Immediate yet Temporary Solution to Global Refugee Crisis?

There is some agreement with Barack Obama, the civil wars, the unrest, the terror conditions in the Middle East is an Islamic problem to solve. When however, outside influences have manifested the state of order in the region, not only is the Obama administration culpable due to lack of leadership, but filling that void is Iran, Russia, the Gulf States and China.

This is not a new condition by any stretch and the cost to the United States has yet to be realized or accounted. In 2013, the United States had already provided $339 million and additional humanitarian aid to the Syria crisis. That is but one small portion to the costs which have mounted still in 2015.

The refugee crisis festering across the globe is worse than what is being reported and the moving parts are countless.

So there are some short term and creative solutions that would provide some relief such that other cures can be devised in the interim.

  1. Call on affected nations to step up assets to rescue and safe haven to the refugees by offering respective naval vessels to the Mediterranean Sea and to ports involved. Each country has decommissioned ships or ships that are expendable for immediate use, including cruise ships. The United States alone has decommissioned countless naval assets and sold many of them to other countries for use. Further, after generally 25 years, cruise ships are taken out of service where some would take minor upgrades to deploy for the cause.
  2. The United Nations along with involved countries call to duty personnel to work resources for humanitarian means. This would include medical, safety, transportation, educational and early vetting.
  3. Place intelligence operations on the entry-way path to interview, fingerprint and background personnel files that are matched with global intelligence services that would and could find the terrorists and jihadis among the crowds.
  4. Set rules aboard the ships for order, when violations occur, aggressive consequences are invoked. This may include prison, deportation or other detention sentences.
  5. Contain the problem and then manage it. Stop spreading the destruction, crisis and despair. The cost of this program would come under that of the Gulf States, Russia and Iran that have offered zero assistance and are in fact guilty of exacerbating the calamity. The global community has a role and for those that ignore, sanctions and isolation is the consequence.
  6. Countries where war and unrest is proven are the target of a worldwide military solution beyond that of today’s feeble strategy. NATO membership is accountable for a tactical strategy in locations such as Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and more.
  7. Determine Muslim countries that may be conditioned to take refugees on a medium term basis until stability is gained, one country at a time. Those countries may include Maldives, Malaysia or perhaps even Kyrgyzstan.

It is time to think out of the box for a semi-lasting yet immediate solution during which time Islamic State, al Nusra, Boko Harem, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are defeated.

This post is up for debate and further discussion, yet today, there must be robust collaboration, cures, humanitarian and military strategies on the table. Your comments are invited and welcomed.

How Obama Won Iran Deal and the Money Flows

Obama has officially won on the Iran deal. How?

In part from the Hill:

The White House —which has a reputation for keeping an arms-length relationship with Capitol Hill —mounted an all hands on deck effort in the three weeks after the deal was signed and before lawmakers left town for the August recess.

Secretary of State John Kerry, Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and other top officials became fixtures on Capitol Hill and sought to answer every lawmaker’s questions in person before they fanned out across the country.

Moniz was the ringer, offering a detailed yet affable performance that contrasted with Kerry’s more pedantic style, and earned him the affection of even the deal’s most bitter critics.

The president, too, got personally involved, and refused to relent once Congress left town.

Obama spoke to more than 100 lawmakers in individual or small-group settings, according to a White House official, including 30 calls during his two-week August vacation in Martha’s Vineyard, Mass.

Cabinet secretaries and senior administration officials made the case directly to over 200 House members and senators after the deal was reached.

Supporters were up against heavy artillery. At home, lawmakers were bombarded with tens of millions of dollars’ worth of TV ads from opponents of the agreement such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

To counteract that firepower, organizations such as J Street spent millions of their own to run advertisements in key markets.

Obama also made an open plea for liberal groups to lend him a hand.

“As big of a bully pulpit as I have, it’s not enough,” Obama told thousands of activists in July. “I can’t carry it by myself.”

But what do the Republicans know that the Democrats also know but are ignoring because of the covert Iran money deals to the Democrats?

Iran spending billions on terrorists’ salaries: report

 Iran has been sending billions of dollars to fill the pockets of terrorist fighters across the Middle East, including in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, according to a private U.S. government report ordered by Sen. Mark Kirk.

Iran’s defense budget ranges anywhere between $14 billion to $30 billion a year and much of that money goes to fund terrorist groups and rebel fighters throughout the region, according to the Congressional Research Service report conducted at the request of Mr. Kirk, an Illinois Republican.
The report, first viewed by The Washington Free Beacon, discloses that funding for these terrorist groups could be much higher than originally estimated, as Iran often hides public records about its defense spending.

“Some regional experts claim that Iran’s defense budget excludes much of its spending on intelligence activities and support of foreign non-state actors,” the report states, stressing that actual military spending could far exceed the $30 billion that Iran discloses annually, The Free Beacon reported.

“Similarly, another study claims that actual funding for the [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force’s Al Quds Force] is ‘much greater’ ” than the amount allocated in the state budget, as the group’s funds are supplemented by its own economic activities,” the report said.

The report gives “low-ball” estimates for each of the groups supported by Iranian funding. Researchers estimate Iran spends between $100 million and $200 million per year on Hezbollah, $3.5 billion to $15 billion per year in support of Syria’s Asad Regime, $12 million to $26 million per year on Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, $10 million to $20 million per year to support Houthi rebels in Yemen and tens of millions per year to support Hamas terrorists in Israel.

In Syria, for example, Iranian-backed fighters are paid between $500 to $1,000 a month to fight in support of Bashar Assad’s regime, according to the report.

Afghan fighters in Syria have disclosed that they “had recently returned from training in Iran and planned to fight in Syria,” the report notes. These militants “expected to receive salaries from Iran ranging from $500 to $1000 a month.”

The report comes as the Obama administration gained the final critical vote needed to suppress a resolution to disapprove a nuclear deal with Iran. Under the deal, the U.S. and other world powers will gradually lift economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic in exchange for dismantling its nuclear weapons program.

Similar reports from watchdog groups have revealed that releasing Iranian assets sanctions could allow Tehran to spend more money on its terrorist-link Quds force, as well as beef up its own military in general.

“The administration is celebrating support from a partisan minority of senators for a nuclear deal that threatens the security of the United States and our allies,” Mr. Kirk said, The Free Beacon reported. “This deeply flawed agreement will transfer over $100 billion to a regime that U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper calls the ‘foremost state sponsor of terrorism,’ and pave Iran’s path to nuclear weapons.

“Like North Korea before it, Iran will cheat on this flawed deal in order to get nuclear weapons. Congress must hold accountable the Iranian regime and ensure that our children never wake up to a nuclear-armed Iran in the Middle East.”

20150800-INFOGRAPHIC-Kirk-CRS Estimates of Iranian Financial Support to Terrorists Militants

The report is located here and everyone in Congress has access.

CSMonitor: One of the beneficiaries will be Iran’s primary tool for projecting power – the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and especially its elite Qods Force, which handles operations abroad.

But are Iran’s wizened generals, who mostly cut their military teeth in the 1980s as teenage volunteers during the brutal Iran-Iraq War, already in danger of overreach?

For decades, American military planners aimed to be capable of simultaneously fighting – and winning – two full-blown wars in different regions. It was a challenge, even for a superpower. Today, on a much smaller scale and with a sliver of the military means, Iran is attempting the same thing in the Middle East: It is deeply engaged in Syria and Iraq; waving the flag in Yemen; and very influential in Lebanon.

Never before has the Revolutionary Guard, whose 120,000-strong force is much smaller than Iran’s regular 425,000-strong armed forces, been engaged so deeply and widely abroad – yet with increasingly mixed and entangling results.

There is no shortage of commitment: at least seven IRGC generals have died on the frontlines, primarily in Syria but also in Iraq, taken down by snipers’ bullets, bombs, and even an Israeli airstrike. The Guards are relatively top heavy with generals due to their origins as an ideological militia. Still, such high-ranking losses are highly uncommon in modern warfare.

In Syria, the IRGC and its Lebanese Shiite ally Hezbollah are bolstering the regime of President Bashar al-Assad against an array of rebels and jihadists. In Iraq, Iran has mobilized Shiite militias to take on the self-described Islamic State, but at a cost of stoking more sectarian strife. While in Yemen, Iran has played a much lesser role in aiding Houthi militiamen against Saudi-backed forces.

Each conflict has now devolved largely along sectarian lines that pit Shiite Iran against its regional Sunni rivals, Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf states allied with the US and Israel.

The IRGC “exceeded their reach long ago.… They are at the end of their tricks [in Syria], and Hezbollah lost a lot,” says Walter Posch, a specialist on Iranian military forces at the Austrian National Defense Academy in Vienna.

“It worked well when it was low cost, but now it is high cost.… There is no Saddam Hussein who insulted the Iranian nation as a whole” as a national motivating factor, as in the 1980s, says Mr. Posch. “This is a war of their own liking, for the purpose of power projection. But they’ve been too ignorant of the fear of the small Gulf countries; too ignorant about the fears of the Saudis.”

 

Ideological origins

The IRGC was formed after Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who wanted a more trusted and ideologically pure force than the regular Army. The grim years of the Iran-Iraq war consolidated its role – and its anything-is-possible reputation.

Embracing the religious Shiite aspects of resistance in the image of Imam Hossein, the 7th-century Shiite saint venerated as “lord of the martyrs,” the IRGC has since become an economic and political powerhouse. It runs a multi-billion dollar business empire that handles everything from oil and infrastructure projects to weapons production. In politics, active-duty guardsman play no formal role, but its generals are close to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and veterans have held cabinet and other government posts.

“I don’t see signs of overreach; I think they’ve got leadership in depth,” says Richard Dalton, a former British ambassador to Tehran now at the Chatham House think tank in London. “They are tested in difficult situations. They’ve been involved, whether in Lebanon, Iraq, or Afghanistan, for a very long period.”

“It comes back to, ‘Who wins wars?’ People who win wars and are the most effective are the ones with the greatest conviction, and the Iranians have got it,” says Amb. Dalton.

That certainly applies to Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who has often been photographed along frontlines in Iraq and elsewhere. He claimed this week that Iran’s efforts prompted the “collapse of American power in the region,” according to details of a high-level briefing published in Iran’s conservative media.

 

‘Gobbling’ or choking?

Some argue that Iran’s regional expansion is unprecedented. Addressing Congress in March, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Iran was “gobbling up” Mideast capitals. Yet the tide now isn’t all going Iran’s way.

In Syria, for example, Iran has been fighting to defend Mr. Assad’s regime for more than 4-½ years, spending an estimated $6 billion to $15 billion a year in a war that has claimed more than 240,000 lives. But pro-Assad forces have lost ground in recent months to rebels backed by the US, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, as well as to the self-described Islamic State.

President Hassan Rouhani has vowed to back the Syrian government “until the end of the road.” While Assad is running short of loyalist troops, the IRGC reportedly has tried to fill the gap by finding several thousand Afghans to fight, and die, in exchange for cash, Iranian residency or passports, and sometimes for commuted jail terms, according to Germany’s Spiegel and Agence France-Presse.

In May, a special event held in Tehran commemorated Afghan martyrs killed in Syria, and 65 corpses were returned in a single exchange, according to Iranian media reports. Many are buried in Iran. Officially, Iran denies enlisting Afghans to fight in Syria.

In Iraq, Soleimani was instrumental in reviving tens of thousands of Shiite militiamen to push back IS for more than a year – in concert with American airstrikes, and ironically with a similar mission as US military advisers now in Iraq. But those militias are accused of atrocities against Sunnis, and efforts to bolster the regular Iraqi military – decisive at first – have begun to stumble.

And in Yemen, Iran has been marginally involved on the side of Houthi rebels as they advanced across the country earlier this year. In July, the critical port city of Aden was recaptured by Saudi-backed forces and troops of the United Arab Emirates. Months of Saudi-led airstrikes are imperiling the population, in a campaign explicitly aimed at rolling back Iranian influence.

“There is support for Soleimani but also high expectations,” says Posch, of the IRGC’s Qods Force chief. “He has to deliver now. I don’t know how he deals with all these crises individually. He can’t go to all these battlefields in person.”

 

JPOA: Strategic Consequences For U.S. National Security

What you can know from the military experts that the Democrats that are standing with the White House on the Iran ‘YES’ vote are ignoring.

The full report is here.

Assessment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action:

By: Co-Chairs General James Conway, USMC (ret.) and General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)

Strategy Council and Staff

Members

Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, USN (ret.)

Former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa

General Lou Wagner, USA (ret.)

Former Commander of U.S. Army Materiel Command

Vice Admiral John Bird, USN (ret.)

Former Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet

Lt. General David Deptula, USAF (ret.)

Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force Headquarters

Maj. General Lawrence Stutzriem, USAF (ret.)

Former Director, Plans, Policy, and Strategy, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command

 

We assess:

The JCPOA will not prevent a nuclear Iran. No later than 15 years, the deal’s major nuclear restrictions will lapse, Iran will stand on the brink of nuclear weapons capability, and once again the United States will likely have to devote significant resources and attention to keeping Tehran from attaining nuclear weapons.

  1. The JCPOA will give Iran the means to increase support for terrorist and insurgent proxies, aggravate sectarian conflict and trigger both nuclear and conventional proliferation cascades. It will provide the expansionist regime in Tehran with access to resources, technology and international arms markets required to bolster offensive military capabilities in the vital Persian Gulf region, acquire long-range ballistic missiles and develop other major weapons systems.
  1. Our long-standing allies feel betrayed – even angry – with the JCPOA, seeing it as a weakening of U.S. security guarantees and reversal of decades of U.S. regional security policy. The mere fact that such perceptions persist, regardless of their veracity, will undermine U.S. credibility, threatening to turn them into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
  1. Simultaneously, sequestration is diminishing the ability of the United States to respond to Iranian aggression, mitigate security threats emanating from Iran and protect U.S. regional allies. Leaving it with fewer and older ships and planes as well as fewer and less well-trained troops, these cuts will severely damage the U.S. military’s ability to project power in the region, even as the Iranian threat grows.
  1. The United States is in a far better position to prevent a nuclear Iran today, even by military means if necessary, than when the JCPOA sunsets. The strategic environment will grow much more treacherous in the next 15 years. Comparatively, Iran will be economically stronger, regionally more powerful and militarily more capable, while the United States will have a smaller, less capable fighting force, diminished credibility and fewer allies.

Contrary to the false choice between support for the JCPOA and military confrontation, the agreement increases both the probability and danger of hostilities with Iran. Given the deleterious strategic consequences to the United States, implementation of the JCPOA will demand increased political and military engagement in the Middle East that carries significantly greater risks and costs relative to current planning assumptions.

Improved Iran Military Capabilities

The JCPOA will enable Iran to improve its unconventional military capabilities to challenge the strategic position of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. Iran will be able to revitalize its defense industrial base in the short term, even if it devotes only a fraction of the $100 billion or more that will be unfrozen as part of the agreement – more than the government’s entire budget for the current fiscal year – to military spending. It is also set to acquire advanced S-300 air defenses from Russia at the end of this year. Over the medium term, the removal of economic sanctions and the United Nations arms embargo will allow the regime to acquire other advanced technologies and weapons from abroad. And, once sanctions against its ballistic missile program sunset, Iran could more easily develop weapons capable of reaching targets in the Middle East and beyond – including Europe and the United States.

Iran has historically been at a serious disadvantage against the United States in conventional military power, most notably when the use of overwhelming U.S. force in the region compelled it to reverse course dramatically and agree to a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and to suspend its nuclear program in 2003. Indeed, Iran lacks large numbers of sophisticated conventional capabilities, including armored forces, air support and fighter aircraft and large surface ships. This likely will remain true for the foreseeable future.

Despite its deficit in conventional capabilities, Iran poses an asymmetric challenge to U.S. military assets and interests in the region. Iran learned from hard experience that it could not match the United States in a direct military confrontation. It also understands the United States relies heavily on unfettered access to close-in bases across the Middle East to keep the region’s vital and vulnerable sea lanes open, conduct combat operations and deter aggression against its allies. Therefore, it has spent more than a decade pursuing a strategy to disrupt or deter the United States from projecting superior forces into the region, or to prevent those forces from operating effectively if deployed. For example, Iran could seek to do so by sealing off the Persian Gulf at the Strait of Hormuz; degrading U.S. freedom of maneuver and military lines of communication; blocking the flow of oil through the Gulf; and targeting naval and commercial vessels, military bases, energy infrastructure and other vital sites inside and outside the Gulf.

Iran has acquired and developed various capabilities to execute this asymmetric strategy, including anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). It possesses the region’s largest arsenal of short (SRBM) and medium-range (MRBM) ballistic missiles, as well as a growing arsenal of cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), to target military and energy installations throughout the Gulf, including U.S. ships. It also has a sizable fleet of fast attack craft, submarines and large numbers of torpedoes and naval mines for choking off Hormuz and attacking the aforementioned targets. The S-300 air defense systems could stymie U.S. air operations around the Gulf, in addition to complicating any strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Russian or Chinese-sourced anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles could give Iran an even greater standoff capability, allowing it to target U.S. naval assets beyond the Persian Gulf. Iran is also devoting attention to cyber warfare against the battle networks of U.S. forces and the critical infrastructure of its adversaries in the region.7

Assessment of the JCPOA: Strategic Consequences for U.S. National Security

The JCPOA will provide Iran with access to the resources, technology and international arms markets it needs to execute its asymmetric and A2/AD strategy more effectively. We expect it will take full advantage of the opportunity. Iran could simply make or buy more of what it already has, particularly missiles, launchers, submarines and surface warfare ships. It could also upgrade crucial capabilities. Improved precision guidance systems would enable Iran’s ballistic and cruise missiles to target individual ships and installations around the Gulf much more accurately, as would new missile boats, submarines and mobile launchers. If combined with longer-range radars, it could expand this increased threat across wider swathes of the region. Better UAVs or multirole aircraft – not to mention additional advanced air defenses – could permit it to contest U.S. air supremacy over the region. It could also augment its stealth and electronic and cyber warfare capabilities with new technologies from abroad.

Iran might also invest in entirely new capabilities to disrupt and deter operations not only around its immediate vicinity, but also across the region more broadly. These could include long-range strike, satellite, airlift and sealift capabilities as well as the development of long-range ballistic missiles.

The full 14 page report is here.

 

 

 

Truth of the Iran Lobby

All Republicans in the Senate are ‘NO’ votes on the Iran deal and there is an estimated 12 Democrats so far that are staying with a NO vote, the rest of the Democrats have declared they will vote with the White House, when not one Senator has had any access to the side deals.

The White House has declared they don’t need any part of Congress to approve the deal, it is done. Further, the Iran deal is non-binding which is to say Iran does not need to comply with any part of the JPOA.

Meanwhile, you may be interested to know who the Iran Lobby is in Washington DC and the influence they have with legislators and the White House. Simply, money votes.

The text below is the perfect model for how all politics work in Washington DC. Chilling but true.

Meet the Iran Lobby

In the fight over sanctions and the nuclear deal, how did the supposedly all-powerful pro-Israel lobby lose to the slick operatives of the National Iranian American Council?

Raise Your Hand if You Think You’re Going Back to Iraq

You’re correct, and it could be a ten year war.

With sequestration and even worse defense contractors without advance platform orders and enemies in the same technology as the United States, ten years is not out of the limits of acceptance. The next commander in chief faces a daunting reality as Islamic State, al Nusra, the Taliban, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Houthis and countless other terror operation cells have nothing but time and a constant flow of new generational fighters.

Listen to the Generals. The new standard before America is the endless war condition, but is the West ready and is Congress or the American people able to dismiss the battlefield weariness? There is no choice. Questions emerge and they include funding for the Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF) and possibly the draft, if in fact ground operations are needed. Today our troop levels are at a low point near that of pre-World War ll and this calls for some exceptional decisions to be made in the near future. Additionally, conditions could also call for more civilian contractors to be used in both offensive and defensive duties.

There is Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Nigeria, Sudan, Asia and the bigger issue and the bear in the room everyone ignores, Russia.

Throw in Iran…well the future is bleak.

Is the U.S. Ready for an Endless War Against the Islamic State?
op generals predict the fight against ISIS will last more than a decade. It’s not a message the White House or Congress wants to hear.

FP Magazine: Looking out over rows of young American soldiers sitting in a dusty hall in Baghdad, the U.S. military’s top-ranking officer had a few questions for the troops.

Had they deployed to Iraq before, Gen. Martin Dempsey asked.

Out of about 200 soldiers in the hall, three-quarters raised their hands.

“How many of you think you’ll serve a tour in Iraq again?”

They all put up their hands.

“I think you may be right about that,” Dempsey said. “We’re going to be at this for a while.”

The exchange, which came in July during what is likely to be Dempsey’s final visit to Iraq before he steps down in October, captured what top Pentagon brass view as a “generational conflict” against the Islamic State. Despite optimistic assessments from the White House, the generals believe the war will extend far into the future, long after President Barack Obama leaves office.

In an interview with Foreign Policy in July, shortly before stepping down as vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Sandy Winnefeld likened the campaign against the Islamic State to the Cold War.

“I do think it’s going to be a generational struggle,” Winnefeld said.

The Army’s outgoing chief of staff, Gen. Ray Odierno, meanwhile, told reporters that “in my mind, ISIS is a 10- to 20-year problem; it’s not a two years problem.”

But White House officials, and most members of Congress, are reluctant to speak publicly about how long the campaign may last, much to the frustration of military commanders. For members of both political parties, acknowledging that the war could drag on for another 10 to 20 years is politically risky, if not poisonous, and would require confronting difficult decisions about ordering troops into combat, budgets, and strategy.

Instead, the White House has vaguely spoken of a “long-term” effort, without specifically addressing the generals’ expectations of a potentially decade-long war. But officials have acknowledged that the fight will continue after the end of Obama’s presidential term in 2017, leaving his successor with tough choices about whether, and how, to expand the flagging campaign.

While the administration has shied away from talking about precisely how long the war may last, some Republican lawmakers, including Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), and defense analysts have accused the White House of offering an overly positive account of the faltering campaign.

Now the administration faces explosive allegations that the military may have sought to water down intelligence reports to convey a more optimistic portrayal of the war.

The Defense Department’s inspector general has launched an investigation into the allegations after an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency alleged that assessments had been revised improperly by U.S. Central Command, according to the New York Times.

The allegations raise questions about the possible politicization of the air campaign and carry echoes of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, as officials under then-President George W. Bush were later accused of distorting intelligence reports about suspected stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction to bolster the rationale for military action.

The Senate Intelligence Committee “is aware of the allegations that intelligence assessments may have been improperly used or revised,” a staffer for Sen. Richard Burr (R-N.C.), chairman of the committee, told Foreign Policy on Thursday.

But as the case involves an alleged whistleblower, congressional aides said they could not discuss any aspect of the investigation or whether lawmakers would launch their own separate probe.

Obama has long condemned how intelligence was distorted in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. And in his Aug. 5 speech defending the recently negotiated nuclear agreement with Iran, Obama said the ill-fated U.S. war in Iraq had been the product of “a mindset that exaggerated threats beyond what the intelligence supported.”

After entering office, Obama vowed to carry out a campaign promise to bring the war in Iraq to “a responsible end” by withdrawing U.S. troops in 2011.

The war, however, did not end on his schedule. Obama has had to send 3,400 troops back to Iraq to help local forces battle the Islamic State, a virulent incarnation of the extremist threat that bedeviled the nearly nine-year U.S. occupation. A U.S.-led air campaign has carried out more than 6,400 strikes against Islamic State targets.

Taken together, that means Obama will leave office with no prospect of an end to the American role in the conflict, which has cost more than $3.7 billion after just one year and has undercut the Pentagon’s plans to “reset” the force after years of grinding counterinsurgency warfare.

While administration officials have been reluctant to offer more specific forecasts about the campaign’s duration, Odierno told reporters in July that the Islamic State will be “a long-term problem” over the next decade or more, though he cautioned that he wasn’t sure about how serious a threat it would be in the years ahead.

Odierno was voicing a widely held view among American commanders, who often privately complain about what they see as a lack of coherent strategic planning from the White House or Congress.

“This is not a two- to three-year task. We’re talking a decade-long effort,” a senior military officer said.

A senior administration official declined to say whether the White House agreed with Odierno’s forecast, saying, “It’s impossible to give any precise answer beyond a long-term schedule.”

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, added: “This administration believes the effort should last as long as it takes to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. There are more than a few variables involved in that.”

There are few signs that the current campaign has turned the tide against the Islamic State in any meaningful way, reinforcing the sense of a long struggle ahead. U.S. officials have touted the success that Iraqi and Kurdish forces, backed by American air power, have had in retaking Tikrit and in recapturing territory in northern Syria, while blunting Islamic State offensives around Mount Sinjar in northern Iraq. But the Islamic State still holds broad swaths of Iraq and Syria, including the major Iraqi cities of Mosul and Ramadi, and American intelligence officials estimate that the group has been able to replenish its ranks of fighters and replace those killed by Washington and its allies.

Despite the marked lack of progress, there are no heated policy debates inside the White House now about how to conduct the war against the Islamic State, administration officials and military officers said.

And there is no indication that the White House is planning to revisit its strategy, despite the disappointing results on the ground.

Dempsey and other top military leaders — scarred by the disastrous experience that followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 — are not advocating a radical departure from the current approach, as they do not see a viable alternative without risking another quagmire on the ground.

Administration officials insist that the top generals are not pushing to send in a large force of ground troops or to have special operations commandos embedded with Iraqi troops in combat.

“Our military is not pressing for this,” said a senior administration official familiar with policy discussions, adding that commanders mostly support the current approach.

Most Republican presidential candidates, who castigate Obama for his handling of the Islamic State and promise to take a tougher approach, are also not pressing for the deployment of U.S. combat forces.

Some of them have said they might send special operations forces to accompany Iraqi troops into battle, but the Republicans have offered few details about precisely what they would be willing to do differently and have sidestepped the question of how many years the United States may have to wage war against the Islamic State.

Only one candidate, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), has explicitly called for a major ground force, urging the deployment of at least 10,000 U.S. troops to Iraq and more to Syria.

Graham opposes any limits on U.S. military action against the Islamic State, and his spokesman, Kevin Bishop, said the senator would support “whatever it takes for as long as it takes.”

Democratic Sen. Tim Kaine of Virginia has argued for a more honest public debate about the open-ended war, but he blames the Republican-led Congress for failing to hold a vote to authorize the use of military force in Iraq and Syria, his office said.

“In my opinion, this is less about candor on the part of the administration and much more about twelve months of congressional abdication of its most solemn constitutional responsibility — whether or not to send our service members into harm’s way,” Kaine said in an email.

Gen. Joseph Dunford, who is due to take over from Dempsey as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in October, told lawmakers in July he agreed that a congressional vote to authorize force against the Islamic State would send a signal of unity to allies and adversaries while offering reassurance to troops in the field.

But Congress has opted against a vote that might entail a full-fledged debate on the war and the resources it will require. And the White House has made clear it will stay the course in its military campaign, with no major policy review in the works.

The administration, however, may be open to a more public discussion of the campaign. A senior administration official indicated that the White House may attempt to engage in a broader public discussion of the war later this year, after it is able to shift its focus from the upcoming congressional vote in September on the Iran nuclear agreement.

“Once we get through the Iran nuclear deal, it’s probably time to have a discussion about the broader Middle East,” the official said.