Author Archives: Denise Simon

The Wilful Reckless Handling of Classified Docs in DHS too?

Posted on by

Okay, so we have had the issue at the U.S. State Department and now the Department of Homeland Security, so it begs the question, what other agencies? Further, Iran, Russia, China and North Korea are likely loving this.

Security? Heh….

Homeland Security Is Spilling a Lot of Secrets

By

Bloomberg: The Department of Homeland Security suffered over 100 “spills” of classified information last year, 40 percent of which came from one office, according to a leaked internal document I obtained. Officials and lawmakers told me that until the Department imposes stricter policies and sounder practices to better protect sensitive intelligence, the vulnerabilities there could be exploited. Not only does this raise the threat that hostile actors could get their hands on classified information, but may lead to other U.S. agencies keeping DHS out of the loop on major security issues.

A spill is not the same as an unauthorized disclosure of classified information. A Homeland Security official explained that spills often include “the accidental, inadvertent, or intentional introduction of classified information into an unclassified information technology system, or higher-level classified information into a lower-level classified information technology system, to include non-government systems.”

Examples include: using a copier not approved for the level of classified information copied; failing to properly mark a classified product; transmitting classified information on an unclassified system like Gmail; or sending classified information to someone who, while having the proper level of clearance, is not authorized to read a section of information sent to them, the official said.

There were 119 of these classified spills reported throughout the Homeland Security Department in fiscal year 2015, according to the internal document, which itself is unclassified. The section with the most spills by far was the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, headquartered at building 19 of the Nebraska Avenue Complex in Washington, led by retired General Francis Taylor. This office is composed mostly of intelligence analysts assigned to produce and review classified reports that are often the work of other intelligence agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

One senior Homeland Security official told me that the intelligence and analysis office at DHS suffers from lax enforcement of the established policies and practices to protect classified information. This official said the numbers of classified spills in the internal report only represents those incidents that were officially reported, and the actual number is much higher.

S.Y. Lee, a department spokesman, told me that DHS does not comment on reports of leaked information, but that the department is currently having mandatory employee training sessions on the handling of classified and sensitive information.

“We take any report of mishandling of information very seriously, and when violations are discovered, the Department takes immediate, appropriate actions to address the situation,” he said. “DHS takes the protection of all our assets very seriously, and will continue to evolve our training and remediation efforts to address security needs and accountability to the American public.”

Experts on government secrecy and classified information handling told me that the number of spills alone does not directly prove that there is a larger cultural or policy problem at DHS. But there is a history of carelessness with e-mail at the department, and this new finding combined with anecdotal reports of bad practices indicate that there should be more investigation the intelligence and analysis division in particular.

“At a minimum, this raises a question about what’s going on at this corner of the agency,” said Steven Aftergood, director of the program on government secretary at the Federation of American Scientists. “If it is happening disproportionally in one part of the agency, that may mean that remedial measures are needed there, including security training, better oversight and similar steps.”

Spillages are a normal part of the classification system at the DHS and elsewhere, and there are formal procedures for addressing them because it’s understood that you cannot eliminate human error, he said. But if one intelligence shop is mishandling information from another part of the government, that could cause real problems in the interagency cooperation and intelligence-sharing.

“If they have a reputation as a shop with unreliable security, other agencies are going to think twice about sharing their most valuable information with Homeland Security,” Aftergood said. “It can hurt other agencies and it can rebound on them. It’s bad all around and should be corrected.”

Johannes B. Ullrich, dean of research for the SANS Technology Institute, said that it’s probable most of the classified spills were unintentional and the result of sloppiness more than anything else. But lax enforcement of policies meant to protect sensitive information also presents an opportunity for exploitation by malicious actors.

“If it’s accepted practice that you print documents and scan them in, for example, then it’s much easier for an insider to take advantage of that,” he said. “By reducing the unintentional spillage you make it easier to find the intentional ones.”

The House Homeland Security Committee is currently pushing DHS to implement new systems for monitoring employees who handle classified information. Last November, the House passed the DHS Insider Threat and Mitigation Act, which was sponsored by Representative Peter King, chairman of the Homeland Security Committee’s subcommittee on counterterrorism and intelligence. The bill would require Taylor, among other things, to develop a timeline for deploying workplace monitoring technologies, employee awareness campaigns, and education and training programs related to potential insider threats to the department’s critical assets. The Senate Homeland Security Committee marked up a companion bill earlier this month.

“In recent years, the department has made progress installing limited monitoring technology, but much more needs to be done,” King said in a statement. “Results from the existing systems demonstrate the need for more auditing and education for DHS employees.”

Classified spills are a government-wide problem and there’s no way to know if the incidents at the DHS intelligence shop have been exploited. But unless that office and the government as a whole does a better job of protecting classified information, it’s just a matter of time before real damage is done to U.S. national security

Lew Alcindor aka Eric Holder….But Its Okay?

Posted on by

While US Attorney General, Eric Holder Used Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s Birth Name as His Official Email Address

Leopold/Vice:

Former US Attorney General Eric Holder is a huge fan of NBA hall of famer Kareem Abdul-Jabbar.

So much so that Holder used Abdul-Jabbar’s birth name, Lew Alcindor, as an alias for his official Department of Justice (DOJ) email account, raising more questions about the email practices of top Obama administration officials, and about the ability of US government agencies to track down correspondence in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.

The Lew Alcindor revelation was made in a February 16 letter that DOJ sent to VICE News and Ryan Shapiro, a historian and doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who specializes in national security research.

“For your information,” the letter said, “e-mails in the enclosed documents which use the account name ‘Lew Alcindor’ denote e-mails to or from former Attorney General Holder.”

The letter was part of about 500 pages of heavily redacted emails and other documents given to VICE News and Shapiro in response to a FOIA lawsuit filed in late 2014. The documents show that Justice Department officials sent emails to Lew Alcindor regarding calls from lawmakers for a federal investigation into claims that CIA personnel spied on Senate staffers while the Senate was drafting a report about the CIA’s torture program. Holder’s name does not appear anywhere in his Lew Alcindor email account.

The responses from Lew Alcindor, notably one about Senator Ron Wyden’s demand that the DOJ “reopen” an investigation into the CIA after the agency’s own internal watchdog upheld the spying allegations, are virtually all redacted. DOJ declined to launch a criminal probe into the matter, claiming there was insufficient evidence. (Earlier this month, Wyden confronted CIA Director John Brennan about the spying incident and tried to get him to acknowledge it was improper and would not happen again.)

Other documents center around messages sent to the DOJ by David Grannis, the former staff director of the Senate Intelligence Committee, about authorizing Senate staffers to return to a secure facility leased by the CIA so they could finish fact-checking and writing the torture report. Grannis brings up the DOJ’s subsequent “odd” request, communicated to Grannis through the CIA, that Senate staffers “receive a security refresher beforehand, highlighting especially the computer system’s audit feature.”

“Can you cast any light on what DOJ personnel meant by this, or why they said it? Seems odd for DOJ to get involved in the security procedures between the Agency and the Committee, so I wanted to make sure we understood DOJ’s recommendation,” Grannis wrote, suggesting that the DOJ gave credence to CIA claims that Senate staffers inappropriately gained access to a coveted internal CIA document that sparked CIA spying.

There are vast swaths of redacting black ink throughout the emails — including DOJ’s response to Grannis.

Last March, a week after the New York Times revealed that Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton exclusively used a private email account to conduct official business while she was Secretary of State, Holder’s chief spokesman, Brian Fallon, disclosed that his boss had used three different aliases — all of which had a usdoj.gov domain — during his tenure as the nation’s top law enforcement official.

‘Will members of the public reviewing the records of Eric Holder’s tenure as attorney general understand emails purporting to be from Lew Alcindor are actually from him?’

Fallon made the disclosure less than a week before he announced that he would serve as lead press secretary for Clinton’s presidential campaign. Fallon identified two of the email accounts Holder previously used, but they weren’t the names of any known living person. Fallon declined to identify Holder’s third email alias other than to say that it was “based” on an athlete. (Before leaving the DOJ in April 2015, Holder had still been using the Lew Alcindor email address.)

Fallon, who exchanged many of the emails in the cache with Lew Alcindor, explained the rationale for the practice: to combat spam and to avoid being inundated with correspondence from the public.

A Justice Department spokesman told VICE News there was nothing improper or legally questionable about Holder using the identity of a living person for his email account. Nor was it in any way an attempt, he said, to thwart FOIA or the Federal Records Act, which requires government agencies to preserve federal records. DOJ officials who handle FOIA requests and congressional inquiries, the spokesman said, knew of Holder’s email aliases.

Yet DOJ and many other federal agencies, the State Department and FBI in particular, have been harshly criticized (including by VICE News) for poorly performing searches meant to capture emails from officials who use their true identities. Experts in FOIA law said Holder’s Lew Alcindor identity calls into question the ability of FOIA staff to locate all emails from an official who uses an alias.

Laura Sheehan, a spokeswoman for the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), said the email alias practice appears to be fairly common among agency heads in large government departments.

“There is no prohibition against it, so long as they can be linked to the actual name,” Sheehan said.

A few years ago, the former head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Lisa Jackson, came under fire from conservative lawmakers and open government advocates — and was accused of attempting to thwart open records requests and federal records retention laws — after it was revealed that she used the email alias Richard Windsor when conducting official business. An inspector general review into the practice concluded that EPA lacks “internal controls to ensure the identification and preservation of records when using private and alias email accounts for conducting government business.” The disclosure lead NARA to issue policy guidance to the heads of federal agencies on email management, which say:

Agencies must ensure that the name of an individual employee is linked with each account in order to comply with FOIA, discovery, and the requirement to transfer permanent email records… to NARA. In most cases, this requires the full name or readily identifiable nickname that is maintained on a distribution list.

In a Q&A with the Washington Post shortly thereafter, NARA’s chief records officer, Paul Wester Jr., said that while there is no prohibition against using email aliases, the practice makes it difficult to locate and turn over records in response to FOIA requests, and NARA does not condone it.

“We’ve been pretty clear with agencies it is not a good practice to follow, and we don’t recommend that they authorize the use of personal e-mail accounts or alias accounts to conduct their business,” Wester said. “There’s a higher probability the emails wouldn’t be documented properly with their broader record keeping systems.”

Anne Weismann, the executive director of good government group Campaign for Accountability, and an expert on FOIA, told VICE News that even though the DOJ has acknowledged that Holder used an email alias, and that DOJ’s FOIA staff is aware, “it still raises a question about whether the agency is properly documenting its work and preserving records under the Federal Records Act.”

“Will members of the public reviewing the records of Eric Holder’s tenure as [attorney general] understand emails purporting to be from ‘Lew Alcindor’ are actually from him?” Weismann said. “An investigation clearly is warranted.”

Several years ago, Weismann inquired with the DOJ about the number of email accounts associated with Holder and his deputies. The DOJ responded to her inquiry by saying Holder’s email address does not use his name.

“This protects his privacy and security and allows him to conduct official business efficiently via e-mail,” DOJ attorney Vanessa Brinkman wrote in a September 30, 2013 letter addressed to Weismann. (Brinkmann also signed the February 16 letter turned over to VICE News and Shapiro.)

Holder, who returned to his old law firm Covington after he left the DOJ, did not return a call for comment.

A DOJ spokesman said Attorney General Loretta Lynch uses an official DOJ email address to conduct government business, but “to help guard against security risks, the Attorney General does not use her given name in the handle of her email address.”

Douglas Cox, a law professor with the City University of New York School of Law whose research focuses on the intersection of information policy and national security, said he believes there is a “legitimate problem” with alias emails, “especially in the way agencies appear to be administering them.”

“Agencies are unnecessarily creating risks of undermining FOIA responses, subpoena responses, and discovery disclosures,” Cox said. “I also think alias emails are inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the federal record keeping laws.”

Cox said he understands why Holder would want to avoid being spammed and receiving unsolicited emails from the public, “but I don’t see what the justification would be for not configuring [[email protected]] so [Holder’s] actual name appears in internal emails.”

“Is there some reason why the identity of the sender has to be masked internally? And if so, then they must be tightly controlling who knows the alias, which in turn invites, if not guarantees, FOIA and record keeping problems,” Cox said. “When you consider the possibility, if not likelihood based on what we know, that alias emails are common practice among high-ranking officials across dozens of agencies, the risk of undermining FOIA searches and discovery requests within the various agencies approaches certainty.”

Meanwhile, Abdul-Jabbar, who legally changed his name in 1971, was unaware that Holder used his birth name for his official government email account. A spokeswoman for the former Los Angeles Lakers great declined to comment about the issue. Last year, Abdul-Jabbar interviewed Holder for a documentary he is producing on race. And in an interview with Politico around the same time, Holder said he idolized Abdul-Jabbar growing up and that the basketball legend had become a friend.

 

Lew

Chilling Details of the Sony Hack, Reported

Posted on by

These Are the Cyberweapons Used to Hack Sony

MotherBoard: In late November 2014, a mysterious group of hackers calling itself “God’sApstls” sent an ominous and jumbled email to a few high-level Sony Pictures executives.

“The compensation for it, monetary compensation we want,” the hackers wrote. “Pay the damage, or Sony Pictures will be bombarded as a whole.”

The executives at the Hollywood studio, which was about to release the controversial James Franco and Seth Rogen’s comedy The Interview, ignored the email. Just three days later, the hackers’ followed through with their threat and breached the studio’s systems, displaying a message on the computer screen of every employee: “Hacked by #GOP [Guardians of Peace].”

The hackers not only defaced employee’s computers, they then wiped their hard disks, crippling Sony Pictures for weeks, and costing the company $35 million in IT damages, according to its own estimate.

Now, more than a year later, several security researchers are still hunting down the hackers behind the attack, which the FBI officially identified as North Korean government-employed hackers. And despite the fact that the group is apparently still alive and well, a coalition of security researchers believes they can now disrupt them by exposing their extensive malware arsenal.

On Wednesday, a group of companies led by Novetta released a report detailing the Sony hackers’ long history of operations, as well as its large stock of malware. It’s perhaps the most detailed and extensive look at the group behind what might be the most infamous cyberattack ever.

Andre Ludwig, the senior technical director at Novetta Research and Interdiction Group, said that the investigation started from four hashes (values that uniquely identify a file) that the Department of Homeland security published after the attack. With those few identifying strings, and after months of sleuthing, the researchers found 2,000 malware samples, both from online malware portal VirusTotal, as well as from antivirus companies. Of those, they manually reviewed and catalogued 1,000, and were able to identify 45 unique malware strains, revealing that the Sony hackers had an arsenal more sophisticated and varied than previously thought.

The researchers hope that by shedding light on the hackers’ toolkit, the group, which the researchers called “Lazarus Group,” will be forced to adapt, spending resources and time, and perhaps even lose capabilities after antivirus companies and potential targets put up new defenses.

“There is no more shadows to hide in for these tools.”

“If all of a sudden you have antivirus signatures that detect and delete all the group’s arsenal, boom!” Jaime Blasco, the chief scientist at AlienVault Labs and one of the researchers who investigated the Sony hackers, told Motherboard. “They lose access to all the victims’ they got before.”

As Ludwig put it, “there is no more shadows to hide in for these tools.”

As it turns out, the hackers’ arsenal contains not only malware capable of wiping and destroying files on a hard disk like the Sony hack, but also Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) tools, tools that allow for remotely eavesdropping on a victim’s computer, and more, according to the report. The researchers tracked some of this tools in cyberattacks and espionage operations that go as far as back as 2009, perhaps even 2007, showing the hackers that hit Sony have a long history.

While others suspected this before, Blasco said that nobody demonstrated it as conclusively until now.

Novetta researchers and their partners, which include AlienVault and Kaspersky Lab, don’t get into saying who the hackers really are, but they also don’t question the FBI’s controversial claim that North Korea was behind the attack.

The main reason, LaMontagne explained, is that the new data they found discredits the alternative theories that the hackers were actually a disgruntled former employee or just an independent hacktivist group.

A former Sony system administrator is unlikely to have built more than 45 malware tools in the span of more than seven years, LaMontagne told me. And the same time, he added, it’s also unlikely that a previously unheard of hacktivist group would pop up, claim responsibility for such a high-profile attack, and then disappear.

“They’re extremely motivated, regimented, organized, and they can definitely execute.”

“We have no reason to dispute what the US government and other governments have asserted as the threat being North Korean,” Peter LaMontagne, the CEO of Novetta, told me.

And as it turns out, those hackers have been around for longer than anyone thought—wielding sophisticated weapons. This, according to the researchers, shows the group was much more seasoned than anyone believed.

“Their motivation and operational execution, it’s impressive,” Ludwig said. “They’re extremely motivated, regimented, organized, and they can definitely execute.”

Now that their methods and tools are exposed, however, the researchers hope that they won’t be as effective.

The head-scratcher is sanctions are only for the missile test?

US to present UN sanctions resolution on North Korea

United Nations (United States) (AFP) – The United States will on Thursday present a draft UN resolution toughening sanctions on North Korea after reaching agreement with China on a joint response to Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test and a rocket launch.

The UN Security Council will meet at 2:00 pm (1900 GMT) to discuss the draft text detailing a new package of measures to punish North Korea, but there will be no immediate vote.

US Ambassador Samantha Power “intends to submit for consideration by the Security Council a draft sanctions resolution in response to the DPRK’s recent nuclear test and subsequent proscribed ballistic missile launch,” US spokesman Kurtis Cooper said, using the abbreviation for North Korea’s formal name.

“We look forward to working with the Council on a strong and comprehensive response to the DPRK’s latest series of tests aimed at advancing their nuclear weapons program.”

UN diplomats said a vote was expected as early as Friday.

European Union: 10 Days to Collapse, $1.4 Trillion Euros

Posted on by

EU has 10 days to see progress on migrant crisis or Schengen unravels: EU commissioner

BRUSSELS (Reuters) – European Union has 10 more days to see significantly lower inflows of migrants and refugees from Turkey “or else there is risk the whole system will completely break down”, EU Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos said on Thursday.

Avramopoulos was speaking after the bloc’s justice and home affairs ministers met in Brussels on Thursday in an effort to put a European solution to the crisis in place. A growing number of EU states are resorting to unilateral border tightening, unraveling the continent’s free-travel Schengen zone.

The study estimated that under a worst case scenario, in which the reintroduction of controls at EU borders pushed import prices up three percent, the costs to the bloc’s largest economy Germany could be as much as 235 billion euros between 2016 and 2025, and those to France up to 244 billion.

At a minimum, with import prices rising one percent, the study showed that a breakdown of Schengen would cost the EU roughly 470 billion euros over the next decade.

The cost would climb to 1.4 trillion euros, or roughly 10 percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP) in the 28-member EU bloc, under the more dire scenario.

“If border controls are reinstated within Europe, already weak growth will come under additional pressure,” said Aart De Geus, president of Bertelsmann.

Schengen was established over 30 years ago and now counts 26 members, 22 of which are EU members. But the system of passport-free travel has come under severe pressure over the past half year due to a flood of migrants entering Europe, mainly from the Middle East and Africa.

To stem the tide and to ensure they have an overview of who is entering their territory, many countries within Schengen have reintroduced border controls in recent months, leading to fears the whole system could collapse.

Underscoring the urgency of the issue, Germany’s Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere told public broadcaster ARD on Sunday that EU member states, which have been squabbling for months over how to tackle the migrant crisis, must agree a common approach within two weeks if they wanted to avoid such a fate.

In addition to being a devastating symbolic setback for Europe, a collapse of Schengen would increase the amount of time it takes for goods to be transported across European borders, raising costs for companies and consumers.

The Bertelsmann study, conducted by Prognos AG, estimated that the minimum costs to Germany and France would be 77 billion euros and 80.5 billion euros, respectively, over the period to 2025.

A collapse of Schengen would also increase costs for countries outside the zone, with the combined burden on the United States and China over the next decade estimated at between 91 billion and 280 billion euros, according to the study.

More here.

*** EU’s migration system close to ‘complete breakdown’

EuroNews: The EU’s migration system is on the point of complete breakdown, according to a top European Commission official.

Dimitris Avramopoulos, the European Commissioner for migration, issued the stark warning after a meeting between EU interior ministers on Thursday.

inRead invented by Teads

“In the next ten days, we need tangible and clear results on the ground, otherwise there is a danger, there is a risk that the whole system will completely break down. There is no time for uncoordinated actions,” he told reporters in Brussels.

A number of EU countries have introduced border checks amid disagreements over how to best handle the huge influx of refugees and migrants into Europe.

Austria irked some EU officials by calling a mini summit with Western Balkan nations – without inviting Greece or Germany

The Austrian government has also set a daily cap on how migrants per day are allowed to enter the country, ignoring a warning from European Commission lawyers

“We have to recover our ability to act – and that will only be possible when the European external border is protected,” said Johanna Mikl-Leitner, the Austrian interior minister.

“If Greece stresses over and over again that it is not possible to protect the Greek border…we have to ask the question if it’s possible that the external border of the Schengen area stays in Greece.”

The Schengen area is a passport-free travel zone including 26 countries, of which 22 are EU member states.

But the migration crisis, which saw more than a million people reach Europe last year, has left some observers to question whether the whole system may be at risk.

The influx of migrants has exposed divisions between EU governments, which are trading accusations of blame and resulting beggar-thy-neighbour policies to tighten border controls.

Belgium became the seventh Schengen member on Wednesday to introduce border checks as it became clear that a court in Lille would order the partial demolition of the infamous Calais ‘Jungle’ refugee camp.

 

U.S. Poised to Take on China Aggressions

Posted on by

The Pentagon Readies Backup Island in Case of Chinese Missile Onslaught

Threat prompts the U.S. military to prepare a fallback option

WiB: The United States can no longer count on its Pacific air bases to be safe from missile attack during a war with China. On the contrary, a 2015 paper from the influential RAND Corporation noted that in the worst case scenario, “larger and accurate attacks sustained over time against a less hardened posture could be devastating, causing large losses of aircraft and prolonged airfield closures.”

Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, due to its relative proximity, would be hardest hit. To up the stakes, China in September 2015 publicly revealed its DF-26 ballistic missile, which can strike Andersen Air Force Base in Guam — nearly 3,000 miles away — from the Chinese mainland. Andersen and Kadena are among the U.S. military’s largest and most important overseas bases.

Enter Tinian. The lush, small island near Guam is emerging as one of the Air Force’s backup landing bases. On Feb. 10, the flying branch announced that it selected Tinian as a divert airfield “in the event access to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, or other western Pacific locations is limited or denied.”

In the Pentagon’s 2017 budget request, it asked for $9 million to buy 17.5 acres of land “in support of divert activities and exercise intiatives,” the Saipan Tribune reported. In peacetime, the expanded Tinian airfield will host “up to 12 tanker aircraft and associated support personnel for divert operations,” according to the Air Force.

7637127318_661f4e4d60_kAbove — Tinian’s West Field in 1945. At top — Tinian seen from the cockpit of a C-130H. U.S. Air Force photo

Tinian is now a sleepy place.

During World War II, the 4th and 2nd Marine Divisions captured the island, which later based the B-29 Superfortresses Enola Gay and Bockscar which took off from Tinian’s North Field and dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. An arsenal during the war, most of its airstrips are now abandoned and unused. The island’s other former air base, West Field, is a small, neglected international airport.

The Air Force first wanted Saipan for its airfield. Very close to Tinian, Saipan has 15 times the population, a larger airport and a harbor. But this proposal met opposition from local activists due to the effect on “coral, potable water, local transportation and socioeconomic factors on surrounding communities,” Stars and Stripes reported.

The opposition even included the pro-business Saipan Chamber of Commerce, which worried that Tinian’s rusty airport would miss out on the flood of Pentagon spending. Saipan’s airport is also overcrowded — with locals not happy about the prospect of hundreds of airmen flying in for military exercises lasting up to eight weeks ever year.

In a way, its a return to the past. The United States dispersed air bases to varying degrees — and in different parts of the world — during the Cold War, but as the threat of a Soviet missile attack evaporated and post-Persian Gulf War budget cuts hit hard in the 1990s, the trend shifted toward larger mega-bases that operate on economies of scale.

But dispersed bases are more survivable, RAND’s Alan Vick noted in his 2015 paper:

Dispersing aircraft across many bases creates redundancy in operating surfaces and facilities. This enhances basic safety of flight by providing bases for weather or inflight-emergency diverts. It also increases the number of airfields that adversary forces must monitor and can greatly complicate their targeting problem (in part by raising the prospect that friendly forces might move among several bases).

 

At the least, dispersal (because it increases the ratio of runways to aircraft) forces an attacker to devote considerably more resources to runway attacks than would be the case for a concentrated force. It also greatly increases construction and operating costs to spread aircraft across many major bases. To mitigate these costs, dispersal bases tend to have more-modest facilities and, at times, might be nothing more than airstrips.