Mosul Iraq now (Satellite) and in the Future

Posted on October 24, 2016October 24, 2016 by Denise Simon

These satellite photos reveal the scorched Earth that ISIS is leaving behind in the battle for Mosul

BusinessInsider: As a crucial battle continues over the control of Mosul, Iraq — one of the last Islamic State (ISIS) strongholds in the country — militants are taking a play from the “scorched Earth” playbook.

Photos released Wednesday by UrtheCast reveal the extent of oil fires and infrastructure damage inflicted by ISIS followers.

The satellite imaging company used its Deimos-2 spacecraft to take the image below, though it also operates an ultra-high-definition video camera on a Russian module of the space station.

Below is an infrared view of the Mosul District taken by UrtheCast on October 18:

UrtheCast

A zoomed-in view shows how militants are lighting the large fires inside populated areas and destroying nearby buildings:

UrtheCast

This is how UrtheCast described the scence in an emailed press release:

“The smoke covers part of the city Qayyarah, about 35 miles south of the city of Mosul, along the West Bank of the Tigris River. Mosul is the last stronghold of the extremist group ISIS in Iraq — and it’s here in Qayyarah where people flee to from Mosul, and where military forces are staged.”

For reference, this is where the fires in this image are happening, and where the main city of Mosul is located:

mosul oil fires urthecast Google Maps/Business Insider

According to a New York Times dispatch from Mosul by Bryan Denton and Michael R. Gordon, the intention of the oil fires is to provide a screen:

“Thick funnels of black smoke began rising from the towns — a past tactic used by the Islamic State militants, setting oil barrels aflame to try to screen them from American airstrikes. The strikes came anyway, sending shock waves through the haze.”

UrtheCast’s new photos also show how ISIS militants are destroying infrastructure in the area.

The view below shows a bridge that was recently demolished to slow the advance of Kurdish and Iraqi security forces:

UrtheCast

The international coalition that is fighting ISIS hopes to secure villages surrounding Mosul and reach the city’s center in weeks.

But soldiers face roadside bombs, networks of secret tunnels, suicide bombers, civilians being used as human shields, and other grave threats.

Shi’a Militias in Mosul and Beyond

Bottom Line Up Front:

• Shi’a militias are a significant component of the forces attempting to recapture Mosul from the Islamic State, but the Iraqi government seeks to keep their role limited.

• The U.S. has insisted that Shi’a militias not enter the city of Mosul because of their sectarian impulses, linkages to Iran, and the likelihood of adverse reaction from the city’s mostly Sunni inhabitants.

• The commanders of the Iraqi Shi’a militias will likely have substantial influence over which coalition forces remain in Iraq over the longer term.

• After the Islamic State is militarily defeated in Iraq, the Iraqi government will likely work to demobilize the Shi’a militias by integrating them into the Iraqi Security Forces.

SoufanGroup: As with many other cities in Iraq previously liberated from the so-called Islamic State, Shi’a militia forces comprise a substantial portion of the Iraqi forces fighting to retake the city of Mosul. The Shi’a militias, which operate under an umbrella known as the ‘Popular Mobilization Units’ (PMUs), account for around 25,000 fighters of the total Iraqi force—which numbers nearly 100,000. In the prior battles, Shi’a militias entered the mostly Sunni cities, such as Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah, and conducted many abuses against the local population as retribution for alleged ‘collaboration’ with the Islamic State. While Shi’a militia involvement perhaps sped up Iraqi military advances, it set back the longer term political reconciliation that is vital to permanently defeating the Islamic State. To prevent a recurrence of such actions, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi—with strong backing of U.S. military commanders in Iraq—is requiring the PMUs to only advance on Mosul from the west and help capture the city of Tal Afar, and to refrain from advancing into Mosul itself. This requirement builds on the U.S. policy of providing minimal help to the PMUs, and then only to those militias that are not advised or armed by Iran.

The political strength of the largest Shi’a militias—which are backed by Iran—raises the question of whether they will comply with Abadi’s directive. In mid-October, one key Iran-backed Shi’a militia leader, Asa’ib Ahl al Haq’s Qais Khazali, vowed that his forces would enter Mosul ‘in vengeance against the slayers of Hussein’—a reference to the original Sunni-Shi’a split in the early Islamic community. An area that Shi’a militia commanders and Abadi do agree, however, is in opposing the U.S. position of giving Turkey—a Sunni power—a combat role in the battle for Mosul. The broad Iraqi opposition to Turkish involvement in the Mosul fight goes beyond sectarian differences to longstanding Iraqi fears about Turkey’s territorial ambitions in northern Iraq, particularly Mosul. Iraq’s Kurds—in an uneasy partnership with Baghdad to fight the Islamic State—are also wary that Turkey may seek to maintain a military presence in Iraq after Mosul is liberated, perhaps for no other reason than to intimidate Iraqi Kurdish leaders from pursuing a planned referendum on full independence for Iraqi Kurdistan.

Abadi’s opposition to the U.S. stance on a Turkish contribution to the battle for Mosul illustrates the significant political influence the Shi’a militia commanders and their allies enjoy. Many Shi’a militia commanders have close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF) from their time in the Iran-backed struggle against Saddam Hussein. IRGC-QF commander-in-chief Qasem Soleimani is in overall command of the Shi’a militia units in the Mosul battle, and has substantial influence inside the Iraqi government.

Soleimani and the Shi’a commanders will undoubtedly play a major role in determining whether foreign forces remain in Iraq after the Islamic State is expelled from Iraqi territory. Consistent with Iran’s position, these figures have insisted that no U.S. troops remain in Iraq after the Islamic State is defeated. Further, these commanders have support from another powerful Iraqi Shi’a leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, who responded to the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 by organizing the militia precursor from which many of the current militias split off. Sadr displayed his power over the summer of 2016 by twice sending his followers to storm the Iraqi parliament building in the heavily-fortified ‘Green Zone’ to demand government reform and efforts against official corruption. Although Sadr no longer enjoys Tehran’s unquestioned support and many Shi’a militia commanders are no longer loyal to him, his ability to determine outcomes in Iraq should not be underestimated.

Poised against the Shi’a hardliners is Abadi, who appears to recognize that a U.S. military presence will be needed in Iraq for some time after the Islamic State is defeated. To tamp down hardline Shi’a opposition to a continuing U.S. presence, Abadi plans to weaken the hardliners’ base of support by disbanding the PMUs as a separate force. Over the summer, Abadi advanced a plan to integrate the PMUs into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) directly, although his plan attracted skeptics who argue that doing so would simply move factionalism into the ISF, rather than eliminate it entirely. That plan would also entail expenditures that Iraq can ill afford with oil prices at current levels. The more likely option is that Abadi will seek to demobilize the PMUs and encourage militia leaders to return to participating in the political process. Should he take that route, Abadi’s success in doing so will likely determine the long-term stability of Iraq.

Meet Monzer al Kassar: Jailed Arms Trafficker to Global Hot Spots

Posted on October 21, 2016October 21, 2016 by Denise Simon

Photo: NBC

Monzar al Kassar was accused of being a key player in the Iraq insurgency. Indeed, he barely raises his grey eyebrows at the latest charges by the Baghdad government, which says he was a key associate of the family of a brother of Saddam Hussein.

The Observer tracked him down to his lavish, 15-suite residence, designed like a Renaissance palazzo overlooking Puerto Banus. Guards swing the gates open to allow guests into the estate, where there is a swimming pool built like a four-leaf clover. Three Spanish mastiffs prowl during the night to deter uninvited guests.

Inside the palace, a grand piano is showcased at the bottom of a marble staircase under a domed skylight. In the grand salon, silk flowers are arranged in a giant Chinese vase in front of a marble fireplace. Statues of servants holding lamps stand before the massive drapes, and on the wall are murals of African servants in turbans, carrying platters of fruit.

Photographs furnish a stark reminder of just who Kassar is. One is of him shaking hands with Uday Hussain, Saddam’s brutal son, killed in the months after the invasion. Another photo shows the two men together with an Arab musician. Kassar says he met Uday when he was sponsoring the Iraqi football team.

In a cabinet nearby is a picture of him holding hands with Hassan Aideed, son of Farah Aideed, the now-deceased Somali warlord portrayed in the film Black Hawk Down. ‘A good man,’ says Kassar. (He has been implicated in shipping arms to Somalia, in violation of an international embargo.)

The warlord Aideed is just one of his eclectic group of acquaintances, and Kassar insists that, in fairness, there are many less controversial ones. On the mantelpiece is a photo of Kassar with a Spanish intelligence official and Mustafa Tlas, the former defence minister of Syria. Then there is the photo, taken at a gala fundraiser in Marbella, of him standing next to ageing country music singer Kenny Rogers. Yet on a massive coffee table is a photo of Kassar hugging Palestinian terrorist Abu Abbas, former leader of the Palestinian Liberation Front. The picture was taken about 15 years ago, in South Yemen, and shows the portly Abbas smiling and sitting on a chair with Kassar in a tight embrace. Abu Abbas was apprehended in Baghdad in 1993 and died after a year in US custody. For more details and a timeline, Guardian published this summary.

The Court’s decision in the case of the United States v. al Kassar is found here.

The background on how the takedown of Monzar al Kassar:

Known as the Prince of Marbella, al Kassar sits in a prison in South Carolina for the conviction of several international crimes, most of all arms trafficking.

Since in or about the early 1970s, MONZER AL KASSAR, a/k/a “Abu Munawar,” a/k/a “El Taous,” the defendant, has been an international weapons trafficker. During this time period, KASSAR has been a source of weapons and military equipment for armed factions engaged in violent conflicts around the world. Specifically, KASSAR has provided weapons and military equipment to such factions in Nicaragua, Brazil, Cyprus, Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, Iran, and Iraq, among other countries. Some of these factions have included known terrorist organizations, such as the Palestinian Liberation Front (“PLF”), the goals of which included attacks on United States interests and United States nationals.

al Kassar was snared in a plot to sell weapons to FARC, a terror organization in Columbia with a 50 year history of Marxism and a global narcotics network.

**** In part from a site known as DeepCapture:

It is nice to know that Monzer al-Kassar has been arrested and that he is no longer described as the “Prince of Marbella,” but in charging him only with the one crime that he did not commit, the DOJ seems to be covering up (or at least neglecting to publicize, much less prosecute) the many crimes (from terrorist atrocities to narco-trafficking and destructive financial crime perpetrated against the American economy) that he did commit during his long and colorful career as one of the world’s most prominent oligarchs.

In addition, it is possible that Monzer al-Kassar was finally arrested in 2008 only because of his importance to the Syrian government (he was, indeed, one of Syrian President Assad’s most important associates), and because the U.S. government had decided at that point to lend its support to the jihadi guerrillas who were then already gearing up to overthrow the Syrian government. Those jihadis, of course, are now (with U.S. support) fighting the Syrian military under the banner of an “Arab Spring” campaign for freedom and democracy.

In any event, Monzer al-Kassar accomplished much over his career, and with few exceptions, the major U.S. news organizations have yet to give him any credit for these accomplishments. One exception, as I mentioned before, was Forbes Magazine. In 2004, Forbes (without otherwise providing the details of Monzer al-Kassar interesting biography) reported that Monzer al-Kassar not only had ties to Osama bin Laden, but was involved, along with two British citizens—Jared Brook and Lincoln Fraser—with a “high flying financial outfit” called Imperial Consolidated Group.

Imperial Consolidated was involved in multiple destructive financial crimes, most of them involving pump and dump schemes and the “bust-outs” of publicly listed companies in Europe and the United States. All told, Imperial Consolidated looted at least $300 million from the Western financial system. The British miscreants were charged for their involvement in this monumental criminal enterprise, and, meanwhile, they had sued Monzer al Kassar for slander, accusing him of telling people that Imperial Consolidated had fronted arms sales to Osama bin Laden. The merits of that lawsuit remain unclear, but it is clear that Monzer al-Kassar was himself involved with Imperial Consolidated (though he has never been charged on any count other then selling weapons to undercover DEA agents).

Meanwhile (to cite just one more accomplishment), Monzer al-Kassar had long been one of the world’s leading counterfeiters of American currency. His fake U.S. $100 bills were of such high quality that they were known as “Supernotes,” and he created such vast quantities of them that they had a negative impact on the value of the U.S. dollar. As early as 1996, Kenneth Timmerman, a reporter for Time magazine and The Wall Street Journal, prepared an official document for U.S. Congressman Spencer Bacchus outlining the details of Monzer al-Kassar’s counterfeiting operation. This report was promptly deposited in a trash can somewhere in Washington. (This site has quite a summary defined in chapters, where more information is in fact provided)

**** From PBS in part:

While building the case, Spain requested that Switzerland seize Al Kassar’s bank accounts. Swiss officials then opened their own preliminary inquiry into money laundering, lack of vigilance in financial operations, and fraudulent documents and foreign certificates. Following this inquiry, Swiss authorities began to investigate Al Kassar’s arms sales using Swiss banks.

Questioned on December 9, 1993, by Swiss prosecutors, Al Kassar explained that he was a diplomatic representative of Yemen in Poland and therefore could not answer questions about government-to-government affairs. A search of Al Kassar’s Spanish address revealed documents confirming his relationship to the Croatian Zeljko Mikulic and containing the codes used for the ship’s contents: “Tea” meant TT pistols (Tula-Tokarev pistols, developed in the U.S.S.R. in the 1930s and subsequently manufactured by other Eastern Bloc countries), and “tea bags” meant bullets.

Bassam Abu Sharif was questioned by Swiss officials while passing through Geneva in 1994. He claimed that he had only met Al Kassar once in 1979 and twice thereafter. He explained that he had been asked by the Yemeni government to use his bank account to transfer money for an arms sale organized by the Yemeni ministry of defense to buy arms for Bosnia and Croatia. He said that he learned only later that Al Kassar had organized the sale.

A Determined Swiss Prosecutor Freezes Al Kassar’s Millions

Geneva Cantonal prosecutor Laurent Kasper-Answermet upheld his 1992 freeze on $6 million belonging to Al Kassar, arguing that his financial investigation found the funds to have come from criminal activities. The financial side of an arms deal leaves a paper trail, whereas arms hidden in shipping containers, guerilla armies and corrupt government officials leave none. In 1998, a Geneva appeals court upheld the seizure but released $3.7 million not directly linked to the arms deal.

“If Yemen does a deal with Bosnia and Croatia, how can I control it?” asked Al Kassar, dismissing accusations that he is an embargo-busting arms dealer. Under existing legal controls, his question is reasonable.

The case is the first of its kind in Switzerland and is expected to set a precedent. The arms did not touch Swiss territory and did not involve Swiss citizens or the country in any way other than through its banking system. Switzerland is not directly affected by the small-arms trade but has an interest in maintaining the respectability of its banking system. Such cases, as well as that of Leonid Minin ,an Israeli citizen arrested in Italy for selling Ukrainian weapons to Liberia and Sierra Leone, are pushing existing legislation in new directions in an attempt to discourage the illegal arms trade.

Al Kassar has lost successive court appeals and has one final chance to have his $2.3 million returned in an appeal to a Swiss federal court.

Matthew Brunwasser is a freelance journalist based in Bulgaria. He worked as field producer on FRONTLINE/World’s “Gunrunners” story.

NEXT – SARKIS SOGHANALIAN:
The Cold War’s Largest Arms Merchant

Links relevant to this article:

Monzer Al Kassar and the Iran-Contra Affair
In Chapter 8 of the Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, the authors allege that Monzer Al Kassar made $500,000 selling arms to supply the Contras.

Al Kassar in Argentina
This Middle East Intelligence Bulletin report describes the investigation into Al Kassar’s involvement in the Buenos Aires bombings of the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Cultural Center, unsolved 10 years later. The report also describes Al Kassar’s possible connection to President Carlos Menem and the shipment of arms to Croatia.

Al Kassar and President Menem
This article from Argentina’s La Nacion describes the political price Carlos Menem paid for his alleged involvement with Al Kassar and the 6000-ton shipment of Argentine arms to Ecuador and Croatia. (La Nacion, April 15, 2001)

Al Kassar Fights Back
The Independent (U.K.) documents the public falling-out between Al Kassar and his former business partner, U.K. investment firm Imperial Consolidated Group. Al Kassar says the firm wanted him to sell arms to Osama bin Laden back in January 2001. The firm denies his accusation. (Independent, January 21, 2001)

Al Kassar’s Estranged Business Partner
Offshore Business News and Research offers a portrait of Imperial Consolidated’s questionable offshore business. A glance at the links under the heading “Regulatory Problems” shows that their deal with Al Kassar was only part of their portfolio.

U.S. Senate Investigation Into the Bank for Credit and Commerce International
This 1992 Senate committee report recommended further investigation into BCCI’s “relationships with convicted Iraqi arms dealer Sarkis Soghanalian, Syrian drug trafficker, terrorist and arms trafficker Monzer Al Kassar, and other major arms dealers.” This decade-old investigation sheds some light on the history and interconnectedness of illegal arms dealers.

Obama Directs Intelligence to be Shared with Cuba

Posted on October 20, 2016October 20, 2016 by Denise Simon

Ah what?

In part from CubaToday: Diaz-Balart, a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said Cuba shares intelligence with Russia and Iran, among others. Earlier this year, Gen. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Cuba was among four countries that pose the greatest espionage threat to the United States. The others were Russia, China and Iran.

“The threat from foreign intelligence entities, both state and non-state, is persistent, complex and evolving,” Clapper testified in a February hearing on “Worldwide Threats.” “Targeting collection of U.S. political, military, economic and technical information by foreign intelligence services continues unabated.”

Over the course of five decades, Fidel Castro built one of the world’s most active intelligence services, whose missions included spying on U.S. military facilities in South Florida and infiltrating leading Cuban exile organizations in Miami. More here.

Previously on this site, it was published that Cuba’s largest source of revenue is stealing and selling intelligence and secrets to enemies of the United States.

Now it appears, Barack Obama is not finished with his new friends in Cuba and handing off gifts to them.

Today, I approved a Presidential Policy Directive that takes another major step forward in our efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. This Directive takes a comprehensive and whole-of-government approach to promote engagement with the Cuban government and people, and make our opening to Cuba irreversible. Read more here.

It gets worse…..

China and Russia have maintained a sophisticated spy base in Cuba for many years.

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 14, 2016

Presidential Policy Directive — United States-Cuba Normalization

October 14, 2016

SUBJECT: United States-Cuba Normalization

I. Introduction

On December 17, 2014, I announced that the United States would chart a new course with Cuba, ending an outdated policy that had failed to advance U.S. interests and support reform and a better life for the Cuban people on the island over several decades. Under the new policy, the United States expands and promotes authorized engagements with Cuba to advance cooperation on areas of mutual interest, and increase travel to, commerce with, and the free flow of information to Cuba. The objective of the new policy is to help the Cuban people to achieve a better future for themselves and to encourage the development of a partner in the region capable of working with the United States to confront regional challenges, such as climate change, disease, and illicit trafficking.

Endogenous changes underway in Cuba offer opportunities to advance U.S. interests and shift away from an embargo, which is an outdated burden on the Cuban people and has impeded U.S. interests. My Administration has repeatedly called on the Congress to lift the embargo. United States policy is designed to create economic opportunities for the Cuban people; promote respect for human rights; further advances on regional security and defense issues, such as health, law enforcement, and migration; and pursue cooperation with the Cuban government that can strengthen our leadership in the hemisphere. We recognize Cuba’s sovereignty and self-determination and acknowledge areas of difference. We seek to address such differences through engagement and dialogue, and by encouraging increased understanding between our governments and our peoples.

The large Cuban-American community in the United States has an integral role to play in normalization, and in reconciliation between members of the diaspora who left Cuba and those who remain on the island. Normalization necessarily extends beyond government-to-government rapprochement — it includes rebuilding bridges between individuals and families.

This directive: (1) describes the U.S. vision for normalization with Cuba and how our policy aligns with U.S. national security interests; (2) assesses progress toward normalization; (3) describes the current and foreseen strategic landscape; (4) describes priority objectives for normalization; and (5) directs actions required to implement this PPD.

II. Vision for United States-Cuba Normalization

The vision of the United States for U.S.-Cuba normalization is guided by the following national security interests, as described in the 2015 National Security Strategy:

The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.
A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.
Respect for universal values at home and around the world.
A rules-based international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity.

Our vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization reflects my Administration’s support for broad-based economic growth, stability, increased people-to-people ties, and respect for human rights and democratic values in the region. In the long-term, the United States seeks the following end-states:

1. Enhanced security of the United States and U.S. citizens at home and abroad. We seek to ensure U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba are safe and secure and the United States is protected from: those seeking to exploit increased connectivity for illicit ends, irregular migration, and natural or man-made hazards. Our policy advances bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual interest, including diplomatic, agricultural, public health, and environmental matters, as well as disaster preparedness and response, law enforcement, migration, and other security and defense topics. Our policy also supports increased cooperation with Cuba on regional initiatives on behalf of these interests.

2. A prosperous, stable Cuba that offers economic opportunities to its people. Increased travel and economic interconnectedness supports improved livelihoods for the Cuban people, deeper economic engagement between our two countries, as well as the development of a private sector that provides greater economic opportunities for the Cuban people. Efforts by the Cuban authorities to liberalize economic policy would aid these goals and further enable broader engagement with different sectors of the Cuban economy. United States policy helps U.S. businesses gain access to Cuban markets and encourages the sustainable growth of the Cuban economy. The U.S. private sector, scientific and medical researchers, agriculture industry, foundations, and other groups have new avenues for collaboration that can provide opportunities for Cuban entrepreneurs, scientists, farmers, and other professionals. At the same time, increased access to the internet is boosting Cubans’ connectivity to the wider world and expanding the ability of the Cuban people, especially youth, to exchange information and ideas. The United States is prepared to support Cuban government policies that promote social equality and independent economic activity.

3. Increased respect for individual rights in Cuba. Even as we pursue normalization, we recognize we will continue to have differences with the Cuban government. We will continue to speak out in support of human rights, including the rights to freedoms of expression, religion, association, and peaceful assembly as we do around the world. Our policy is designed to support Cubans’ ability to exercise their universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, with the expectation that greater commerce will give a broader segment of the Cuban people the information and resources they need to achieve a prosperous and sustainable future. In pursuit of these objectives, we are not seeking to impose regime change on Cuba; we are, instead, promoting values that we support around the world while respecting that it is up to the Cuban people to make their own choices about their future.

4. Integration of Cuba into international and regional systems. We seek Cuban government participation in regional and international fora, including but not limited to, those related to the Organization of American States (OAS) and Summit of the Americas to advance mutually held member objectives. We believe that a Cuba that subscribes to the purposes and standards of such fora will benefit, over time, from bringing its domestic economic and political practices in line with international norms and globally accepted standards. Our policy strengthens the U.S. position in international systems by removing an irritant from our relationships with our allies and partners and gaining support for a rules-based order.

III. Progress Toward United States-Cuba Normalization

Since the United States announced on December 17, 2014, that it would chart a new course with Cuba, we have re-established diplomatic relations and have made progress toward the normalization of our bilateral relationship. We opened our respective embassies, six U.S. cabinet secretaries visited Havana, four Cuban ministers visited the United States, and I became the first sitting U.S. President to visit Cuba since 1928. We established a Bilateral Commission to prioritize areas of engagement, and we concluded non-binding arrangements on environmental protection, marine sanctuaries, public health and biomedical research, agriculture, counternarcotics, trade and travel security, civil aviation, direct transportation of mail, and hydrography. We launched dialogues or discussions on law enforcement cooperation, regulatory issues, economic issues, claims, and internet and telecommunications policy.

Given Cuba’s proximity to the United States, increased engagement by U.S. citizens, companies, and the nongovernmental sector holds extraordinary promise for supporting our national interests. Bearing in mind the limits imposed by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (LIBERTAD) Solidarity Act of 1996 (“Libertad Act”) and other relevant statutes, the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce implemented six packages of regulatory amendments to the Cuba sanctions program, easing restrictions on travel, trade, and financial transactions. United States individuals, firms, and nongovernmental organizations are availing themselves of these regulatory changes to visit Cuba, and authorized travel to Cuba increased by more than 75 percent from 2014 to 2015. Future U.S. citizen travel will be supported by scheduled air service, which began in August 2016, and the first U.S. cruise liner visited Cuban ports in May 2016. We also commenced direct transportation of mail between our two countries, and U.S. telecommunications firms established direct voice and roaming agreements with Cuba. For its part, the Cuban government has continued to pursue incremental economic reforms and launched more than 100 public Wi-Fi hotspots across the island.

These developments lay the foundation for long-term engagement with Cuba that advances U.S. interests. But we have a great deal more to do to build on that foundation based on a realistic assessment of the strategic landscape surrounding normalization.

IV. Strategic Landscape

Cuba is experiencing several transitions in areas such as leadership, the economy, technological development, civil society, and regional and global integration. Cuba’s leaders recognize the need to transition to the next generation, but they prioritize gradual, incremental changes to ensure stability.

Cuba has important economic potential rooted in the dynamism of its people, as well as a sustained commitment in areas like education and health care. Yet the Cuban government faces significant economic challenges, including eliminating its dual-exchange-rate system, making its state-run enterprises more efficient and transparent, developing a financial system that provides expanded services to individuals and the private sector, and reducing its reliance on foreign subsidies. Cuba remains highly dependent on food and energy imports, yet must cope with limited sources of hard currency to pay for import needs. Significant emigration of working age Cubans further exacerbates Cuba’s demographic problem of a rapidly aging population.

A series of statutes limits U.S. economic engagement with Cuba, precluding a complete lifting of restrictions on U.S. travel to Cuba, prohibiting United States Government export assistance and the provision of U.S. credit for Cuban purchases of agricultural commodities, and requiring that the embargo not be suspended or terminated unless the President determines that a transition or democratically elected government has come to power in Cuba.

Due to Cuba’s legal, political, and regulatory constraints, its economy is not generating adequate foreign exchange to purchase U.S. exports that could flow from the easing of the embargo. Even if the U.S. Congress were to lift the embargo, Cubans would not realize their potential without continued economic reform in Cuba. Cuban government regulations and opaque procurement practices hamper transactions with U.S. companies that would be permitted under U.S. law.

Normalization efforts have raised Cubans’ expectations for greater economic opportunities. With an estimated 1 in 4 working Cubans engaged in entrepreneurship, a dynamic, independent private sector is emerging. Expansion of the private sector has increased resources for individual Cubans and created nascent openings for Cuban entrepreneurs to engage with U.S. firms and nongovernmental organizations. We take note of the Cuban government’s limited, but meaningful steps to expand legal protections and opportunities for small- and medium-sized businesses, which, if expanded and sustained, will improve the investment climate.

Cuba is not a member of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, which could provide expertise and potentially finance economic reforms and viable investment projects.

Although Cuba has reached agreement with several creditor nations on bilateral debt relief through restructuring and forgiveness, it remains in default to the United States Government on pre-Cuban revolution bilateral debts and does not participate in international capital markets. Cuba and the United States are both members of the World Trade Organization (WTO); however, neither country applies the agreement to the other because of the U.S. embargo toward Cuba.

Rapprochement has enabled us to increase our engagement with Cuba on regional issues such as the Colombia peace process and healthcare in Haiti, and has undermined an historic rallying point for regimes critical of the United States. Although Cuba has expressed no interest in participating in the OAS, it did attend the Summit of the Americas in 2015. We also welcome engagement between Cuba and other U.S. allies from around the world, including our European and Asian treaty allies. At the same time, we recognize that Cuba and the United States will continue to have differences on many regional and global issues.

U.S. engagement with the Cuban government will also be constrained by Cuba’s continued repression of civil and political liberties. We anticipate the Cuban government will continue to object to U.S. migration policies and operations, democracy programs, Radio and TV Marti, the U.S. presence at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, and the embargo. The United States Government has no intention to alter the existing lease treaty and other arrangements related to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, which enables the United States to enhance and preserve regional security.

In this strategic environment, the policies and actions the United States pursues to advance our vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization will significantly shape the future of bilateral and regional relations, as well as our shared security and prosperity.

V. Six U.S. Objectives for the Medium-Term U.S.-Cuba Relationship

To advance the four end-state goals associated with our strategic vision for U.S.-Cuba normalization, the United States will move concurrently on the following six priority objectives:

1. Government-to-Government Interaction

We will continue high-level and technical engagement in areas of mutual interest, including agriculture, the economy and small businesses, transportation, science and technology, environment, climate, health, law enforcement, migration, national security, disaster preparedness and response, and counterterrorism. Through the Bilateral Commission, we will identify and prioritize areas of collaboration and engagement that advance our end-state goals. Stronger diplomatic ties will enable constructive engagement on bilateral differences, including our democracy and broadcasting programs, while protecting our interests and assets, such as the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. We will utilize engagement to urge Cuba to make demonstrable progress on human rights and religious freedom. As the United States and Cuban governments build trust through more frequent engagement, we will increasingly conduct working-level interactions between Cuban ministries and U.S. agencies and departments that lessen the need for high-level conversations on routine matters. Given the lack of diplomatic relations over the past several decades, we will seek broad engagement across the Cuban government, including ministries and local officials. When appropriate and legally available, we will engage with Cuba to normalize trade relations fully.

2. Engagement and Connectivity

The United States will continue to encourage people-to-people linkages through government and privately sponsored exchanges, including those involving educational, cultural, business, science, environment, technology, and sports. As permitted by law, we will continue to support the development of scheduled and chartered air service and maritime links, including ferries. An ongoing partnership with the Cuban-American community is of particular importance given Cuban-Americans’ strong family and socio-cultural ties, as well as their natural role as citizen-ambassadors. We will facilitate opportunities for Cuban-Americans to rebuild and create new bonds with family to support reconciliation. To facilitate Cuba’s goal of increasing its internet access from 5 percent to 50 percent of the population by 2020, we will seek the establishment of a bilateral working group to expand internet connectivity. We will seek opportunities that enable U.S. foundations and universities to establish linkages with Cuba.

3. Expanded Commerce

The United States Government will seek to expand opportunities for U.S. companies to engage with Cuba. The embargo is outdated and should be lifted. My Administration has repeatedly called upon the Congress to lift the embargo, and we will continue to work toward that goal. While the embargo remains in place, our role will be to pursue policies that enable authorized U.S. private sector engagement with Cuba’s emerging private sector and with state-owned enterprises that provide goods and services to the Cuban people. Law enforcement cooperation will ensure that authorized commerce and authorized travelers move rapidly between the United States and Cuba. Although we recognize the priority given to state-owned enterprises in the Cuban model, we seek to encourage reforms that align these entities with international norms, especially transparency.

United States regulatory changes have created space for the Cuban government to introduce comparable changes. In tandem with the Department of the Treasury’s regulatory change to expand Cuba’s access to the U.S. financial system and U.S. dollar transit accounts, the Cuban government announced in early 2016 plans to eliminate the 10 percent penalty on U.S. dollar conversion transactions, subject to improved access to the international banking system. We will sustain private and public efforts to explain our regulatory changes to U.S. firms and banks, Cuban entrepreneurs, and the Cuban government.

4. Economic Reform

While the Cuban government pursues its economic goals based on its national priorities, we will utilize our expanded cooperation to support further economic reforms by the Cuban government. Recent exchanges among financial service institutions and regulators have provided greater mutual understanding of our respective financial system and economic priorities. We will undertake government-to-government dialogues to discuss options for macro- and microeconomic reform, with the goal of connecting the changes in U.S. policy with Cuban reforms in a manner that creates opportunity for U.S. firms and the Cuban people.

If and when the Congress lifts the embargo, my Administration will engage with the Congress and stakeholders on preparatory commercial and economic exchanges and dialogues. My Administration would then similarly engage the Congress on the substance and timing of a new bilateral commercial agreement to address remaining statutory trade requirements.

5. Respect for Universal Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms, and Democratic Values

We will not pursue regime change in Cuba. We will continue to make clear that the United States cannot impose a different model on Cuba because the future of Cuba is up to the Cuban people. We seek greater Cuban government respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms for every individual. Progress in this area will have a positive impact on the other objectives. We will encourage the Cuban government to respect human rights; support Cuba’s emerging, broad-based civil society; and encourage partners and nongovernmental actors to join us in advocating for reforms. While remaining committed to supporting democratic activists as we do around the world, we will also engage community leaders, bloggers, activists, and other social issue leaders who can contribute to Cuba’s internal dialogue on civic participation. We will continue to pursue engagements with civil society through the U.S. Embassy in Havana and during official United States Government visits to Cuba. We will seek to institutionalize a regular human rights dialogue with the Cuban government to advance progress on human rights. We will pursue democracy programming that is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies around the world. We will utilize our increased ability to engage regional partners, both bilaterally and through regional bodies, to encourage respect for human rights in Cuba. We will consult with nongovernmental actors such as the Catholic Church and other religious institutions. Finally, we will work with the European Union and likeminded international organizations and countries to encourage the Cuban government to respect universal values.

6. Cuban Integration into International and Regional Systems

We will expand dialogue with Cuba in the organizations in which it already holds membership, such as the WTO and the World Customs Organization (WCO), and we will encourage Cuba to move toward rules-based engagement, subject to statutory requirements. We will encourage Cuba to bring its legal framework, particularly its commercial law, in line with international standards. We will encourage Cuba to meet WCO standards for supply chain security. To the extent permitted by and consistent with applicable law, we will facilitate integration into international bodies, including through the use of technical assistance programs. We will pursue cooperation with Cuba on regional and global issues (e.g., combating the Ebola outbreak and the Colombia peace process). Ending the embargo and satisfying other statutory requirements relating to trade will allow the United States to normalize trade relations with Cuba.

VI. Policy Implementation

1. Roles and Responsibilities

To facilitate the effective implementation of this directive, departments and agencies will have the following roles and responsibilities, consistent with the relevant legal authorities and limits:

The National Security Council (NSC) staff will provide ongoing policy coordination and oversight of the implementation of this PPD and the overall Cuba strategy as necessary.

The Department of State will continue to be responsible for formulation of U.S. policy toward and coordination of relations with Cuba. This includes supporting the operations of Embassy Havana and ensuring it has adequate resources and staffing. Other responsibilities include the issuance of nonimmigrant and immigrant visas, refugee processing, promotion of educational and cultural exchanges, coordination of democracy programs, and political and economic reporting. State will continue to lead the U.S.-Cuba Bilateral Commission and coordinate a number of dialogues, such as the Law Enforcement Dialogue, annual migration talks, and meetings to resolve outstanding claims.

State will continue to co-lead efforts with the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure democracy programming is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies. State will coordinate efforts to advance science and technology cooperation with Cuba. State will support telecommunications and internet access growth in Cuba and provide foreign policy guidance to the Departments of Commerce and the Treasury on certain exports, financial transactions, and other license applications.

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN), in coordination with State, will oversee multilateral issues involving Cuba at the United Nations. USUN will identify areas of possible collaboration with Cuba that could help foster a more collaborative relationship between the United States and Cuba at the United Nations. The USUN will also participate in discussions regarding the annual Cuban embargo resolution at the United Nations, as our bilateral relationship continues to develop in a positive trajectory.

The Department of the Treasury is responsible for implementation of the economic embargo restrictions and licensing policies. The Treasury will continue its outreach to help the public, businesses, and financial institutions understand the regulatory changes. The Treasury will continue to review and respond to public questions and feedback on regulations and public guidance that could be further clarified and to discuss with State any novel license requests that the Treasury receives from the public to determine whether such requests are consistent with the regulatory changes and existing law. The Treasury will make use of available channels for bilateral dialogue to understand Cuba’s economic and financial system and encourage reforms and will continue to engage in dialogue with the Cuban government about our regulatory changes.

The Department of Commerce will continue to support the development of the Cuban private sector, entrepreneurship, commercial law development, and intellectual property rights as well as environmental protection and storm prediction. If statutory restrictions are lifted, Commerce will promote increased trade with Cuba by providing export assistance to U.S. companies. In the meantime, Commerce will continue a robust outreach effort to ensure that U.S. companies understand that U.S. regulatory changes provide new opportunities to obtain licenses or use license exceptions to increase authorized exports to Cuba, including to Cuban state-owned enterprises that provide goods and services to meet the needs of the Cuban people. Additionally, Commerce will continue to engage in dialogue with the Cuban government about our regulatory changes, as well as the need for simplification of the Cuban import process, transparency in Cuban business regulations, and other steps that will lead to full realization of the benefits of our regulatory changes.

The Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to take steps to expand the defense relationship with Cuba where it will advance U.S. interests, with an initial focus on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and counternarcotics in the Caribbean. The DOD will support Cuba’s inclusion in the inter-American defense system and regional security and defense conferences, which will give Cuba a stake in hemispheric stability. The DOD will continue to make contingency preparations and support the capacity of the Department of Homeland Security and State to address mass migration and maritime migration issues pursuant to Executive Orders 12807 and 13276 and consistent with other applicable interagency guidance and strategy.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will engage, together with the Department of Justice, with the Cuban government to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime. In support of U.S. security and foreign policy objectives, DHS will develop protocols for investigative cooperation with Cuba in coordination with other departments and agencies. The DHS will strengthen the security and efficiency of cross-border supply chains and travel systems in support of people-to-people engagement and authorized U.S. trade with the Cuban private sector. The DHS will safeguard the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, to include the facilitation of lawful immigration and ensure protection of refugees. The Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Government lead for a maritime migration or mass migration, with support from the Secretaries of State and Defense, will address a maritime migration or mass migration pursuant to Executive Orders 12807 and 13276 and consistent with applicable interagency guidance and strategy.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) will engage, together with DHS, with the Cuban government to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime. The DOJ will work with Cuba to expand security and law enforcement cooperation, increase information sharing, and share best practices with Cuban counterparts. This work will build upon, and strengthen, current law enforcement cooperation with Cuba under the umbrella of the U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue and its various working groups, which focus on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, cybercrime, human trafficking, and other areas of criminal activity.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) will continue to engage with the Cuban government, entrepreneurs, small businesses, and cooperative enterprises. The SBA will support exchanges with the Cuban government in areas of mutual interest, particularly on formalization of small businesses and to spur the growth of new enterprises.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative will provide trade policy coordination in international fora and, consistent with statutory requirements and restrictions, prepare for negotiations to normalize and expand U.S.-Cuba trade.

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) will work to increase U.S. food and agricultural exports to Cuba by building market opportunities, improving the competitive position of U.S. agriculture, and building Cuba’s food security and agricultural capacity, while protecting plant, animal, and human health. USDA will work with the Government of Cuba to advance cooperation outlined in the U.S.-Cuba agricultural memorandum of understanding signed in March 2016. The USDA will build the U.S.-Cuba trade and development relationship to the extent permitted by and consistent with applicable law.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in accordance with the June 2016 memorandum of understanding between HHS and the Ministry of Public Health of the Republic of Cuba, will collaborate with Cuban counterparts in the areas of public health, research, and biomedical sciences, including collaboration to confront the Zika virus, dengue, chikungunya, and other arboviruses. The HHS will promote joint work, such as development of vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics; partner with Cuba to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks; collaborate in the field of cancer control, treatment programs, and joint research; and exchange best practices related to access to healthcare.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) will coordinate with departments and agencies the United States Government’s response to unplanned environmental occurrences, such as natural or manmade disasters. The USAID will co-lead efforts with State to ensure that democracy programming is transparent and consistent with programming in other similarly situated societies.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) will continue to develop air and surface transportation links between the United States and Cuba in support of transportation providers, authorized travelers, and commerce, while providing required regulatory and safety oversight of transportation providers and systems.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) will support broader United States Government efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, with Intelligence Community elements working to find opportunities for engagement on areas of common interest through which we could exchange information on mutual threats with Cuban counterparts.

The Department of the Interior (DOI) will continue cooperation with Cuba on marine protected areas and continue to engage Cuban counterparts to finalize arrangements on wildlife conservation, terrestrial national protected areas, and seismic records.

2. Congressional Outreach

Strong support in the Congress for U.S.-Cuba normalization would contribute to the speed and success of the aforementioned goals, particularly with respect to the embargo and adequate embassy staffing. We will seek to build support in the Congress to lift the embargo and other statutory constraints to enable expanded travel and commerce with Cuba and accelerate normalization. We will regularly engage with Members of Congress and staff on challenges and opportunities in Cuba, advocate for United States Government policies and sufficient staff and resources to implement the aforementioned goals and policy priorities, and encourage and facilitate congressional travel to the region.

3. Monitoring and Oversight

The Interagency Policy Committee (IPC), or its future equivalent, will have primary responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the implementation of this policy. The NSC staff will convene regular IPC and Deputies Committee meetings as necessary to monitor implementation and resolve obstacles to progress. The following departments and agencies will designate senior individuals responsible for managing policy implementation in their agency: State, the Treasury, Commerce, DOD (Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff), DHS, DOJ, USDA, HHS, DOT, USUN, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, USAID, SBA, and DNI.

4. Previous Guidance

Executive Order 13276, Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented Aliens Interdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region, dated November 15, 2002, and Executive Order 12807, Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, dated May 24, 1992, remain in effect.

BARACK OBAMA

War in Yemen is Actually with Iran

Posted on October 20, 2016October 20, 2016 by Denise Simon

Reuters: A 72-hour truce in Yemen came under pressure on Thursday when missiles fired from Yemen injured civilians in southern Saudi Arabia, according to an Arab coalition which launched air strikes that Iran-allied Houthi fighters said killed three people.

Exclusive: Iran steps up weapons supply to Yemen’s Houthis via Oman – officials

Reuters: Iran has stepped up weapons transfers to the Houthis, the militia fighting the Saudi-backed government in Yemen, U.S., Western and Iranian officials tell Reuters, a development that threatens to prolong and intensify the 19-month-old war.

The increased pace of transfers in recent months, which officials said include missiles and small arms, could exacerbate a security headache for the United States, which last week struck Houthi targets with cruise missiles in retaliation for failed missile attacks on a U.S. Navy destroyer.

Much of the recent smuggling activity has been through Oman, which neighbors Yemen, including via overland routes that take advantage of porous borders between the two countries, the officials said.

That raises a further quandary for Washington, which views the tiny Gulf state as a strategic interlocutor and ally in the conflict-ridden region. A senior U.S. administration official said that Washington had informed Oman of its concerns, without specifying when.

“We have been concerned about the recent flow of weapons from Iran into Yemen and have conveyed those concerns to those who maintain relations with the Houthis, including the Omani government,” the official told Reuters.

Oman denies any weapons smuggling across its border, and its officials could not be reached for comment. Yemeni and senior regional officials say the Omanis are not actively involved with the transfers, but rather turning a blind eye and failing to aggressively crack down on the flow.

In an interview with Saudi newspaper Okaz last week, Omani Foreign Minister Yousef bin Alwi said:

“There is no truth to this. No weapons have crossed our border and we are ready to clarify any suspicions if they arise.”

The Iran-allied Houthis gained a trove of weapons when whole divisions allied to former Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh sided with them at the start of the war last year. But Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s exiled government say they also receive substantial amounts of weapons and ammunition from Iran. Tehran views the Houthis as the legitimate authority in Yemen, but denies it supplies them with weapons.

Some Western officials have been more skeptical of the view that the Houthis are receiving large-scale support from Iran.

The U.S. and Western officials who spoke to Reuters about the recent trend in arms transfers said it was based on intelligence they had seen but did not elaborate on its nature. They said the frequency of transfers on known overland smuggling routes had increased notably, though the scale of the shipments was unclear.

Even U.S. officials warning of Iran’s support for the Houthis acknowledge intelligence gaps in Yemen, where the U.S. posture has been sharply reduced since the start of the conflict. The sources all declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

“We are aware of a recent increased frequency of weapons shipments supplied by Iran, which are reaching the Houthis via the Omani border,” a Western diplomat familiar with the conflict told Reuters.

Three U.S. officials confirmed that assertion.

One of those officials, who is familiar with Yemen, said that in the past few months there had been a noticeable increase in weapons-smuggling activity.

“What they’re bringing in via Oman are anti-ship missiles, explosives…, money and personnel,” the official said.

Another regional security source said the transfers included surface-to-surface short-range missiles and small arms.

A senior Iranian diplomat confirmed there had been a “sharp surge in Iran’s help to the Houthis in Yemen” since May, referring to weapons, training and money.

“The nuclear deal gave Iran an upper hand in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia, but it needs to be preserved,” the diplomat said.

Washington’s Gulf allies have warned that U.S. President Barack Obama’s rapprochement with Tehran through the landmark nuclear deal signed last year will only embolden Iran in conflicts in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.

U.S. LOOKING INTO MISSILE ORIGIN

The increase in transfers comes as the civil war drags on and threatens to pull the United States deeper into a conflict that has killed 10,000 people and which pits two regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, against each other. A U.N.-brokered 72-hour ceasefire went into effect on Wednesday.

Since the beginning of the war, the Houthis have used short-range Scud missiles, and the United Nations says they have also used surface-to-air missiles, improvised to operate as surface-to-surface rockets against Saudi Arabia.

But a suspected Houthi missile attack against a United Arab Emirates vessel in a strategic Red Sea shipping lane this month, as well as the attempted strikes against the U.S. warship, raise worries about the rebels’ capability to launch bolder attacks.

The Houthis have denied attacking the USS Mason.

BBC: The Saudi-led military coalition backing the government in the war in Yemen has accused Houthi rebels of repeatedly violating a ceasefire.

A statement said the rebels had breached it more than 40 times along the border with Saudi Arabia.

The UN-brokered truce, meant to last three days, began on Wednesday just before midnight.

Rebels, meanwhile, said an air strike on their territory had killed three civilians.

The UN had hoped that the truce might be extended and lead to renewed peace talks.

Rockets were fired by Houthi rebels at Jazan and Najran in Saudi Arabia, the coalition said in a statement.

“Forty-three violations were committed along the border… in which snipers and various weapons were used, including missiles,” it said.

The Houthis said a coalition air strike on Thursday killed three civilians in northern Saada province. They also said they had launched attacks across the border on Saudi military camps over the past two days.

The war has killed nearly 7,000 people, mostly civilians, the UN says.

The coalition, which backs Yemen’s exiled president, has been fighting the rebels and their allies since March 2015, when a Saudi-led air campaign began.

Five previous ceasefires have broken down within a short time.

The announcement of the ceasefire followed an international outcry over the deaths of 140 people in a Saudi air strike that hit a funeral gathering in Sanaa.

Saudi officials said they had targeted the wrong site by mistake due to “bad information”.

The conflict and a blockade imposed by the Saudi-led coalition have triggered a humanitarian disaster, leaving millions of people homeless and hungry and 80% of the population in need of aid.

Mediterranean Sea is Getting Crowded with Russian Navy

Posted on October 20, 2016October 20, 2016 by Denise Simon

Russia possibly mapping underwater internet cables in Mediterranean

WT: Approximately one year ago, the Russian navy caused quite a stir by hanging around internet cables in the Atlantic for some period of time.

Steffan Watkins, an open-source intelligence analyst who monitors Russian ship movements, said the Russian navy sends vessels such as Yantar to the region to check on existing U.S. underwater sensors or cables that have been detected previously. The ships also search for new equipment on the sea floor that would reveal U.S. operations.

The accusation was the Russians were mapping the cables in order to be able to sever them in times of conflict.

The Russian fleet in the Mediterranean seems to be doing the same thing this week over cables off the Syrian coast.

News.com.au writes, “Author and military analyst H.I. Sutton is one of several observers who have noted the unusual activity of a suspected Russian survey ship, the Yantar, in waters between Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey in recent weeks.

It’s reported positions have been coinciding with the tracks of three major undersea fibre-optic cables. Mr Sutton’s blog suggests the extremely slow speed and frequent stopping of the ship suggest it could be deploying a submersible to the sea floor.”

If internet cables were severed that were supporting Western information flow, this could cause great economic disruption and take a very long time to repair, especially in time of war.

It seems likely that Russia wants this capability to inflict great damage on the European and American economies if need be.

Another possibility is that the Russian navy could be deploying devices to monitor information through the cables for espionage reasons.

(Bloomberg) — U.K. warships are monitoring a Russian aircraft-carrier group sailing past Britain’s eastern coast to the Mediterranean Sea to supplement President Vladimir Putin’s forces in the region, as international condemnation mounts of Russia’s military campaign in Syria.

A photo taken from a Norwegian surveillance aircraft shows a group of Russian navy ships in international waters off the coast of Northern Norway on October 17, 2016. 333 Squadron, Norwegian Royal Airforce/NTB Scanpix/Handout via Reuters

The deployment signals Putin’s determination to assert Russian interests as U.S. and European leaders accuse him of war crimes and dangle the threat of sanctions in response to the bombing of Aleppo by Russian warplanes.

Putin floated a possible extension of a cease-fire for the besieged Syrian city during a late-night meeting in Berlin on Wednesday with French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel that she portrayed as testy. Merkel and Hollande will meet again in Brussels on Thursday for a two-day summit of the EU’s 28 leaders that will consider a common response to Russia’s actions in support of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

“We must show a robust and united European stance in the face of Russian aggression,” U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May told reporters as she arrived for her first summit. While Britain is leaving the EU, until it does “it’s vital that we work together to continue to put pressure on Russia to stop its appalling atrocities, its sickening atrocities in Syria,” she said.

May’s comments hint at the growing outrage over the bombing by Russian and Syrian forces of Aleppo, where some 275,000 inhabitants remain trapped. Syria’s government opened two crossings for fighters who want to leave the rebel-held eastern part of the contested city, a day after announcing a three-day humanitarian pause to its offensive.

Northern Fleet

Russia’s Northern Fleet, based at Severomorsk near the Finnish border, said last week that a naval group had set out for the northeast Atlantic en route to the Mediterranean “to ensure naval presence in the important areas” of the seas, according to the TASS news agency. The ships include the Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft carrier.

“When these ships near our waters we will man-mark them every step of the way,” U.K. Defense Secretary Michael Fallon said in an e-mailed statement on Thursday. “We will be watching as part of our steadfast commitment to keep Britain safe.”

Russia said last month that its permanent naval group already stationed in the Mediterranean numbers about 10 warships and support vessels. Igor Konashenkov, a Defense Ministry spokesman in Moscow, declined to comment on the additional deployment.

Russian Responsibility

Speaking after the Berlin talks that stretched into early Thursday, Putin said Russia would halt its bombing of Aleppo as long as “terrorist forces” aren’t active. At a separate news conference alongside Merkel, Hollande said Putin didn’t specify how long such a cease-fire might last. “We hope it’s as long as possible” to allow for humanitarian aid to reach all parts of the city, he said.

European foreign ministers will work on getting aid to the area, which would “at least be a first step that we haven’t seen in a long time,” Merkel said. “It was right to use this blunt language” in the talks with Putin because “Russia bears a clear responsibility in Syria, including exerting influence over” Assad, the German leader said.

Merkel and Hollande kept the threat of sanctions against Russia on the table, while saying the focus had to be on helping civilians in Aleppo.

Hollande said that at best the European Union could target individuals, while Merkel limited herself to saying that “you can’t deny yourself the option.” Either way, any sanctions would require the approval of all 28 member states and the most ardent support for such an approach came from the U.K, which has voted to leave the bloc. Russia already is under EU and U.S. sanctions for its encroachment on Ukraine.

“The conclusion in the European Union is that we don’t believe in new sanctions at this phase because we already have sanctions and these run until the end of January,” Finnish Prime Minister Juha Sipila said in an interview in Helsinki on Wednesday. “In December or January we will have a discussion about the future of sanctions.’’

Minsk Accord

The Syria talks followed a discussion on Ukraine that was also attended by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. Merkel and Poroshenko said the four leaders agreed to work on a “road map” of measures to advance last year’s Minsk accords for ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine between government forces and Russian-backed separatists.

In Brussels, Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Roivas, whose country borders Russia, said EU leaders must deliver “a very clear message to both the Syrian regime and its allies, mainly Russia.” He compared Aleppo with the Chechen capital, Grozny, that was reduced to rubble by Russian aerial bombing in the 1990s. “This is absolutely unacceptable,” Roivas said.