Category Archives: Department of Homeland Security

Senate Hearing to Protect Election Systems from Russia

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At least there is a hearing to begin the discussion to harden the software systems related to election processes from further intrusions as 2018 and 2020 approaches.

Russia. Russia is a full-scope cyber actor that will remain a major threat to US Government, military, diplomatic, commercial, and critical infrastructure. Moscow has a highly advanced offensive cyber program, and in recent years, the Kremlin has assumed a more aggressive cyber posture. This aggressiveness was evident in Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 US election, and we assess that only Russia’s senior-most officials could have authorized the 2016 US election-focused data thefts and disclosures, based on the scope and sensitivity of the targets. Outside the United States, Russian actors have conducted damaging and disruptive cyber attacks, including on critical infrastructure networks. In some cases, Russian intelligence actors have masqueraded as third parties, hiding behind false online personas designed to cause the victim to misattribute the source of the attack. Russia has also leveraged cyberspace to seek to influence public opinion across Europe and Eurasia. We assess that Russian cyber operations will continue to target the United States and its allies to gather intelligence, support Russian decisionmaking, conduct influence operations to support Russian military and political objectives, and prepare the cyber environment for future contingencies.

Furthermore:

Military and Intelligence. Russia aims to improve intelligence collection, missile warning, and military communications systems to better support situational awareness and tactical weapons targeting. Russian plans to expand its imagery constellation and double or possibly triple the number of satellites by 2025. China intends to continue increasing its space-based military and intelligence capabilities to improve global situational awareness and support complex military operations. Many countries in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South America are purchasing dual-use imaging satellites to support strategic military activities, some as joint development projects.

Space Warfare. We assess that Russia and China perceive a need to offset any US military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems and are increasingly considering attacks against satellite systems as part of their future warfare doctrine. Both will continue to pursue a full range of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce US military effectiveness. In late 2015, China established a new service—the PLA Strategic Support Force—probably to improve oversight and command of Beijing’s growing military interests in space and cyberspace. Russia and China remain committed to developing capabilities to challenge perceived adversaries in space, especially the United States, while publicly and diplomatically promoting nonweaponization of space and “no first placement” of weapons in space. Such commitment continues despite ongoing US and allied diplomatic efforts to dissuade expansion of threats to the peaceful use of space, including international engagements through the UN.

Counterspace Weapons. The global threat of electronic warfare (EW) attacks against space systems will expand in the coming years in both number and types of weapons. Development will very likely focus on jamming capabilities against dedicated military satellite communications (SATCOM), Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging satellites, and enhanced capabilities against Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as the US Global Positioning System (GPS). Blending of EW and cyber-attack capabilities will likely expand in pursuit of sophisticated means to deny and degrade information networks. Chinese researchers have discussed methods to enhance robust jamming capabilities with new systems to jam commonly used frequencies. Russia intends to modernize its EW forces and field a new generation of EW weapons by 2020. Iran and North Korea are also enhancing their abilities to disrupt military communications and navigation.

Some new Russian and Chinese ASAT weapons, including destructive systems, will probably complete development in the next several years. Russian military strategists likely view counterspace weapons as an integral part of broader aerospace defense rearmament and are very likely pursuing a diverse suite of capabilities to affect satellites in all orbital regimes. Russian lawmakers have promoted military pursuit of ASAT missiles to strike low-Earth orbiting satellites, and Russia is testing such a weapon for eventual deployment. A Russian official also acknowledged development of an aircraft-launched missile capable of destroying satellites in low-Earth orbit. Ten years after China intercepted one of its own satellites in low-Earth orbit, its ground-launched ASAT missiles might be nearing operational service within the PLA. Both countries are advancing directed energy weapons technologies for the purpose of fielding ASAT systems that could blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors. Russia is developing an airborne laser weapon for use against US satellites. Russia and China continue to conduct sophisticated on-orbit satellite activities, such as rendezvous and proximity operations, at least some of which are likely intended to test dual-use technologies with inherent counterspace functionality. For instance, space robotic technology research for satellite servicing and debris-removal might be used to damage satellites. Such missions will pose a particular challenge in the future, complicating the US ability to characterize the space environment, decipher intent of space activity, and provide advance threat warning.

In 2017, Russia is likely to be more assertive in global affairs, more unpredictable in its approach to the United States, and more authoritarian in its approach to domestic politics. Emboldened by Moscow’s ability to affect battlefield dynamics in Syria and by the emergence of populist and more pro-Russian governments in Europe, President Vladimir Putin is likely to take proactive actions that advance Russia’s great power status.

Putin will seek to prevent any challenges to his rule in the runup to presidential elections scheduled for 2018. Putin remains popular at home, but low turnout in the Duma elections in 2016 and sustained economic hardship will probably enhance Putin’s concerns about his ability to maintain control. Putin is likely to continue to rely on repression, state control over media outlets, and harsh tactics to control the political elite and stifle public dissent.

Russia is likely to emerge from its two-year recession in 2017, but the prospects for a strong recovery are slim. Russia is likely to achieve 1.3 percent GDP growth in 2017 and 1.7 percent in 2018, according to commercial forecasts. Putin has long sought to avoid structural reforms that would weaken his control of the country and is unlikely to implement substantial reforms before the presidential elections.

Russia is likely to emerge from its two-year recession in 2017, but the prospects for a strong recovery are slim. Russia is likely to achieve 1.3 percent GDP growth in 2017 and 1.7 percent in 2018, according to commercial forecasts. Putin has long sought to avoid structural reforms that would weaken his control of the country and is unlikely to implement substantial reforms before the presidential elections.

We assess that Russia will continue to look to leverage its military support to the Asad regime to drive a political settlement process in Syria on its terms. Moscow has demonstrated that it can sustain a modest force at a high-operations tempo in a permissive, expeditionary setting while minimizing Russian casualties and economic costs. Moscow is also likely to use Russia’s military intervention in Syria, in conjunction with efforts to capitalize on fears of a growing ISIS and extremist threat, to expand its role in the Middle East.

We assess that Moscow’s strategic objectives in Ukraine—maintaining long-term influence over Kyiv and frustrating Ukraine’s attempts to integrate into Western institutions—will remain unchanged in 2017. Putin is likely to maintain pressure on Kyiv through multiple channels, including through Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine, where Russia arms so-called “separatists. Moscow also seeks to undermine Ukraine’s fragile economic system and divided political situation to create opportunities to rebuild and consolidate Russian influence in Ukrainian decisionmaking.

Moscow will also seek to exploit Europe’s fissures and growing populist sentiment in an effort to thwart EU sanctions renewal, justify or at least obfuscate Russian actions in Ukraine and Syria, and weaken the attraction of Western integration for countries on Russia’s periphery. In particular, Russia is likely to sustain or increase its propaganda campaigns. Russia is likely to continue to financially and politically support populist and extremist parties to sow discord within European states and reduce popular support for the European Union. More here from ODNI.

 

 

At Least 34 Years of Immigration Debate, Loopholes and Dollars

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The proposed Department of Justice budget request for 2018 for the Executive Office of Immigration is $421.5 million and includes 2600 employees with 831 lawyers. Judges assigned to immigration courts are being hired, shuffled around the country and have in some areas have a five year base backlog.

Image result for immigration court FoxLatino

The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) was created on January 9, 1983, through an internal Department of Justice (DOJ) reorganization which combined the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) with the Immigration Judge function previously performed by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (now part of the Department of Homeland Security). Besides establishing EOIR as a separate agency within DOJ, this reorganization made the Immigration Courts independent of INS, the agency charged with enforcement of Federal immigration laws. The Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) was added in 1987. In 2013, EOIR observed its 30th anniversary.

EOIR is also separate from the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices in the DOJ Civil Rights Division and the Office of Immigration Litigation in the DOJ Civil Division.

As an office within the Department of Justice, EOIR is headed by a Director who reports directly to the Deputy Attorney General. Its headquarters are located in Falls Church, Virginia, about 10 miles from downtown Washington, DC.

New York City Law Creates Loophole To Avoid Deporting Criminal Illegal Immigrants

A New York City law that reclassifies several low-level offenses as non-criminal went into effect Tuesday, allowing citizen offenders to keep clean records and illegal immigrant offenders to potentially avoid deportation.

The law, passed by the city council and signed by Mayor Bill de Blasio in 2016, allows police to classify trial summonses for petty crimes as civil summonses, rather than criminal summonses. The change would affect crimes including public urination and drinking and staying in the park after dark, DNA Info reports. The change critically affects the impact of an executive order from President Donald Trump this spring ordering the deportation of illegal immigrants convicted of crimes.

Under the new law, illegal immigrants convicted of these crimes would receive a civil rather than criminal summons, which frees local law enforcement from the obligation of reporting the offender’s immigration status to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

The law would affect cases such as Alejandro Luna, a former gang member and an illegal immigrant caught in central park after dark June 5 who now faces deportation. This would be Luna’s second deportation, the first came in 2006 after he was convicted of home-invasion and robbery. He then illegally entered the country again only to be detained on the June 5 park offense. More here.

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Illegals presently have access to government funded healthcare. However:

The ‘Verify First Act’ by Rep. Lou Barletta (R-PA) would subsequently end American taxpayer-funded money going to illegal aliens in the form of healthcare insurance credits. The plan is being supported by NumbersUSA, a group which has staunchly advocated for Trump’s America First agenda.

“We applaud Rep. Lou Barletta for introducing the Verify First Act to ensure that illegal aliens cannot qualify for taxpayer-funded health insurance credits,” NumbersUSA Peter Robbio said in a statement. “We are grateful that the Ways and Means Committee and House Republican Leadership agreed to move this important bill forward.”

Since Obamacare’s enactment, illegal immigrants received more than $700 million in healthcare insurance credits by 2015, according to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

In Barletta’s plan, healthcare insurance recipients through the American Health Care Act (AHCA) would have their citizenship and immigration statuses verified by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). More here.

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In part: Traditional sanctuary policies are often described as falling under one of three categories. First, so-called “don’t enforce” policies generally bar the state or local police from assisting federal immigration authorities. Second, “don’t ask” policies generally bar certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person’s immigration status. Third, “don’t tell” policies typically restrict information sharing between state or local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. This report provides examples of various state and local laws and policies that fall into one of these sanctuary categories. The report also discusses federal measures designed to counteract sanctuary policies. For instance, Section 434 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and Section 642 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) were enacted to curb state and local restrictions on information sharing with federal immigration authorities.

State or local measures limiting police participation in immigration enforcement are not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, many of the recent “sanctuary”-type initiatives can be traced back to

activities carried out by churches that provided refuge—or “sanctuary”—to unauthorized Central American aliens fleeing civil unrest in the 1980s.13 A number of states and municipalities issued declarations in support of these churches’ actions.14 Others went further and enacted more substantive measures intended to limit police involvement in federal immigration enforcement activities.15 These measures have included, among other things, restricting state and local police from arresting persons for immigration violations, limiting the sharing of immigration-related information with federal authorities, and barring police from questioning a person about his or her immigration status.16

Still, there is no official definition of a “sanctuary” jurisdiction in federal statute or regulation.17 Broadly speaking, sanctuary jurisdictions are commonly understood to be those that have laws or policies designed to substantially limit involvement in federal immigration enforcement activities,18 though there is not necessarily a consensus as to the meaning of this term.19 Some jurisdictions have self-identified as sanctuary cities.

The federal government’s power to regulate immigration is both substantial and exclusive.23 This authority is derived from multiple sources, including Congress’s Article I powers to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization” and “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,”24 as well as the federal government’s “inherent power as a sovereign to conduct relations with foreign nations.”

The Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in Arizona v. United States—which invalidated several Arizona laws designed “to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States”28 as preempted by federal law—reinforced the federal government’s pervasive role in creating and enforcing the nation’s immigration laws.29 “The Government of the United States,” the Court said, “has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”30

Yet despite the federal government’s sweeping authority over immigration, the Supreme Court has cautioned that not “every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se preempted” by the federal government’s exclusive power over immigration.39 Accordingly, in Arizona the Supreme Court reiterated that, “[i]n preemption analysis, courts should assume that the historic police powers of the States are not superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”40 For example, in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, the Supreme Court upheld an Arizona law—related to the states’ “broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State”41—that authorized the revocation of licenses held by state employers that knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens.42 Even though the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) expressly preempted “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions … upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens,” the Supreme Court concluded that Arizona’s law fit within IRCA’s savings clause for state licensing regimes and thus was not preempted.43

Accordingly, based on current jurisprudence, federal measures that impose direct requirements on state or municipal authorities appear most likely to withstand an anti-commandeering challenge if they (1) are not directed at a state’s regulation of the activities of private parties; and (2) apply to the activities of private parties as well as government actors.

Finally, Congress does not violate the Tenth Amendment when it uses its broad authority to enact legislation for the “general welfare” through its spending power,62 including by placing

conditions on funds distributed to the states that require those accepting the funds to take certain actions that Congress otherwise could not directly compel the states to perform.63 However, Congress cannot impose a financial condition that is “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”64 For example, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) that purported to withhold Medicaid funding to states that did not expand their Medicaid programs.65 The Court found that the financial conditions placed on the states in the ACA (withholding all federal Medicaid funding, which, according to the Court, typically totals about 20% of a state’s entire budget) were akin to “a gun to the head” and thus unlawfully coercive.66

violations of federal immigration law may be criminal or civil in nature, with alien removal understood to be a civil proceeding.71 Some immigration-related conduct potentially constitutes a removable offense and also may be subject to criminal sanction. For example, an alien who knowingly enters the United States without authorization is not only potentially subject to removal,72 but could also be charged with the criminal offense of unlawful entry.73 Other violations of the INA are exclusively criminal or civil in nature. Notably, an alien’s unauthorized immigration status makes him or her removable, but absent additional factors (e.g., having reentered the United States after being formally removed),74 unlawful presence on its own is not a criminal offense.

Some jurisdictions have adopted measures that restrict or bar police officers from making arrests for violations of federal immigration law. In some jurisdictions restrictions prohibit police from detaining or arresting aliens for civil violations of federal immigration law, like unlawful presence.75 Other jurisdictions prohibit police from making arrests for some criminal violations of federal immigration law, like unlawful entry.76 Still others prohibit assisting federal immigration authorities with investigating or arresting persons for civil or criminal violations of U.S. immigration laws.77 And some other jurisdictions have prohibitions that are broader in scope, such as a general statement that immigration enforcement is the province of federal immigration authorities, rather than that of local law enforcement.

Some states and localities have restricted government agencies or employees from sharing information with federal immigration authorities, primarily to prevent federal authorities from using the information to identify and apprehend unlawfully present aliens for removal.88 For instance, some jurisdictions prohibit law enforcement from notifying federal immigration authorities about the release status of incarcerated aliens, unless the alien has been convicted of certain felonies.89 Similarly, other jurisdictions prohibit their employees from disclosing information about an individual’s immigration status unless the alien is suspected of engaging in illegal activity that is separate from unlawful immigration status.90 Some jurisdictions restrict disclosing information except as required by federal law91—sometimes referred to as a “savings clause”—although it appears that the Department of Justice has interpreted those provisions as conflicting with federal information-sharing provisions. For the full summary and context with access to footnotes, go here.

Turkish Thugs Arrested in DC After Erdogan’s Visit

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http://asbarez.com/164327/warrants-issued-for-erdogan-goons-dc-officials-confirm/

WASHINGTON — Police say two men have been arrested for their role in a violent altercation outside the Turkish ambassador’s residence during a visit to Washington by Turkey’s president last month.The Metropolitan Police Department said in a brief statement that Sinan Narin had been arrested in Virginia on an aggravated assault charge.

It said Eyup Yildirim had been arrested in New Jersey on charges of assault with significant bodily injury and aggravated assault.

The department released no further details about the suspects but said additional information would be available Wednesday.

U.S. officials had strongly criticized the Turkish government after President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s security forces pushed past police and violently broke up a protest outside the residence on May 16.

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(AFP) – US authorities said Thursday they have issued arrest warrants for 12 members of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s security detail accused of assaulting protesters during a street brawl in Washington.

Washington Police Chief Peter Newsham said the 12 were identified in detailed video footage of the May 16 attack on Kurdish and Armenian protesters outside the residence of Turkey’s ambassador, following a meeting between Erdogan and President Donald Trump.

The men, all Turkish citizens, include nine Erdogan security guards and three Turkish police. 

Police outside Turkey's embassy in Washington during a May 16, 2017 visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The scene erupted in violence a short time later when members of his security detail brawled with anti-Erdogan demonstrators
Police outside Turkey’s embassy in Washington during a May 16, 2017 visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The scene erupted in violence a short time later when members of his security detail brawled with anti-Erdogan demonstrators (AFP Photo/Dave Clark)

Washington (AFP) – US authorities said Thursday they have issued arrest warrants for 12 members of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s security detail accused of assaulting protesters during a street brawl in Washington.

Washington Police Chief Peter Newsham said the 12 were identified in detailed video footage of the May 16 attack on Kurdish and Armenian protesters outside the residence of Turkey’s ambassador, following a meeting between Erdogan and President Donald Trump.

The men, all Turkish citizens, include nine Erdogan security guards and three Turkish police.

“In the United States and particularly in the District of Columbia, we hold our ability to peacefully protest as a sacred right,” Newsham said.

“We do not care particularly what your views are, what you support or what you do not support,” he added.

Video footage of the fracas shows Turkish security aides beating and kicking demonstrators, leaving nine people injured.

The State Department formally protested the attack to Ankara, registering its concern in the “strongest possible terms.”

Newsham did not say how the police hoped to arrest the 12, saying the State Department would determine how to execute the warrants.

In addition to the 12, warrants were issued for the arrest of two Canadian citizens who took part in the brawl. Two Turkish Americans were arrested at the scene on May 16, and two more were arrested on Wednesday.

Washington DC Mayor Muriel Bowser condemned the attack strongly, saying it violated US Constitution’s first amendment right to peaceful protest.

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The following 14 individuals who are part of Erdogan’s security team have outstanding warrants for their arrests:

  • Turgut Akar, a Turkish security official, charged with misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Ismail Dalkiran, a Turkish security official, charged with misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Servet Erkan, a Turkish security official, charged with felony Assault with Significant Bodily Injury and misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Tugay Erkan, a Turkish security official, charged with felony Assault with Significant Bodily Injury and misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Ahmet Karabay, a Turkish security official, charged with misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Feride Kayasan, a Turkish security official, charged with misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Lutfu Kutluca, a Turkish security official, charged with misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Mustafa Murat Sumercan, a Turkish security official, charged with felony Assault with Significant Bodily Injury and misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Gokhan Yildirim, a Turkish security official, charged with felony Assault with Significant Bodily Injury
  • Ismail Ergunduz, a Turkish security official, charged with felony Assault with Significant Bodily Injury and misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Mehmet Sarman, a Turkish security official, charged with felony Aggravated Assault and misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Hamza Yurteri, a Turkish security official, charged with felony Aggravated Assault and misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner
  • Mahmut Sami Ellialti, charged with felony Aggravated Assault and felony Assault with Significant Bodily Injury
  • Ahmet Cengizham Dereci, charged with felony Assault with Significant Bodily Injury and misdemeanor Assault or Threatened Assault in a Menacing Manner

Kislyak’s Party, Sanctions and 39 U.S. States

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Yup, it IS Russia, Russia, Russia. Why because Putin’s playbook is working and so many in America are useful dupes and unwitting accomplices. Does that include you?

Well it does include U.S. diplomats attending a party hosted by Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak for the sake of photos and social media. Were you there Monday night? It was a propaganda operation that included Russian intelligence officials as well.

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Embattled Russian diplomat Sergey Kislyak played host to Washington insiders and diplomats at the Russian Embassy Monday night, greeting guests one-by-one in a long receiving line at the embassy in honor of Russia Day. Attendees were encouraged to pose for photos with signs that said “I love Russia” and post them on Facebook, Instagram and other social networks.

The frayed U.S.-Russia relationship was clearly on the embassy’s mind as they handed out a pamphlet highlighting the two countries’ close relationship. On the cover: “As an American, I love Russia – friend of Washington and Lincoln.” At the top of the second page, there was this: “As an American, I love Russia because if not for Russia, there may not have been a United States of America.”

Meanwhile, many Senators came together in a bipartisan fashion for a major piece of legislation on sanctions against Russia.

The Senate has clinched a wide-ranging bipartisan agreement to slap new financial penalties on Russia and limit President Trump’s ability to lift sanctions without giving Congress a chance to weigh in.

“It’s as comprehensive as we could make it, and it’s going to be a very good piece of legislation,”

The agreement imposes new sanctions including “malicious cyber activity” on behalf of Moscow, individuals supplying weapons to Syrian President Bashar Assad’s government or individuals tied to Russia’s intelligence and defense sectors. More here.

So, how bad was this hacking/phishing scheme launched by Russia? Much wider than previously know. Some explain all this to Tucker Carlson.

Russian Cyber Hacks on U.S. Electoral System Far Wider Than Previously Known

Bloomberg: Russia’s cyberattack on the U.S. electoral system before Donald Trump’s election was far more widespread than has been publicly revealed, including incursions into voter databases and software systems in almost twice as many states as previously reported.

In Illinois, investigators found evidence that cyber intruders tried to delete or alter voter data. The hackers accessed software designed to be used by poll workers on Election Day, and in at least one state accessed a campaign finance database. Details of the wave of attacks, in the summer and fall of 2016, were provided by three people with direct knowledge of the U.S. investigation into the matter. In all, the Russian hackers hit systems in a total of 39 states, one of them said.

The scope and sophistication so concerned Obama administration officials that they took an unprecedented step — complaining directly to Moscow over a modern-day “red phone.” In October, two of the people said, the White House contacted the Kremlin on the back channel to offer detailed documents of what it said was Russia’s role in election meddling and to warn that the attacks risked setting off a broader conflict.

The new details, buttressed by a classified National Security Agency document recently disclosed by the Intercept, show the scope of alleged hacking that federal investigators are scrutinizing as they look into whether Trump campaign officials may have colluded in the efforts. But they also paint a worrisome picture for future elections: The newest portrayal of potentially deep vulnerabilities in the U.S.’s patchwork of voting technologies comes less than a week after former FBI Director James Comey warned Congress that Moscow isn’t done meddling.

“They’re coming after America,” Comey told the Senate Intelligence Committee investigating Russian interference in the election. “They will be back.”

A spokeswoman for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington declined to comment on the agency’s probe.

Kremlin Denials

Russian officials have publicly denied any role in cyber attacks connected to the U.S. elections, including a massive “spear phishing” effort that compromised Hillary Clinton’s campaign and the Democratic National Committee, among hundreds of other groups. President Vladimir Putin said in recent comments to reporters that criminals inside the country could have been involved without having been sanctioned by the Russian government.

One of the mysteries about the 2016 presidential  election is why Russian intelligence, after gaining access to state and local systems, didn’t try to disrupt the vote. One possibility is that the American warning was effective. Another former senior U.S. official, who asked for anonymity to discuss the classified U.S. probe into pre-election hacking, said a more likely explanation is that several months of hacking failed to give the attackers the access they needed to master America’s disparate voting systems spread across more than 7,000 local jurisdictions.

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Such operations need not change votes to be effective. In fact, the Obama administration believed that the Russians were possibly preparing to delete voter registration information or slow vote tallying in order to undermine confidence in the election. That effort went far beyond the carefully timed release of private communications by individuals and parties.

One former senior U.S. official expressed concern that the Russians now have three years to build on their knowledge of U.S. voting systems before the next presidential election, and there is every reason to believe they will use what they have learned in future attacks.

Secure Channel

As the first test of a communication system designed to de-escalate cyber conflict between the two countries, the cyber “red phone” — not a phone, in fact, but a secure messaging channel for sending urgent messages and documents — didn’t quite work as the White House had hoped. NBC News first reported that use of the red phone by the White House last December.

The White House provided evidence gathered on Russia’s hacking efforts and reasons why the U.S. considered it dangerously aggressive. Russia responded by asking for more information and providing assurances that it would look into the matter even as the hacking continued, according to the two people familiar with the response.

“Last year, as we detected intrusions into websites managed by election officials around the country, the administration worked relentlessly to protect our election infrastructure,” said Eric Schultz, a spokesman for former President Barack Obama. “Given that our election systems are so decentralized, that effort meant working with Democratic and Republican election administrators from all across the country to bolster their cyber defenses.”

Illinois Database

Illinois, which was among the states that gave the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security almost full access to investigate its systems, provides a window into the hackers’ successes and failures.

In early July 2016, a contractor who works two or three days a week at the state board of elections detected unauthorized data leaving the network, according to Ken Menzel, general counsel for the Illinois board of elections. The hackers had gained access to the state’s voter database, which contained information such as names, dates of birth, genders, driver’s licenses and partial Social Security numbers on 15 million people, half of whom were active voters. As many as 90,000 records were ultimately compromised.

But even if the entire database had been deleted, it might not have affected the election, according to Menzel. Counties upload records to the state, not the other way around, and no data moves from the database back to the counties, which run the elections. The hackers had no way of knowing that when they attacked the state database, Menzel said.

The state does, however, process online voter registration applications that are sent to the counties for approval, Menzel said. When voters are added to the county rolls, that information is then sent back to the state and added to the central database. This process, which is common across states, does present an opportunity for attackers to manipulate records at their inception.

Patient Zero

Illinois became Patient Zero in the government’s probe, eventually leading investigators to a hacking pandemic that touched four out of every five U.S. states.

Using evidence from the Illinois computer banks, federal agents were able to develop digital “signatures” — among them, Internet Protocol addresses used by the attackers — to spot the hackers at work.

The signatures were then sent through Homeland Security alerts and other means to every state. Thirty-seven states reported finding traces of the hackers in various systems, according to one of the people familiar with the probe. In two others — Florida and California — those traces were found in systems run by a private contractor managing critical election systems.

(An NSA document reportedly leaked by  Reality Winner, the 25-year-old government contract worker arrested last week, identifies the Florida contractor as VR Systems, which makes an electronic voter identification system used by poll workers.)

In Illinois, investigators also found evidence that the hackers tried but failed to alter or delete some information in the database, an attempt that wasn’t previously reported. That suggested more than a mere spying mission and potentially a test run for a disruptive attack, according to the people familiar with the continuing U.S. counterintelligence inquiry.

States’ Response

That idea would obsess the Obama White House throughout the summer and fall of 2016, outweighing worries over the DNC hack and private Democratic campaign emails given to

Wikileaks and other outlets, according to one of the people familiar with those conversations. The Homeland Security Department dispatched special teams to help states strengthen their cyber defenses, and some states hired private security companies to augment those efforts.

In many states, the extent of the Russian infiltration remains unclear. The federal government had no direct authority over state election systems, and some states offered limited cooperation. When then-DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson said last August that the department wanted to declare the systems as national critical infrastructure — a designation that gives the federal government broader powers to intervene — Republicans balked. Only after the election did the two sides eventually reach a deal to make the designation.

Relations with Russia remain strained. The cyber red phone was announced in 2011 as a provision in the countries’ Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to allow urgent communication to defuse a possible cyber conflict. In 2008, what started during the Cold War as a teletype messaging system became a secure system for transferring messages and documents over fiber-optic lines.

After the Obama administration transmitted its documents and Russia asked for more information, the hackers’ work continued. According to the leaked NSA document, hackers working for Russian military intelligence were trying to take over the computers of 122 local election officials just days before the Nov. 8 election.

While some inside the Obama administration pressed at the time to make the full scope of the Russian activity public, the White House was ultimately unwilling to risk public confidence in the election’s integrity, people familiar with those discussions said.

 

 

 

 

 

 

It is Better than Putin Planned

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Timelines and context are important and must be adhered to when it comes to controversy and chaos. America and the world is full of it for sure and personally I lay blame at the feet of Barack Obama.

Let’s begin in September of 2015 shall we? ODNI James Clapper warned in not only Congressional testimony but it presidential dialing briefings to the Obama White House that the Russians had launched a cyber military command. In addition to Russia, Clapper singled out China, Iran, and North Korea as the primary nation states capable of conducting sophisticated cyber attacks and espionage.

“Politically motivated cyber attacks are now a growing reality, and foreign actors are reconnoitering and developing access to U.S. critical infrastructure systems, which might be quickly exploited for disruption if an adversary’s intent became hostile,” Clapper said in prepared remarks for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

The testimony on Sept. 10 represents a break from past public testimony on cyber threats. Previous intelligence statements and testimony limited public mention of explicit links between nations and their cyber strikes.

Clapper revealed that Russian cyber warfare specialists are developing the capability to remotely access industrial control systems used in managing critical infrastructure. More here.

Barack Obama did nothing. Obama never established a cyber policy due to rogue countries and cyber attack. Why? Establishing committees and having hearings is theater….this is the kind of stuff that is an act of war…but read on….context, timelines, facts and perspective is noted below.

In May of 2016, Clapper tried again and then attended a breakfast and made it all know more publically. Did anyone listen then? Nope. Further, while on the campaign trail, did any candidate make this an issue? Nope.

Further, Clapper said:

“The transcendent issue here is the Russian interference in our election process, and what that means to the erosion of the fundamental fabric of our democracy,” former DNI Clapper told the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 8. “And that to me is a huge deal. And they’re going to continue to do it. And why not? It proved successful.”

Russia’s success in sowing discord perhaps makes it harder for the US to focus on and fight the cyber intrusion that officials say stole Democratic Party emails and planted false news stories about the election. The purpose of this operation was to amplify division and turmoil in US politics. Well, mission accomplished.”

Barack Obama was convinced as was Hillary she was going to win, so Russian intrusion(s) were minimized. That is until she lost. Leading however into October, Obama kinda sorta decided to get serious. This was not until it was determined by the NSA that Russia did intrude into the voting software company based in Florida known as VR Systems where attempts to phish email accounts of 100+ company officials. So Obama’s best response was to trot out DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson ordering him to visit a handful of states to be vigilant.

That was the best Obama could do? No, he should have embarrassed Russia globally as the same thing was happening in other allied countries least of which was Ukraine and later so many more in Europe. Obama should have ordered the entire United States after embarrassing Putin’s operation to go to paper ballots and state the reason(s) why.

Image result for putin military cyber hacking unit

Former ODNI Clapper recently said the matter of Russia is not the only concern, China is just as aggressive. Anyone paying attention to that? Nope. China and Russia have a cyber pact.

Image result for putin military cyber hacking unit DailyStar

Hillary lost and now Obama decides to expel Russians and shutter 2 dachas in Maryland and New York. Was that enough? Nope.

Now the media stepped in to point to Trump as having to collude with the Russians on the election system. Former FBI Director said to Trump on at least 3 occasions along with the other intelligence community leaders, such was not the case. The media stayed with it, why? Because of the secondary track of investigation and that is the collection of Trump people have undisclosed and in some cases unreported meetings with Russian officials beyond that of Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak. That track continues by the FBI.

Here is where at least Jeff Sessions is caught up in the snare. Sessions is in fact an honorable man as proven in his long political history. However, during his confirmation hearing for the top job at the Department of Justice, he omitted all his meetings in oral and written form. The meeting at the Mayflower Hotel is still under dispute. Why? Likely he was told too. Later, Sessions had a ‘duty to correct’ and he did. So, the recusal chatter started and later it was official. It has been reported by ‘sources’ that President Trump is furious at Sessions for his recusal. That too is suspect since those ahem…sources are unnamed. It is also reported that Sessions offered to tender his resignation over this mess, that too is suspect due to unnamed sources.

Now we have a recused AG, then later one Rod Rosenstein is confirmed at Deputy AG and the whole Russian probe fell into his lap. It never should have gotten this far if Trump himself had taken heed of his White House and outside personnel and quit tweeting and perpetuating the whole topic. Instead, his anger fired Comey. While I agree there is reason to be challenging Comey and his work as Director at the FBI least of which is the Hillary thing…one too must remember the FBI does NOT bring formal charges, but rather the DoJ does. Lynch was not going there. Comey covered for her and that was a mistake, until later Lynch abused that chain of command and met with Bill Clinton on the tarmac and told Comey to assume political speak with regard to investigation, commanding him to use matters rather than investigation. He capitulated again.

So Rosenstein names a special counsel for the Russian probe, one Robert Mueller. He does have a career history with James Comey. So, how come the White House and all the pundits did not blow a cork when Mueller was named?

Further, President Trump’s long time attorney, Marc Kasowitz comes out in support for his client as he should. But, has Kasowitz been forthcoming about his own Russian clients like Oleg Deripaska? One has to go look for that, it is in open source and Deripaska has deep connections with the Kremlin and Putin. Head tilt on this one.

Meanwhile the issue of Flynn was still brewing and then came memos and well, Comey’s testimony. So, Putin wins again. We don’t trust anyone, much less each other and certainly we don’t trust the political bunch on both sides of the aisle in Washington DC. This is just how Putin planned it.

Where is Trump on all this now? Sadly he is not launching any punishment at Russia either on the hacking/phishing front or that of the chaos in Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen or Crimea or Ukraine….and on and on. Why is the big question.

Thoughts?