Category Archives: IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

Putin Officially Stakes Exclusive Claim to the Artic

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Without even so much as a whimper from anyone in Washington DC, Putin made his final submission to the United Nations in writing claiming expanded sovereignty of Russia for the Artic.

This was tried before by Russia and it was denied in 2001.

The question is why is the United Nations the final approval authority for such a claim under which the matter is governed by the Law of the Seas?

Obama’s feeble position on the Artic

In May 2013, President Obama published the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, defining the desired end state as an Arctic Region stable and free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner. In November 2013, the Secretary of Defense published the Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, identifying two supporting objectives to the National Strategy:

• Ensure security, support safety, and promote defense cooperation;
• Prepare for a wide range of challenges and contingencies.

In support of National and Department of Defense aims, the Navy will pursue the following strategic objectives:

• Ensure United States Arctic sovereignty and provide homeland defense;
• Provide ready naval forces to respond to crisis and contingencies;
• Preserve freedom of the seas; and
• Promote partnerships within the United States Government and with international allies and partners.

Full detail here.

Russia’s Application Summary to the United Nations

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Federation signed 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“Convention”) on 10 December 1982 (then the USSR) and ratified it on 26 February 1997. The Convention entered into force for the Russian Federation on 11 April 1997. In accordance with Article 77 of the Convention, the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf exist ipso facto and ab initio.

This Submission of the Russian Federation, which is made on the basis of Article 76.8 of the Convention, is a partial revised submission and covers the part of the Arctic Ocean region. The area under consideration was included in the first Submission of the Russian Federation (made on 10 December 2001) in respect of the extended continental shelf, which was considered at the 11th session of the Commission from 24 to 28 June 2002.

Recommendations relating to the Arctic Ocean adopted at that session of the Commission (L. Recommendations / D. Summary of recommendations. Central Arctic Ocean) say: 154/166. The Commission recommends that the Russian Federation make a revised submission in respect

of its extended continental shelf in the Central Arctic Ocean based on the findings contained in these recommendations.

155/167. The Commission recommends that the Russian Federation follow the scientific and technical advice contained in its Scientific and Technical Guidelines, and as indicated in the various sections of these Recommendations of the Commission.

156/168. The Commission recommends that according to the materials provided in the submission the Lomonosov Ridge cannot be considered a submarine elevation under the Convention.

157/169. The Commission recommends that, according to the current state of scientific knowledge, the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge Complex cannot be considered a submarine elevation under the Convention.

Guided by the provisions of the Rules of Procedure and the STG, and also taking into account the practice of the Commission, the Russian Federation reserves the right to introduce amendments and additions to this partial revised Submission that can be based on new or additional research data and may provide changes to the presented OLCS line of the Russian Federation.

1. EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN

This partial revised Submission of the Russian Federation for establishment of the OLCS in the Arctic Ocean is made to include in the extended continental shelf of the Russian Federation, in accordance with article 76 of the Convention, the seabed and its subsoil in the central Arctic Ocean which is natural prolongation of the Russian land territory.

The basis for the extension of rights to the extended continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean is the identity of the submitted areas to the continental shelf, as well as the OLCS position under Article 76 of the Convention at a distance of more than 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In the case of the Russian Federation, this distance coincides with the boundary of the Russian exclusive economic zone. Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Federal Act “On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation”(No. 191, dated December 17, 1998) states that:

PARTIAL REVISED SUBMISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE COMMISSION ON THE LIMITS OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF IN RESPECT OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN

The outer limit of the exclusive economic zone is established at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, unless otherwise is stipulated by the international treaties of the Russian Federation.

Requirements of Paragraph 1 of Article 75 of the Convention provide that:

Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the lines of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 74 shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Where appropriate, such limit lines or delimitation lines may be substituted by a list of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum.

The line of the Russian exclusive economic zone is shown on the chart of Central Arctic Basin (admiralty No. 91115), publication of the Department of Navigation and Oceanography of the Russian Ministry of Defense in 2014.

The list of straight baseline points was approved by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 15 January 1985 and published in the book “Maritime Legislation of the Russian Federation” (1994) by the Main Department of Navigation and Oceanography (admiralty No. 9055). An English translation of the said list has been officially handed over to the UN Secretary General and placed on the UN website (see List of straight baseline points 4450 “RUS_1985_Declaration”).

The List contains coordinates of the straight baseline endpoints. The position of the normal baselines adjoining the straight baselines in this document is recorded with the text: “onwards along the low-water line up to the base point …. No.”.

The area of the seabed of the Arctic ocean (Fig. 1), considered in this revised partial submission and relevant to the OLCS determination of the Russian Federation under article 76 of the Convention, covers the geomorphological continental shelf of the Russian Arctic marginal seas, part of the Eurasian basin (Nansen basin and Amundsen, the Gakkel ridgeThe Arctic Ocean seabed area considered in this partial revised Submission that for establishment of the OLCS of the Russian Federation under Article 76 of the Convention includes the geomorphological shelf of the Russian Arctic marginal seas, part of the Eurasian Basin (the Nansen, Amundsen basins and the Gakkel Ridge), and the Central Amerasian Basin consisting of the Makarov Basin and Complex of the Central Arctic Submarine Elevations, which includes the Lomonosov Ridge, Podvodnikov Basin, Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, Mendeleev and Chukchi basins, and Chukchi Plateau.

Partial revised Submission of the Russian Federation on the establishment of the OLCS in the Arctic Ocean proceeds from the scientific understanding that the constituent parts of the Complex of the Central Arctic Submarine Elevations, namely the Lomonosov Ridge, Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, and Chukchi Plateau, and separating them the Podvodnikov and Chukchi Basins have the continental origin and belong to submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin under paragraph 6 of Article 76 of the Convention, which are not subject to distance limit of 350 nautical miles from the baselines.

The submitted OLCS line under Article 76 of the Convention in accordance with this partial revised Submission is shown on the schematic map included in the Executive Summary (Fig. 1). A more detailed description of the claimed OLCS is given below in the corresponding section of the Executive Summary.

In accordance with Paragraphs 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 of the STG, all distances in the partial revised Submission of the Russian Federation for establishment of the OLCS in the Arctic Ocean are given in nautical miles (M) or metres (m).

Many more details and the full Russian document is found here.

 

 

How Khamenei Secretly Coded the 15 Secret Iran Deals

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The IAEA signing the secret side deal documents:

 

No for broadcast. Private comments by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi were quoted on Iranian news website EPA/HERBERT NEUBAUER

It was rather like hand signals, encryption in voice conversation and other covert communications that were used to ensure top points were met in P5+1 and Iran negotiations. Still, Iran prevailed and outplayed John Kerry and the White House.

Most curious is what has come to be known about the Fordow nuclear facility and the centrifuges.

In part from the Guardian: In the JCPOA, a total of six 174-centrifuge cascades will remain in Fordow, a total of 1044 machines, in line with the Supreme Leader’s decree. However, only two cascades will spin, producing stable isotopes, rather than enriching uranium. The other four cascades will remain idle. This anecdote chimes with the accounts of Western negotiators who have said that while the Supreme Leader’s edicts frequently complicated proceedings in Vienna, both sides were able and ready to find creative ways around them.

In his comments, Araqchi confirms a detail about Fordow that Western governments have long claimed but that Tehran had never acknowledged, that the Iranian government only informed the UN atomic watchdog, the IAEA, of Fordow’s existence in 2009 after Tehran realised it had been discovered by Western intelligence agencies. More details are here.

Revealed: Iran’s 15 Deal Secrets

Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) has released details of a private meeting between Iran’s top nuclear negotiator and IRIB directors about the July 14 nuclear deal in Vienna. 

The meeting, which was off the record, took place at the end of July. On Saturday, August 1, the IRIB news site published the comments without the permission of Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s chief negotiator. 

Abbas responded immediately, saying the publication of the private conversation was “contrary to national interests and security” and “incompatible with professional ethics.” He also said that the published text contained numerous errors.

A few hours later, the IRIB site retracted the story, stating that the publication had been a mistake. Most of the other Persian-language sites that had republished the text also removed it following Araghchi’s objections.

During the private meeting, Araghchi had tried to not only rebut criticisms of the deal but to also convince IRIB directors that the nuclear agreement encompassed many important achievements. He told them that the media had little influence over the foreign ministry and that IRIB must play its part in ensuring the Iranian people did not become frustrated with the agreement.

Although his statements were removed, it was too late: the controversy had begun. 

But what exactly did Araghchi say that was so controversial? IranWire reviews some of the most salient points.

1. The Americans got what they wanted. 

Araghchi told IRIB directors that the Americans had one important demand that they needed to meet, and they succeeded: preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. “The main demand of the other side was to block Iran from getting nuclear weapons … We had no problem with that, and granted it to the enemy …meaning that we provided trust, trust that we will not be moving towards the bomb. We granted this to the other side in two ways, by accepting certain limitations and certain supervisions. The other side got what it wanted and can say that they prevented an Iranian atomic bomb.” But he said Iran had not conceded to anything it had not wanted to: “We gave up atomic bomb, a bomb which we did not want and considered forbidden.”

2. Iran arms Hezbollah.

Araghchi confirmed that Iran is arming Lebanese Hezbollah: “We said that we cannot stop giving arms to Hezbollah, and we’re not ready to sacrifice it to our nuclear program. So we will continue doing it.”

3. No deals over other issues in the region — but definitely debate.

Araghchi denied that there had been a deal over regional issues as part of the nuclear negotiations. But he did confirm that discussions took place and important connections had been made during negotiations. “Mr. Kerry said a few times: ‘you are the victim of your own successes in the region. You have had successes in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and have gained influence. Under these conditions, if we lift the arms embargo against you, we would kill the deal and we would no longer be able to defend it — not with our own allies, not with Arabs, not with Israel and not with Congress. There will be no deal. So we have to keep the arms embargo.’”

4. The possibility of US military action was real, and Iran took it very seriously.

Araghchi confirmed that over the past few years, reports of possible US military action against Iran were taken seriously. “For 10 years they [the Americans] tried everything and used military threats to a maximum level. Maybe people are not aware of the details, but our Revolutionary Guards and military friends know that there were nights in 85-86 [2006-2007] when we were worried that by the morning Iran would be surrounded,” he said. He added that several times they expected to awake to military operations unfolding around them.  He said military personnel met to analyse maps to see where military bases were located and “what planes were stationed where. An attack on Iran only depended on the political will of Mr. Obama, who could decide to strike, and they would.”

However, media agencies had queried this, pointing out that Obama became president in 2009. Although it might have been a simple misunderstanding — Araghchi could have simple been referring to the fact that Obama had expressed readiness to use military might, or at least threatened it: Obama did repeatedly emphasize that military action was “not off the table.”

5. Parliament approval is not compulsory.

During the meeting, Araghchi implicitly opposed the claim that Iranian parliament had to approve the Vienna agreement. But he did concede that parliament should be in a position to review the document. “According to its own resolution, parliament must review the agreement — not approve it. The Supreme Leader has stated that the legal process must be followed, but the few times that he mentioned this point, he did not refer to parliament. Nevertheless, the Islamic Consultative Assembly [parliament] will review it. However, I believe that parliamentary approval is not prudent, because the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) contains voluntary provisions, which will turn into compulsory obligations if it is approved by parliament … We have to announce our decision as soon as possible so that if the US Congress wants to reject the agreement, it will singlehandedly carry the weight of rejecting the agreement, and the failure of negotiations. In this case we won’t lose anything. We can return to our own program and the world will consider us to be justified.”

6. Ayatollah Khamenei was in the loop.

Contrary to some regime propaganda, Araghchi explained in detail that the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei was involved in every stage of the negotiations and the agreement: “He was very clear that all the general principles, frameworks and red lines must be decided and supervised by him. He even let his views be known about some of the details. When he first brought up the subject of 190,000 Separative Work Units, he showed that he was a master of the details. He intervened when it was necessary, and we were never poorer for that.

“Those who say that the Leadership has been sidestepped … are debasing the role of the leadership and are doing him an injustice. They don’t help the leadership in any way. It is unjust to him that we should think that he was not and hasn’t been involved in the process of negotiations, or that he hasn’t seen the agreement. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution was involved in the general framework and the red lines … During recent negotiations, a couple of times messengers brought us messages …The Supreme Leader expressly ordered that 1,000 centrifuges remain at Fordo [Iran’ underground nuclear enrichment facility]… We were worried sick that this wasn’t possible, because they [the Americans] wouldn’t consent to even one centrifuge in that location…What happened at the negotiations and how they came to consent to it is another story. It was a blessing from god.”

7. Even one ton of enriched uranium is enough to make a bomb

Araghchi also addressed Iran’s technological capability for developing an atomic bomb, and what impact it had on Iranian domestic politics. “Some friends claim that it would take us several years to fully restore our [nuclear] program. But it is important to note that these critics are not talking about returning to our current situation. It is not important to return to the situation where we have eight or 10 tons [of enriched uranium]. Even one ton is enough to make a bomb. Of course, we are not going down that road, and we consider the bomb to be forbidden … They [the Americans] are worried that future political developments in Iran could cause the re-activation of the program. They are afraid of this, so are trying not to be left empty-handed. They want to keep sanctions as long as possible, so both sides can continue the process of building trust.

8. A Preemptive Disclosure of Secret Activities.

Araghchi then went on to discuss Iran’s secret work at Fordow: “When they discovered Fordow, we were aware of this and knew that they wanted to make an announcmement about it, so we preempted this. Mr. Soltanieh [Ali Asghar Soltanieh, former chief nuclear negotiator] was ordered to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency; he disclosed this information in a letter to Mr. ElBaradei [director-general of the IAEA until November 2009].”

9. There will be losses, just as in war.

Araghchi compared the recent nuclear agreement with the Iran-Iraq war: “The troublesome details were the costs that we had to pay. But can you show us any [military] operations that did not entail similar troublesome details? When it came to successful operations, did we say how many tanks we lost or how many people were martyred instead of saying what we achieved? Would have we said, for example, ‘Mr. Commander, it was not 100 [martyrs], but 120’? During the Sacred Defense [the war with Iraq], several operations failed, but we never said we were defeated. At most, we said that we had not been victorious. This was the phrase you used in the news.”

10. The conflict with America continues.

Araghchi advocated for continued confrontation with the US, both politically and in the media: “People should not get the feeling that America is now our friend and that enmities are a thing of the past. This is definitely not the case. Our enmity against the US, and their enmity towards us, is not over. We have managed and solved just one bilateral issue. Otherwise, our hostility towards their tyrannical system and their enmity towards the Islamic Republic, its ideals and its values will continue. You must illustrate these points in every way possible, so that that people will not become frustrated. So  whenever American officials say anything negative about us, it should not be reported in a way that will make people feel we have been cheated or that they have shown us up.”  

11. “We felt alone.”

During the meeting, Araghchi took the opportunity to lash out at certain figures in Iran’s domestic politics: “Unfortunately, over the past two years, we have felt alone many times. We felt that we had to carry the whole weight, and that everybody else was just sitting and waiting to see what the foreign ministry would do. Even in the foreign ministry itself, when there were especially heavy pressures on the team, I distinctly noticed that the media distanced themselves from them; when the negotiations went well, they came closer.”

12. The nuclear program will be cost-effective “in time”.

Araghchi shared his own insights about nuclear weapons and the Iranian nuclear program: “If we had wanted the bomb, then JCPOA is an utter defeat. But if we are after internationally legitimate enrichment and a completely peaceful nuclear program, then this agreement is a great victory. I have always said that if we judge our nuclear program on purely economic criteria, it is a big loss — meaning that if we calculate the cost of the products, it makes no sense at all. But we paid these costs for our honor, our independence and our progress. We will not be bullied by others … Our program will follow the process of industrialization and will become cost-effective in time.”

13. The president’s brother communicated “in code”.

Araghchi’s comments about President Rouhani’s brother, Hossein Fereydoon, attracted considerable attention. “He was our liaison to the president and he took on this role during negotiations. But he was not directly involved in the negotiations. [When contacting the president] he could ask urgent questions in the Semnani dialect [an Iranian dialect difficult to understand and which was widely used during the Iran-Iraq war].” Araghchi said those on the margins of negotiations who communicated in Semnani were helpful because they could hold secret discussions in a language that could not be understood. Again, the reference to the Iran-Iraq war is significant. 

14. Hide and Seek with the IAEA

Araghchi did concede there was some shortcomings in Iran’s dealings with IAEA: “We failed at some points, and were late in informing them. Some of these past mistakes were combined with trumped-up charges and unfounded allegations to make a case against our country, which Mr. Amano [the IAEA chief] later referred to as ‘possible military dimensions’…A purely technical case was turned into a political issue. The  phrase possible military dimensions (PMD) was used. Cooperation with the agency and giving it more information made the situation worse. Ask our friends at the defense ministry. They are angry that these intelligence leaks made the situation worse. In the new cycle [of negotiations], I told our friends at the defense ministry: ‘I promise you that we will not add a word to the information previously given to the agency.’”

15. A Secret Roadmap with IAEA.

Araghchi provided new information about the confidential agreement between Iran and the IAEA: “A roadmap has been signed by Mr. Salehi [the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization] and Mr. Amano. For example, by August 15 we will provide [the IAEA] with a series of our own evaluations of PMD. The agency will review them and by October 15 the agency’s job will be done.” Aright said the team had no other issues with the agreement but that they would have to wait until December 15 for the final report from Amano. “We have made some predictions and there are a series of things that we must do, but we must wait for the agency to issue that report.”

Lifting Sanctions on Iran and Bypassing Iran Front Operations

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Not only is the White House well aware of the front operations and hidden nefarious methods of the regime in Tehran, but aggressive sanctions and financial measures were taken by the U.S. Treasury to expose them with cooperation and approval by several intelligence agencies and Congress.

Now lifted…

So for the sake of the JPOA talks and signed agreements, several previous actions by the Obama administration have now been both overlooked and waived. This is key to understand the psychology of Barack Obama’s policy towards the Middle East and his presidential legacy, such that future aggressions and terror around the globe are assured.

 

Note the date as posted on the U.S. Treasury Department website.

Treasury Targets Assets of Iranian Leadership
6/4/2013

Action Identifies Massive Network of Front Companies Hiding Assets on Behalf of the Government of Iran’s Leadership
WASHINGTON –The U.S. Department of the Treasury is taking action today to expose a major network of front companies controlled by Iran’s leadership.  The Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), through two main subsidiaries, oversees a labyrinth of 37 ostensibly private businesses, many of which are front companies.  The purpose of this network is to generate and control massive, off-the-books investments, shielded from the view of the Iranian people and international regulators.  EIKO and its subsidiaries – one that manages and controls EIKO’s international front companies, and another that manages billions of dollars in investments – work on behalf of the Iranian Government and operate in various sectors of the Iranian economy and around the world, generating billions of dollars in profits for the Iranian regime each year.  EIKO and the 37 companies identified today are subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 13599, which blocks the property of the Government of Iran.
“Even as economic conditions in Iran deteriorate, senior Iranian leaders profit from a shadowy network of off-the-books front companies,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.  “While the Iranian government’s leadership works to hide billions of dollars in corporate profits earned at the expense of the Iranian people, Treasury will continue exposing and acting against the regime’s attempts to evade our sanctions and escape international isolation.”
EIKO has made tens of billions of dollars in profit for the Iranian regime each year through the exploitation of favorable loan rates from Iranian banks and the sale and management of real estate holdings, including selling property donated to EIKO.  EIKO has also confiscated properties in Iran that were owned by Iranians not living in Iran full-time.  In addition to generating revenue for the Iranian leadership, EIKO has been tasked with assisting the Iranian Government’s circumvention of U.S. and international sanctions.  Because of this unique mission, EIKO has received all of the funding it needs to facilitate transactions through its access to the Iranian leadership. The following companies are all part of this elaborate scheme:
Tosee Eqtesad Ayandehsazan Company (TEACO)
In June 2010, Tosee Eqtesad Ayandehsazan Company (TEACO) was created as part of the Iranian strategy to circumvent U.S. and international sanctions.  EIKO uses TEACO as the primary mechanism to transact, manage, and control all of the international companies under EIKO’s control.  To maintain the appearance of being a private company, TEACO is ostensibly owned by private Iranian businessmen and investors; however TEACO’s board members were all chosen by EIKO.  TEACO acts on behalf of EIKO.  As of September 2011, EIKO negotiated business deals using TEACO subsidiaries.  For example, EIKO used an Iranian subsidiary of TEACO to negotiate a deal with a European company to build a factory in Iran.  In these business deals, the TEACO subsidiary directly negotiated with the foreign company.  If the foreign company did not move forward with the deal due to sanctions issues, the TEACO subsidiary would have TEACO take over the negotiations, rather than EIKO, because TEACO was less visibly connected to the Government of Iran.
As of December 2010, EIKO transferred Iranian-owned companies located in Central Europe from the EIKO-controlled Iranian company Rey Investment Company to TEACO.  TEACO planned to use these central European companies to facilitate international transactions in Europe otherwise prohibited by U.S. and international sanctions.  The companies were officially owned by Iranian expatriates with dual Iranian-European citizenship to conceal ties to the Iranian Government, EIKO, TEACO, and Rey Investment Company.
Tadbir Economic Development Company (Tadbir Group)
Tadbir Group, an investment company subordinate to EIKO, manages billions of dollars in investments, including on behalf of Iranian leadership figures.  Tadbir Group is one of the main holding companies belonging to EIKO.  Its subsidiaries include Tadbir Investment Company, Modaber (Tadbir Industrial Holding Company), Tadbir Construction Development Company and Tadbir Energy Development Group.  The Tadbir Group has used its subsidiaries to make significant investments in the Iranian economy, including an investment of over $100 million in Amin Investment Bank, and controls the Pardis Investment Company and Mellat Insurance Company in Iran.
Rey Investment Company
As of late December 2010, Rey Investment Company was worth approximately $40 billion. Rey Investment Company was formerly run by Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammadi Reyshahri, who previously served as the Iranian Minister of Intelligence and Security.  Rey Investment Company collected and invested donations obtained from Iranian Shi’a shrines.  However, amidst allegations of mismanagement and embezzlement of shrine donations from the company, the Iranian Government cut off its funding to the point of nearly bankrupting the company.  In mid-to-late 2010, Reyshahri was removed and control of Rey Investment Company was transferred to EIKO and its director.  EIKO subsequently appointed a new Managing Director of Rey Investment Company.
Reyco GmbH
Reyco was a German subsidiary of Rey Investment Company, although there were no public ties between Reyco and Rey Investment Company, TEACO, or the Iranian Government.  Reyco owned MCS Engineering and MCS International.  Reyco had the appearance of being a purely German company to circumvent sanctions restricting an Iranian Government-controlled entity’s ability to do business in Europe.  Reyco was eventually transferred to the control of TEACO from Rey Investment Company, and TEACO planned to use Reyco to purchase a bank for Iran in Germany.
MCS International GmbH (Mannesman Cylinder Systems)
Reyco subsidiary MCS International is a German company ostensibly owned by German nationals or Iranian expatriates with dual Iranian-European citizenship to conceal its ties to the Iranian Government, EIKO, TEACO, and Rey Investment Company.  MCS International was audited by TEACO in October 2010 and determined to be in poor financial standing.  However, EIKO management rescued MCS International from bankruptcy and insisted on keeping the company open because it viewed MCS International as key to facilitating business in Europe.  EIKO management viewed MCS International as being too important to EIKO’s international plans to allow it to go bankrupt and believed that it would be easier to rescue MCS International from bankruptcy than to create or acquire new foreign companies on behalf of EIKO due to U.S. and international sanctions.  EIKO subsequently ordered that responsibility for MCS International be transferred from EIKO-controlled TEACO to Iranian businessmen, who were sent to oversee the company.  Following this transfer, the two individuals owned the shares for MCS International, but answered directly to EIKO.
MCS Engineering (Efficient Provider Services GmbH)
Reyco and MCS International subsidiary MCS Engineering is a German company ostensibly owned by German nationals or Iranian expatriates with dual Iranian-European citizenship to conceal ties to the Iranian Government, EIKO, TEACO, and Rey Investment Company.  EIKO required that Iranians be used for management positions, preferably dual Iranian-European citizens, who could conceal the relationship between the company and the Iranian Government.
Golden Resources Trading Company L.L.C. (GRTC)
GRTC, a Dubai-based Iranian company, has been controlled by EIKO and used in early 2011 to inject 7.5 million Euros from EIKO into MCS International.  EIKO sent money through GRTC in Dubai for deposit into an account with a bank in Germany.  The Iranian Government has used GRTC to transfer money internationally to circumvent U.S. and international sanctions.  GRTC was responsible for the transfer of funds to Europe and Africa by EIKO, and its subsidiary, the Tadbir Group.  EIKO relied on GRTC to transfer money and secure letters of credit on behalf of Iranian-controlled companies in Europe and South Africa.  As of December 2010, control over GRTC was transferred from Rey Investment Company to TEACO by EIKO.  GRTC has represented a number of Iranian companies with affiliations to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. (IRGC) and has been used by the IRGC to procure needed equipment and supplies.
Cylinder System Ltd. (Cilinder Sistem DDO) 
Cylinder System Ltd. is a Croatia-based company that has been controlled by EIKO.  In October 2010, TEACO determined that Cylinder System Ltd. was poorly run, and EIKO ordered new management.  Cylinder System Ltd. was subsequently transferred under the control of TEACO from Rey Investment Company.  EIKO was also interested in procuring a bank in Central Europe and considered using Cylinder System Ltd. to facilitate this transaction.
One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd.
One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd. is a South Africa-based company that was owned by Rey Investment Company, but was subsequently transferred to TEACO’s control in order to avoid being linked to the Iranian Government.  EIKO managed One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd. and used the company to transfer funds from Iran internationally and to facilitate financial transactions through South Africa to circumvent U.S. and international sanctions.
One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd.
EIKO planned to use South Africa-based One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd. to purchase a bank and an insurance company.  EIKO managed One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd. through TEACO in order to avoid being linked to the Iranian Government.  The Iranian Government used One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd. to transfer money internationally and to facilitate financial transactions in circumvention of U.S. and international sanctions.  One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd. owned 49 percent of One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd., while the Government of Iran owned 51 percent.
Treasury is also imposing sanctions on additional companies in Iran that are owned or controlled by the Tadbir Group, Rey Investment Company, or their subsidiaries.  These companies are: Iran & Shargh Company, Iran & Shargh Leasing Company, Tadbir Brokerage Company, Rafsanjan Cement Company, Rishmak Productive & Exports Company, Omid Rey Civil & Construction Company, Behsaz Kashane Tehran Construction Co., Royal Arya Company, Hormuz Oil Refining Company, Ghaeed Bassir Petrochemical Products Company, Persia Oil & Gas Industry Development Co., Pars Oil Co., Commercial Pars Oil Co., Marjan Petrochemical Company, Ghadir Investment Company, Sadaf Petrochemical Assaluyeh Company, Polynar Company, Pars MCS, Arman Pajouh Sabzevaran Mining Company, Oil Industry Investment Company, and Rey Niru Engineering Company.
U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the entities listed today, and any assets those entities may have subject to U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.
Identifying Information
Entity: Amin Investment Bank
AKA: AMINIB
Location: No. 51 Ghobadiyan Street, Valiasr Street, Tehran  1968917173, Iran
Website: http://www.aminib.com
Entity: Behsaz Kashane Tehran Construction Co.
AKA: Behsaz Kashaneh Co.
Location: No. 40, East Street Journal, North Shiraz Street, Sadra Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.behsazco.ir
Entity: Commercial Pars Oil Co.
Location: 9th Floor, No. 346, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Entity: Cylinder System L.T.D.
AKA: Cilinder Sistem D.O.O.
AKA: Cilinder Sistem D.O.O. Za Proizvodnju I Usluge
Location: Dr. Mile Budaka 1, Slavonski Brod  35000, Croatia
Alt. Location: 1 Mile Budaka, Slavonski Brod  35000, Croatia
Website: http://www.csc-sb.hr
Registration ID: 050038884 (Croatia)
Tax ID No.: 27694384517 (Croatia)
Entity: Execution Of Imam Khomeini’s Order
AKA: EIKO
AKA: SETAD
AKA: Setad Ejraei Emam
AKA: Setad-E Ejraei-E Farman-E Hazrat-E Emam
AKA: Setad-E Farman-Ejraei-Ye Emam
Location: Khaled Stamboli St., Tehran, Iran
Entity: Ghadir Investment Company
Location: 341 West Mirdamad Boulevard, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: P.O. Box 19696, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.ghadir-invest.com
Entity: Ghaed Bassir Petrochemical Products Company
AKA: Ghaed Bassir
Location: No. 15, Palizvani (7th) Street, Gandhi (South) Avenue, Tehran  1517655711, Iran
Alt. Location: Km 10 of Khomayen Road, Golpayegan, Iran
Website: http://www.gbpc.net
Entity: Golden Resources Trading Company L.L.C.
AKA: GRTC
Location: 9th Floor, Office No. 905, Khalid Al Attar Tower 1, Sheikh Zayed Road, After Crown Plaza Hotel, Al Wasl Area, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Alt. Location: Postal Box 34489, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Alt. Location: Postal Box 14358, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Entity: Hormoz Oil Refining Company
Location: Next To The Current Bandar Abbas Refinery, Bandar Abbas City, Iran
Entity: Iran & Shargh Company
AKA: Iran And East Company
AKA: Iran And Shargh Company
AKA: Iranoshargh Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Iran Va Shargh
Location: 827, North Of Seyedkhandan Bridge, Shariati Street, P.O. Box 13185-1445, Tehran  16616, Iran
Alt. Location: No. 41, Next To 23rd Alley, South Gandi St., Vanak Square, Tehran  15179, Iran
Website: http://www.iranoshargh.com
Entity: Iran & Shargh Leasing Company
AKA: Iran And East Leasing Company
AKA: Iran And Shargh Leasing Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Lizing-E Iran Va Shargh
Location: 1st Floor, No. 33, Shahid Atefi Alley, Opposite Mellat Park, Vali-E-Asr Street, Tehran  1967933759, Iran
Website: http://www.isleasingco.com
Entity: Marjan Petrochemical Company
AKA: Marjan Methanol Company
Location: Ground Floor, No. 39, Meftah/Garmsar West Alley, Shiraz (South) Street, Molla Sadra Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: Post Office Box 19935-561, Tehran, Iran
Entity: MCS Engineering
AKA: Efficient Provider Services Gmbh
Location: Karlstrasse 21, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen  46535, Germany
Entity: MCS International Gmbh
AKA: Mannesman Cylinder Systems
AKA: MCS Technologies Gmbh
Location: Karlstrasse 23-25, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen  46535, Germany
Website: http://www.mcs-tch.vom
Entity: Mellat Insurance Company
Location: No. 48, Haghani Street, Vanak Square, Before Jahan-Kodak Cross, Tehran  1517973913, Iran
Alt. Location: No. 40, Shahid Haghani Express Way, Vanak Square, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: No. 9, Niloofar Street, Sharabyani Avenue, Taavon Boulevard, Shahr-E-Ziba, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: 72 Hillview Court, Woking, Surrey  Gu22 7qw, United Kingdom
Alt. Location: No. 697 Saeeidi Alley, Crossroads College, Enghelab St., Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.mellatinsurance.com
Entity: Modaber
AKA: Modaber (A.K.A. Modaber Investment Company
AKA: Tadbir Industrial Holding Company
Entity: Oil Industry Investment Company
AKA: O.I.I.C.
Location: No. 83, Sepahbod Gharani Street, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.oiic-ir.com
Entity: Omid Rey Civil & Construction Company
AKA: Omid Development And Construction
AKA: Omid Rey Civil And Construction Company
AKA: Omid Rey Renovation And Development Co.
Website: http://www.omidrey.com
Entity: One Class Properties (Pty) Ltd.
AKA: One Class Incorporated
Location: Cape Town, South Africa
Entity: One Vision Investments 5 (Pty) Ltd.
AKA: One Vision 5
Location: 3rd Floor, Tygervalley Chambers, Bellville, Cape Town  7530, South Africa
Alt. Location: Canal Walk, P.O. Box 17, Century City, Milnerton  7446, South Africa
Registration ID: 2002/022757/07 (South Africa)
Entity: Pardis Investment Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Sarmayegozari-E Pardis
Location: Unit D4 and C4, 4th Floor, Building 29 Africa, Corner of 25th Street, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran
Entity: Pars MCS
AKA: Pars MCS Co
AKA: Pars MCS Company
Location: 2nd Floor, No. 4, Sasan Dead End, Afriqa Avenue, After Esfandiar, Crossroads, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: No. 5 Sasan Alley, Atefi Sharghi St., Afrigha Boulevard, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: Oshtorjan Industrial Zone, Zob-E Ahan Highway, Isafahan, Iran
Website: http://www.parsmcs.com
Entity: Pars Oil Co.
AKA: Pars Oil
AKA: Sherkat Naft Pars Sahami Aam
Location: No. 346, Pars Oil Company Building, Modarres Highway, East Mirdamad Boulevard, Tehran  1549944511, Iran
Alt. Location: Postal Box 14155-1473, Tehran  159944511, Iran
Website: http://www.parsoilco.com
Entity: Persia Oil & Gas Industry Development Co.
AKA: Persia Oil And Gas Industry Development Co.
AKA: Tose Sanat-E Naft Va Gas Persia
Location: 7th Floor, No. 346, Mirdamad Avenue, Tehran, Iran
Alt. Location: Ground Floor, No. 14, Saba Street, Africa Boulevard, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.pogidc.com
Entity: Polynar Company
Location: Polynar Company, No. 58, St. 14, Qanbarzadeh Avenue, Resalat Highway, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.polynar.com
Entity: Rey Investment Company
Location: 2nd And 3rd Floors, No. 14, Saba Boulevard, After Esfandiar Crossroad, Africa Boulevard, Tehran  1918973657, Iran
Website: http://www.rey-co.com
Entity: Rey Niru Engineering Company
AKA: Rey Niroo Engineering Company
Website: http://www.reyniroo.com
Entity: Reyco Gmbh
AKA: Reyco Gmbh Germany
Location: Karlstrasse 19, Dinslaken, Nordrhein-Westfalen  46535, Germany
Entity: Rishmak Productive & Exports Company
AKA: Rishmak Company
AKA: Rishmak Export And Manufacturing P.J.S.
AKA: Rishmak Production And Export Company
AKA: Rishmak Productive And Exports Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Tolid Va Saderat-E Rishmak
Location: Rishmak Cross Rd., 3rd Km. Of Amir Kabir Road, Shiraz  71365, Iran
Entity: Royal Arya Co.
AKA: Aria Royal Construction Company
Location: Iran
Entity: Sadaf Petrochemical Assaluyeh Company
AKA: Sadaf Asaluyeh Co.
AKA: Sadaf Chemical Asaluyeh Company
AKA: Sadaf Petrochemical Assaluyeh Investment Service
Location: Assaluyeh, South Pars Special Economy/Energy Zone, Iran
Entity: Tadbir Brokerage Company
AKA: Sherkat-E Kargozari-E Tadbirgaran-E Farda
AKA: Tadbirgaran Farda Brokerage Company
AKA: Tadbirgaran-E Farda Brokerage Company
AKA: Tadbirgarane Farda Mercantile Exchange Co.
Location: Unit C2, 2nd Floor, Building No. 29, Corner Of 25th Street, After Jahan Koudak, Cross Road Africa Street, Tehran  15179, Iran
Website: http://www.tadbirbroker.com
Entity: Tadbir Construction Development Company
AKA: Goruh-E Tose-E Sakhteman-E Tadbir
AKA: Tadbir Building Expansion Group
AKA: Tadbir Housing Development Group
Location: Block 1, Mehr Passage, 4th Street, Iran Zamin Boulevard,  Shahrak Qods, Tehran, Iran
Entity: Tadbir Economic Development Group
AKA: Tadbir Group
Location: 16 Avenue Bucharest, Tehran, Iran
Entity: Tadbir Energy Development Group Co.
Location: 6th Floor, Mirdamad Avenue, No. 346, Tehran, Iran
Website: http://www.tadbirenergy.com
Entity: Tadbir Investment Company
Location: Tehran, Iran
Entity: Tosee Eqtesad Ayandehsazan Company
AKA: Teaco
AKA: Tosee Eghtesad Ayandehsazan Company
Location: 39 Gandhi Avenue, Tehran  1517883115, Iran
Entity: Zarin Rafsanjan Cement Company
AKA: Rafsanjan Cement Company
AKA: Zarrin Rafsanjan Cement Company
Location: 2nd Floor, No. 67, North Sindokht Street, West Dr. Fatemi Avenue, Tehran  1411953943, Iran
Website: http://www.zarrincement.com
To see a chart of Imam Khomeini’s international financial network, click this link. 

Syria Has Advanced to Using Napalm?

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This is now new, the matter surfaced in 2013, but no official confirmations have been published.

 

Syria regime reportedly using napalm in Zabadani
The 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons bans the use of napalm against civilians.
BEIRUT – Reports have emerged that the Syrian regime in recent days has fired napalm-loaded rockets at rebels holed up in the border town of Zabadani.

Alaraby Aljadeed on Monday reported the use of napalm against the insurgents, who have fought fierce battles against encroaching Hezbollah and regime troops in the past month.

The London-based daily said that the regime was using surface-to-surface missiles to deliver the incendiary payload, which can set buildings alight and has been banned for use against civilians by the 1980 United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

Napalm has a devastating effect on humans as it sticks to skin and causes firestorms and a carbon monoxide atmosphere that can kill people entrenched in shelters.

Several pro-rebel outlets reported on the alleged napalm use, with the Syrian Media Office telling the activist Shaam outlet  that the regime had used missiles loaded with the substance.

“The regime has used missiles containing the caustic and internationally banned substance, napalm,” Faris al-Araby told Shaam.

Araby also gave the outlet details of other munitions used by regime and allied forces since the start of the recent offensive on the strategic town, which overlooks the Beirut-Damascus highway.

“Over the course of a month the town has been hit by 1100 barrel bombs, 600 surface-to-surface missiles, 400 thermobaric rockets, thousands of shells and an uncountable number of bullets.”

“The city is being besieged from 170 military positions in the surrounding mountains.”

Meanwhile, another report by Orient TV said that strikes using the substance had caused “dozens of civilian victims, suffering from severe burns and suffocation from the gases given off by the projectiles.”

Hezbollah and the Syrian army’s crack 4th Armored Division have been battling rebels in Zabadani since July 5, making gradual territorial gains in the face of fierce resistance that has left dozens dead from the Shiite Lebanese party.

Inside the Iran Deal, Killers Go Free

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Breitbart: The Iranian regime has filed a complaint with the International Atomic Energy Agency, alleging that the United States has already broken the Iran deal.

The complaint cites remarks by White House press secretary Josh Earnest about the possible use of military force in the long run, and the use of nuclear inspections to gain intelligence about Iran’s nuclear facilities in the meantime. These are frequent talking points that the White House uses to reassure legislators like Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA).
Iran calls them a “material breach” of the nuclear deal itself.

According to the text of the Iran deal itself (page 20), any of the parties can treat “significant nonperformance” of the agreement “as grounds
to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA.” More here.

Then, the Washington Times notes that Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) has come out early in full support of the Iran deal. One wonders if she has read the whole document much less the annex agreements.

The real terrifying part of the agreement

Forgotten flaw in Iran nuclear deal: It lets killers go free

Reuters: President Barack Obama has in good faith negotiated an agreement with Iran that would end a broad range of economic sanctions on Iran, in return for Iran’s promise to scale back its efforts to build a nuclear bomb. I believe that Congress’s support of the agreement would be a very serious mistake.

I find persuasive the arguments of many analysts that the proposal fails because it lifts sanctions before Iran has over time proven that it is committed to abandoning its nuclear weapons program.

Perhaps even more importantly, I oppose the agreement because it does not require Iran to stop its funding of Hezbollah and other extremist hoodlums around the world.

But more fundamentally, I oppose the proposal because, while addressing strategic issues, the deal ignores a moral issue, among the most profound of our time.

Put simply: Iran sponsors terrorism. I am convinced I could prove that proposition in a court of law, and indeed some Americans have done so. Survivors of terrorist attacks have sued the Iranian government in American courts, and won significant judgments.

But the Iranian government has refused to pay those judgments, and the proposed agreement does nothing to challenge that intransigence. In fact, the agreement would release up to 150 billion dollars of frozen assets to Iran, without requiring that a dime go to paying off the survivors of Iran-sponsored terror.

I understand that sometimes strategic interests require us to negotiate with enemies; and I do not underestimate the imminence of Iran’s development of a nuclear bomb capability. And as a veteran of war, I favor peace, when peaceful means can be found to deter aggression.

But the world has within its grasp those peaceful means, in international sanctions, and those sanctions should be strengthened, not abandoned, so long as Iran sponsors terror against civilian populations and foments unrest among its neighbors. Some of those individuals and entities who will be removed from the sanctions list are associated with terrorism in addition to nuclear proliferation.

I have had the good fortune to have lived through a good deal of history, enough to know that history most often favors principled actions over short-term pragmatism.

One of the most significant regimens of international sanctions ever imposed was the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. In response to a humanitarian crisis in South Africa, that law imposed economic sanctions against South Africa, sanctions would not be lifted until South Africa met specified conditions, granting basic human rights to its own people.

When President Ronald Reagan vetoed that bill, Nobel Prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu predicted that the veto would be “judged harshly by history.” Congress overrode the President’s veto, kept the sanctions in place – and five years later, minority white rule ended.

Historians still debate the role that those sanctions played in ending apartheid. But I don’t think anyone can doubt that Congress would be “judged harshly by history” had it given up, or had it agreed to end sanctions in return for a mere temporary suspension of apartheid rule. Congress met the most important moral issue of its time the way moral issues must be met – with principle.

And so must Congress act today in the face of Iranian terror and aggression.

The proposed agreement contains a very long list of individuals and institutions – previously identified as supporting attacks against the West or Iran’s nuclear bomb project – whose names are on international sanctions lists but who, should the agreement be approved, will soon be off. The roll call should make anyone shudder.

For example, among those who would be freed from European sanctions is Ahmad Vahidi, the former commander of Iran’s Quds Force of the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guard and a suspect in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires. Eighty-five people died in that bombing, and hundreds were injured, making it the deadliest bombing in the history of Argentina.

No one has ever been held accountable for those murdered, a denial of justice that led human rights leaders, among them Pope Francis, to sign a petition in protest. Justice moved slowly, but in 2007, the Argentine judicial authorities identified Ahmad Vahidi as one of those responsible for the bombing, INTERPOL listed him as wanted for “aggravated murder.” Incredibly, part of the deal with Iran would remove him from Europe’s sanctions list, before he ever faces the bar of justice.

Peruse the agreement some more, and you will find the name of Javad Al Yasin, the head of something called the “Research Centre for Explosion and Impact.” Al Yasin was on the sanctions list for his work in developing Iran’s nuclear bomb. Not only does the Iranian agreement take Al Yasin off the sanctions list, it even removes sanctions from the Research Centre for Explosion and Impact.

International sanctions against Iran were effective because they created an economic incentive for Iran to come to the bargaining table. But they were effective as well because they prevented funds from reaching named militants and organizations sponsoring attacks against the West. It would be a mistake of historic proportions to remove the sanctions without evidence that Iran has ceased its sponsorship of such attacks, and without a permanent end to their ambitions to build a nuclear weapon.

And so, our negotiators must insist on an agreement in which Tehran agrees to permanent, not temporary, limitations on its abilities to prepare weapons-grade fissionable materials and ballistic missiles.

The sanctions must remain in place until Tehran renounces terrorism, stops funding Hezbollah, and honors judgments awarding compensation to those whose loved ones have been killed in past attacks.

Can we get such a deal? In urging the nation to support the end of sanctions, the president has said that the deal he presented to Congress is the best one that could be negotiated. Others disagree. But whoever is right, one thing is certain: no agreement is worth supporting if it undermines the most basic principles that must govern relations among civilized nations.

Shortly before his death, President John Kennedy delivered a speech in which he told Americans of the peace he hoped to bring to the world. He called it “genuine peace … not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women, not merely peace in our time, but peace in all time.”

The proposed Iran agreement does just the opposite: faced with an international crisis, it just kicks the can down the road. It provides for temporary restrictions on nuclear aggression, while largely ignoring the broader threats of militant attacks and proxy war.

It asks the next generation to solve a problem that this generation refused to address squarely.

We owe it to our progeny to leave a record not of avoidance but of principled action. Congress should reject the proposed agreement.