Ibrahim wrote, “we have presented Muslims with different weapons, including bombs and tactics … Now we are obliged to give our ummah something special. Something unique that can easily be prepared at home — that is the reason we have taken a long period to produce this issue. Here, we give the Muslim ummah a bomb recipe that America fears it might reach the hands of other Mujahideen in other fronts.”
“However, what America didn’t expect is that this recipe is going to be in the reach of all Muslims around the world,” Ibrahim said, noting, “It will circulate in the social media and Muslims will translate it into different languages. Some will be pleased and pass on the message; while others will be inspired and most importantly make the bomb.”
The article, Open Source Jihad (OSJ), was written by “AQ-Chef,” presumably Ibrahim Hassan Tali Al Asiri, AQAP’s premier bomb maker who the Department of State issued a $5 million bounty for on October 14, 2014. At the same time, the State Department announced a total bounty of $45 million for information leading to the locations of the eight key leaders of AQAP. The department authorized rewards of up to $10 million for information leading to the location of Nasir Al Wahishi and up to $5 million each for information leading to the locations of Qasim Al Rimi, Othman Al Ghamdi, Shawki Ali Ahmed Al Badani, Jalal Bala’idi, Ibrahim Al Rubaysh, Ibrahim Al Banna and Al Asiri.
Named targets include American, United, Continental and Delta airlines, as well as British Airways, EasyJet, Air France and Air France KI. Other objectives include “direct economic targets” and high-profile “economic personalities” like former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (the current issue of Inspire says he’s the current chairman, raising questions about when the current issue was produced – Bernanke stepped down in February) and “wealthy entrepreneurs or company owners” like Bill Gates.
Titled Neurotmesis: Cutting the Nerves and Isolating the Head (Neurotmesis is a Greek word meaning “to sever the nerves”), the latest issue of Inspire is very similar to the previous issue, as it focuses on instigating Muslims to carry out lone wolf attacks against the US. The focus on attacking the US is signaled in a letter by Yahya Ibrahim, the magazine’s editor-in-chief.
The article details ways to “breaching airport security,” “making the hidden bomb,” and various “field tactics” related to selecting targets and executing an attack. AQAP dedicated the OSJ section to individuals who had previously attempted to blow up airlines, including Ramzi Yusuf, Abdulmutallab and Richard Reid (the shoe bomber).
Beginning the 37-pages of instructions for how to build “The Hidden Bomb,” AQAP said, “On the dawn of 2010, media agencies reported that a Nigerian youth boarded an American plane, Delta, carrying with him a unique bomb. He nearly blew the plane up. His name is ‘Umar Al Fârouq. Prior to that, a Mujahid blew himself in the castle of the Saudi Prince, Muhammad bin Naif.”
“The Mujahid’s name was Abdallâh ‘Asiri. The aim was to assassinate the prince, but the prince survived. Both men used bombs similar in design.”
“Initially, what we faced as a main problem was: How can a lone Mujahid acquire the required explosive materials. For several months, we conducted a number of experiments. As a result we came up with these simple materials that are readily available around the globe, even inside America – and this is our goal.
“We spared no effort in simplifying the idea in such we made it ‘another meal prepared in the kitchen’ so that every determined Muslim can prepare.”
AQAP claims the “hidden bomb is 2.5x as powerful as ‘Umar Fârouq’s bomb, and 3x as powerful as the military-grade F1Russian grenade,” adding, “American security organs do not know what they do not know.”
Following the instructions for building “the hidden bomb,” AQ-Chef provides a missive on “Field Tactics” for how to use the bomb to blow up a jetliner. He said, “I assume you have now prepared your hidden bomb after you have been convinced by the importance of this operation both politically and militarily. What is left is identifying the target that will achieve the greatest success, Biidhnillâh — a success that will crush the enemy’s economy. We have sketched the targets as a part of a complete program we have presented to the Lone Mujahid.”
Continuing, he said, “So as to achieve the greatest success, it is necessary for the person responsible and his motives to be publicized. This is what we call ‘the Message.’ It is obvious that most Martyrdom Operation’s executors are Mujahideen. Some say these operations have become the Mujahideen’s signature. But after the plane has exploded, how can the world know that a martyrdom seeker is behind this explosion?
“To achieve that,” he wrote, “you can write a timing email before departure in such the email is sent a day or two after you have carried out the operation. The timing service is available in the net. Write down who you are and what your motives are.
Continuing, he concluded, “The news of this bomb spread like wildfire. It worried many security personnel. At the time, we did not publish the bomb recipe for many reasons. But now we have decided to release it as part of a complete program for the Lone Mujahid (Neurotmesis). Biidhnillâh, it will achieve its goals as anticipated.”
In a question and answer “interview” with AQ Chef, he said, “Unlike a lab, a kitchen is found in every house. Moreover, if a Mujahid can prepare a bomb from materials used in the kitchen instead of lab materials and use cooking utensils instead of lab apparatus, then we have a double success and we have overcome the security hurdle. Therefore, a larger number of Mujahideen can carry out Jihādi operations.
“You will notice in this issue specifically we have focused on the kitchen,” he noted. “Generally, we are trying as much as possible to move the lone Mujahid from the lab to the pharmacy and from the pharmacy to the kitchen.”
Asked if he believes “airport security can deal with this bomb?” Al Asiri presumably responded, saying, “We said security has imaging devices. They could detect the bomb. But these devices cannot be included in all airports due to cost reasons and the harassment they cause. Then these bombs are not only used in airports, but they are also used in assassinations as the brothers clarified in their program (Neurotmesis). Nevertheless, I say to the heads of the US intelligence in general, by the Help of Allāh, many airplanes will be ‘crashing.’ Hereby, I call the National Transportation Safety Board, ‘Do not weary yourself of investigation, the US Department of Homeland Security will take over the job because of a simple reason: This jihādi work belongs to the ‘Global Lone Jihād Movement.’”
“Hereby, Inspire magazine is committed to arm Muslim individuals — as well as Muslim groups as is in this issue — in their Jihâd on America.”
WASHINGTON (AP) — While President Barack Obama hasn’t ruled out the possibility of reopening a U.S. Embassy in Iran, Republicans say the Senate will vote within weeks on a bill to impose more sanctions on Tehran over its nuclear program.
Obama was asked in an NPR interview broadcast on Monday whether he could envision opening an embassy there during his final two years in office.
“I never say never,” Obama said, adding that U.S. ties with Tehran must be restored in steps.
Washington and its partners are hoping to clinch a deal with Iran by July that would set long-term limits on Iran’s enrichment of uranium and other activity that could produce material for use in nuclear weapons. Iran says its program is solely for energy production and medical research purposes. It has agreed to some restrictions in exchange for billions of dollars in relief from U.S. economic sanctions.
In an interview in late 2006, I asked then-Senator Barack Obama to talk about the challenges to rational deterrence theory posed by the behavior of rogue states. “Whatever you want to say about the Soviets,” Obama answered, “they were essentially conservative. The North Korean regime and the Iranians are driven more by ideology and fantasy.”
Earlier this year, I asked Obama the following question: “What is more dangerous: Sunni extremism or Shia extremism?”
His answer was revealing, suggestive of an important change in the way he has come to view the Iranian regime. He started by saying, as would be expected, “I’m not big on extremism generally.” And then he argued—in part by omission—that he finds the principal proponent of Shiite extremism, the regime in Tehran, more rational, and more malleable, than the main promoters of Sunni radicalism.
“I don’t think you’ll get me to choose on those two issues,” he said. “What I’ll say is that if you look at Iranian behavior, they are strategic, and they’re not impulsive. They have a worldview, and they see their interests, and they respond to costs and benefits. And that isn’t to say that they aren’t a theocracy that embraces all kinds of ideas that I find abhorrent, but they’re not North Korea. They are a large, powerful country that sees itself as an important player on the world stage, and I do not think has a suicide wish, and can respond to incentives. And that’s the reason why they came to the table on sanctions.”
Since becoming president, Obama has made the argument that Iran could be induced, cajoled, and pressured into compromise, a view that has been proven provisionally, partially, correct: Sanctions, plus Obama’s repeated (and, to my mind, at least, credible) threat of military action, convinced Iran to temporarily halt many aspects of its nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief. But Obama and his international partners have been less successful at bringing Iran to permanent denuclearization.
A long-term, verifiable arrangement that keeps Iran perpetually a year or more from nuclear breakout is surpassingly important for the national security of the United States (as Obama noted in this interview); for the health and safety of America’s friends in the Middle East; and for the cause of nuclear nonproliferation in the world’s most volatile and dangerous region. Over the past year, the two sides of international nuclear negotiations have apparently moved somewhat closer to each other, and when the second round of talks came to an end without achieving a deal, both sides agreed that yet another negotiation extension was in order. As Iran and its interlocutors move into what stands to be the fateful year for these negotiations, a credible deal does not look to be achievable; so far, at least, the Iranians seem unwilling to make the truly creative concessions necessary to meet the West’s minimum requirements.
Especially if a deal is ultimately proven to be unachievable, another question will arise: Is the price the U.S. has paid to reach this elusive deal too high? An admirable aspect of Obama’s foreign-policy making is his ability to coolly focus on core issues to the exclusion of what he considers to be extraneous matters. This is also, however, a non-admirable aspect of his policymaking, in particular when the subject at hand is Iran’s role in supporting the killer Assad regime in Syria.
Obama seems to believe that a nuclear deal is, in a way, like Casaubon‘s key to all mythologies: Many good things, he believes, could flow from a nuclear compromise. In an interview last week with NPR’s Steve Inskeep, the president suggested that a nuclear agreement would help Iran become “a very successful regional power that was also abiding by international norms and international rules.” This, he said, “would be good for everybody. That would be good for the United States, that would be good for the region, and most of all, it would be good for the Iranian people.”
This is a wonderful notion, the idea that the end of Iran’s isolation could lead it to moderate its more extreme impulses. But there isn’t much in the way of proof to suggest that Iran’s rulers are looking to join an international order whose norms are defined by the United States and its allies. In fact, there is proof of something quite opposite: Iran seems as interested as ever in becoming a regional hegemon, on its own terms. And its supreme leader, and his closest confidants, have made it clear, over and over again, that he is not interested in normalizing relations with the United States.
Across the greater Middle East, Iran’s efforts to extend its influence have been blunt and brutal: It supports Shiite insurrections in Yemen and Bahrain; it attempts to manipulate Lebanese politics through its Beirut-based proxy, Hezbollah; it intervenes in Gaza and against the already-fading hope for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Arab crisis; and certainly its unceasing threats to eradicate a fellow member-state of the United Nations, Israel, suggest that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has a vision for Iran that differs from Obama’s.
But nothing underscores the Iranian regime’s imperialistic, hegemonic nature more than its support for the Assad regime in Damascus. Without Iran’s assistance, Assad would have fallen a long time ago. The death toll in Syria is more than 200,000; half of Syria’s population has been displaced. These dark achievements of the Assad regime would not have been possible without Iran. Thousands of Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps troops and advisers, plus Iranian weaponry, have made all the difference for Assad. As a recent study by the Middle East Institute states:
It is no longer accurate to describe the war in Syria as a conflict between Syrian rebels on the one hand and Bashar al-Assad’s regime forces “supported” by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRG), Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias on the other. Most major battles in Syria—along the frontlines of regime-held areas—are now being directed and fought by the IRG and Hezbollah, along with other non-Syrian Shi‘i militias, with Assad forces in a supportive or secondary role. …
One result of this heavy Iranian involvement in the war in Syria has been a change in the nature of the relationship between the Syrian and the Iranian regimes. From historically being mutually beneficial allies, the Iranian regime is now effectively the dominant force in regime-held areas of Syria, and can thus be legally considered an “occupying force,” with the responsibilities that accompany such a role.
There was no commensurate effort made by opponents of Assad to help those Syrians who were trying to overthrow him. President Obama called on Assad to go, but kept the U.S. on the sidelines through the first years of the Syrian civil war, for reasons he has explained in many places, including here.
Today, the U.S. and its allies are fighting in the Syrian theater, but they are fighting Assad’s putative enemies, the Sunni extremists of ISIS, not Assad and his Iranian allies. And yet ISIS is a derivative problem of a larger crisis: Without Assad—which is to say, without Iran—there would be no ISIS “caliphate” in Syria in the first place. The midwives of ISIS are Assad, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, and Ayatollah Khamenei.
If Assad had been overthrown early in the civil war, a more moderate, multi-confessional Syrian government could have plausibly emerged to take its place. The early rebels, who frightened the Assad regime to its core, were not seeking to build a cross-border caliphate on a foundation of medieval cruelty; they were simply seeking to remove Assad’s boot from their necks. As the Assad regime, with Iran’s invaluable help, recovered from the first blows of the rebellion, many Sunni Syrians, seeking help everywhere but finding it mainly among radicals, became radicalized themselves. This was an explicable, if not justifiable, reaction to the mortal threat posed by what they saw as a massed Shiite threat.
Earlier this year, in a conversation about the Obama administration’s Middle East strategy, Senator John McCain brought me up short when he criticized the president for launching attacks on a symptom of the Syrian civil war, ISIS, rather than its root cause. He told me that the U.S. should be battling the Assad regime at the same time it attacks Sunni terrorists. I asked him the following question: “Wouldn’t the generals say to you, ‘You want me to fight ISIS, and you want me to fight the guys who are fighting ISIS, at the same time? Why would we bomb guys who are bombing ISIS? That would turn this into a crazy standoff.’”
McCain answered: “Our ultimate job is not only to defeat ISIS but to give the Syrian people the opportunity to prevail as well. … If we do this right, if we do the right kind of training and equipping of the Free Syrian Army, plus air strikes, plus taking out Bashar Assad’s air assets, we could reverse the battlefield equation.”
There is even less reason to believe today that the Free Syrian Army, such as it is, is capable of fighting the Assad regime (and ISIS) effectively. So at this late stage, McCain’s policy prescriptions may be unrealistic. But his diagnosis of the core problem seems tragically accurate.
“I don’t think ISIS would exist if Bashar al-Assad had been removed two or three years ago,” McCain told me when we revisited the question earlier this month. “He was on his way out until the Iranians brought in 5,000 Hezbollah fighters, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps came in, to train Assad’s troops and provide them with weapons, including the barrel bombs, which are horrible weapons of war.”
McCain argues that the Obama administration has avoided confronting Assad in part for fear that doing so would alienate Assad’s patrons in Tehran, the same men who are in charge of the nuclear file. “The whole theory hinges on a major breakthrough in the nuclear talks, that once they get their deal, Iran will stop funding Hamas, stop supporting Hezbollah, stop destabilizing Yemen, that they’ll join us in fighting extremism. So they have to get a nuclear deal at all costs, and not do anything in Syria. This is just so farfetched it’s delusional.”
I wouldn’t go so far as to call proponents of this theory delusional, but let’s say that they are not approaching the issue of leverage in an effective way. Gary Samore, a former Obama administration official who was in charge of the National Security Council’s Iran nuclear file, told me this month that he would use Iran’s deep exposure in Syria to U.S. advantage.
“Confronting Iran forcefully in Syria and Iraq increases chances for a nuclear deal because Iran will only meet our nuclear demands if it feels weak and vulnerable,” Samore wrote in an email. “Conversely, Iran’s sense that it is winning in Syria and that it is indispensable in Iraq decreases chances for a nuclear because the Supreme Leader won’t make nuclear concessions if he feels strong and ascendant.”
Is it likely that Obama will move toward a policy of containing Iran in Syria, and away from his more accommodationist stance? Arab states that count Iran as an enemy and the U.S. as a friend have asked him repeatedly over the past two years to treat Iran as a root cause of the Syrian catastrophe. But Obama appears focused solely on achieving a nuclear deal with Iran, in part because he seems to believe that Iran is ready to play the part of rational and constructive actor, rather than extremist would-be hegemon. I hope he’s right, and I hope he achieves a strong nuclear deal, but I worry that he is empowering an Iranian government that isn’t about to change in any constructive way. In the meantime, the Iranian regime continues to get away, quite literally, with murder.
Then there is the economic outlook for the Middle East and Iran and the tribal sects.
Likewise in Iraq, which like Iran has a Shiite majority, Tehran’s consolidated influence since the U.S. troop withdrawal in 2011 has contributed to sectarian polarization and left the government dependent on Iranian-backed militias to fight the Sunni extremist group Islamic State.
With Iran’s economy crippled by the double whammy of international sanctions and falling oil prices, Syria and Iraq will become even more of a burden in 2015.
In the end, Mr. Khamenei’s two big projects could merge into one during 2015 or diverge. A nuclear deal with world powers could open the door to further cooperation with the U.S. in Iraq and Syria. But failure to strike such a deal could spark new tensions on all fronts between Iran and the international community.