Day After Benghazi PDB, Obama Did not Take

  

Barack Obama skipped his daily intelligence briefing one day after the Benghazi attacks on September 11, 2012. The president’s briefer handed a written copy of the presidential daily briefing to a White House usher and then briefed Jack Lew, who was then serving as White House chief of staff. But Obama, who sometimes avails himself of the oral briefing that is offered along the written intelligence product, did not ask for such a briefing the day after the attacks on U.S. facilities in Libya. TWS

Below is the testimony, including citations and redactions:

THE SEPTEMBER 12 SITUATION REPORT AND THE PRESIDENT’S DAILY BRIEF

The very first written piece produced by CIA analysts regarding the Benghazi attacks was an overnight Situation Report written very early in the morning on September 12, 2012. This piece included the line “the presence of armed assailants from the outset suggests this was an intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest.” While that line was correct—the attacks were an intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest—Michael Morell, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, noted it was a “crucial error that [came] back to haunt [the CIA].”1 This was an error, according to Morell, because that line was not written by analysts but rather a “senior editor” who “believed there needed to be some sort of bottom line” in the piece.2 Morell labeled it a “bureaucratic screw-up” and claims that since similar language did not appear in the CIA assessment the following day, September 13, it was evidence to critics that “the intelligence community was politicizing the analysis.”3

1 MICHAEL MORELL, THE GREAT WAR OF OUR TIME: THE CIA’S FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM—FROM AL-QAIDA TO ISIS 217 (2015) [hereinafterMORELL].

2 Testimony of Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Central Intelligence Agency, Tr. at 25 (Sept. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Morell Testimony].

3 MORELL, supra note 1, at 218.

4 Morell Testimony at 28.

Though Morell learned this information second-hand4 and put it in his book, the Select Committee spoke directly to individuals with first-hand accounting of the events. In reality, the “senior editor” was the Executive Coordinator of the Presidential Daily Brief; she included the language about the intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest; and this “bureaucratic screw-up” resulted in this individual taking the piece to the White House, presenting it to Jacob Lew, Chief of Staff to the President, and delivering it to an usher to give to the President.

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Insertion of the Language

The Executive Coordinator described to the Committee when she first saw the September 12 update:

A: So the analysts came in to brief me—I don’t remember what time that was, but my guess is probably somewhere between 3 and 4. And the piece that he gave to me was much longer than this.

And we had a difference of opinion on one piece of the intelligence. He believed that this was a spontaneous event and was not open to the idea that it wasn’t a spontaneous event. And I disagreed because, you know, I had 20 years of Army experience. You know, this is the military person in me. And I said, I just can’t buy that something that’s, you know, this coordinated, this organized, and this sophisticated was something that they just, you know, did on, you know, the spur of the moment. I said, we have to consider the fact that that might not be the case.

He had a lot of good arguments. You know, it was the anniversary of 9/11, there was the video in Cairo, there were a number of other things happening that, you know, would seem to suggest that it was spontaneous. But just being military and seeing, you know, what we were seeing in the traffic, I was like, I don’t think that this is—I don’t think we can discount the possibility that this was a, you know, coordinated, organized, preplanned attack.

Q: When you say when you were seeing what you were seeing in the traffic, what does that mean?

A: So the things they were talking about, how organized that it was, in the press reporting. There was a lot of press that was coming back and talking about, you know, like, how they were breaching and, you know, like, how it was sort of phased, right? It was coming across to me, reading, you know, the open press at the time, that this was a phased attack. And I would be very surprised if a phased attack was something that was just, all of a sudden, you know, “Hey, guess what? Let’s go have an attack today because these other things are happening.” I don’t think

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According to the manager of the analysts, none of her analysts believed the sentence regarding an intentional assault should have been included. The manager testified:

A: And so the POTUS coordinator inserted this sentence because she felt strongly that it was an intentional assault against our consulate.

Q: And—

A: But there was no—nothing to base that on, no reporting.

Q: And that view is the view of that single editor. Is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: Was there anyone—any of the analysts on your team that thought that sentence should have been included?

A: No.

Q: And the reason your team and your analysts felt so strongly was because there was no reporting to support that. Is that correct?

A: Correct. We just—you can’t make a call without an evidentiary base to support it.8

8 Id. at 100-101.

However, without solid evidence pointing in either direction—spontaneous or not—the Executive Coordinator was sure to be careful with her language. She merely wanted to leave open the possibility that it was an intentional assault and the language she chose reflected that possibility—not a conclusion. She told the Committee:

Q: —your choice of the word “suggests,” is that to couch it—

A: Yes.

Q: —to say that this may have happened, as opposed to it definitively happened?

A: Correct.

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Q: Okay. And was that a deliberate —

A: It was leaving the door open that this is what it suggests, but that doesn’t mean this is what it is.9

9 PDB Testimony at 37.

10 Id. at 29.

11 Id. at 26.

The analysts and the Executive Coordinator were not able to reach a consensus on the language in the piece. The analysts, who had went up to the 7th Floor of the CIA headquarters to brief the Executive Coordinator on the piece, returned to their desks. The Executive Coordinator testified:

Q: Okay. And was there a resolution between you and him—

A: Not really.

Q: —on how to proceed?

A: No.

Q: No. Okay. So how did your conversation or interactions with him end?

A: I told him I would think about, you know, what he had said. And I said, you know, I will to talk to somebody.10

The Executive Coordinator, however, did not make the decision to include the language of an intentional assault on her own, and she did not do it in a vacuum based solely on her experience. Members of her staff, which numbered roughly 15, talked with individuals outside CIA headquarters about what was going on. She told the Committee:

Q: In terms of picking up the phone and calling anybody outside of the building, is that something you did to acquire information?

A: We did. Yes.11

She also discussed the matter with another analyst who had expertise in regional issues. The Executive Coordinator testified:

We had—I was very lucky because we had another—we had a MENA analyst that was a PDB briefer. She was the, I want to

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say, the SecDef briefer. And so I went over and I talked to her and I said, “Hey, this is what the analyst says. Here’s my opinion. You know, what are your thoughts, having covered this area, you know, pretty extensively in your career?” And she agreed with me.

We discussed it, we had a conversation about it and—you know. And so I made the decision to change the wording to make sure that we at least addressed the possibility that this was a planned attack.12

12 Id. at 29.

13 Testimony of Dir. of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, Tr. at 23 {Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter OTA Director Testimony].

She also testified:

A: There was a lot of discourse about this at the PDB. I mean, the other PDB briefers and I, that’s the only resource I have at the time. And I never would make an assessment all on my own and just be like, this is it. I mean, we would do—

Q: I understand.

A: We talk about it, we’re sounding boards for each other. So there was a lot of discussion. And, yes, I’m sure that the supervisor of the young man who wrote this, we had that conversation. Like, are you sure that this is what you want to say. And yes, when I wrote this, I didn’t feel like I was saying you’re wrong and I’m right. All I was trying to do was say, look, we need to leave the door open in case this is not a spontaneous attack. We want to be able to wait until there’s more information, and so that’s why I use the word “suggests.” I didn’t say this is an intentional assault. It suggests that it is.

The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the Executive Coordinator, however, concedes that the Executive Coordinator was right with her analysis. She testified:

Q: And she was right?

A: In the event, yes, she was right.13

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Similarly, Michael Morell concedes the sentence was accurate. He testified:

Q: So the sentence ended up being accurate?

A: Yeah. Absolutely.14

14 Morell Testimony at 25.

15 PDB Testimony at 41.

16 Id. at 6.

17 Id. at 41.

The President’s Daily Brief

When the Executive Coordinator finished inserting the accurate sentence regarding the “intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest” into the September 12 piece, she put it into the “book” she prepared each day for the President and his Chief of Staff.15 This “book” is otherwise known as the President’s Daily Brief, or the PDB.

Normally, upon completion of the PDB, the Executive Coordinator would travel to the White House, brief the Chief of Staff, and if the President required a briefing, she would brief the President. She testified:

So during the weeks that I produced the PDB, I would produce it, and then they would drive me to the White House, and I would produce—or I would brief Jack Lew first, who was the Chief of Staff. And if the President required a brief during that day or chose to take a brief, then I would give him a brief, and if not, then his briefer—then the DNI would brief him.

When we were on travel, I always briefed the President. That was my responsibility whenever we would fly.16

On September 12, 2012, the morning after the Benghazi attacks, the Executive Coordinator—the individual presenting the President with his Presidential Daily Brief—traveled to the White House. That day, however, she did not present the PDB to the President.17 Instead, she gave it to an usher. She testified she presented the PDB—with the accurate sentence regarding the “intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest”—to Lew:

A: So it depends. If we’re traveling, then I present it to the President personally. And if he has questions—usually the only questions he usually asks—

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Lawyer. We’re not going to talk about what the President said or your conversations with him.

A: Okay. So if we’re in town and we’re not traveling then I bring it to the White House, and I personally brief Jack Lew. And I hand the President’s book to the usher, and the usher presents it to the President.

Q: So normally in Washington, when you’re here in town, you’re not sitting across from the President, him looking at the book, and he may be asking you questions?

A: No.

Q: How did it happen on the 12th that day?

A: I was here. So we were not traveling yet. We were in D.C. So I would have—I had a driver, and the driver drives me to the White House. I drop off the book first with the usher and then I go down and I brief Jack Lew.

Q: Okay. And what time was that on the 12th?

A: So we always arrive by 7:00, and so it would’ve been around 7:00. I mean, I’m assuming around 7:00.

Q: So that day at 7:00, the booklet that has been put together, you take it to the White House, you visit with Jack Lew and then someone walked it into—

A: No. First we give the brief to the usher. So my driver drops me off at the front gate. I go through—

Q: You actually physically hand the document—or the material.

A: Yeah, I physically hand the material to the usher and then I walk back down with my briefcase and go see Jack Lew and wait for him and then I brief him.

Q: Okay. And with Mr. Lew, did you talk about this SITREP?

Lawyer: We’re not going to discuss what specific information was provided to any White House staff in any PDB.

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Q: But you did talk with Mr. Lew that day?

A: I did.18

18 Id. at 66-67.

19 Morell Testimony at 25.

20 Team Chief Testimony at 30-31.

Fallout

Morell labeled the insertion of the language by the Executive Coordinator a “bureaucratic screw-up.” This language made it into a piece that was put in the President’s Daily Brief, which was briefed to Lew, and possibly shared with the President. Such a “bureaucratic screw-up,” therefore, has far reaching implications if it occurs with any regularity.

Michael Morell told the Committee that what occurred was a “big no-no.” He testified:

She was, I’m told, a long-time military analyst with some expertise in military matters, no expertise in North Africa and no expertise in this particular incident. She added that, right? That’s a no-no, that’s a no-no in the review process business.19

The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the Executive Coordinator called what occurred an analytic “cardinal sin.” She testified:

What she did was, frankly, in the analytic world, kind of a cardinal sin. I mean, the job of the POTUS coordinator—so we had the two analysts stay overnight. Their job is to copy edit these things and make sure that if there is some analysis in there, that the evidentiary techs sort of hang together; that it actually makes sense because it does go to the—it’s a big deal. I mean, it goes to very senior policymakers. So–20

The OTA Director also said that what occurred was a problem:

Q: Okay. Is that a problem that the senior DNI editor had the final sign-off on this as opposed to the analysts, and that person is inserting something in there that the analysts adamantly disagree with?

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A: In my personal view, yes.21

21 OTA Director Testimony at 43.

22 Morell Testimony at 25-26.

23 Team Chief Testimony at 30-31.

Despite this “bureaucratic screw-up”—which occurred in relation to the Benghazi attacks, one of the few, if only, times in history outside scrutiny has ever been applied to the PDB process—Morell and others at the CIA told the Committee this occurs infrequently. Morell testified:

Q: So from my perspective, I’m very new to this arena, it seems like it’s a problem that you have these rigorous processes in place, and on this particular occasion a piece is going before the President and somebody inserts a sentence that substantively changes the meaning of a bullet point without any additional review by the analysts who wrote the piece.

A: Yes. You’re absolutely right.

Q: That’s a problem in your eyes as well?

A: Yes.

Q: And how often does something like that occur?

A: Not very. You know, in my experience, one or twice a year.22

The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the Executive Coordinator testified:

Q: Is that something that in your 8 years prior you had ever seen or heard of happening?

A: No.23

She also testified:

A: Oh, I’m sure I did, yeah. I mean, it was unheard of and it hasn’t happened since.

Q: Okay.

A: It’s a big deal.24

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24 Team Chief Testimony at 35-36.

25 Morell Testimony at 26.

26 Id. at 27.

Morell, himself once the head of the PDB staff, told the Committee how he would have responded if a senior editor had made such a substantive edit over the objections of the analysts:

A: And this—you know, I ran—I’ve ran the PDB staff, right, as part of the jobs I had. I would have reprimanded, orally reprimanded, not in a formal sense, right—

Q: Sure.

A: —called this person in my office and said, you know, what happened? And if it turned out to be exactly what I just explained to you, I would have said, don’t ever do that again.25

Morell also suggested how to ensure such a “bureaucratic screw-up” doesn’t happen in the future. He told the Committee:

Q: Is there any way to prevent these types of insertions by senior reviewers in the future?

A: Well, I said, it doesn’t happen very often, right.

Q: But it happened in this case, though.

A: So it’s not a huge problem, right, it doesn’t happen very often. The way you prevent it is twofold, right? You make it very clear when somebody shows up to the PDB staff what their responsibilities are and what their responsibilities are not, you’re not the analyst. And, two, when something—when something does happen, even something very minor, right, you make it very clear then that they overstepped their bounds. That’s how you prevent it.26

The Executive Coordinator, however, has a different point of view than Morell, the OTA Director, and the manager of the analysts. She did not view this as a “bureaucratic screw-up” at all, but rather exactly the job she was supposed to be doing. She acknowledged the disagreement with the analysts the night of the Benghazi attacks, testifying:

Q: Okay. And I know we talked about it, but how unusual, I

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guess, was this disagreement, this type of disagreement?

A: It was pretty unusual. Most of the time, we were able to, you know, just sort of agree on language, and they’ll gave you a face like, “Okay,” they’ll roll their eyes, they’ll be like, “All right, you know, that’s not as strong of language as I would like.” But, you know, a lot of times, you know, we soften the language because we just don’t know for sure. So, you know, we’ll change from, you know, “believe with high confidence” to—I’m like, do you really believe with high confidence, or do you really think that’s maybe medium confidence?

And I sort of saw my role as, you know, like, a mentor because I’d been in intelligence for 20 years. So a lot of times, you know, I would tell the analysts, you know, this is good tradecraft, but it will be better analysis if you take into consideration these things which you may or may not have considered.27

27 PDB Testimony at 38.

28 Id. at 31.

However, the fact that she inserted language into the piece was not a “no-no” or a “cardinal sin,” but rather something that was ultimately her decision, not the analysts’. This directly contradicts what Morell said about the Executive Coordinator overstepping her bounds. She testified:

But I do know that, you know, when I talked to [senior CIA official], you know, in the interview process and also, you know, subsequent to that, he basically said that you’re the PDB briefer, you are the last, you know, line of defense and, you know, it’s your call. So if there’s something in there that, you know, bothers you, you know, coordinate it out, and then if you can’t come to an agreement, it’s your, you know, responsibility. So I did not take that lightly.28

Since it was a responsibility she did not take lightly, she only modified such language when there was ample evidence to support it. She told the Committee:

But yes. I mean, we don’t—I rarely ever—in fact, I can’t remember any time that I’ve ever made, you know, a call just based on press reporting, so I’m sure there was other

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A: Yeah.

Q: There was discussion. It seemed to be—the consensus was that it was the right call.

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. The consensus by those at the roundtable.

A: At the roundtable, yes.31

31 Id. at 43-44.

32 Id. at 42.

33 OTA Director Testimony at 43.

One of the briefers at the roundtable was an analyst who came from the Middle East and North African desk at the CIA, and was a colleague of the analysts who disagreed with the Executive Coordinator the night of the attack.32

The testimony received by the Committee on this topic presents a dichotomy between two parties. On the one hand, CIA personnel present a picture that what occurred was a major error and breach of protocol. On the other hand, the Executive Coordinator, who works for ODNI, testified she was told when she took the job that she had the final call on language in analytic pieces, though changing substantive language was something exercised judiciously. Since the Benghazi attacks, the analysts have been instructed to stay with the PDB editors until the final piece is with the ODNI official.33 Given how the situation unfolded early in the morning of September 12, 2012, it is unclear how this new guidance would have altered that particular outcome.

Two of the first pieces produced by the CIA analysts in the wake of the Benghazi attacks contained errors either in process or substance. Both of these pieces became part of the President’s Daily Brief. While the Committee only examined intelligence pieces regarding the Benghazi attacks, discovering errors in two pieces—on successive days, on one single topic—that became part of the President’s Daily Brief is extremely problematic for what should be an airtight process. Whether these errors are simply a coincidence or part of a larger systemic issue is unknown. The September 12 piece, along with the egregious editing and sourcing errors surrounding the September 13 WIRe, discussed in detail above,

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raise major analytic tradecraft issues that require serious examination but are beyond the purview of this Committee.

 

Cruz Led Senate Hearing on Militant Islam, Who Refused to Show?

Willful Blindness

Code Pink Confronts Cruz at Senate Hearing on Islamic Terror, Says He Has a ‘Serious Case’ of Islamophobia

Washington, D.C. – Code Pink was in attendance for Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-TX) hearing to address to White House’s downplaying of Islamic terror on Tuesday – and they immediately made their presence known. Standing in their infamous bright pink shirts with signs that read “Islamophobia is un-American,” they began by asking the room if anyone was “suffering from Islamophobia.”

When Cruz walked in, they asked him the same thing. 

The senator kept his cool, slammed down the gavel and began the hearing. He opened his remarks by referencing the terror attack at Fort Hood in 2009 waged by Nidal Hasan. Cruz noted the innocent people Hasan had slaughtered and how he chanted “allahu akbar” during his rampage. When Cruz accidentally mispronounced “allahu Akbar,” Code Pink and other attendees laughed out loud. More from TownHall

Obama Admin Refuses to Inform Congress of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in U.S.

Officials ignore congressional call to testify about radicalism

FreeBeacon: Senior Obama administration officials refused to appear before Congress on Tuesday to explain the recent decision to purge all references to “Islamic terrorism” and radicalism from public documents, according to disclosures made Tuesday on Capitol Hill.

Top officials from the Justice Department and FBI declined to appear on Capitol Hill to answer questions from lawmakers about domestic terror attacks and an administration policy of scrubbing references to Islamic terrorism and similar terms from government materials, lawmakers said.

The policy has thwarted attempts by federal authorities to stop an increasing series of terror attacks from taking place on United States soil, according to Sen. Ted Cruz (R., Texas), chair of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on oversight.

In the past year the Obama administration has twice ordered that mentions of the terror group ISIS and “Islamic terrorism” be purged “from highly significant public records,” Cruz said.

One such effort took place in the aftermath of the recent terrorist shooting in Orlando in which the administration censored 911 transcripts of calls made by the shooter.

These efforts came amid other campaigns by the Department of Homeland Security to force its personnel to remove references to “jihad,” “sharia,” and other similar terms from material focused on methods to counter violent extremism, Cruz said.

“I would like nothing more than to speak with a government official about these bizarre decisions and omissions, especially in light of the most recent terrorist attack in Orlando by a radicalized man who had been interviewed three times by the FBI,” Cruz said.

“Indeed, this subcommittee invited two such witnesses: John P. Carlin, an assistant attorney general for the Department of Justice’s National Security Division, and Michael B. Steinbach, the executive assistant director for the FBI’s National Security Branch,” he said. “Both have refused to appear.”

Cruz blamed the administration’s policy for contributing to recent terror attacks in Orlando, San Bernardino, and Boston.

There has been a “consistent effort by this administration to scrub any reference to radical Islamic terrorism, to pretend the threat does not exist, and tragically as a consequence of that, over and over again, we have instances where the administration has ample evidence of radical Islamic terrorists,” Cruz said.

“The consequence of a willful blindness, of a policy that is a matter of administration policy, refusal to acknowledge the threat, means over and over again this administration has allowed the threats to go forward,” he added.

The administration “had declined to appear and explain” this policy and rationale behind it despite multiple requests from Congress.

“Are government officials prohibited from debating anything about Islam?” Cruz asked. “We would like to hear an explanation for that.”

The efforts to avoid using these terms have been longstanding in the Obama administration.

Muslim advocacy groups forced the FBI to purge some 876 documents from its training materials because they were deemed “offensive” in March 2012, Cruz explained.

“One article was purged because it was ‘highly inflammatory’ and ‘inaccurately argues the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization,’” he added.

In lieu of the Obama administration officials, the subcommittee heard from a range of outside terrorism experts and the government whistleblower who disclosed attempts by the Obama administration to purge many names from the U.S. terror watch list.

The Obama administration has come under further criticism for failing to properly combat ISIS abroad, a strategy that some lawmakers say could enable the terror group to carry out attacks inside the United States.

“I fear that in spite of continued attacks on our homeland, our military response to ISIS does not adequately reflect the direct nature of this threat to the United States,” Sen. Bob Corker (R., Tenn.), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said during a separate Tuesday hearing on the U.S. strategy to combat ISIS.

“I think many of us grow frustrated when the administration’s optimistic rhetoric often does not match the results,” Corker said.

ISIS Kill List Targets American Civilians, But do They Know?

Is anyone telling the civilians they are targets of Islamic State? Nope…Anyone explain why? The military? the FBI? The police? Is anyone collaborating, coordinating and protecting citizens?

 

ISIS ‘Kill Lists’ Increasingly Target U.S. Civilians

Report: Calls for random attacks by hacking groups illuminate ‘evolving terror threat’

FreeBeacon: Pro-ISIS hacking groups have started including American civilians along with military, government, and law enforcement personnel on “kill lists,” consistent with the terror group’s effort to expand attacks to random targets and instill fear in the public, according to a new report.

The SITE Intelligence Group, an organization that monitors jihadist propaganda, examined eight lists recently circulated online by pro-ISIS hacking groups, including some that name random civilian targets.

“These lists, with targets spanning drone operators to random civilians, appear to have achieved at least part of their presumed intentions: heightened alert by government workers, FBI visits to startled civilians, and significant media attention,” SITE wrote in its report.

Eight lists released over the course of two months this year have targeted federal government employees, military personnel, state and local government officials, and random residents of New York and Texas. While most of the kill lists have not been pushed through official ISIS channels, fighters and supporters of the terror group have promoted the targets through social media.

“This embrace of random targets, though new within the context of hackers’ kill lists, is nonetheless consistent with IS’ methodology, and demonstrates application of attack instructions from IS’ leadership and affiliates,” the report explained, using another name for the Islamic State, or ISIS.

ISIS has inspired self-radicalized terrorists who have launched attacks inside the United States. Omar Mateen, a U.S. citizen, pledged allegiance to the terror group during conversations with 911 operators during a gun attack that killed 49 victims at an Orlando gay club earlier this month. The couple who opened fire on a San Bernardino, California, holiday party last December are also believed to have pledged support to ISIS.

The FBI declined to comment specifically on investigative matters related to the kill lists but said that the agency routinely notifies people and organizations of information collected during investigations that could be “perceived as potentially threatening in nature.”

“Potential threats may relate to individuals, institutions, or organizations, and are shared in order to sensitize potential victims to the observed threat, and to assist them in taking proper steps to ensure their safety,” Matthew Bertron, a representative for the FBI’s National Press Office, told the Washington Free Beacon.

Kill lists from pro-ISIS hacking groups have become increasingly abundant since the so-called Islamic State Hacking Division called for attacks on 100 military personnel in March of last year, and later released lists targeting 10 Italian Army officers and over 1,000 military and government personnel. While this particular hacking group—once headed by ISIS fighter Junaid Hussain before he was killed in an airstrike—has focused on military and government personnel, others have emerged to target civilians and local officials.

A pro-ISIS group called the United Cyber Caliphate, for example, released five different target lists between March and May of this year. The lists publicized personal information about 11 Tennessee state county board members; 3,600 New York citizens; and 1,543 Texas residents, according to SITE’s report. Two lists each separately included information about 50 federal government employees, including workers from the Departments of State, Defense, and Navy.

While the list of New York residents was removed from the hosting site where it was posted, the lists with information on individuals in Tennessee and Texas remained online.

Another group named the Caliphate Cyber Army also released two lists, one of which called for attacks on 56 New Jersey state police staff and another that targeted 36 Minnesota state police officers.

While inactive between September 2015 and May of this year, the Islamic State Hacking Division also recently released names and personal information of 76 U.S. military personnel who work with drones.

“In just over a year, kill lists from pro-IS hacking groups have not only become more abundant, but have also expanded in terms of target selection,” the SITE report stated. “Between March and May of this year, kill lists by these groups have expanded beyond conventional criteria to random civilian targets, instructing to ‘shoot them down.’”

The lists are consistent with ISIS ideology supporting attacks on all non-Muslims living in countries at war with the terror group, according to SITE.

“This shift in target selection shows a new method in serving a long-standing function of IS and other jihadi groups: instill widespread fear into governments and the public,” the report stated. “As IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani stated in a September 2014 speech, Muslims should kill any non-Muslim living in countries warring with the group, with no distinction of ‘whether he is a civilian or military.’”

The promotion of the lists also highlights ISIS militants’ exploitation of social media to recruit and inspire attacks, regardless of the fact that the pro-ISIS hacking groups do not appear to be publicly coordinating with one another.

“Given the power and ease of social media, along with the increasing ubiquity of Internet access and smart phones, every IS supporter can act as their own online media group, recruitment office, or fundraising organization. Likewise, every IS-supporting hacker can use their skills to serve the group’s goals, whether they be a fighter or a supporter in non-combat zones,” the report stated.

The SITE Intelligence Group could not confirm that the groups obtained the information by hacking into government or other private systems but said that it was both possible and plausible. The report noted that some of the information on the lists is available through public channels though they “appear to be compiled via non-public sources, especially when factoring what would be immense labor and difficulty required to manually compile the information via those public sources.”

The Islamic State Hacking Division is believed to have obtained data for its list targeting over 1,000 U.S. military personnel from Ardit Ferizi, a Kosovo citizen who hacked into a U.S.-based company’s servers to harvest the information. The Justice Department charged Ferizi with computer hacking, identity theft, and providing material support to ISIS last October.

The Covert Russian Influence, Targets Europe/USA

What if Russia does have Hillary’s emails? When the KGB/FSB hacked into the DNC, the Kremlin does have an army of people cultivating and assessing all American politics moving ahead for the next 4 years. That is a trove of data for political warfare and coupled with Europe, Putin’s sights on global expansion is becoming a simple game of checkers.

Russian intelligence and security services have been waging a campaign of harassment and intimidation against U.S. diplomats, embassy staff and their families in Moscow and several other European capitals that has rattled ambassadors and prompted Secretary of State John F. Kerry to ask Vladimir Putin to put a stop to it.

At a recent meeting of U.S. ambassadors from Russia and Europe in Washington, U.S. ambassadors to several European countries complained that Russian intelligence officials were constantly perpetrating acts of harassment against their diplomatic staff that ranged from the weird to the downright scary. Some of the intimidation has been routine: following diplomats or their family members, showing up at their social events uninvited or paying reporters to write negative stories about them.

But many of the recent acts of intimidation by Russian security services have crossed the line into apparent criminality. In a series of secret memos sent back to Washington, described to me by several current and former U.S. officials who have written or read them, diplomats reported that Russian intruders had broken into their homes late at night, only to rearrange the furniture or turn on all the lights and televisions, and then leave. One diplomat reported that an intruder had defecated on his living room carpet. A real terrifying set of Russian aggressions explained more in detail here. It has been going on for some time, where now diplomats are being trained to handle Russian aggression.  More here from the Washington Post.

Let’s examine some other symptoms and facts:

Primer #1, 1948: Preventive Direct Action in Free Countries.

Purpose: Only in cases of critical necessity, to resort to direct action to prevent vital installations, other material, or personnel from being (1) sabotaged or liquidated or (2) captured intact by Kremlin agents or agencies. 

Description: This covert operation involves, for example, (1) control over anti-sabotage activities in the  Venezuelan oil fields, (2) American sabotage of Near Eastern oil installations on the verge of Soviet capture, and (3) designation of key individuals threatened by the Kremlin who should be protected or removed elsewhere. 

It would seem that the time is now fully ripe for the creation of a covert political warfare operations directorate within the Government. If we are to engage in such operations, they must be under unified direction. One man must be boss. And he must, as those responsible for the overt phases of political warfare, be answerable to the Secretary of State, who directs the whole in coordination. (More from Political Warfare, in the Gray Zone)

Primer #2: (2014)When Central and Eastern Europe threw off the Communist yoke and the Soviet Union collapsed, Europe and the United States transformed their Soviet policy of isolation and containment to one of political and economic integration with the Russian Federation.

This approach had been largely successful over the past 25 years. Russia joined the Group of Eight (G8) in 1998, the World Trade Organization in 2012, and was considered for membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the past 10 years alone, the value of Russia’s global trade has nearly quadrupled from $210 billion in 2003 to $802 billion in 2013. Last year, Russia’s trade with the EU represented 48.5 percent of its total. Although U.S.-Russian trade ties remained subdued by comparison, the two former superpowers developed a measurable degree of economic interdependence, as evidenced by the International Space Station and Russian-made titanium for Boeing’s 787 fleet. This transatlantic policy of integration came to an abrupt halt on March 18, 2014. (More here from Heather Conley)

Political warfare is cheap and effective when dupes are willing accomplices.

So, in 2016 we are seeing the following:

 Putin and Ortega

The Russian government is building an electronic intelligence-gathering facility in Nicaragua as part of Moscow’s efforts to increase military and intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere.

The signals intelligence site is part of a recent deal between Moscow and Managua involving the sale of 50 T-72 Russian tanks, said defense officials familiar with reports of the arrangement.

The tank deal and spy base have raised concerns among some officials in the Pentagon and nations in the region about a military buildup under leftist Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega.

Disclosure of the Russia-Nicaraguan spy base comes as three U.S. officials were expelled from Nicaragua last week. The three Department of Homeland Security officials were picked up by Nicaraguan authorities, driven to the airport, and sent to the United States without any belongings.

State Department spokesman John Kirby said the expulsion took place June 14 and was “unwarranted and inconsistent with the positive and constructive agenda that we seek with the government of Nicaragua.”

“Such treatment has the potential to negatively impact U.S. and Nicaraguan bilateral relations, particularly trade,” he said.

The action is an indication that President Obama’s recent diplomatic overture to Cuba has not led to better U.S. ties to leftist governments in the region. More here.  

*****

Silicon Valley’s hostility to U.S. intelligence and law enforcement reached a new low last week when Twitter rejected the Central Intelligence Agency as a customer for data based on its tweets—while continuing to serve an entity controlled by Vladimir Putin.

The Wall Street Journal broke the news that Twitter decided U.S. intelligence services could no longer buy services from Dataminr, which has a unique relationship with Twitter. (More from the WSJ)

Russia accused of clandestine funding of European parties as US conducts major review of Vladimir Putin’s strategy
Exclusive: UK warns of “new Cold War” as Kremlin seeks to divide and rule in Europe

Telegraph: American intelligence agencies are to conduct a major investigation into how the Kremlin is infiltrating political parties in Europe, it can be revealed.

James Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence, has been instructed by the US Congress to conduct a major review into Russian clandestine funding of European parties over the last decade.

The review reflects mounting concerns in Washington over Moscow’s determination to exploit European disunity in order to undermine Nato, block US missile defence programmes and revoke the punitive economic sanctions regime imposed after the annexation of Crimea.

The US move came as senior British government officials told The Telegraph of growing fears that “a new cold war” was now unfolding in Europe, with Russian meddling taking on a breadth, range and depth far greater than previously thought.

“It really is a new Cold War out there,” the source said, “Right across the EU we are seeing alarming evidence of Russian efforts to unpick the fabric of European unity on a whole range of vital strategic issues.”

A dossier of “Russian influence activity” seen by The Sunday Telegraph identified Russian influence operations running in France, the Netherlands, Hungary as well as Austria and the Czech Republic, which has been identified by Russian agents as an entry-point into the Schengen free movement zone.

The US intelligence review will examine whether Russian security services are funding parties and charities with the intent of “undermining political cohesion”, fostering agitation against the Nato missile defence programme and undermining attempts to find alternatives to Russian energy.

Officials declined to say which parties could come into the probe but it is thought likely to include far-right groups including Jobbik in Hungary, Golden Dawn in Greece, the Northern League in Italy and France’s Front National which received a 9m euro (£6.9m) loan from a Russian bank in 2014.

Other cases of possible Moscow-backed destabilisation being monitored by diplomats includes extensive links in Austria, including a visit by Austrian MPs to Crimea to endorse its annexation, as well as cases of Russian spies discovered using Austrian papers.

 

A Hotel in Texas for Immigrants?

Immigration officials consider bid for new ‘hotel-like’ detention center

Stratton Oilfield Systems seeks to turn former Texas work camp into 500-bed facility with improved living conditions, which activists say would still be ‘prison’

 

Guardian: Federal immigration officials are moving forward with plans for a new 500-bed family detention center to house migrant women and children, even as many advocates and politicians have called for the closure of such facilities altogether.

Officials in Dimmit County, 45 miles from the Texas border with Mexico, say they’ll consider a bid on Monday from a firm who says their facility in a 27-acre former work camp for oil workers would provide dramatically better conditions than two other family detention centers in the state.

Those facilities have faced complaints of poor food, inadequate medical care and allegations of sexual abuse from detainees, activists and the US Civil Rights Commission.

“Our facility offers a community-based alternative that will allow children to live in a home setting, attend school, and access critical legal and social services,” Stratton Oilfield Systems said in a pitch to potential partners.

“They want to have it with no fence,” said Mike Uriegas, a commissioner in Dimmit County, who says he first met with Stratton Oilfield Systems two weeks ago. “They don’t want to appear like a prison or detention center.”

But Cristina Parker, Immigration Programs Director for Grassroots Leadership, said she and other advocates object inherently to the concept of a detention center for families fleeing violence, regardless of the purported conditions.

“If you are not free to leave, then it doesn’t matter how nice it is,” Parker said. “It’s a prison.”

The Obama administration’s use of family detention centers that hold children and mothers has become one of the most contested elements of America’s border protection program.

Advocates have called on the Obama administration to pursue alternatives for families who are waiting for courts to hear pending asylum and immigration claims.

“Our families have witnessed their loved ones killed before their eyes, they have been the victim of rapes and robberies simply because of who they are,” said Jonathan Ryan, executive director of the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services. “Our refugee families need protection, not jail.”

Related reading: SERCO, Global Corruption

Related reading: Orlando Terrorist, Omar/G4S and SERCO

Earlier this month, a nearby Texas county had considered a bid with British firm Serco, which has a history of immigration detention center scandals in the UK and Australia. Jim Wells County voted not to bid on the contract, after some officials voiced concern over past abuse allegations against the firm.

Uriegas said he and other officials are undecided on the Stratton bid and will learn more at a meeting on Monday, which immigration advocates also plan to attend. One group had already heard of the company.

Last July, Stratton’s vice-president, Shannon A Stratton, tried to pitch the same idea for the closed worker housing in a letter to Grassroots Leadership, an Austin-based organization that opposes the prison industry.

A glossy proposal accompanying Stratton’s letter showed hotel-like two-bedroom studios with a living room, kitchenette and full bathroom. Stratton noted a federal judge has said women and children should be released from other detention centers where they are being held in “deplorable” conditions.

“The Studios in Carrizo Springs offers an excellent solution and is distinctly different from the facilities that are so highly criticized in the media and by human rights groups,” Stratton wrote. “Families could be free to come and go while they await immigration hearings, receive education about their rights and responsibilities, and pursue permanent relocation and employment.”

“It shows they don’t quite know what is going on,” said Cristina Parker, immigration programs director for Grassroots Leadership. “They’re confused about other things too, because it is blanketly untrue that the families will be free to come and go.”

Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s other two family residential centers in Texas are surrounded by razor wire and high fences.

The proposal emerges just days after the US supreme court blocked Obama’s plan to spare millions of immigrants from deportation. He vowed afterward: “What was unaffected by today’s ruling, or lack of a ruling, is the enforcement priorities that we’ve put in place.”