Ruh Roh, Taking the Fight to Iraq

 

Report: 21 Generals Heading ISIS Fight in Iraq

FreeBeacon: Twenty-one generals, a majority of them American, are heading the fight against ISIS in the Middle East, according to a report Thursday. These include at least 12 U.S. generals currently based in Iraq.

The Daily Beast reported:

There is the three-star general in charge of the war, Army Gen. Sean MacFarland, and his two deputies, one of whom is in Iraq at any given time. There is the two-star Army general in charge of the ground war, Army Maj. Gen. Gary Volesky, and his two deputies, who also travel between Iraq and Kuwait. There is the two-star general in charge of security cooperation–things like military sales–and his deputy. Then there are the one-star generals in charge of intelligence, operations, future operations, targeting, and theater support. There also are an untold number of Special Forces commanders in the battlefield whom the military does not speak publicly about; the dozen figure presumes at least one one-star Special Forces general.

When taken with the count of generals based in nations like Bahrain and Kuwait to help support the mission, the generals in charge of the U.S. Air Forces Central Command, the Marine Corps Forces Central Command, and the Naval Forces Central Command based stateside, and the generals from dozens of countries belonging to the anti-ISIS coalition, the count rises to at least 21.

There are officially only 3,870 American troops in Iraq, though military officials privately indicated earlier this month that approximately 5,000 troops are operating in Iraq to assist the fight against ISIS. By this estimate, there are just over 416 troops for every single general.

Defense officials defended the count of generals in conversations with the Beast. “When you look at what they do and what they are in command of and how they provide support, I think it is justifiable,” an unnamed defense official said.

Despite the significant number of generals and increased American presence in Iraq and Syria, the Obama administration has repeatedly insisted that American troops are not engaged in combat operations against ISIS.

In one of the more recent developments in the fight against ISIS, the Pentagon secretly established a Marine fire base not far from Mosul, which serves as the first independent U.S. military position in the battle against the terror group. The existence of the fire base was only revealed after it came under attack from ISIS and one of the Marines based there was killed. The Pentagon has insisted that the Marines will only provide force protection for Iraqi and Kurdish troops there.

Concerns about ISIS have precipitated increased support for American combat operations in Syria and Iraq. The terror group has claimed responsibility for attacks in Paris, and more recently Brussels, and is also believed to have inspired the gun attack in San Bernardino, California, last December.

*****

FNC: The Islamic State, despite being driven by Kurdish fighters from its one-time Syrian stronghold in Kobani last week, nevertheless is extending its reach well beyond Iraq and Syria, military officials and analysts warn — represented, by some estimates, in nearly a dozen countries.

Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, delivered a grim assessment earlier this week in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, as he described how the group was surfacing in North Africa.

“With affiliates in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, the group is beginning to assemble a growing international footprint that includes ungoverned and under governed areas,” Stewart said.

ISIS continues to hold a wide swath of territory, bigger than the state of Pennsylvania, in its home base spanning parts of Iraq and Syria, propped up by more than 20,000 foreign fighters from at least three dozen countries. But the terror network’s tentacles, as Stewart indicated, are creeping into other nations; largely those with fragile governments.

“ISIS, like Al Qaeda, has thrived in the failed states where there is a vacuum of power,” said James Phillips, Middle East senior research fellow with the Heritage Foundation.

A key worry is the group’s potential ambitions in Afghanistan, where the U.S. combat mission just ended and Afghan security forces are in control.

The First Drone, bin Ladin: No Trigger to Pull

The drone was a rather experimental aircraft and used for surveillance, none at the time were armed. Why? To arm a new UAV was out of the box thinking that quickly took on a new mission, the hellfire. Furthermore, even President GW Bush had to deal with a major impediment at the time, the missile treaty.

Remember the year as you listen. America has come a very long way..

WiB: Months before the 9/11 terror attacks, U.S. Air Force captain Scott Swanson was controlling a Predator drone over Afghanistan. Swanson and his team were looking for Osama Bin Laden … and they found him.

But this was months before the Predator could fire missiles. The drone operators could only watch as the terrorist leader walked away. When the military finally gave the drones weapons, Swanson became the first Predator operator fire a Hellfire missile in combat.

This week on War College, Swanson walks us through the early history of America’s killer drone program. To learn more, Swanson recommends reading Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution by journalist Richard Whittle.

Belgium, France, Greece, Holland, Sweden, Germany, Iraq, Syria The Network

The most chilling and terrifying summary outside of the 9/11 Commission Report.

Go slow reading this and absorb it in total then consider how it can happen here at home. Has ISIS caused real fear in America? The results are here.

The inside story of the Paris and Brussels attacks

 

Hey Putin, Can you See the United States Yet?

Et tu, Brute? Oh and the estimated price tag? $3.4 billion and the U.S. military is deploying 4500 troops with 250 tanks and other vehicles throughout the year.

Eucom Announces European Reassurance Initiative Implementation Plan

From a U.S. European Command News Release

Army Spc. Devon Rivera, left, Army Sgt. Jorge Martinez and Army Pfc. Justin Giaimo, right, all indirect-fire infantrymen assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, bound to a fighting position while rehearsing before a multinational mortar live fire exercise alongside Latvian partners at Adazi Military Base, Latvia, Feb. 17, 2016. As part of the U.S. commitment to increased assurance and deterrence, U.S. Army Europe will begin receiving continuous troop rotations of U.S.-based armored brigade combat teams to the European theater in early 2017, bringing the total Army presence in Europe up to three fully-manned Army brigades. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Paige Behringer

Army Spc. Devon Rivera, left, Army Sgt. Jorge Martinez and Army Pfc. Justin Giaimo, right, all indirect-fire infantrymen assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, bound to a fighting position while rehearsing before a multinational mortar live fire exercise alongside Latvian partners at Adazi Military Base, Latvia, Feb. 17, 2016. As part of the U.S. commitment to increased assurance and deterrence, U.S. Army Europe will begin receiving continuous troop rotations of U.S.-based armored brigade combat teams to the European theater in early 2017, bringing the total Army presence in Europe up to three fully-manned Army brigades. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Paige Behringer

STUTTGART, Germany, March 30, 2016 — As part of the U.S. commitment to increased assurance and deterrence, U.S. Army Europe will begin receiving continuous troop rotations of U.S.-based armored brigade combat teams to the European theater in February, bringing the total Army presence in Europe up to three fully-manned Army brigades, U.S. European Command officials said.

As discussed during the announcement of the fiscal year 2017 European Reassurance Initiative budget proposal, officials said, the Army has decided to begin storing static equipment, known as Army pre-positioned stocks, within Europe for contingency operations.

“This is a big step in enhancing the Army’s rotational presence and increasing their combat equipment in Europe,” Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, Eucom commander, said. “This Army implementation plan continues to demonstrate our strong and balanced approach to reassuring our NATO allies and partners in the wake of an aggressive Russia in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. This means our allies and partners will see more capability — they will see a more frequent presence of an armored brigade with more modernized equipment in their countries.”

Nine-Month Rotations

The armored brigade combat teams will be on nine-month rotations from the United States and will bring their own modern equipment to conduct exercises across Atlantic Resolve countries, officials said.

The rotations will demonstrate the ability to rapidly deploy equipment and forces to Europe by sending U.S.-based rotational forces with their currently assigned equipment, they added. This equipment will be the most modern the Army has to offer, officials noted, and over the next year will replace the current training equipment in Europe.

When the first rotational armored brigade combat team arrives early next year, the equipment currently used by rotational forces, known as the European activity sets, will remain in Europe, be repaired, upgraded, and converted into the core of the Army pre-positioned stocks announced in February, officials said. The pre-positioned equipment will be stored in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

Will Enable Rapid Deployment

The equipment will enable rapid deployment of ground forces and additional combat power in response to contingencies throughout the region, Eucom officials said.

By the end of 2017, there will be a continuous presence of three fully equipped Army brigade combat teams — one armored, one airborne one Stryker brigade – as well as one pre-positioned set of combat-ready equipment sufficient to support another armored brigade combat team and division-level enablers in Europe, officials said.

Breedlove is attending the Northern European Chiefs of Defense Conference in Riga, Latvia, this week, where he is meeting with regional counterparts to reassure allies of Eucom’s commitment and support to regional security, they added.

****

Just for additional information, that announcement by Putin and Russia withdrawing from Syria was NO withdraw at all, in fact….

Exclusive: Russia, despite draw down, shipping more to Syria than removing

Reuters: When Vladimir Putin announced the withdrawal of most of Russia’s military contingent from Syria there was an expectation that the Yauza, a Russian naval icebreaker and one of the mission’s main supply vessels, would return home to its Arctic Ocean port.

Instead, three days after Putin’s March 14 declaration, the Yauza, part of the “Syrian Express”, the nickname given to the ships that have kept Russian forces supplied, left the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk for Tartous, Russia’s naval facility in Syria.

Whatever it was carrying was heavy; it sat so low in the water that its load line was barely visible.

Its movements and those of other Russian ships in the two weeks since Putin’s announcement of a partial withdrawal suggest Moscow has in fact shipped more equipment and supplies to Syria than it has brought back in the same period, a Reuters analysis shows.

It is not known what the ships were carrying or how much equipment has been flown out in giant cargo planes accompanying returning war planes.

But the movements – while only a partial snapshot – suggest Russia is working intensively to maintain its military infrastructure in Syria and to supply the Syrian army so that it can scale up again swiftly if need be.

Putin has not detailed what would prompt such a move, but any perceived threat to Russia’s bases in Syria or any sign that President Bashar al-Assad, Moscow’s closest Middle East ally, was in peril would be likely to trigger a powerful return.

Russia operates an air base in Hmeymim and a naval facility at Tartous. Putin has said Russia will keep both and that they will need to be well protected.

“Since the main part of the force de facto stayed there, there is no reason to reduce the traffic,” said Mikhail Barabanov, a senior research fellow at the Moscow-based CAST military think tank. “Supplies for the Syrian army remain significant as well.”

Moscow has not revealed the size of its force in Syria, nor has it given details of its partial withdrawal.

Reuters has calculated that around half of Russia’s fixed-wing strike force based in Syria flew out of the country in the days after the partial draw down was made public. The precise number of planes Russia had was secret, but analysis suggested it had about 36 fixed-wing military jets there.

On Monday, state TV showed three heavy attack helicopters being flown out of Syria along with some support staff.

NAVAL FIREPOWER

But an examination of shipping data, official information, tips from maritime security sources and photographs from bloggers of Russian ships passing the Bosphorus strait en route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, shows no signs that the “Syrian Express” is being wound down.

A Reuters analysis of the same data shows Russia is also likely to have reinforced its naval force in the Mediterranean and now appears to have more war ships near the Syrian coast than at the time of Putin’s declaration.

Their role is to protect cargo ships. Their presence also gives Moscow the option of firing cruise missiles from the sea.

Russia appears to have more than a dozen military vessels in the Mediterranean, including the Zeleniy Dol warship equipped with terrain-hugging Kalibr cruise missiles which are accurate to within three metres, according to Russian state media and the database of Bosphorus Naval News, a Turkish online project.

Moscow is likely to maintain that strength, said CAST’s Barabanov.

“Russia doesn’t have too many ships that it can keep in the Mediterranean. The role of the force was to ensure the activity of the ‘Syrian Express’ and to demonstrate it to the West and, later, to Turkey.”

The Russian defense ministry did not reply to questions about what the Russian navy was doing in the Mediterranean or whether there were plans to reduce its presence.

Russia’s military ships and most auxiliary vessels are not shown in publicly available databases. But most of its ships are seen and photographed when they pass the Bosphorus on their way from Russia to the Mediterranean or vice versa.

In most cases it is impossible to track military shipments to destination ports however, meaning data is only partial.

LOW IN THE WATER

Since Moscow began to scale back in Syria, Russia has sent two landing ships, which are typically used to transport troops and armor – the Caesar Kunikov and the Saratov – to the Mediterranean along with the Yauza, an auxiliary cargo vessel.

The Saratov looked loaded when it passed the strait on Thursday going south toward Syria. Its load line was visibly lower than on March 14 when it was photographed going the other way, toward Russia.

At the same time, two warships – the Alexander Otrakovsky and the Minsk – and the Dvinitsa-50, an auxiliary vessel, were photographed by Turkish bloggers passing the Bosphorus en route back to Russia.

At least two of the returning ships, the Alexander Otrakovsky and the Dvinitsa-50, looked unloaded on their way back.

Photographs show that the Otrakovsky, a large landing ship, sat higher in the water on its return to Russia compared to March 2 when it crossed the strait in the other direction. It was not clear if it carried troops or equipment.

The load line of the Dvinitsa-50 was also high above the water when it was photographed in the Bosphorus on March 20 on its way back to Russia.

It seems unlikely that Russian troops or equipment were on board any of the returning ships. None of them looked like they had heavy cargo onboard.

The Minsk has already headed back toward Syria. On Tuesday, it was photographed passing the Bosphorus. Its bow sat deep in the water; its cargo could not be discerned.

Non-military cargo traffic between Russia and Syria also shows no signs of flagging.

Four cargo ships involved in the supply operation called at Syria in the two weeks before Putin announced the draw down.

A fifth, the Alexander Tkachenko, a Russian ferry, previously photographed with military trucks onboard, probably called there too.

Reuters shipping database showed it was approaching Syria, but then suddenly disappeared for a few days before re-appearing en route back to Russia, meaning its transponders were not switched on for that period.

Five cargo ships, including an oil tanker, arrived in Syria in the two weeks following Putin’s announcement.

WH Nuclear Summit Details

3 countries by the way are ‘no-shows’ Iran, Russia and Pakistan.

The basis of the summit could and should begin with Western powers at UN seek meeting on Iranian missile tests

Washington, Paris, London and Berlin said as much in a letter dated Monday to the Spanish ambassador Roman Oyarzun Marchesi, who is in charge of the issue within the council.

The same powers last July signed an historic nuclear accord with Tehran to limit its nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of crippling sanctions.

The letter obtained by AFP says the missile launches were “destabilizing and provocative” and defied a 2015 UN resolution, number 2231. Much more here.

FACT SHEET: The Nuclear Security Summits: Securing the World from Nuclear Terrorism

Progress Since Prague

The Obama Administration’s focus on nuclear security is part of a comprehensive nuclear policy presented by the President in Prague in 2009. In that speech, President Obama described a four-pronged agenda to pursue a world without nuclear weapons.  He laid out new U.S. policies and initiatives towards nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear energy.

President Obama in his Prague remarks identified the risk of nuclear terrorism as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security, and he called for a worldwide effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years.  He also highlighted the need to break up black markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt illicit trade in nuclear materials.

The Nuclear Threat

It is almost impossible to quantify the likelihood of nuclear attack by extremist groups.  But we know that roughly 2000 metric tons of nuclear weapons usable materials — highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium — are present in both civilian and military programs, and we know that terrorists have the intent and the capability to turn these raw materials into a nuclear device if they were to gain access to them.  A terrorist attack with an improvised nuclear device would create political, economic, social, psychological, and environmental havoc around the world, no matter where the attack occurs. The threat is global, the impact of a nuclear terrorist attack would be global, and the solutions therefore must be global.

The President’s call-to-action in Prague was intended to reinvigorate existing bilateral and multilateral efforts and to challenge nations to re-examine their own commitments to nuclear security. Given the global repercussions of such an attack, all nations have a common interest in establishing the highest levels of security and protection over nuclear material and strengthening national and international efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling and detect and intercept nuclear materials in transit.  World leaders have no greater responsibility than ensuring their people and neighboring countries are safe by securing nuclear materials and preventing nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear Security Summit Successes

The Nuclear Security Summit process has been the centerpiece of these efforts.  Since the first Summit in April 2010 in Washington, DC, President Obama and more than 50 world leaders have been working together to prevent nuclear terrorism and counter nuclear smuggling.  This Summit community has built an impressive track record in meaningful progress towards nuclear security, and on actions that back up our words.  Collectively, Summit participants have made over 260 national security commitments in the first three Summits, and of these, nearly three-quarters have been implemented.  These outcomes – nuclear material removed or eliminated, treaties ratified and implemented, reactors converted, regulations strengthened, “Centers of Excellence” launched, technologies upgraded, capabilities enhanced – are tangible, concrete evidence of improved nuclear security.  The international community has made it harder than ever for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons, and that has made us all more secure.

In addition to national actions, Summits have provided opportunities for countries to step beyond the limitations of consensus to highlight steps they are actually taking as a group to reduce nuclear threats.  These so-called “gift baskets” have reflected joint commitments related to countering nuclear smuggling, radioactive source security, information security, transportation security, and many other topics.  It would be an overstatement to suggest that these national and collective commitments have come about exclusively as a result of the Nuclear Security Summits, but it is fair to say that they would almost certainly not all have transpired in the absence of the kind of high-level forcing effect that summits can have.

Across the four Nuclear Security Summits, we have maintained the momentum of tangible actions to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism and to make progress towards strengthened international norms and standards for nuclear security.

  • The number of facilities with nuclear material continues to decline:  We successfully completed removals or confirmed the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from more than 50 facilities in 30 countries — in total, enough material for 130 nuclear weapons.
    • In 2010, Ukraine committed to remove four bombs’ worth of HEU and completed that removal in 2012, fully eliminating all HEU from its territory – a particularly vital step in light of Russia’s subsequent breaches of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
    • Japan is on track to remove over 500 kilograms of HEU and separated plutonium from its Fast Critical Assembly. This is the largest-ever project by a country to remove nuclear material from its territory and we look forward to continued work with Japan on additional removals.
  • Fourteen countries and Taiwan highlighted the elimination of all nuclear materials from their territory; as a result, wide swaths of Central and Eastern Europe and all of South America can be considered free of HEU and therefore no longer targets for those seeking nuclear materials.
  • Security at sites and on borders is increasing: All Summit countries reported progress in enhancing nuclear security practices, including 20 countries committing to increase cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling efforts, and 13 countries pledging to improve nuclear detection practices at ports;
  • A majority of Summit states will implement stronger security practices: 36 countries pledged to implement stronger nuclear security practices in their countries by – among other things – incorporating international guidelines into national laws, inviting international peer reviews of their nuclear material, and committing to continuous review and improvement of their nuclear security systems.
  • The legal basis for nuclear security continues to be strengthened: additional countries are adopting binding legal commitments, such as the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which will soon achieve entry into force with over 80 new ratifications since 2009, and the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
  • Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers and other nuclear security Centers of Excellence have increased and become more connected: 15 states have opened centers since 2009 in support of national nuclear workforce training requirements, as well as international capacity building and research and development on nuclear security technologies.
  • Radioactive source security has been enhanced: 23 countries agreed to secure their most dangerous radioactive sources to levels established in international guidelines by 2016.

Strengthening the Architecture

Key aspects of the Summits’ success have included the personal attention of national leaders; a focus on tangible, meaningful outcomes; a regular event that elicits deliverables and announcements; and a forum that builds relationships that can help advance joint efforts.  We need to find ways to capture some of these attributes in more lasting vehicles to promote nuclear security progress.

The IAEA’s first-ever nuclear security ministerial held in 2013 is an important step towards strengthening the Agency’s role in promoting nuclear security, and we look forward to regularizing those high-level meetings, with the next one being held in December 2016. The 2012 special session at the UN on nuclear terrorism reflects the unique convening power of the United Nations in this arena. INTERPOL plays a unique role in bringing together law enforcement officials, as seen through its recent convening of the recent Global Conference to combat nuclear smuggling.  Other fora for collective action – the Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group – have all been invigorated in recent years.  The United States hosted the first Nuclear Security Regulators Conference in 2012, and Spain will host the second such meeting in May 2016.  The World Institute for Nuclear Security, professional societies and nongovernmental expert communities are also key components of this architecture and must continue to contribute to this mission as we move beyond Summits to nurture new concepts, build professional skills, and develop global connections.

The Summits were designed to enhance, elevate, expand and empower this architecture of treaties, institutions, norms and practices to effectively address the threats we face today and in the future.  As the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit represents the last summit in this format, we will issue five Action Plans in support of the key enduring institutions and initiatives related to nuclear security: the UN, the IAEA, INTERPOL, the GICNT and the Global Partnership.  These Action Plans represent steps the Summit participants will take as members of these organizations to support their enhanced role in nuclear security.

Another key component of the Summit’s success has been the effective network of “Sherpas” – the senior expert officials in each Summit country responsible for developing the outcomes of the Summits and for preparing their respective leaders.  These Sherpas cut across multiple agencies to form a tight-knit community of action.  This community will be carried forward after the 2016 Summit as a “Nuclear Security Contact Group” that will meet regularly to synchronize efforts to implement commitments made in the four Summit Communiqués, national statements, gift baskets, and Action Plans.  Recognizing the interest from those who have not been part of the Summit process, this Contact Group will be open to countries that wish to promote the Summit agenda.

Looking Ahead

As much as we have accomplished through the Summit process, more work remains.  We will continue to seek additional tangible results in nuclear material reductions and better overall nuclear and radiological security practices; we will look for ways to enhance the global nuclear security architecture; and, we will continue to promote an architecture that – over time – is comprehensive in its scope (including civilian and military material), is based on international standards, incorporates measures to build confidence that states are applying security responsibly in their countries, and promotes declining stocks of directly useable fissile material.

We all need to do more together to enhance nuclear security performance, to dissuade and apprehend nuclear traffickers, to eliminate excess nuclear weapons and material, to avoid production of materials we cannot use, to make sure our facilities can repel the full range of threats we have already seen in our neighborhoods, to share experiences and best practices, and to do so in ways that are visible to friends, neighbors, and rivals – and thereby provide assurance that we are effectively executing our sovereign responsibility. We also need to reflect the principle of continuous improvement, because nuclear security is never “done”.  As long as materials exist, they require our utmost commitment to their protection—we continue the march toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.