Marines Salvaging Aircraft Parts to Keep Flying

Congressional failures just forced the Marines to raid a museum for aircraft parts

MilitaryTimes: Marine aviation squadrons are salvaging aircraft parts from museums in order to keep planes flying, according to anecdotes from a key congressional leader.

During a recent trip to several Southern U.S. military bases, Marines told House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, that they’ve been paying for their units’ supplies like pens and paper towels, and were forced to raid decommissioned aircraft for parts.

“I have heard firsthand from service members who have looked me in the eye and told of trying to cannibalize parts from a museum aircraft … getting aircraft that were sent to the boneyard in Arizona back and ready to fly missions, pilots flying well below the minimum number of hours required for minimal proficiency,” Thornberry said.

To see the short real time video go here.

Lawmakers are livid about the fiscal shortfalls, even if their budget infighting in Congress is partly to blame.

At issue are military readiness accounts stretched thin by more than a decade of war and four years of defense penny pinching. Earlier this month, chiefs from each of the four services told lawmakers that those two stressors have led to belt-tightening headaches for units across the military, in some cases deferring long-term needs in favor of short-term solutions.

 PhotoCamel

Thornberry would not identify which Marine air station had the parts shortage, and Marine Corps officials at the locations he visited would not confirm the stories.

But Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford did not dispute and seemed to confirm the incidents when confronted with the anecdotes at a March 22 hearing.

“What you saw in the Marine Corps I think reflects in some part what you’ll see in all the services, perhaps not to the same degree as Marine aviation,” he told the chairman. “But that same dynamic exists in each one of the services.”

The Marine Corps has about 180 F/A-18A-Ds, said Marine Corps spokesman Maj. Clark Carpenter. Typically, 43 F/A-18s from deployable squadrons and nine from training squadrons are in depot for maintenance at any given time. That leaves only about 60 percent of the deployable aircraft in flyable, “fight tonight” status.”

Lt. Gen. Glen Walters, the Corps’ deputy commandant for programs and resources, told lawmakers earlier this month that budget cuts have left the entire service “under-resourced” for spare parts.

The Marine Corps has requested $460 million from Congress in fiscal 2017, some of which would buy spare parts for aircraft, but aviation readiness is not expected to fully recover until at least 2020.

Thornberry said the museum salvage attempt he learned about didn’t work, and the Marines were forced to find another fix to get the aircraft ready for an overseas mission.

“The part they took off the museum aircraft did not fit the aircraft they were trying to keep flying,” he said. “But they’re looking for whatever they can do to keep these things up in the air. It’s just amazing.”

Earlier this month, Marine Commandant Gen. Robert Neller blamed some of the maintenance and repair woes on the continued high tempo of operations.

“The fight in ISIL continues to put stress on equipment, particularly aviation,” he told lawmakers, using an acronym for the Islamic State group. “We’re in the process of resetting our equipment and then you’re trying to maintain legacy gear, and at the same time modernize every model type series of aircraft.”

Other service officials have echoed similar problems. Dunford and Defense Secretary Ash Carter point to Congress’ defense spending caps, which have limited maintenance and investment accounts in recent years, and begged for relief in upcoming budgets.

But committee members have questioned the Pentagon leaders’ assessments that the White House’s fiscal 2017 budget request is truly enough to fix the deep-seated problems, criticizing their promises that next year’s spending caps will be enough to right the force.

Thornberry said that several service members have told him they’ve started buying “basic supplies” like pens and cleaning products “because otherwise it would take three to four months to get them if they could get them at all.”

“I’d say my concern level was very high when I hear [anecdotes] like that. You have folks out there doing their job and they can’t get a pen from the federal government procurement system.

“It just makes you think ‘my gosh, can’t we do better than this?’”

Pentagon Launching Cyber Bombs on ISIS

FNC: The U.S. has ramped up its fight against the Islamic State terror group’s online capabilities, dropping so-called “cyber bombs” on the militants, a top Pentagon official said Tuesday.

“Those guys are under enormous pressure. Every time we have gone after one of their defended positions over the last six months, we have defeated them. They have left, they have retreated,” Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work told Reuters.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter gave some explanation for the concept of “cyber bombs” in a February NPR interview.

“We are using cyber tools, which is really a major new departure… These are strikes that are conducted in the warzone using cyber essentially as a weapon of war, just like we drop bombs,” Carter said.

Analysts say ISIS has frequently used the Internet to spread its message, regularly releasing photos and videos on social media. The latest edition of its magazine “Dabiq” went online this week.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has helped Iraqi forces as they prepare operations to retake the northern city of Mosul. While they got off to a slow start, there have been some recent advances, and officials say momentum has been growing in the fight against ISIS.

Secretary of State John Kerry, during a visit to Baghdad last Friday, pledged $155 million in new U.S. aid to Iraq and offered a show of political support to Iraq’s beleaguered Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

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DefenseSystems: Given the classifications and operational security surrounding cyber operations, details on anti-ISIS activity in this domain are scant, though Carter added some information in a Pentagon press conference with reporters on Monday, saying the cyber component is aimed at disrupting ISIS’s command and control to cause them to lose confidence in their networks, as well as overloading their networks to limit their operational functionality. But given that the cyber tools are new, Carter said details are being kept under wraps, especially considering they are applicable to other conflicts globally.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford reiterated the point that DOD does not want to provide operational details in hopes of keeping the element of surprise. Dunford did say that, conceptually, DOD is trying to isolate ISIS in the same way it is trying to so in the physical space.

Both Dunford and Carter said that the capabilities being used against ISIS, and others globally, are exactly why the U.S. Cyber Command was established in the first place. Dunford said the command is building an inventory of tools to be used in cyberspace going forward.

Carter has said previously that the Defense Department will look to take the fight to ISIS in the cyber domain, even resorting to targeting members of ISIS’s hacking cadre with bombs. However, it is still believed that ISIS’ cyber capabilities remain low, limited to merely website defacements and denial-of-service attacks.

One concern, whether from nation-states or groups such as ISIS should they gain cyber acumen, is the targeting of U.S. critical infrastructure. “Although it’s not a popular target for people trying to make a profit – that’s good and bad, because the flip side is that the adversaries who are interested in potentially targeting critical infrastructure could potentially be more sophisticated adversaries,” Isaac Porche, associate director of the Forces and Logistics Program at RAND, told a panel of lawmakers last week. “So critical infrastructure today might have to deal with a more sophisticated threat than, let’s say, a hardware store might have to.”

Military and U.S. intelligence officials in the past have been careful about what, in their minds, the term “attack” connotes in cyberspace, potentially allowing conclusions to be drawn regarding current U.S. activity against ISIS. “Terminology and lexicon is very important in this space,” Adm. Michael Rogers, the head of the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, told the House Intelligence Committee last year.“And many times I’ll hear people throw out ‘attack’ and ‘act of war’ and I go, ‘That’s not necessarily in every case how I would characterize the activity that I see’.”

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has said previously that the hack and theft of millions of records from the Office of Personnel Management did not constitute an attack, because it did not result in the destruction of systems, infrastructure or data.

“We generally look at all cyber events and we define it as an attack. In many cases you can do reconnaissance, you can do espionage, you can do theft in this domain we call cyberspace,” Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart told lawmakers recently. “But the reaction always is, whether it’s an adversary doing reconnaissance, an adversary trying to conduct a [human intelligence] operations in this domain, we define it as an attack and I don’t think that’s terribly helpful.”

Russian Provocation on U.S. Military, Pact Violation

Earlier this week, the Russians buzzed a U.S. guided missile destroyer in the Baltic Sea. This occurred 11 times over 2 days. It is an educated guess that this provocation was meant to be a classified occurrence but our military is angry and leaked it into the public domain. This is hardly the first time the Russians have behave outside the scope of international pacts and conditions against the West and allies.

The Russians did have a response to our complaints, that is if there were any from Washington:

NBC: A U.S. official said the maneuvers were “unsafe” and “unprofessional” — and that the jets were so low they left “wake in the water.” He said a Russian KA-27 helicopter also made seven passes above the destroyer and was believed to be photographing the ship.

Russian Ministry of Defense spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov hit back Thursday, saying that “upon visual contact, the Russian pilots have executed a turnaway from the ship, compliant to all safety regulations.”

Safety regulations? Whose regulations exactly? There is something called the IncSea that prevents as one of the issues THE exact type of incident that Russia is guilty of. Additionally, the Cold War Museum has an interesting story about this exact matter.

Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation


Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972
Entered into force May 25, 1972

Narrative
Treaty Text
Protocol

Narrative

 
In the late 1960s, there were several incidents between forces of the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy. These included planes of the two nations passing near one another, ships bumping one another, and both ships and aircraft making threatening movements against those of the other side. In March 1968 the United States proposed talks on preventing such incidents from becoming more serious. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation in November 1970, and the talks were conducted in two rounds — October 1, 1971, in Moscow and May 17, 1972, in Washington, D.C. The Agreement was signed by Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov during the Moscow summit meeting in 1972.

Specifically, the agreement provides for:

  • steps to avoid collision;
  • not interfering in the “formations” of the other party;
  • avoiding maneuvers in areas of heavy sea traffic;
  • requiring surveillance ships to maintain a safe distance from the object of investigation so as to avoid “embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance”;
  • using accepted international signals when ships maneuver near one another;
  • not simulating attacks at, launching objects toward, or illuminating the bridges of the other partys ships;
  • informing vessels when submarines are exercising near them; and
  • requiring aircraft commanders to use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party and not permitting simulated attacks against aircraft or ships, performing aerobatics over ships, or dropping hazardous objects near them.

The agreement also provides for: (1) notice three to five days in advance, as a rule, of any projected actions that might “represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight”; (2) information on incidents to be channeled through naval attaches assigned to the respective capitals; and (3) annual meetings to review the implementation of the Agreement.

The protocol to this agreement grew out of the first meeting of the Consultative Committee established by the agreement. Each side recognized that its effectiveness could be enhanced by additional understandings relating to nonmilitary vessels. In the protocol signed in Washington, D.C., on May 22, 1973, each party pledged not to make simulated attacks against the nonmilitary ships of the other.

Like other confidence-building measures, the Incidents at Sea Agreement does not directly affect the size, weaponry, or force structure of the parties. Rather, it serves to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities; to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis. In 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman cited the accord as “a good example of functional navy-to-navy process” and credited this area of Soviet-American relations with “getting better rather than worse.” In 1985, he observed that the frequency of incidents was “way down from what it was in the 1960s and early 1970s.”

 

Treaty Text

Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972
Entered into force May 25, 1972

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Desiring to assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas, and

Guided by the principles and rules of international law,

Have decided to conclude this Agreement and have agreed as follows:

 

Article I
For the purpose of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:

1. “Ship” means:

 

(b) Naval auxiliaries of the Parties, which include all naval ships authorized to fly the naval auxiliary flag where such a flag has been established by either Party.

    (a) A warship belonging to the naval forces of the Parties bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy list, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline;

2. “Aircraft” means all military manned heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air craft, excluding space craft.

3. “Formation” means an ordered arrangement of two or more ships proceeding together and normally maneuvered together.

 

Article II
The Parties shall take measures to instruct the commanding officers of their respective ships to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, hereinafter referred to as the Rules of the Road. The Parties recognize that their freedom to conduct operations on the high seas is based on the principles established under recognized international law and codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.

 

Article III
1. In all cases ships operating in proximity to each other, except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, shall remain well clear to avoid risk of collision.

2. Ships meeting or operating in the vicinity of a formation of the other Party shall, while conforming to the Rules of the Road, avoid maneuvering in a manner which would hinder the evolutions of the formation.

3. Formations shall not conduct maneuvers through areas of heavy traffic where internationally recognized traffic separation schemes are in effect.

4. Ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk of collision and also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance. Except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, a surveillant shall take positive early action so as, in the exercise of good seamanship, not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.

5. When ships of both Parties maneuver in sight of one another, such signals (flag, sound, and light) as are prescribed by the Rules of the Road, the International Code of Signals, or other mutually agreed signals, shall be adhered to for signalling operations and intentions.

6. Ships of the Parties shall not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a passing ship of the other Party, not launch any object in the direction of passing ships of the other Party, and not use searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of passing ships of the other Party.

7. When conducting exercises with submerged submarines, exercising ships shall show the appropriate signals prescribed by the International Code of Signals to warn ships of the presence of submarines in the area.

8. Ships of one Party when approaching ships of the other Party conducting operations as set forth in Rule 4 (c) of the Rules of the Road, and particularly ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft as well as ships engaged in replenishment underway, shall take appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and shall remain well clear.

 

Article IV
Commanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party operating on and over the high seas, in particular, ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft, and in the interest of mutual safety shall not permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft and ships, or performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various objects near them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.

 

Article V
1. Ships of the Parties operating in sight of one another shall raise proper signals concerning their intent to begin launching or landing aircraft.

2. Aircraft of the Parties flying over the high seas in darkness or under instrument conditions shall, whenever feasible, display navigation lights.

 

Article VI
Both Parties shall:

1. Provide through the established system of radio broadcasts of information and warning to mariners, not less than 3 to 5 days in advance as a rule, notification of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight.

2. Make increased use of the informative signals contained in the International Code of Signals to signify the intentions of their respective ships when maneuvering in proximity to one another. At night, or in conditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lighting and such distances when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light should be used to inform ships of maneuvers which may hinder the movements of others or involve a risk of collision.

3. Utilize on a trial basis signals additional to those in the International Code of Signals, submitting such signals to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization for its consideration and for the information of other States.

 

Article VII
The Parties shall exchange appropriate information concerning instances of collision, incidents which result in damage, or other incidents at sea between ships and aircraft of the Parties. The United States Navy shall provide such information through the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington and the Soviet Navy shall provide such information through the United States Naval Attache in Moscow.

 

Article VIII
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for a period of three years. It will thereafter be renewed without further action by the Parties for successive periods of three years each.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon six months written notice to the other Party.

 

Article IX
The Parties shall meet within one year after the date of the signing of this Agreement to review the implementation of its terms. Similar consultations shall be held thereafter annually, or more frequently as the Parties may decide.

 

Article X
The Parties shall designate members to form a Committee which will consider specific measures in conformity with this Agreement. The Committee will, as a particular part of its work, consider the practical workability of concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters between ships, aircraft, and ships and aircraft. The Committee will meet within six months of the date of signature of this Agreement and submit its recommendations for decision by the Parties during the consultations prescribed in Article IX.

DONE in duplicate on the 25th day of May 1972 in Moscow in the English and Russian languages each being equally authentic.

 

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

John W. Warner

Secretary of the Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Sergei G. Gorshkov

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy

 

Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas Signed May 25, 1972

Signed at Washington May 22, 1973
Entered into force May 22, 1973

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on measures directed to improve the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas,

Recognizing that the objectives of the Agreement may be furthered by additional understandings, in particular concerning actions of naval ships and military aircraft with respect to the non-military ships of each Party,

Further agree as follows:

 

Article I
The Parties shall take measures to notify the non-military ships of each Party on the provisions of the Agreement directed at securing mutual safety.

 

Article II
Ships and aircraft of the Parties shall not make simulated attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes and other weapons at non-military ships of the other Party, nor launch nor drop any objects near non-military ships of the other Party in such a manner as to be hazardous to these ships or to constitute a hazard to Navigation.

 

 

Article III
 

This Protocol will enter into force on the day of its signing and will be considered as an integral part of the Argument between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas which was signed in Moscow on May 25, 1972.

 

 
 

DONE on the 22nd of May, 1973 in Washington, in two copies, each in the English and the Russian language, both texts having the same force.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

J.P. Weinel

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Alekseyev, Admiral

 

 

50,000-troop coalition needed in order to crush ISIS

General Odierno was a guest at The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. There was a fascinating question and answer session between the General and Fox News Catherine Herridge.

Operation Hemorrhage: The Terror Plans to Wreck the West’s Economy

Some of the points made by General Odierno included:  Odierno says at FDDWF that Obama decision to pull US troops from Iraq became “self-inflicted wound.”

  •  [U.S.] lost its intelligence network when we withdrew from Iraq
  • What I worry most about ISIS is that they are growing fast and their perception of success
  • We can defeat  the ISIS military, but we need a solution for what happens next after success
  • I am not sure we have capabilities to respond to crisis on five continents
  • We’ve loss capability [in latest defense cuts]
  • Today it is harder and harder to have a unified Iraq because of Iranian influence
  • Kurds have fought heroically and we need to train them and provide economic support
  • Airstrikes have some impact but will not solve all problems as we must enable force on the ground and having people on the ground would enable our air capabilities to be more successful
  • When our military left [Iraq] we lost political influence in the country and region
  • The whole time [U.S.] were there the Syrian government was complicit with al Qaeda
  • I worry [U.S.] have isolationist tendencies and the next president needs to strengthen our [diplomatic] relationships the rest of the world wants the U.S. involved

Top general: 50,000-troop coalition needed in order to crush ISIS

FNC: It will take a coalition of 50,000 troops on the ground to defeat the Islamic State, according to the former army chief of staff who spent more than four years serving in Iraq and who is credited, along with retired General David Petraeus, with being the architect of the successful 2007 troop surge there.

In this Jan. 1, 2010 file photo, Gen. Ray Odierno is shown at a news conference at Camp Victory in Baghdad.

“Probably around 50,000,” said Gen. Raymond T. Odierno during a panel discussion moderated by Fox News for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Odierno, who received the George P. Shultz award for distinguished service, emphasized the 50,000 would not all be U.S. troops, but the coalition would need to be U.S.- led.

While the general, who commanded all U.S. forces from 2008 to 2010, said he supports a unified country, he added the U.S. government needs to consider whether Iraq has already been divided into three sectors by the sectarian violence — Shia, Sunni and Kurd. Odierno fingered the newly emboldened Iran as a primary agitator.

“Today, I think it’s becoming harder and harder to have a unified Iraq,” he said. “And the reason is I believe the influence of Iran inside of Iraq is so great, they will never allow the Sunnis to participate in a meaningful way in the government. If that doesn’t happen, you cannot have a unified Iraq.”

Odierno, who argued for leaving 20,000 troops in Iraq but met resistance from several senior Obama administration officials as well as then Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki, said the decision to pull out became a self-inflicted wound.

The withdrawal made it harder, if not impossible, for the U.S. government to independently assess what was happening on the ground, at a time when the alienation of the Sunni population fueled the rise of ISIS.

“We lost what we call our human intelligence network on the ground,” he said. “I mean we used to have a pretty significant human intelligence operation. So as we pulled out, our U.S. military, we lose it. So we have to depend on Iraqis, which they collect intelligence, but they do it a little bit differently than we do and they look for different things.”

Speaking at the CIA Wednesday, President Obama touted the air campaign against ISIS, though Odierno said air power can only go so far, and working with the local Iraqis was the cornerstone of the surge.

When he was in Iraq, Odierno had first-hand knowledge of the ISIS leader Omar al-Baghdadi, who, at the time was a nondescript bomb maker with control over small Baghdad neighborhoods.

“We had captured him a couple of times, released him. He then fled to, I think, Syria. And then he shows (up) – and all of a sudden, I see him on TV making a pronouncement that he’s the head of ISIS,” Odierno recalled. “You have these individuals who’ve grown up now fighting the U.S. or whatever – an insurgency – and that becomes their life. And so they continue to grow and grow and grow and some of them become leaders of a movement, which is what he did.”

The retired general continued to sound the alarm about military cuts, saying the army has “lost capability” at a time when the likelihood of responding to threats on five continents is not hypothetical.

At the same time, the number of American troops dropped from over 100,000 to 50,000. In 2015, the White House sent 450 military advisers to train and assist Iraqi forces battling ISIS, with 5,000 troops.

Fox News’ William Turner contributed to this report.

New Balance Sneakers vs. the Pentagon

Enter the early consequences of the Trans Pacific Partnership

New Balance accuses Pentagon of reneging on sneaker deal

BostonGlobe: New Balance is renewing its opposition to the far-reaching Pacific Rim trade deal, saying the Obama administration reneged on a promise to give the sneaker maker a fair shot at military business if it stopped bad-mouthing the agreement.

New Balance has several Northeast factories, including in Lawrence. John Tlumacki/Globe Staff/File

New Balance has several Northeast factories, including in Lawrence.

After several years of resistance to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a pact aimed at making it easier to conduct trade among the United States and 11 other countries, the Boston company had gone quiet last year. New Balance officials say one big reason is that they were told the Department of Defense would give them serious consideration for a contract to outfit recruits with athletic shoes.

But no order has been placed, and New Balance officials say the Pentagon is intentionally delaying any purchase.

New Balance is reviving its fight against the trade deal, which would, in part, gradually phase out tariffs on shoes made in Vietnam. A loss of those tariffs, the company says, would make imports cheaper and jeopardize its factory jobs in New England.

The administration has made the pact a priority. It could be voted on by Congress later this year, though possibly not until after the November elections.

“We swallowed the poison pill that is TPP so we could have a chance to bid on these contracts,” said Matt LeBretton, New Balance’s vice president of public affairs. “We were assured this would be a top-down approach at the Department of Defense if we agreed to either support or remain neutral on TPP. [But] the chances of the Department of Defense buying shoes that are made in the USA are slim to none while Obama is president.”

The administration says the issues of foreign tariffs and of whether the Pentagon should be required to buy shoes made domestically are entirely separate.

New Balance disagrees. Though most of the company’s shoes are made overseas, domestic manufacturing is a big priority for owner Jim Davis, a longtime Republican donor.