WH and State Dept Slowed Walked Russian Sanctions

Posted on October 27, 2017October 27, 2017 by Denise Simon

While many are questioning Robert Mueller’s role into the Russian investigation, be sure to understand Russian operatives had an open door for at least 8 years and earlier than that there were clandestine Russian spy rings functioning across the country.

Much less there are dead Russians in the UK as well as in the United States, the risks are extraordinary.

Thanks to the Democrats and the greed of money where Russia was happy to comply for agreements to all their requests, the Russian probe goes beyond that common term of collusion.

The Obama administration launched the back channels for nuclear talks with Iran in 2009 in Oman. Obama needed the Russian vote, so all things concocted by the Kremlin were given a wink and nod by the Obama White House as well as the Hillary and John Kerry State Department.

So, we now have the Trump White House which has been slow and measured to take additional actions regarding Russia. The ‘why’ has a convoluted answer. There is/was Russian hacking. There were/are Russian trolls and bots in social media. There is Russian involvement in Silicon Valley known as Skolkovo. There is conflicted military airspace in Syria. There is Russian support of the Taliban. There are Russian operations in Cuba, Latin America, Libya, Iraq, Ukraine (…)

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Medvedev and Putin have a master plan and they are calculating and effective. One action results in unknown global consequences.

So, finally the Tillerson State Department provided approval of additional sanctions on Russia and Congress has the list. Is it enough or complete? Too early to know. However, the Magnitsky Act is gaining approval in countries allied to United States and Putin is seeking revenge by any means necessary including through Interpol.

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Read on:

WASHINGTON — The State Department gave Congress a list Thursday of 39 Russian individuals and entities it says support the Russian government’s intelligence and defense sectors. Early next year, anyone in the U.S. doing business with entities on that list will be hit with sanctions by the Trump administration.

“Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has authorized the department to issue guidance to the public specifying the persons or entities that are part of or operating on behalf of the defense or intelligence sectors of the government of the Russian Federation,” said State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert.

After President Trump signed sanctions legislation in August, the administration gave the State and Treasury Departments the authority to draw up a list of entities that enable Moscow’s intelligence and defense sectors. The State Department had a deadline of October 1 to send the list to Congress. Now, nearly a month late, State has done so.

There had been growing criticism that the administration was slow-walking the process. The State Department cited the complexity of the process when asked about the delay. Nauert also explained that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson is “very hands-on in these types of things.”

Experts on Russia who reviewed the list, which was obtained by CBS News, say it covers most of the Russian defense sector.

“This seems to be a comprehensive list that broadly covers a significant portion of the Russian defense industry,” said Mark Simakovsky, a former Defense Department official and Atlantic Council fellow. “The administration likely took very seriously the review, required of the legislation, and has sought to abide by the terms.”

Five of the six Russian defense contractors listed on the State and Treasury list are among the 100 biggest defense companies worldwide.

Rosoboronexport OJSC, which is on the list, is one of Russia’s largest exporters of defense products. Its partner company, Rostec, promotes technology products in both the civil and defense sectors and is also on the list. On the intelligence side, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) are included.

The State Department is making the entire list public in advance of actual sanctions implementation in order to alert U.S. stakeholders, primarily those who do business with these companies, early notice, so they can draw down those transactions. If they don’t, they, too, will face sanctions.

“These are the types of entities that they can no longer do business with,” State Department Spokeswoman Heather Nauert said. “So it helps them to at least make their business decisions and be able to decide on the best course of action going forward,” she said.”

Making the list public before sanctions go into effect is a departure from the usual State Department policy of waiting for the sanctions to be announced. Congressional aides acknowledged that this caveat, which essentially enables both U.S. companies and the Russian companies to prepare, was a concern as the legislation was nearing its final hours before passage. In the end, there was no major effort to change this.

Once the Senate passed its sanctions legislation with an overwhelming majority, it put pressure on the House to pass it as well. Democrats applied intense pressure not to change anything because they did not want to water down the bill.

Senator Bob Corker, R-Tennessee, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called the list a “good first step in responsibly implementing a very complex piece of legislation.” Senators Ben Cardin, D-Maryland, and John McCain, R-Arizona also welcomed the list as part of the effort to hold Russia accountable for interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

The two senators noted that questions remain about the implementation of the sanctions. Under the current plan, beginning Jan. 29, individuals involved in “significant” transactions with entities on the list will also be sanctioned. It’s still up to the State Department to determine how the sanctions are applied. McCain and Cardin are concerned about how the agency will come up with the staffing and resources to carry out the sanctions. In their statement they pointed out reports that say the sanctions office has been closed and “a number of its staff have resigned.” The policy planning staff, which doesn’t usually play a role in operations, is being tasked with implementing the sanctions.

Providing dedicated staffing and resources within the State Department will demonstrate the administration’s commitment to carrying out this vitally important law,” wrote McCain and Cardin.

The sanctions law signed by Mr. Trump in August targeted Iran and North Korea, in addition to Russia. It maintains and expands sanctions against the Russian government, Russian crude oil projects and also targets those who evade foreign sanctions and entities that abuse human rights. The legislation also prevents the president from unilaterally easing or lifting sanctions against Russia, a provision that came after Mr. Trump had consistently espoused the idea of a warming of relations with Russia, even in the face of the intelligence community’s conclusion that Russia had meddled in the 2016 elections.

FBI Watched the Spy Ring Inside the Hillary Inner Circle

Posted on October 23, 2017October 23, 2017 by Denise Simon

Ah, she was posing as an accountant..

FBI hidden camera surveillance videos of the spies’ operations give a fascinating look into Russian spy tradecraft as employed by Chapman and the other Russian agents. The videos show, among other things, the Russian infiltrators hiding messages under bridges, secretly trading information, money and contact information via “brush passes,” and digging for buried payoff money in the woods.

While Chapman and her fellow spies seemed to live routine, middle-class lives, the videos reveal both traditional and hi-tech spy techniques, including Chapman sending encrypted messages to her handler with a specially equipped laptop. In one of the FBI surveillance tapes, Chapman is in a department store, transmitting messages to her contact standing outside the store.

“We were able to capture wirelessly the communications between her and her handler,” Figliuzzi said. “There were six locations throughout New York,” that Chapman used, he said. “She transmits and receives messages from the official who is in close proximity but not anywhere near visibly close to her … she is transmitting encrypted code that the FBI was able to break.” More here.

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The 97 page criminal complaint is here.

As Hillary Clinton was beginning her job as President Obama’s chief diplomat, federal agents observed as multiple arms of Vladimir Putin’s machine unleashed an influence campaign designed to win access to the new secretary of State, her husband Bill Clinton and members of their inner circle, according to interviews and once-sealed FBI records.

Some of the activities FBI agents gathered evidence about in 2009 and 2010 were covert and illegal.

A female Russian spy posing as an American accountant, for instance, used a false identity to burrow her way into the employ of a major Democratic donor in hopes of gaining intelligence on Hillary Clinton’s department, records show. The spy was arrested and deported as she moved closer to getting inside the secretary’s department, agents said.

Other activities were perfectly legal and sitting in plain view, such as when a subsidiary of Russia’s state-controlled nuclear energy company hired a Washington firm to lobby the Obama administration. At the time it was hired, the firm was providing hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in pro bono support to Bill Clinton’s global charitable initiative, and it legally helped the Russian company secure federal decisions that led to billions in new U.S. commercial nuclear business, records show.

Agents were surprised by the timing and size of a $500,000 check that a Kremlin-linked bank provided Bill Clinton with for a single speech in the summer of 2010. The payday came just weeks after Hillary Clinton helped arrange for American executives to travel to Moscow to support Putin’s efforts to build his own country’s version of Silicon Valley, agents said.

There is no evidence in any of the public records that the FBI believed that the Clintons or anyone close to them did anything illegal. But there’s definitive evidence the Russians were seeking their influence with a specific eye on the State Department.

“There is not one shred of doubt from the evidence that we had that the Russians had set their sights on Hillary Clinton’s circle, because she was the quarterback of the Obama-Russian reset strategy and the assumed successor to Obama as president,” said a source familiar with the FBI’s evidence at the time, speaking only on condition of anonymity, because he was not authorized to speak to the news media.

That source pointed to an October 2009 communication intercepted by the FBI in which Russian handlers instructed two of their spies specifically to gather nonpublic information on the State Department.

“Send more info on current international affairs vital for R., highlight US approach,” part of the message to the spies read, using the country’s first initial to refer to Russia. “… Try to single out tidbits unknown publicly but revealed in private by sources closer to State department, government, major think tanks.”

The Clintons, by that time, had set up several new vehicles that included a multimillion dollar speech-making business, the family foundation and a global charitable initiative, all which proved attractive to the Russians as Hillary Clinton took over State.

“In the end, some of this just comes down to what it always does in Washington: donations, lobbying, contracts and influence – even for Russia,” said Frank Figliuzzi, the former FBI assistant director for counterintelligence.

The sleeper ring

Figliuzzi supervised the post-arrest declassification and release of records from a 10-year operation that unmasked a major Russian spy ring in 2010. It was one of the most important U.S. counterintelligence victories against Russia in history, and famous for nabbing the glamorous spy-turned-model Anna Chapman.

While Chapman dominated the headlines surrounding that spy ring, another Russian woman posing as a mundane New Jersey accountant named Cynthia Murphy was closing in on accessing Secretary Clinton’s department, according to records and interviews.

For most of the 10 years, the ring of Russian spies that included Chapman and Murray acted as sleepers, spending a “great deal of time collecting information and passing it on” to their handlers inside Russia’s SVR spy agency, FBI records state.

Murphy, living with her husband and kids in the New Jersey suburbs of New York City, reported a major breakthrough in February 2009 in an electronic message sent to her handlers: she had scored access to a major Democrat, FBI records state.

“Murphy had several work-related personal meetings with [a prominent New York-based financier, name omitted] and was assigned his account,” one FBI record from the case read. “The message accurately described the financier as ‘prominent in politics,’ ‘an active fund-raiser’ for [a major political party, name omitted] and a ‘personal friend’ of [a current Cabinet official, name redacted].”

Multiple current and former officials confirmed to The Hill that the Cabinet officer was Hillary Clinton, the fundraiser was New York financier Alan Patricof and the political party was the Democratic National Committee. None of the Americans were ever suspected of illegalities, but the episode made clear the Russian spies were stepping up their operations against the new administration after years of working in a “sleeper” capacity, officials said.

Patricof did not return a call to his office Friday seeking comment. But in 2010 he told The Washington Post after the spy case broke he believed he had been a victim of the spy ring, saying Murphy had worked for him but that he only talked accounting and not government or politics with her.

“It’s just staggering,” he told the Post about the idea of being targeted by Russia. “It’s off the charts.”

Clinton spokesman Nick Merrill declined Saturday to say if the secretary was ever alerted or briefed to the Russian spy effort, instead suggesting that any focus on the spy case was a partisan effort to distract from the controversy around Moscow and President Trump.

“Nothing has changed since the last time this was addressed, including the right’s transparent attempts to distract from their own Russia problems, which are real and a grave threat to our national security,” he wrote in an email to The Hill.

Back in 2010, when the spy story broke, Hillary Clinton’s office issued a statement that there was “no reason to think the Secretary was a target of this spy ring.”

Court documents and agents who worked the case suggest otherwise, saying the Russians were specifically targeting her department and any intelligence they could get on the new administration’s emerging foreign policy.

Trying to get inside State

The FBI documents show exactly what Murphy’s Russian handlers wanted her to get from a Clinton-tied donor she had befriended. “Maybe he can provide Murphy with remarks re US foreign policy, roumors (sic) about White House internal kitchen, invite her to major venues,” one FBI document quoted the Russians as saying.

By 2010, the Russian SVR urged Murphy to consider taking a job with a lobbying firm because “this position would expose her to prospective contacts and potential sources in U.S. government,” the FBI affidavit read.

Figliuzzi said it was the FBI’s belief that Murphy wasn’t going to risk taking a job inside the State Department, where the vetting process might unmask her true identity. So she aimed for a private sector job where “she could get next to people who had the jobs who could get the information she wanted from State,” he said.

The retired FBI executive said that by early summer 2010, agents feared Chapman might flee the country and Murphy was getting too close to posing a security concern to Hillary Clinton. As a result, they arrested the entire ring of 10 spies, and quickly expelled them.

“In regards to the woman known as Cynthia Murphy, she was getting close to Alan, and the lobbying job. And we thought this was too close to Hillary Clinton. So when you have the totality of the circumstance, and we were confident we had the whole cell identified, we decided it was time to shut down their operations,” Figliuzzi said.

The FBI announced the arrests on June 28, 2010, a day after they were made.

The ring highlights the long-standing efforts Russia has made to gain access to U.S. officials, which sprouted up well before the last election. But the recent events also illustrate how Russia’s efforts have advanced.

Figliuzzi said they show a “logical evolution or morphing of methodology to exploit social media in a way that is far more effective and potentially damaging” than the spy ring rolled up in 2010.

“We watched a sleeper cell of ten people for ten years that didn’t come close to the impact of a few thousand ads and posts on FB, Twitter, Google and Instagram,” he said.

Bill Clinton’s big check

A day after the arrests of the sleeper ring, another event captured the FBI’s attention.

Thousands of miles away in Russia, former President Clinton collected a $500,000 check for giving a 90-minute speech to Renaissance Capital, a Kremlin-connected bank, then scored a meeting with Putin himself.

The check caught the attention of FBI agents, especially with Hillary Clinton having recently returned from meetings in Russia, and her department working on a variety of issues where Moscow had an interest, records show.

One issue was American approval of the Russian nuclear company Rosatom’s purchase of a Canadian company called Uranium One, which controlled 20 percent of America’s strategic uranium reserves. State was one of more than a dozen federal agencies that needed to weigh in, and a Clinton deputy was handling the matter.

The second issue was the Russian company TENEX’s desire to score a new raft of commercial nuclear sales to U.S. companies. TENEX for years was selling uranium recycled from old Soviet warheads to the United States. But that deal was coming to an end and now it needed a new U.S. market.

And the third was a promise Secretary Clinton herself made to Russian leaders to round up support in America’s Silicon Valley for then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s dream for a new high-tech hub outside Moscow known as Skolkovo. A team of venture capitalists had been dispatched to Moscow just a few weeks before Bill Clinton landed his payday, records show.

“We have 40,000 Russians living in Silicon Valley in California. We would be thrilled if 40,000 Russians were working in whatever the Russian equivalent of Silicon Valley is, providing global economic competition, taking the internet and technology to the next level,” Hillary Clinton said at the time, according to a State Department transcript. She added that the business executives she dispatched to Putin’s homeland had Twittered their way through Russia.

The bank that paid Bill Clinton was promoting the Uranium One deal’s stock. And the former president entertained – though he never followed through with – meeting with two Russian figures who had ties to the nuclear sales and the Silicon Valley deals as well, State Department records show.

Angel Urena, the official spokeswoman for the former president, told The Hill that Bill Clinton never discussed the issues pending before his wife’s department when he was in Russia and that the money he collected for himself and his charitable efforts never influenced his wife’s decision-making.

Another investigation

Away from Bill Clinton’s check and the breaking news of a spy ring, the FBI had another major investigation underway where the Clinton name was surfacing.

Since 2009, the FBI had an undercover informant gathering evidence of a massive bribery and kickback scheme inside the Russian nuclear energy firm TENEX and its American arm TENAM.

Years later, FBI agents would help the Justice Department bring charges against the Russian nuclear industry’s point man in the United States, TENEX director Vadim Mikerin, as well as a Russian financier and an American trucking executive whose company moved Russian uranium around the United States.

But as the informant gathered evidence of the bribery scheme in early 2010, he began to hear a familiar name crop up in conversations. The Russians kept talking about ways they could win access to or favor with the Clintons, and the informant kept reporting it back to his FBI handlers.

The informant has never been publicly identified, but his lawyer told The Hill on Friday he can shed significant light to Congress on what the Russians were doing to try to win favorable treatment from the Obama administration.

“I can confirm that my client while working undercover for the FBI and in the employ of the Russian energy firm TENEX witnessed numerous, detailed conversations in which Russian actors described their efforts to lobby, influence or ingratiate themselves with the Clintons in hopes of winning favorable uranium decisions from the Obama administration,” attorney Victoria Toensing said.

“Unfortunately, he cannot at the present time disclose the specifics of that evidence he reported to the agents in real time because of an NDA he signed with the bureau. But we are working with Congress to find a means in the future for him to transmit the important information he possesses,” she added.

There are some public records that show what TENEX was trying to do inside the United States.

The Russian firm between 2009 and 2011 hired two Washington consulting firms to help it win Obama administration approval for policies and contracts that opened up billions in new nuclear fuel sales for TENEX, foreign agent registration records show. Those firms were never implicated in any wrongdoing in court records, and were just doing contract work to expand the Russian company’s commercial nuclear sales inside the United States.

The lobbying work was perfectly legal, focusing on agencies like State, Commerce and Energy that supervised the U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship. But once again, a connection to the Clintons emerged.

One of the firms TENEX hired in 2010 was providing hundreds of thousands of dollars a year in support to the Clinton Global Initiative, starting in 2008.

Subpoena Tim Geithner About the Uranium One Deal for Starters

Posted on October 19, 2017October 19, 2017 by Denise Simon

Ever wonder where any Hillary emails are with regard to this case both as Secretary of State or through the Clinton Foundation? Perhaps Huma knows all…did Obama’s OFA take any kickbacks? What else is out there that the Obama administration hid from congress and oversight? Anyway read on for context and the people line-up.

Under the Treasury Department is also the responsibility of sanctions and where waivers to those sanctions occur.

Composition of CFIUS in 2010 the Chairperson was Tim Geithner.

The Secretary of the Treasury is the Chairperson of CFIUS, and notices to CFIUS are received, processed, and coordinated at the staff level by the Staff Chairperson of CFIUS, who is the Director of the Office of Investment Security in the Department of the Treasury.

The members of CFIUS include the heads of the following departments and offices:

Department of the Treasury (chair)
Department of Justice
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of State
Department of Energy
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Office of Science & Technology Policy

The following offices also observe and, as appropriate, participate in CFIUS’s activities:

Office of Management & Budget
Council of Economic Advisors
National Security Council
National Economic Council
Homeland Security Council

The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Labor are non-voting, ex-officio members of CFIUS with roles as defined by statute and regulation.

Of note for the Uranium One transaction to happen, unless there was a waiver:

What steps can be taken with respect to information required by § 800.402 to further facilitate CFIUS review?

Suggestions include:

Section 800.402(j)(1) requires submission of organizational charts showing control and ownership of the foreign person that is a party to the transaction. CFIUS’s review would be aided if the parties provide such charts for the U.S. business and if the charts for the U.S. business and the foreign person diagram the ownership chains for the acquirer and target before and after the transaction being notified to CFIUS. These should be as extensive and detailed as possible.

Sections 800.402(c)(1)(iii) and (v) require submission of information related to the foreign person and its parents. CFIUS’s review would be aided if the notice identifies whether the actual party in interest is the party to the transaction or one of the parents of the party to the transaction. CFIUS does not consider special purpose vehicles, wholly-owned subsidiaries established for the sole purpose of the transaction, or other shell companies to be the actual parties in interest in a transaction.

Sections 800.402(c)(3)(iii) and (iv) require information regarding certain United States Government contracts. Parties are advised to update and verify United States Government contact information for such contracts. Private sector entities not party to the notice are not acceptable points-of-contact for contracts in question.

Filers should ensure that all files in the electronic version of a notice are less than five megabytes (5MB) in size.

What steps, though not required for a notice to be determined complete, may facilitate CFIUS review?

CFIUS agencies have found it very helpful in the past for filing companies to provide the following additional information, even if the activity is not the primary focus of their commercial operations. CFIUS often requests this information after a voluntary notice has been accepted if it was not included in the initial filing.

Cyber systems, products, services: Identify whether the U.S. business being acquired develops or provides cyber systems, products, or services, including:

Business systems used to manage or support common business processes and operations (for example, enterprise resource planning, e-commerce, email, and database systems); control systems used to monitor, assess, and control sensitive processes and physical functions (for example, supervisory control, data acquisition, process and distributed control systems); safety, security, support, and other specialty systems (for example, fire, intrusion detection, access control, people mover, and heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems); or

(ii) Telecommunications and/or Internet or similar systems, products or services.

Natural resources: Identify whether the U.S. business being acquired processes natural resources and material or produces and transports energy, and the amount processed, produced, or transported annually.

Discussion in the notice of the business rationale for the transaction may be useful.

The regulations require parties to provide information regarding any other applicable national security-related regulatory authorities, such as the ITAR, EAR, and NISPOM. Some of the regulatory review processes under these authorities may have longer deadlines than the CFIUS process, and parties to transactions affected by these other reviews may wish to start or complete these processes prior to submitting a voluntary notice to CFIUS under section 721.

The FBI has a network of informants domestically and it did the job it is tasked to do, that is until the Holder Justice Department ensured it could no longer do the job with regard to the Uranium One Case.

Before the Obama administration approved a controversial deal in 2010 giving Moscow control of a large swath of American uranium, the FBI had gathered substantial evidence that Russian nuclear industry officials were engaged in bribery, kickbacks, extortion and money laundering designed to grow Vladimir Putin’s atomic energy business inside the United States, according to government documents and interviews.

Federal agents used a confidential U.S. witness working inside the Russian nuclear industry to gather extensive financial records, make secret recordings and intercept emails as early as 2009 that showed Moscow had compromised an American uranium trucking firm with bribes and kickbacks in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, FBI and court documents show.

They also obtained an eyewitness account — backed by documents — indicating Russian nuclear officials had routed millions of dollars to the U.S. designed to benefit former President Bill Clinton’s charitable foundation during the time Secretary of State Hillary Clinton served on a government body that provided a favorable decision to Moscow, sources told The Hill.

The racketeering scheme was conducted “with the consent of higher level officials” in Russia who “shared the proceeds” from the kickbacks, one agent declared in an affidavit years later.

When this sale was used by Trump on the campaign trail last year, Hillary Clinton’s spokesman said she was not involved in the committee review and noted the State Department official who handled it said she “never intervened … on any [Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States] matter.”

In 2011, the administration gave approval for Rosatom’s Tenex subsidiary to sell commercial uranium to U.S. nuclear power plants in a partnership with the United States Enrichment Corp. Before then, Tenex had been limited to selling U.S. nuclear power plants reprocessed uranium recovered from dismantled Soviet nuclear weapons under the 1990s Megatons to Megawatts peace program.

Vadim Mikerin was a director of Rosatom’s Tenex in Moscow since the early 2000s, where he oversaw Rosatom’s nuclear collaboration with the United States under the Megatons to Megwatts program and its commercial uranium sales to other countries. In 2010, Mikerin was dispatched to the U.S. on a work visa approved by the Obama administration to open Rosatom’s new American arm called Tenam.

The kickbacks were known by the FBI, they had to happen to advance the case and to allow them as evidence of wrong-doing.

His, Mikerin’s, illegal conduct was captured with the help of a confidential witness, an American businessman, who began making kickback payments at Mikerin’s direction and with the permission of the FBI. The first kickback payment recorded by the FBI through its informant was dated Nov. 27, 2009, the records show.

In evidentiary affidavits signed in 2014 and 2015, an Energy Department agent assigned to assist the FBI in the case testified that Mikerin supervised a “racketeering scheme” that involved extortion, bribery, money laundering and kickbacks that were both directed by and provided benefit to more senior officials back in Russia. More here.

Mikerin indictment document here.

The plea deal and 2 associated cases here.

Mikerin was sentenced to 4 years and forfeited $2,126,622.36 :

According to court documents, Mikerin was the director of the Pan American Department of JSC Techsnabexport (TENEX), a subsidiary of Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation and the sole supplier and exporter of Russian Federation uranium and uranium enrichment services to nuclear power companies worldwide, and the president of TENAM Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary and the official representative of TENEX. Court documents show that between 2004 and October 2014, conspirators agreed to make corrupt payments to influence Mikerin and to secure improper business advantages for U.S. companies that did business with TENEX, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Mikerin admitted that he conspired with Daren Condrey, Boris Rubizhevsky and others to transmit approximately $2,126,622 from Maryland and elsewhere in the United States to offshore shell company bank accounts located in Cyprus, Latvia and Switzerland with the intent to promote the FCPA violations. Mikerin further admitted that the conspirators used consulting agreements and code words to disguise the corrupt payments.

Condrey, 50, of Glenwood, Maryland, pleaded guilty on June 17, 2015, to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Rubizhevsky, 64, of Closter, New Jersey, pleaded guilty on June 15, 2015, to conspiracy to commit money laundering. Condrey and Rubizhevsky await sentencing.

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Mikerin

Officials Potentially Influenced (Name; Title; Organization):

Vadim Mikerin; President; TENAM Corporation

Vadim Mikerin; Director of the Pan American Department; JSC Techsnabexport (“TENEX”)

Defendant-Related Entities Involved in the Misconduct: N/A

Third-Party Intermediary:

Cypriot shell company , Shell Company

Latvian shell company , Shell Company

Swiss shell company , Shell Company

Vadim Mikerin , Agent/Consultant/Broker

DPRK: What Barack/Hillary Knew and When

Posted on September 4, 2017September 4, 2017 by Denise Simon

Hey China…what gives? France, you have a call holding on line 4.

None of this would have been in Obama’s, Hillary’s or John Kerry’s emails? Hillary did not use ANY official government email platform…just say’n.

John Kerry under the instruction of the Obama White House negotiated the Joint Plan of Action with Iran on the nuclear development program. Purposely many things were overlooked including the nefarious activities between Iran and North Korea.

Imagine the developments are cables since 2009.

Countries that were part of the long negotiations were the P5+1, which included:

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 to offer “P5+1” proposals to Iran.

North Korean front companies operate inside China with impunity.

The extent of Chinese companies’ role in enabling North Korea’s evasion of sanctions is detailed deep in the fine print of the still unpublished 105-page report. For instance, North Korea’s Daedong Credit Bank (DCB) and Korea Daesong Bank, both subject to U.S. and U.N. sanctions, continue to operate in the Chinese cities of Dalian, Dandong, and Shenyang in violation of U.N. resolutions. The panel suspects that one of the banks, Daedong, may in fact be majority-owned by Chinese shareholders, citing July 2011 documents indicating the sale of a controlling stake, 60 percent, to a Chinese firm. More here.

So, when it comes to France, what did they know via the MTCR?

Background

Formal discussions on controlling missile proliferation began in 1983 among France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They were later joined by Canada and Japan, and in 1985, an interim agreement to control the proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, including dual-use missile items, was reached. A nuclear-capable missile was defined as one capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) to a range of 300 kilometers (km) or more. The G-7 States formally announced the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR) on 16 April 1987.

Since then, membership has expanded to the present 34 States, the additional members being Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine. Some other States, including China, India, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia, have pledged to abide by the MTCR Guidelines.

Regime Goal

The regime goal is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons) by controlling the transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons.

Regime Guidelines

The regime guidelines consist of national control laws and procedures; a two-category common control list; information-sharing on any denied cases to ensure no commercial advantage; no impediment to national space programs; presumption of denial of any transfers in terms of nuclear weapon delivery systems development; and no retransfers without authorization.

Equipment and Technology Annex

Category I items of the Equipment and Technology Annex include complete rocket and unmanned-air-vehicle delivery systems and subsystems. The transfer of Category I items is subject to a strong presumption of denial. The transfer of production technology for Category I items is prohibited.

Category II items include propulsion and propellant components, launch and ground support equipment, as well as the materials for the construction of missiles. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted, but still requires end-use certification or verification where appropriate. More here.

So, to answer the question in the title of this article, here is a WikiLeaks cable providing background:

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MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): NORTH KOREA,S MISSILE PROGRAM
Date: 2009 October 6, 13:14 (Tuesday)	Canonical ID: 09STATE103755_a
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: SECRET
In the metadata of the Kissinger Cables this field is called ‘Previous Handling Restrictions’. Cablegate does not originally have this field. We have given it the entry ‘Not Assigned’. Citations for acronyms used are available here.” data-hasqtip=”true” oldtitle=”Handling Restrictions” title=””>Handling Restrictions — Not Assigned —	Character Count: 14817
Executive Order: — Not Assigned —	Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: BR – Brazil \| ETTC – Trade and Technology Controls \| FR – France \| KSCA – Science Counselors and Attachés \| MNUC – Military and Defense Affairs–Military Nuclear Applications \| MTCRE – Missile Technology Control Regime \| PARM – Political Affairs–Arms Controls and Disarmament \| TSPA – Technology and Science–Space Activities	Concepts: — Not Assigned —
Enclosure: — Not Assigned —	Type: TE – Telegram (cable)
Office Origin: — N/A or Blank — Office Action: — N/A or Blank —	Archive Status: — Not Assigned —
From: Secretary of State	Markings: — Not Assigned —
To: France Paris \| Missile Technology Control Regime

Original cable: Reasons: 1.4 (B), (D), (H). 1. (U)

This is an action request.

Please see paragraph 2. 2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy Paris provide the interagency cleared paper “North Korea,s Missile Program” in paragraph 3 below to the French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners.

Info addressees also may provide to host government officials as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio, November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be provided via septels. END NOTE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER: (SECRET REL MTCR) North Korea’s Missile Program Introduction North Korea continues to make progress in its ballistic missile development efforts. We expect both the new Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the solid-propellant Toksa short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) to be fielded in the coming years, and as demonstrated by North Korea,s April 5th launch of the Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) space launch vehicle (SLV)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the pursuit of longer-range systems remains a DRPK priority. North Korea’s deployed forces include hundreds of Scud and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM), seven of which it launched in 2009.

North Korea remains one of the world’s leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and technology, and continues to provide assistance to both Iran’s and Syria’s ballistic missile programs. North Korea, since the 1980s, has supplied a variety of customers with ballistic missiles, missile components, and missile-related technology. These sales have included complete Category I missile systems, as well as production technology and expertise.

North Korea has maintained its right to sell ballistic missiles and continues to market its systems to countries in the Middle East while seeking to expand its missile marketing activities worldwide. North Korea this year probably resumed ballistic missile-related cooperation with Yemen, and may have recently reached an agreement with Burma to provide Rangoon with ballistic missile technology.

North Korea has developed most of the necessary capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its ballistic missiles. However, while North Korea continues to make progress in its missile development efforts, it remains reliant on outside suppliers for a range of missile-related raw materials and components. While most of these materials are for direct application to its missile program, North Korea may procure some items in support of its missile customers.

Program History North Korea’s ballistic missile program started in the early-1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made 300km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt. This Scud B technology went on to form the basis for the DPRK,s Scud B, Scud C, No Dong, Taepo Dong-l (TD-1), and TD-2 systems. In return for the Scud Bs, North Korea assisted Egypt’s efforts to domestically produce Scuds. Building on this success, the DPRK began designing the 500 km- range Scud C in the mid-1980s.

These Scuds have been exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed in North Korea. Given its 20 years experience working with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000 km.

North Korea also used Scud technology to develop the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that is deployed as part of North Korea’s missile forces. The No Dong has a range of 1,300 km with a 500 kg payload, which could strike all of South Korea and Japan. Scud and No Dong technology also form the basis of North Korea’s TD-1 and TD-2 systems. In 1998, North Korea tested the Taepo Dong-1, which probably utilized a No Dong first stage and Scud second stage. Although launched as an SLV, the TD-1 launch showed that North Korea had successfully developed many of the essential technologies for staged missile systems vital for ICBM development.

The DPRK has also developed the follow-on system for the TD-1, the TD-2. Although a more advanced design than the TD-l, the TD-2 still relies on Scud and No Dong technology, with probably clustered No Dong engines powering the first stage, and either a Scud or No Dong-based second stage. In a two stage configuration, the TD-2 would have a range of over 9,000 km with a substantial weapons payload of approximately 500 kg.

In a three stage configuration, such as that launched in April 2009, the TD-2 could deliver the same sized payload up to 15,000 km, which could reach all of the United States and Europe, although likely with very poor accuracy.

The first stage of the April 2009 launch fell into the Sea of Japan, and the upper stages landed in the Pacific. This demonstrates progress since the 2006 test, which flew only about 40 seconds. Recently, North Korea has developed a new land-mobile IRBM –called the Musudan by the United States.

The Musudan is a single-stage missile and may have a range of up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload. The Musudan is derived from the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and represents a substantial advance in North Korea’s liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6 had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic propellants — unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N204) — than those used in Scud-type missiles. Development of the Musudan with this more advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to build even longer-range missiles — or shorter range missiles with greater payload capacity — than would be possible using Scud-type technology. As the Scud market nears saturation, North Korea also has started to develop its own solid-propellant missile systems, as evidenced by its development of a new solid propellant SRBM based on the SS-21 SRBM.

This new missile — called the Toksa by the United States — has a range of 120 km with a payload as large as 500 kg. This is a disturbing development since North Korea can apply its experience in producing this missile to other, longer- range, solid propellant missile designs. Solid propellant ballistic missiles are preferred by many countries due to their lesser logistics requirements and shorter launch times, making them more survivable than liquid propellant missiles. North Korea,s advances — in both its liquid and solid propellant programs — have come despite a self-imposed missile launch moratorium, that limited North Korea’s ability to verify new designs or modifications to its missile systems during the 1999-2006 timeframe.

North Korea ended the moratorium with its July 5, 2006 Scud, No Dong, and Taepo Dong-2 launches. Program Activities On April 5, 2009, North Korea — despite UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which requires the suspension of all activities related to its ballistic missile program — conducted the second launch of the TD-2. Although the April 5th TD-2 launch failed to place a satellite in orbit, the launch was much more successful than the first TD-2 launch in 2006, demonstrating that North Korea is making progress in developing technology that can directly contribute to the production of ICBMs. Subsequently, and despite the adoption on June 12, 2009 of UNSCR 1874, which reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR 1718 related to North Korea,s ballistic missile activities, North Korea tested seven Scud SRBMs and No Dong MRBMs on July 4th.

The April 5th TD-2 launch also demonstrated that North Korea continues to pursue the development of longer-range missile systems and that long range missile development probably remains a priority. North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world, without requiring the lengthy — and potentially vulnerable — launch preparation time required by the TD-2. Technology Supplier The DPRK continues to sell ballistic missile-related technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking to re-engage with former customers in the region. North Korea is probably also pursuing new markets for its missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and Africa.

North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic missile services, almost certainly is willing to offer any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers interested in complete systems, and can design missiles to meet specific customer needs. For customers with established missile programs or otherwise lacking interest in complete systems, North Korea provides missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground support equipment and launchers, and production technology. North Korea can also broker precision machine tools and other missile-related raw materials from third-parties for customers through its extensive procurement network. Iran Iran is one of North Korea’s key missile customers.

Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has exported complete Scud B and Scud C missiles to Iran, as well as their production technology. The Scud and other missile technology acquired from North Korea form the basis for the Iranian Shahab-3, which is based on North Korea’s No Dong. North Korea has probably provided Iran an MRBM variant, called the BM-25, of its Musudan IRBM.

This technology would provide Iran with more advanced missile technology than currently used in its Shahab-series of ballistic missiles and could form the basis for future Iranian missile and SLV designs. North Korea also provided assistance to Iran’s SLV program. On February 2nd, Iran successfully orbited the Omid satellite, using its Safir SLV, the first stage of which was based on the Shahab-3 (No Dong). Pyongyang’s assistance to Iran’s SLV program suggests that North Korea and Iran may also be cooperating on the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Syria Syria is another of North Korea’s key missile customers. North Korea has provided Syria with 500 km-range Scud C missiles and technology as well as technology for a 700 km-range Scud variant, referred to in Syria as the “Scud D.”

The missiles came initially in either partially or completely knocked-down kit form, but were produced in North Korea. Syria has since achieved a domestic production capability, probably with extensive assistance from Pyongyang. North Korea has also provided a range of other missile-related services to Syria, including production technology, ground support equipment, raw material, components, technical assistance, and know-how.

North Korea probably provided assistance to Syria’s development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for its Scud ballistic missiles. Yemen In December 2002, Yemen received a shipment of Scud missiles, which Sanaa claimed to have bought from North Korea for defensive purposes and pledged would not be retransferred to any third party. North Korea probably resumed ballistic missile cooperation with Yemen in 2009.

Burma The mid-2009 voyage of the North Korean ship, Kang Nam 1, probably was associated with North Korea’s primary arms export entity — suggesting that the cargo was most likely weapons-related. The ship returned to North Korea prior to reaching its destination, which was most likely Burma.

The Kang Nam 1 probably was carrying ballistic missiles or conventional weapons. A November 2008 visit by a senior Burmese official to a North Korean ballistic missile production facility suggests that the two sides probably have been discussing a ballistic missile deal, and that the cargo may have been related to these discussions.

Foreign Assistance North Korea operates a vast network of embassy personnel, front companies, and commercial entities run by ethnic Koreans in other countries to obtain key technologies and materials needed to support both its own and its customers’ missile programs. Members of this network often do not reveal their affiliation with North Korea, or North Korea as the end-user of critical goods; they utilize entities in Europe, China, East Asia, and South Asia to establish reliable routes for the transfer of controlled items. Most foreign procurement by the North Korean missile program includes material North Korea finds too costly or too advanced to manufacture domestically, such as missile component testing equipment, heat-resistant materials for re-entry vehicles, heavy-duty vehicle chassis, missile tracking technologies, precision machine tools, specialty steels and aluminums, ball bearings, precision gyroscopes, solid-propellant precursor chemicals, and liquid-propellant precursors. Although important for its own program, North Korea also uses this network to broker missile-related raw materials for its missile export customers.

Conclusion North Korea will continue to develop missiles with increasing range, payload capacity, and sophistication. In support of these efforts, North Korea will continue to seek critically-needed components from foreign suppliers — most commonly China-based, given their proximity and access to technology that would be beneficial to North Korea,s missile program. In light of its past missile technology acquisition practices, we remain vigilant for any attempts by North Korea to acquire material or technology associated with missile systems other countries — including MTCR Partners — have retired. International pressure against North Korea and its customers have had a significant impact on North Korea,s missile sales.

However, despite such pressure, North Korea continues missile cooperation with its core clients and continues to offer MTCR Category I missile systems, their production technology, and missile maintenance and support services to all interested customers. END TEXT OF PAPER.

4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR issues for ISN/MTR.

A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON

Judge Rules to Re-Open Hillary Benghazi Email Case

Posted on August 10, 2017August 10, 2017 by Denise Simon

Primer:

Photo essay

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part I:

Despite President Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s clear orders to deploy military assets, nothing was sent to Benghazi, and nothing was en route to Libya at the time the last two Americans were killed almost 8 hours after the attacks began. [pg. 141]

With Ambassador Stevens missing, the White House convened a roughly two-hour meeting at 7:30 PM, which resulted in action items focused on a YouTube video, and others containing the phrases “[i]f any deployment is made,” and “Libya must agree to any deployment,” and “[w]ill not deploy until order comes to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi.” [pg. 115]

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff typically would have participated in the White House meeting, but did not attend because he went home to host a dinner party for foreign dignitaries. [pg. 107]

A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) sat on a plane in Rota, Spain, for three hours, and changed in and out of their uniforms four times. [pg. 154]

None of the relevant military forces met their required deployment timelines. [pg. 150]

The Libyan forces that evacuated Americans from the CIA Annex to the Benghazi airport was not affiliated with any of the militias the CIA or State Department had developed a relationship with during the prior 18 months. Instead, it was comprised of former Qadhafi loyalists who the U.S. had helped remove from power during the Libyan revolution. [pg. 144]

The following facts are among the many new revelations in Part II:

Five of the 10 action items from the 7:30 PM White House meeting referenced the video, but no direct link or solid evidence existed connecting the attacks in Benghazi and the video at the time the meeting took place. The State Department senior officials at the meeting had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time. The Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact with the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground in Benghazi and sent out multiple updates about the situation, including a “Terrorism Event Notification.” The State Department Watch Center had also notified Jake Sullivan and Cheryl Mills that it had set up a direct telephone line to Tripoli. There was no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. Greg Hicks—one of the last people to talk to Chris Stevens before he died—said there was virtually no discussion about the video in Libya leading up to the attacks. [pg. 28]

The morning after the attacks, the National Security Council’s Deputy Spokesperson sent an email to nearly two dozen people from the White House, Defense Department, State Department, and intelligence community, stating: “Both the President and Secretary Clinton released statements this morning. … Please refer to those for any comments for the time being. To ensure we are all in sync on messaging for the rest of the day, Ben Rhodes will host a conference call for USG communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today.” [pg. 39]

Minutes before the President delivered his speech in the Rose Garden, Jake Sullivan wrote in an email to Ben Rhodes and others: “There was not really much violence in Egypt. And we are not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ‘over inflammatory videos.’” [pg. 44]

According to Susan Rice, both Ben Rhodes and David Plouffe prepared her for her appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows following the attacks. Nobody from the FBI, Department of Defense, or CIA participated in her prep call. While Rhodes testified Plouffe would “normally” appear on the Sunday show prep calls, Rice testified she did not recall Plouffe being on prior calls and did not understand why he was on the call in this instance. [pg.98]

On the Sunday shows, Susan Rice stated the FBI had “already begun looking at all sorts of evidence” and “FBI has a lead in this investigation.” But on Monday, the Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs sent an email stating: “McDonough apparently told the SVTS [Secure Video Teleconference] group today that everyone was required to ‘shut their pieholes’ about the Benghazi attack in light of the FBI investigation, due to start tomorrow.” [pg. 135]

After Susan Rice’s Sunday show appearances, Jake Sullivan assured the Secretary of the State that Rice “wasn’t asked about whether we had any intel. But she did make clear our view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.” [pg. 128]

Susan Rice’s comments on the Sunday talk shows were met with shock and disbelief by State Department employees in Washington. The Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, wrote: “I think Rice was off the reservation on this one.” The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded: “Off the reservation on five networks!” The Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Bureau of Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: “WH [White House] very worried about the politics. This was all their doing.” [pg. 132]

The CIA’s September 13, 2012, intelligence assessment was rife with errors. On the first page, there is a single mention of “the early stages of the protest” buried in one of the bullet points. The article cited to support the mention of a protest in this instance was actually from September 4. In other words, the analysts used an article from a full week before the attacks to support the premise that a protest had occurred just prior to the attack on September 11. [pg. 47]

A headline on the following page of the CIA’s September 13 intelligence assessment stated “Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,” but nothing in the actual text box supports that title. As it turns out, the title of the text box was supposed to be “Extremists Capitalized on Cairo Protests.” That small but vital difference—from Cairo to Benghazi—had major implications in how people in the administration were able to message the attacks. [pg. 52]

Read the full report here as published by the Select Committee on Benghazi

Judge orders new searches for Clinton Benghazi emails

Politico: Nine months after the presidential election was decided, a federal judge is ordering the State Department to try again to find emails Hillary Clinton wrote about the Benghazi attack.

U.S. District Court Judge Amit Mehta ruled that the State Department had not done enough to try to track down messages Clinton may have sent about the assault on the U.S. diplomatic compound on Sept. 11, 2012 — an attack that killed four Americans, including the U.S. ambassador to Libya.

In response to Freedom of Information Act requests, State searched the roughly 30,000 messages Clinton turned over to her former agency at its request in December 2014 after officials searching for Benghazi-related records realized she had used a personal email account during her four-year tenure as secretary.

State later searched tens of thousands of emails handed over to the agency by three former top aides to Clinton: Huma Abedin, Cheryl Mills and Jake Sullivan. Finally, State searched a collection of emails the FBI assembled when it was investigating Clinton’s use of the private account and server.

In all, State found 348 Benghazi-related messages or documents that were sent to or from Clinton in a period of nearly five months after the attack.

However, the conservative watchdog group Judicial Watch argued that the search wasn’t good enough because State never tried to search its own systems for relevant messages in the official email accounts of Clinton’s top aides.

In a 10-page ruling issued Tuesday, Mehta — an Obama appointee — agreed.

“To date, State has searched only data compilations originating from outside sources — Secretary Clinton, her former aides, and the FBI. … It has not, however, searched 8 the one records system over which it has always had control and that is almost certain to contain some responsive records: the state.gov e-mail server,” Mehta wrote.

“If Secretary Clinton sent an e-mail about Benghazi to Abedin, Mills, or Sullivan at his or her state.gov e-mail address, or if one of them sent an e-mail to Secretary Clinton using his or her state.gov account, then State’s server presumably would have captured and stored such an e-mail. Therefore, State has an obligation to search its own server for responsive records.”

Justice Department lawyers representing State argued that making them search other employees’ accounts for Clinton’s emails would set a bad precedent that would belabor other FOIA searches.

But Mehta said the circumstances surrounding Clinton’s email represented “a specific fact pattern unlikely to arise in the future.”

A central premise of Mehta’s ruling is that the State Department’s servers archived emails from Clinton’s top aides. However, it’s not clear that happened regularly or reliably.

State Department officials have said there was no routine, automated archiving of official email during Clinton’s tenure. Some officials did copy their mailboxes from time to time and put archived message folders on desktop computers or servers, so State may still have some messages from the aides, but the FBI may already have acquired some of those messages during its inquiry.

A State Department spokesperson declined to comment on the judge’s decision. A Justice Department spokesman said: “We are reviewing the judge’s opinion and order.”