Category Archives: Insurgency

Mexico’s Cartel Kids and a Deadly State

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Reuters: The Mexican army says its fight against surging opium production that feeds U.S demand is increasingly complicated by the rise of smaller gangs disputing wild, ungoverned lands planted with ever-stronger poppy strains.

The gangs have engulfed the state of Guerrero in a war to control poppy fields, turning inaccessible mountain valleys of endemic poverty and famous beach resorts into Mexico’s bloodiest spots.

Colonel Isaac Aaron Jesus Garcia, who runs a base in one of the state’s most unruly cities, Ciudad Altamirano, told Reuters on an operation to chop down poppies high in the Guerrero mountains that violence increased two years ago when a third gang, Los Viagra, began a grab for territory.

Bodies are discovered almost daily across the state, tossed by roads, some buried in mass graves. In Ciudad Altamirano, the mayor was killed last year and a journalist gunned down in March at a car wash.

“These fractures (in the gangs) started two years ago, and that caused this violence that is all about monopolizing the production of the drug,” Jesus Garcia said.

From this frontline of the fight against heroin, Jesus Garcia sees a direct link between a record U.S. heroin epidemic that killed nearly 13,000 people in 2015 and violence on his patch.

“The increase of consumers for this type of drug in the United States has been exponential and the collateral effect is seen here,” Jesus Garcia said.

REUTERS/Henry Romero

Heroin use in the United States has risen five-fold in the past decade and addiction has more than tripled, with the biggest jumps among whites and men with low incomes.

Jesus Garcia said the task of seeking out poppy fields in one of Mexico’s poorest and least accessible regions, rising above the beach resorts of Acapulco and Ixtapa, was practically endless.

His 34th Battalion and others send platoons of troops on foot for month-long expeditions every season. They set up camps and fan through treacherous terrain, part of a campaign that destroys tens of thousands of fields a year.

One such field visited by Reuters was deep in a lawless region six hours from Ciudad Altamirano through winding dirt roads thick with dust that rose into the mountains.

It was irrigated by a lawn sprinkler mounted on a pole that spritzed water over less than a hectare of poppies and fertilizer bags were piled nearby, basic farming techniques the soldiers nevertheless said were a sign of growers’ new sophistication.

A dozen troops fanned out, chopping down the flowers with machetes.

HIGHER YIELDS

Army officials said gangs use poppy varieties that produce higher yields and more potent opium from smaller plots, and that its higher value is driving violent competition between gangs.

“Now we see more production of poppy in less terrain, and it has to do with the quantity of bulbs each plant has,” said Lieutenant Colonel Jose Urzua as he showed bulbs oozing valuable gum from slits. He explained opium is often harvested by families.

In these tiny mountain hamlets opium has grown for decades, officials said, but a coffee plague and the U.S. opiate epidemic has led farmers to plant much more.

The harvest has become central to Guerrero’s economy, also dependent on cash sent home by immigrants.

One army official said the field seen by Reuters could produce around 3 kilos (6.6 lb) of opium, fetching up to $950 per kilo from traffickers who sell it for up to $8,000.

“There aren’t many alternatives here,” said a woman selling soft drinks and snacks from a pine shack by a dirt road. Her husband grows poppies, and she said anyone who runs a business faces extortion by gangs.

***   Image result for cnn no way out cartel kids CNN

(CNN)It was the second deadliest conflict in the world last year, but it hardly registered in the international headlines.

As Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan dominated the news agenda, Mexico’s drug wars claimed 23,000 lives during 2016 — second only to Syria, where 50,000 people died as a result of the civil war.
“This is all the more surprising, considering that the conflict deaths [in Mexico] are nearly all attributable to small arms,” said John Chipman, chief executive and director-general of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which issued its annual survey of armed conflict on Tuesday.
“The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan claimed 17,000 and 16,000 lives respectively in 2016, although in lethality they were surpassed by conflicts in Mexico and Central America, which have received much less attention from the media and the international community,” said Anastasia Voronkova, the editor of the survey.   
In comparison, there were 17,000 conflict deaths in Mexico in 2015 and 15,000 in 2014 according to the IISS.

Rising death toll

Voronkova said the number of homicides rose in 22 of Mexico’s 32 states during 2016 and the rivalries between cartels increased in violence.
“It is noteworthy that the largest rises in fatalities were registered in states that were key battlegrounds for control between competing, increasingly fragmented cartels,” she said.
“The violence grew worse as the cartels expanded the territorial reach of their campaigns, seeking to ‘cleanse’ areas of rivals in their efforts to secure a monopoly on drug-trafficking routes and other criminal assets.”
Mexican drug cartels take in between $19 billion and $29 billion annually from US drug sales, according to the Department of Homeland Security.
Rivalries between the cartels wreak havoc on the lives of civilians who have nothing to do with narcotics. Bystanders, people who refused to join cartels, migrants, journalists and government officials have all been killed.

Not on news agenda

Jacob Parakilas, assistant head of the US and the Americas Programme at London-based think tank Chatham House, said part of the reason for the relative lack of attention paid to Mexico in the international media is “it’s not a war in the political sense of the word. The participants largely don’t have a political objective. They’re not trying to create a breakaway state. It doesn’t come with the same visuals. There are no air strikes.
“Also this has been going on since the beginning of the modern drug trade in the Americas. It’s not news in that sense. And Mexico is one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a journalist. They are intentionally targeted in Mexico, which puts a dampener on the ability to report on this.”
Drug kingpin Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman is facing trial in New York.

Drug kingpin Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman is facing trial in New York.
There have, however, been significant arrests in relation to the Mexican drug trade in recent times.
Damaso Lopez Nunez, a high-ranking leader of Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel, was arrested on May 2 in Mexico City and could face charges in the US, authorities said.
His arrest follows January’s extradition of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, who is accused of running the Sinaloa cartel — one of the world’s largest drug-trafficking organizations.
He awaits trial in New York on 17 counts accusing him of running a criminal enterprise responsible for importing and distributing massive amounts of narcotics and conspiring to murder rivals.

World conflict deaths fall

The number of conflict fatalities globally edged down last year, from 167,000 to 157,000, according to the IISS.
This was the second successive annual drop — 180,000 people were killed in 2014.
The number of deaths in Syria fell from 55,000 in 2015. But there were 1,000 more deaths in Afghanistan last year than 2015 and 4,000 more in Iraq.
Voronkova from the IISS said: “Civilians caught amid conflict arguably suffered more than in the preceding years. Between January and August, 900,000 people were internally displaced in Syria alone.”
The internal displacement figures were 234,000 for Iraq and 260,000 for Afghanistan.

 

Syria: Memorandum signed, De-escalation Zones are NOT Safe Zones

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This is terrifying for the Syrian people that remain in country and just as bad as the millions of refugees, noted to be about 11 million that have fled the country. Their hopes of ever returning to their home country fades each day.

It is also notable that the United States and coalition countries do have boots on the ground in Syria and the matter of an offensive operation to liberate Raqqa Syria, the headquarters for Islamic State is not even mentioned in this newly signed document. There is no mention of the United States operations in Syria along with other allied countries. Are the skies to be conflicted again? Any mention of the use of U.S. operations out of Incirlik, Turkey? Nope.

Some will read this and reply that the United States has no interest in Syria. As long as refugees and migrants continue to arrive across the United States each month and as long as there are more than 1000 open terror cases being investigated by the FBI and DHS, we DO have a dog in this hunt.

“The functioning of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as the administration of the security zones shall be ensured by the forces of the Guarantors by consensus”

 

6 May 201712:41

Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic Official website of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2746041

 

The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey as guarantors of the observance of the ceasefire regime in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter referred to as “Guarantors”):

-guided by the provisions of UNSC resolution 2254 (2015); -reaffirming their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic; -expressing their determination to decrease the level of military tensions and to provide for the security of civilians in the Syrian Arab Republic, have agreed on the following.

1.the following de-escalation areas shall be created with the aim to put a prompt end to violence, improve the humanitarian situation and create favorable conditions to advance political settlement of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic:

– Idlib province and certain parts of the neighbouring provinces (Latakia, Hama and Aleppo provinces); -certain parts in the north of Homs province; -in eastern Ghouta; -certain parts of southern Syria (Deraa and Al-Quneitra provinces).

The creation of the de-escalation areas and security zones is a temporary measure, the duration of which will initially be 6 months and will be automatically extended on the basis of consensus of the Guarantors.

2.Within the lines of the de-escalation areas:

-hostilities between the conflicting parties (the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the armed opposition groups that have joined and will join the ceasefire regime) with the use of any kinds of weapons, including aerial assets, shall be ceased; -rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access shall be provided; -conditions to deliver medical aid to local population and to meet basic needs of civilians shall be created; -measures to restore basic infrastructure facilities, starting with water supply and electricity distribution networks, shall be taken; -conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons shall be created.

3.Along the lines of the de-escalation areas, security zones shall be established in order to prevent incidents and military confrontations between the conflicting parties.

4.The security zones shall include:

 

– Checkpoints to ensure unhindered movement of unarmed civilians and delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as to facilitate economic activities;

 

– Observation posts to ensure compliance with the provisions of the ceasefire regime.

The functioning of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as the administration of the security zones shall be ensured by the forces of the Guarantors by consensus. Third parties might be deployed, if necessary, by consensus of the Guarantors.

5.The Guarantors shall:

-take all necessary measures to ensure the fulfillment by the conflicting parties of the ceasefire regime; -take all necessary measures to continue the fight against DAESH/ISIL, Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaeda or DAESH/ISIL as designated by the UN Security Council within and outside the de-escalation areas; -continue efforts to include in the ceasefire regime armed opposition groups that have not yet joined the ceasefire regime.

6.The Guarantors shall in 2 weeks after signing the Memorandum form a Joint working group on de-escalation (hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Working Group”) composed of their authorized representatives in order to delineate the lines of the de-escalation areas and security zones as well as to resolve other operational and technical issues related to the implementation of the Memorandum.

The Guarantors shall take steps to complete by 4 June 2017 the preparation of the maps of the de-escalation areas and security zones and to separate the armed opposition groups from the terrorist groups mentioned in para.5 of the Memorandum.

The Joint Working Group shall prepare by the above-mentioned date the maps of the de-escalation areas and security zones to be agreed by consensus of the Guarantors as well as the draft Regulation of the Joint Working Group.

The Joint Working Group shall report on its activities to the high-level international meetings on Syria held in Astana.

The present Memorandum enters into force the next day after its signing.

Done in Astana, 4 May 2017 in three copies in English, having equal legal force.

 

Signatures

Islamic Republic of Iran   Russian Federation   Republic of Turkey

***

Russia is telling the entire Western world they are in control and alleges full cooperation and approval not only from the United Nations but claims the Trump administration has also agreed. Read on as it also shows maps of the ‘de-escalation zones’.

Russian Defense Ministry Held A Briefing Titled “Principles Of Implementation Of The Memorandum On Syria De-Eescalation Zones Signed In Astana”

Russian Defence Ministry held a briefing titled “Principles of implementation of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones signed in Astana”

Speech of the Deputy Defence Minister of Russia

Lieutenant General Alexander Fomin

Good day, ladies and gentlemen!

The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation is holding a briefing on the main points and principles of implementation of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones signed in Astana.

The event is participated by the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate – the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy and Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov.

As you know, yesterday, after two-day negotiations held in Astana, plenipotentiaries from Russia, Iran and Turkey signed a Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones.

For reference:

The Russian party was represented by the Special envoy of the President of the Russian Federation on the settlement of the Syrian conflict A. Lavrentiev.

The Turkish party was represented by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey S. Onal.

Iran is represented by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran H. Ansari.

First, we should briefly inform you about the preparation of the agreement, its participants and ideas.

The document had been elaborated by the Russian Defence Ministry upon the direct order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces Vladimir Putin to maintain the ceasefire on the territory of Syria.

The adoption of the Memorandum had been preceded by a thorough work with all the participants of the negotiation process.

The political settlement in Syria had been numerously discussed by the President of the Russian Federation with the leadership of Turkey, the USA and other states.

In particular, de-escalation zones were negotiated in the course of the talks with the Heads of Russia and Turkey on May 3 in Sochi.

The Russian Defence Minister held bilateral talks with Ministers of Defence of Iran, Turkey, Syria and Israel.

Intelligence services and foreign affairs departments cooperated with each other permanently. A large work was done in order to convince the Syrian leadership and leaders of armed opposition formations to take measures aimed to deescalate the conflict.

Constructive attitude of Iran and Turkey, which had supported building up of the ceasefire regime, has played an important role in operative development of the Memorandum.

Position of the United States positively influenced on establishment of the de-escalation zones. The US supported measures aimed to reduce violence in Syria, improvement of humanitarian situation and creation of conditions promoting political settlement of the conflict.

António Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, supported the signing of the Memorandum. He welcomed decisions on stoppage of use of weapons and increasing of opportunities for providing humanitarian aid to the population.

Efforts of Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Envoy to Syria, are highly appreciated. Staffan de Mistura jointly with a group of high-qualified experts had arrived in Astana to support the negotiations.

Memorandum is a landmark document, implementation of which will allow to separate the opposition from the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra.

Free access in the de-escalation zones for providing medical, product and other assistance to the Syrian population will be granted.

Recovery of infrastructural objects will be organized.

All these issues will create conditions for safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Implementation of the Memorandum will allow to stop warfare and civil war in Syria.

That is why the document is important for political settlement of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Not everybody appreciates it. At the same time, its signing supported by all main interested players: the UN, the US administration, the leadership of Saudi Arabia and other countries. That is a guarantee of its implementation.

The Memorandum comes into effect tomorrow, i.e. from 00.00 May 6, 2017.

Speech of the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate

Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

Command staff of the Russian force grouping has taken a complex of measures, which had provided favourable conditions for signing the Memorandum.

Starting from May 1, the Russian Aerospace Forces have stopped operating in the de-escalation zones determined by the Memorandum.

On May 2 and 3, The Russian Centre for reconciliation of opposing sides jointly with leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic organized delivery of a humanitarian convoy of the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in Duma and the Eastern Ghouta region.

Military police units of the Russian Armed Forces escorted the 51-automobile convoy. Four unmanned aerial vehicles covered the moving convoy.

Russian military servicemen detected and neutralized a suicide bomber armed with 10-kilogram explosives and grenades. They handed him over to representatives of the Syrian security service.

The Memorandum provides creation of four de-escalation zones in the Syrian Arab Republic.

First one is most extensive located in the north of Syria. It includes the Idlib province as well as north-eastern areas of the Latakia province, western areas of the Aleppo province, and northern areas of the Hama province. There are more than 1 million people in the zone. 14,500-men strong armed formations are controlling this zone.

The second one is in the north of the Homs province. It includes al-Rastan and Tell Bisa as well as nearest areas controlled by the opposition groups. The groups consist of up to 3,000 insurgents. There are about 180,000 civilians in the zone.

The third one is Eastern Ghouta. About 9,000 insurgents are controlling it.

About 690,000 civilians live in Eastern Ghouta. The Syrian authorities have deployed eight checkpoints for their transfer. In the morning, most civilians leave Eastern Ghouta for Damascus for earning money, and, in the evening, they come back.

This zone does not include the area of Kabun controlled by insurgents of Jabhat al-Nusra. The Damascus city, and the Russian Embassy in particular, are shelled from there. Operation aimed to eliminate terrorists in this area is continued.

The fourth zone is located in the south of Syria and includes areas of the Daraa and Quneitra provinces. This zone is mainly controlled by units of so-called Southern Front (15,000 men strong). Up to 800,000 civilians live there.

The Memorandum provides additional de-escalation zones if necessary.

In the de-escalation zones, warfare between the government troops and armed opposition units joined or are to join the ceasefire regime is being stopped.

This refers to use of all types of weapons, including aviation strikes.

Special attention is paid to control implementation of the ceasefire regime.

In order to prevent incidents and combat actions between the opposing sides along the de-escalation zone borders, security lanes are established. These lanes include posts for observation of reconciliation regime and checkpoints for controlling movement of civilians without weapons, delivery of humanitarian aid, and support of economical activity.

Operation of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as control over security zones will be provided by personnel from Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Forces from other countries can be involved under agreement of state-guarantors.

Command staff of the Russian grouping under the leadership of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces is determining the number of necessary checkpoints and observation posts as well as forces supporting their operation.

Within two weeks, representatives of state-guarantors will form a Joint working group. The group will present borders of the de-escalation zones and safety lanes as well as maps for separating formations of armed opposition from terrorist groupings by July 4, 2017.

It is to be stressed that signing of the Memorandum on creation of the de-escalation zones in the Syrian Arab Republic does not stop fighting against terrorists of the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

State-guarantors undertake to continue fighting against formations of these and other terrorist organizations in the de-escalation zones as well as provide assistance to the government troops and armed opposition in fighting insurgents in other areas of Syria.

After establishing of the de-escalation zones, the government troops will be sent to continue offensive on the ISIS formations in the central and eastern parts of Syria as well as to liberate areas located along the River Euphrates.

The Russian Aerospace Forces will support these actions.

Speech of the Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate

of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces

Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov

Ladies and gentlemen!

Active preliminary work with our partners has contributed to the results of negotiations in Astana. To this purpose, the working group of the Russian Defence Ministry held a meeting with the leadership of Syria on April 25 in Damascus and on April 26 – in Ankara with representatives of Turkey and leaders of armed formations of the opposition.

In the course of the meetings, we have explained in detail to our partners the methods of creation of safety zones, the mechanism of control over the implementation of the agreements, organization of the humanitarian access and restoration of the peaceful life.

Delegations of the Russian Defence Minister conducted the same work simultaneously in Tehran and Amman.

Just in the course of the preliminary work, we managed to enlist support of guarantor states and the opposing sides for our initiatives.

These activities ensured constructive work of the representatives from Turkey, Iran, the UN and the Syrian government at the meeting in Astana.

The lack of trust between the representatives of the Syrian government and the oppositions gave rise to some difficulties in the course of negotiations.

Despite the intention of all the delegations to sign the document, the initial points of view of the parties differed. First, that concerned the issues of security of the civil population in the de-escalation zones and organization of control over the implementation of the ceasefire agreements by the parties.

The peculiarity of negotiations in Astana is the fact that the opposition was represented by field commanders who really control the situation “on the ground”, but not politicians or emigrants.

Despite the conflict with the government troops, these people realize their responsibility for the future of the united Syrian state.

In the course of frank talks, common methods of stabilization of the situation in Syria were elaborated. We managed to agree on Memorandum with the field commanders of 27 detachments active in the de-escalation zones.

The constructive position of representatives from Iran and Turkey played an important role in achieving agreements as both countries as guarantor states had incurred the responsibility for implementation of the ceasefire.

The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General Staffan de Mistura made an important contribution to the most tough periods of negotiations. He held several meetings with opposition representatives and convinced them of the importance of the Memorandum for stabilization of the situation in Syria.

It is also important that the results of the talks in Astana are considered by Staffan de Mistura as an influential contribution to the political dialogue in Genève.

The UN experts have rendered considerable assistance, their peace-making experience, practical recommendations were took into account during the elaboration of the Memorandum.

The high level of organization of negotiations provided by the leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan also contributed to the success of the talks. During each stage of the conversations all the delegations were provided with support by our Kazakh colleagues.

In the near future, the main efforts will be concentrated on the establishment of a Joint working group for de-escalation, preparation of maps with coordinates of safe margins and buffer zones and their negotiation with the partners.

The reports on the activities of the Group will be heard during the international meetings on the Syrian conflict settlement within the Astana process.

Moreover, the mechanism of effective control over the implementation of agreements mentioned by Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy will be elaborated jointly with the partners. This work has already been started.

We plan to continue the work with partners on elaboration of additional trust-building measures for the opposing sides. First of all, this concerns the liberation of persons retained forcibly by both sides of the conflict as well as the humanitarian mine clearance.

We expect further interaction with our partners within the Astana process, the observer countries as well as the support of international organizations, first of all the UN.

Thank you for your attention.

Media representatives’ questions

Yekaterina Babayeva, reporter, KSB TV-channel (Republic of Korea) – a question to Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

– After the adoption of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones, where will the main efforts of the Aerospace Forces be concentrated for elimination of terrorist groupings?

Sergei Rudskoy:

– De-escalation zones will allow the government troops to release many units. The Russian Aerospace Forces will continue supporting the Syrian Armed Forces while eliminating illegal armed groups of the ISIL international terrorist organization.

The main efforts will focused on the development of the offensive in the east from Palmyra and further lifting a siege of the Deir ez-Zor city, which is besieged for over three years as well as on the liberation of the north-eastern territories in the Aleppo province along the Euphrates River.

Yaroslav Kurashov, reporter of NHK TV-channel (Japan), a question to Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov

Which measures are prescribed for the violators of the Memorandum?

Stanislav Gadjimagomedov:

First, a thorough investigation will be held. According to the results, the measures applied to the violators will be defined. Among them – neutralization by fire.

Alexey Konopko, reporter of the Россия-24 TV-channel, a question to Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

– Is Russia planning to recommence the Memorandum between Russia and the USA on prevention of incidents in the air space over Syria?

Sergei Rudskoy:

– This agreement is an effective means of prevention of incidents in the air. After the US cruise missile strike against the Shayrat Air Base, the Russian party has suspended its participation in this agreement.

The question of returning to the cooperation within the Memorandum on prevention of incidents in the air space over Syria will be discussed in the course of bilateral contacts with the American colleagues in the nearest future.

Antonio Rondon Garcia, reporter of the Prensa Latina (Cuba), a question to Lieutenant General Alexander Fomin

– Is it planned to extend the number of participants in the de-escalation process?

Alexander Fomin:

Yes, it is. Now we are working on this issue with Jordan and a number of other states.

In the conclusion, I would like to thank you for responding to our invitation.

Traditionally, the Russian Defence Ministry pays great attention to the covering of its activities by the media. We will continue informing you about the most important events including the Syrian topic.

Taking the opportunity, I would like to congratulate all of you with the upcoming Victory Day and to wish you peaceful sky.

Thank you for your attention.

Less than 1% of Visa Overstays are Captured

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Note: Former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson signed his name to a report dated January 2016 on the matter of ‘visa-overstays’. Nowhere in the report does it state all the systems and databases are not connected or using old technology and software. Click on the link above if you want to see the tables published by country. In the summary this paragraph was included:

Due to continuing departures by individuals in this population, by January 4, 2016, the number of Suspected In-Country Overstays for FY 2015 had dropped to 416,500, rendering the Suspected In-Country Overstay rate as 0.9 percent. In other words, as of January 4, 2016, DHS has been able to confirm the departures of more than 99 percent of nonimmigrant visitors scheduled to depart in FY 2015 via air and sea POEs, and that number continues to grow.

Image result for visa overstay report  NBCBoston

Homeland Security can’t keep up with more than 1 million immigrants who have overstayed visas

Homeland Security has built up a backlog of more than 1.2 million illegal immigrants who it believes have overstayed visas but managed to arrest only about 3,400 of them, according to the most recent data, which works out to a rate of about 1 in every 350 lawbreakers.
That is far worse than the rate for those who crossed the border illegally, and it means criminals, people engaged in narcoterrorism and other national security risks are left to run free in the U.S., the Homeland Security inspector general said in a report Thursday.
Federal agents have trouble tracking down the criminals because the government still doesn’t monitor departures, meaning it can’t be certain whether those who came on tourist, business or student visas leave when they are supposed to.
Officers have to check as many as 27 in-house systems, in addition to state databases, to try to guess whether someone has left. Even then, they can make catastrophic mistakes when it wrongly appears that a visitor has left the country.

“Such false departure information resulted in [deportation] officers closing visa overstay investigations of dangerous individuals, such as suspected criminals, who were actually still in the United States and could pose a threat to national security,” the investigators said in the report. “For example, an ERO officer stated that a suspect under investigation was listed as having left the country, but had given his ticket to a family member and was still residing in the United States.”
Visa overstays, as they are called, have become an increasing focus of the immigration debate. As the flow of illegal border crossings declines, an increasing percentage of those in the country illegally are travelers who came on business, tourist or student visas but didn’t leave when their time was up.
Several of the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers were overstays.
Homeland Security has struggled to get a handle on the situation, or even to figure out how bad it is.
A report last year looking at just a portion of visas calculated that more than 500,000 visitors overstayed in 2015. The total backlog grew to more than 1.2 million, the inspector general said.
Meanwhile, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested only 3,402 potential overstays in 2015.

(Advance this video to the 18:40 minute mark and listen to the statistics on inbound travelers under the Visa Waiver Program) What could go wrong on this program?


In its official response, ICE said it is trying to do a better job of calculating the number of visa overstays.
President Trump has pushed the Homeland Security Department to finish the system that would track departures, and tests are being run at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta.
The department also plans to release its next overstay report soon. That report will cover almost all visa categories, so the government will have a better sense for how bad the problem is.
But Rep. Bob Goodlatte, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said that until the government tracks all departures, it won’t know what’s going on.
“Visa security is a matter of national security, and it is imperative that we know who is coming to our country and when they leave so that we protect American citizens and our interests,” the Virginia Republican said.
Congress demanded a biometric entry-exit system more than 20 years ago, but administrations in both parties have failed to deliver, saying that airports aren’t configured to check departures and that the land ports of entry are an even bigger logistical hurdle.
Mr. Goodlatte said he expects Mr. Trump’s focus on immigration to finally push Homeland Security to finish the job.

Until then, officers will waste time on bogus leads, the inspector general’s report said. The data are so unreliable that officers and agents often end up finding an overstay still in the country who the systems said already had left, or spend time trying to track down someone who did leave the country or obtained legal status.
“An ICE officer estimated that he spent more than 50 hours on a single suspect, only to find the individual had applied for [an immigration] benefit and should not have been categorized as an overstay,” the audit said.

Iraq: Sallyport Global = Sex Trafficking, Alcohol, Lax Security

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Sheesh…..typical for a government contractor and in Iraq.

U.S. Firm in Iraq Overlooks Smuggling, Security for F-16s

WASHINGTON (AP) — The two American investigators felt a sense of foreboding that Sunday as they headed to an emergency meeting with their boss on the Iraqi air base. But they didn’t expect to be surrounded by armed guards, disarmed, detained against their will — and fired without explanation.

It was March 12 — less than two months ago. Robert Cole and Kristie King were in Iraq working as investigators for Sallyport Global, a U.S. company that was paid nearly $700 million in federal contracts to secure Balad Air Base, home to a squadron of F-16 fighter jets as part of the U.S.-led coalition to annihilate the Islamic State.

** Click here for video

Cole and King had spent more than a year together in Iraq investigating all manner of misconduct at Balad and beyond.

Image result for balad air base

They’d uncovered evidence that Sallyport employees were involved in sex trafficking , they said. Staff on base routinely flew in smuggled alcohol in such high volumes that a plane once seesawed on the tarmac under the weight. Rogue militia stole enormous generators off the base using flatbed trucks and a 60-foot crane, driving past Sallyport security guards.

Managers repeatedly shut down Cole and King’s investigations and failed to report their findings to the U.S. government that was footing the bill, the investigators said.

Right before they were fired, Cole and King had opened an investigation into allegations of timesheet fraud among Sallyport employees. In a call with Sallyport lawyers, they said, they were advised to keep two sets of books about potential crimes and contract violations.

“One for the government to see and one for the government not to see,” King told The Associated Press.

The company said that the investigators misinterpreted the instructions.

In a statement to the AP, Sallyport said it follows all contracting rules at the base, home to the F-16s that are a key to the fight against the Islamic State.

“Sallyport has a strong record of providing security and life support services in challenging war zones like Iraq and plays a major but unheralded role in the war against ISIS,” Chief Operating Officer Matt Stuckart wrote. “The company takes any suggestion of wrongdoing at Balad very seriously.”

More than 150 documents obtained by AP, as well as interviews with more than a half-dozen former or current Sallyport employees, show how a contractor ran amok after being hired for lucrative and essential combat support operations. The investigators and other witnesses describe grave security breaches and illegal schemes that went unreported until the government asked about them.

The point behind requiring contractors to employ their own investigators was to limit the waste and corruption that has marred federal security contracting going back to the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.

The Pentagon’s own auditors, who were frequently on the base 50 miles north of Baghdad, were not told of the serious problems until early this year, a potential violation of law. The Pentagon auditors’ reports, obtained by the AP, detail dozens of more minor infractions. That gap illustrates the limits of U.S. oversight for billions of dollars in contracts run by companies that have cashed in on the fight to protect Americans from extremism.

The Defense Department declined to comment.

The morning of March 12, King had gone to church and was still carrying her Bible when she and Cole walked into the office foyer for the meeting with the boss. To their astonishment, they were immediately surrounded by armed security guards and forced to turn over the 9 mm pistols they both routinely carried on the job.

The boss, David Saffold, informed them they were being fired but wouldn’t say why.

“We knew too much,” King told AP in an interview at her home in Amarillo, Texas. “They want to cover it up and move on because it’s a huge amount of money.”

BODYGUARD OR TERRORIST?

In 2004, Rob Cole was a retired California police officer and licensed private investigator when he decided to go to Iraq for a series of contracting jobs. Like many U.S. contractors working in hazardous regions, he went because the work paid a lot more than he could make back home.

Americans have been at Balad on and off since 2003. Sallyport’s parent company, Michael Baker International, announced in 2014 its subsidiaries had been awarded $838 million for work on the base.

Cole’s first job at Balad was cut short in June 2014, a month after he arrived, when the Islamic State group began sweeping across Iraq and Syria. The extremists ultimately made it to the gates of Balad, which was evacuated.

When the Americans went back, they found a looted base largely under the control of Iranian-backed Shiite militias that were supporting the Iraqi government, according to former employees. A former senior manager told the AP that Sallyport reached an understanding with the militias that they would not enter the flight and residential areas. He declined to be named because he wasn’t authorized to discuss the matter and didn’t want to be blacklisted from future jobs.

Cole, now 62, returned to Balad in May 2015, as Sallyport was preparing for the arrival of American F-16s sold to the Iraqi government. Sallyport’s mission, along with its parent company, was to keep the base operating smoothly, train the Iraqis, and most importantly maintain security on the base, where thousands of Iraqis and hundreds of contractors work.

The federal contract required investigations into potential crimes and violations involving the company’s work at Balad. That was Cole and King’s assignment.

“They wanted someone to be competent enough to process an investigation, if there was a crime, or if someone turned up dead,” King said. “The way it was put to me: If someone turned up with a knife in their back, who are you going to call?”

From the start, it was clear that much was awry on the base. Despite the urgency of fighting IS, the delivery of the F-16s had been delayed by months amid security concerns. It would be catastrophic if IS seized the base and its multimillion-dollar jets.

On July 13, 2015, four F-16s flew in from Arizona, the first of 36 fighter jets that the U.S. planned to deliver.

Brett McGurk, then the U.S. deputy envoy for the international coalition against IS, hailed the arrival in a tweet.

“After years of preparation & training in the U.S., Iraqi pilots today landed the 1st squadron of Iraqi F16s in #Iraq,” he wrote.

The first security breach came in less than 24 hours: A long black skid mark on the tarmac was reported. It stopped about 45 yards from the nose of one of the fighter jets. A truck had plowed through a rope barrier in the “no-go” zone, where lethal force is authorized to protect the planes. For more than 10 minutes, no one even responded as the vehicle drove away, according to reports citing surveillance video.

That turned out not to be a terrorist. But Cole says the out-of-control truck was a harbinger. He noted the lax protection for the F-16s in his report and forwarded it to the chief of security, Steve Asher. Under the requirements of the contract, Cole’s report should have then made its way to the Pentagon. But he says Asher kept a lid on the incident.

Three months later, in October 2015, Cole reported another security breach, the theft of a Toyota SUV that Sallyport had assigned to bodyguards to drive VIPs around the base. Cole eventually uncovered a plot by three Iraqi Sallyport staff working with a dangerous Iran-backed militia, known as Kataib Imam Ali.

The Shiite militia was an ongoing headache, politically connected and operating outside the law, with sidelines in theft and gunrunning. It has ties to the leader of the umbrella militia Popular Mobilization Forces, which is on the U.S. list of designated terrorists.

To Cole’s astonishment, the prime suspect threatened to join the militia during his interrogation. He was a Sallyport bodyguard. In fact, the investigators later found a photo of him on his Facebook page, dressed in black militia garb and a patch indicating his allegiance to the group.

He is “viewed by the Investigations Unit as a hard-core recruit to become a terrorist who poses a serious threat to all personnel on this base,” Cole wrote in another report.

The Toyota was recovered within a few days, but Cole was ordered off the case. In an interview with AP, the former senior manager defended the company’s order, saying negotiations with the militias were highly sensitive and had to be handled with Iraqi cooperation. Still, the suspect was supposed to be banned from the base, and Cole later saw the man walking around freely.

GUMMY BEARS SOAKED IN VODKA

The longer Cole was on the base, the more he suspected that management was turning a blind eye to criminal activity.

On the books, Balad is a dry base, where alcohol is restricted. But in reality the booze was everywhere and everyone knew it. Finding out how it got there led to more troubling questions.

A Sallyport employee who worked in the air terminal reported in late 2015 that co-workers were involved in a smuggling scheme. They were bringing in cases and cases of water bottles filled with liquor that they’d sneaked onto planes flying in from Baghdad.

According to investigative documents and people who watched the smuggling in action, three empty suitcases would routinely be loaded onto a flight to Baghdad. Each time, the bags came back with plastic water bottles filled with liquor. When they were unloaded, the bags were not searched but taken directly outside to be picked up — a serious security risk in a war zone.

“You could be putting a bomb in there,” said one former employee who witnessed the smuggling. “You’ve got people just going rogue.” He spoke only on condition of anonymity because he didn’t want to imperil his new job with a different overseas contractor.

Steve Anderson, who worked on flight logistics, says he was pressured to sign off on faked flight manifests that omitted passenger names and falsified the weight of cargo to cover for the alcohol smuggling and other infractions — a violation of international flight regulations. The planes were getting so weighed down he was worried about flight safety.

“They were playing Russian roulette with the passengers’ lives — including mine,” Anderson said.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, Here to Stay

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Seems like everyday, Russia is in our house, in fact it is true. The hybrid warfare crafted by the Kremlin is here to stay so exactly when does the Trump White House deal with this constant threat? What threat you ask?

Adam Meyers is from the cyber-security firm CrowdStrike. As the Vice President of Intelligence, Adam heads a team that identifies the perpetrators of cyber-crimes, both in the private and public sectors. CrowdStrike helped to identify the hackers behind the Democratic National Committee’s email leaks last year, and more recently the mastermind behind the Kelihos Botnet.

*** Notice, there was no intrusion into Marie Le Pen’s campaign operations. Why? Putin endorses LePen and has provided campaign funds to her.

According to Trend Micro researchers, the campaign of French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron has been hit by the same Russian hackers who targeted Democratic campaign officials in the U.S. before last year’s presidential election, the New York Times reports.

On March 15, the researchers say, they saw the Pawn Storm group (a.k.a. Fancy Bear, APT28 or the Sofacy Group) begin targeting Macron’s campaign with phishing attacks seeking campaign officials’ login information.

“The phishing pages we are talking about are very personalized Web pages to look like the real address,” Mounir Mahjoubi, Macron’s digital director, told the Times. “They were pixel perfect. It’s exactly the same page. That means there was talent behind it and time went into it — talent, money, experience, time and will.”

Still, Mahjoubi said none of the attacks was successful.

He described the phishing attacks as the invisible side of a Russian campaign against Macron, with the visible side being fake news published on Russian news sites like Sputnik and RT. More here.

***

Panel to Senate: Cyber Operations Influence Political Processes Worldwide

Russia used “useful idiots” to meddle in the U.S. presidential election and “fellow travelers” opposed to European Union and NATO to influence elections in France and Germany, while Islamic terrorists used “agent provocateurs” to topple Spain’s government in 2004 and cast another pall over French voting, a cyber security expert told a congressional subcommittee Thursday.

That, in capsule form, is how cyber is changing how the public views elections, Clint Watts, of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, said at the Senate Armed Services cybersecurity subcommittee hearing.

So far in the case of the United States warding off this kind of activity, “far more is said than done.” He added it is a “human challenge, not technical ones” that needs to be addressed.

In the American and European elections, he said at the panel’s first public hearing since being formed the Russians created content, sent it out as if were “nuclear-powered and “pushed [it] in unison from many locations,” including “gray outlets” that appear to be legitimate sources of news. They also did all of this over long periods of time.

The goal in the American election was to plant doubt in the integrity of the voting, he said. He added there was no indication that actual votes were tampered with.

Later in answer to a question, Watts said the Russians “are picking parties and supporting them” in the United States and financially in Europe.

In cyber, not all is as it appears and its speed is instantaneous.

Rand Waltzman, senior information scientist at the RAND Corporation, described how an American special forces raid that successfully rescued a hostage and killed a number of terrorists in Iraq was turned into a terrorist propaganda victory. “Those guys film everything,” he said describing how they recorded the incident by placing the bodies on prayer rugs so it appeared that soldiers killed innocent civilians. The video was posted before the special forces soldiers returned to their base. “How did they manage to this so fast?” Their mobile phones.

This changed the story of what happened 180 degrees and put the United States in the position of having to refute the video rather than telling a story of rescue.

He said this kind of quick reaction by adversaries — misinformation, fake news — requires new thinking on cyber security. Instead of the traditional “denial of service” by causing a crash, they are applying “cognitive denial of service” — misinformation and propaganda — to achieve their ends.

“We’re hamstrung” by bureaucracy and directives in addressing the new “hyperkinetic world,” Michael Lumpkin, former acting under secretary of defense for policy, said. The United States’ government efforts in public diplomacy, public affairs and information operations have not been synchronized so that it becomes a credible source of information. It also needs to take the necessary steps “to make sure our information is accurate” before releasing it. “That has not always been the case.”

John Inglis, former deputy director of the National Security Agency, used his organization’s handling of metadata collection as an example. “You need to go first” to establish credibility and explain the value of what it is you are doing. “We went second. That made it more difficult to put it back in the bottle.”

Watts said one approach would be to have a rating non-profit, private agency, similar to Consumer Reports, vet every story on Twitter, Facebook and Google. He added Facebook and Google “are moving in that direction” to eliminate false news, but so far Twitter has not acted.

When asked how he rated RT, the Russian-sponsored media outlet, as a source of news, he said 70 percent was true, 20 percent was misleading and 10 percent false. Watts said he rated some American media outlets as falling in the same percentages of true, misleading and false.

A continuing difficulty in improving cyber security in and out of government is “how do you get people to share problems,” Waltzman said when they would prefer not to admit being hacked or even attacked. Lumpkin said more also needs to be done in training people how not to “provide access to adversaries unwittingly” and holding them accountable for security.

As for recruiting skilled cyber workers, “they’re motivated people out there” interested in the challenges they can find in government, rather than private sector, careers, Watts said. “Give them the space to be the tech savants they are.”

*** Need more? Do you ever watch C-Span and listen to testimony before Congressional committees? No? Too bad, but here is some help:

Full Spectrum Influence Operations: Synchronization of White, Gray and Black Efforts

Russian cyber enabled influence operations demonstrate never-before-seen synchronization of Active Measures.  Content created by white outlets (RT and Sputnik News) promoting the release of compromising material will magically generate manipulated truths and falsehoods from conspiratorial websites promoting Russian foreign policy positions, Kremlin preferred candidates or attacking Russian opponents.  Hackers, hecklers and honeypots rapidly extend these information campaigns amongst foreign audiences. As a comparison, the full spectrum synchronization, scale, repetition and speed of Russia’s cyber-enabled information operations far outperform the Islamic State’s recently successful terrorism propaganda campaigns or any other electoral campaign seen to date.

Cyber-enabled Influence Thrives When Paired with Physical Actors and Their Actions – 

American obsession with social media has overlooked the real world actors assisting Russian influence operations in cyber space, specifically “Useful Idiots,” “Fellow Travelers,” and “Agent Provocateurs.”

“Useful Idiots” – Meddling in the U.S. and now European elections has been accentuated by Russian cultivation and exploitation of “Useful Idiots” – a Soviet era term referring to unwitting American politicians, political groups and government representatives who further amplify Russian influence amongst Western populaces by utilizing Russian kompromat and resulting themes.

“Fellow Travelers” – In some cases, Russia has curried the favor of “Fellow Travelers” – a Soviet term referring to individuals ideologically sympathetic to Russia’s anti-EU, anti-NATO and anti-immigration ideology. A cast of alternative right characters across Europe and America now openly push Russia’s agenda both on-the-ground and online accelerating the spread of Russia’s cyber-enabled influence operations.

“Agent Provocateurs” – Ever more dangerous may be Russia’s renewed placement and use of “Agent Provocateurs” – Russian agents or manipulated political supporters who commit or entice others to commit illegal, surreptitious acts to discredit opponent political groups and power falsehoods in cyber space. Shots fired in a Washington, D.C. pizza parlor by an American who fell victim to a fake news campaign called #PizzaGate demonstrate the potential for cyber-enabled influence to result in real world consequences. While this campaign cannot be directly linked to Russia, the Kremlin currently has the capability to foment, amplify, and through covert social media accounts, encourage Americans to undertake actions either knowingly or unknowingly as Agent Provocateurs.

Each of these actors assists Russia’s online efforts to divide Western electorates across political, social, and ethnic lines while maintaining a degree of “plausible deniability” with regards to Kremlin interventions. In general, Russian influence operations targeting closer to Moscow and further from Washington, D.C. will utilize greater quantities and more advanced levels of human operatives to power cyber-influence operations. Russia’s Crimean campaign and their links to an attempted coup in Montenegro demonstrate the blend of real world and cyber influence they can utilize to win over target audiences. The physical station or promotion of gray media outlets and overt Russian supporters in Eastern Europe were essential to their influence of the U.S. Presidential election and sustaining “plausible deniability.”

It’s important to note that America is not immune to infiltration either, physically or virtually.  In addition to the Cold War history of Soviet agents recruiting Americans for Active Measures purposes, the recently released dossier gathered by ex MI6 agent Chris Steele alleges on page 8 that Russia used “Russian émigré & associated offensive cyber operatives in U.S.” during their recent campaign to influence the U.S. election. While still unverified, if true, the employment of such agents of influence in the U.S. would provide further plausible deniability and provocation capability for Russian cyber-enabled influence operations.

2) How can the U.S. government counter cyber-enabled influence operations?

When it comes to America countering cyber-enabled influence operations, when all is said and done, far more is said than done. When the U.S. has done something to date, at best, it has been ineffective. At worst, it has been counterproductive. Despite spending hundreds of millions of dollars since 9/11, U.S. influence operations have made little or no progress in countering al Qaeda, its spawn the Islamic State or any connected jihadist threat group radicalizing and recruiting via social media.

Policymakers and strategists should take note of this failure before rapidly plunging into an information battle with state sponsored cyber-enabled influence operations coupled with widespread hacking operations – a far more complex threat than any previous terrorist actor we’ve encountered.  Thus far, U.S. cyber influence has been excessively focused on bureaucracy and expensive technology tools – social media monitoring systems that have failed to detect the Arab Spring, the rise of ISIS, the Islamic State’s taking of Mosul, and most recently Russia’s influence of the U.S. election.  America will only succeed in countering Russian influence by turning its current approaches upside down, clearly determining what it seeks to achieve with its counter influence strategy and then harnessing top talent empowered rather than shackled by technology – a methodology prioritizing Task, Talent, Teamwork and Technology in that order.

Task – Witnessing the frightening possibility of Russian interference in the recent U.S. Presidential election, American policy makers have immediately called to counter Russian cyber influence.  But the U.S. should take pause in rushing into such efforts. The U.S. and Europe lack a firm understanding of what is currently taking place.  The U.S. should begin by clearly mapping out the purpose and scope of Russian cyber influence methods.  Second, American politicians, political organizations and government officials must reaffirm their commitment to fact over fiction by regaining the trust of their constituents through accurate communications. They must also end their use of Russian kompromat stolen from American citizens’ private communications as ammunition in political contests. Third, the U.S. must clearly articulate its policies with regards to the European Union, NATO, and immigration, which, at present, sometimes seems to mirror rather than counters that of the Kremlin. Only after these three actions have been completed, can the U.S. government undertake efforts to meet the challenge of Russian information warfare through its agencies as I detailed during my previous testimony.

Talent –Russia’s dominance in cyber-enabled influence operations arises not from their employment of sophisticated technology, but through the employment of top talent. Actual humans, not artificial intelligence, achieved Russia’s recent success in information warfare. Rather than developing cyber operatives internally, Russia leverages an asymmetric advantage by which they coopt, compromise or coerce components of Russia’s cyber criminal underground.  Russia deliberately brings select individuals into their ranks, such as those GRU [Russia’s foreign intelligence agency] leaders and proxies designated in the 29 December 2016 U.S. sanctions. Others in Russia with access to sophisticated malware, hacking techniques or botnets are compelled to act on behalf of the Kremlin.

The U.S. has top talent for cyber influence but will be unlikely and unable to leverage it against its adversaries.  The U.S. focuses on technologists failing to blend them with needed information campaign tacticians and threat analysts.  Even further, U.S. agency attempts to recruit cyber and influence operation personnel excessively focus on security clearances and rudimentary training thus screening out many top picks.  Those few that can pass these screening criteria are placed in restrictive information environments deep inside government buildings and limited to a narrow set of tools.  The end result is a lesser-qualified cyber-influence cadre with limited capability relying on outside contractors to read, collate and parse open source information from the Internet on their behalf.  The majority of the top talent needed for cyber-enabled influence resides in the private sector, has no need for a security clearance, has likely used a controlled substance during their lifetime and can probably work from home easier and more successfully than they could from a government building.

Teamwork – Russia’s cyber-enabled influence operations excel because they seamlessly integrate cyber operations, influence efforts, intelligence operatives and diplomats into a cohesive strategy.  Russia doesn’t obsess over their bureaucracy and employs competing and even overlapping efforts at times to win their objectives.

Meanwhile, U.S. government counter influence efforts have fallen into the repeated trap of pursuing bureaucratic whole-of-government approaches. Whether it is terror groups or nation states, these approaches assign tangential tasks to competing bureaucratic entities focused on their primary mission more than countering cyber influence.  Whole-of-government approaches to countering cyber influence will assign no responsible entity with the authority and needed resources to tackle our country’s cyber adversaries.  Moving forward, a task force led by a single entity must be created to counter the rise of Russian cyber-enabled operations.

Technology – Over more than a decade, I’ve repeatedly observed the U.S. buying technology tools in the cyber- influence space for problems they don’t fully understand. These tech tool purchases have excessively focused on social media analytical packages producing an incomprehensible array of charts depicting connected dots with different colored lines. Many of these technology products represent nothing more than modern snake oil for the digital age.  They may work well for Internet marketing but routinely muddy the waters for understanding cyber influence and the bad actors hiding amongst social media storm.

Detecting cyber influence operations requires the identification of specific needles, amongst stacks of needles hidden in massive haystacks. These needles are cyber hackers and influencers seeking to hide their hand in the social media universe. Based on my experience, the most successful technology for identifying cyber and influence actors comes from talented analysts that first comprehensively identify threat actor intentions and techniques and then build automated applications specifically tailored to detect these actors.  The U.S. government should not buy technical tools nor seek to build expensive, enterprise-wide solutions for cyber-influence analytics that rapidly become outdated and obsolete.  Instead, top talent should be allowed to nimbly purchase or rent the latest and best tools on the market for whatever current or emerging social media platforms or hacker malware kits arise.

3. What can the public and private sector do to counter influence operations?

I’ve already outlined my recommendations for U.S. government actions to thwart Russia’s Active Measures online in my previous testimony on 30 March 2017. Social media companies and mainstream media outlets must restore the integrity of information by reaffirming the purity of their systems. In the roughly one month since I last testified however, the private sector has made significant advances in this regard. Facebook has led the way, continuing their efforts to reduce fake news distribution and removing up to 30,000 false accounts from its system just this past week. Google has added a fact checking function to their search engine for news stories and further refined its search algorithm to sideline false and misleading information. Wikipedia launched a crowd-funded effort to fight fake news this week.  The key remaining private sector participant is Twitter, as their platform remains an critical networking and dissemination vector for cyber-enabled influence operations.  Their participation in fighting fake news and nefarious cyber influence will be essential. I hope they will follow the efforts of other social media platforms as their identification and elimination of fake news spreading bots and false accounts may provide a critical block to Russian manipulation and influence of the upcoming French and German elections.

In conclusion, my colleagues and I identified, tracked and traced the rise of Russian influence operations on social media with home computers and some credit cards. While cyber-influence operations may appear highly technical in execution, they are very human in design and implementation.  Technology and money will not be the challenge for America in countering Russia’s online Active Measures; it will be humans and the bureaucracies America has created that prevent our country from employing its most talented cyber savants against the greatest enemies to our democracy. Full article here.