An affordable price is probably the major benefit persuading people to buy drugs at www.americanbestpills.com. The cost of medications in Canadian drugstores is considerably lower than anywhere else simply because the medications here are oriented on international customers. In many cases, you will be able to cut your costs to a great extent and probably even save up a big fortune on your prescription drugs. What's more, pharmacies of Canada offer free-of-charge shipping, which is a convenient addition to all other benefits on offer. Cheap price is especially appealing to those users who are tight on a budget
Service Quality and Reputation Although some believe that buying online is buying a pig in the poke, it is not. Canadian online pharmacies are excellent sources of information and are open for discussions. There one can read tons of users' feedback, where they share their experience of using a particular pharmacy, say what they like or do not like about the drugs and/or service. Reputable online pharmacy canadianrxon.com take this feedback into consideration and rely on it as a kind of expert advice, which helps them constantly improve they service and ensure that their clients buy safe and effective drugs. Last, but not least is their striving to attract professional doctors. As a result, users can directly contact a qualified doctor and ask whatever questions they have about a particular drug. Most likely, a doctor will ask several questions about the condition, for which the drug is going to be used. Based on this information, he or she will advise to use or not to use this medication.

CFIUS, what is Worse than Uranium One?

When Douglas Campbell, the FBI informant and Uranium One whistle-blower says that Obama himself approved the deal, he was right. Campbell has delivered in February, written testimony annexed with full evidence to three congressional committees. Further, he was provided an monetary award/reward for his remarkable work as an informant. For the full summary and details, go here.

Campbell’s lawyer of record, Victoria Toensing has sent a letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions to further investigate the matter and the media smearing of Campbell himself including committee leaks. That letter is found here.

AG Sessions has not responded at the time of this post.

Image result for cfius photo

Related reading: Cfius, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals

Meanwhile, looking deeper into Obama and CFIUS….

By law, CFIUS, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, does not publicly disclose information provided to CFIUS by parties to a transaction, nor does it reveal the fact that the parties have submitted the transaction for review. If CFIUS determines that the transaction poses national security concerns that cannot be resolved, it will refer the transaction to the President which the President has 15 days after completion of CFIUS’s investigation to decide. The President must publicly announce his decision.

CFIUS provides an annual report to Congress, but the last report was dated 2015. This report is in accordance with section 721(m) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the amended section of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007.

The Process  

During the review period, CFIUS members examine the transaction in order to identify and address, as appropriate, any national security concerns that arise as a result of the transaction. CFIUS concludes action on the preponderant majority of transactions during or at the end of the initial 30-day review period.  In certain circumstances defined in section 721 and at § 800.503 of the regulations, CFIUS may initiate a subsequent investigation, which must be completed within 45 days.  In certain circumstances described at section 6(c) of Executive Order 11858, as amended, and § 800.506 of the regulations, CFIUS may also refer a transaction to the President for decision.  In such case, section 721 requires the President to announce a decision with respect to a transaction within 15 days of CFIUS’s completion of the investigation. If CFIUS finds that a covered transaction presents national security risks and that other provisions of law do not provide adequate authority to address the risks, then CFIUS may enter into an agreement with, or impose conditions on, parties to mitigate such risks or may refer the case to the President for action.

Where CFIUS has completed all action with respect to a covered transaction or the President has announced a decision not to exercise his authority under section 721 with respect to the covered transaction, then the parties receive a “safe harbor” with respect to that transaction, as described in § 800.601 of the regulations and section 7(f) of Executive Order 11858, as amended.

Rejection

During the entire term of President, he only got one referral that he rejected. President Obama blocked a privately owned Chinese company from building wind turbines close to a Navy military site in Oregon due to national security concerns, and the company said it would challenge the action in court.

Ralls Corp, which had been installing wind turbine generators made in China by Sany Group, has four wind farm projects that are within or in the vicinity of restricted air space at a naval weapons systems training facility, according to the Obama administration.

“There is credible evidence that leads me to believe” that Ralls Corp, Sany Group and the two Sany Group executives who own Ralls “might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States,” Obama said in issuing his decision.

Industry Sectors

From 2009-2015, 75% of the foreign transactions included finance, information, mining, utilities and transportation. From 2013-2015, China was the largest country with transactions by far with manufacturing being the majority of the transactions. If there are concerns with any part of the transaction, CFIUS will work on mitigation measures as they relate to national security such that CFIUS earnestly wants the transaction(s) to occur. CFIUS offers onsite compliance, assigns additional staff and offers tracking systems as well as instructions and procedures from in-house expertise to meet stipulations and standards where on other issues, waivers can be designated if compliance is too difficult or adverse to national security standards and law.

Review Concerns

Expanded conditions for national security considerations include vulnerabilities, cyber, sabotage and exploitation. Further, if any transaction leads to complications to critical infrastructure or energy production or would affect the U.S. financial system and would in some conditions have access to sensitive government information, classified material or in any manner threaten a government employee, involve activities related to weapons, munitions, aerospace, satellite or radar system(s), these items would impair the approval process or under the CFIUS review, mitigation procedures would be applied.

Little is of consequence when a foreign company that under cover is actually controlled by a foreign government which is a terrifying condition. A 2011 Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report to Congress stated that the pace of foreign economic collection and industrial espionage activities against major U.S corporations and U.S. government agencies is accelerating.

photo

Are we sure we want China, Russia or any Middle Eastern country investing in any form or part in the United States when we have the likes of Warren Buffet or Bill Gates and those billions?

Sens. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) introduced legislation on Wednesday to prevent the U.S. government from using products from certain Chinese telecommunications firms.

The impetus for Cotton and Rubio’s legislation is concern over the Chinese government using hypothetical backdoors in ZTE and Huawei phones to spy on U.S. government officials.

“Huawei is effectively an arm of the Chinese government, and it’s more than capable of stealing information from U.S. officials by hacking its devices,” Cotton said in a statement. “There are plenty of other companies that can meet our technology needs, and we shouldn’t make it any easier for China to spy on us.”

Uranium One violated all conditions set forth in the CFIUS law. China is yet a larger security issue and all agency members of CFIUS are aware of this and the history of both Russia and China.

The risks and violations of law are well known in Congress and legislation has been introduced to address major concerns, yet still the United States is and has sold out to at least 2 rogue countries and no security assessments have been published.

 

 

 

Obama, McDonough Lied by Omission: 2016 Election 7 States

Image result for dhs voting

photo

DHS disputes the NBC reporting with the following:

Jeanette Manfra, National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Assistant Secretary for the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, released the following statement regarding the recent NBC news coverage on the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to combat election hacking.

“Recent NBC reporting has misrepresented facts and confused the public with regard to Department of Homeland Security and state and local government efforts to combat election hacking. First off, let me be clear: we have no evidence – old or new – that any votes in the 2016 elections were manipulated by Russian hackers. NBC News continues to falsely report my recent comments on attempted election hacking – which clearly mirror my testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee last summer – as some kind of “breaking news,” incorrectly claiming a shift in the administration’s position on cyber threats. As I said eight months ago, a number of states were the target of Russian government cyber actors seeking vulnerabilities and access to U.S. election infrastructure. In the majority of cases, only preparatory activity like scanning was observed, while in a small number of cases, actors were able to access the system but we have no evidence votes were changed or otherwise impacted.

“NBC’s irresponsible reporting, which is being roundly criticized elsewhere in the media and by security experts alike, undermines the ability of the Department of Homeland Security, our partners at the Election Assistance Commission, and state and local officials across the nation to do our incredibly important jobs. While we’ll continue our part to educate NBC and others on the threat, more importantly, the Department of Homeland Security and our state and local partners will continue our mission to secure the nation’s election systems.

“To our state and local partners in the election community: there’s no question we’re making real and meaningful progress together. States will do their part in how they responsibly manage and implement secure voting processes. For our part, we’re going to continue to support with risk and vulnerability assessments, offer cyber hygiene scans, provide real-time threat intel feeds, issue security clearances to state officials, partner on incident response planning, and deliver cybersecurity training. The list goes on of how we’re leaning forward and helping our partners in the election community. We will not stop, and will stand by our partners to protect our nation’s election infrastructure and ensure that all Americans can have confidence in our democratic elections.”

U.S. intel: Russia compromised seven states prior to 2016 election

The U.S. intelligence community developed substantial evidence that state websites or voter registration systems in seven states were compromised by Russian-backed covert operatives prior to the 2016 election — but never told the states involved, according to multiple U.S. officials.

Top-secret intelligence requested by President Barack Obama in his last weeks in office identified seven states where analysts — synthesizing months of work — had reason to believe Russian operatives had compromised state websites or databases.

Three senior intelligence officials told NBC News that the intelligence community believed the states as of January 2017 were Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Texas and Wisconsin.

The officials say systems in the seven states were compromised in a variety of ways, with some breaches more serious than others, from entry into state websites to penetration of actual voter registration databases.

While officials in Washington informed several of those states in the run-up to the election that foreign entities were probing their systems, none were told the Russian government was behind it, state officials told NBC News.

All state and federal officials who spoke to NBC News agree that no votes were changed and no voters were taken off the rolls.

After NBC’s report on the compromised states aired Tuesday night, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Acting Press Secretary Tyler Houlton challenged its accuracy in a series of tweets. “NBC’s reporting tonight on the 2016 elections is not accurate and is actively undermining efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to work in close partnership with state and local governments to protect the nation’s elections systems from foreign actors,” wrote Houlton.

“As we have consistently said, DHS has shared information with affected states in a timely manner and we will continue to do so. We have no intelligence — new or old — that corroborates NBC’s reporting that state systems in seven states were compromised by Russian government actors. We believe tonight’s story to be factually inaccurate and misleading.”

On Wednesday morning, however, Michael Daniel, the top White House cybersecurity official at the end of the Obama administration, told NBC News that the government’s assessment when he left the White House in January 2017 was that networks in seven states were compromised. He said he could not account for whether that assessment had changed in the past year.

Daniel, who is now president of the Cyber Threat Alliance, an industry group, said it was the intention of the Obama administration to inform those states, “but clearly it didn’t happen the way that we wanted it to.”

He said he could not name the states because some of the assessment was based on classified information.

“This continued debate about whether or not the states were notified is actually distracting from the larger point, which is that we need to build the relationship between the federal government and state governments in the electoral area to improve cybersecurity,” he said.

“It is also easy to get lost in the cybersecurity industry’s ability to parse words, and the differing definitions of malicious cyber activity. But between what the states themselves detected and what the federal government detected through law enforcement and intelligence, it clearly showed a really broadbased Russian campaign to probe and figure out how they could gain access to different components of our electoral systems.”

According to classified intelligence documents, the intelligence community defines compromised as actual “entry” into election websites, voter registration systems and voter look-up systems.

NBC News reached out to all seven states that were compromised, as well as 14 additional states that DHS says were probed during the 2016 election.

To this day, six of the seven states deny they were breached, based on their own cyber investigations. It’s a discrepancy that underscores how unprepared some experts think America is for the next wave of Russian interference that intelligence officials say is coming.

Eight months after the assessment, in September 2017, the Trump administration’s DHS finally contacted election officials in all 50 states to tell them whether or not their systems had been targeted. It told 21 states they had been targeted, and U.S. officials acknowledged that some of those attempts had been successful.

“I think the Obama administration should have been doing much more to push back against the Russians across the board,” said Juan Zarate, an NBC News analyst who was deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism under President George W. Bush. “I think the U.S. was very meek and mild in how we responded to Russian aggression.”

Denis McDonough, who was Obama’s last chief of staff, strongly disagrees, arguing the administration acted to thwart the Russians before and after the election. Obama administration spokespeople also say they transmitted sensitive intelligence regarding state compromises to congressional leaders.

“The administration took a series of steps to push back against the Russians to include far-ranging sanctions, diplomatic steps to push people associated with the Russian effort out of this country and also warning our friends and allies,” he said.

The Trump DHS, like under the Obama administration, has declined to share the intelligence assessment of which states were actually compromised, according to state election officials.

This month, in an exclusive interview with NBC News, Jeanette Manfra, the current head of cybersecurity at DHS, said that “an exceptionally small number” of those 21 states “were actually successfully penetrated.” But Manfra declined to answer questions about the classified intelligence assessment, or to say specifically how many states had been penetrated.

Top election officials from all 50 states met in Washington this month for a National Association of Secretaries of State conference and received temporary security clearances for a classified threat briefing from intelligence officials. According to two officials present, one from the intelligence community and the other a state official, the actual intelligence on state compromises was not shared.

While numerous state election officials told NBC News that the Department of Homeland Security has been stepping up communications with them, many say they’re worried they are still not getting enough information from Washington.

Illinois itself had detected a “malicious cyberattack” on its voter registration system in the summer of 2016 and reported it to DHS, saying its voter rolls had been accessed but nothing had been altered. It is the only state to acknowledge actual compromise.

The other six states from the January 2017 assessment, however, say that when DHS told them last September that their systems had been targeted, it still did not tell them that their systems had been compromised. All six also say that based on their own cyber investigations, they believe their election systems were never compromised.

Three states said publicly in September that while some state websites were affected, none were directly related to voting; specifically, Texas, Wisconsin and California say some sites were “scanned.” But a former senior intelligence official told NBC News that these types of probes can also be serious, either as gateways to other networks or as reconnoitering for future attacks.

Fears of a repeat in 2018

Nearly 16 months after the presidential election, and more than eight months before the critical midterms, many state and federal officials are convinced the Russians will be back. They’re concerned that 2016 was laying the groundwork for a possible future attack.

“We have an extreme sense of urgency on insuring security of the 2018 elections, because you don’t get a chance to do it over,” said Alex Padilla, California’s secretary of state, who said there was no evidence of a successful hack in California.

Several state election officials, including Padilla, told NBC News they think they should have been told that U.S. intelligence agencies believed they’d been breached whether or not that turned out to be true.

“It is hugely imperative that intelligence be shared with state elections officials immediately in order to protect our election infrastructure and the integrity of election results,” Padilla said.

Reluctance to share the information may be due, in part, to the classification of the intelligence itself. Multiple intelligence officials told NBC News that determining the Russian government was behind the hacks depended on “exceptionally sensitive sources and methods” including human spies and eavesdropping on Russian communications.

No state election official at the time had a security clearance sufficient to permit access to such sensitive information, according to DHS.

“Look, whether or not state elections officials had the proper clearance has unfortunately been an excuse in my opinion, a bureaucratic response for why information or intelligence hasn’t been more quickly shared with state elections officials,” Padilla said.

“We’ve got to fix that right away, because it does us no good, [when somebody is] sitting in Washington, D.C., with a bit of information about a significant cyberthreat and elections officials and locals are completely unaware. That doesn’t help anybody and that needs to be addressed,” Padilla said.

Zarate said that he thought “too much of this has happened behind the veil of the government,” and that “much more has to be discussed openly with the public about what we know of the kinds of attacks that are happening, who may be behind them, and how we defend ourselves against [them].”

A spokesperson for Florida’s secretary of state, Mark Ard, said the state was informed by DHS in September 2017 that Florida had been targeted by hackers in 2016. “This attempt was not in any way successful and Florida’s online elections databases and voting systems remained secure,” Ard said.

Texas Secretary of State Rolando Pablos said in a statement that his agency had not seen any evidence that any voting or voting registration systems in Texas were compromised before the 2016 elections.

The public information officer for the Wisconsin Elections Commission said the commission has never detected a successful hack on its system, “nor has it ever been notified of one by the Department of Homeland Security or any other state or federal agency.”

A spokesperson for the Arizona secretary of state, Matt Roberts, said the state had still not been informed of a successful hack, and had seen no evidence of one. Roberts said the state had not been told that “ANY Arizona voting system has been compromised, nor do we have any reason to believe any votes were manipulated or changed. No evidence, no report, no nothing.”

Alaska did not respond to repeated requests for comment, but has previously denied that any breach occurred.

Bradley Moss, a lawyer specializing in national security, tried to lift the veil and find out what U.S. intelligence knew about the Russian attempts to compromise the voter system. He sued for disclosure of government files and won last week, receiving 118 top-secret pages from the intelligence community. The pages referred to “compromises” and other breaches but the pages were almost completely blacked out for security reasons.

Said Moss: “The spreadsheets show that there were documented breaches of election networks. That there were documented, numerous documented instances of attempted breaches of state election networks, and that there was a widespread concern among several agencies in the intelligence committee about the sanctity and the integrity of these election networks.”

In a statement, DHS said it has been working with state and local officials for more than a year on the issue.

“This relationship is built on trust and transparency, and we have prioritized sharing threat and mitigation information with election officials in a timely manner to help them protect their systems,” DHS acting press secretary Tyler Houlton said.

“In addition to granting state officials clearances to give them access to classified information, we work to declassify information rapidly and have the ability to grant one-day waivers when necessary to provide state officials with information they may need to protect their systems.

“We are committed to this work and will continue to stand by our partners to protect our nation’s election infrastructure and ensure that all Americans can have the confidence that their vote counts — and is counted correctly.”

A statement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said only: “The declassified Intelligence Community Assessment of January 6, 2017, found that Russian actors did not compromise vote tallying systems. That assessment has not changed.”

Next steps

At a Senate hearing on Tuesday, the National Security Agency director, Adm. Mike Rogers, acknowledged that the White House has not directed him to try to stop Moscow from meddling in U.S. elections.

Sen. Claire McCaskill, D-Mo., said that was “outrageous” and asked whether the U.S. was in a position to stop Russia from “doing this again.”

“We’re taking steps but we’re probably not doing enough,” Rogers said.

“I want to know, why the hell not?” McCaskill shot back. “What’s it going to take?”

While the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security say they are taking steps to shore up cyberdefenses, FBI Director Christopher Wray told Congress this month that the instructions did not come from the top.

When Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., asked Wray if the president had directed him or the bureau to take “specific actions to confront and blunt” ongoing Russian activities, Wray said, “We’re taking a lot of specific efforts to blunt Russian efforts.”

Reed then asked, “Specifically directed by the president?” Wray answered, “Not as specifically directed by the president.”

The White House on Tuesday pushed back on any suggestion they’re not doing enough, saying President Trump is “looking at a number of different ways of making sure that Russia doesn’t meddle in our elections.”

For the future, Zarate suggests taking a lesson from the past.

“After 9/11, the walls between law enforcement and intelligence sources had to be broken down in order to connect the dots,” Zarate said. “There has to be a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to dealing with what is an assault on American democracy.”

Cyber: ‘Our adversaries have grown more emboldened’

Primer:

Russia hasn’t been sufficiently penalized for its meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections and that has emboldened Moscow to continue interfering in American elections, Adm. Michael Rogers, Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday.

“They haven’t paid a price sufficient to change their behavior,” Rogers said under questioning by Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn. Although the United States has taken some actions, including imposing additional sanctions and Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III has indicted more than a dozen Russians for their role in the interference, “it hasn’t changed the calculus,” Rogers said, adding that “it hasn’t generated the change in behavior that we all know we need.”

In another exchange with Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., Rogers said that Russian President Vladimir Putin has probably come to the conclusion that “that there’s little price to pay here so I can continue the activity” of interfering in the U.S. election system. More here.

*** In context however, where is Senator(s) Warren and Blumenthal’s proposed legislation on sanctions or punishment toward Russia for cyber and active measures interference? It was political posturing by Warren and Blumenthal when they can introduce multi-faceted legislation as Russia, China and North Korea continue to attack the United States via layered cyber operations including espionage.

Meanwhile…. Image result for admiral rogers nsa photo

Although competitors such as China and Russia remain the greatest threat to U.S. security, rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea have increased in capabilities and have begun using aggressive methods to conduct malicious cyberspace activities, the military’s top cyber officer told Congress today.

Navy Adm. Michael S. Rogers, director of the National Security Agency, commander of U.S. Cyber Command and chief of the Central Security Service, testified at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing.

“Our adversaries have grown more emboldened, conducting increasingly aggressive activities to extend their influence without fear of significant consequence,” Rogers said. “We must change our approaches and responses here if we are to change this dynamic.”

But as the cyber domain has evolved, Rogers told the senators, Cybercom’s three major mission areas endure: protecting the Department of Defense Information Network; enabling other joint force commanders by delivering effects in and through cyberspace; and defending the nation against cyber threats through support to the Department of Homeland Security and others when directed to do so by the president or secretary of defense.

Cybercom Milestones

Rogers highlighted milestones in Cybercom’s growth.

Joint Force Headquarters DODIN, the subordinate headquarters responsible for securing, operating and defending the Defense Department’s complex information technology infrastructure, has achieved full operational capability, he said.

Joint Task Force Ares, created to lead the fight in cyber against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, has successfully integrated cyberspace operations into broader military campaigns, has achieved some “excellent results,” and will continue to pursue ISIS in support of the nation’s objectives, the admiral told the Senate panel.

Cybercom also has significantly enhanced training in cyber operation platforms to prepare the battlespace against key adversaries, he said.

Milestones expected to be achieved this year include Cyber Command’s elevation to a combatant command responsible for providing mission-ready cyberspace operations forces to other combatant commanders, Rogers said.

New Facility

In addition, the admiral said, Cybercom will be moving into a state-of-the-art integrated cyber center and joint operations facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, enhancing the coordination and planning of operations against cyber threats.

“Without cyberspace superiority in today’s battlefield, risk to mission increases across all domains and endangers our security,” Rogers said.

Cybercom’s focus on innovation and rapid tech development has extended all the way to small businesses and working with the private sector while maintaining cybersecurity, Rogers told the committee.

“We intend in the coming year to create an unclassified collaboration venue where businesses and academia can help us tackle tough problems without needing to jump over clearance hurdles, for example, which for many are very difficult barriers,” Rogers explained.

After serving more than four years as a commander of Cybercom and after nearly 37 years of service as a naval officer, Rogers is set to retire this spring.

“I will do all I can during the intervening period to ensure the mission continues, that our men and women remain ever motivated, and that we have a smooth transition,” he said.

Money Approved in 2016 to Counter Russian Disinformation

Government does move slowly, in some cases if at all at tackling specific issues. With the cheap but effective disinformation campaign launched by Russia via the Internet Research Agency during the U.S. election season, the Mueller operation continues including the indictment of several Russian operatives.

A little factoid which has not been covered by media, much less how the visa got approved is curious, but a former IRA supervisor from Russia has moved to Bellevue, Washington. She is running a blog…ah what? This suspected ex-troll factory manager talked of filing for a Social Security Number (SSN). Burdonova declined to comment to TV Rain about her reasons for the move to the U.S. and denied having worked for the Internet Research Agency. The IRA, since at least 2014, worked to “interfere with the U.S political system” in part by supporting Donald Trump and “disparaging” Hillary Clinton.

The organization used social media advertising to spread misinformation and even staged political rallies in the U.S., the indictment alleged. Officials from Facebook, Twitter and Google have admitted their platforms were abused. More here from Newsweek.

Image result for global engagement center state department rex tillerson photo

So, between the U.S. State Department and the Pentagon, $40 million has been allocated to the Global Engagement Center to counter the Russian disinformation operation and China or other rogue nations are not exempt from the soon to be American response.

The State Department describes it this way:

The work of the GEC is focused around four core areas: science and technology, interagency engagement, partner engagement, and content production.

  • Science & Technology: The GEC’s Science & Technology team is charged with enabling the U.S. government and its partners to increase the reach and effectiveness of their communications. The team conducts research on target audiences and utilizes data science techniques to measure the effectiveness of our efforts. Among other techniques, the Science & Technology team performs A/B testing and multivariate analysis to measure the effectiveness of our content distribution. The GEC utilizes hypothesis-driven experimentation and applies a “create-measure-learn” approach to its activities to maximize effectiveness.
  • Interagency Engagement: The GEC liaises regularly across the interagency and coordinates closely with the relevant national security departments and agencies to identify efficiencies and opportunities in the messaging and partnership space. The GEC’s staff includes detailees from throughout the interagency, including the Department of Defense, Intelligence Community, United States Agency for International Development, and Broadcasting Board of Governors.
  • Partner Engagement: One of the GEC’s overarching strategies is to identify, cultivate, and expand a global network of partners whose voices resonate with individuals most vulnerable to harmful propaganda. These partners work tirelessly to drive a wedge between susceptible audiences and those nations, groups, and terrorists seeking to influence them. The GEC conducts on-the-ground training sessions to enable these partners to develop their own content and disseminate it through their distribution networks. The GEC also leverages rigorous research and data science to improve tactics and techniques and inspire innovation.
  • Content Production: The GEC and its partners have established programming across multiple platforms, including social media, satellite television, radio, film, and print. This programming is conducted in various languages, including Arabic, Urdu, Somali, and French. These platforms allow the U.S. government and its partners to inject factual content about terrorist organizations into the information space to counter recruitment and radicalization to violence. They also allow us to develop and disseminate messaging on effective themes, such as exposing ISIS’s financial and governance failures; its violence against women, children, and religious minorities; and its ongoing territorial losses.

The GEC is currently led by Acting Coordinator Daniel Kimmage.

Congress had mandated the initiative to counter propaganda and disinformation after Russia’s meddling in the 2016 US election. Lawmakers and career foreign service officers were deeply critical when Tillerson didn’t move to use any of the funding, and cited his inaction as another example of the agency’s dysfunction.

A similar operation was allegedly applied to counter Islamic State Islamic propaganda and sophisticated media messaging. Measuring effectiveness is still in question.

 

5 Former Venezuelan Officials Charged, Money Laundering/Bribery

5 former government officials from Venezuela charged in Houston federal court with money laundering scheme involving foreign bribery

Criminal complaint is here.

Some of the vendors lived in the United States, the DOJ said, or owned and controlled businesses incorporated and based in the United States.

The defendants allegedly laundered some of the bribe money through real estate transactions and other investments in the U.S.

The indictment alleges two PDVSA vendors sent over $27 million in bribe payments to an account in Switzerland.

De Leon and Villalobos controlled the account.

Some of the money went to another “foreign official” who wasn’t named in the indictment. That’s the basis for the FCPA conspiracy charges against De Leon and Villalobos.

Related reading: Venezuela’s PDVSA: The World’s Worst Oil Company

Image result for Petroleos de Venezuela S.A photo

HOUSTON — Five former government officials from Venezuela were charged Monday for allegedly participating in an international money laundering scheme involving bribes made to corruptly secure energy contracts from Venezuela’s state-owned and state-controlled energy company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA).

Two of the five defendants are also charged with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) investigated this case.

In October 2017, Spanish authorities arrested four of the following defendants on arrest warrants based on a 20-count indictment returned Aug. 23, 2017, in the Southern District of Texas:  Luis Carlos De Leon Perez (De Leon), 41, Nervis Gerardo Villalobos Cardenas (Villalobos), 50, Cesar David Rincon Godoy (Cesar Rincon), 50, and Rafael Ernesto Reiter Muñoz (Reiter), 39.

On Feb. 9, Cesar Rincon was extradited from Spain and made his initial appearance Monday in federal court in the Southern District of Texas. De Leon, Villalobos and Reiter remain in Spanish custody pending extradition. A fifth defendant, Alejandro Isturiz Chiesa (Isturiz), 33, remains at large; a warrant remains outstanding for his arrest. All five defendants are citizens of Venezuela. De Leon is also a U.S. citizen.

De Leon, Villalobos, Reiter and Isturiz are each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering; Cesar Rincon is charged with two counts of conspiracy to commit money laundering. De Leon, Cesar Rincon and Reiter are charged with four counts of money laundering; Villalobos and Isturiz are charged with one and five counts of money laundering, respectively. De Leon and Villalobos are each also charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.

“This case is an example of what can be accomplished when international law enforcement agencies work together to thwart complex cross-border crimes,” said Mark Dawson, special agent in charge of HSI Houston. “HSI is committed to upholding the rule of law and investigating those that would participate in illegal practices.”

The indictment alleges the five defendants, all of whom were officials of PDVSA and its subsidiaries or former officials of other Venezuelan government agencies or instrumentalities, were known as the “management team” and wielded significant influence within PDVSA.

According to the indictment, the management team conspired with each other and others to solicit several PDVSA vendors, including vendors who were U.S. residents and who owned and controlled businesses incorporated and based in the United States, for bribes and kickbacks in exchange for providing assistance to those vendors in connection with their PDVSA business.

The indictment further alleges the co-conspirators then laundered the proceeds of the bribery scheme through a series of complex international financial transactions including to, from or through U.S. bank accounts. In some instances, they allegedly laundered the bribe proceeds in the form of real estate transactions and other investments in the United States.

The indictment also reads that the following two PDVSA vendors sent more than $27 million in bribe payments to an account in Switzerland for which De Leon was a beneficial owner, and De Leon and Villalobos were authorized signers:  Roberto Enrique Rincon Fernandez (Roberto Rincon), 57, of The Woodlands, Texas, and Abraham Jose Shiera Bastidas (Shiera), 54, of Coral Gables, Florida. The indictment alleges those funds were later transferred to other accounts in Switzerland. Both Roberto Rincon and Shiera previously pleaded guilty to FCPA charges in connection with a scheme to bribe PDVSA officials. According to admissions made in connection with their pleas, Roberto Rincon and Shiera paid bribes and provided other things of value to PDVSA officials to ensure that their companies were placed on PDVSA bidding panels and ensure that they were given payment priority so that they would get paid ahead of other PDVSA vendors with outstanding invoices. Roberto Rincon and Shiera are awaiting sentencing.

On Feb. 12, the indictment was unsealed. Fifteen individuals were charged, and 10 have pleaded guilty as part of a larger and ongoing investigation by the U.S. government into bribery at PDVSA.

HSI Houston is conducting the ongoing investigation with assistance from HSI Boston, HSI Madrid and the IRS Criminal Investigation.

The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs, the Swiss Federal Office of Justice and the Spanish Guardia Civil also provided assistance.