ISIS moving into Tunisia and the Indo-Asia-Pacific

This is precisely how the civil war in Syria began, with a protest. And so much for that Obama Asia pivot.

Escalating Protests Threaten Instability in Tunisia

AEI: Key Takeaway: Economic protests resembling those that sparked the 2010 Jasmine Revolution are spreading throughout Tunisia and may grow into nationwide civil unrest. The protests may escalate if security forces respond with violence or officials prove unwilling or unable to meet protestors’ demands. Widespread civil unrest provides an opportunity for Salafi-jihadi groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda, to attack government or economic targets and further destabilize the Tunisian state.

The Situation as of September 15, 2016

Major economic protests began in two Tunisian cities on September 5 and September 7.

  • Protestors blocked roads and burned a business in the town of Ben Guerdane on September 5 after Tunisian security forces shot dead a suspected smuggler. Ben Guerdane is located on the Mediterranean coastline near the Libyan border. Its economy depends on smuggling. Trade unions plan to strike in Ben Guerdane on September 21 to protest administrative gridlock.
  • A café owner set himself on fire in Fernana, a town in northwestern Tunisia, on September 7 after being denied a request to negotiate a fine. Protestors responded by burning tires, closing a major road, striking, calling for the resignation of local officials, and attempting to disrupt the water supply to Tunisia’s capital. Demonstrations intensified on September 11 after the café owner succumbed to his injuries. Additional security forces deployed to Fernana on September 12. Protestors released a series of demands, including calls for anti-corruption measures, an industrial zone, and improved public health and energy infrastructure on September 13. Demonstrations quieted on September 15, but government buildings and schools remain closed.

Protests are spreading to other cities in Tunisia in a manner that resembles the beginning of the 2010 Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia that overthrew the Zine el Abidine Ben Ali regime.

  • Labor union members marched in Makthar, western Tunisia on September 13 to protest overdue development projects. Demonstrators demanded the removal of a corrupt official in El Mida, a town on Tunisia’s northeastern coast, on September 14. National Guard officers intervened to protect the official. Teachers and professors marched in Beja, north central Tunisia and Tozeur, southwestern Tunisia on September 14 to demand the implementation of a labor agreement and development plans. A farm worker in Reguib, central Tunisia attempted to self-immolate after a dispute with a local official on September 15.
  • These protests resemble the wave of civil unrest triggered by the self-immolation of Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in late 2010 that ousted longtime Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali. The Jasmine Revolution sparked the Arab Spring.

The Tunisian government is attempting to respond to protestors’ demands, but its response may be insufficient.

  • Tunisian authorities had promised on September 12 to send a ministerial delegation to Fernana to hear protestors’ grievances. Local activists reported on September 14 that the promised delegation never arrived. A regional council is now set to convene to discuss Fernana’s development on September 18. The Tunisian Ministry of Industry and Trade announced plans to develop a free-trade zone in Ben Guerdane on September 13, possibly in an effort to placate protestors.
  • The Tunisian public’s expectations that life would improve after the 2010 Jasmine Revolution have not been met. Continued economic failure and successive corruption scandals underpin widespread discontent with the government, especially in marginalized regions, where the unemployment rate hovers around 30 percent. Clashes between security forces and local residents, as well as corruption, drive popular resentment against the police.

 

Context

Tunisia’s new unity government is vulnerable to economic and political backlash.

  • Newly appointed Prime Minister Youssef Chahed is preparing to announce austerity measures that will include new taxes and limits on public sector jobs. Parliament ousted former Prime Minister Habib Essid for his failure to resolve the country’s economic and security challenges. Chahed’s government faces the same challenges, as well as allegations of nepotism.

Tunisian security forces have violently repressed popular protests in the post-revolution period.

  • Protestors demonstrated nationwide in January 2016 after an unemployed young man electrocuted himself. Tunisian police responded with violent crackdowns.
  • Tunisian security forces may crack down on protestors. Tunisia’s security sector, including key leadership, has not changed since it responded violently to demonstrations in January 2016. Security forces have used states of emergency and unlawful force to break up peaceful demonstrations and detain suspects multiple times in recent years.

Tunisia is surrounded by unstable neighbors.

Tunisia is a target for global Salafi-jihadi groups.

  • Thousands of Tunisian militants are fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Waves of returning foreign fighters will attempt to re-enter their country, bringing with them plans to break the Tunisian state.
  • The al Qaeda network, composed of a core group and an array of associates and affiliates that pursue al Qaeda’s objectives, has grown stronger since 2011. This network includes Ansar al Sharia Tunisia and the Tunisian Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade.

 

Complications

Salafi-jihadi groups may be positioned to infiltrate or attack Tunisia in the event of unrest.

  • Tunisian has limited security resources. The government would probably re-allocate these resources from counter-terrorism operations to quell unrest should there be widespread protests.
  • Tunisian ISIS militants operating in Libya may be preparing to return to Tunisia. ISIS could exploit unrest to penetrate Tunisia’s border at Ben Guerdane, where it attacked in March 2016. ISIS militants moving westward from the group’s former stronghold in Sirte, Libya are a growing threat on Tunisia’s eastern border.
  • Al Qaeda’s strategy includes embedding itself within and co-opting movements. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, an AQIM affiliate, may be positioned to infiltrate a movement against the Tunisian state.

A crackdown by security forces would strengthen the Salafi-jihadi base in Tunisia.

  • A violent crackdown would exacerbate existing popular grievances and reinforce a Salafi-jihadi popular support base in Tunisia. This base will remain a source of strength for local and global Salafi-jihadi groups.

 

Implications

Instability in Tunisia could greatly exacerbate regional instability and threaten U.S. interests in the region.

  • The destabilization of Tunisia would remove one of the few remaining semi-stable states in North Africa.
  • The U.S. relies on Tunisia as the host of diplomatic efforts for neighboring Libya. U.S. Africa Command works closely with Tunisian security forces in counterterrorism operations and may seek to base from Tunisia for future operations.

A stronger Salafi-jihadi base in Tunisia would threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies in the long term.

  • Salafi-jihadi groups with global objectives, including ISIS and al Qaeda, will continue to draw on a Tunisian support base for resiliency and strength.
  • This base will continue to threaten Tunisia and provide foreign fighters to regional conflicts. It will support Salafi-jihadi groups with the intent and capability to attack the American and European homelands.

Popular protests in Tunisia may spread throughout the country. In the most dangerous scenario, the Tunisian state will weaken or collapse and the country’s Salafi-jihadi base will grow stronger.  

*****

SanDiegoUnionTribune: The commander of American military forces across Asia, Adm. Harry Harris, said the jihadist group — commonly called ISIS — is seeking new territory as it gets squeezed out of Iraq and Syria.

“It’s clear to me that [ISIS] is also “rebalancing” to the Indo-Asia-Pacific,” said Harris, speaking during a meeting of the San Diego Military Advisory Council on Wednesday in Point Loma.

Using a cancer analogy, the four-star leader of U.S. Pacific Command added: “Through multinational cooperation, we can eradicate this [ISIS] disease before it metastasizes.”

But the U.S. alliance with the Philippines hit choppy waters recently after comments by President Rodrigo Duterte — something that Harris also addressed Wednesday with lightly veiled criticism of Duterte’s statements.

“We have been allied with the Philippines for a long time. We have shed our blood with them. … We fought side by side during World War II. I consider our alliance with the Philippines to be iron-clad,” Harris said. He also mentioned U.S. aid to the Philippines, budgeted at $120 million this year, and the dispatch of American troops to help after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.

“So when the leader said, ‘Only China supports us,’ I don’t know what he means,” Harris said, answering a reporter’s question toward the end of his presentation.

Duterte started making headlines last week when, speaking in Tagalog, he called President Barack Obama a son of a bitch.

Since then the Philippines president has said his government would shop for weapons in China and Russia and would halt joint U.S.-Philippines patrols in the South China Sea to avoid appearing hostile to China.

He also called for the departure of U.S. special-operations troops from the southern Philippines, saying their presence could complicate the fight against the ISIS-linked terrorist group Abu Sayyaf.

One analyst said it appears that nationalism and a desire for “outsider” status are driving the Filipino president’s current tone.

“I don’t really think this is as much about the U.S. as it is about domestic politics — and just his personality. We are a very useful whipping boy,” said Thomas Sanderson, director of the transnational threats project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “I think this is largely about someone who is a rebel … he’s an outsider and he’s broken through into an area that outsiders typically didn’t get to.”

Sanderson said the Philippines would do an about-face if Islamic terrorism becomes a more widespread problem for Filipinos.

“[Duterte] comes right back to us, there’s no doubt about it,” he said. “Because the center of gravity for counter-terrorism knowledge and skill is the United States.”

Harris outlined the signposts of the ISIS advance on new turf in the Pacific Command theater, an area that’s home to 700 million Muslims. That means more Muslims live in the Asia-Pacific region than in the Middle East.

“Population numbers alone have forced [Pacific Command] to think ahead about what’s next in the fight against [ISIS],” Harris said. “The vast majority of these people are peaceful citizens who seek to live lives free from the scourge of terrorism, but we know that a small band of fanatics can produce deadly results.”

He pointed to ISIS-inspired terrorism in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines so far in 2016. Those events include the July 2 attack on a Bangladeshi restaurant by ISIS-aligned militants. In May and June, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines released video showing the beheadings of two Canadians after their families didn’t pay ransoms.

Hundreds of jihadists have traveled from Asia to the main ISIS battlegrounds of Iraq and Syria to join in the group’s violent vision of creating an Islamic caliphate, according to published accounts.

The tally is about 700 from Indonesia, 100 from Malaysia, 100 from the Philippines, 200 from the Maldives, 300 from China and 120 from Australia, according to a December report by The Soufan Group. These recruits make up a small portion of the estimated 30,000 to 40,000 fighters ISIS can claim or has been credited with over time.

But as they tire of warfare, the danger is that they may return home and try to continue the fight — and recruit others.

Sanderson said Indonesia has the highest vulnerability to ISIS despite its strong security forces, because of the number of ISIS fighters already hailing from there and because of Indonesia being a string of islands with lots of places to hide.

All of this comes as the United States is finishing its own “rebalance,” with the Navy shifting 60 percent of its fleet to the Pacific by 2020. That move, announced late in Barack Obama’s first term, was seen as a hedge against North Korean saber-rattling and the growing economic and military might of China.

Academics differ on how big the ISIS threat is becoming in the Pacific and Asia.

Eli Berman, a UC San Diego economics professor, said he thinks “rebalancing” is too strong a term for the jihadist group’s foothold in Asia. ISIS isn’t on the verge of controlling territory anywhere in the Pacific Rim, said Berman, who is a research director at the university’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.

Asia expert Denny Roy at the East-West Center in Honolulu agrees with Harris that the basic ideas represented by ISIS won’t die if the Islamic State is geographically erased.

“The purveyors of those ideas are already trying to transplant them into other regions and are finding some interest,” Roy said.

But several observers pointed out that Asia has major differences that may hinder ISIS if it tries to expand there.

Governments there are generally more intact than in the Middle East.

“What’s missing is the ultra-weak states in which locals are ready and chomping at the bit to sign up for something to do,” said Sanderson at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “There are far fewer people who would want to sign up for a battle inside of Indonesia, as opposed to those who would want to sign up to battle inside Libya, Tunisia, Yemen or Syria — where the majority of young men would say, ‘Give me a gun and let’s go.’ They have nothing to lose.”

Roy sees South Asia, which includes Bangladesh, as fertile ground for extremism.

“Southeast Asia is less so, because the sense of grievance and the (routine practice) of mass political violence are less strong than in the Middle East or South Asia,” he said.

 

Sheik Anwar and Yaafghankid78, the NY/NJ Bomber

The full criminal complaint by the FBI on Federal charges for Ahmad Khan Rahami is here.

Ahmad kept a journal and it was on his body when he was wounded in a shooting exchange with police near his home.

Much of the references in this journal are to Anwar al Alawki who was an American born cleric and major target for the Obama administration to begin the defeat of al Qaeda. He was in fact killed in a drone strike in Yemen. Major Nadal Hassan, the Ft. Hood killer was also a devoted follower of al Alawki.

This journal does have a very small reference to Islamic State, however Rahami was radicalized during one of his last trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan where the Taliban and al Qaeda maintain a foothold of power. Islamic State on the days of the bombings in New York and New Jersey did not claim any connection however they did to the knife attack in St. Cloud, Minnesota.

 There was immediate chatter and concern that there was a functioning terror cell in that does appear to be the case in some form. Rahami did not act alone. The FBI has published a wanted poster for 2 other individuals.

Rahami’s father brought the family to the United States under asylum conditions and there have been several legal cases with members of the family with law enforcement. Ahmad has a first wife (Dominican) and a daughter and he is known to have married a second wife in Afghanistan and has a child with her. The second wife was returning to the United States and was detained by the FBI in the United Arab Emrites. Ahmad’s father wanted his 8 children to remain loyal to their heritage and such has been the case at least for some. One son moved back to the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the father in fact himself was part of the mujahedeen as a fighter against the Soviets as did Usama bin Ladin.

Not only has the father travel back to Afghanistan but the son, Ahmad did so more than once.

Rahami, 28, spent several weeks in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Quetta, Pakistan, in 2011, according to a law enforcement official who reviewed his travel and immigration record.

Two years later, in April 2013, he went to Pakistan and remained there until March 2014 before returning to the US, official said.

 

So, how did the FBI and DHS miss all the signals?

In part from Vocativ: The [FBI] should have launched a formal surveillance investigation as Rahami clearly followed a path towards radicalization and mobilization over the past two years,” said Nicholas Glavin, a senior research associate at the U.S. Naval War College.

Tracking all potential terror threats, however, is not easy. The FBI claims it already has more than 1,000 active Islamic State probes alone, which does not include investigations related to other Islamist groups. And Rahami is by no means the only terror suspect to avoid detection. Analysts who spoke with Vocativ noted that Mohammad Youssef Abdulazeez, the man who killed four marines at a pair of Tennessee military sites in July 2015, had not been monitored by the FBI. Neither had Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik, the husband and wife who carried out the ISIS-inspired slaughter in San Bernardino, California, last year.

Even those known to law enforcement as would-be jihadists manage to conduct horrific attacks. The FBI had investigated Omar Mateen on two separate occasions before the Florida man executed 49 people and wounded 53 others during a shooting massacre at the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando this summer.

“The U.S. has the most robust counterterrorism apparatus [in the world], yet it is already stretched thin,” Glavin said. FBI Director James Comey previously admitted that his agency has struggled to keep up with surveillance demands.

Experts also concede that there’s no predictable path toward radicalization, making it a persistent challenge to suss out extremists. Some studies have argued that a uniform profile of a “lone-wolf” terrorist does not exist. Peter Bergen, who has researched more than 300 jihadist terrorism cases in the U.S. since 9/11, told Vocativ that they lead largely normal lives.

Bergen’s data shows that four-fifths of these homegrown jihadists are U.S. citizens. They are no more likely to have criminal backgrounds than other Americans and are less likely to suffer from mental illness. Many of them attended college and are married.

“The big takeaway is that they’re ordinary Americans,” Bergen, who published the book The United States of Jihad: Investigating America’s Homegrown Terrorist earlier this year, told Vocativ. Like most, Rahami was not a foreigner, a refugee or a recent immigrant.

Which presents a daunting challenge of its own. 

“We’ve created political culture where we want 100 percent success in stopping them,” Bergen said. “Unfortunately, that is not a realistic expectation.” 

 

U.S SOF are Back in Al-Rai, Accompanied by FSA units

Operation Noble Lance: Barack Obama has authorized up to 300 Special Operations Forces to be deployed to Syria. It was not clear if the Americans accompanying the Turkish military had been re-assigned from other locations in northern Syria or were part of a new contingent. More here.

***  Getty Images

        Getty Images

State Department Daily Briefing Secretary of State John Kerry made brief remarks to reporters on the agreement between the U.S. and Russia to bring about a ceasefire in Syria. Spokesman John Kirby then continued the daily briefing. Secretary Kerry said that if Syria did not comply with the cease-fire agreement, then the arrangement would “not go forward.” He acknowledged the doubts that still existed regarding the agreement and said he expected challenges in the days to come. He also said the plan had a chance to work. He later said that Syria was one of the “most complicated places in the world” and responded to a news report that said the U.S.-Russia plan was “flawed and full of caveats.” He concluded his statement saying he had “never seen a more complicated or entangled political, and military, sectarian, somewhat religiously over-toned issue than what exists in Syria today.

****

Fighting steadily escalating in Syria – reports of heavy combat around Damascus, Hama and  Aleppo. Aid still being blocked by regime too. US Special Ops forces in Tell Abyad Syria put up US flag to show identity as they came under fire.

NYT/WASHINGTON — American Special Operations forces have arrived in northern Syria to work alongside Turkish troops fighting the Islamic State, the Pentagon said on Friday, stressing that the approximately three dozen Americans would serve in an “advise and assist” capacity.

Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said in an email that the American Special Operations forces “are accompanying Turkish and vetted Syrian opposition forces as they continue to clear territory” from the Islamic State near Jarabulus and al-Rai.

The decision to send the American forces into northern Syria with the Turkish military came last week, one American official said, shortly after a meeting between Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and President Obama during the G-20 summit meeting in China.

American officials described details of the deployment on the condition of anonymity because of the diplomatic and national security sensitivities of the mission.

****

Bloomberg: “Denying ISIL access to this critical border cuts off critical supply routes in and out of Iraq and Syria,” Major Adrian Rankine-Galloway, a Defense Department spokesman, said in a statement, using an alternate acronym for Islamic State. There are about 40 special operations troops in the operation, said a U.S. official who asked to remain anonymous because the details aren’t public.

Earlier Friday, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry warned his Russian counterpart that the U.S. was prepared to walk away from plans to coordinate strikes unless delays in aid deliveries are resolved. The United Nations is ready to deliver the aid but says it hasn’t received the necessary permission from the Syrian government to proceed.

“Secretary Kerry expressed concerns about the repeated and unacceptable delays of humanitarian aid,” State Department spokesman John Kirby said in a statement Friday after Kerry and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke by phone. Russia must “use its influence on the Assad regime to allow UN humanitarian convoys to reach Aleppo and other areas in need,” Kirby said.

“The Secretary made clear that the United States will not establish the Joint Implementation Center with Russia unless and until the agreed terms for humanitarian access are met,” he added.

****

CBS: The fighting has stopped in Aleppo, but Syrian troops are still holding up on humanitarian aid that the city desperately needs, said United Nations officials.

Samantha Power, United States ambassador to the United Nations, blamed the Syrian regime.

But she also added that Russians had a “significant” influence and that it was “incumbent” on Moscow to deliver on Syria. The war-torn country is now in its fourth day of the U.S.-Russian cease-fire, which Secretary of State John Kerry called “a last chance to be able to hold Syria together.” Power emphasized the significance and potential impact of the deal — one she said was the first of its kind –with “this level of granularity and specificity.”

“It can be a very important deal because it can prevent the regime from flying over opposition areas, it can prevent barrel bombing, chemical attacks, the kinds of things we’ve seen the regime do for so long. It can also turn the Russians to doing what they were supposed to do all along, which was actually fight terrorists instead of civilians,” Power said.

“Don’t you believe that’s what’s happening again today in Syria?” O’Donnell asked. “Well, Syria is a very complex picture,” Power answered. “There are thousands of armed groups. The question again of what military intervention would achieve, where you would do it, how you would do it in a way where the terrorists wouldn’t be the ones to take advantage of it — this has been extremely challenging. But the idea that we have not been doing quote anything in Syria seems absurd. We’ve done everything short of waging war against the Assad regime and we are – I should note – having significant success against ISIL on the ground.”

For my Military Friends: General Mattis -‘Everyone Fills Sand Bags’

 

Art of War Papers

Hat-tip to Michael L. ValentiMajor, USMC

Mattis believed in delegating responsibility to the lowest capable level. He stated, “Most Marine units and most Marines can do more than they are asked to do. It’s how you unleash that, delegate the decision making to the lowest capable level so that units can maneuver swiftly and aggressively based on exercising initiative. A sense of co-equal ownership of the mission between generals and 18 year olds.”

Mattis asserted that “by reading, you learn through others’ experiences—generally a better way to do business—especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men.”36 This alluded to a responsibility that is inherent to commanders and leaders: honest and detailed preparation for the task. It went far beyond just concentrating study on tactics, techniques, and procedures, for that will never be enough for “those who must adapt to overcoming an independent enemy’s will are not allowed the luxury of ignorance of their profession.”37

Mattis gave guidance on the construction of his staff. He wanted “a small staff comprised of aggressive officers who were able to act with initiative, make rapid decisions and recommendations, and exercise good judgment.”14 Due to the small size of the staff and few enlisted Marines to support it, General Mattis made it clear that everyone had to “fill sandbags.”15 The initial tempo of planning was intense and as new members arrived to fill positions, they had to be caught up to speed quickly and start working quickly. In order to expedite this process the creation of a “Brain Book” was implemented. The book consisted of various references and orders that were needed to get new members ready to operate quickly. The Brain Book by itself would not be enough. Instead, professionalism, willingness, and doctrinal foundation of the new members of the staff would carry them the rest of the way.16

General Mattis’s personal feelings:

War is a human endeavor and as such, warriors must be comfortable operating on and within the scopes of human terrain.38 An object in war is to impose our will upon the enemy.39 It is critical in professional study to include the study of the human dimension that is the study of decision-making, group interaction, leadership, etc. When the enemy votes, a study of these topics will enable the warrior to beat him to the polls.

warrior

A Marine from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit moves to a security position at Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, 25 November 2001. Photo by Sgt. Joseph R. Chenelly. (DVIC DM-SD-06-03033).

Mattis asserts that a commander must “be ready to embrace allied elements without necessarily having TACON/OPCON over them—use HANDCON.”54 Bringing allied elements into the planning process early with an emphasis on information sharing a commander can gain battlefield harmony through trust building.55 His bottom line is that “you will have little formal authority yet expectations for tactical achievements will not be diminished just because you lack formal command authority.”56

The greatest attribute a field grade officer can have according to Mattis is anticipation.57 General Mattis anticipated his lack of resources, capabilities, and authorities and actively sought measures to correct them by forming relationships and exchanging liaison officers.

For a full read and inspiring summary, go here.

Image result for task force 58 afghanistan 2001

Related reading: Task Force 58: A Higher Level of Naval Operation

Has Anyone Asked Obama about the Perfume Letter?

This will make you miss GW Bush.

Related reading: The General Accounting Office comprehensive response to Senator Dianne Feinstein on the factors to transfer detainees to the homeland facilities.

The base is self-sufficient.

– Desalination plant produces 1.2 million gallons of water per day

– Power plant produces more than 350,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity per day.

– Wind Turbines

o On average 2-3 percent of the base’s electric energy per day comes from the Naval Station’s four 262 ft. tall, three-blade turbines.

o Each of the turbines produces 950 kilowatts of electricity.

o The wind turbines save approximately 250,000 gallons of diesel fuel per year.

Major Units and Tenant Commands:

– Naval Hospital

– Marine Corps Security Force

– Personnel Support Activity

– Naval Atlantic Meteorology and Oceanography Command Detachment

– Naval Media Center Detachment

– Department of Defense Education Activity – W.T. Sampson Schools

– International Organization for Migration

– The GEO Group

– Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Southeast, Public Works Detachment

– Fleet & Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Jacksonville Detachment, GTMO

– Joint Task Force Guantanamo (Detention Center)

– U.S. Coast Guard Aviation Detachment – Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

The Disgraceful Gitmo Exodus

Obama’s terrorist-release program

WeeklyStandard: As Barack Obama prepared to enter the final year of his presidency, he sat down for an interview with Olivier Knox to discuss a bold new policy change. He had announced a year earlier that the United States would be ending its decades-long isolation of Cuba and seeking rapprochement with the authoritarian Communists who run the island nation 90 miles from Florida. In this December 14, 2015, interview, Obama described his new approach in greater detail. The change he proposed dominated headlines for days.

There was other big news in the interview—though this the media didn’t treat as such. The president declared that he remained committed to closing the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, despite strong objections from Republicans and some Democrats. Obama had campaigned in 2008 on closing Guantánamo and as one of his first acts upon taking the oath of office signed Executive Order 13492 directing his national security team to shutter the facility within a year:

The detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by this order shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order. If any individuals covered by this order remain in detention at Guantánamo at the time of closure of those detention facilities, they shall be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

Almost seven years later, much to Obama’s frustration, the facility remained open. Closing it had proved much more challenging than Obama had theorized as a candidate trying to win an election and a new president acting on his idealism. It turned out that the jihadists who remained in Guantánamo were there for a reason. Many of them were truly, as the cliché had it, “the worst of the worst.” Al Qaeda leaders, top Taliban officials, the men who planned the 9/11 attacks, veteran jihadists caught plotting follow-on attacks on U.S. interests, and even those al Qaeda operatives believed to be charged with carrying out the next wave of assaults on the U.S. homeland.

The news in the president’s interview wasn’t that he intended to make good on his promise to close Guantánamo, however belatedly. It was instead the president’s attempt to mislead the American people to accomplish his controversial objective.

“I am absolutely persuaded, as are my top intelligence and military advisers, that Guantánamo is used as a recruitment tool for organizations like ISIS,” Obama said, endeavoring to create a national security rationale for closing the detention facility. “And if we want to fight them, then we can’t give them these kinds of excuses.”

This isn’t true. There is virtually no evidence that jihadists use Guantánamo as a significant recruiting tool, and national security experts from across the political spectrum who have tested the claim have judged it false.

He wasn’t finished. “Keep in mind that between myself and the Bush administration hundreds of people have been released and the recidivism rate—we anticipate, we assume that there are going to be—out of four, five, six hundred people that get released—a handful of them are going to be embittered and still engaging in anti-U.S. activities and trying to link up potentially with their old organizations,” Obama said.

That wasn’t true. When Obama made this claim, 653 detainees had been released. Of that group, 196 had been confirmed (117) or suspected (79) of returning to jihadist activity upon their release. Those numbers came from the office of the director of national intelligence and represent the U.S. government’s official count of Guantánamo recidivism. Nearly one-in-three former detainees returned to the fight, not a “handful,” as the president suggested.

There was more. “The bottom line is that the strategic gains we make by closing Guantánamo will outweigh, you know, those low-level individuals who, you know, have been released so far.”

Again, false. The U.S. government—under George W. Bush and Barack Obama—has released dozens of veteran jihadists whose terror résumés include senior positions in al Qaeda and like-minded groups. And of course Obama had himself transferred five senior Taliban officials to Qatar in order to secure the release of Bowe Bergdahl.

So, at a time of escalated threat levels from international terrorists, the president of the United States is releasing dangerous jihadists against the advice of the military and intelligence professionals who have studied the threat for years, and he’s lying to the American people to downplay the threat.

That’s news. And yet a review of press briefing transcripts from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the White House over the two weeks after Obama’s claims shows that his interview didn’t generate a single follow-up question. Not one.

Hence the president, having paid no cost for misleading the American people on such a crucial matter of national security, is moving forward undeterred. Vice President Joe Biden, at a press conference in Stockholm late last month, said his “hope and expectation” is that Guantánamo will be closed by January 20, 2017.

In recent weeks, the Obama administration has transferred from Guantánamo al Qaeda operatives who were working directly for the men who planned the 9/11 attacks. Obama’s Periodic Review Board has approved for transfer a veteran jihadist who was identified in the 9/11 Commission report as an individual who “recruited 9/11 hijackers in Germany.” The administration is preparing to release or transfer many remaining jihadists judged by U.S. military and intelligence professionals to be “high-risk” detainees who would almost certainly return to the fight if freed.

As the administration’s urgency increases, so will its deception. And so, too, will the dangers to the American people.

The ‘Karachi Six’

On September 11, 2002, Pakistani forces stormed three al Qaeda safe houses in Karachi. Their targets were Ramzi Binalshibh, the point man for the 9/11 hijackings one year earlier, and Hamza al Zubayr, who was planning to attack hotels frequented by Americans. Both Binalshibh and Zubayr worked for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the chief architect of 9/11. At Binalshibh’s safe house, the residents held knives to their own throats in a desperate attempt to stall their enemies’ advances. Their gambit failed and Binalshibh, a native of Yemen, was captured. Elsewhere in Karachi, at another al Qaeda guesthouse, Zubayr was killed during an intense firefight that lasted hours.

In all, 10 people were captured during the raids. The detainees included six other Yemenis who were later dubbed the “Karachi Six” by U.S. intelligence officials. Five of them were detained at Zubayr’s safe house after the shootout with Pakistani forces. One of them was captured alongside Binalshibh. All six were transferred to Guantánamo on October 28, 2002.

Three days after the raids, on September 14, 2002, President George W. Bush praised the operations in Pakistan during a press conference with Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi. “We’re making progress in the war against terror,” Bush said. “I tell the American people all the time that we’re doing everything we can to protect our homeland by hunting down killers one person at a time.” The president added: “Thanks to the efforts of our folks, and people in Pakistan, we captured one of the planners and organizers of the September the 11th attack that murdered thousands of people.”

That was then.

Since the beginning of this year, at least five members of the “Karachi Six” have been approved for transfer by the Obama administration. Two of them, including the man captured at the side of this planner and organizer of the September 11th attack—Ramzi Binalshibh—were sent to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in August. When the Department of Defense announced their transfer from Guantánamo, along with 13 others, it thanked the UAE “for its humanitarian gesture and willingness to support ongoing U.S. efforts to close the Guantánamo Bay detention facility.” The implication was clear: It was inhumane for the United States to continue holding the jihadists.

A senior UAE official tells The Weekly Standard that the men will be kept in a military facility that allows them internal freedom of movement but includes “strict monitoring” to ensure that they cannot escape.

The Pentagon said nothing about the dangers posed by the detainees. Nor was there any mention of the fact that the decision to transfer them reversed years of warnings from U.S. military and intelligence professionals about the Karachi Six.

U.S. intelligence analysts had assessed that the Karachi Six were slated to take part in terrorist attacks ordered by KSM and orchestrated by Zubayr and Binalshibh. At a minimum, the professional analysts concluded, they were part of the support network that helped with Zubayr’s plotting against American targets in Karachi. But intelligence officials thought these al Qaeda operatives may have been involved in something even more troubling: KSM’s plans to target the American homeland once again. Whatever their specific plans, there was broad consensus among U.S. military and intelligence officials—based on extensive intelligence reporting from multiple U.S. intelligence agencies, including in-person interrogations with other senior al Qaeda leaders—that the men captured in Pakistan on September 11, 2002, were dangerous al Qaeda operatives determined to attack the United States and its interests.

Then, suddenly, in late 2015, the Obama administration reversed these conclusions, describing four of the Karachi Six as merely “low-level” or “low-ranking” fighters. Multiple publicly available documents illustrate how the Obama administration changed the analysts’ assessments.

In 2008, Joint Task Force Guantánamo (JTF-GTMO), which oversees the detention facility, deemed each member of the “Karachi Six” a “high” risk, “likely to pose a threat to the U.S., its interests, and allies.” JTF-GTMO recommended that they remain in the Defense Department’s custody. The leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessments authored for each of the six opened with this line:

Detainee is assessed to be an al Qaeda operative who planned to participate in terrorist operations targeting US forces in Karachi, Pakistan (PK), and possibly inside the United States.

But the Obama administration changed the assessment on precisely this point beginning in late 2015.

In files submitted to a Periodic Review Board (PRB), which was authorized by Obama in 2011 to evaluate the Guantánamo detainees’ cases on a regular basis, the administration’s representatives conceded that the Karachi Six were transferred to Guantánamo “based on concerns that they were part of an al Qaeda operational cell intended to support a future attack.” But, the administration argued, they probably “did not play a major role in the attack plotting in Karachi.”

The Obama administration’s unclassified submission for each of the six jihadists includes these lines (or similar language):

Based on a review of all available reporting, we judge that this label [ed: Karachi Six] more accurately reflects the common circumstances of their arrest and that it is more likely the six Yemenis were elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al Qaeda planners considered potentially available to support future operations.

The file for one of the six, Ayoub Murshid Ali Saleh, who was transferred to the UAE in August, explicitly notes the Obama administration’s disagreement with previous U.S. intelligence analyses (emphasis added):

Our review of available intelligence indicates that he probably did not play a major role in terrorist operations, leading us to disagree with previous US government assessments that he was involved in a 2002 plot to conduct an attack in Karachi, Pakistan.

The language here matters. The Obama administration does not claim that the change in the assessment on Saleh was based on new information, but a “review of available intelligence.” In other words, they looked at the same information that has driven U.S. intelligence assessments since 2002 and decided it no longer meant what the intelligence professionals had concluded.

Just months after these files were submitted to the PRB, at least five of the Karachi Six were approved for transfer. In four of the unclassified decisions, the PRB wrote (emphasis added):

In making this determination, the Board noted that the detainee’s degree of involvement and significance in extremist activities has been reassessed to be that of a low-level fighter

“Low-level” fighters. Remember that phrase as we delve into the details.

The reporting cited in JTF-GTMO’s files and other documents does not support the administration’s revised conclusion. Instead, the mosaic of intelligence portrays a very different picture: All six were working for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or KSM’s men, including some of the same operatives who planned and facilitated the 9/11 attacks.

During the raid in which Zubayr was killed and five members of the Karachi Six were captured, the Pakistanis recovered a crucial document known as the “perfume letter.” The missive, which was written by KSM in May 2002 and addressed to Zubayr, was given this name because of its cryptic reference to “perfumes.” U.S. officials initially suspected that this code word referred to chemical weapons or poisons, but they later concluded that KSM meant military-grade explosives.

The “perfume letter” would become a key piece of evidence in the dispute between Democrats on the Senate Intelligence Committee and the CIA over the value of the intelligence collected in the agency’s enhanced interrogation program. The CIA claimed that intelligence from harsh interrogations thwarted an al Qaeda plot against American targets in Karachi in 2003. In the so-called Feinstein report, Democratic senators and their staffers argued that the U.S. government already knew about the al Qaeda threat in Karachi from the “perfume letter.”

“Dear Brother, we have the green light for the hotels,” KSM wrote to Zubayr. KSM added that Zubayr should consider “making it three instead of one.” Consistent with al Qaeda’s modus operandi of conducting simultaneous suicide operations against multiple targets, KSM wanted Zubayr to strike three hotels housing Americans at once.

“By early October 2002,” the Feinstein report reads, “the CIA had completed a search of the names identified in the ‘perfume letter’ in its databases and found many of the individuals who ‘had assigned roles in support of the operation’ were arrested by Pakistani authorities during the [September 11, 2002,] raids” (emphasis added). While it is not clear based on public reporting which members of the Karachi Six are directly named in the “perfume letter,” if any, only four other individuals were arrested during the raids.

And there is no doubt that Zubayr, the letter’s recipient, was in charge of the Karachi Six. One of them, Shawki Awad Balzuhair, identified Zubayr as the Karachi Six’s “operational leader.” According to the JTF-GTMO files, Balzuhair explained that Zubayr was “unconditionally accepted as the leader of the group given his stature in al Qaeda” and his experience as a “senior military trainer” at the Farouq camp, which was Osama bin Laden’s primary training facility in pre-9/11 Afghanistan. Balzuhair has been approved for transfer from Guantánamo.

According to the Feinstein report, another senior al Qaeda operative named Walid Bin Attash, also known as “Khallad,” was specifically identified in the “perfume letter.” Khallad was directly involved in the USS Cole bombing in October 2000. He also helped al Qaeda prepare to hijack airliners leaving Southeast Asia for the United States prior to the 9/11 hijackings. Al Qaeda originally intended to commandeer planes headed for America’s West Coast as part of the 9/11 plot, but bin Laden canceled Khallad’s portion of the plan. Months later, Khallad went to work with KSM and KSM’s nephew, Ammar al Baluchi (also a key figure in the 9/11 attacks), on the anti-American plots in Pakistan. Khallad and Baluchi, both of whom were captured in 2003, planned to use the explosives left behind by Zubayr and his men in their own operations.

The intelligence cited by JTF-GTMO tied Khallad and Baluchi directly to the Karachi Six. Balzuhair told U.S. officials that Khallad, “visited the apartment” where he and the others lived “roughly every two weeks” and was their “primary facilitator in Karachi,” as well as “their link to senior people in al Qaeda.” Balzuhair also said that Baluchi “visited to bring money, clothing, and assistance.” Additional evidence cited in the leaked JTF-GTMO files indicates that the Karachi Six were working directly for KSM and his subordinates.

Bashir Nasir Ali al Marwalah was transferred to the UAE in August. The JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Marwalah notes that he was captured alongside Binalshibh, the man Bush cited in the days after the raid as a key planner of the 9/11 attacks.

The file includes another stunning detail. After KSM himself was captured months later, in March 2003, he was questioned about another letter he authored that was recovered during the Karachi raids. In this second letter, KSM “instructed” Binalshibh “to tell an individual named Jafar al-Tayyar to be ready for travel.”Al Tayyar means “the pilot.” And “Jafar al-Tayyar” is better known as Adnan al Shukrijumah, who was eventually killed during a counterterrorism operation in northern Pakistan in late 2014.

For American counterterrorism officials, the true identity of “Jafar al-Tayyar” was one of the biggest mysteries in 2002 and early 2003. Both the FBI and the CIA frantically tried to track him down after he was identified as the potential ringleader for al Qaeda’s next wave of attacks inside the United States. CBS News reported in March 2003 that U.S. officials thought he could be the “next Mohammad Atta”—a reference to the lead hijacker on 9/11.

KSM was dismayed that his “Jafar al-Tayyar” letter had fallen into American hands. “When [KSM] was confronted with the letter during a custodial interview,” according to JTF-GTMO, “he was surprised that the letter existed, as detainee [Marwalah] was supposed to destroy important documents and correspondence.” JTF-GTMO’s analysts surmised that KSM’s “comment indicates that detainee [Marwalah] had access to operation planning and coordination through his handling of the correspondence.”

The Obama administration’s reassessment elided this straightforward conclusion, and the evidence that led to it, claiming curiously that Marwalah’s “role in al Qaeda operational plotting is unverified.”

KSM’s letters weren’t the only incriminating evidence recovered during the Karachi raids. Authorities also found and analyzed two laptop hard drives. According to JTF-GTMO’s threat assessments, the hard drives “contained images of instrument approach charts for major US and European airfields, along with flight simulator software.” An analysis by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) concluded that the data on the hard drives could be used to plan another hijacking or to assist in the targeting of aircraft with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). JTF-GTMO’s analysts concluded it was “probable” Jafar al-Tayyar (Shukrijumah) was “utilizing the data from the hard drives” in his “operational planning.”

Another document scooped up during the raids is especially difficult to explain away. The Obama administration’s PRB summary notes in passing that Marwalah’s “last will and testament” were “found in the Karachi raids” and “included a martyrdom statement.” JTF-GTMO’s memo describes this document as Marwalah’s “last will before a suicide operation.” And JTF-GTMO’s analysts added a commonsense observation: “The presence of the document indicates that detainee [Marwalah], and probably the group [Karachi Six] as a whole, were in the final stages of planning suicide terrorist operations.”

Why else would Marwalah have written his “martyrdom” message if he wasn’t preparing to die? The Obama administration, in its eagerness to rewrite the history of the Karachi Six, didn’t offer an alternative explanation in its unclassified summary.

That’s not all. Some members of the Karachi Six, including Said Salih Said Nashir, told authorities that they had personally met with KSM. Curiously, Nashir is the only one of the six whose PRB decision has not yet been released to the public. In its unclassified summary for Nashir’s case, the administration claimed he wasn’t part of Zubayr’s plot in Karachi. But Nashir was hardly exonerated. Instead, the administration claimed Nashir “was probably intended by al Qaeda senior leaders to return to Yemen to support eventual attacks in Saudi Arabia,” but “may not have been witting of these plans.” The summary also notes that Nashir has “admitted to a close association with some of [al Qaeda’s] external operations planners and senior leadership, including” Khallad.

In sum, there is abundant evidence that the Karachi Six were working directly for senior al Qaeda operatives, including KSM and his immediate subordinates. Five of them lived with Zubayr, who was plotting against American hotels in Karachi.

Even if one were inclined to accept the Obama administration’s spin on the evidence about the Karachi Six, that revisionism doesn’t support the conclusion that they were harmless innocents. The administration itself argued it was “more likely” the Karachi Six “were elements of a large pool of Yemeni fighters that senior al Qaeda planners considered potentially available to support future operations.” Of course, unlike many of the Yemenis from this “large pool,” these six were actually living with the “senior al Qaeda planners” responsible for the Karachi plots. And one of them had already said his goodbyes as a willing “martyr.”

Tellingly, the Obama administration previously found that the Karachi Six should remain in U.S. custody. In January 2010, President Obama’s Guantánamo Review Task Force concluded that all six should be detained under the law of war, because they were “too dangerous to transfer, but not feasible for prosecution.” It was only under the Periodic Review Board (PRB) process, established by President Obama on March 7, 2011, that five of them were eventually granted transfer. It turns out that is an all too frequent occurrence. (In response to detailed questions about the Karachi Six and the transfers to the UAE, Pentagon spokeswoman Lt. Col. Valerie Henderson said, “Detainee-related information is derived from multiple sources, some of which was gathered by the Intelligence Community through sensitive sources and methods and cannot be discussed publicly. The Department of Defense is constantly reviewing its detainee-related information for accuracy and updating its records as appropriate.”)

Transferring Detainees ‘too dangerous to transfer’

To simplify: President Obama created two different entities to evaluate Guantánamo detainees and the risks they present to the United States. Both bodies—first Obama’s task force and later the Periodic Review Board—were conceived to further the president’s oft-expressed objective of closing the detention facility. As the end of Obama’s presidency draws near, and the urgency of closing Guantánamo increases, Obama’s PRB is finding ways to transfer many of the same detainees that Obama’s own task force previously said were too dangerous to transfer.

The PRB’s web page describes the body as “a discretionary, administrative interagency process” that was established “to review whether continued detention of particular individuals held at Guantánamo remains necessary to protect against a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.”

To date, according to a review of government filings conducted by The Weekly Standard, the PRB has issued a ruling in 52 cases. Thirty-three detainees have been approved for transfer by the PRB. The PRB determined that continued detention of 19 Guantánamo detainees “remains necessary” to protect the “security of the United States.” This means that the PRB has approved Guantánamo detainees for transfer in nearly two-thirds of the cases it has heard.

This is a stunning success rate for these particular detainees. To put it in perspective, keep in mind that Obama’s own Guantánamo Review Task Force previously assessed all 52 of these detainees and determined that none of them—not one of them—should be transferred or released. Twenty-eight of the 33 detainees approved for transfer by the PRB had been deemed “too dangerous to transfer but not feasible for prosecution” by Obama’s task force. The remaining five approved for transfer by the PRB were referred for prosecution by Obama’s task force. But instead of being prosecuted, they have either already been transferred or will be.

To add some additional perspective, keep in mind that Obama’s task force decided that nearly two-thirds of the 240 detainees remaining at Guantánamo as of January 2009 could be transferred. The task force made it clear that the detainees approved for transfer were not deemed innocent. Nor were they considered non-threats. Instead, Obama’s task force concluded that the security risks they posed could be adequately mitigated. In many of these cases, Obama’s task force decided to transfer detainees who had been deemed “high” risks by the military and intelligence professionals at JTF-GTMO. That is, Obama’s task force was willing to accept the dangers these detainees’ presented to further the president’s desire to close Guantánamo.

Regardless, even Obama’s task force drew the line at transferring the detainees who have been evaluated by the PRB. But roughly two out of every three of them have won transfer under the PRB process.

Simply put: The Obama administration is transferring many of the detainees the administration itself previously deemed to be the worst of the worst—including at least five members of the Karachi Six and the man long suspected of recruiting some of the 9/11 hijackers.

Al Qaeda’s Forrest Gump?

The 9/11 Commission published its final report in 2004. The lengthy account connects the dots on the key al Qaeda figures who carried out the most devastating terrorist attack in history. On page 165 of the report, readers are introduced to a Mauritanian named Mohamedou Ould Slahi, who is described as a “significant al Qaeda operative.” Slahi was “well known to U.S. and German intelligence, though neither government apparently knew he was operating in Germany in late 1999,” the commission’s report explained. Slahi’s presence in the heart of Europe proved to be crucially important. An appendix to the report makes clear why: Slahi “recruited 9/11 hijackers in Germany.”

Indeed, Slahi facilitated the travel to Afghanistan of the aforementioned Ramzi Binalshibh and at least two of the 9/11 hijackers. (Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker, used the same route as those three, but apparently didn’t receive instructions from Slahi directly.) The four jihadists who traveled to Afghanistan on Slahi’s advice are known to history as the Hamburg Cell. Three of them piloted hijacked planes on 9/11. Al Qaeda probably could not have pulled off the attacks without them.

Slahi was detained in late 2001 and shipped to Guantánamo in 2002. He has been held at the facility ever since. As reflected in the 9/11 Commission report, U.S. intelligence professionals have long considered him to be a key al Qaeda recruiter.

On July 14, 2016, the PRB approved Slahi for transfer, finding that “continued law of war detention of the detainee is no longer necessary to protect against a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.” Essentially, the PRB believed Slahi and his advocates when they said he wanted to begin his life again in peace. The PRB’s unclassified decision cited Slahi’s “candid responses” to its questions, including “recognition of his past activities,” but didn’t provide any further details. The PRB believes there are “clear indications of a change in [Slahi’s] mindset.” He will be transferred.

Slahi’s detention at Guantánamo has long been controversial because he was treated harshly during interrogations. Slahi was one of a few detainees subjected to a special interrogation regime in Cuba. Human rights activists and anti-Guantánamo zealots have not been content to denounce the manner in which Slahi was questioned; they have turned Slahi into something of a living martyr. They claim he was essentially the jihadist Forrest Gump. According to his advocates, even though Slahi admittedly swore allegiance to al Qaeda in the early 1990s and repeatedly assisted various al Qaeda operatives through the years thereafter, he somehow wasn’t really an al Qaeda man. They’ve characterized his meeting with the Hamburg Cell as a jihadist sleepover—innocent and misunderstood. Slahi himself pitches a version of this sanitized story in his widely acclaimed autobiography, Guantánamo Diary, which is a New York Times bestseller.

President Obama’s Guantánamo Review Task Force concluded in 2010 that Slahi should remain in detention under the law of war, because he was too dangerous to transfer. But the administration didn’t fight hard to keep him in detention during the PRB process. The administration’s unclassified summary for the PRB notes: “He facilitated the travel of future 9/11 operational coordinator Ramzi [Binalshibh] .  .  . and two future 9/11 hijackers to Chechnya via Afghanistan in 1999.” This is mostly accurate, but leaves out a key point. According to the 9/11 Commission, Binalshibh and the others wanted to join the jihad in Chechnya. It was Slahi who convinced them to go to Afghanistan for training first.

The leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessment for Slahi references a constellation of other al Qaeda personalities in his life. For instance, Slahi showed up in Montreal in November 1999, just weeks before Ahmed Ressam, who was trained in Afghanistan and relocated to Montreal, began his journey for Los Angeles. Ressam intended to detonate a car bomb packed with explosives at the LAX airport as part of the “Millennium Plot.” Ressam was arrested in mid-December 1999 before he could complete his mission. JTF-GTMO’s analysts concluded that Slahi “had prior knowledge” of Ressam’s plan and had “contact with extremist cells in Canada planning for that attack.” Slahi disputes this, and the government’s PRB summary doesn’t mention the connection.

Court documents show that, in January 1997, Slahi sent a fax to a known al Qaeda operative named Christopher Paul. In it, Slahi asked for Paul’s help in finding “a true Group and Place” for “some Brothers” who wanted to wage jihad. The fax is significant because Slahi sent it years after he and his boosters now claim that he had forsworn al Qaeda. In 2008, Paul pleaded guilty in an American court to conspiring to bomb targets in Europe and the United States.

Slahi also routinely consorted with a relative, a jihadist known as Abu Hafs al Mauritani, who was once one of al Qaeda’s most senior ideologues. The administration noted in its PRB summary that Slahi “established a broad network of terrorist contacts while living in Germany, Canada, and Mauritania.” (Again, Slahi’s advocates portray his terrorist network as a benign Rolodex of acquaintances who just happened to be al Qaeda.) While “most of his extremist contacts have since been detained or killed,” Abu Hafs al Mauritani is “currently residing in Mauritania.” Abu Hafs “could provide him [Slahi] with an avenue to reengage, should he decide to do so,” the administration noted. Abu Hafs is also referenced in the 9/11 Commission report as one of a handful of bin Laden subordinates who may have opposed the suicide hijackings, although he later praised them. Abu Hafs was also suspected of involvement in earlier terrorist plots.

Judging by his Twitter feed (@AbuHafsMuritani) and Facebook page, Abu Hafs remains committed to jihad. In recent tweets, for example, he lamented the death of an al Qaeda military commander in Syria and praised the battlefield gains of al Qaeda front groups fighting Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Mauritania is not exactly committed to keeping men such as Abu Hafs and Slahi under wraps. Files recovered in Osama bin Laden’s compound show that al Qaeda negotiated a truce with the government of Mauritania. In exchange for not committing any terrorist attacks inside the country, al Qaeda was given free rein to proselytize.

Perhaps Slahi won’t rejoin al Qaeda’s ranks once he is let go. But he doesn’t have to in order to damage American interests. The U.S. government doesn’t consider ex-Guantánamo detainees turned anti-American propagandists to be recidivists. But there is no question that they go far beyond any legitimate criticisms of the United States in making up lies about America, their time in Cuba, and their own biographies. Slahi could easily fill this role; his book is already an international sensation. Slahi was undoubtedly subjected to rough, coercive interrogations. The world will continue to hear that part of the story, probably with some exaggerations. And Slahi’s claim of innocence will go largely unchallenged.

The Guantánamo Blame Game

The linchpin of President Obama’s argument for closing Guantánamo is that it is a major recruiting mechanism for terrorists. In December 2010, Obama claimed that Guantánamo is “probably the number one recruitment tool that is used by” al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. “And we see it in the websites that they put up. We see it in the messages that they’re delivering,” Obama added. He made a similar argument at a press conference on December 18, 2015, saying, “We see how Guantánamo has been used to create this mythology that America is at war with Islam.” The Obama administration still has not offered any empirical evidence to substantiate this argument. Anyone even casually familiar with jihadist propaganda knows that Guantánamo is infrequently mentioned and is not part of any significant recruiting theme. Ayman al Zawahiri, the head of al Qaeda, has released five messages since early August. He didn’t mention Guantánamo once.

But Obama clings to this argument as a national security rationale for closing Guantánamo. He has claimed that Guantánamo “was an explicit rationale for the formation of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” or AQAP. Like so many of Obama’s claims about Guantánamo, this is false.

At no point in time did AQAP’s leaders, some of whom were once held at Guantánamo, say that the facility was the reason they launched their organization. If anything, AQAP’s history shows the dangers of releasing known al Qaeda operatives from Guantánamo. One current AQAP leader is Ibrahim al Qosi, who was transferred in 2012. Qosi was a trusted associate of Osama bin Laden before he was captured. JTF-GTMO’s assessment of Qosi described him as “an admitted al Qaeda operative and one of Usama bin Laden’s (UBL) most trusted associates and veteran bodyguard.”

In fact, in May, AQAP’s Inspire magazine directly rebuked Obama on his claim that the facility is a key recruitment tool, arguing that al Qaeda talks about many issues and Guantánamo wasn’t nearly at the top of their list. Inspire cited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as other issues, as far more important from a recruiting standpoint and chastised Obama for being pro-Israeli.

As the Islamic State rose in power, Obama shifted his argument, claiming that it, too, was using Guantánamo as a major recruiting tool. Once again, the administration has provided no evidence this is true. Because the Islamic State rarely mentions Guantánamo in its propaganda, the administration shifted attention to the group’s use of orange jumpsuits in its snuff videos. This is supposedly a subtle, indirect reference to Guantánamo. The Islamic State is not known for its subtlety, of course, and it has never said that it uses orange jumpsuits because of Guantánamo. Orange jumpsuits are ubiquitous, the standard garb in prisons around the globe, including the Iraqi facilities where many of leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s loyalists were once held. The Islamic State puts its victims in other colors, too, and there is no apparent logic behind which color is used. Moreover, the administration says nothing of the fact that Obama’s own policies, including the air campaign in Iraq and Syria, are explicitly mentioned in these gruesome productions.

After the Islamic State struck in Paris last November, killing and wounding hundreds of people, Obama went so far as to cite Guantánamo: “It’s part of how they rationalize and justify their demented, sick perpetration of violence on innocent people. And we can keep the American people safe while shutting down that operation.” Once again, not true. The Islamic State did not use Guantánamo to justify the Paris massacres. Nor has the administration pointed to a single attack—out of thousands carried out by the Islamic State around the globe—that was rationalized or justified on the basis of Guantánamo.

The fifteenth issue of the Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine, released earlier this year, carried an article aptly titled “Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You.” For starters: “We hate you, first and foremost, because you are disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah—whether you realize it or not—by making partners for Him in worship, you blaspheme against Him, claiming that He has a son, you fabricate lies against His prophets and messengers, and you indulge in all manner of devilish practices.” Dabiq‘s editors listed many other reasons, including our “secularism and nationalism,” our “perverted liberal values,” and our “Christianity and atheism.” They did include a generic mention of the imprisonment and “torture” of Muslims around the world, but only after listing Obama’s drones and many other reasons, and even then there was nothing—not a word—about Guantánamo.

208 Recidivists—and Counting

“The existence of Guantánamo,” the president claimed in 2009, “likely created more terrorists around the world than it ever detained.” But the president has not shown, and cannot demonstrate, that Guantánamo has “created” as many as the 208 recidivists who have now been freed. Just this past week, the office of the director of national intelligence released its latest estimate of the number of “confirmed” and “suspected” recidivists. Most of them, 188, were transferred during the Bush years. But the growth in the number of recidivists over time demonstrates the flaws in Obama’s thinking. In January 2009, the month Obama was inaugurated, the Pentagon counted 61 recidivists. Today, that figure is nearly three and a half times larger.

Intelligence officials tell The Weekly Standard that those estimates are undoubtedly low. And there is little question that those numbers will grow—though we likely won’t know the details until after Obama leaves office. Sources familiar with the negotiations on Guantánamo transfers tell TWS that when Obama administration officials have insisted on a timeframe for host-country tracking of detainees, the requirements for monitoring soften considerably after January 2017.

In at least one case, the transfer of six detainees to Uruguay in December 2014, five of them “high-risk” detainees, the recipient country had announced in advance that it would not track the detainees. President José Mujica accused the United States of “kidnapping” the jihadists and abusing their human rights and, in a May 2014 interview with the Washington Post, declared that he would not monitor the high-risk detainees after the transfer. “We are not the jailers of the United States government or the United States Senate. We are offering solidarity on a question that we see as one of human rights.”

In other cases, just as Obama administration officials have misled the American people about the threats presented by Guantánamo detainees, they’ve also misled the diplomatic partners who have agreed to receive them.

On January 6, 2016, Mahmmoud Omar Mohammed Bin Atef and Khalid Mohammed Salih al Dhuby were transferred to Ghana. U.S. intelligence determined that both men were committed jihadists. Bin Atef, in particular, was assessed as a “high risk” detainee “likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.” According to JTF-GTMO, he was “a fighter in Usama bin Laden’s former 55th Arab Brigade and is an admitted member of the Taliban” who had trained in al Qaeda’s notorious Farouq camp. In addition, Bin Atef had “participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces.” Unlike many detainees who renounce jihadism—or pretend to—Bin Atef “continues to demonstrate his support of UBL and extremism” and “has threatened to kill US citizens on multiple occasions including a specific threat to cut their throats upon release.”

When the transfer to Ghana was announced, however, a statement from the government in Accra claimed the men “were detained in Guantánamo but have been cleared of any involvement in terrorist activities and are being released.”

It’s almost as if the U.S. intelligence assessment and the statement from Ghana are describing different people. How does this happen? Jojo Bruce-Quansah, the information minister at Ghana’s embassy in Washington, D.C., told us at the time that the U.S. government provided assurances that Bin Atef was “never involved in terrorism” and presented little risk. “If that assurance was not there,” he said, there is “no way” his government “would have taken the detainees.” A spokesman for the National Security Council declined to comment on whether the U.S. government provided Ghana with the full intelligence assessment of Bin Atef.

It’s not clear today whether the Obama administration will succeed in closing Guantánamo. What is clear is that, in attempting to do so, the president is willing to free dangerous terrorists and mislead the American people and our diplomatic partners.