Think Tank Predicted Russian Cyberwar v. United States

Washington, D.C., May 3, 2017 – A Rand Corporation 1967 paper predicted many of the cyber dilemmas faced by policy makers today, and a 2017 expanded analysis of the “GRIZZLY STEPPE” hacking by Russian cyber operators disclosed key findings about the techniques the hackers used and ways to mitigate them, according to the National Security Archive publication today of 40+ highlighted primary sources from the critically-praised “Cyber Vault” at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/cybervault.

Compiled and edited by noted intelligence historian Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, the Cyber Vault collection of primary sources is growing by a dozen or more documents every week, and includes the declassified briefings provided by the National Security Agency to the George W. Bush and Barack Obama transition teams in 2000 and 2009, respectively.  The collection also includes a 2016 order from the U.S. Cyber Command to set up a unit with the mission of debilitating and destroying computer and communications operations of the terrorist group ISIS.

The Cyber Vault team obtained the 2016 order under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  The project has filed scores of other FOIA and declassification requests as part of a multi-year documentation contribution to the growing field of cyber studies, with the support of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

The 2000 transition briefing explicitly foreshadowed the Edward Snowden controversy, warning the new White House team that the 4th Amendment-protected communications of Americans were inextricably mixed with those of foreigners on the Internet.  The 2016 U.S. Cyber Command order established a joint task force designed to bring the resources of the Defense Department, Intelligence Community, and Justice Department to bear against the terrorist group that the Trump administration has since designated its top foreign policy priority.


Cyber Vault Highlights

By Jeffrey T. Richelson

On March 30, 2016, the National Security Archive opened its Cyber Vault, a repository of documents on all aspects of cyber activity – including computer network defense (and other other aspects of cybersecurity), computer network attack, and computer network exploitation. The more than 750 documents currently in the vault have been drawn from a variety of sources – Freedom of Information Act releases, websites of both U.S. federal and state government organizations, courts, foreign government organizations, NATO, government contractors, think-tanks, advocacy groups, and media websites (including Wikileaks and those that posted documents provided by Edward Snowden).

In addition to relying on a multitude of sources to populate the Cyber Vault, the Archive has sought to accumulate a diverse set of documents – which has guided its collection strategy. As a result, the Cyber Vault includes significant documents from the 1960s and each subsequent decade, on cyber organization, on policy and strategy, on domestic and foreign cyber activities, on cybersecurity requirements, and on cyber crimes and the related investigations. Also included are intelligence assessments and theses. The documents also represent a spectrum of classifications, from unclassified, to formerly classified, and – in the cases of Wikileaks and Snowden documents – currently classified documents. Many of the documents cut across a number of categories.

Among the documents represented from the 1960s and 1970s are two seminal papers.  One is Willis Ware’s 1967 effort, Secrecy and Privacy in Computer Systems (Document 1), written for the RAND Corporation, and one of the very first systematic approaches to information leakage, security, and privacy. The other (Document 2), produced by a staff member of Britain’s signals intelligence agency, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), represents the initial development of public key cryptography – although it was not declassified until years after the concept had been made public by American mathematicians.

That document is also one of several illustrating or concerning foreign government cyber efforts. A much more recent GCHQ product (Document 29) was one of the documents provided to Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras by Edward Snowden – a briefing on efforts to deanonymize users of The Onion Router (TOR) network, which had been developed by  members of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (Document 32) as a means of protecting online communications. Chinese cyber organization, policy, and operations are covered, collectively, by two documents – an unclassified paper (Document 36) produced under the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and a Top Secret codeword NSA briefing (Document 24) on the People Republic of China’s computer network exploitation activity. Current Russian cyber activities are discussed in an extract (Document 35) from the controversial “Trump Dossier,” written by a former British Secret Intelligence Service officer.

Other documents concern hostile cyber activities from an earlier era. One, from 1998  (Document 12) provides information to the then director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, concerning the SOLAR SUNRISE investigation concerning intrusions into at least 11 unclassified DoD Computer systems at various locations in the United States. Another FBI memo (Document 13), concerns a 1999 investigation into intrusions into computer systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, and Germany – an investigation which took some of the investigators to Moscow. In a newly released portion, it discusses possible response to intrusions – including the creation of “honeypots” containing “beacon” files.

In addition to being the victim of intrusions, the U.S. has also debated and formulated policy, granted authority over, and conducted intrusions in pursuit of national security objectives. In March 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen assigned the responsibility for computer network attack and exploitation to the National Security Agency in a short memo (Document 10). During that Spring a senior NSA official addressed the issue of cyberwar in a Secret article (Document 11) in a NSA journal. Many years later, according to a number of accounts, U.S. and Israeli cyber personnel were able to penetrate industrial control systems associated with the Iranian nuclear program and damage centrifuges that could produce weapons-grade material. While there have been no publicly released executive branch documents concerning the “Stuxnet” operation, it has been the subject of reports by RAND and the Congressional Research Service. (Document 26).

Concern over possible Russian intrusion into U.S. computer systems related to elections became a significant subject of discussion in the 2016 presidential election. Apprehensions over the possibility of such intrusions go back at least a decade. A December 2007 report (Document 20) was commissioned by Ohio’s Secretary of State, and contained disturbing results about the vulnerability of Ohio’s electronic voting systems. In the wake of a poorly-received, brief analysis of alleged Russian cyber activity related to the 2016 election, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center produced more detailed examination (Document 41) of the GRIZZLY STEPPE activity.

By the time the DHS report was issued, President Trump had been presented with a draft executive order on cybersecurity (Document 40 ), which would undoubtedly have been the first of a significant number of presidential actions on cybersecurity – just as President Obama had signed a number of cyber-related executive orders and presidential directives, including one (Document 34) that established a Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. Ultimately, the Trump draft order became the first in a series of drafts, and no order has yet been signed.

Other highlight documents include:

    • A 1979 exploration (Document 5) in an NSA journal on computer system vulnerabilities
    • A 1996 treatment (Document 9) of the threat to computer systems from human Intelligence operations.
    • A 2001 memo (Document 15) from the director of NSA concerning a major computer outage at the agency.
    • A 2008 Director of National Intelligence cyber counterintelligence plan (Document 21).
    • A 2016 USCYBERCOM order (Document 37) to establish a task force to combat ISIS in cyber space
    • A 2016 examination (Document 38) of cyber threats to nuclear weapons systems.
    • A 2016 DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis briefing (Document 39) on cyber threats to the homeland

 

Bayrock in Money Laundering Scheme

Trump business partner accused of involvement in Dutch-based money laundering scheme

  • sater-en-trump

    Dutch letter box companies implicated in million-dollar fraud

    The American real estate development company Bayrock, through which Donald Trump constructed hotels and apartment complexes, used Dutch letter box companies in a network suspected of being involved in money laundering. A ZEMBLA investigation suggests that Bayrock siphoned off $1.5 million dollars by setting up a corporate structure in the Netherlands in 2007. In New York, Bayrock also stands accused of large-scale tax fraud. This incriminating information could place Donald Trump in an extremely difficult position, claims attorney F. Oberlander, who is prosecuting Bayrock on behalf of the State of New York: “The maximum jail term would be 30 years. So you’re in really serious trouble.”

    In 2005, Donald Trump became 18% owner of an hotel-condominium known as Trump SoHo. Bayrock, the other owner, is accused of perpetrating fraud on a grand scale through, among other things, Trump SoHo. According to US law, this means that Trump is jointly liable for Bayrock’s criminal activities. Oberlander concludes:
    “Anybody running a business through a pattern of crime is guilty of racketeering. Anybody knowing what they’re doing and are helping is guilty of racketeering conspiracy. They go to jail.”

    All Bayrock wants is to make clear to ZEMBLA that the Dutch corporate construction was established on the advice of an external legal counsel. ZEMBLA discovers that the firm in question is Bracewell & Giuliani. Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York, and part owner of the law firm at the time, is also a Trump confidante. ZEMBLA has access to correspondence between the law firm and the Dutch director of a trust company in Amsterdam, which leaves no doubt as to the ultimate beneficiary owners of the Dutch business construction: the director of Bayrock and the Khrapunov family from Kazakhstan.

    Viktor Khrapunov is a fugitive ex-mayor and governor from Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstan government accuses Khrapunov of embezzling hundreds of millions of state assets. In 2007, Bayrock and the Khrapunov family founded the Dutch joint venture KazBay B.V. ZEMBLA has copies of the act of incorporation, bank statements and internal communications showing how the suspected money laundering scheme was set up. “It was designed to get millions of dollars out of New York into Europe. Through KazBay. KazBay was just a conduit”, asserts attorney Oberlander.

    The Dutch director of KazBay B.V. tells ZEMBLA that he has no knowledge of his clients’ dubious backgrounds. In 2007, the year that the Dutch letter box companies were established, Viktor Khrapunov’s alleged criminal dealings become public knowledge. Around the same time, it also becomes clear that Felix Sater, one of the Bayrock owners, has concealed his criminal past and mafia connections.

    Image result for felix sater

    For years, the Dutch Central Bank has been concerned that Dutch trust companies are failing to comply with legislation. Over half of the companies investigated by the Dutch Central Bank are in breach of the regulations, such as subjecting their clients to rigorous screening. Investigations performed by the supervisory body reveal that hundreds of politicians from Russia and Kazakhstan make use of Dutch trust companies. Frank Elderson, director of the Dutch Central Bank: “There are no legal stipulations forcing you to do business with a former political hot-shot from Russia or any other high risk nation.”

    Six months ago, the Financial Times reported that, in 2013, the Khrapunov family had bought three apartments in Trump SoHo to the tune of 3.1 million dollars. A sale from which Trump benefitted as joint owner. The White House, the Trump Organization and Viktor Khrapunov decline to answer ZEMBLA’s questions. In the episode ‘The Dubious Friends of Donald Trump: Part 1 – the Russians’, ZEMBLA explores the possible implications of these shady business dealings for the United States’ 45th president.

     

*** More on the letter box issue:  Related reading/ EU to close ‘letterbox’ company tax loopholes

“Nearly one-third of all foreign profits reported by US corporations in 2003 came from just three small, low-tax countries: Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Ireland,” said a White House factsheet in 2009. Like the Queen in Shakespeare’s ‘Hamlet’ who protested that ‘The lady doth protest too much, methinks,’ the Dutch government hypocritically objected to the Netherlands being dubbed a tax haven and the White House deleted the line. The Dutch tax haven, has about 20,000 letter-box companies and in recent years, Facebook joined U2, the Irish rock group, to avail of the system. The Netherlands also hosts thousands of foreign financial vehicles. Bloomberg reports that a bookkeeper’s home office in Amsterdam, doubles as the headquarters for a Yahoo! Inc. offshore unit.  It says as a deficit-strapped Europe raises retirement ages and taxes on the working class, the Netherlands’ role as a $13tn relay station on the global tax-avoiding network is prompting a backlash.

Bloomberg says that attracted by the Netherlands’ lenient policies and extensive network of tax treaties, companies such as Yahoo, Google, Merck & Co and Dell have moved profits through the country. Using techniques with nicknames such as the “Dutch Sandwich,” multinational companies routed €10.2tn in 2010 through 14,300 Dutch “special financial units,” according to the Dutch Central Bank. Such units often only exist on paper, as is allowed by law.

Google, IBM and Italian oil and gas group ENI head the list of companies using letter-box companies to cut their Dutch tax bills to between 0 and 5%, the Volkskrant daily said last week.

Trump, Peace Deal with Palestinians, Easy

So far there has been no read out if Trump asked or rather demanded that the Palestinian authority to stop paying families of terrorists.

The PA, which receives millions in funding from U.S. taxpayers, spends roughly 8 percent of its annual budget, some $300 million a year, on salaries for terrorists who are imprisoned in Israel as well as the families of terrorists who attacked the Jewish state.

Mahmood Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority met with President Trump at the White House. Abbas brought the following people with him:

So who are these people?

Well Usama Qawasmeh in April of last year said that the West sponsors Islamic extremism and that 9/11 was no coincidence.

Saeb Erikat was one of the negotiators of the Oslo Accords and said there will never be peace if Trump moves the embassy to Jerusalem.

Ziad Abu Amr is an author, negotiator and foreign minister in charge of economics for Gaza. By the way, he was educated at Georgetown.

Hosso Zomlot is the Palestinian ambassador to the United States and continues to broadcast Israel as an occupier while declaring a two state solution is an international responsibility.

Ahmad Assaf, in 2011 said: ‘if armed resistance can accomplish the goals of the Palestinian people, we will not hesitate even for a second.’

***

So there was a working lunch at the Trump White House.

Working lunch with discussions of economic and trade opportunities?

“I’m committed to working with Israel and the Palestinians to reach an agreement,” Trump said. “I will do whatever is necessary to facilitate the agreement.”

Acknowledging an Israeli-Palestinian accord is seen as the “toughest deal to make,” Trump told Abbas, “Perhaps we can prove them wrong” – before heading into a meeting with the Palestinian Authority president.

Abbas told Trump moments earlier, “Mr. President, with you we have hope.”

The peace process has been stalled since 2014 when former Secretary of State John Kerry’s effort to lead the sides into peace talks collapsed. Since then, there have been no serious attempts to get negotiations restarted. The Obama administration spent its last months in office attempting to preserve conditions for an eventual resumption.

“We hope this will be a new beginning,” Abbas told Palestinians at a meeting in Washington on the eve of the talks.

During remarks alongside Trump at the White House, Abbas – through a translator – stressed that his people want a Palestinian state with the capital of East Jerusalem and borders along the pre-1967 lines.

Israel rejects the 1967 lines as a possible border, saying it would impose grave security risks.

Trump stressed that there can be no lasting peace unless Palestinian leaders speak in a unified voice against “incitement … to violence and hate.”

He also was expected to press Abbas to end payments to families of Palestinians killed or held in Israeli jails, which critics decry as payments for terrorism. Republicans lawmakers have urged a halt to such payments.

While Abbas will be challenged on the payments, officials said Trump will reiterate his belief that Israeli settlement construction on land claimed by the Palestinians does not advance peace prospects.

In his Wednesday comments, Abbas also criticized ideas for a “one state” peace agreement, saying it could mean “racial discrimination” or an apartheid-like system.

In a February news conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump broke with longtime U.S. policy by raising the one-state idea and withholding clear support for an independent Palestine, though officials quickly stressed he would support any arrangement agreed by the two sides.

Another contentious issue: Trump’s campaign promise to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The symbolic relocation would essentially recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Abbas and other Arab leaders have said doing so would inflame already simmering tensions.

Since taking office, Trump has backed away from the pledge while saying he’s still discussing it. On Tuesday, Vice President Mike Pence said the White House was giving “serious consideration” to the idea. More here.

DHS’s Office for Community Partnerships, Stonewalling

Release Date:
September 28, 2015  <– Note Jeh Johnson created this department

DHS: Violent extremism – that which is inspired by foreign terrorist groups and that which is rooted in a range of domestic-based radical ideologies – pose a persistent and unpredictable threat to our homeland. Countering violent extremism has become a key focus of DHS’s work to secure the homeland. Last year I appointed a Department-wide coordinator for our efforts to counter violent extremism. As Secretary of Homeland Security, I am also personally committed to this mission, having traveled to Boston, Chicago, Columbus, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New York City, northern Virginia and suburban Maryland to meet with community leaders as part of this effort. We heard many strongly-held views, generated conversations, and built some bridges.

It is now time to take our efforts to the next level.

Today I announce the creation of the DHS Office for Community Partnerships. This Office will be dedicated to the mission of countering violent extremism, but its ultimate mission is as its name suggests – community partnerships. My charge to this Office, to be set forth in a more detailed plan, is to continue to build relationships and promote trust, and, in addition, find innovative ways to support communities that seek to discourage violent extremism and undercut terrorist narratives. More here.

Problem? Either DHS was told to hide documents, not cooperate, there is collusion or the Obama White House applied executive privilege to the documents.

Just before Jeh Johnson left as Secretary of DHS:

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010

In 2016, Congress answered our call for federal grants, awarded and administered by the Department of Homeland Security, to support local efforts to counter violent extremism. Today, I am pleased to announce the first round of awards of these grants.

A total of 31 proposals, from various organizations in multiple communities, have been accepted to receive some part of the $10 million appropriated by Congress last year. The funding will go for activities that include intervention, developing resilience, challenging the narrative, and building capacity. The organizations approved for grants include local governments, universities, and non-profit organizations, in locations across the country such as Boston, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Detroit, Nebraska, Houston, Illinois, New Jersey, Texas and New York City. Among the awardees are organizations devoted specifically to countering ISIL’s recruitment efforts in our homeland, and Life After Hate, an organization devoted to the rehabilitation of former neo-Nazis and other domestic extremists in this country. More here.

The lawsuit is found here.

Background:

Philadelphia – May 1, 2017 – The Middle East Forum has filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to secure the release of documents related to the Obama administration’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) grant program.

The grant program, which began last year, is intended to assist “efforts at the community level to counter violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence,” but MEF was concerned about U.S. Islamist groups – themselves radicals – receiving CVE funds. Indeed, grant recipients have included the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), an organization with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and a long history of sanitizing Islamist terrorism.

On January 10, MEF filed a detailed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with DHS seeking documents about the selection criteria and specific decisions in awarding CVE grants. The request indicated that the documents are mostly located at the DHS Office for Community Partnerships (OCP), headed by George Selim.

Having failed to receive even a response to its request within the 20-day period mandated by law, MEF contacted DHS. Finally, on March 23, DHS FOIA officer Ebony Livingston informed us that the request had been routed to the Federal Emergency Management System (FEMA), which found no pertinent records.

On April 26, MEF filed a lawsuit alleging that DHS violated the law by not only failing to produce the documents, but failing even to conduct a search for the documents.

The complaint, prepared by attorney Matt Hardin, a specialist in FOIA litigation, seeks injunctive relief compelling DHS “to search for and produce all records in its possession responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request.”

“We filed a detailed FOIA request, specifying the documents we were looking for and where they likely were,” said MEF Director Gregg Roman. “DHS not only failed to produce the documents, it failed even to conduct a search and closed our case without bothering to tell us. This is not just unacceptable but illegal.”

The case has been assigned to Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. It bears noting that Judge Lamberth previously handled FOIA litigation concerning former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emails.

“The CVE program should be canceled altogether,” said Sam Westrop, director of MEF’s Islamist Watch project. “And guidelines should be put in place to make sure that extremist groups like MPAC never receive taxpayer money to counter extremism.”

The Even Darker side of the Downward Spiral, Venezuela

Primer: It is just a few days ago, that Russia was muscling the United States with regard to policy in Venezuela. Really Moscow?

Image result for venezuela protests ABC

Russia Warns Against US Interference in Venezuela, Calls for Dialogue

Russia’s foreign ministry voiced its concern over violence by right-wing protests in Venezuela while rebuking recent threats by the U.S. Southern Command, saying these would only stoke violence and ultimately act against U.S. interests. More here.

Meanwhile: Venezuela’s state-run oil company, PDVSA, sent a tanker in October to the Caribbean with the expectation that its cargo of crude would fetch about $20 million – money the crisis-stricken nation desperately needs.

Instead, the owner of the tanker, the Russian state-owned shipping conglomerate Sovcomflot, held the oil in hopes of collecting partial payment on $30 million that it says PDVSA owes for unpaid shipping fees.

Despite a longstanding alliance between Venezuela and Russia, Sovcomflot sued PDVSA in St. Maarten, a Dutch island on the northeast end of the Caribbean.

“The ship owners … imposed garnishment on the aforementioned oil cargo,” reads a March decision by the St. Maarten court.

Five months after crossing the Caribbean, the NS Columbus discharged its cargo of crude at a storage terminal on St. Eustatius, an island just south of St. Maarten, under a temporary decision by the court. Another tribunal in England will decide if Sovcomflot will ultimately take the oil.

***

Update: Reuters: A prison riot in Venezuela’s eastern state of Anzoategui has left at least 12 people dead and 11 wounded, a spokesman at the Prisons Ministry said on Wednesday, the latest incident in the crisis-hit country’s overcrowded and violent jail system.

Venezuela’s public prosecutor’s office said it was investigating the deaths of “several” inmates on Tuesday during a shootout between the prisoners at the Jose Antonio Anzoategui prison.

Critics have said that Venezuela’s prisons are controlled by gangs with ready access to machine guns and even hand grenades.

“There are 12 people dead, nine shot, two due to drug overdoses, and one due to multiple injuries,” the spokesman told Reuters, asking not to be identified by name because he was not authorized to speak to media about the riot.

“It’s a prison that was going through a transition … the clashes were between those who wanted it and those who didn’t,” the official said in reference to a government push to end overcrowding and weapons in jails.

Further details were not immediately available. It was not immediately clear if all the dead were inmates.

Venezuela is one of the world’s most violent countries and inmates often plan kidnappings and robberies from their cells.

 Dark Times in Venezuela Signal Bright Future for Organized Crime

Venezuela Today

The social unrest in Venezuela over the last two weeks has been the most widespread since Leopoldo López, the opposition leader, was arrested and subsequently imprisoned by the administration of President Nicolás Maduro in 2015.

The latest anti-government demonstrations were sparked by a decision by the country’s Supreme Court, which is controlled by the regime, to nullify the National Assembly, which is dominated by the opposition. The Supreme Court later backtracked, but it was too late — critics of the regime had been emboldened once again by the audacious move. Luisa Ortega Díaz, the country’s attorney general and traditionally a supporter of Maduro, also condemned the Supreme Court’s attempt to consolidate power, further eroding Maduro’s legitimacy.

Their indignation was stoked by the move a few days later to ban Henrique Capriles, a prominent member of the opposition, from politics for 15 years. Capriles, who has run twice as a presidential candidate, is one of the opposition’s strongest hopes for winning presidential elections against Maduro’s United Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela – PSUV) at the end of 2018.

A chronic economic recession in Venezuela has provoked sky-high inflation, shortages of basic foods and goods, and a collapse in the health and education systems. Maduro’s popularity has dropped steadily, yet the Venezuelan people have so far showed incredible tolerance for what many of them have been reduced to — searching for food in the trash, waiting for hours in line to buy basic goods, often at inflated prices, and scouring the country for black market medicines as they watch their family members suffer and even die.

But the current economic and social predicament has had another sinister consequence: It has fed the growth of criminality and organized crime to unprecedented levels.

Venezuela’s homicide rate is one of the highest in the world, and Caracas is now the deadliest city on earth. New forms of organized crime have emerged in the country’s prisons, within its armed forces and on its streets in the form of megabandas since Hugo Chávez took power in 1999. Drug trafficking has penetrated the highest levels of the current regime, all the way up to the family of President Maduro. Armed, civilian groups known as colectivos, which were embraced and nurtured by Chávez as defenders of the revolution, have gone rogue and are increasingly supporting themselves through criminal earnings. Unbridled corruption has allowed for kleptocrats to plunder the country’s public coffers via artificial exchange rates and the state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA).

Below, we look at some possible future scenarios and their implications for organized crime.

The Regime Remains or Renews

Criminal elements within the regime and outside it would like nothing more than to maintain the status quo.

The armed forces are the muscle and political backbone of the sitting government. Out of Maduro’s 32 government ministers, 11 of them are acting or retired military officers. Some have been sanctioned or indicted by the United States for their links to drug trafficking (see graphic below). The armed forces have deepened their role in transnational cocaine trafficking since 1999, in part as a direct result of political decisions by Hugo Chávez, and profit from other criminal incomes such as the sale of government-subsidized contraband petrol on the Colombian border and the process of food distribution, of which they are in charge. The National Guard controls the nation’s borders, airports and ports and has been implicated in some of the biggest cocaine seizures in recent years.

Venezuela-Gov Drugs insightcrime

Criminality isn’t just limited to military members of the government. Vice President Tareck El-Aissami was recently sanctioned by the United States for his alleged role in drug trafficking, dating back to his time as governor of the state of Aragua.

Should Maduro decide to fall on his sword, El Aissami is in line to replace him as president. That could result in a political shakeup and give the regime a chance to renew itself with some internal changes and shifts. If El Aissami changed tack on the regime’s economic policies and reversed some of the damage done in recent years, he could improve the PSUV’s chance of winning presidential elections at the end of next year — something that Maduro almost certainly couldn’t pull off at this stage.

It is unclear, however, which way El Aissami, a party hardliner, would go if he became president, and his status as a suspected drug trafficker might not inspire new confidence in Venezuelans already sick of corruption and the abuse of power within the current system.

For other criminal elements, maintaining the status quo remains the best option. The armed pro-government colectivos, many of which are perceived as violent thugs by those living in territories they control, depend utterly on the socialist regime for their survival. InSight Crime investigations in the 23 de Enero neighborhood of Caracas, once a bastion of Chavismo, show that these groups are increasingly profiting from criminal activities such as extortion and micro-trafficking.

They are also involved in anti-crime raids, known as Operation Liberation and Protection of the People (Operación de Liberación y Protección del Pueblo – OLP), in which they work alongside state security forces to supress criminal groups and megabandas.

Those raids were instigated as the result of the government’s failed “peace zone” policy, which handed swathes of territory over to the criminal gangs that occupied them. In effect, the plan made megabandas the de facto law in those areas, because security forces were prohibited from entering without prior permission. Many of those peace zones still exist. Although the megabandas openly attack patrols and headquarters of Venezuelan security forces, and have been forced to regroup following the elimination of many of their original leaders, they continue to run their criminal economies that include extortion, kidnapping, contract killing and micro-trafficking.

As for the country’s prisons, criminal business has never been so good, even though violence and overcrowding are serious human rights problems. The creation in 2011 of a Ministry of Penitentiary Services effectively handed governance of the country’s jails to the powerful bosses on the inside, known as “pranes,” who now run them like their own fiefdoms. Violence remains one of the main means of maintaining control.

The Regime and the Opposition Form a Joint Government

The decision to reverse the Supreme Court ruling to annul the National Assembly could be a sign that the Maduro administration is faltering. The Miami Herald reported this week that the president has secretly offered the opposition a deal that would result in regional elections supposed to take place this year, in which the opposition looks set to win a strong foothold.

Given the hostility between the government and the opposition, and the failure of Vatican-monitored talks at the end of last year, this seems like the least likely scenario. Should it happen, it is likely to be thwarted by infighting and disagreement between the different sides. The coalition would have to come to an agreement on long-term and fundamental issues such as the role of the military in the country, security, the prison system and economic controls.

In this unlikely scenario, the main casualty could be the colectivos, which the Maduro administration might be forced to call to heel as a condition of a joint government. They may have limits put on their weapons as well as their role as repressors of the media and critical protests. Other than that, there would be little change on the ground in the short term as far as criminal dynamics are concerned.

Armed Forces Stage a Coup or Force Maduro into a Political Transition

The importance of the support of the armed forces for President Maduro and the regime cannot be overstated. But factions have turned against the regime before, as was seen in the failed coup against Hugo Chávez in 2002, which removed him from power for a couple of days.

In the short term, the colectivos and the military itself would be the criminal elements most impacted by a move by parts of the military to force Maduro’s hand. The armed forces would want to assure their place at the table in the new government, and might offer the colectivos — who are despised and feared by the opposition — as a sacrificial lamb.

“Colectivos really imagine themselves as being put on the offing block as sacrificed pawns in a negotiated context,” Alejandro Velasco, author of the book Barrio Rising, told InSight Crime. “They very much imagine that the struggle to come is going to be a struggle, not against the opposition, but really against the military in the context of survival. Both of them are kind of in a maneuvre for survivability in a transition context.”

Should this scenario arise, the political uncertainty it could generate might push the reality on the streets in Venezuela to get worse before improving. It would have little immediate negative impact on the megabandas or the criminal enterprises being run in the prisons. If anything, criminality and impunity would only increase, giving these elements more freedom of movement. Longer-term, an administration capable of governing could take steps to curb their criminal freedoms and fiefdoms.

SEE ALSO: Venezuela News and Profiles

The military, as broker and mediator, would have to make some concessions of its own. Should the armed forces be involved in brokering or forcing this potential transition, implicit in its negotiations would be the continuation of its stewardship of the country’s ports, borders and airports — a fundamental element of its role in profiting from transnational organized crime.

The amount of coca and cocaine being produced in neighboring Colombia is booming, and the network of Venezuelan military officials involved in the drug trade, known loosely as the Cartel of the Suns, would want to keep its interests safe.

But heads would have to roll as part of a change in government, and many on the chopping block would be those military officials seen as being the most corrupt and most loyal to the socialist regime. There is little doubt, however, that they would be replaced with others equally willing to profit from their power and position in this key transit nation in the global cocaine trafficking industry.