Jerusalem

Posted on November 29, 2014November 29, 2014 by Denise Simon

While the talks over Iran’s nuclear program have failed, negotiations have now been extended by seven more months. Eyes have now been turned back to the peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Votes are flying, time limits are being attached and secret back-channel negotiations are no longer secret. Israel is failing to sell their position globally especially to the United Nations and to Europe. Allies of Israel, especially the United States are also working to make a deal to the detriment of the 1967 borders.

PARIS — France’s foreign minister Friday urged the international community to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within two years, as the French parliament debated whether to recognize a Palestinian state.

“At the United Nations, we are working with our partners to adopt a Security Council resolution to relaunch and conclude talks. A deadline of two years is the one most often mentioned and the French government can agree with this figure,” Laurent Fabius told MPs

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The Secret Back Channel That Doomed the Israel-Palestine Negotiations

By Amir Tibon

The latest wave of violence in the Holy Land has prompted influential centrist voices in Israel—including former intelligence chiefs and army generals—to call for new peace talks with the Palestinian Authority. But those calling for the revival of the eternal “peace process” admit that the most recent effort, which failed miserably earlier this year, offers some harsh lessons. Since the collapse of talks back in April, many have analyzed why Secretary of State John Kerry fell short of reaching any kind of agreement. One critical fact, however, has been kept hidden until now: a secret communication channel between the private attorney of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a confidante of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

The secret channel—reported here for the first time—created substantial progress toward an agreement. But it also had one fundamental flaw, which contributed to the collapse of Kerry’s entire process. Abbas’s supposed representative was in fact holding these talks without a real mandate from the Palestinian President; the concessions he discussed with Molho didn’t represent the President’s views. Parts of this story remain unsolved—most importantly, why this lack of a mandate was missed or ignored in real time. But what can be told is enough to raise some hard questions about Kerry’s effort, and offer important lessons for future attempts at reaching an agreement.

In 2010, Yitzhak (Itzik) Molho, Netanyahu’s attorney and his point man for negotiations with the Palestinians, began to hold secret talks with a person considered very close to Abbas. The New Republic has decided not to publish the identity of this person out of concern for this individual’s security. Peace process veteran Dennis Ross—at the time a special foreign policy adviser to President Obama—was brought into the discussions as well.

Since their first meeting in 2010, Molho and Abbas’s confidante focused on finding common ground—a basis for final status negotiations that both Abbas and Netanyahu could tolerate. Back then, they came up with a formula in which Israel would accept the 1967 borders (with land swaps that would allow it to annex some large “settlement blocs”). In return, the Palestinians would show flexibility regarding Netanyahu’s insistence on recognizing Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people (while clarifying that such recognition would not abridge the rights of Israel’s Arab citizens). This formula, which was discussed but not concluded or agreed upon, included a huge concession from each side—Netanyahu’s representative accepting the same borders Bibi had spent decades rallying against, and Abbas’s supposed representative coming to terms with an Israeli demand that the Palestinian president had rejected time after time, on every possible stage.

Ross tried to make these conversations more prominent with the Obama administration back in 2011, but met with little success. One source in the administration said that except for former national security adviser Tom Donilon, no one was truly interested in this backchannel at the time. Washington wasn’t the only city where the secret channel didn’t incite much excitement. Neither Netanyahu in Jerusalem nor Abbas in Ramallah gave any public sign of accepting the proposed formula. As it became clear no one was interested in their work, Molho and his counterpart reduced the frequency of their meetings.

Things changed in the spring of 2013, when Kerry began a serious push for new peace talks, visiting Jerusalem and Ramallah five times between March and July. As Kerry was laying the ground for an official negotiating track, Molho and his counterpart also renewed their backchannel, with Molho flying in and out of a European capital where the two would meet every few weeks.

Ross had officially quit the Obama administration late in 2011, but he remained involved in talks long after his resignation—even after Secretary Kerry appointed former ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk as his envoy to the official peace talks in July of 2013. Ross had no official mandate when the talks resumed in 2013, but used his personal relationships with Molho, Indyk, and Kerry to weigh influence.

In the early months of the Kerry talks, the official track, led by Indyk, stalled. As Ben Birnbaum and I detailed last summer, arguments, shouting matches, and other distractions dominated the negotiations during this period. Molho, who in addition to pursuing this backchannel was also representing Netanyahu in the official talks, showed little interest in what was being discussed there. His Israeli negotiating partner, Justice Minister Tzipi Livni, and the official Palestinian negotiators, Saeb Erekat and Mohammed Shtayyeh, all expressed frustration over his behavior. “It was clear he thought this wasn’t where the important things were happening,” says a source involved in the talks.

Important things were happening, however, in the secret channel. Molho and his counterpart were busy reconstructing their understanding from 2010, and transforming it into an outline of the terms for serious final status negotiations. Building from the Israeli acceptance of the 1967 borders (with land swaps) and Palestinian flexibility on the “nation state of the Jewish people” (with equal rights for Arab citizens) demand, additional components were added. Molho and Abbas’s confidante discussed the Palestinian refugee problem in depth, and were close to finding a creative wording they thought both sides could accept. On the explosive issue of Jerusalem, the two couldn’t reach an understanding, thus postponing the discussion for later stages of the negotiations.

Kerry, Indyk, and Livni were all aware of the secret channel, and briefed regularly on progress. But Israeli officials believed that the official Palestinian negotiators had no idea about the backchannel. By December 2013, when Molho and his counterpart were finalizing their talks and working on a dramatic understanding that summed up everything they had discussed, a larger problem emerged: The Israelis began to realize that it wasn’t clear if Molho’s counterpart was truly negotiating on behalf of President Abbas.

Late that month, one of Israel’s top newspaper columnists, Nahum Barnea, reported that during Netanyahu’s prior term in office (2009–2012), Molho had a “secret Palestinian contact” with whom he exchanged messages between Abbas and Netanyahu. Barnea didn’t report on the fact that this channel was still active and important—at least in the eyes of senior people in Israel and the U.S.—but the essence of his report was correct. Netanyahu’s office refused to comment, but Abbas was quick to reply, saying in an interview that “there is no secret channel with Netanyahu, and never was one.” He added that the official negotiations led by Indyk are “the only channel of communication I have with Netanyahu.”

On the Israeli side, an argument erupted over the meaning of Abbas’s statement. Some officials started voicing concerns that Abbas truly had no idea about the state of the backchannel talks, or that he knew about them but didn’t consider them to be important. This concern was also shared by senior American officials, including Indyk, who had thought for some time that Abbas and Netanyahu did not see the backchannel in the same light. A Palestinian official close to Abbas claims that, from their very first day back in 2010, the Palestinian president had no interest in these talks: “He never took these talks with Molho seriously.”

The extent of Abbas’s detachment from the secret-channel’s product became clear in early 2014, when Kerry decided to merge the two negotiation tracks. The understanding that had developed through the secret channel was spilled into the discussions that Indyk’s team was holding with both sides over a “framework document.” Netanyahu was willing to work with the fruits of the secret channel (although he insisted on airing his reservations, and the negotiations his advisers held with Indyk over the exact wording were endless). But Abbas completely rejected what had already, supposedly, been accepted by his own negotiator. He wasn’t willing to show any flexibility on the Jewish state issue, and the idea of excluding any clear reference to a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem seemed like political suicide.

The anger Abbas expressed at the American framework caught Kerry by surprise: After all, these were all ideas his supposed negotiator was discussing with Molho. Realizing he had a problem with Abbas, Kerry tried to convince Netanyahu to tilt some of the provisions in Abbas’s direction. But the Israeli Prime Minister was not having it. “We already agreed on these issues in the secret channel,” he told the Secretary, according to a former senior U.S. official. “Bibi is angry at Kerry for opening up understandings that everybody considered a done deal, just because Abbas had changed his mind,” an Israeli Minister told me in February. But a Palestinian official rebuffed this criticism, saying that Abbas never changed his mind on anything: “He was presented with positions that no Palestinian leader could ever accept, and that he personally had spoken out against many times.”

For some, it was always clear that the positions presented by the supposed “Palestinian negotiator” in this secret channel were totally unacceptable for Abbas. Officials involved in the process admit in retrospect that there was too much wishful thinking regarding the backchannel.

A major reason for the skepticism of some people involved in the negotiations toward this backchannel, had to do with Abbas’s ostensible confidante. A number of Israeli, American, and Palestinian officials claimed that it was a miscalculation to assume this person would have authority to make concessions on delicate issues. One senior Palestinian official told me that those in the American and Israeli camps who thought otherwise were “fools.”

If Abbas really was unaware of, or not totally committed to, the backchannel negotiations, what was his “representative” telling Molho? And why did Kerry and Netanyahu treat this channel so seriously, if they had no proof that Abbas had any interest in the proceedings? Perhaps Netanyahu understood that Abbas didn’t know or didn’t care about the backchannel, but decided to keep it going, hoping to bring the negotiations to a point where he could say: “We were willing to make historical concessions, but have found out that we have no partner.” This could explain why some senior Obama administration officials have lately been saying that Netanyahu misled Kerry during the negotiations.

Then again, perhaps Abbas did know what was going on with Molho, but regretted it midway. There is historical precedent for this scenario: In 1993, Abbas held secret negotiations with Israel’s then–Deputy Foreign Minister, Yossi Beilin. The negotiations gave birth to the “Beilin–Abu Mazen Understandings,” the first-ever draft of a final status agreement. But when the document was leaked to the press, Abbas tried to distance himself from it and to minimize its importance. Some Israeli officials believe something similar happened in the last round of negotiations—that after extracting territorial concessions from Israel, Abbas backtracked on any concessions from his side. (The irony of this claim is that Netanyahu had also retreated from the positions presented by Molho in the secret channel, first by insisting on having reservations and later by going back to hardliner positions in the recent months.)

Both scenarios could serve some beautifully written conspiracy theories, but the truth could very well be much simpler: that this blunder was just a terrible misunderstanding. Perhaps what the Israelis considered a serious backchannel, the Palestinians—including their man in the room—saw as merely an unofficial exchange of ideas. Only two people can really solve the mystery, Yitzhak Molho and his negotiating counterpart. Both of them refused to comment.

Ayatollah Rebukes Kerry on Nuclear Talks

Posted on November 28, 2014November 28, 2014 by Denise Simon

The New York Times reported that Khamenei posted a statement on his personal website attacking America but approving of the decision to continue negotiations with world leaders on his country’s nuclear program.

“I do not disagree with the extension of the negotiations, as I have not disagreed with negotiations in the first place,” the ayatollah said in speech published on Khamenei.ir.

Western negotiators – the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1) – and Iran failed to meet the second deadline for a comprehensive nuclear agreement on Monday, announcing an extension of talks that started last year.

During that time, the parties have operated under an interim agreement that has limited Iran’s production of enriched uranium, imposed stricter international inspections of the current nuclear program and stopped the country from firing up unused centrifuges. In exchange, the United States and European Union have scaled back sanctions on Iran and released portions of frozen assets.

“America is a chameleon, and every day makes new statements,” he said in comments that were to be delivered to an audience of paramilitary Basij forces, according to his website, Khamenei.ir. “It also says different things in public and in private.”

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in his first response to the extension of talks over the country’s nuclear program, said world powers have failed to humiliate the Islamic Republic.

“The U.S. and all the European colonialist countries gathered together and tried everything to bring the Islamic Republic of Iran to its knees, but they couldn’t and they never will,” Khamenei said today, according to state-run media.

Diplomats from Iran and the so-called P5+1 group — the U.S., Germany, France, the U.K., Russia and China — gave themselves until March to come up with a political framework and July to spell out technical steps needed for a final accord.

Where does this leave John Kerry and his reputation in Washington for failing to get a deal?

But after having preached patience for a long time, Kerry, the designated defender of the talks, is coming under increasing pressure to deliver an agreement or give up.

Although he has never said a deal with Iran would be easy, Kerry has sometimes raised expectations—as he did in September of last year, when he told “60 Minutes” that a nuclear deal might be reached in less than three to six months.

That was fourteen months ago.

In comments from Vienna Monday, Kerry dangled new hope that a long-term nuclear agreement is close at hand. “[I]n these last days in Vienna, we have made real and substantial progress, and we have seen new ideas surface,” Kerry said, expressing hope that a broad framework could be completed in just four more months.

But administration allies are beginning to worry that Kerry is chasing an ever-moving rainbow’s end.

Shortly after the announcement of the deadline extension, GOP Senate foreign policy figures John McCain, Lindsey Graham and Kelly Ayotte in a joint statement said, “We believe this latest extension of talks should be coupled with increased sanctions and a requirement that any final deal between Iran and the United States be sent to Congress for approval.”

Interestingly, the presidential waiver authorities that are included in the relevant acts have been ratified by the Congress, yet now that Obama is likely to use them, fierce Congressional opposition has emerged.

Under the Joint Plan of Action agreed between Iran and the P5+1, the US should refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. In January, Obama explicitly threatened a veto on any new Iran sanction bill. Any new sanction bill would be considered as a violation of the JPOA on the part of the United States.

Fading List to Replace Hagel

Posted on November 28, 2014November 28, 2014 by Denise Simon

SecDef Chuck Hagel has an on camera reputation of being slow and lagging in control. But more that comes out since his termination that tells us otherwise. The position of Secretary of Defense is the least sought position in the Obama administration due in part to two wars, the Guantanamo detainee release program and most of all the shrinking budget for defense.

Politico explains why no one wants the job. Then there is the matter of releasing more detainees from Gitmo which is under the full authority of the Pentagon, and Hagel fought back hard under pressure from the White House to apply his signature for releases. More detainees are slated for release, trade or transfer.

Deputy Defense Secretary Work flew to Afghanistan to spend Thanksgiving with the troops and for meetings on the matter of recent Taliban attacks on ISAF. It was only yesterday that the Taliban attacked a NATO base. Matters in Afghanistan are sliding south and the Pentagon officials went to the White House demanding immediate action to prevent a rise in the Taliban and al Qaeda. Simply put a military leadership revolt occurred a few weeks ago such that Obama finally got the message and secretly approved an extended operation in Afghanistan including more aggressive operations.

Sequestration is the biggest threat to protecting national security at home and globally. If sequestration continues, Hagel said last week when he presented his “Strategic Choices and Management Review,” DOD might try to end civilian pensions for retired military troops who work for DOD, or cut unemployment payments.

Carter said changes in pensions, health care and other benefits would likely be grandfathered. Still, a $100 million dollar cut would do damage to DOD and its personnel that officials currently can’t calculate.

The Daesh containment strategy which is to manage the terror group to Iraq and Syria has already failed as Islamic State has moved into North Africa and Libya has fallen.

Little support and attention has been paid to NATO, Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States except to throw money at building defenses. President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel pledged to defend the continent and announced $1 billion in additional military measures aimed at deterring Russia. They also pleaded with NATO members to use their bully pulpits to convince their governments to boost defense spending. U.S. leaders promised that America would fulfill its obligations to protect Europe and urged other NATO members to do to the same. Obama cited the U.S. Article 5 commitment to Poland – referring to the portion of the NATO charter which states that a threat against one nation is a threat against all. “As president, I’ve made sure that the United States is upholding that commitment.”

So who will approve staying on the list to replace SefDef Hagel? There are rumors that include Colin Powel and Tom Donilon, beyond that others are being considered. None of them frankly will have the military in their best interest and national security will likely continue to suffer.

Obama proposed his Pentagon budget for 2015 and it is less than 2014 while the global threat matrix increases. Another matter of great importance is keeping pace of the higher quality, readiness and assets of adversaries of the United States, those countries like China and Russia who are both jointly cooperating in military advancements.

The Irony of Ferguson

Posted on November 26, 2014November 26, 2014 by Denise Simon

In recent days we have watched terrorists in Ferguson burn the town, many of whom were not even from Missouri. Protests in solidarity for Justice for Michael Brown are occurring in cities across the nation including Oakland, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Boston and Atlanta.

The protests in Ferguson burned their own community over the Grand Jury decision not to indict Officer Daren Wilson. What is left of Ferguson and what will the future be? Furthermore, testimony and scientific forensic evidence spelled out without dispute that Michael Brown never put his hand in the air, the signature of submission to police orders. If he had, he would clearly be alive today.

The Ferguson Fraud

The bitter irony of the Michael Brown case is that if he had actually put his hands up and said don’t shoot, he would almost certainly be alive today. His family would have been spared an unspeakable loss, and Ferguson, Missouri wouldn’t have experienced multiple bouts of rioting, including the torching of at least a dozen businesses the night it was announced that Officer Darren Wilson wouldn’t be charged with a crime.

Instead, the credible evidence (i.e., the testimony that doesn’t contradict itself or the physical evidence) suggests that Michael Brown had no interest in surrendering. After committing an act of petty robbery at a local business, he attacked Officer Wilson when he stopped him on the street. Brown punched Wilson when the officer was still in his patrol car and attempted to take his gun from him.

The first shots were fired within the car in the struggle over the gun. Then, Michael Brown ran. Even if he hadn’t put his hands up, but merely kept running away, he would also almost certainly be alive today. Again, according to the credible evidence, he turned back and rushed Wilson. The officer shot several times, but Brown kept on coming until Wilson killed him.

This is a terrible tragedy. It isn’t a metaphor for police brutality or race repression or anything else, and never was. Aided and abetted by a compliant national media, the Ferguson protestors spun a dishonest or misinformed version of what happened—Michael Brown murdered in cold blood while trying to give up—into a chant (“hands up, don’t shoot”) and then a mini-movement.

When the facts didn’t back their narrative, they dismissed the facts and retreated into paranoid suspicion of the legal system. It apparently required more intellectual effort than almost any liberal could muster even to say, “You know, I believe policing in America is deeply unjust, but in this case the evidence is murky and not enough to indict, let alone convict anyone of a crime.”

They preferred to charge that the grand jury process was rigged, because St. Louis County prosecutor Robert McCulloch didn’t seek an indictment of Wilson and allowed the grand jury to hear all the evidence and make its own decision. This, Chris Hayes of MSNBC deemed so removed from normal procedure that it’s unrecognizable.

It’s unusual, yes, but not unheard of for prosecutors to present a case to a grand jury without a recommendation to indict. Regardless, who could really object to a grand jury hearing everything in such a sensitive case? If any of the evidence were excluded that, surely, would have been the basis of other howls of an intolerably stacked deck.

It’s a further travesty, according to the Left, that Officer Wilson was allowed to testify to the grand jury. Never mind that it is standard operating procedure. As former prosecutor Andrew McCarthy points out, guilty parties usually don’t testify because they have to do it without their lawyer present and anything they say can be used against them.

It is also alleged that the prosecutor McCulloch is biased because his father was a cop who was killed by a criminal. Follow this argument though to its logical conclusion and McCulloch would be unable to handle almost all cases, because of his engrained bias against criminality.

Finally, there is the argument that Wilson should have been indicted so there could be a trial “to determine the facts.” Realistically, if a jury of Wilson’s peers didn’t believe there was enough evidence to establish probable cause to indict him, there was no way a jury of his peers was going to convict him of a crime, which requires the more stringent standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

Besides, we don’t try people for crimes they almost certainly didn’t commit just to satisfy a mob that will throw things at the police and burn down local businesses if it doesn’t get its way. If the grand jury had given into the pressure from the streets and indicted as an act of appeasement, the mayhem most likely would have only been delayed until the inevitable acquittal in a trial.

The agitators of Ferguson have proven themselves proficient at destroying other people’s property, no matter what the rationale. This summer, they rioted when the police response was “militarized” and rioted when the police response was un-militarized. Local businesses like the beauty-supply shops Beauty Town (hit repeatedly) and Beauty World (burned on Monday night) have been targeted for the offense of existing, not to mention employing people and serving customers.

Liberal commentators come back again and again to the fact that Michael Brown was unarmed and that, in the struggle between the two, Officer Wilson only sustained bruises to his face, or what Josh Marshall of Talking Points Memo calls an “irritated cheek.” The subtext is that if only Wilson had allowed Brown to beat him up and perhaps take his gun, things wouldn’t have had to escalate.

There is good reason for a police officer to be in mortal fear in the situation Officer Wilson faced, though. In upstate New York last March, a police officer responded to a disturbance call at an office, when suddenly a disturbed man pummeled the officer as he was attempting to exit his vehicle and then grabbed his gun and shot him dead. The case didn’t become a national metaphor for anything.

Ferguson, on the other hand, has never lacked for media coverage, although the narrative of a police execution always seemed dubious and now has been exposed as essentially a fraud. “Hands up, don’t shoot” is a good slogan. If only it was what Michael Brown had done last August.

Circa 1607, the Tradition of Thanksgiving

Posted on November 26, 2014November 26, 2014 by Denise Simon

David Barton – 11/2002

Thanksgiving in AmericaThe tradition of Thanksgiving as a time to focus on God and His blessings dates back almost four centuries in America. While such celebrations occurred at Cape Henry Virginia as early as 1607,[1] it is from the Pilgrims that we derive the current tradition of Thanksgiving.

The Pilgrims set sail for America on September 6, 1620, and for two months braved the harsh elements of a storm-tossed sea. After disembarking at Plymouth Rock, they had a prayer service and began building hasty shelters, but unprepared for a harsh New England winter, nearly half died before spring.[2]

Yet, persevering in prayer, and assisted by helpful Indians,[3] they reaped a bountiful harvest the following summer.[4] The grateful Pilgrims then declared a three-day feast in December 1621 to thank God and to celebrate with their Indian friends[5] America’s first Thanksgiving Festival. This began an annual tradition in the New England Colonies that slowly spread into other Colonies.[6]

The first national Thanksgiving occurred in 1789. According to the Congressional Record for September 25 of that year, immediately after approving the Bill of Rights:

Mr. [Elias] Boudinot said he could not think of letting the [congressional] session pass without offering an opportunity to all the citizens of the United States of joining with one voice in returning to Almighty God their sincere thanks for the many blessings He had poured down upon them. With this view, therefore, he would move the following resolution:

Resolved, That a joint committee of both Houses be directed to wait upon the President of the United States to request that he would recommend to the people of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer. . . .

Mr. Roger Sherman justified the practice of thanksgiving, on any single event, not only as a laudable one in itself but also as warranted by a number of precedents in Holy Writ. . . . This example he thought worthy of a Christian imitation on the present occasion.[7]

The resolution was delivered to President George Washington, who heartily concurred with the congressional request, declaring:

Whereas it is the duty of all nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey His will, to be grateful for His benefits, and humbly to implore His protection and favor. . . . Now, therefore, I do appoint Thursday, the 26th day of November 1789 . . . that we may all unite to render unto Him our sincere and humble thanks for His kind care and protection.[8]

National Thanksgiving Proclamations occurred sporadically following this one,[9] and most official Thanksgiving observances still occurred only at the State level. Much of the credit for the adoption of an annual national Thanksgiving may be attributed to Mrs. Sarah Josepha Hale, the editor of Godey’s Lady’s Book. For over twenty years, she promoted the idea of a national Thanksgiving Day,[10] contacting President after President until Abraham Lincoln responded in 1863 by setting aside the last Thursday of November, declaring:

We are prone to forget the Source from which [the blessings of fruitful years and healthful skies] come. . . . No human counsel hath devised nor hath any mortal hand worked out these great things. They are the gracious gifts of the Most High God. . . . I do, therefore invite my fellow-citizens in every part of the United States . . . to observe the last Thursday of November next as a day of thanksgiving and praise to our beneficent Father Who dwelleth in the heavens.[11]

For the next seventy-five years, Presidents followed LincolnÌs precedent, annually declaring a national Thanksgiving Day. Then, in 1941, Congress permanently established the fourth Thursday of each November as a national holiday.[12]

As you celebrate the Thanksgiving holiday this year, remember to retain the original gratefulness to God that has always been the spirit of this, the oldest of all American holidays.

It is also recommended that during this Thanksgiving weekend of celebration, that some time to watch the movie ‘America’. Click here it is always streaming.

[Congress] recommended [a day of] . . . thanksgiving and praise [so] that the good people may express the grateful feelings of their hearts and join . . . their supplication that it may please God, through the merits of Jesus Christ to forgive [our sins] and . . .to enlarge [His] kingdom which consisteth in righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. (Continental Congress, 1777 – Written by Signers of the Declaration Samuel Adams and Richard Henry Lee)[13]

[I] appoint . . . a day of public Thanksgiving to Almighty God. . . to [ask] Him that He would . . . pour out His Holy Spirit on all ministers of the Gospel; that He would . . . spread the light of Christian knowledge through the remotest corners of the earth; . . . and that He would establish these United States upon the basis of religion and virtue. (Governor Thomas Jefferson, 1779)[14]

. appoint . . . a day of public thanksgiving and praise . . . to render to God the tribute of praise for His unmerited goodness towards us . . . [by giving to] us . . . the Holy Scriptures which are able to enlighten and make us wise to eternal salvation. And [to] present our supplications…that He would forgive our manifold sins and . . . cause the benign religion of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ to be known, understood, and practiced among all the inhabitants of the earth. (Governor John Hancock, 1790)[15]

[1] Benson Lossing, Our Country. A Household History of the United States (New York: James A. Bailey, 1895), Vol. 1, pp. 181-182; see also National Park Service, “Robert Hunt: Jamestown’s First Chaplain” (at http://www.nps.gov/archive/colo/Jthanout/RHunt.html).

[2] William Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1856), pp. 74, 78, 80, 91.

[3] William Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1856), p. 100.

[4] William Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1856), p. 105.

[5] Ashbel Steele, Chief of the Pilgrims: Or the Life and Time of William Brewster (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co, 1857), pp. 269-270.

[6] William DeLoss Love, Jr, The Fast and Thanksgiving Days of New England (Boston: Houghton,, Mifflin & Co, 1895), pp. 87-90.

[7] The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United State (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1834), Vol. I, pp. 949-950.

[8]George Washington, Writings of George Washington, Jared Sparks, editor (Boston: Russell, Odiorne and Metcalf, 1838), Vol. XII, p. 119, Proclamation for a National Thanksgiving on October 3, 1789.

[9] See, for example: H.S.J. Sickel, Thanksgiving: Its Source, Philosophy and History With All National Proclamations (Philadelphia: International Printing Co, 1940), pp. 154-155, “Thanksgiving Day- 1795” by George Washington, pp. 156-157, “Thanksgiving Day -1798” by John Adams, pp. 158-159, “Thanksgiving Day-1799” by John Adams, p. 160, “Thanksgiving Day- 1814” by James Madison, p. 161, “Thanksgiving Day-1815” by James Madison.

[10] Appleton’s Cyclopedia of American Biography, James Grant Wilson & John Fiske, editors (New York: D. Appleton & Co, 1888), Vol. III, p. 35.

[11] The Works of Abraham Lincoln, John H. Clifford & Marion M. Miller, editors (New York: University Society Inc, 1908), Vol. VI, pp. 160-161, Proclamation for Thanksgiving, October 3, 1863, The American Presidency Project, “Abraham Lincoln: Proclamation- Thanksgiving Day, 1863” (at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=69900&st=&st1=)

[12] The National Archives, “Congress Establishes Thanksgiving” (at http://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/thanksgiving/); see also Pilgrim Hall Museum, “Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations 1940-1949: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman” (at http://www.pilgrimhall.org/ThanxProc1940.htm), Proclamation 2571: Days of Prayer: Thanksgiving Day and New YearÌs Day, November 11, 1942, referring to a Ïjoint resolution of Congress approved December 26, 1941, which designates the fourth Thursday in November of each year as Thanksgiving Day.

[13]Journals of the Continental Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), Vol. IX, p. 855, November 1, 1777.

[14] The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd, editor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), Vol. 3, p. 178, Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and Prayer, November 11, 1779.

[15] John Hancock: Proclamation for a Day of Public Thanksgiving (Boston, 1790), from an original in possession of the author.