IRGC Commander Plotted out Russian Action in Syria

From the U.S. Treasury terror list noted in 2011:

During the Iranian negotiations Iran was plotting, punking all of the P5+1 members. The head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Commander Soleimani, who has sanctioned travel restrictions violated the sequestration and traveled to Moscow twice. The plotting begins including maps and tactics.

Guessing here that once again, Obama missed his presidential daily briefing on his specially designed iPad, but the distribution list included many others such as John Kerry, Susan Rice, and global military command centers.

Crickets….

How Iranian general plotted out Syrian assault in Moscow

By Laila Bassam and Tom Perry

 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander Soleimani stands at the frontline during offensive operations against Islamic State militants in the town of Tal...

BEIRUT (Reuters) – At a meeting in Moscow in July, a top Iranian general unfurled a map of Syria to explain to his Russian hosts how a series of defeats for President Bashar al-Assad could be turned into victory – with Russia’s help.

Major General Qassem Soleimani’s visit to Moscow was the first step in planning for a Russian military intervention that has reshaped the Syrian war and forged a new Iranian-Russian alliance in support of Assad.

As Russian warplanes bomb rebels from above, the arrival of Iranian special forces for ground operations underscores several months of planning between Assad’s two most important allies, driven by panic at rapid insurgent gains.

Soleimani is the commander of the Quds Force, the elite extra-territorial special forces arm of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, and reports directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Senior regional sources say he has already been overseeing ground operations against insurgents in Syria and is now at the heart of planning for the new Russian- and Iranian-backed offensive.

That expands his regional role as the battlefield commander who has also steered the fight in neighboring Iraq by Iranian-backed Shi’ite militia against Islamic State.

His Moscow meeting outlined the deteriorating situation in Syria, where rebel advances toward the coast were posing a danger to the heartland of Assad’s Alawite sect, where Russia maintains its only Mediterranean naval base in Tartous.

“Soleimani put the map of Syria on the table. The Russians were very alarmed, and felt matters were in steep decline and that there were real dangers to the regime. The Iranians assured them there is still the possibility to reclaim the initiative,” a senior regional official said. “At that time, Soleimani played a role in assuring them that we haven’t lost all the cards.”

“SEND SOLEIMANI”

Three senior officials in the region say Soleimani’s July trip was preceded by high-level Russian-Iranian contacts that produced political agreement on the need to pump in new support for Assad as his losses accelerated.

Their accounts suggest planning for the intervention began to germinate several months earlier. It means Tehran and Moscow had been discussing ways to prop up Assad by force even as Western officials were describing what they believed was new flexibility in Moscow’s stance on his future.

Before the latest moves, Iran had aided Assad militarily by mobilizing Shi’ite militias to fight alongside the Syrian army, and dispatching Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps officers as advisors. A number of them have been killed.

Russia, an ally of Damascus since the Cold War, had supplied weapons to the Syrian army and shielded Damascus diplomatically from Western attempts to sanction Assad at the United Nations.

Their support did not prevent rebels – some of them backed by Assad’s regional foes – from reducing Assad’s control of Syria to around one fifth of its territory in a four-year-long war estimated to have killed 250,000 people.

The decision for a joint Iranian-Russian military effort in Syria was taken at a meeting between Russia’s foreign minister and Khamenei a few months ago, said a senior official of a country in the region, involved in security matters.

“Soleimani, assigned by Khamenei to run the Iranian side of the operation, traveled to Moscow to discuss details. And he also traveled to Syria several times since then,” the official said.

The Russian government says its Syria deployment came as the result of a formal request from Assad, who himself laid out the problems facing the Syrian military in stark terms in July, saying it faced a manpower problem.

Khamenei also sent a senior envoy to Moscow to meet President Vladimir Putin, another senior regional official said. “Putin told him ‘Okay we will intervene. Send Qassem Soleimani’. He went to explain the map of the theater.”

RESIDENT IN DAMASCUS

Russian warplanes, deployed at an airfield in Latakia, began mounting air strikes against rebels in Syria last week.

Moscow says it is targeting Islamic State, but many of Russia’s air strikes have hit other insurgents, including groups backed by Assad’s foreign enemies, notably in the northwest where rebels seized strategically important towns including Jisr al-Shughour earlier this year.

In the biggest deployment of Iranian forces yet, sources told Reuters last week that hundreds of troops have arrived since late September to take part in a major ground offensive planned in the west and northwest.

Around 3,000 fighters from the Iranian-backed Lebanese group Hezbollah have also mobilized for the battle, along with Syrian army troops, said one of the senior regional sources.

The military intervention in Syria is set out in an agreement between Moscow and Tehran that says Russian air strikes will support ground operations by Iranian, Syrian and Lebanese Hezbollah forces, said one of the senior regional sources.

The agreement also included the provision of more sophisticated Russian weapons to the Syrian army, and the establishment of joint operations rooms that would bring those allies together, along with the government of Iraq, which is allied both to Iran and the United States.

One of the operations rooms is in Damascus and another is in Baghdad.

“Soleimani is almost resident in Damascus, or let’s say he goes there a lot and you can find him between meetings with President Assad and visits to the theater of operations like any other soldier,” said one of the senior regional officials.

Syria’s foreign minister said on Monday that the Russian air strikes had been planned for months.

 

Here Comes Another Obama Prison Break

Just consider, that giving a pass to drug and narcotic offenders, promotes more lawlessness and the laws on the books become inert. Further, what are the prospects for the business and economic outlook for America and compare that to other competitive countries. The implications are surfacing. Of particular note, we cannot begin to estimate how many of those being released are illegal aliens.

How to Deal With the Retroactive Drugs Minus Two AmendmentThe Sentencing Commission voted to reduce by two levels the base offense levels for drug offenses subject to the Drug Quantity Table at USSG § 2D1.1(c), and to make parallel changes to the quantity tables at § 2D1.11 for chemical precursors. See Amendment 3, Reader Friendly Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (eff. Nov. 1, 2014).1 The amendment will take effect November 1, 2014 unless disapproved by act of Congress.2 This two-level reduction in the base offense level is one reason that the sentences of many (though not all) drug offenders would be lower if imposed today. See How a Sentence for a Drug Offender May Be Lower if Imposed Today.

On July 18, 2014, the Commission voted to make this “drugs minus two” amendment retroactive. Unless Congress disapproves it, beginning November 1, 2014, inmates who were already sentenced can ask courts to retroactively reduce their sentences, and courts can rule on those requests, but no one can be released before November 1, 2015.3 The Commission estimates that 46,376 inmates could benefit from the retroactive amendment, and that the average reduction will be 25 months.4 Thus, your clemency client may be eligible for a retroactive sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which provides that when a defendant was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” “the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”

Justice Department about to free 6,000 prisoners, largest one-time release

WaPo: The Justice Department is set to release about 6,000 inmates early from prison — the largest ever one-time release of federal prisoners — in an effort to reduce overcrowding and provide relief to drug offenders who received harsh sentences over the past three decades.

The inmates from federal prisons nationwide will be set free by the department’s Bureau of Prisons between Oct. 30 and Nov. 2. Most of them will go to halfway houses and home confinement before being put on supervised release.

The early release follows action by the U.S. Sentencing Commission — an independent agency that sets sentencing policies for federal crimes — which reduced the potential punishment for future drug offenders last year and then made that change retroactive.

The commission’s action is separate from an effort by President Obama to grant clemency to certain nonviolent drug offenders, an initiative that has resulted in 89 inmates being released early.

The panel estimated that its change in sentencing guidelines eventually could result in 46,000 of the nation’s approximately 100,000 drug offenders in federal prison qualifying for early release. The 6,000 figure, which has not been reported previously, is the first tranche in that process.

“The number of people who will be affected is quite exceptional,” said Mary Price, general counsel for Families Against Mandatory Minimums, an advocacy group that supports sentencing reform.

The Sentencing Commission estimated that an additional 8,550 inmates will be eligible for release between this Nov. 1 and Nov. 1, 2016.

The releases are part of a shift in the nation’s approach to criminal justice and drug sentencing. Along with the commission’s action, the Justice Department has instructed its prosecutors not to charge low-level, nonviolent drug offenders who have no connection to gangs or large-scale drug organizations with offenses that carry severe mandatory sentences.

The U.S. Sentencing Commission voted unanimously for the reduction last year after holding two public hearings in which they heard testimony from former attorney general Eric H. Holder Jr., federal judges, federal public defenders, state and local law enforcement officials, and sentencing advocates. The panel also received more than 80,000 public comment letters with the overwhelming majority favoring the change.

Congress did not act to disapprove the change to the sentencing guidelines, so it became effective on Nov. 1, 2014. The commission then gave the Justice Department a year to prepare for the huge release of inmates.

The policy change is referred to as “Drugs Minus Two.” Federal sentencing guidelines rely on a numeric system based on different factors, including the defendant’s criminal history, the type of crime, whether a gun was involved and whether the defendant was a leader in a drug group.

The sentencing panel’s change decreased the value attached to most drug-trafficking offenses by two levels, regardless of the type of drug or the amount.

An average of about two years is being shaved off eligible prisoners’ sentences under the change. Although some of the inmates who will be released have served decades, on average they will have served 8 1/2 years instead of 10 1/2 , according to a Justice Department official.

“Even with the Sentencing Commission’s reductions, drug offenders will have served substantial prison sentences,” Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates said. “Moreover, these reductions are not automatic. Under the commission’s directive, federal judges are required to carefully consider public safety in deciding whether to reduce an inmate’s sentence.”

In each case, inmates must petition a judge who decides whether to grant the sentencing reduction. Judges nationwide are granting about 70 sentence reductions per week, Justice officials said. Some of the inmates already have been sent to halfway houses.

In some cases, federal judges have denied inmates’ requests for early release. For example, U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth recently denied requests from two top associates of Rayful Edmond III, one of the District’s most notorious drug kingpins.

Federal prosecutors did not oppose a request by defense lawyers to have the associates, Melvin D. Butler and James Antonio Jones, released early in November. But last month Lamberth denied the request, which would have cut about two years from each man’s projected 28 1/2 -year sentence.

“The court struggles to understand how the government could condone the release of Butler and Jones, each convicted of high-level, sophisticated and violent drug-trafficking offenses,” Lamberth wrote. The Edmond group imported as much as 1,700 pounds of Colombian cocaine a month into the city in the 1980s, according to court papers.

Critics, including some federal prosecutors, judges and police officials, have raised concerns that allowing so many inmates to be released at the same time could cause crime to increase.

But Justice officials said that about one-third of the inmates who will be released in a few weeks are foreign citizens who will be quickly deported.

They also pointed to a study last year that found that the recidivism rate for offenders who were released early after changes in crack-cocaine sentencing guidelines in 2007 was not significantly different from offenders who completed their sentences.

“Prison officials and probation officers are working hard to ensure that returning offenders are adequately supervised and monitored,” Yates said.

Federal prison costs represent about one-third of the Justice Department’s $27 billion budget. The U.S. population has grown by about a third since 1980, but the federal prison population has increased by about 800 percent and federal prisons are operating at nearly 40 percent over capacity, Justice officials said.

Last week, a group of senators introduced a bipartisan criminal justice reform bill, the first such legislation in decades. Although some advocates say it doesn’t go far enough, the measure, which is supported by a coalition that includes the Koch brothers and the American Civil Liberties Union, would shorten the length of mandatory-minimum drug sentences that were part of the tough-on-crime laws passed during the war on drugs in the 1980s and 1990s.

If passed by Congress and signed by Obama, the reforms would apply retroactively, allowing inmates who were previously incarcerated under mandatory minimums an opportunity for release.

“It’s a remarkable moment,” Price said. “Over the past several years, the tone of the discussion about incarceration has changed dramatically. We have come to the realization that our punitive approach to drug crimes is not working and has produced significant injustices.”

 

How we get to World War III

(Videos courtesy of Popular Mechanics)

by Danielle Pletka, AEI: NATO’s SecGen Jens Stoltenberg today warned the Russians about their violation of Turkish airspace in ongoing Russian air operations over Syria. It was only the latest warning from NATO about Russian violations of various NATO nations’ airspace and assorted other antics. But today’s incursion — which prompted a nasty threat from Turkey about what would happen if the Russians make the same mistake again — only underscores what a dangerous place the world has become since Barack Obama became president.

History teaches us that large wars begin for many complex reasons, and that notwithstanding our obsession with poor old Archduke Ferdinand, it was probably not simply his shooting that spawned World War I. But… there are now so many global flashpoints that we cannot rule out the notion that a conflict between major powers could break out simply based on circumstance. Consider:

  • NATO aircraft scrambled more than 500 times in 2014, with only a few exceptions, in reaction to Russian incursions into NATO member airspace. Russians planes reportedly often switch off transponders and fail to file flight plans, which has resulted in several near misses, including with a passenger plane. (Not to speak of the Russian shoot down of the Malaysia Airlines passenger jet.)

  • In 2014, Japan scrambled aircraft almost 1000 times, with all but a few of these incidents attributed to either Russian or Chinese warplanes.
  • Russian bombers entered US airspace 10 times in 2014, double the previous average.
  • On July 4th, as Americans celebrated Independence Day, the US Air Force scrambled fighter jets to intercept two pairs of Russian bombers skirting US airspace off the coast of California and Alaska.
  • The United States is preparing, reportedly, a show of force with “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea, a reaction to increasingly aggressive land reclamation/military construction in disputed territory.

  • On the eve of Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Washington, two Chinese fighters intercepted a US Air Force surveillance plane over the Yellow Sea.
  • The US is planning on stepping up air operations over Syria at the same time that Russia advances its own war on Assad’s opponents. Washington and Moscow aim to “deconflict” (whatever that means).
  • Russia is consistently violating its obligations under the Minsk Accords and continues to make claims on Ukrainian territory. Facing few consequences for his actions in Ukraine, there are fears that Putin may choose to move on NATO members Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia.

The world has always been a dangerous place, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons has only made it more so. But not since the Cold War have there been so many potential triggers for major power conflicts. Will we get into a shooting war? Perhaps not, and almost not certainly with the current Commander in Chief. But each time there is a near miss without consequence, as most are, bad actors are encouraged to believe there will never be any consequence. Still, notwithstanding Barack Obama, the United States does have red lines, treaty obligations (to the Philippines, to Japan, to NATO allies) that could force us into conflict where none was planned.

A Quick Preview of the Start of World War III

What Russia’s newest ICBM looks like when it takes off.

Popular Mechanics: The RS-24 was developed in secret by Russia, but public tests of the fifth-generation ICBM began in 2007 in response to a possible missile shield being built in Europe, and the Yars became operational in 2010. The RS-24 has been “MIRVed,” meaning it has multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—in other words, each missile has multiple warheads that can hit multiple targets. Each of the RS-24’s four nuclear warheads has a yield of about 150 to 250 kilotons (the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of 15 and 21 kilotons, respectively).

The RS-24 is powered by solid-state fuel, meaning that it can be ready to be launched within minutes, and is built to accelerate extremely quickly, giving opposition forces little time to react to a launch. It also can deploy a series of anti-missile-defense measures to evade attempts to shoot it down. The Russian government reports it to have an effective range of 6,800 miles, traveling at top speeds of 15,220 miles per hour, or just a shade under Mach 20. It can be launched from a silo, as seen above, or from a mobile launch vehicle, meaning the Russian government can essentially tuck one of these away anywhere in the vast wilderness that makes up so much of its territory.

What makes the Yars perhaps even more unsettling is that it’s an upgrade to the Topol-M ICBM, a weapon that Tyler Rogorsky over at Foxtrot Alpha called “scary as hell.” The Topol-M was the first ICBM to be developed by Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, and is now being phased out in favor of the RS-24.

The Yars and Topol-M, along with America’s own state-of-the-art ICBMs, the LGM-30G Minuteman-III and UGM-133 Trident II, are stark reminders that mutually assured destruction continues to define nuclear warfare, despite various nuclear arms treaties. It’s easier to add more warheads to an ICBM than to build a missile defense system that can effectively shoot down those additional warheads, meaning there isn’t much either side can hope to do once a nuclear power decides to launch—except fling off their own set of ICBMs and irradiate the other side of the globe as well.

Russian Fighter Jets, Navigational Error? Nah..

Associated Press: NATO chief: Russian jets in Turkish airspace no accident

“BRUSSELS (AP) — NATO’s secretary-general on Tuesday rejected Moscow’s claim that its military incursion into alliance airspace over Turkey wasn’t intentional or important, saying there were two separate incidents and “the violation lasted for a long time.”

Turkey’s military, meanwhile, said more of its jets patrolling the border with Syria were placed in a radar lock by Russian planes and surface-to-air missile systems.

In Syria, Russian warplanes reportedly continued pounding targets in the country, where the Kremlin has come to the aid of beleaguered ally President Bashar Al-Assad.

NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference in Brussels that recent breaches of Turkish airspace by Russian warplanes were “very serious”— even dangerous.

“It doesn’t look like an accident, and we’ve seen two of them over the weekend,” he added.

The latest Russian airstrikes in Syria, in cooperation with Syrian jets, struck targets in rural areas of the northern Aleppo province, targeting the towns of al-Bab and Deir Hafer, Syrian state TV reported, quoting a military official.

Both towns are controlled by the Islamic State group. The official also said IS bases were targeted in Palmyra and surrounding areas in the central Homs province, destroying 20 vehicles, three arms depots and three rocket launchers.

Meanwhile, the Syrian air force was said to have targeted areas in rural Latakia controlled by militants, with the military official reporting the death of at least 12 fighters, including two Turks, one Saudi militant from al-Qaida’s affiliate in Syria, Nusra Front, and one Palestinian.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a monitoring group with a wide network of activists on the ground, said in the last 24 hours, Russia carried out at least 34 airstrikes in Palmyra and vicinity, areas controlled by IS.

Airstrikes also were reported in the rural part of the city of Raqqa, the group’s de facto capital. The Observatory said at least 19 IS members were killed, including four in Raqqa in an airstrike that hit two vehicles and an arms depot. In Palmyra and its boroughs, the airstrikes were said to have killed 15 IS militants, struck 10 vehicles and an arms depot.

In a statement, NATO spokeswoman Carmen Romero said Stoltenberg later confirmed that NATO generals would be contacting their Russian counterparts about the violation of Turkish airspace.

“It’s unacceptable to violate the airspace of another country,” Stoltenberg told reporters. He said NATO is expressly worried that such acts by the Russians could have unforeseen consequences.

“Incidents, accidents, may create dangerous situations,” Stoltenberg said. “And therefore it is also important to make sure that this doesn’t happen again.”

Turkey’s military said Tuesday that eight Turkish F-16 jet patrolling the Turkish-Syrian border were harassed by a MIG-29 plane as well as surface-to-air missile systems based in Syria in two separate incidents on Monday.

It was the second successive harassment of Turkish planes reported by Turkey. The MIG-29 locked radar on the planes for 4 minutes and 30 seconds, while the missile systems threatened the planes for 4 minutes and 15 seconds, the military said.

Turkey reported Monday that two Turkish jets were harassed by a MIG-29 on Sunday.

During an official visit to Belgium, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed NATO’s stance, and pointedly warned the Russians that if such actions continue, relations between the two neighboring countries on the Black Sea could go into a deep freeze.

“Any attack on Turkey is an attack on NATO,” Erdogan said. “If Russia loses a friend like Turkey with whom it has cooperated on many issues, it will lose a lot.”

A Turkish government official confirmed that Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov had been called to the ministry on Monday afternoon during which Turkish officials lodged a “strong protest” over the second infringement.

The official spoke on condition of anonymity in line with Turkish government regulations.

On Monday, NATO ambassadors met in special session and condemned what they termed Russia’s “irresponsible behavior” in penetrating alliance airspace. The ambassadors also called on Russia to cease such practices.

On Thursday, NATO defense ministers are scheduled to meet in Brussels, and the actions of the Russian military in Syria and any measures the U.S.-led alliance needs to take as a result will be among the leading topics.

Stoltenberg told reporters he was also concerned that in Syria the Russians are not mainly targeting the Islamic State extremist group, “but instead attacking the Syrian opposition and civilians.”

Russia’s Defense Ministry rejected claims that its airstrikes in Syria are targeting civilians or opposition forces.

Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said in a televised briefing on Tuesday that Western media is engaged in “information warfare,” distributing “pure propaganda” about alleged civilian deaths caused in Syria.

Russia says the airstrikes that began last week are targeting IS and al-Qaida’s Syrian affiliates, but at least some of the strikes appear to have hit Western-backed rebel factions. The Russian attacks have largely focused on the northwestern and central provinces — the gateways to the heartland of Assad’s power in the capital and on the Mediterranean coast.

The main Western-backed Syrian opposition group said Russia’s airstrikes have damaged an archaeological in the northwestern village of Serjilla in Idlib province.

The Syrian National Coalition said the attacked area didn’t have any IS presence, adding that airstrikes occurred on Sunday and damaged an Assyrian site.

The group called on the U.N.’s cultural agency UNESCO to condemn the Russian airstrike and preserve archaeological sites in Syria.”

Of course there is more. It is fascinating that Russia is using some cunning tactics above the skies in Syria. The U.S. has drones watching the action and the reports are dispatched back to the Pentagon and for sure the White House situation room.

Watch this interesting video of the Russian planes (with Red Star painted over) at work in Syria

Take a look at what happens inside Latakia airbase, where the Russian Air Force contingent is based.

The following exclusive video by RT brings you inside al-Assad International Airport, near Latakia, where Russian Air Force contingent, currently made of 36 combat planes, is based.

The footage is extremely interesting as it clearly shows the six Su-34 Fullback aircraft returning from the first combat sorties against Islamic State targets in Syria.

A closer look at the warplanes provides the confirmation that all the aircraft, including the Su-25s and the Su-34s, were removed the standard Russian Air Force markings and the typical Red Star: most probably the Russians don’t want their symbol to be shown off along with the wreckage of a plane in case one is shot down or crashes in Syria.

By the way, the insignia were overpainted on the Su-30SMs and the Su-24Ms as well, even if these are not clearly visible in this video; however there are screenshots in the social media that prove the same applies to Flankers and Fencers.

Su-34 tail

Su-25 Latakia

This is not the first time aircraft taking part in real operations are stripped off their national markings. UAE F-16s deployed to Jordan to take part in Operation Inherent Resolve didn’t wear the national flag while some U.S. drones deployed in sensitive areas perform their clandestine missions “unmarked.”

 

Blair Tries to Save Qaddafi, Hillary Tries to Kill Him

June 2011: Clinton Arrives in Abu Dhabi for talks on post-Qaddafi Libya

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrived in the United Arab Emirates on Wednesday for talks with European and Arab partners on planning for a democratic Libya without Muammar Qaddafi, aides said.

The talks in the UAE capital Abu Dhabi will be held on Thursday. They come after US President Barack Obama said NATO’s mission in Libya was forging “inexorable” advances that meant it was only a matter of time before Mr. Qaddafi’s departure. “With each meeting, international pressure is growing and momentum is building for change in Libya,” Secretary Clinton’s spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, told the accompanying press.

“Not only does the Contact Group allow us to sustain the (NATO-led military) coalition, it also allows us to reinvest all these countries in our common effort and to concert views on the next steps,” Ms. Nuland added.

Due to take part are two dozen countries, including key NATO allies Britain, France and Italy, as well as delegates from the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Conference.

The UAE also plans to invite Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Russia, US officials said.

As the military, political and economic pressure mount on Mr. Qaddafi to step down, the group will discuss “what a post-Qaddafi Libya ought to look like,” a senior US official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

Such a place should be a “unified state, (a) democratic state with a smooth transition,” the official said before Secretary Clinton arrived for the talks.

A second official said the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) had set up shadow ministries in its base in eastern Libya and named a civilian to head military in preparation for assuming power when Mr. Qaddafi falls.

The international community has begun to talk among themselves and with the rebel administration about how to offer security and basic services to the people of Tripoli when the Libyan capital is freed, he said.

However, the official added that Washington cannot say whether the NTC “is ready to assume complete control,” and cautioned that there is no international consensus over when Mr. Qaddafi should leave power, where he should go, or even whether he should leave Libya.

“And we in the international community have stepped up our effort as well to be able to be in a position to provide them (the opposition) whatever kind of assistance they might need,” the second official said.

A third US administration official said the Contact Group — which includes NATO allies leading the military action against Mr. Qaddafi as well as Arab partners and the United Nations — would discuss the opposition’s stark need for funds.

The opposition has complained that little has happened since the group last met on May 5 in Rome when Clinton and her partners agreed on a new fund to aid Libya’s rebels and promised to tap frozen assets of Mr. Qaddafi’s regime.

“We understand the (NTC’s) frustration but again the international community isn’t going to let the (NTC) go under financially,” the official said on the condition of anonymity.

‘If you have a safe place to go, go there’: Tony Blair’s astonishing message during phone call to Colonel Gaddafi just before he was overthrown by Libyan rebels

Here the pair are pictured embracing after a meeting in Sirte, Libya, in 2007

DailyMail: Tony Blair warned Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi to find safety as his regime began to collapse.

Showing surprising concern for the tyrant’s welfare, Mr. Blair told him: ‘If you have a safe place to go then you should go there’.

There was no mention of facing justice and instead Mr. Blair wanted to broker a deal for Gaddafi. The conversation shines a light once again on his questionable links to the man responsible for decades of authoritarian rule.

The former Prime Minister was criticised over his infamous ‘Deal in the desert’ in 2004 which secured lucrative oil deals for BP and ended Libya’s international isolation. He also wrote Gaddafi grovelling letters which began: ‘Dear Muammar, I trust you and your family are well’.

The conversation between Mr. Blair and Gaddafi was made public as part of the latest batch of emails released from when Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State in response to a freedom of information request.

The relevant message is dated February 25, 2011 and was sent by Mr. Blair’s head of strategy Catherine Rimmer to Jake Sullivan, Mrs. Clinton’s former top foreign policy adviser, who sent it on to her. At the time Mr. Blair was special envoy to the Middle East for the Quartet – the UN, the US, the EU and Russia.

Miss Rimmer notes that ‘Mr. Blair wanted me to let you know that he is making these calls very privately and is not briefing the media’.

She says that Mr. Blair ‘delivered a very strong message to Gaddafi that the violence had to end and that he had to stand aside’.

Miss Rimmer then directly quotes Mr. Blair telling Gaddafi: ‘The absolute key thing is that the bloodshed and violence must stop…if you have a safe place to go then you should go there, because this will not end peacefully unless that happens. ‘If this goes on for another day/two days we will go past the point. I’m saying this because I believe it deeply. If we can’t get a way through/out very quickly this will go past the point of no return.

Another email from February 23, 2011 from Mr. Sullivan to Mrs. Clinton describes how Mr. Blair was suggested to Mrs. Clinton as someone who ‘might have a good relationship’ with Gaddafi. The dictator fled the capital Tripoli and was killed by rebels near Sirte, his birthplace, in October 2011.

Other messages sent and received by Mrs. Clinton reveal more details about how Cherie Blair lobbied her on behalf of her friends in the Qatari government.

Earlier emails showed that in the summer of 2009 and in 2010 Mrs. Blair arranged a meeting between Mrs. Clinton and her friend Sheikha Mozah.

The latest batch show that in the summer of 2011 Mrs Blair also facilitated a meeting with Mrs. Clinton and Fahed al-Atiyah, chairman of the Qatar Food Security Programme.

Nobody for Mr. or Mrs. Blair was available for comment.

Hold on there is more and of course the Obama administration ‘go-to’ country for money and diplomatic support is Qatar…..

In part from Reuters:

The experts said they had found that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had breached the arms embargo on Libya during the 2011 uprising by providing weapons and ammunition to the rebels fighting Gaddafi forces. The experts said Qatar had denied the accusation, while the United Arab Emirates had not responded.

“Some 18 months after the end of the conflict, some of this materiel remains under the control of non-state actors within Libya and has been found in seizures of military materiel being trafficked out of Libya,” according to the report.

“Civilians and brigades remain in control of most of the weapons in the country, while the lack of an effective security system remains one of the primary obstacles to securing military materiel and controlling the borders,” it said.

Last month the U.N. Security Council made it easier for Libya to obtain non-lethal equipment such as bulletproof vests and armored cars but expressed concern at the spread of weapons from the country to nearby states.

The council urged the Libyan government to improve its monitoring of arms and related material that is supplied, sold or transferred to the government – with approval of the U.N. sanctions committee that oversees the arms embargo.

Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan told the Security Council last month that the government had control of its borders with Algeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Egypt. Zeidan said in February he wanted the council to lift the arms embargo on Libya, but council members said they never received an official request.

The Gun Smuggler’s Lament

by Elizabeth Dickinson:  In 2011, Osama Kubbar ran Qatari-supplied arms to Libyan rebels battling the Qaddafi regime. Today, he is watching from afar as his country is torn apart by two warring governments and a web of rival militias. This is the story of a failed revolution and the people it engulfed.

“Perched in a seaside villa in 
eastern Tunisia, Osama Kubbar had anxiously waited for days for the final news about his guns. It was May 2011, five months into the Arab Spring, and Kubbar, a Libyan smuggler, was remotely tracking the slow movements across the southern Mediterranean of a fishing vessel he’d arranged to transport 600 Belgian FN rifles, 10 machine guns, 200 grenades, 100 bulletproof vests, and 200 kegs for packing explosives. The boat was bound from Benghazi for his hometown, the coastal city of Zawiya, some 370 nautical miles away, where beleaguered rebels were battling the mightier forces of longtime Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi. Guns, Kubbar hoped, might help shift the tide in the fighters’ favor.

The voyage, now in its third week, had been arduous. Through frequent satellite-
phone calls, Kubbar learned from the crew when the boat’s engine broke down in the Gulf of Sidra, necessitating a several-day maintenance detour to Misrata two-thirds of the way through the trip. Once waterborne again, the vessel avoided lurking catastrophe. Not only can spring weather on the Mediterranean be fierce, but Qaddafi’s henchmen were scanning the sea for rebel aid and threatening to sink any ship that approached land.

The moment of reckoning had finally arrived: After several days hovering near Zawiya’s shore, waiting for an opportune time, the crew on board told Kubbar that docking wasn’t an option. “The boat came close, about five kilometers from shore,” Kubbar recalls, “and the guys said, ‘We cannot go further.’”

Kubbar didn’t waste any time. He called rebel contacts in Zawiya and told them where the boat was floating; they would have to try to get the guns themselves. So under the cover of darkness, fighters in small rubber boats pushed off from the sand, navigated rough waves, and met up with Kubbar’s crew. Then, box by box, they carried the arms ashore.

“I swear to God,” Kubbar says, “you can do a movie about this.”

Three months and four more arms shipments later, Kubbar’s short career as a gunrunner ended when the invigorated opposition officially seized Zawiya. Shortly afterward, Qaddafi was forced from power and killed. “The military was organized. The revolutionaries, it was chaos,” Kubbar remembers. “And it worked to our advantage: If you cannot predict the rebels’ moves, you cannot really counter them.”

Kubbar cuts an unlikely figure for a former smuggler. Muscular and trim, with graying hair and thin-rimmed glasses, he was trained as an electrical engineer. A devout Muslim and vocal opponent of the Qaddafi government, he had been living in exile for more than 15 years when the Arab Spring began. Kubbar halted his day job and started moving weapons to help Libya’s resistance movement—which included his own brother—finally break the yoke of dictatorship. And he was able to do it thanks to a formidable backer: Qatar, his adopted home.

The Persian Gulf emirate, eager to flex its muscles in the Middle East, was the first regional state to turn on the Qaddafi regime in 2011. Through the United Nations, the Arab League, and other channels, it 
publicly urged international action against the dictatorship—a stance that earned it plaudits from humanitarians and foreign-
policy hawks alike. Using its two Boeing C-17 cargo jets, among other means, to illicitly ship aid and arms to Libya, Qatar’s operation nurtured an ecosystem of clerics, businessmen, ex-jihadis, and other middlemen—
figures like Kubbar who quietly fed pockets of the revolution with money, guns, and other support. Once Qaddafi was gone, members of that network—many of them Islamists, long-preferred partners of Qatar across the Middle East—used their positions to jockey for power and influence. Kubbar, for one, says he rode his renown as Zawiya’s weapons smuggler to seize property and build a small political career that lasted nearly two years.

Yet the promise of revolution was fleeting. By 2013, Libya had all but collapsed—not despite Doha’s efforts and those of its opportunistic middlemen, but partly because of them. Supporting certain allies, at the expense of national reconciliation, helped drive dangerous political wedges. To be sure, Qatar was not alone. Other countries, most notably the United Arab Emirates, contributed to Libya’s instability by building their own networks on the ground. But where Abu Dhabi also offered material and logistical assistance, Qatar was exceptional in the scale of its provision during the uprising. And while this investment might have paid off at the time, the question now is, to what end? Mieczyslaw Boduszynski, a former U.S. foreign service officer and current professor at Pomona College who has spent time in Libya, wrote in 2014, “[I]t is clear that Qatari engagement has contributed, at least indirectly, to further polarization within the Libyan political scene and to overall state weakness.” (A spokesman for the Qatari government declined to answer questions or comment for this article.)

Today, nearly five years since demonstrators began to agitate for Qaddafi’s removal, Libya suffers from unpredictable violence. It is riven by lawless militias and two rival 
governments. The humanitarian toll of the conflict is dire. More than 200,000 Libyans are in need of food assistance, according to the World Food Programme. And “scores of those displaced during the 2011 Libyan revolution have been unable to return to their homes,” the Brookings Institution reported in April, “while over a million more have been uprooted in the subsequent violence.”

Some of Qatar’s proxies have stayed in the chaos, still hoping to find fame, fortune, and power. Others have given up or been forced out, including Kubbar. He’s back where he started: living in Doha, watching at a painful remove as the country of his birth splinters. Blending into a crowd of well-to-do expats while sipping a cappuccino one evening at the capital city’s Ritz-Carlton, he boasts about his smuggling, calling it “the most courageous operation to my name.” But his brow wrinkles when he talks about the present: Libya, Kubbar says in his ever-measured voice, “is really messed up.”

The ability of outside actors like Qatar, much less a dissident-turned-
smuggler-turned-bureaucrat, to shape Libya’s trajectory is rapidly diminishing. For 51-year-old Kubbar, however, the dream remains steadfast. “The path to the solution is still a long way away, but we should not be negative,” he insists. “I have a strong belief that … the right people will be in charge.”

In 1969, when Kubbar was just 5 years old, a charismatic young military colonel unseated Libya’s monarch, King Idris, in a coup. Promising sweeping political and economic reforms, Qaddafi’s rule blended populist rhetoric with domineering authoritarianism. He used the country’s massive oil revenues to fund free education and health care, but also to buy the loyalty of security forces, expand the army with recruits from sub-Saharan African allies, and increase his personal wealth. He was pitiless toward perceived opponents, imprisoning and torturing thousands in a network of detention facilities. Islamists who offered an alternative ideology to Qaddafi’s socialist state were targeted as heretics.

Growing up in Zawiya, Kubbar knew of Qaddafi’s tyrannical politics, but it was only after moving to the capital to attend university in 1981 that he saw them firsthand. There, he witnessed one of Qaddafi’s so-called revolutionary committees—informal surveillance networks that monitored dissent—execute students who opposed the regime by hanging them on campus.

Although he was horrified, turning political was too dangerous an option. 
That changed when he left Libya in 1986 to study for advanced engineering 
degrees at Queen’s University in Ontario, Canada. Safely abroad, Kubbar 
became fascinated with the Muslim Brotherhood opposition so demonized by Qaddafi. He devoured any literature he could find about the organization—he says he later joined the Libyan chapter, banned at home but operating in exile—and participated in his university’s Muslim Students Association. Sometimes, 
he delivered speeches at weekly prayer gatherings on campus, decrying 
Qaddafi’s rule.

A few years after he moved to Canada, Kubbar says he learned that officials in Libya’s intelligence service had visited his father in Zawiya, inquiring about Kubbar’s activities. (Kubbar suspects that one of his classmates alerted the government to his dissent.) Then, in 1995, Kubbar’s uncle was denied an exit visa to visit the United Kingdom. “He was rejected because of my name,” Kubbar guesses. Estimating that he had landed on a blacklist, Kubbar decided he couldn’t safely return to Libya.

For more than a decade, he worked for telecom companies in North America, before moving to Doha in 2009 for a job at Qatar University. He says the Libyans living in the city avoided one another—certainly in public—because they feared the Libyan Embassy was monitoring them. Yet a handful of Qaddafi dissidents knew one other, and when the Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia in December 2010, they disregarded potential dangers and started meeting in cafes. They shared videos of protests in Tunis and later Cairo, and they swapped stories about nascent demonstration attempts relayed by family members back home. “Egypt is the center of the Arab world. [That meant] the revolutions were starting to catch on,” Kubbar says of that heady time. “We thought that we should start warming up for Libya.”

On Feb. 17, 2011, protesters in dozens of Libyan cities heeded social media calls for a Day of Rage. In Benghazi, Tobruk, and even parts of Tripoli, demonstrators—led by youths and students—marched, destroyed regime icons, and burned garbage bins. Soldiers fired live ammunition at them. The uprising had begun.

Kubbar spent hours on Facebook and YouTube, following events. He says one video clip particularly seized his emotions. In it, a woman filming herself in Benghazi hysterically screams that the regime is coming to massacre her family. It “really pumped the blood in my veins,” Kubbar says . He rang his brother, Ihab, who was still living in Zawiya. “Go to the streets and tell [the regime], ‘It’s never going to be peaceful until that lady who screamed in Benghazi sits quiet,’” Kubbar recalls beseeching.

In another conversation, Kubbar says Ihab held up the phone so that, even in Doha, Kubbar could hear the noise of crowds in Zawiya chanting, “The people want the fall of the regime.” On Feb. 24, 2011, Qaddafi’s forces killed at least 17 people and wounded another 150 in an attack on the restive city. Afterward, Ihab, then 36, joined neighborhood men who were taking up arms against the government.

Kubbar considered himself just as much a freedom fighter as his brother. “We were just standing up to Qaddafi, and we were naked,” he says of the rebels, who had very few arms and little ammunition at that point. (Ihab carried a hunting rifle that could fire two bullets.) “We had no support.”

That was soon to change.

In late February, one of Kubbar’s Libyan acquaintances in Doha, a newspaper editor named Mahmoud Shammam, gathered together local dissidents. (In the interest of disclosure, Shammam previously edited a now-defunct Arabic edition of Foreign Policy.) A close friend of the ruling emir, Shammam had convinced the Qatari royal family to back supporters of the revolution: The family would pay for a new TV channel, Al Ahrar, devoted to the Libyan uprising and a makeshift office for opposition expats. “He [told us], ‘OK, I can get some support; let us rent a place where we can have an operations room,’” Kubbar says. The group secured an apartment in the 
Kempinski, a luxury high-rise building in Doha’s chic West Bay. Upstairs from one of the city’s best pastry shops, the Libyans set up computers and phone lines and brainstormed how they could abet the revolution. (The Kempinski’s management declined to comment, saying it does not “disclose any information about tenants or guests.”)

It was no coincidence that Qatar had agreed to help. Over the previous two decades, the small, gas-rich country had been expanding its global leverage aggressively. Qatar had built alliances with Western countries, including the United States, and had funded the world’s most watched Arabic-language network, Al Jazeera. But it had also thrown financial and material support behind Islamic resistance 
movements across the Middle East, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and branches of the Muslim Brotherhood; the groups’ organization, discipline, and geographic spread made them excellent conduits for Qatari influence. “Qatar was not identifying with the Muslim Brotherhood for any ideological reasons,” says Salah Eddin Elzein, head of the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, a think-tank arm of the network; rather, he said, Qatar chose to align itself with rising forces. Lina Khatib, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, has written that Qatar savvily pursued an “open-door” foreign policy, “creating friends and avoiding enmities by appealing to all sides at once.” Khalid bin Mohammed al-Attiyah, Qatar’s foreign minister, told an audience at Princeton University in 2014 that during the uprisings, his country also felt a “moral duty” to help Arab brethren topple dictators.

Kubbar appreciated Doha’s early patronage, but he wanted to be closer to the front lines. “I’m not going to be sitting here when my people die,” he recalls thinking. So no sooner had the office at the Kempinski opened than Kubbar picked up and moved to Tunisia, from where he believed he could help deliver humanitarian aid—already much needed—to western Libya.

Leaving his wife and two children behind in Doha, Kubbar set out for Ben Gardane, a Tunisian city about 20 miles from the Libyan border. There, he says, he rented a villa with his own money and began to liaise with aid organizations, including a British Islamic charity called Wafa Relief, providing it with lists of goods that Libyan activists and rebels, with whom he was in contact, needed. “It was things like painkillers, and sometimes drugs for chronic conditions.”

On March 7, after Kubbar had been in Tunisia for less than two weeks, he received a dreadful call from his sisters: Ihab had been shot in a firefight with government forces. Fellow rebels found him wounded and crumpled on a slope leading away from Zawiya’s central square; the fighters managed to get him home, but he died soon after.

Kubbar’s father told him not to come home. It was too dangerous, and he couldn’t bear to lose another son. But the revolution was now more personal than ever. On a visit to Doha at the end of March, Kubbar spilled his frustrations to his friends. “There are lots of people doing humanitarian aid,” he remembers complaining. What he needed to do, he said, was run weapons.

Just as Kubbar was losing patience, Qatar was also looking for more direct ways to back Libya’s rebels. Qaddafi was using his air force to target civilians, a galling sight for regional leaders. So Doha launched a whirlwind diplomatic campaign to convince the Arab League and the U.N. Security Council to impose a no-fly zone. Other backers of the plan included the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. On March 17, the council approved Resolution 1973, authorizing the safe area and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. A week later, Qatar became the first Arab state to agree to patrol the zone.

Doha’s leaders didn’t stop there. They began to supply the rebellion with weapons, despite an arms embargo that the United Nations had also just placed on Libya. “For small states like Qatar,” says Sergio Finardi, head of the consultancy TransArms, which has tracked several illicit Qatari-linked weapons shipments to Libya, its contribution could be “something covert in order to have a foot and play a role in this situation.” (Other countries provided arms too, including the United Arab Emirates and France.) A U.N. panel of experts later found Qatar to be in violation of the embargo, but Doha stated in 2012 that its actions “were in full coordination with NATO and under its umbrella.” In a statement provided to Foreign Policy, a spokesperson for NATO said “no country notified or coordinated national weapons deliveries with” the organization.

Qatar channeled many of its arms deliveries through two brothers: Ali and Ismael al-Sallabi, both Libyan Islamists with extensive connections inside the country. Ali al-Sallabi, an exiled cleric who had served time in Qaddafi’s notorious Abu Salim prison, was a longtime resident of Doha and close with Qatar’s political elite. Soon after rebels won their first significant victory, routing regime forces in Benghazi on March 20, 2011, Qatari jets began moving weapons and ammunition to Benina’s airport, just outside the city. The Sallabis’ network then parceled out materiel to rebels. (Despite widespread coverage of their involvement in gunrunning, Ali declined in an interview for this article to confirm that he directly received weapons shipments from Qatar.)

In Kubbar’s telling, fighters were having difficulty shipping weapons to western Libya, which was still firmly in Qaddafi’s hands. Qatar’s weapons handlers had no point person in Zawiya, Kubbar says, “no contact.” Thus, in early April 2011, Kubbar reached out to Ali al-Sallabi. As Libyan expats in Doha, they were neither strangers nor friends, but Kubbar says, “People from the same movement trust each other.” Once they were in touch, “everything moved so fast.” Kubbar, still in Tunisia, says Sallabi connected him with men in Benghazi who could provide the arms; Kubbar identified a boat and crew; and the first arms were shipped by late April.

Not long after the weapons were unloaded in Zawiya, thanks to the rebels in rubber boats, hostilities there escalated. On the morning of June 11, opposition fighters, some of whom had been trained clandestinely by Qatari, French, and British forces in the nearby Nafusa Mountains, swarmed the city, but it took only 24 hours for Qaddafi’s men to push back the advance. Fighting, bolstered by NATO airstrikes, continued throughout the summer, as did deliveries of Kubbar’s arms—in all, there were three by sea and two by land, he says.

On a Saturday in early August 2011, during one of only three visits he made to his family in Doha during the uprising, a rebel in Zawiya called him to say that the opposition was preparing for the final assault on Kubbar’s birthplace—and then moving on to Tripoli. “You have to come,” Kubbar recalls the man saying. So Kubbar flew to Tunisia, and by Aug. 12, he had crossed by land to his hometown. He wanted to witness freedom firsthand. Videos from the time that he has since posted online show that he traded his Western clothing for Libya’s traditional robe-like Bedouin dress and visited the families of martyrs. In one clip, with a sense of authority and religiosity he still exudes, Kubbar says, “May Allah grant victory for the rebels, repay them, hold and unite them, and win over this dictator.”

Rebels finally took full control of Zawiya on Aug. 20. Three days later, Kubbar claims that his last batch of arms arrived in the city. According to his personal tally, it included 120 cases, each containing 1,500 Kalashnikov bullets; 15 rocket-
propelled grenades and 200 munitions for them; and 10 machine guns with 60 boxes of ammunition. This time, his boat was able to dock, and Kubbar says he personally witnessed the distribution of arms to fighters.

Rebels took Tripoli within a matter of days. Transitional leaders didn’t proclaim the country free until Oct. 23, 2011, when Qaddafi was found hiding in a drainpipe and was bludgeoned to death. By then, through the likes of men like the Sallabis and Kubbar, Qatar had poured at least 20,000 tons of weapons into Libya.

In the newly liberated Libya, power vacuums existed everywhere, as did self-proclaimed heroes of the revolution. Regime property was up for grabs, and Kubbar says he claimed an office in Zawiya for himself: a palatial hall once used by Qaddafi’s army deputy chief of staff. “I was the only one who channeled weapons [to Zawiya],” he recalls with bravado, “so even the warlords, they were respecting me big time.” Kubbar says he helped start and lead an NGO, the Revolutionary Youth Coalition of February 17, with the goal of restricting the political power of regime defectors. The group issued public statements and organized political meetings. Kubbar imagined his religious allies would be in power in Tripoli in no time; his mission complete, he’d then head home to Doha.

Qatar, meanwhile, also sought to maintain influence in Libya. An October 2011 Wall Street Journal article reported that Qatar’s military chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah, attended a meeting in Tripoli aimed at organizing Libya’s militias. Doha also likely kept money flowing through various political proxies, such as Abdel Hakim Belhaj, a hardened rebel commander who had trained fighters during the uprising. “Qatar’s strategy is sort of to keep these guys on retainer,” explains Frederic Wehrey, of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “It’s not massive support, but you keep the channels open.”

Cracks quickly ran through Libya’s political facade, however. During the uprising, Qatar’s allies repeatedly clashed with the more secular defectors who dominated the National Transitional Council (NTC), the formal opposition body. The two camps had managed their tensions thanks to a common enemy. With Qaddafi gone, these factions began to attack one another in the media and in public statements. “We saw this explosion of the differences between the Islamists and the non-Islamists start to emerge,” remembers Shammam, a secular NTC member. (Despite his early appreciation of Qatar’s help, Shammam says he repeatedly warned Doha against sticking around after Qaddafi was gone.) Many religiously oriented freedom fighters, including some who had Qatar’s backing, believed Libya should look something like Turkey, a democracy run by religious moderates. Ali al-Sallabi was a key architect of this vision. Regime defectors also saw a democracy, but one that wasn’t so colored by religion.

With the political battleground firmly drawn, many of Libya’s new government officials grew intolerant of Doha’s ongoing aid to their rivals. “Qatar was among countries which have provided us with the greatest military, financial, and political support” in ousting Qaddafi, Libya’s U.N. envoy, Mohammed Abdel Rahman Shalgam, told Reuters in November 2011. “We don’t want them to spoil this great feat through meaningless acts of meddling.”

As tensions heated up, Kubbar’s NGO called for former regime figures to resign. In March 2012, Kubbar moved to Tripoli to run for Libya’s new national legislature. According to his platform, posted on Facebook, Libya should be a “moderate Muslim state” with the Quran as “our constitution and the only source of legislation.” He frequently appeared on Al Ahrar and Al Jazeera to promote his candidacy.

But disappointment followed. That July, in Libya’s first democratic election since 1964, Kubbar lost his bid. Broadly speaking, Islamists fared worse than expected. The Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Justice and Construction Party won just 10 percent of the vote. (That said, the fact that the legislature included many seats reserved for “independents” meant that, by not standing as affiliates, other members were able to get into the body; a German think-tank analysis later determined that more than half of independents in the legislature actually had ties to a political party.) Most embarrassing for Qatar was the dismal performance of al-Watan (Homeland), a party formed by rebel commander 
Belhaj: It failed to win a single seat.

Kubbar was stunned—and bitter. “Leave, and take your council with you,” he wrote in a Facebook diatribe against interim leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil, a former justice minister under Qaddafi. “I feel nauseous whenever I see your face or read a story about you. I swear to you that the country will not be worse than it is in your presence.”

Excluded from office, Kubbar joined the self-proclaimed High Council of Libyan Revolutionaries, a national organization that, similar to his Zawiya NGO, promised to advocate on behalf of freedom fighters. (By this time, Kubbar had largely abandoned his work with the Revolutionary Youth Coalition of February 17; the organization foundered less than a year after it was created.) As the High Council’s first deputy, Kubbar fixated on the need to pass a proposed political-isolation law that would ban former regime figures from holding public office, including many former NTC leaders and two former prime ministers. The law was widely supported by the groups persecuted under Qaddafi, including tribal and Islamist figures, who hoped to secure further power in the new Libya. “I, Osama Kubbar, support all kinds of escalations,” Kubbar shouted to a crowd gathered outside the legislature in December 2012. “We don’t want this government.”

As the vote over the bill approached the following May, several militias, including ones allied with the High Council, blockaded the Foreign Affairs and Justice ministries as a not-subtle threat to anyone who might consider voting against the bill. Under duress, just four legislators out of 200 dared to do so. Kubbar was thrilled: “It was a step forward,” he said.

The morning after the law passed, Kubbar says he got a call from one of Zawiya’s rebel leaders, a man named Mohammed, who had benefited from his weapons deliveries. Mohammed asked whether Kubbar, whom he called “Dr. Osama,” could meet him at Tripoli’s harbor just a few miles from the headquarters of the High Council of Libyan Revolutionaries. Kubbar went alone and found Mohammed standing near the water.

But just as Kubbar approached on foot, a Land Cruiser drove up and Mohammed pulled a gun. “Come here,” he said, gesturing to the vehicle, where a handful of passengers revealed their own weapons. “Who sent you to kidnap me?” Kubbar remembers asking. The men stayed silent, driving Kubbar to a cell in Tripoli where he says he was kept for two days.

Kubbar won’t discuss the specifics of his captivity, including why he was eventually let go. He believes, however, he was taken in retaliation for his stance on the political-isolation law.

The kidnapping was a wake-up call. Before then, there had been few consequences for Kubbar as he openly ridiculed political opponents and encouraged takedowns of many of Libya’s new leaders. Now, he realized, Libya had changed; new rivalries were emerging, even between onetime friends, and violence was a daily risk.

So Kubbar returned to Doha, where he began working as an advisor on regional strategy for the Qatari armed forces’ Strategic Studies Centre. (He still holds the post today.) Then, alongside others in the capital city who’d once hoped revolution would bring stability, he watched as conflict sank its teeth firmly into Libya.

In May 2014, forces loyal to former army general Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity, a coordinated assault against Islamist and jihadi militias in Benghazi and Tripoli. The following month, Islamists lost in national polls marred by violence and low turnout. They refused to recognize the new government, however, and instead joined several local armed groups in a loose alliance called Libya Dawn. The body declared itself in charge of the country and, by August, had retaken Tripoli from Haftar’s men. Over the following months, the two sides raced toward civil war: In the last half of 2014, between 1,000 and 2,500 people, including many noncombatants, died as a result of aerial bombardments, ground attacks, and other violence.

Today, grim circumstances persist. Militia members have ballooned into the hundreds of thousands, up from just 17,000 at the height of the 2011 uprising, according to NATO figures. No political faction can hope to control them. And new extremists have begun to stake claims. In early 2015, the Islamic State announced its arrival in the coastal city of Derna. By March, the U.S. State Department estimated the group had between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters in Libya, enough to give it a dangerous springboard into the rest of North Africa.

Foreign powers have remained enmeshed in the conflict. Haftar’s forces, for instance, have reportedly enjoyed air and material support from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Qatar, for its part, continued to support proxies until at least 2014, which likely included funneling weapons to Libya Dawn fighters, according to allegations in a 2015 U.N. report. Yet despite these efforts, Qatar has seen its clout shrink mightily as bedlam has descended on Libya. “Qatar is a curse word in Libya,” says Jason Pack, president of the consultancy Libya-
Analysis. “Even in Tripoli, they don’t like the Qatari hand. [Qatar is] not somewhere you want to be associated with.”

Many of Qatar’s early beneficiaries are now only marginal players in the post-revolutionary game. Ali al-Sallabi moves between Istanbul and Doha, hosting conferences and meetings, but he says he has stepped back from politics. “There were mistakes,” he says of the revolution, including a failure to prioritize reconciliation between defectors and Islamists. Meanwhile, Shammam has returned to his former life as a journalist, opening an independent online newspaper in Cairo. His regrets echo Sallabi’s: “We could not really understand the difficulty of a transformation.”

For his part, Kubbar says he traveled to Tripoli last December and January to meet with friends in Libya Dawn—“the guys,” he calls them. The effect of the trip was deflating. “The freedom fighters,” Kubbar says, a look of disgust crossing his face, “don’t really have a vision and project for the country.”

Kubbar’s life in Doha is now built around offering commentary on Libya. He writes reports for the Qatari military, joins panel discussions, and still regularly speaks on Al Jazeera. He isn’t fond of U.N.-brokered peace talks underway to end the crisis in his home country—they leave too many doors open for regime defectors—but he also acknowledges that a bad deal may be better than no deal at all. “So many people just want a solution,” he says. “They have had enough of this chaos and need to build a country.”

In another breath, however, he speaks of returning to Libya one day and rekindling the snuffed flame of revolution. “If you have never lived under oppression, you can’t understand,” Kubbar says. “It’s loyalty to this huge investment of bloodshed and martyrs and dignity.

“You cannot really turn your back on this and say, ‘I’m going to walk away.’”