FY SCAAP 2016: Criminal Aliens $189,008,372.00

Posted on February 3, 2017February 3, 2017 by Denise Simon

A faithful reader of this website, reached out to me and asked for an update on a previous post. Hat tip for this great reminder. Grrr….when looking at the dollars, it has hard not to jump and down in frustration.

With a little effort in research, the last time the Government Accountability Office did any estimate to the cost of the U.S. economy for all things illegal/immigration related was 2011.

Image result for criminal aliene detention

The cost at the State level fluctuates based on deportations and beds available. The Federal government out of the Justice Department helps pay respective states for the costs of alien incarceration. It must be understood that aliens come from hundreds of countries and since there are some countries that allegedly refuse to take back their citizens by deportation, at least the Justice Department should work all the diplomatic channels that the home countries of the criminals should pay up for all expenses and associated future costs.

Three groups of criminal aliens can be distinguished.

 All criminal aliens include both unauthorized aliens, most of whom are potentially removable, and legal aliens10 who may or may not be removable depending on specific crimes committed. This population contains the set of criminal aliens who are removable on the basis of specific crimes committed.

 Criminal aliens who have been convicted of removable criminal offenses are subject to removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) even if they are otherwise legally present.11 For example, a legal permanent resident (LPR) convicted of cocaine possession is subject to removal,12 but an LPR convicted of public intoxication is not. This population also includes aggravated felons.

 Criminal aliens who have been convicted of aggravated felonies13 are ineligible for most forms of relief from removal14 and are ineligible to be readmitted to the United States.15

As noted above, all three of these subpopulations—criminal aliens, removable criminal aliens, and aggravated felons—comprise an unknown mix of legally present noncitizens and unauthorized aliens.

State by state and listed by country, click here for what the Bureau of Justice released for FY 2016.

SCAAP Overview

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, administers SCAAP, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). SCAAP provides federal payments to states and localities that incurred correctional officer salary costs for incarcerating undocumented criminal aliens who have at least one felony or two misdemeanor convictions for violations of state or local law, and who are incarcerated for at least 4 consecutive days during the reporting period.

SCAAP Legislative Authority

SCAAP is governed by Section 241(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(i), as amended, and Title II, Subtitle C, Section 20301, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322. In general terms, if a chief executive officer of a state or a political subdivision exercises authority over the incarceration of undocumented criminal aliens and submits a written request to the U.S. Attorney General, the Attorney General may provide compensation to that jurisdiction for those incarceration costs. SCAAP is subject to additional terms and conditions of yearly congressional appropriations.

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ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH 8 U.S.C. § 1373

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Just a view from the State of Texas for aliens that are not being detained or incarcerated as noted in a report from 2013:

In part from FAIRUS.org: In 2013, illegal immigration cost Texas taxpayers about $12.1 billion annually. That amounts to more than $1,197 for every Texas household headed by a native-born or naturalized U.S. citizen. The taxes paid by illegal aliens — estimated at $1.27 billion per year — do not come close to paying for those outlays, but we include an estimate of revenue from sales taxes, property taxes, alcohol taxes, and cigarette taxes.

Examining Texas’s fiscal outlays from the perspective of the current debate over adopting an amnesty for illegal aliens, we find that the fiscal burden to taxpayers would not be significantly lessened even if an amnesty like that proposed in the Senate’s S.744 were enacted. In fact, it becomes clear that the only way to significantly reduce the fiscal burden is to reduce the size of the population that illegally entered the country. State and local policymakers have options available to accomplish that objective. In Arizona, efforts to discourage the arrival of additional illegal residents and to hold employers accountable for knowingly hiring illegal workers have been effective in reducing the illegal alien population and, thereby, the fiscal costs associated with that population.

UC Berkeley, Protests over Milo and $370 Million

Posted on February 2, 2017February 2, 2017 by Denise Simon

How did it all happen? It continues to happen…

Exactly who is boycotting/protesting who? Napolitano protesting Federal law perhaps?

UC Berkely, the birthplace of ‘free speech’ is the campus where Milo Yiannopoulos was invited to speak. The Republican student organization extended the invitation and the university officials said fine if you put up $6000.00 for security teams. They agreed and did. Then Milo, a foreign national in the United States on a green card, actually travels the country doing talks with his own bodyguard. Once Milo was inside the student union building, things began to go sideways and Milo was evacuated. So much for free speech.

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Berkeley students were still receiving texts from university police to “shelter in place” as of 9pm PT, and helicopters could be heard overhead well into the evening. More here from Forbes.

NBC

The Star

So, where did all this come from?

UC President Janet Napolitano reiterates vow to protect immigrant students

University of California President Janet Napolitano assured vulnerable immigrant students Wednesday that, despite fear and uncertainty about President Trump’s intentions, the university would protect them.

“UC chancellors and I have reaffirmed our intentions to ensure that every corner of the University of California remains welcoming, safe and inclusive for all,” Napolitano said at a two-day meeting of the Board of Regents in San Francisco.

Trump signed executive orders Wednesday signaling a crackdown on illegal immigration, but he has not yet moved to end an Obama administration program that deferred deportation against young people who are in the country illegally. The program, Deferred Action Against Childhood Arrivals (DACA), was created by Napolitano when she served as Homeland Security secretary under Obama.

UC officials indicated that they intend to fight back if Trump does end the program, which could jeopardize an estimated 3,700 UC students who are living in the country illegally.

The regents plan to discuss the “prelitigation potential” of possible university responses to Trump’s actions on immigration in a closed session Thursday, Regent George Kieffer said. He asked UC officials Wednesday about whether such responses would be legal.

“We know that the new president has certain views on immigration, DACA…. We’re going to be in a position in some ways to be opposite to him,” Kieffer said. “Do we have solid legal foundation for some of the actions we’ll be taking?”

“Everything that we do will be thoroughly researched and grounded in law,” replied Nelson Peacock, the university system’s senior vice president for state and federal government relations.

A working group formed by Napolitano the day after Trump’s election in November is developing possible responses to any repeal of the DACA program or other actions that would harm their students, said Julia Friedlander, UC deputy general counsel. She declined to elaborate on what such actions might be.

“There’s a great deal of concern, but we’ll have to see the fine print” of any move by Trump before responding, she said. “The university has a commitment to equal opportunity, and we will do everything in our power to fulfill that commitment.” Read more here from LATimes.

Just $370 million in Federal funding goes to UC Berkeley? (How many other universities are doing the same as UC Berkeley and getting Federal funding subsidies?)

Each year, the UC Berkeley campus receives well over half a billion dollars in research and other support from external sources. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 2016, UC Berkeley attracted $673.9 million in new awards. Many of these awards fund multiyear research projects and support expenditures that will be reflected in subsequent years. The federal government provided 55 percent of these funds, and California state agencies and other government sources, industry, and the nonprofit sector supplied the rest. Of the research funding provided by the U.S. government, the largest contributors are the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation.

More here on UC Berkeley funding revenue.

Homeland Security Protection Measures on the Move

Posted on February 2, 2017February 2, 2017 by Denise Simon

These legislative actions have long been sitting on desk tops waiting for the right moment to introduce and pass, now over to the Senate. When fully passed, it will be a great launch of additional security for the new DHS Secretary, John Kelly.

House Passes 17 Sweeping Bipartisan Bills to Enhance Homeland Security

Assuring that the “House Committee on Homeland Security continues its efforts to shield the homeland and protect Americans right out of the gate in the 115th Congress,” committee chairman Michael McCaul’s (R-TX) office said Tuesday “the House passed 17 Committee bills that touch on a wide array of homeland security issues—from the security of our border, transportation and cyber networks, to counterterrorism, first responder capabilities and ensuring the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] runs efficiently.

“The 17 bills that passed the House today are all unified in their purpose to better protect our homeland and our people,” McCaul said in a statement, noting, “These bills improve our border security, transportation security and cybersecurity defenses, enhance first responder capabilities and streamline the management efficiency of [DHS]. My committee is working to get common sense legislation signed into law as soon as possible and make our country safer by doing so.”

Six of the bills passed Tuesday were sponsored by Democrats, Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS), ranking member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, pointed out.

Thompson said his legislation, the “Department of Homeland Security Clearance Management and Administration Act … which previously passed the House in 2015, makes specific reforms in how DHS identifies positions that warrant clearances, how it investigates and homeland security manages its security clearance processes. Specifically, it addresses dates for clearances, and how it administers its adjudications, denials, suspensions, revocations and appeals processes.”

“This legislation … seeks to improve how DHS manages its clearance process at all stages—from decisions on whether to designate positions as requiring clearances to ensuring uniformity in how clearances are adjudicated, suspended, denied and revoked. My bill will make DHS a leader among federal agencies with respect to security clearance and position designations practices. It is critical we put DHS on a path to right-sizing the number of classified positions in its workforce. I thank my colleagues for supporting it and urge the Senate to recognize the necessity to pass this legislation.”

The 17 passed by the full House include:

The DHS Acquisition Documentation Integrity Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ). It would require the DHS Secretary to request component heads to maintain specific types of acquisition documentation.

The DHS Stop Asset and Vehicle Excess (SAVE) Act, introduced by Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA), would direct the Under Secretary for Management of the Department of Homeland Security to make certain improvements in managing DHS’s vehicle fleet.

The Medical Preparedness Allowable Use Act, introduced by Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-FL), would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to codify authority under existing grant guidance authorizing the use of Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland Security Grant Program funding for enhancing medical preparedness, medical surge capacity and mass prophylaxis capabilities.

The Border Security Technology Accountability Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Martha McSally (R-AZ), would strengthen accountability for deployment of border security technology at DHS and for other purposes.

The Counterterrorism Advisory Board Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. John Katko (R-NY), would establish a board in the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate and integrate departmental intelligence, activities, and policy related to counterterrorism.

The Transit Security Grant Program Flexibility Act, introduced by Rep. Dan Donovan (R-NY), would clarify certain allowable uses of funds for public transportation security assistance grants and establish periods of performance for such grants, and for other purposes.

The Cyber Preparedness Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Dan Donovan (R-NY), would enhance preparedness and response capabilities for cyberattacks and bolsters the sharing of information related to cyber threats.

The United States-Israel Cybersecurity Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. James Langevin (D-RI), would establish a grant program at DHS to promote cooperative research and development between the United States and Israel on cybersecurity.

The Fusion Center Enhancement Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Lou Barletta (R-PA), would enhance the partnership between DHS and the National Network of Fusion Centers.

The Securing the Cities Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Dan Donovan (R-NY) would establish the Securing the Cities program, which will enhance the ability of the United States to detect and prevent terrorist attacks and other high consequence events utilizing nuclear or other radiological materials that pose a high risk to homeland security in high-risk urban areas.

The Airport Perimeter and Access Control Security Act, introduced by Rep. William Keating (D-MA), would require the Transportation Security Administration to update risk assessments at airports—specifically along airport perimeters and points of access to secure areas—and report to Congress strategic plans to increase security measures.

The Department of Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Peter King (R-NY), would require the DHS Secretary to establish an insider threat program within the department.

The CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Martha McSally (R-AZ), would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear intelligence and information sharing functions of DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and to require dissemination of information analyzed by the department to entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security.

The Department of Homeland Security Support to Fusion Centers Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Martha McSally (R-AZ), would require an assessment of fusion center personnel needs.

The First Responder Access to Innovative Technologies Act, introduced by Rep. Donald Payne Jr. (D-NJ), reported this week by Homeland Security Today, would direct FEMA to develop a uniform process for reviewing grant applications seeking to purchase equipment or systems that do not meet or exceed applicable national voluntary consensus standards using funds from the Urban Area Security Initiative or the State Homeland Security Grant Program.

The Gains in Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Act, introduced by Rep. Cedric Richmond (D-LA), would direct DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to develop and maintain documentation that provides information on how the Office’s research investments align with gaps in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and the research challenges identified by the DNDO Director.

The Department of Homeland Security Clearance Management and Administration Act, introduced by Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS), would improve the management and administration of the security clearance processes throughout DHS.

The House also passed the First Responder Identification of Emergency Needs in Disaster Situations Act sponsored by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX).

*** When it comes to cyber and cyber protections, things are not so rosy.

The extent to which the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) has taken steps to perform each of its 11 statutorily required cybersecurity functions — such as being a federal civilian interface for sharing cybersecurity-related information with federal and nonfederal entities — the degree to which the center has adhered to the 9 principles required by the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 to perform its cybersecurity functions “is unclear because the center has not yet determined the applicability of the principles to all 11 functions, or established metrics and methods by which to evaluate its performance against the principles,” according to new Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit report.

NCCIC manages programs that provide data used in developing 43 products and services in support of its functions, including monitoring network traffic entering and exiting federal agency networks, and analyzing computer network vulnerabilities and threats. NCCIC products and services also are provided to its customers in the private sector; federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government entities; and other partner organizations. For example, NCCIC issues indicator bulletins, which can contain information related to cyber threat indicators, defensive measures and cybersecurity risks and incidents, and help to fulfill its function to coordinate the sharing of such information across the government.

GAO reported it “identified instances where NCCIC had implemented its functions in accordance with one or more of the principles. For example, consistent with the principle that it seek and receive appropriate consideration from industry sector-specific, academic, and national laboratory expertise, NCCIC coordinated with contacts from industry, academia and the national laboratories to develop and disseminate vulnerability alerts.”

But, “On the other hand,” GAO said it “also identified instances where the cybersecurity functions were not performed in accordance with the principles. For example, NCCIC is to provide timely technical assistance, risk management support and incident response capabilities to federal and nonfederal entities; however, it had not established measures or other procedures for ensuring the timeliness of these assessments. Until NCCIC determines the applicability of the principles to its functions and develops metrics and methods to evaluate its performance against the principles, the center cannot ensure that it is effectively meeting its statutory requirements.”

GAO said it further “identified factors that impede NCCIC’s ability to more efficiently perform several of its cybersecurity functions. For example, NCCIC officials were unable to completely track and consolidate cyber incidents reported to the center, thereby inhibiting its ability to coordinate the sharing of information across the government. Similarly, NCCIC may not have ready access to the current contact information for all owners and operators of the most critical cyber-dependent infrastructure assets. This lack could impede timely communication with them in the event of a cyber incident.”

GAO warned that, “Until NCCIC takes steps to overcome these impediments, it may not be able to efficiently perform its cybersecurity functions and assist federal and nonfederal entities in identifying cyber-based threats, mitigating vulnerabilities and managing cyber risks.”

In its written comments on a draft of GAO’s audit, DHS concurred with all nine recommendations.

DHS “also provided details about steps that it plans to take to address each of the recommendations, including estimated time frames for completion. If effectively implemented, these actions should enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of NCCIC in performing its statutory requirements,” GAO reported.

To more fully address the requirements identified in the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 and the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, GAO recommended that the DHS Secretary take the following nine actions:

Determine the extent to which the statutorily required implementing principles apply to NCCIC’s cybersecurity functions.

Develop metrics for assessing adherence to applicable principles in carrying out statutorily required functions.

Establish methods for monitoring the implementation of cybersecurity functions against the principles on an ongoing basis.

Integrate information related to security incidents to provide management with more complete information about NCCIC operations.

Determine the necessity of reducing, consolidating, or modifying the points of entry used to communicate with NCCIC to better ensure that all incident tickets are logged appropriately.

Develop and implement procedures to perform regular reviews of customer information to ensure that it is current and reliable.

Take steps to ensure the full representation of the owners and operators of the nation’s most critical cyber-dependent infrastructure assets.

Establish plans and time frames for consolidating or integrating the legacy networks used by NCCIC analysts to reduce the need for manual data entry.

Identify alternative methods to collaborate with international partners, while ensuring the security requirements of high-impact systems.

Russian Hacking, We knew Because we had an Inside Operative(s)

Posted on February 1, 2017February 1, 2017 by Denise Simon

This Executive Order is in draft form and does not include Russia, which is quite curious. The question of ‘why’ must be asked based on information noted below.

The Trump administration’s draft of the executive order on cybersecurity obtained by the Washington Post by April Glaser on Scribd

Those people involved in internet forensics and that track hackers, malicious code, malware, ransomware and intrusions are all dedicated to finding the cracks in code and even more finding the hackers while further understanding their code and patterns. I get emails about this topic every day that include a variety of global companies operating in this realm.

Back in December of 2015, ODNI James Clapper announced Russian intrusions into several American infrastructure locations. This was before the announcement of Russian intrusions into the U.S. political apparatus. In can be presumed the United States has long had the help of operatives inside adversarial countries, most of all Russia. Spies are out there and further, it is estimated there are 100,000 foreign spies inside the United States as of this moment. Heh, before Barack Obama left his presidency, he did expelled many Russians and closed two Russian compounds.

IN 2014, U.S. Cyber operations quietly penetrated Russian systems without declaring in specific language the exact operations.

In 2014, National Security Agency chief Adm. Mike Rogers told Congress that U.S. adversaries are performing electronic “reconnaissance” on a regular basis so that they can be in a position to disrupt the industrial control systems that run everything from chemical facilities to water treatment plants.

“All of that leads me to believe it is only a matter of when, not if, we are going to see something dramatic,” he said at the time.

Rogers didn’t discuss the U.S.’s own penetration of adversary networks. But the hacking undertaken by the NSA, which regularly penetrates foreign networks to gather intelligence, is very similar to the hacking needed to plant precursors for cyber weapons, said Gary Brown, a retired colonel and former legal adviser to U.S. Cyber Command, the military’s digital war fighting arm. More here.

It is unclear if we have recruited people inside Russia to work on the behalf of the United States, but clues tell us we did, with success.

In part from RFEL: At the simplest level, two FSB officers working in cyberdefense, Sergei Mikhailov and Dmitry Dokuchayev, as well as Ruslan Stoyanov, a former Interior Ministry official who works for the cyber security company Kaspersky Lab, are reportedly being charged with espionage.

According to Russian media reports, Mikhailov is suspected of alerting U.S. intelligence to the FSB’s connection to a Russian server-rental company called King Servers.

Last year, the U.S.-based cybersecurity firm ThreatConnect had identified King Servers as the nexus for hacking attacks against the United States.

If U.S. intelligence did indeed have a highly placed source like Mikhailov, it would explain why it was able to conclude with such a high degree of confidence that Russia was behind the cyberattacks during the election campaign.

The timing of the arrests and the timing of the decision by former U.S. President Barack Obama to declassify and make public parts of the U.S. intelligence report on the alleged Russian hacking also makes sense.

Mikhailov was arrested in December. And the U.S. released the intelligence report a month later, in January.

If Mikhailov was indeed a source, then Washington would have been reluctant to declassify its intelligence for fear of compromising him.

After he was arrested, this, of course, would no longer be an issue.

So far, so straightforward. Until it isn’t.

Leaks to the Russian media have also connected Mikhailov and his subordinate Dokuchayev to a hacker group known as Shaltai-Boltai, or Humpty Dumpty, which in the past has released embarrassing material about top Russian officials.

Vladimir Anikeyev, the founder of Shaltai-Boltai, has also been arrested, but is not being charged with espionage.

Moreover, Russian media reports claim that Dokuchayev is actually a former hacker known as Forb, who was serving a prison sentence for credit-card theft when he was recruited by the FSB, where he held the rank of major.

As Leonid Bershidsky notes in his column for Bloomberg, “parallel to their official duties, officers often run private security operations involving blackmail and protection. If Mikhailov ran such a business out of the FSB’s Information Security Center, he wouldn’t stand out among his colleagues.”

And it’s also not unusual for the FSB to recruit former hackers. In fact, it’s pretty much standard practice.

This is where the story diverts into the murky world of FSB officers and their civilian collaborators monetizing their positions and forming protection rackets.

“An FSB officer, recruited from the hacking community, can use his rank and position to obtain compromising material and sell it to wealthy clients. A team profiting from these opportunities can include both officers and civilians,” Bershidsky writes.

“The Russian government can hire such a team through intermediaries if it needs something sensitive done — but so can foreign intelligence services. It’s a murky world in which actors are both predator and prey. The Kremlin enjoys access to brilliant and unscrupulous people; the downside, of course, is that they may be hard to control.”

If you follow this line of logic, then it’s easy to imagine that Mikhailov and Dokuchayev inadvertently or unwittingly sold information exposing King Server’s FSB connections to a front for U.S. intelligence.

But the fact of the matter is we simply don’t know.

And if things aren’t confusing enough yet, there is also the matter of the bitter personal and clan rivalries in the shadow world of the Russian security services.

In a recent post on his blog KrebsOnSecurity, Brian Krebs, author of the book Spam Nation: The Inside Story Of Organized Cybercrime, suggested the whole affair might be traced to a personal rivalry between Mikhailov and Pavel Vrublevsky, an Internet businessman whose partner owns King Servers.

Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russia’s security services and a senior research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, notes that the FSB’s Information Security Center, which Mikhailov headed and where Dokuchayev was his subordinate, has emerged as “a pivotal agency” and “a source of power.”

And this makes it a prime arena for fierce rivalries and power plays.

“This is probably an intelligence leak that is being cleared up. But the question is: why now? And I wonder if domestic politics explains the leaking of the information now. It could be a rebuke to the FSB for having messed up,” Galeotti said on last week’s Power Vertical Podcast.

High Risk: National Security Personnel in Foreign Own Buildings

Posted on January 31, 2017January 31, 2017 by Denise Simon

FBI St. Louis Little Rock

Oh Donald, Mr. President sir…you’re the expert here….need an immediate executive order on this one. By the way, don’t stay in the Waldorf Astoria any more, perhaps don’t go to movie theaters either if you’re concerned for personal reasons.

First on CNN: Report finds national security agencies at risk in foreign-owned buildings

Washington (CNN)US law-enforcement agencies are at risk of being spied on and hacked because some of their field offices are located in foreign-owned buildings without even knowing it, according to a new government report.

The report by the Government Accountability Office, which was obtained by CNN and is due to be released later Monday, reveals that a number of FBI, Homeland Security, Secret Service and Drug Enforcement Agency offices across the country are housed in space leased from firms based in China and other nations.

Experts told the GAO that the agencies could be vulnerable to espionage and cyber intrusions because the foreign owners could gain unauthorized access to the properties, be able to secretly install surveillance equipment, and have knowledge of building systems like heating, ventilation and electronics which could facilitate hacking.

The General Services Administration, which handles leasing for many federal agencies, is renting space in 20 buildings from foreign owners — and its investigators were unable to identify who the property owners for about one-third of the government’s more than 1,400 “high-security leases.”

Nine of the 14 agencies the GAO contacted were unaware the building space they were using was foreign owned.

“It’s an eye opener,” Rep. Jason Chaffetz, R-Utah, told CNN about the report. “Certainly our security professionals should know who owns the piping in the buildings that they occupy.”

Chaffetz, along with Sen. Tammy Duckworth, D-Illinois, and Rep. Elijah Cummings, D-Maryland, called for the GAO review.

The chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee said he doesn’t necessarily think the agencies should be barred from leasing office space from foreign owners, but added that he would feel “much more comfortable if they’re at least aware.”

Currently, the GSA is not required to determine whether a building is foreign owned when it is considering whether to lease space.

Among the report’s findings were that DEA, Homeland Security and Secret Service offices in Little Rock, Arkansas, Jacksonville, Florida, and Shreveport, Louisiana, along with an FBI office in St. Louis, Missouri, were leased from “Gemini Investments” — a company based in China.

The GAO report noted that Chinese-owned properties were of particular concern because the country has been linked to numerous instances of hacking.

After the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in Manhattan was sold to Chinese investors, then-President Barack Obama didn’t stay there, as had long been the custom of US presidents, with security concerns being one of the factors.

Other federal offices listed in the study are located in buildings owned by companies in Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, Germany, South Korea and Japan.

GAO investigators talked to officials who assess foreign investments in the US, as well as real estate representatives, who warned about the potential danger.

” … (L)easing space in foreign-owned buildings could present security risks such as espionage, unauthorized cyber and physical access to the facilitates, and sabotage,” the report said. “For example, a DHS foreign investment official said that potential threat actors could coerce owners into collecting intelligence about the personnel and activities of the facilities when maintaining the property.”

The report also noted other possible “insider threats,” referring to “disgruntled employees, contractors, or other persons abusing their position of trust” who pose a “significant threat” to building access.

But this doesn’t mean that the threats have materialized. Chaffetz said he was unaware of any specific instances where sensitive information had been compromised. The report also said two real estate representatives determined it wasn’t a security risk to lease foreign-owned space.

“One of the representatives said that access at high-security facilities is strictly controlled, including access by the owners, and that passive investors in properties do not have access to the buildings,” the report said.

In addition to hacking and espionage, the report also cautioned that renting from foreign owners presented the possibility of the US agencies becoming unwittingly involved in money laundering, since real estate purchases are often used to conceal the criminal source of the investment funds.

The report recommended that the GSA should start informing the agencies if their space is foreign owned, so they can put the necessary security precautions in place. The GSA said it agreed with the recommendation.

“I hope this is a wake-up call,” Chaffetz said.