Category Archives: FBI

Trump Signs New Sanctions on Iran

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For more information on Iran sanctions, go here.

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U.S. Treasury Department Announces New Sanctions On Iran

 

NPR: The U.S. Treasury Department announced additional sanctions on Iran on Friday, less than a week after a ballistic missile test prompted the Trump administration to accuse Iran of violating an international a weapons agreement.

The newly announced sanctions target people and businesses the U.S. government says support Iran’s ballistic missile program and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, according to a Treasury Department statement. They are in line with previous sanctions, implemented over what then-President Barack Obama called Iran’s “violations of human rights, for its support of terrorism and for its ballistic missile program.”

The acting director of the Treasury unit in charge of sanctions, John Smith, said the latest sanctions do not violate the international nuclear deal reached with Iran in 2015, which required Iran to scale back its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of some economic sanctions.

A top Treasury Department official tells NPR’s Michele Kelemen that the actions are part of the U.S. efforts to counter Iranian “malign activity abroad.”

The public text of the sanctions lists 12 companies and 13 individuals, blocking assets and prohibiting U.S. citizens from dealing with them. Among the individuals, four are listed as Iranian citizens, two are Lebanese, one is Chinese, and one holds a passport from the island nation of St. Kitts and Nevis. It also announced changes to previous, unrelated sanctions on a 14th individual.

The businesses are based both inside and outside Iran.

According to the Treasury Department, the sanctions target:

“several networks and supporters of Iran’s ballistic missile procurement, including a critical Iranian procurement agent and eight individuals and entities in his Iran- and China-based network, an Iranian procurement company and its Gulf-based network, and five individuals and entities that are part of an Iran-based procurement network.”

Hours before the sanctions were announced, President Trump addressed Iran in a tweet, writing, “Iran is playing with fire — they don’t appreciate how ‘kind’ President Obama was to them. Not me!”

Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, tweeted an hour later that “we will never use our weapons against anyone, except in self-defense.”

***

We will never use our weapons against anyone, except in self-defense. Let us see if any of those who complain can make the same statement.

Both U.S. and Iranian officials weighed in on whether Sunday’s missile test broke the terms of the nuclear deal.

Acting State Department spokesman Mark Toner told The Associated Press on Monday that the U.S. was looking into whether the test violated a 2015 side agreement to the nuclear accord, and that the U.S. would “hold Iran accountable” if it did.

Zarif said Tuesday, that “the missile issue is not part of the nuclear deal.”

National Security Adviser Mike Flynn said a day later that former President Barack Obama had gone too easy on Iran, but that “as of today, we are officially putting Iran on notice.”

Flynn also listed the administration’s grievances with Tehran, including its test of a ballistic missile and what he said were attacks by proxy forces in Yemen on U.S. and Middle Eastern ships, as we reported.

One of the incidents he appeared to be referring to occurred in October 2016, when U.S. Navy ships off Yemen’s southwestern coast came under missile attacks twice in four days.

According to the Pentagon, the missiles came from an area controlled by Houthi forces, who are fighting against the government of Yemen and who the U.S. government says are backed by the Iranian government, which is supplying weapons to the rebel group.

But it was unclear who ordered October’s missile launches, as NPR’s Philip Ewing reported. Houthi leaders denied the attacks, and Tehran has denied U.S. accusations that Iran is supporting Houthi forces. Nonetheless, the U.S. carried out airstrikes against what the Pentagon said were radar installations in Houthi-controlled areas.

In December, Congress extended U.S. sanctions against Iran originally imposed in 1996 until 2026.

Homeland Security Protection Measures on the Move

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These legislative actions have long been sitting on desk tops waiting for the right moment to introduce and pass, now over to the Senate. When fully passed, it will be a great launch of additional security for the new DHS Secretary, John Kelly.

House Passes 17 Sweeping Bipartisan Bills to Enhance Homeland Security

Assuring that the “House Committee on Homeland Security continues its efforts to shield the homeland and protect Americans right out of the gate in the 115th Congress,” committee chairman Michael McCaul’s (R-TX) office said Tuesday “the House passed 17 Committee bills that touch on a wide array of homeland security issues—from the security of our border, transportation and cyber networks, to counterterrorism, first responder capabilities and ensuring the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] runs efficiently.

“The 17 bills that passed the House today are all unified in their purpose to better protect our homeland and our people,” McCaul said in a statement, noting, “These bills improve our border security, transportation security and cybersecurity defenses, enhance first responder capabilities and streamline the management efficiency of [DHS]. My committee is working to get common sense legislation signed into law as soon as possible and make our country safer by doing so.”

Six of the bills passed Tuesday were sponsored by Democrats, Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS), ranking member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, pointed out.

Thompson said his legislation, the “Department of Homeland Security Clearance Management and Administration Act … which previously passed the House in 2015, makes specific reforms in how DHS identifies positions that warrant clearances, how it investigates and homeland security manages its security clearance processes. Specifically, it addresses dates for clearances, and how it administers its adjudications, denials, suspensions, revocations and appeals processes.”

“This legislation … seeks to improve how DHS manages its clearance process at all stages—from decisions on whether to designate positions as requiring clearances to ensuring uniformity in how clearances are adjudicated, suspended, denied and revoked. My bill will make DHS a leader among federal agencies with respect to security clearance and position designations practices. It is critical we put DHS on a path to right-sizing the number of classified positions in its workforce. I thank my colleagues for supporting it and urge the Senate to recognize the necessity to pass this legislation.”

The 17 passed by the full House include:

The DHS Acquisition Documentation Integrity Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ). It would require the DHS Secretary to request component heads to maintain specific types of acquisition documentation.

The DHS Stop Asset and Vehicle Excess (SAVE) Act, introduced by Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA), would direct the Under Secretary for Management of the Department of Homeland Security to make certain improvements in managing DHS’s vehicle fleet.

The Medical Preparedness Allowable Use Act, introduced by Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to codify authority under existing grant guidance authorizing the use of Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland Security Grant Program funding for enhancing medical preparedness, medical surge capacity and mass prophylaxis capabilities.

The Border Security Technology Accountability Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Martha McSally (R-AZ), would strengthen accountability for deployment of border security technology at DHS and for other purposes.

The Counterterrorism Advisory Board Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. John Katko (R-NY), would establish a board in the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate and integrate departmental intelligence, activities, and policy related to counterterrorism.

The Transit Security Grant Program Flexibility Act, introduced by Rep. Dan Donovan (R-NY), would clarify certain allowable uses of funds for public transportation security assistance grants and establish periods of performance for such grants, and for other purposes.

The Cyber Preparedness Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Dan Donovan (R-NY), would enhance preparedness and response capabilities for cyberattacks and bolsters the sharing of information related to cyber threats.

The United States-Israel Cybersecurity Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. James Langevin (D-RI), would establish a grant program at DHS to promote cooperative research and development between the United States and Israel on cybersecurity.

The Fusion Center Enhancement Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Lou Barletta (R-PA), would enhance the partnership between DHS and the National Network of Fusion Centers.

The Securing the Cities Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Dan Donovan (R-NY) would establish the Securing the Cities program, which will enhance the ability of the United States to detect and prevent terrorist attacks and other high consequence events utilizing nuclear or other radiological materials that pose a high risk to homeland security in high-risk urban areas.

The Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Act, introduced by Rep. William Keating (D-MA), would require the Transportation Security Administration to update risk assessments at airports—specifically along airport perimeters and points of access to secure areas—and report to Congress strategic plans to increase security measures.

The Department of Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Peter King (R-NY), would require the DHS Secretary to establish an insider threat program within the department.

The CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Martha McSally (R-AZ), would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear intelligence and information sharing functions of DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and to require dissemination of information analyzed by the department to entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security.

The Department of Homeland Security Support to Fusion Centers Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Martha McSally (R-AZ), would require an assessment of fusion center personnel needs.

The First Responder Access to Innovative Technologies Act, introduced by Rep. Donald Payne Jr. (D-NJ), reported this week by Homeland Security Today, would direct FEMA to develop a uniform process for reviewing grant applications seeking to purchase equipment or systems that do not meet or exceed applicable national voluntary consensus standards using funds from the Urban Area Security Initiative or the State Homeland Security Grant Program.

The Gains in Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Act, introduced by Rep. Cedric Richmond (D-LA), would direct DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to develop and maintain documentation that provides information on how the Office’s research investments align with gaps in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and the research challenges identified by the DNDO Director.

The Department of Homeland Security Clearance Management and Administration Act, introduced by Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS), would improve the management and administration of the security clearance processes throughout DHS.

The House also passed the First Responder Identification of Emergency Needs in Disaster Situations Act sponsored by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX).

*** When it comes to cyber and cyber protections, things are not so rosy.

The extent to which the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) has taken steps to perform each of its 11 statutorily required cybersecurity functions — such as being a federal civilian interface for sharing cybersecurity-related information with federal and nonfederal entities — the degree to which the center has adhered to the 9 principles required by the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 to perform its cybersecurity functions “is unclear because the center has not yet determined the applicability of the principles to all 11 functions, or established metrics and methods by which to evaluate its performance against the principles,” according to new Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit report.

NCCIC manages programs that provide data used in developing 43 products and services in support of its functions, including monitoring network traffic entering and exiting federal agency networks, and analyzing computer network vulnerabilities and threats. NCCIC products and services also are provided to its customers in the private sector; federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government entities; and other partner organizations. For example, NCCIC issues indicator bulletins, which can contain information related to cyber threat indicators, defensive measures and cybersecurity risks and incidents, and help to fulfill its function to coordinate the sharing of such information across the government.

GAO reported it “identified instances where NCCIC had implemented its functions in accordance with one or more of the principles. For example, consistent with the principle that it seek and receive appropriate consideration from industry sector-specific, academic, and national laboratory expertise, NCCIC coordinated with contacts from industry, academia and the national laboratories to develop and disseminate vulnerability alerts.”

But, “On the other hand,” GAO said it “also identified instances where the cybersecurity functions were not performed in accordance with the principles. For example, NCCIC is to provide timely technical assistance, risk management support and incident response capabilities to federal and nonfederal entities; however, it had not established measures or other procedures for ensuring the timeliness of these assessments. Until NCCIC determines the applicability of the principles to its functions and develops metrics and methods to evaluate its performance against the principles, the center cannot ensure that it is effectively meeting its statutory requirements.”

GAO said it further “identified factors that impede NCCIC’s ability to more efficiently perform several of its cybersecurity functions. For example, NCCIC officials were unable to completely track and consolidate cyber incidents reported to the center, thereby inhibiting its ability to coordinate the sharing of information across the government. Similarly, NCCIC may not have ready access to the current contact information for all owners and operators of the most critical cyber-dependent infrastructure assets. This lack could impede timely communication with them in the event of a cyber incident.”

GAO warned that, “Until NCCIC takes steps to overcome these impediments, it may not be able to efficiently perform its cybersecurity functions and assist federal and nonfederal entities in identifying cyber-based threats, mitigating vulnerabilities and managing cyber risks.”

In its written comments on a draft of GAO’s audit, DHS concurred with all nine recommendations.

DHS “also provided details about steps that it plans to take to address each of the recommendations, including estimated time frames for completion. If effectively implemented, these actions should enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of NCCIC in performing its statutory requirements,” GAO reported.

To more fully address the requirements identified in the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 and the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, GAO recommended that the DHS Secretary take the following nine actions:

  1. Determine the extent to which the statutorily required implementing principles apply to NCCIC’s cybersecurity functions.
  2. Develop metrics for assessing adherence to applicable principles in carrying out statutorily required functions.
  3. Establish methods for monitoring the implementation of cybersecurity functions against the principles on an ongoing basis.
  4. Integrate information related to security incidents to provide management with more complete information about NCCIC operations.
  5. Determine the necessity of reducing, consolidating, or modifying the points of entry used to communicate with NCCIC to better ensure that all incident tickets are logged appropriately.
  6. Develop and implement procedures to perform regular reviews of customer information to ensure that it is current and reliable.
  7. Take steps to ensure the full representation of the owners and operators of the nation’s most critical cyber-dependent infrastructure assets.
  8. Establish plans and time frames for consolidating or integrating the legacy networks used by NCCIC analysts to reduce the need for manual data entry.
  9. Identify alternative methods to collaborate with international partners, while ensuring the security requirements of high-impact systems.

 

Russian Hacking, We knew Because we had an Inside Operative(s)

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This Executive Order is in draft form and does not include Russia, which is quite curious. The question of ‘why’ must be asked based on information noted below.

The Trump administration’s draft of the executive order on cybersecurity obtained by the Washington Post by April Glaser on Scribd

Those people involved in internet forensics and that track hackers, malicious code, malware, ransomware and intrusions are all dedicated to finding the cracks in code and even more finding the hackers while further understanding their code and patterns. I get emails about this topic every day that include a variety of global companies operating in this realm.

Back in December of 2015, ODNI James Clapper announced Russian intrusions into several American infrastructure locations. This was before the announcement of Russian intrusions into the U.S. political apparatus. In can be presumed the United States has long had the help of operatives inside adversarial countries, most of all Russia. Spies are out there and further, it is estimated there are 100,000 foreign spies inside the United States as of this moment. Heh, before Barack Obama left his presidency, he did expelled many Russians and closed two Russian compounds.

IN 2014, U.S. Cyber operations quietly penetrated Russian systems without declaring in specific language the exact operations.

In 2014, National Security Agency chief Adm. Mike Rogers told Congress that U.S. adversaries are performing electronic “reconnaissance” on a regular basis so that they can be in a position to disrupt the industrial control systems that run everything from chemical facilities to water treatment plants.

“All of that leads me to believe it is only a matter of when, not if, we are going to see something dramatic,” he said at the time.

Rogers didn’t discuss the U.S.’s own penetration of adversary networks. But the hacking undertaken by the NSA, which regularly penetrates foreign networks to gather intelligence, is very similar to the hacking needed to plant precursors for cyber weapons, said Gary Brown, a retired colonel and former legal adviser to U.S. Cyber Command, the military’s digital war fighting arm. More here.

It is unclear if we have recruited people inside Russia to work on the behalf of the United States, but clues tell us we did, with success.

In part from RFEL: At the simplest level, two FSB officers working in cyberdefense, Sergei Mikhailov and Dmitry Dokuchayev, as well as Ruslan Stoyanov, a former Interior Ministry official who works for the cyber security company Kaspersky Lab, are reportedly being charged with espionage.

According to Russian media reports, Mikhailov is suspected of alerting U.S. intelligence to the FSB’s connection to a Russian server-rental company called King Servers.

Last year, the U.S.-based cybersecurity firm ThreatConnect had identified King Servers as the nexus for hacking attacks against the United States.

If U.S. intelligence did indeed have a highly placed source like Mikhailov, it would explain why it was able to conclude with such a high degree of confidence that Russia was behind the cyberattacks during the election campaign.

The timing of the arrests and the timing of the decision by former U.S. President Barack Obama to declassify and make public parts of the U.S. intelligence report on the alleged Russian hacking also makes sense.

Mikhailov was arrested in December. And the U.S. released the intelligence report a month later, in January.

If Mikhailov was indeed a source, then Washington would have been reluctant to declassify its intelligence for fear of compromising him.

After he was arrested, this, of course, would no longer be an issue.

So far, so straightforward. Until it isn’t.

Leaks to the Russian media have also connected Mikhailov and his subordinate Dokuchayev to a hacker group known as Shaltai-Boltai, or Humpty Dumpty, which in the past has released embarrassing material about top Russian officials.

Vladimir Anikeyev, the founder of Shaltai-Boltai, has also been arrested, but is not being charged with espionage.

Moreover, Russian media reports claim that Dokuchayev is actually a former hacker known as Forb, who was serving a prison sentence for credit-card theft when he was recruited by the FSB, where he held the rank of major.

As Leonid Bershidsky notes in his column for Bloomberg, “parallel to their official duties, officers often run private security operations involving blackmail and protection. If Mikhailov ran such a business out of the FSB’s Information Security Center, he wouldn’t stand out among his colleagues.”

And it’s also not unusual for the FSB to recruit former hackers. In fact, it’s pretty much standard practice.

This is where the story diverts into the murky world of FSB officers and their civilian collaborators monetizing their positions and forming protection rackets.

“An FSB officer, recruited from the hacking community, can use his rank and position to obtain compromising material and sell it to wealthy clients. A team profiting from these opportunities can include both officers and civilians,” Bershidsky writes.

“The Russian government can hire such a team through intermediaries if it needs something sensitive done — but so can foreign intelligence services. It’s a murky world in which actors are both predator and prey. The Kremlin enjoys access to brilliant and unscrupulous people; the downside, of course, is that they may be hard to control.”

If you follow this line of logic, then it’s easy to imagine that Mikhailov and Dokuchayev inadvertently or unwittingly sold information exposing King Server’s FSB connections to a front for U.S. intelligence.

But the fact of the matter is we simply don’t know.

And if things aren’t confusing enough yet, there is also the matter of the bitter personal and clan rivalries in the shadow world of the Russian security services.

In a recent post on his blog KrebsOnSecurity, Brian Krebs, author of the book Spam Nation: The Inside Story Of Organized Cybercrime, suggested the whole affair might be traced to a personal rivalry between Mikhailov and Pavel Vrublevsky, an Internet businessman whose partner owns King Servers.

Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russia’s security services and a senior research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, notes that the FSB’s Information Security Center, which Mikhailov headed and where Dokuchayev was his subordinate, has emerged as “a pivotal agency” and “a source of power.”

And this makes it a prime arena for fierce rivalries and power plays.

“This is probably an intelligence leak that is being cleared up. But the question is: why now? And I wonder if domestic politics explains the leaking of the information now. It could be a rebuke to the FSB for having messed up,” Galeotti said on last week’s Power Vertical Podcast.

 

 

High Risk: National Security Personnel in Foreign Own Buildings

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 FBI St. Louis  Little Rock

Oh Donald, Mr. President sir…you’re the expert here….need an immediate executive order on this one. By the way, don’t stay in the Waldorf Astoria any more, perhaps don’t go to movie theaters either if you’re concerned for personal reasons.

First on CNN: Report finds national security agencies at risk in foreign-owned buildings

Washington (CNN)US law-enforcement agencies are at risk of being spied on and hacked because some of their field offices are located in foreign-owned buildings without even knowing it, according to a new government report.

The report by the Government Accountability Office, which was obtained by CNN and is due to be released later Monday, reveals that a number of FBI, Homeland Security, Secret Service and Drug Enforcement Agency offices across the country are housed in space leased from firms based in China and other nations.
Experts told the GAO that the agencies could be vulnerable to espionage and cyber intrusions because the foreign owners could gain unauthorized access to the properties, be able to secretly install surveillance equipment, and have knowledge of building systems like heating, ventilation and electronics which could facilitate hacking.
The General Services Administration, which handles leasing for many federal agencies, is renting space in 20 buildings from foreign owners — and its investigators were unable to identify who the property owners for about one-third of the government’s more than 1,400 “high-security leases.”
Nine of the 14 agencies the GAO contacted were unaware the building space they were using was foreign owned.
“It’s an eye opener,” Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, told CNN about the report. “Certainly our security professionals should know who owns the piping in the buildings that they occupy.”
Chaffetz, along with Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Illinois, and Rep. Elijah Cummings, D-Maryland, called for the GAO review.
The chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee said he doesn’t necessarily think the agencies should be barred from leasing office space from foreign owners, but added that he would feel “much more comfortable if they’re at least aware.”
Currently, the GSA is not required to determine whether a building is foreign owned when it is considering whether to lease space.
Among the report’s findings were that DEA, Homeland Security and Secret Service offices in Little Rock, Arkansas, Jacksonville, Florida, and Shreveport, Louisiana, along with an FBI office in St. Louis, Missouri, were leased from “Gemini Investments” — a company based in China.
The GAO report noted that Chinese-owned properties were of particular concern because the country has been linked to numerous instances of hacking.
After the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in Manhattan was sold to Chinese investors, then-President Barack Obama didn’t stay there, as had long been the custom of US presidents, with security concerns being one of the factors.
Other federal offices listed in the study are located in buildings owned by companies in Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, Germany, South Korea and Japan.
GAO investigators talked to officials who assess foreign investments in the US, as well as real estate representatives, who warned about the potential danger.
” … (L)easing space in foreign-owned buildings could present security risks such as espionage, unauthorized cyber and physical access to the facilitates, and sabotage,” the report said. “For example, a DHS foreign investment official said that potential threat actors could coerce owners into collecting intelligence about the personnel and activities of the facilities when maintaining the property.”
The report also noted other possible “insider threats,” referring to “disgruntled employees, contractors, or other persons abusing their position of trust” who pose a “significant threat” to building access.
But this doesn’t mean that the threats have materialized. Chaffetz said he was unaware of any specific instances where sensitive information had been compromised. The report also said two real estate representatives determined it wasn’t a security risk to lease foreign-owned space.
“One of the representatives said that access at high-security facilities is strictly controlled, including access by the owners, and that passive investors in properties do not have access to the buildings,” the report said.
In addition to hacking and espionage, the report also cautioned that renting from foreign owners presented the possibility of the US agencies becoming unwittingly involved in money laundering, since real estate purchases are often used to conceal the criminal source of the investment funds.
The report recommended that the GSA should start informing the agencies if their space is foreign owned, so they can put the necessary security precautions in place. The GSA said it agreed with the recommendation.
“I hope this is a wake-up call,” Chaffetz said.

Security Behind the Scenes at the Super Bowl

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Super Bowl Security

Super Bowl LI Command Post at Houston Emergency Center
During the 10 days of festivities leading up to Super Bowl LI on February 5, the FBI will be working closely with the Houston Police Department and other local, state, and federal agencies to keep the city safe. At the Houston Emergency Center, a command post will monitor and coordinate law enforcement and public safety activities.

Behind the Scenes Look at Game Day Preparations

When tens of thousands of fans stream into NRG Stadium in Houston for the Super Bowl this Sunday, they will understandably be thinking more about the big game than the behind-the-scenes preparations that have gone into ensuring their safety—and that’s just the way law enforcement officials want it to be.

The Super Bowl will put Houston squarely in the international spotlight, and the FBI and its local, state, and federal law enforcement partners have been working hard to make sure the game and the events leading up to it in Houston are without incident.

“We’ve been working for several years with our partners to make sure appropriate security is in place,” said Perrye Turner, special agent in charge of the FBI’s Houston Division. “We’re going to do everything in our power to make sure it’s a safe event.”

“On the day of the big game, we will be here, but our presence may not necessarily be seen,” said Mark Webster, an FBI assistant special agent in charge in Houston who is coordinating the Bureau’s Super Bowl security efforts. “We will have multiple elements in place onsite as well as offsite.”

Working with the Houston Police Department—which has the lead role in security planning—and other local, state, and federal agencies, the FBI’s primary role is to provide intelligence about possible terror threats. But because the Super Bowl is a major national event, just about every aspect of the Bureau’s expertise will be called into play.

“We are using all the elements within our office,” Webster said. From SWAT teams and cyber squads to intelligence analysts and surveillance specialists, FBI personnel will be on the ground at the stadium and will also be staffing command posts set up for the 10-day operational period that includes a variety of festivities leading up to the game on February 5.

“Today is called a rehearsal of concept,” said George Buenik, an executive assistant chief with the Houston Police Department responsible for Super Bowl security and police operations. “We invite everybody here to check the equipment, check the hookups, to see where they’re going to be sitting, and to also meet some of the other folks that they’re going to be working with. We have a great security plan in place,” Buenik said.

Matt Slinkard, an assistant chief with the Houston Police Department also involved with Super Bowl security preparations, noted that this will be the third Super Bowl the city has hosted, along with many other national-level events. “Our city and our counterparts both locally and federally are well prepared and well equipped to deal with these types of events.”

He added that even with all the law enforcement coordination, “the community has to be our eyes and ears. We cannot do it by ourselves. If you see something—if something doesn’t seem right to you, it’s probably not right to us either—say something about it.”

Mark Webster on Field at NRG Stadium

Mark Webster, an assistant special agent in charge of the FBI’s Houston Division, stands on the 50-yard line at NRG Stadium, where the Super Bowl will be played.

Highway Patrol Officer at Houston Super Bowl LI Command Post
At the Super Bowl command post, a Texas Highway Patrol officer takes part in a “rehearsal of concept” exercise several weeks prior to the command post going operational.
NRG Stadium Prepares for Super Bowl LI
  In the weeks leading up to the big game, as law enforcement agencies work behind the scenes, the stadium gets a very public fresh look.

At the Houston Emergency Center recently, where the main command post is located, specialists gathered from more than a dozen partner agencies.

The FBI’s Turner agreed. “We all have to work together to make this a safe event,” he said, expressing confidence that with the extensive planning and resources that have gone into Super Bowl security preparations, “people will be able to come to Houston, be safe, and have a great time cheering on their favorite football team.”