China Gave Trump an Ultimatum to Deal with N. Korea?

Posted on May 7, 2017May 7, 2017 by Denise Simon

BEIJING – China urged the United States to sack the head of the U.S. Pacific Command in return for exerting more pressure on North Korea amid concerns over its growing nuclear and missile threats, a source close to U.S.-China ties said Saturday.

The Chinese leadership headed by President Xi Jinping made the request, through its ambassador in the United States, to dismiss Adm. Harry Harris, known as a hard-liner on China, including with respect to the South China Sea issue, the source said.

Adm. Harry Harris, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, addresses the Lowy Institute think tank in Sydney last December. | AFP-JIJI

China’s envoy to the United States, Cui Tiankai, conveyed the request to the U.S. side, to coincide with the first face-to-face, two-day meeting between President Donald Trump and Xi in Florida from April 6, but the Trump administration likely rejected it, the source said.

China is a longtime economic and diplomatic benefactor of North Korea.

As the head of Pacific Command, Harris, who was born in Japan and raised in the United States, plays a vital role in the security of the region.

He was responsible in ordering last month the dispatch of the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier to waters near off the Korean Peninsula in a show of force amid signs the North was preparing to test-fire another ballistic missile or conduct a sixth nuclear test.

The Trump administration has called for exerting “maximum pressure” on North Korea to prod it to give up its nuclear and missile programs. The administration has said all options — including a military strikes — remain on the table.

Harris has pushed for the U.S. deployment of the advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system to South Korea. China has opposed the deployment, saying it could undermine its security interests and the strategic balance of the region.

He has also called for continuing U.S. “freedom of navigation” operations in the contested South China Sea. Overlapping territorial claims, as well as land construction and militarization of outposts in disputed areas in the sea, remain a source of tension in the region.

According to the source, Cui also asked the Trump administration not to label China as a currency manipulator. As per the request, the United States did not label China as such, in light of Beijing’s role in helping Washington deal with the North Korean issue.

*** Related reading: 2013 Study Finds North Korea Has Indigenous Capabilities to Produce Nuclear Weapons

An example of the open-source evidence used for Kemp’s study: A 2011 image from a television broadcast in North Korea showing Kim-Jong Il inspecting a flow-forming machine located in an underground tunnel. This type of machine is able to produce centrifuge rotors for North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program.

***

Is the United States partners in the Asia Pacific region ready to deal with 5000 tunnels and an underground operation?

The entrance of an ‘intrusion tunnel’ under the DMZ between South and North Korea, Telegraph

North Korea’s Secret Strategy in a War with America: Go Underground

North Korea, one of the most secretive countries in the world, is no stranger to building underground military facilities. Whether a tunnel dug under the demilitarized zone designed to pass thousands of troops an hour, or bunkers to accommodate the regime’s leadership, North Korea has built extensive underground facilities designed to give it an edge in wartime.

One of the earliest examples of North Korean underground engineering was the discovery of several tunnels leading from North Korea under the demilitarized zone to South Korea. The first tunnel was located in 1974, extending one kilometer south of the DMZ. The tunnel was large enough to move up to two thousand troops per hour under the DMZ. A U.S. Navy officer and South Korean Marine corporal were killed by a booby trap while investigating the tunnel. Thanks to a tip from a North Korean defector, an even larger tunnel was discovered in 1978, a mile long and nearly seven feet wide.

Since then at least four tunnels have been discovered, with reinforced concrete slabs, electricity for lighting and fresh air generation, and narrow railway gauges to shuttle dirt and rock back to the tunnel entrance. Collectively, the four tunnels would have likely been able to move a brigade’s worth of troops an hour under South Korea’s defenses.

It’s difficult to determine how many tunnels exist. One report says that Kim Il-sung, the founder of the North Korean state and Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, ordered each of the ten frontline combat divisions to dig two tunnels. If completed, that would theoretically mean another dozen or so tunnels remain undiscovered. A former South Korean general, Han Sung-chu, claims there are at least eighty-four tunnels—some reaching as far as downtown Seoul. The South Korean government does not believe Han’s numbers—nor the claimed ability to reach Seoul—are credible. A forty-mile tunnel would reportedly generate a seven-hundred-thousand-ton debris pile, which has not been picked up by satellite. Despite the warnings, the last major tunnel was discovered in 1990 and South Korea seems to believe that the tunneling danger has passed.

If it has passed, it may be because North Korea has decided to tunnel in different ways. The North Korean People’s Liberation Army Air Force is believed to have three different underground air bases at Wonsan, Jangjin and Onchun. The underground base at Wonsan reportedly includes a runway 5,900 feet long and ninety feet wide that passes through a mountain. According to a defector, during wartime NK PLAAF aircraft, including MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, would take off from conventional air bases but return to underground air bases. This is plausible, as one would expect North Korean air bases to be quickly destroyed during wartime.

Another underground development is a series of troop bunkers near the DMZ. A North Korean defector disclosed that, starting in 2004, North Korea began building bunkers capable of concealing between 1,500 and two thousand fully armed combat troops near the border. At least eight hundred bunkers were built, not including decoys, meant to conceal units such as light-infantry brigades and keep them rested until the start of an invasion.

Other underground facilities are believed to have been constructed to shelter the North’s leadership. According to a South Korean military journal, the United States believes there are between six thousand and eight thousand such shelters scattered across the country. This information was reportedly gathered from defectors in order to hunt down regime members in the event of war or government collapse.

North Korea is believed to have hundreds of artillery-concealing caves just north of the DMZ. Known as Hardened Artillery Sites, or HARTS, these are usually tunneled into the sides of mountains. An artillery piece, such as a 170-millimeter Koksan gun or 240-millimeter multiple-launch rocket system, can fire from the mouth of the cave and then withdraw into the safety of the mountain to reload. These sites are used to provide artillery support for an invasion of South Korea or direct fire against Seoul itself. As of 1986, and estimated two hundred to five hundred HARTS were thought to exist.

According to a report by the Nautilus Institute, North Korea is also thought to have “radar sites in elevator shafts that can be raised up like a submarine periscope; submarine and missile patrol boat bases in tunnels hewn in rock; tunnels a kilometer or more in length for storing vehicles and supplies, or to hide the population of a nearby city.”

How would the United States and South Korea deal with these underground facilities in wartime? First, it would have to locate the facilities. These facilities are hard to spot via satellite, and gleaning information from defectors is perhaps the best way to learn about them in peacetime. Once war commences, signal intelligence will pick up radio transmissions from previously unknown underground locations, enemy troops will from concealed positions or tunnel entrances, and artillery counter-battery radars will fix the positions of HARTS. It is likely that, despite advance preparations, many of these positions will be a surprise to Washington and Seoul.

Once located, there are three ways of dealing with the sites. The first and safest way to deal with them is to bomb them from above. This presents the least risk to allied forces, but it will also prove difficult to determine whether air or artillery strikes have had good effect. The use of bombs or artillery shells may cause cave-ins that prevent allied forces from entering an underground complex and exploiting any intelligence found inside.

Another option is to simply station troops outside tunnels and shoot anyone who ventures outside. While also a safer option, an underground complex will always have multiple exits—the tunnels Kim Il-sung ordered his divisions to dig were to each have four or five exit points. The most thorough way to deal with the tunnels would be to enter them. This would be by far the most effective way to deal with regime holdouts, but also the most dangerous.

Pyongyang’s eventual defeat in any wartime scenario is a given, but its underground headquarters, fortifications and troop depots have the potential to not only enhance the Korean People’s Army’s ability to mount a surprise attack, but also to prolong the war, confounding the high-tech armed forces of its adversaries. Such underground shelters, wherever they are, will likely be the site of the endgame phase of the war, as the regime is driven underground by rapidly advancing allied forces. Only then will we discover the true extent of North Korea’s extensive underground empire.

Syria: Memorandum signed, De-escalation Zones are NOT Safe Zones

Posted on May 7, 2017May 7, 2017 by Denise Simon

This is terrifying for the Syrian people that remain in country and just as bad as the millions of refugees, noted to be about 11 million that have fled the country. Their hopes of ever returning to their home country fades each day.

It is also notable that the United States and coalition countries do have boots on the ground in Syria and the matter of an offensive operation to liberate Raqqa Syria, the headquarters for Islamic State is not even mentioned in this newly signed document. There is no mention of the United States operations in Syria along with other allied countries. Are the skies to be conflicted again? Any mention of the use of U.S. operations out of Incirlik, Turkey? Nope.

Some will read this and reply that the United States has no interest in Syria. As long as refugees and migrants continue to arrive across the United States each month and as long as there are more than 1000 open terror cases being investigated by the FBI and DHS, we DO have a dog in this hunt.

“The functioning of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as the administration of the security zones shall be ensured by the forces of the Guarantors by consensus”

6 May 201712:41

Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic Official website of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2746041

The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey as guarantors of the observance of the ceasefire regime in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter referred to as “Guarantors”):

-guided by the provisions of UNSC resolution 2254 (2015); -reaffirming their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic; -expressing their determination to decrease the level of military tensions and to provide for the security of civilians in the Syrian Arab Republic, have agreed on the following.

1.the following de-escalation areas shall be created with the aim to put a prompt end to violence, improve the humanitarian situation and create favorable conditions to advance political settlement of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic:

– Idlib province and certain parts of the neighbouring provinces (Latakia, Hama and Aleppo provinces); -certain parts in the north of Homs province; -in eastern Ghouta; -certain parts of southern Syria (Deraa and Al-Quneitra provinces).

The creation of the de-escalation areas and security zones is a temporary measure, the duration of which will initially be 6 months and will be automatically extended on the basis of consensus of the Guarantors.

2.Within the lines of the de-escalation areas:

-hostilities between the conflicting parties (the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the armed opposition groups that have joined and will join the ceasefire regime) with the use of any kinds of weapons, including aerial assets, shall be ceased; -rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access shall be provided; -conditions to deliver medical aid to local population and to meet basic needs of civilians shall be created; -measures to restore basic infrastructure facilities, starting with water supply and electricity distribution networks, shall be taken; -conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons shall be created.

3.Along the lines of the de-escalation areas, security zones shall be established in order to prevent incidents and military confrontations between the conflicting parties.

4.The security zones shall include:

– Checkpoints to ensure unhindered movement of unarmed civilians and delivery of humanitarian assistance as well as to facilitate economic activities;

– Observation posts to ensure compliance with the provisions of the ceasefire regime.

The functioning of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as the administration of the security zones shall be ensured by the forces of the Guarantors by consensus. Third parties might be deployed, if necessary, by consensus of the Guarantors.

5.The Guarantors shall:

-take all necessary measures to ensure the fulfillment by the conflicting parties of the ceasefire regime; -take all necessary measures to continue the fight against DAESH/ISIL, Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaeda or DAESH/ISIL as designated by the UN Security Council within and outside the de-escalation areas; -continue efforts to include in the ceasefire regime armed opposition groups that have not yet joined the ceasefire regime.

6.The Guarantors shall in 2 weeks after signing the Memorandum form a Joint working group on de-escalation (hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Working Group”) composed of their authorized representatives in order to delineate the lines of the de-escalation areas and security zones as well as to resolve other operational and technical issues related to the implementation of the Memorandum.

The Guarantors shall take steps to complete by 4 June 2017 the preparation of the maps of the de-escalation areas and security zones and to separate the armed opposition groups from the terrorist groups mentioned in para.5 of the Memorandum.

The Joint Working Group shall prepare by the above-mentioned date the maps of the de-escalation areas and security zones to be agreed by consensus of the Guarantors as well as the draft Regulation of the Joint Working Group.

The Joint Working Group shall report on its activities to the high-level international meetings on Syria held in Astana.

The present Memorandum enters into force the next day after its signing.

Done in Astana, 4 May 2017 in three copies in English, having equal legal force.

Signatures

Islamic Republic of Iran Russian Federation Republic of Turkey

***

Russia is telling the entire Western world they are in control and alleges full cooperation and approval not only from the United Nations but claims the Trump administration has also agreed. Read on as it also shows maps of the ‘de-escalation zones’.

Russian Defense Ministry Held A Briefing Titled “Principles Of Implementation Of The Memorandum On Syria De-Eescalation Zones Signed In Astana”

Russian Defence Ministry held a briefing titled “Principles of implementation of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones signed in Astana”

Speech of the Deputy Defence Minister of Russia

Lieutenant General Alexander Fomin

Good day, ladies and gentlemen!

The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation is holding a briefing on the main points and principles of implementation of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones signed in Astana.

The event is participated by the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate – the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy and Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov.

As you know, yesterday, after two-day negotiations held in Astana, plenipotentiaries from Russia, Iran and Turkey signed a Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones.

For reference:

The Russian party was represented by the Special envoy of the President of the Russian Federation on the settlement of the Syrian conflict A. Lavrentiev.

The Turkish party was represented by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey S. Onal.

Iran is represented by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran H. Ansari.

First, we should briefly inform you about the preparation of the agreement, its participants and ideas.

The document had been elaborated by the Russian Defence Ministry upon the direct order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces Vladimir Putin to maintain the ceasefire on the territory of Syria.

The adoption of the Memorandum had been preceded by a thorough work with all the participants of the negotiation process.

The political settlement in Syria had been numerously discussed by the President of the Russian Federation with the leadership of Turkey, the USA and other states.

In particular, de-escalation zones were negotiated in the course of the talks with the Heads of Russia and Turkey on May 3 in Sochi.

The Russian Defence Minister held bilateral talks with Ministers of Defence of Iran, Turkey, Syria and Israel.

Intelligence services and foreign affairs departments cooperated with each other permanently. A large work was done in order to convince the Syrian leadership and leaders of armed opposition formations to take measures aimed to deescalate the conflict.

Constructive attitude of Iran and Turkey, which had supported building up of the ceasefire regime, has played an important role in operative development of the Memorandum.

Position of the United States positively influenced on establishment of the de-escalation zones. The US supported measures aimed to reduce violence in Syria, improvement of humanitarian situation and creation of conditions promoting political settlement of the conflict.

António Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, supported the signing of the Memorandum. He welcomed decisions on stoppage of use of weapons and increasing of opportunities for providing humanitarian aid to the population.

Efforts of Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Envoy to Syria, are highly appreciated. Staffan de Mistura jointly with a group of high-qualified experts had arrived in Astana to support the negotiations.

Memorandum is a landmark document, implementation of which will allow to separate the opposition from the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra.

Free access in the de-escalation zones for providing medical, product and other assistance to the Syrian population will be granted.

Recovery of infrastructural objects will be organized.

All these issues will create conditions for safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Implementation of the Memorandum will allow to stop warfare and civil war in Syria.

That is why the document is important for political settlement of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Not everybody appreciates it. At the same time, its signing supported by all main interested players: the UN, the US administration, the leadership of Saudi Arabia and other countries. That is a guarantee of its implementation.

The Memorandum comes into effect tomorrow, i.e. from 00.00 May 6, 2017.

Speech of the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate

Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

Command staff of the Russian force grouping has taken a complex of measures, which had provided favourable conditions for signing the Memorandum.

Starting from May 1, the Russian Aerospace Forces have stopped operating in the de-escalation zones determined by the Memorandum.

On May 2 and 3, The Russian Centre for reconciliation of opposing sides jointly with leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic organized delivery of a humanitarian convoy of the United Nations, International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent in Duma and the Eastern Ghouta region.

Military police units of the Russian Armed Forces escorted the 51-automobile convoy. Four unmanned aerial vehicles covered the moving convoy.

Russian military servicemen detected and neutralized a suicide bomber armed with 10-kilogram explosives and grenades. They handed him over to representatives of the Syrian security service.

The Memorandum provides creation of four de-escalation zones in the Syrian Arab Republic.

First one is most extensive located in the north of Syria. It includes the Idlib province as well as north-eastern areas of the Latakia province, western areas of the Aleppo province, and northern areas of the Hama province. There are more than 1 million people in the zone. 14,500-men strong armed formations are controlling this zone.

The second one is in the north of the Homs province. It includes al-Rastan and Tell Bisa as well as nearest areas controlled by the opposition groups. The groups consist of up to 3,000 insurgents. There are about 180,000 civilians in the zone.

The third one is Eastern Ghouta. About 9,000 insurgents are controlling it.

About 690,000 civilians live in Eastern Ghouta. The Syrian authorities have deployed eight checkpoints for their transfer. In the morning, most civilians leave Eastern Ghouta for Damascus for earning money, and, in the evening, they come back.

This zone does not include the area of Kabun controlled by insurgents of Jabhat al-Nusra. The Damascus city, and the Russian Embassy in particular, are shelled from there. Operation aimed to eliminate terrorists in this area is continued.

The fourth zone is located in the south of Syria and includes areas of the Daraa and Quneitra provinces. This zone is mainly controlled by units of so-called Southern Front (15,000 men strong). Up to 800,000 civilians live there.

The Memorandum provides additional de-escalation zones if necessary.

In the de-escalation zones, warfare between the government troops and armed opposition units joined or are to join the ceasefire regime is being stopped.

This refers to use of all types of weapons, including aviation strikes.

Special attention is paid to control implementation of the ceasefire regime.

In order to prevent incidents and combat actions between the opposing sides along the de-escalation zone borders, security lanes are established. These lanes include posts for observation of reconciliation regime and checkpoints for controlling movement of civilians without weapons, delivery of humanitarian aid, and support of economical activity.

Operation of the checkpoints and observation posts as well as control over security zones will be provided by personnel from Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Forces from other countries can be involved under agreement of state-guarantors.

Command staff of the Russian grouping under the leadership of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces is determining the number of necessary checkpoints and observation posts as well as forces supporting their operation.

Within two weeks, representatives of state-guarantors will form a Joint working group. The group will present borders of the de-escalation zones and safety lanes as well as maps for separating formations of armed opposition from terrorist groupings by July 4, 2017.

It is to be stressed that signing of the Memorandum on creation of the de-escalation zones in the Syrian Arab Republic does not stop fighting against terrorists of the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

State-guarantors undertake to continue fighting against formations of these and other terrorist organizations in the de-escalation zones as well as provide assistance to the government troops and armed opposition in fighting insurgents in other areas of Syria.

After establishing of the de-escalation zones, the government troops will be sent to continue offensive on the ISIS formations in the central and eastern parts of Syria as well as to liberate areas located along the River Euphrates.

The Russian Aerospace Forces will support these actions.

Speech of the Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate

of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces

Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov

Ladies and gentlemen!

Active preliminary work with our partners has contributed to the results of negotiations in Astana. To this purpose, the working group of the Russian Defence Ministry held a meeting with the leadership of Syria on April 25 in Damascus and on April 26 – in Ankara with representatives of Turkey and leaders of armed formations of the opposition.

In the course of the meetings, we have explained in detail to our partners the methods of creation of safety zones, the mechanism of control over the implementation of the agreements, organization of the humanitarian access and restoration of the peaceful life.

Delegations of the Russian Defence Minister conducted the same work simultaneously in Tehran and Amman.

Just in the course of the preliminary work, we managed to enlist support of guarantor states and the opposing sides for our initiatives.

These activities ensured constructive work of the representatives from Turkey, Iran, the UN and the Syrian government at the meeting in Astana.

The lack of trust between the representatives of the Syrian government and the oppositions gave rise to some difficulties in the course of negotiations.

Despite the intention of all the delegations to sign the document, the initial points of view of the parties differed. First, that concerned the issues of security of the civil population in the de-escalation zones and organization of control over the implementation of the ceasefire agreements by the parties.

The peculiarity of negotiations in Astana is the fact that the opposition was represented by field commanders who really control the situation “on the ground”, but not politicians or emigrants.

Despite the conflict with the government troops, these people realize their responsibility for the future of the united Syrian state.

In the course of frank talks, common methods of stabilization of the situation in Syria were elaborated. We managed to agree on Memorandum with the field commanders of 27 detachments active in the de-escalation zones.

The constructive position of representatives from Iran and Turkey played an important role in achieving agreements as both countries as guarantor states had incurred the responsibility for implementation of the ceasefire.

The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General Staffan de Mistura made an important contribution to the most tough periods of negotiations. He held several meetings with opposition representatives and convinced them of the importance of the Memorandum for stabilization of the situation in Syria.

It is also important that the results of the talks in Astana are considered by Staffan de Mistura as an influential contribution to the political dialogue in Genève.

The UN experts have rendered considerable assistance, their peace-making experience, practical recommendations were took into account during the elaboration of the Memorandum.

The high level of organization of negotiations provided by the leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan also contributed to the success of the talks. During each stage of the conversations all the delegations were provided with support by our Kazakh colleagues.

In the near future, the main efforts will be concentrated on the establishment of a Joint working group for de-escalation, preparation of maps with coordinates of safe margins and buffer zones and their negotiation with the partners.

The reports on the activities of the Group will be heard during the international meetings on the Syrian conflict settlement within the Astana process.

Moreover, the mechanism of effective control over the implementation of agreements mentioned by Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy will be elaborated jointly with the partners. This work has already been started.

We plan to continue the work with partners on elaboration of additional trust-building measures for the opposing sides. First of all, this concerns the liberation of persons retained forcibly by both sides of the conflict as well as the humanitarian mine clearance.

We expect further interaction with our partners within the Astana process, the observer countries as well as the support of international organizations, first of all the UN.

Thank you for your attention.

Media representatives’ questions

Yekaterina Babayeva, reporter, KSB TV-channel (Republic of Korea) – a question to Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

– After the adoption of the Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones, where will the main efforts of the Aerospace Forces be concentrated for elimination of terrorist groupings?

Sergei Rudskoy:

– De-escalation zones will allow the government troops to release many units. The Russian Aerospace Forces will continue supporting the Syrian Armed Forces while eliminating illegal armed groups of the ISIL international terrorist organization.

The main efforts will focused on the development of the offensive in the east from Palmyra and further lifting a siege of the Deir ez-Zor city, which is besieged for over three years as well as on the liberation of the north-eastern territories in the Aleppo province along the Euphrates River.

Yaroslav Kurashov, reporter of NHK TV-channel (Japan), a question to Lieutenant General Stanislav Gadjimagomedov

Which measures are prescribed for the violators of the Memorandum?

Stanislav Gadjimagomedov:

First, a thorough investigation will be held. According to the results, the measures applied to the violators will be defined. Among them – neutralization by fire.

Alexey Konopko, reporter of the Россия-24 TV-channel, a question to Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy

– Is Russia planning to recommence the Memorandum between Russia and the USA on prevention of incidents in the air space over Syria?

Sergei Rudskoy:

– This agreement is an effective means of prevention of incidents in the air. After the US cruise missile strike against the Shayrat Air Base, the Russian party has suspended its participation in this agreement.

The question of returning to the cooperation within the Memorandum on prevention of incidents in the air space over Syria will be discussed in the course of bilateral contacts with the American colleagues in the nearest future.

Antonio Rondon Garcia, reporter of the Prensa Latina (Cuba), a question to Lieutenant General Alexander Fomin

– Is it planned to extend the number of participants in the de-escalation process?

Alexander Fomin:

Yes, it is. Now we are working on this issue with Jordan and a number of other states.

In the conclusion, I would like to thank you for responding to our invitation.

Traditionally, the Russian Defence Ministry pays great attention to the covering of its activities by the media. We will continue informing you about the most important events including the Syrian topic.

Taking the opportunity, I would like to congratulate all of you with the upcoming Victory Day and to wish you peaceful sky.

Thank you for your attention.

US Sanctions did not Stop Russian Election Hacking

Posted on May 5, 2017May 5, 2017 by Denise Simon

Image result for apt 28 russia The RegisterUK

Wired: Ten days after US intelligence agencies pinned the breach of the Democratic National Committee last October on the Russian government, Vice President Joe Biden promised government would “send a message” to the Kremlin. Two months later, the White House announced new sanctions against a handful of Russian officials and companies, and kicked 35 Russian diplomats out of the country. Six months later, it appears that the message has been thoroughly ignored.

The Russian hackers who gleefully spilled the emails of the DNC, Colin Powell, and the Clinton campaign remain as busy as ever, this time targeting the elections of France and Germany. And that failure to stop Russia’s online adventurism, cybersecurity analysts say, points to a rare sort of failure in digital diplomacy: Even after clearly identifying the hackers behind one the most brazen nation-state attacks against US targets in modern history, America still hasn’t figured out how to stop them.

Poking the Bear

In a recent report tracking the Kremlin-affiliated activity of the hacker group known as Pawn Storm, a.k.a. APT 28 or Fancy Bear, the security firm Trend Micro identified phishing sites that they say were used to target the political campaigns of left-leaning politicians Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel in upcoming French and German elections. The analysts also found that the phishing domains had been registered in March and April of 2017, leaving no doubt the attacks started well after the US government’s attempt at deterrence last year.

“It seems like the opposite effect is happening. There’s definitely not even a slowing down” of the Pawn Storm attacks, says Trend Micro researcher Ed Cabrera. “It’s an emboldening.”

Speaking in a Senate hearing yesterday, FBI director James Comey had no illusions that the Obama administration’s response measures would keep Russian hackers away from future American elections, either. “I think one of the lessons that the Russians may have drawn from this is that this works,” Comey told the Senate Intelligence Committee. “I expect to see them to come back in 2018, and especially in 2020,” for the next US presidential election.

That failure to effectively deter Russia from its attempts at so-called “influence operations” of stealing and leaking documents doesn’t mean deterrence won’t work to stop state-sponsored hacking, says Peter Singer, a strategist at the New America Foundation. It means that the US just hasn’t gone far enough. “Never speak to me of cyber-deterrence if this is how we respond to the most important cyberattack so far in history,” Singer says. “We’ve put out the message not just to APT28 or Russia but any state or non-state attacker that this is going to be low cost, high gain.”

The Obama White House’s move to sanction Russian companies and hackers, eject diplomats and seize two Russian-owned compounds on US soil were “too little, too late,” Singer wrote in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee last month. That reaction, he pointed out, took more than six months to materialize, after even the private-sector cybersecurity community had come to the consensus that Russia was behind the attack. And even those sanctions didn’t cut deep enough for Russia’s highest-level leaders, Singer argues.

Pressure Points

Instead, Singer says, the US should have retaliated in a way that Putin would have felt personally: exposing his hidden personal wealth. “You have to go after the leverage points against the Russian oligarchy,” Singer says. He points to Putin’s fury at the Panama Papers leak from the tax haven law firm of Mossack Fonseca, which revealed portions of the Russian president’s secret wealth. “Reveal where things are hidden,” says Singer. “Make their lives more difficult.”

More broadly, Russian officials fear evidence of their corruption being exposed, says Jim Lewis, a cybersecurity and foreign policy analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. That sort of counter-leak, he says, could be a significant card for the US to play. “We need to think if we want to be more aggressive in our responses,” says Lewis. “We need to think about how to make it more painful for them to continue to do this.”

Last December, in the wake of the sanctions, Lewis told WIRED he felt they were in fact strong enough to rile the Kremlin—he called them the “the biggest retaliatory move against Russian espionage since the Cold War.” However much they may have helped the US though, Lewis says, their deterrent effect doesn’t seem to have extended to US allies like France and Germany. Hence the Pawn Storm hackers’ targeting of the Macron campaign—a hacking attempt Macron’s staff has said failed—as well as German targets including a think tank associated with Germany president Angel Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union party and the German parliament. The latter hack resulted in actual theft of documents that could still be leaked ahead of the country’s September election, in another Russian attempt to destabilize the European Union.

“The Russians appear to have interpreted the sanctions as only applying to actions against the US,” Lewis says. “On a collective level, we need to think about where NATO and the EU can take action.”

Lack of Action

Which raises the third problem with America’s digital diplomatic strategy: President Trump. The Trump administrations weak commitment to European allies, and his softening of Obama’s stance, can only have emboldened Russia further, rather than helping curtail their efforts. Trump has even continued to doubt publicly that the attacks on Democratic targets in the 2016 campaign originated in Russia in the first place, despite his own intelligence officials repeatedly pointing to the Kremlin’s involvement. More than three months after he momentarily conceded Russia’s involvement, Trump earlier this week again floated the unsubstantiated notion it “could’ve been China.”

That lack of commitment to even naming Russia—not to mention deterring its next attack—has left the US on its back foot, says Peter Singer. Even Republican leaders like Mitch McConnell and Paul Ryan, who criticized Obama’s sanctions for being too light or too late, Singer points out, are now fighting instead just to maintain sanctions against Russia rather than lift them. “The response to something being too little is to do more, not to do nothing,” says Singer. “And that’s what we’ve done since.”

All of which means the notion of deterring Russian attacks on elections or civil society is, for the moment, defunct. Expect the Kremlin’s habit of electoral-meddling will get worse before it gets better—until someone gives them a reason not to.

*** Image result for apt 28 russia FireEye

Meanwhile, Germany looks to take a more aggressive posture against Russian intrusion.

The head of Germany’s domestic intelligence agency accused Russian rivals of gathering large amounts of political data in cyber attacks and said it was up to the Kremlin to decide whether it wanted to put it to use ahead of Germany’s September elections….

Hans-Georg Maassen, president of the BfV agency, said “large amounts of data” were seized during a May 2015 cyber attack on the Bundestag, or lower house of parliament, which has previously been blamed on APT28, a Russian hacking group….

Germany’s top cyber official last week confirmed attacks on two foundations affiliated with Germany’s ruling coalition parties that were first identified by security firm Trend Micro.

“We recognize this as a campaign being directed from Russia. Our counterpart is trying to generate information that can be used for disinformation or for influencing operations,” he said. “Whether they do it or not is a political decision … that I assume will be made in the Kremlin.”

Maassen said it appeared that Moscow had acted in a similar manner in the United States, making a “political decision” to use information gathered through cyber attacks to try to influence the U.S. presidential election.

Berlin was studying what legal changes were needed to allow authorities to purge stolen data from third-party servers, and to potentially destroy servers used to carry out cyber attacks.

“We believe it is necessary that we are in a position to be able to wipe out these servers if the providers and the owners of the servers are not ready to ensure that they are not used to carry out attacks,” Maassen said….

He said intelligence agencies knew which servers were used by various hacker groups, including APT10, APT28 and APT29.

China Hacked the FDIC, will Trump Sanction?

Posted on May 5, 2017May 5, 2017 by Denise Simon

Beyond not trusting Russia, the same holds true for Iran. But then there is China. Trump should never allow China to take the lead in handling North Korea. Anyway, back to hacking and covert hegemony in Latin America.

Problems uncovered after employees walk off job with thousands of SSNs on flash drives.

Image result for china hacked fdic

China hacked FDIC, US officials covered it up, report says

China’s spies hacked into computers at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation from 2010 until 2013 — and American government officials tried to cover it up, according to a Congressional report.

The House of Representative’s Science, Space and Technology Committee released its investigative report on Wednesday.

It presents the FDIC’s bank regulators as technologically inept — and deceitful.

According to congressional investigators, the Chinese government hacked into 12 computers and 10 backroom servers at the FDIC, including the incredibly sensitive personal computers of the agency’s top officials: the FDIC chairman, his chief of staff, and the general counsel.

When congressional investigators tried to review the FDIC’s cybersecurity policy, the agency hid the hack, according to the report.

Investigators cited several insiders who knew about how the agency responded. For example, one of the FDIC’s top lawyers told employees not to discuss the hacks via email — so the emails wouldn’t become official government records.

FDIC Chairman Martin Gruenberg is being summoned before the Congressional committee on Thursday to explain what happened.

The FDIC refused to comment. However, in a recent internal review, the agency admits that it “did not accurately portray the extent of risk” to Congress and recordkeeping “needs improvement.” The FDIC claims it’s now updating its policies.

Given the FDIC’s role as a national banking regulator, the revelation of this hack poses serious concern.

The FDIC’s role is to monitor any bank that isn’t reviewed by the Federal Reserve system. It has access to extremely sensitive, internal information at 4,500 banks and savings institutions.

The FDIC also insures deposits at banks nationwide, giving it access to huge loads of information on Americans.

“Obviously it’s indicative of the Chinese effort to database as much information as possible about Americans. FDIC information is right in line with the deep personal information they’ve gone for in the past,” said computer security researcher Ryan Duff. He’s a former member of U.S. Cyber Command, the American military’s hacking unit.

“Intentionally avoiding audits sounds unethical if not illegal,” he added.

Congressional investigators discovered the hacks after finding a 2013 memo from the FDIC’s own inspector general to the agency’s chairman, which detailed the hack and criticized the agency for “violating its own policies and for failing to alert appropriate authorities.”

The report also says this culture of secrecy led the FDIC’s chief information officer, Russ Pittman, to mislead auditors. One whistleblower, whose identity is not revealed in the report, claimed that Pittman “instructed employees not to discuss… this foreign government penetration of the FDIC’s network” to avoid ruining Gruenberg’s confirmation by the U.S. Senate in March 2012.

David Kennedy, a computer security expert and former analyst at the NSA spy agency, worries that federal agencies are repeatedly hiding hacks “under the blanket of national security.”

“With such a high profile breach and hitting the top levels of the FDIC, it’s crazy to me to think that this type of information wasn’t publicly released. We need to be deeply concerned around the disclosure process around our federal government,” said Kennedy, who now runs the cybersecurity firm TrustedSec.

This same committee, led by Republican Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas, has previously criticized the FDIC for minimizing data breaches.

Several cybersecurity experts — who have extensive experience guarding government computers — expressed dismay at the alleged cover-up.

“It’s incumbent upon our policymakers to know about these data breaches so we can properly evaluate our defenses. Trying to hide successful intrusions only makes it easier for the next hacker to get in,” said Dan Guido, who runs the cybersecurity firm Trail of Bits.

*** China’s Great Leap Into Latin America

U.S. President Donald Trump’s opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement and his withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership have led some critics to claim that the United States is turning its back to regional trading partners, and that Trump is thus freeing up China to make inroads into Latin America. But China’s presence in the Western Hemisphere is already well-established, having predated Trump’s election by almost 20 years. Beijing’s involvement in the region is subject to the ebb and flow of the region’s economic and political changes, but it stems from the needs both of China and corresponding Latin American capitals.

But if China’s position has long since become a fixture in the hemisphere, it is equally true that U.S. policymakers have been remarkably complacent over the years as the growing Chinese presence has necessarily impacted not only the region, but U.S. political, economic, and security interests. That needs to change.

China’s interest in Latin America is both economic and strategic. It was the accelerating Chinese economy’s voracious appetite for raw materials that keyed its entry to the region, a land of plenty when it comes to natural resources. Iron, soybeans, copper, and oil make up the bulk of Chinese imports from the region. In turn, securing access to Latin American markets for the export of Chinese manufactured products became a priority as well.

Economic Push

The numbers are staggering. China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and its bilateral trade with Latin America and the Caribbean has since skyrocketed, from $15 billion in 2001 to $288.9 billion in 2013 — an increase of almost 2000 percent. That number now represents 6 percent of China’s total foreign trade, an increase from 2.7 percent in 2000. (Some 13 percent of Latin America’s trade is now done with China, up from negligible levels in 2000.)

In the past decade, China’s two biggest development banks have provided $125 billion to Latin America — more than the combined total lending of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. China is now Latin America’s largest creditor. In addition, between 2000 and 2015, Chinese leaders visited the region more than 30 times.

Last November, Chinese President Xi Jinping made his third trip to the region since 2013, announcing a plan to double bilateral trade and to increase investment stock value by 150 percent over the next decade.

Not Just Economics

China also has significant geopolitical interests. It wants to project power and influence in an area long considered to be within the U.S. sphere of influence — no doubt a response to what Beijing considers U.S. efforts to contain and encircle China in Asia by cultivating allied and friendly governments.

Critical to China’s aspirations as a growing global power as well is what it calls global governance reform. In translation, that means Beijing uses its growing trade and financial might to challenge the architecture of the U.S.-dominated post-World War II order and alter it along lines more favorable to China. Beijing sees developing its own alliances through trade and loans as an important way to counterbalance U.S. influence and to secure support in multilateral forums on such important issues to Beijing as human rights, climate change, and economic governance.

It bears noting that China considers its principal regional economic and political interlocutor to be the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States, an organization established by the late Venezuelan firebrand Hugo Chavez that purposefully excludes the United States and Canada.

Finally, it is no coincidence that of the 22 countries that diplomatically recognize Taiwan, 12 are in Latin America and the Caribbean. China wants specifically to erode this support for Taipei. As a Chinese white paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 put it succinctly, “the One China principle is the political basis for the establishment and development of relations between China and Latin America.”

Changing Times

Chinese demand for commodities keyed its entry into the region and helped produce one of Latin America’s fastest periods of growth in decades, but the times are changing. Lackluster global economic growth and the cooling Chinese economy (which has contributed to the end of the global commodity boom) have resulted in a drop in Chinese imports from and exports to Latin America in recent years. Indeed, over the past year regional revenues from commodity exports to China dropped some 40 percent.

Latin America is also changing politically. China’s initial push into the Western Hemisphere was facilitated by the rise to power of a host of leftist populist governments — a phenomenon collectively referred to as the Pink Tide. Many leaders, foremost among them Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, were determined to distance themselves from the United States and from institutions perceived to be allied with Washington. These leaders were happy to align themselves with China, which adheres to a supposed policy of non-interference in countries’ internal affairs. That equally suited a number of Latin American governments, which proceeded to undermine democratic institutions and the rights of their citizens.

However, with the bust in oil prices and other commodities exposing the economic dysfunction of the populist model, frustrated voters are shifting their support to more pragmatic, market-friendly governments. These governments can be expected to operate in a more sober and transparent manner, and to be more respectful of democratic institutions, eschewing the opaque, behind-the-scenes deals that China previously thrived on. With less opportunity to present itself as the buyer or lender of last resort, China will find itself needing to adapt to a more challenging and competitive environment.

Beijing seems to be adjusting well: China’s evolving economic strategy is now one of diversification, with an emphasis less on traditional industries such as mining and energy extraction and more on sectors such as infrastructure (including energy, airports, seaports, and roads), construction, telecommunications, manufacturing, finance, agriculture, tourism, and even the space sector.

Implications for the United States

China’s authoritarianism, global designs, and disregard for international norms and practices raise serious questions about the impact of its engagement in the Western Hemisphere on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In recent congressional testimony, U.S. Southern Commander Adm. Kurt Tidd put it like this:

For Russia, China, and Iran, Latin America is not an afterthought. These global actors view the Latin American economic, political, and security arena as an opportunity to achieve their respective long-term objectives and advance interests that may be incompatible with ours and those of our partners. Their vision for an alternative international order poses a challenge to every nation that values non-aggression, rule of law, and respect for human rights — the very same principles that underlie the Inter-American system of peace and cooperation. Some of what they’re doing — while not a direct military threat — does warrant examination. Even seemingly benign activities can be used to build malign influence.

This was certainly evident in recent years, with China providing anti-American governments with an alternative source of trade, investment, and finance outside conventional institutions that ordinarily require some conditionalities on good governance, transparency, anti-corruption efforts, human rights, and the rule of law. In some cases, it didn’t create major problems. In others, such as Venezuela ($65 billion in Chinese loans) and Ecuador ($11 billion), Beijing bankrolled authoritarianism and human rights abuses, undercutting U.S. efforts to promote its policy agenda in the Americas and setting the stage for the chaos now underway in Venezuela.

Yet it is not as though the United States can block or impede Chinese trade and investment in the hemisphere. It is also important to keep things in perspective: U.S. trade with Latin America is still three times larger than China’s. Nor can China match our proximity, cultural and familial ties, and long shared history. The best response therefore to the Chinese presence in the Western Hemisphere is to do what the United States does best: compete.

The situation is best approached as a strategic competition in which the United States employs its comparative advantages and the above described strengths to secure its role as the preferred partner of choice for our Latin American neighbors. China may have the cash advantage, but it cannot compete with the United States in terms of the aforementioned, nor in the agreements shared throughout the Western Hemisphere on rules-based behavior, transparency, and a belief in economic opportunity, strong institutions, and the rule of law. The United States also boasts a 50-year record of promoting sustainable long-term regional development and humanitarian projects, a commitment to corporate social responsibility, and — not to put too fine a point on it — laws that prohibit bribery and other corrupt practices that often undermine the public’s faith in their systems.

This is in contrast to the Chinese presence, where cultural differences, radically divergent value systems, and different ways of doing business often impair mutual understanding and trust. China also has a poor record on human rights, anti-corruption practices, and environmental and labor conventions. (In many cases, Chinese construction companies import Chinese workers, spurring local resentments over lost employment opportunities.)

On the economic front, many economists worry that China’s demand for raw materials harkens back to Latin America’s bad old days of too much dependence on commodity exports. Neither do they see purchasing Chinese manufactured goods in return as being conducive to long-term development. Again, in contrast, the United States provides meaningful value-added, job-creating investment in the region while purchasing the sort of manufactured goods that generate more jobs.

Game On

Whatever professions of a win-win economic situation for all, or of China’s benign intent, China’s position in Latin America affects the U.S. agenda and regional stability — and Beijing has the resources and motivation needed to adapt to changing circumstances and to remain such a regional fixture for the foreseeable future. That is why U.S. complacency is not an option. Competition need not be hostile, just determined. In particular, the Trump administration has an excellent opportunity to press the U.S. advantage by drawing closer to regional heavyweights Brazil and Argentina, who are attempting to shake off the legacies of years of statist economics. These are countries where China has been particularly active. Each now has a market-friendly president desperate to produce economic growth and draw foreign investment.

A reinvigorated U.S. engagement with the hemisphere will reap significant benefits for the U.S. economy. It will create new investment opportunities, including in the energy sector, but it will also drive up the cost of doing business for Beijing. That China continues to expand its presence in other regions such as Asia and Africa is one thing, but encroaching in our own neighborhood more directly impacts the U.S. national interest. It’s time for America to pay closer attention.

Think Tank Predicted Russian Cyberwar v. United States

Posted on May 3, 2017May 3, 2017 by Denise Simon

Washington, D.C., May 3, 2017 – A Rand Corporation 1967 paper predicted many of the cyber dilemmas faced by policy makers today, and a 2017 expanded analysis of the “GRIZZLY STEPPE” hacking by Russian cyber operators disclosed key findings about the techniques the hackers used and ways to mitigate them, according to the National Security Archive publication today of 40+ highlighted primary sources from the critically-praised “Cyber Vault” at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/cybervault.

Compiled and edited by noted intelligence historian Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, the Cyber Vault collection of primary sources is growing by a dozen or more documents every week, and includes the declassified briefings provided by the National Security Agency to the George W. Bush and Barack Obama transition teams in 2000 and 2009, respectively. The collection also includes a 2016 order from the U.S. Cyber Command to set up a unit with the mission of debilitating and destroying computer and communications operations of the terrorist group ISIS.

The Cyber Vault team obtained the 2016 order under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The project has filed scores of other FOIA and declassification requests as part of a multi-year documentation contribution to the growing field of cyber studies, with the support of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

The 2000 transition briefing explicitly foreshadowed the Edward Snowden controversy, warning the new White House team that the 4th Amendment-protected communications of Americans were inextricably mixed with those of foreigners on the Internet. The 2016 U.S. Cyber Command order established a joint task force designed to bring the resources of the Defense Department, Intelligence Community, and Justice Department to bear against the terrorist group that the Trump administration has since designated its top foreign policy priority.

Cyber Vault Highlights

By Jeffrey T. Richelson

On March 30, 2016, the National Security Archive opened its Cyber Vault, a repository of documents on all aspects of cyber activity – including computer network defense (and other other aspects of cybersecurity), computer network attack, and computer network exploitation. The more than 750 documents currently in the vault have been drawn from a variety of sources – Freedom of Information Act releases, websites of both U.S. federal and state government organizations, courts, foreign government organizations, NATO, government contractors, think-tanks, advocacy groups, and media websites (including Wikileaks and those that posted documents provided by Edward Snowden).

In addition to relying on a multitude of sources to populate the Cyber Vault, the Archive has sought to accumulate a diverse set of documents – which has guided its collection strategy. As a result, the Cyber Vault includes significant documents from the 1960s and each subsequent decade, on cyber organization, on policy and strategy, on domestic and foreign cyber activities, on cybersecurity requirements, and on cyber crimes and the related investigations. Also included are intelligence assessments and theses. The documents also represent a spectrum of classifications, from unclassified, to formerly classified, and – in the cases of Wikileaks and Snowden documents – currently classified documents. Many of the documents cut across a number of categories.

Among the documents represented from the 1960s and 1970s are two seminal papers. One is Willis Ware’s 1967 effort, Secrecy and Privacy in Computer Systems (Document 1), written for the RAND Corporation, and one of the very first systematic approaches to information leakage, security, and privacy. The other (Document 2), produced by a staff member of Britain’s signals intelligence agency, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), represents the initial development of public key cryptography – although it was not declassified until years after the concept had been made public by American mathematicians.

That document is also one of several illustrating or concerning foreign government cyber efforts. A much more recent GCHQ product (Document 29) was one of the documents provided to Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras by Edward Snowden – a briefing on efforts to deanonymize users of The Onion Router (TOR) network, which had been developed by members of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (Document 32) as a means of protecting online communications. Chinese cyber organization, policy, and operations are covered, collectively, by two documents – an unclassified paper (Document 36) produced under the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and a Top Secret codeword NSA briefing (Document 24) on the People Republic of China’s computer network exploitation activity. Current Russian cyber activities are discussed in an extract (Document 35) from the controversial “Trump Dossier,” written by a former British Secret Intelligence Service officer.

Other documents concern hostile cyber activities from an earlier era. One, from 1998 (Document 12) provides information to the then director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, concerning the SOLAR SUNRISE investigation concerning intrusions into at least 11 unclassified DoD Computer systems at various locations in the United States. Another FBI memo (Document 13), concerns a 1999 investigation into intrusions into computer systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, and Germany – an investigation which took some of the investigators to Moscow. In a newly released portion, it discusses possible response to intrusions – including the creation of “honeypots” containing “beacon” files.

In addition to being the victim of intrusions, the U.S. has also debated and formulated policy, granted authority over, and conducted intrusions in pursuit of national security objectives. In March 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen assigned the responsibility for computer network attack and exploitation to the National Security Agency in a short memo (Document 10). During that Spring a senior NSA official addressed the issue of cyberwar in a Secret article (Document 11) in a NSA journal. Many years later, according to a number of accounts, U.S. and Israeli cyber personnel were able to penetrate industrial control systems associated with the Iranian nuclear program and damage centrifuges that could produce weapons-grade material. While there have been no publicly released executive branch documents concerning the “Stuxnet” operation, it has been the subject of reports by RAND and the Congressional Research Service. (Document 26).

Concern over possible Russian intrusion into U.S. computer systems related to elections became a significant subject of discussion in the 2016 presidential election. Apprehensions over the possibility of such intrusions go back at least a decade. A December 2007 report (Document 20) was commissioned by Ohio’s Secretary of State, and contained disturbing results about the vulnerability of Ohio’s electronic voting systems. In the wake of a poorly-received, brief analysis of alleged Russian cyber activity related to the 2016 election, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center produced more detailed examination (Document 41) of the GRIZZLY STEPPE activity.

By the time the DHS report was issued, President Trump had been presented with a draft executive order on cybersecurity (Document 40 ), which would undoubtedly have been the first of a significant number of presidential actions on cybersecurity – just as President Obama had signed a number of cyber-related executive orders and presidential directives, including one (Document 34) that established a Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. Ultimately, the Trump draft order became the first in a series of drafts, and no order has yet been signed.