Pentagon Launching Cyber Bombs on ISIS

Posted on April 14, 2016April 14, 2016 by Denise Simon

FNC: The U.S. has ramped up its fight against the Islamic State terror group’s online capabilities, dropping so-called “cyber bombs” on the militants, a top Pentagon official said Tuesday.

“Those guys are under enormous pressure. Every time we have gone after one of their defended positions over the last six months, we have defeated them. They have left, they have retreated,” Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work told Reuters.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter gave some explanation for the concept of “cyber bombs” in a February NPR interview.

“We are using cyber tools, which is really a major new departure… These are strikes that are conducted in the warzone using cyber essentially as a weapon of war, just like we drop bombs,” Carter said.

Analysts say ISIS has frequently used the Internet to spread its message, regularly releasing photos and videos on social media. The latest edition of its magazine “Dabiq” went online this week.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has helped Iraqi forces as they prepare operations to retake the northern city of Mosul. While they got off to a slow start, there have been some recent advances, and officials say momentum has been growing in the fight against ISIS.

Secretary of State John Kerry, during a visit to Baghdad last Friday, pledged $155 million in new U.S. aid to Iraq and offered a show of political support to Iraq’s beleaguered Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

****

DefenseSystems: Given the classifications and operational security surrounding cyber operations, details on anti-ISIS activity in this domain are scant, though Carter added some information in a Pentagon press conference with reporters on Monday, saying the cyber component is aimed at disrupting ISIS’s command and control to cause them to lose confidence in their networks, as well as overloading their networks to limit their operational functionality. But given that the cyber tools are new, Carter said details are being kept under wraps, especially considering they are applicable to other conflicts globally.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford reiterated the point that DOD does not want to provide operational details in hopes of keeping the element of surprise. Dunford did say that, conceptually, DOD is trying to isolate ISIS in the same way it is trying to so in the physical space.

Both Dunford and Carter said that the capabilities being used against ISIS, and others globally, are exactly why the U.S. Cyber Command was established in the first place. Dunford said the command is building an inventory of tools to be used in cyberspace going forward.

Carter has said previously that the Defense Department will look to take the fight to ISIS in the cyber domain, even resorting to targeting members of ISIS’s hacking cadre with bombs. However, it is still believed that ISIS’ cyber capabilities remain low, limited to merely website defacements and denial-of-service attacks.

One concern, whether from nation-states or groups such as ISIS should they gain cyber acumen, is the targeting of U.S. critical infrastructure. “Although it’s not a popular target for people trying to make a profit – that’s good and bad, because the flip side is that the adversaries who are interested in potentially targeting critical infrastructure could potentially be more sophisticated adversaries,” Isaac Porche, associate director of the Forces and Logistics Program at RAND, told a panel of lawmakers last week. “So critical infrastructure today might have to deal with a more sophisticated threat than, let’s say, a hardware store might have to.”

Military and U.S. intelligence officials in the past have been careful about what, in their minds, the term “attack” connotes in cyberspace, potentially allowing conclusions to be drawn regarding current U.S. activity against ISIS. “Terminology and lexicon is very important in this space,” Adm. Michael Rogers, the head of the National Security Agency and Cyber Command, told the House Intelligence Committee last year.“And many times I’ll hear people throw out ‘attack’ and ‘act of war’ and I go, ‘That’s not necessarily in every case how I would characterize the activity that I see’.”

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has said previously that the hack and theft of millions of records from the Office of Personnel Management did not constitute an attack, because it did not result in the destruction of systems, infrastructure or data.

“We generally look at all cyber events and we define it as an attack. In many cases you can do reconnaissance, you can do espionage, you can do theft in this domain we call cyberspace,” Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart told lawmakers recently. “But the reaction always is, whether it’s an adversary doing reconnaissance, an adversary trying to conduct a [human intelligence] operations in this domain, we define it as an attack and I don’t think that’s terribly helpful.”

Russian Provocation on U.S. Military, Pact Violation

Posted on April 14, 2016April 14, 2016 by Denise Simon

Earlier this week, the Russians buzzed a U.S. guided missile destroyer in the Baltic Sea. This occurred 11 times over 2 days. It is an educated guess that this provocation was meant to be a classified occurrence but our military is angry and leaked it into the public domain. This is hardly the first time the Russians have behave outside the scope of international pacts and conditions against the West and allies.

The Russians did have a response to our complaints, that is if there were any from Washington:

NBC: A U.S. official said the maneuvers were “unsafe” and “unprofessional” — and that the jets were so low they left “wake in the water.” He said a Russian KA-27 helicopter also made seven passes above the destroyer and was believed to be photographing the ship.

Russian Ministry of Defense spokesman Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov hit back Thursday, saying that “upon visual contact, the Russian pilots have executed a turnaway from the ship, compliant to all safety regulations.”

Safety regulations? Whose regulations exactly? There is something called the IncSea that prevents as one of the issues THE exact type of incident that Russia is guilty of. Additionally, the Cold War Museum has an interesting story about this exact matter.

Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972
Entered into force May 25, 1972

Narrative
Treaty Text
Protocol

Narrative

In the late 1960s, there were several incidents between forces of the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy. These included planes of the two nations passing near one another, ships bumping one another, and both ships and aircraft making threatening movements against those of the other side. In March 1968 the United States proposed talks on preventing such incidents from becoming more serious. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation in November 1970, and the talks were conducted in two rounds — October 1, 1971, in Moscow and May 17, 1972, in Washington, D.C. The Agreement was signed by Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Soviet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov during the Moscow summit meeting in 1972.

Specifically, the agreement provides for:

steps to avoid collision;

not interfering in the “formations” of the other party;

avoiding maneuvers in areas of heavy sea traffic;

requiring surveillance ships to maintain a safe distance from the object of investigation so as to avoid “embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance”;

using accepted international signals when ships maneuver near one another;

not simulating attacks at, launching objects toward, or illuminating the bridges of the other partys ships;

informing vessels when submarines are exercising near them; and

requiring aircraft commanders to use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party and not permitting simulated attacks against aircraft or ships, performing aerobatics over ships, or dropping hazardous objects near them.

The agreement also provides for: (1) notice three to five days in advance, as a rule, of any projected actions that might “represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight”; (2) information on incidents to be channeled through naval attaches assigned to the respective capitals; and (3) annual meetings to review the implementation of the Agreement.

The protocol to this agreement grew out of the first meeting of the Consultative Committee established by the agreement. Each side recognized that its effectiveness could be enhanced by additional understandings relating to nonmilitary vessels. In the protocol signed in Washington, D.C., on May 22, 1973, each party pledged not to make simulated attacks against the nonmilitary ships of the other.

Like other confidence-building measures, the Incidents at Sea Agreement does not directly affect the size, weaponry, or force structure of the parties. Rather, it serves to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military activities; to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis. In 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman cited the accord as “a good example of functional navy-to-navy process” and credited this area of Soviet-American relations with “getting better rather than worse.” In 1985, he observed that the frequency of incidents was “way down from what it was in the 1960s and early 1970s.”

Treaty Text

Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas

Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972
Entered into force May 25, 1972

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Desiring to assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas, and

Guided by the principles and rules of international law,

Have decided to conclude this Agreement and have agreed as follows:

Article IFor the purpose of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:

1. “Ship” means:

(b) Naval auxiliaries of the Parties, which include all naval ships authorized to fly the naval auxiliary flag where such a flag has been established by either Party.

(a) A warship belonging to the naval forces of the Parties bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy list, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline;

2. “Aircraft” means all military manned heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air craft, excluding space craft.

3. “Formation” means an ordered arrangement of two or more ships proceeding together and normally maneuvered together.

Article IIThe Parties shall take measures to instruct the commanding officers of their respective ships to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, hereinafter referred to as the Rules of the Road. The Parties recognize that their freedom to conduct operations on the high seas is based on the principles established under recognized international law and codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.

Article III1. In all cases ships operating in proximity to each other, except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, shall remain well clear to avoid risk of collision.

2. Ships meeting or operating in the vicinity of a formation of the other Party shall, while conforming to the Rules of the Road, avoid maneuvering in a manner which would hinder the evolutions of the formation.

3. Formations shall not conduct maneuvers through areas of heavy traffic where internationally recognized traffic separation schemes are in effect.

4. Ships engaged in surveillance of other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk of collision and also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance. Except when required to maintain course and speed under the Rules of the Road, a surveillant shall take positive early action so as, in the exercise of good seamanship, not to embarrass or endanger ships under surveillance.

5. When ships of both Parties maneuver in sight of one another, such signals (flag, sound, and light) as are prescribed by the Rules of the Road, the International Code of Signals, or other mutually agreed signals, shall be adhered to for signalling operations and intentions.

6. Ships of the Parties shall not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a passing ship of the other Party, not launch any object in the direction of passing ships of the other Party, and not use searchlights or other powerful illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of passing ships of the other Party.

7. When conducting exercises with submerged submarines, exercising ships shall show the appropriate signals prescribed by the International Code of Signals to warn ships of the presence of submarines in the area.

8. Ships of one Party when approaching ships of the other Party conducting operations as set forth in Rule 4 (c) of the Rules of the Road, and particularly ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft as well as ships engaged in replenishment underway, shall take appropriate measures not to hinder maneuvers of such ships and shall remain well clear.

Article IVCommanders of aircraft of the Parties shall use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party operating on and over the high seas, in particular, ships engaged in launching or landing aircraft, and in the interest of mutual safety shall not permit: simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against aircraft and ships, or performance of various aerobatics over ships, or dropping various objects near them in such a manner as to be hazardous to ships or to constitute a hazard to navigation.

Article V1. Ships of the Parties operating in sight of one another shall raise proper signals concerning their intent to begin launching or landing aircraft.

2. Aircraft of the Parties flying over the high seas in darkness or under instrument conditions shall, whenever feasible, display navigation lights.

Article VIBoth Parties shall:

1. Provide through the established system of radio broadcasts of information and warning to mariners, not less than 3 to 5 days in advance as a rule, notification of actions on the high seas which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight.

2. Make increased use of the informative signals contained in the International Code of Signals to signify the intentions of their respective ships when maneuvering in proximity to one another. At night, or in conditions of reduced visibility, or under conditions of lighting and such distances when signal flags are not distinct, flashing light should be used to inform ships of maneuvers which may hinder the movements of others or involve a risk of collision.

3. Utilize on a trial basis signals additional to those in the International Code of Signals, submitting such signals to the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization for its consideration and for the information of other States.

Article VIIThe Parties shall exchange appropriate information concerning instances of collision, incidents which result in damage, or other incidents at sea between ships and aircraft of the Parties. The United States Navy shall provide such information through the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington and the Soviet Navy shall provide such information through the United States Naval Attache in Moscow.

Article VIIIThis Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for a period of three years. It will thereafter be renewed without further action by the Parties for successive periods of three years each.

This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon six months written notice to the other Party.

Article IXThe Parties shall meet within one year after the date of the signing of this Agreement to review the implementation of its terms. Similar consultations shall be held thereafter annually, or more frequently as the Parties may decide.

Article XThe Parties shall designate members to form a Committee which will consider specific measures in conformity with this Agreement. The Committee will, as a particular part of its work, consider the practical workability of concrete fixed distances to be observed in encounters between ships, aircraft, and ships and aircraft. The Committee will meet within six months of the date of signature of this Agreement and submit its recommendations for decision by the Parties during the consultations prescribed in Article IX.

DONE in duplicate on the 25th day of May 1972 in Moscow in the English and Russian languages each being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

John W. Warner

Secretary of the Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Sergei G. Gorshkov

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy

Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas Signed May 25, 1972

Signed at Washington May 22, 1973
Entered into force May 22, 1973

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on measures directed to improve the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas,

Recognizing that the objectives of the Agreement may be furthered by additional understandings, in particular concerning actions of naval ships and military aircraft with respect to the non-military ships of each Party,

Further agree as follows:

Article IThe Parties shall take measures to notify the non-military ships of each Party on the provisions of the Agreement directed at securing mutual safety.

Article IIShips and aircraft of the Parties shall not make simulated attacks by aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes and other weapons at non-military ships of the other Party, nor launch nor drop any objects near non-military ships of the other Party in such a manner as to be hazardous to these ships or to constitute a hazard to Navigation.

Article III

This Protocol will enter into force on the day of its signing and will be considered as an integral part of the Argument between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas which was signed in Moscow on May 25, 1972.

DONE on the 22nd of May, 1973 in Washington, in two copies, each in the English and the Russian language, both texts having the same force.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

J.P. Weinel

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

Alekseyev, Admiral

Passing a Law to Enforce the Law and an App

Posted on April 14, 2016April 14, 2016 by Denise Simon

When George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland Security, one of the missions was to bring together the mobilize key agencies into one to force collaboration, cooperation and joint use of tools and technology to secure the country. Under Barack Obama, not only were executive orders signed to waive standing law and procedures, the security of the country has reached a tipping point as a result of adding in migrants, refugees and aliens. Mandates from the White House to other agencies include edicts to ignore policy and security standards but we are virtually giving sanctuary to criminals.

Now the House of Representatives is working on legislation to force compliance with law.

The Department of Homeland Security knows there are growing threats across the country so in December of 2015 the agency re-launched the warning system.

There is an app for that. The Department of Justice even published a 10 page handbook.

WASHINGTON — Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson activated the National Terrorism Advisory System for the first time Wednesday, warning the public of “self-radicalized actors who could strike with little or no notice.”

The bulletin, which marks the addition of a new level of public warning to the system, will be in effect for the next six months, or until events dictate otherwise, Johnson said.

The Department of Homeland Security is “especially concerned that terrorist-inspired individuals and homegrown violent extremists may be encouraged or inspired to target public events or places,” the bulletin stated.

“As we saw in the recent attacks in San Bernardino and Paris, terrorists will consider a diverse and wide selection of targets for attacks,” the DHS notice said.

House Acts to Keep America Safe

Passes Legislation to Enhance Overseas Traveler Vetting & Help Stem Flow of Foreign Fighters

Washington, D.C. – Today, the House of Representatives passed the Enhancing Overseas Traveler Vetting Act (H.R. 4403). The legislation, introduced by Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX), works to improve the vetting of travelers against terrorist watch lists and law enforcement databases, enhances border management, and improves targeting and analysis.

On the House floor, speaking in support of the bipartisan legislation, Chairman Royce delivered the following remarks (as prepared for delivery):

The global threat of terrorism has never been as high as it is today. In just the last 12 months, we’ve seen terrorists strike in my home state of California, and in France, Belgium, Turkey, India, Tunisia, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Pakistan and Iraq – to name a few. No country is immune. The ideology of violent extremism knows no boundaries – allowing individuals to become radicalized by terrorists overseas without leaving their neighborhood.

I just returned from Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia, where I heard first-hand about the foreign fighter threat. More than 35,000 foreigners from 120 countries have traveled to the Middle East to join ISIS, and many of these fighters are now looking to return to their homes and to the United States to carry out attacks.

That is why information sharing between countries is more critical than ever.

The bipartisan Task Force’s report highlighted the lack of any comprehensive, global database of foreign fighters and suspected terrorists. In its absence, the U.S. and other countries rely on a patchwork system for exchanging extremist identities, which is weak and increases the odds that foreign fighters and suspected terrorists will be able to cross borders undetected.

H.R. 4403 will authorize the Secretaries of the Department of State and Homeland Security to develop open-source software platforms to vet travelers against terrorist watch lists and law enforcement databases. It permits the open-source software to be shared with foreign governments and multilateral organizations, like INTERPOL.

This bill reflects the recommendations made by our colleagues on the Task Force, which we have worked together on. I thank Mr. Hurd and Chairman McCaul for their leadership working to make our nation safer against terrorist threats.

50,000-troop coalition needed in order to crush ISIS

Posted on April 13, 2016April 13, 2016 by Denise Simon

General Odierno was a guest at The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. There was a fascinating question and answer session between the General and Fox News Catherine Herridge.

Operation Hemorrhage: The Terror Plans to Wreck the West’s Economy

Some of the points made by General Odierno included: Odierno says at FDDWF that Obama decision to pull US troops from Iraq became “self-inflicted wound.”

[U.S.] lost its intelligence network when we withdrew from Iraq
What I worry most about ISIS is that they are growing fast and their perception of success
We can defeat the ISIS military, but we need a solution for what happens next after success
I am not sure we have capabilities to respond to crisis on five continents
We’ve loss capability [in latest defense cuts]
Today it is harder and harder to have a unified Iraq because of Iranian influence
Kurds have fought heroically and we need to train them and provide economic support
Airstrikes have some impact but will not solve all problems as we must enable force on the ground and having people on the ground would enable our air capabilities to be more successful
When our military left [Iraq] we lost political influence in the country and region
The whole time [U.S.] were there the Syrian government was complicit with al Qaeda
I worry [U.S.] have isolationist tendencies and the next president needs to strengthen our [diplomatic] relationships the rest of the world wants the U.S. involved

Top general: 50,000-troop coalition needed in order to crush ISIS

FNC: It will take a coalition of 50,000 troops on the ground to defeat the Islamic State, according to the former army chief of staff who spent more than four years serving in Iraq and who is credited, along with retired General David Petraeus, with being the architect of the successful 2007 troop surge there.

“Probably around 50,000,” said Gen. Raymond T. Odierno during a panel discussion moderated by Fox News for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Odierno, who received the George P. Shultz award for distinguished service, emphasized the 50,000 would not all be U.S. troops, but the coalition would need to be U.S.- led.

While the general, who commanded all U.S. forces from 2008 to 2010, said he supports a unified country, he added the U.S. government needs to consider whether Iraq has already been divided into three sectors by the sectarian violence — Shia, Sunni and Kurd. Odierno fingered the newly emboldened Iran as a primary agitator.

“Today, I think it’s becoming harder and harder to have a unified Iraq,” he said. “And the reason is I believe the influence of Iran inside of Iraq is so great, they will never allow the Sunnis to participate in a meaningful way in the government. If that doesn’t happen, you cannot have a unified Iraq.”

Odierno, who argued for leaving 20,000 troops in Iraq but met resistance from several senior Obama administration officials as well as then Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki, said the decision to pull out became a self-inflicted wound.

The withdrawal made it harder, if not impossible, for the U.S. government to independently assess what was happening on the ground, at a time when the alienation of the Sunni population fueled the rise of ISIS.

“We lost what we call our human intelligence network on the ground,” he said. “I mean we used to have a pretty significant human intelligence operation. So as we pulled out, our U.S. military, we lose it. So we have to depend on Iraqis, which they collect intelligence, but they do it a little bit differently than we do and they look for different things.”

Speaking at the CIA Wednesday, President Obama touted the air campaign against ISIS, though Odierno said air power can only go so far, and working with the local Iraqis was the cornerstone of the surge.

When he was in Iraq, Odierno had first-hand knowledge of the ISIS leader Omar al-Baghdadi, who, at the time was a nondescript bomb maker with control over small Baghdad neighborhoods.

“We had captured him a couple of times, released him. He then fled to, I think, Syria. And then he shows (up) – and all of a sudden, I see him on TV making a pronouncement that he’s the head of ISIS,” Odierno recalled. “You have these individuals who’ve grown up now fighting the U.S. or whatever – an insurgency – and that becomes their life. And so they continue to grow and grow and grow and some of them become leaders of a movement, which is what he did.”

The retired general continued to sound the alarm about military cuts, saying the army has “lost capability” at a time when the likelihood of responding to threats on five continents is not hypothetical.

At the same time, the number of American troops dropped from over 100,000 to 50,000. In 2015, the White House sent 450 military advisers to train and assist Iraqi forces battling ISIS, with 5,000 troops.

Fox News’ William Turner contributed to this report.

Obamaphones Back in the News, the Scandal was a Secret

Posted on April 13, 2016April 13, 2016 by Denise Simon

Primer: Remember YOU, the taxpayer are subsidizing this program.

FNC/WSJ: The U.S. government spent about $2.2 billion last year to provide phones to low-income Americans, but a Wall Street Journal review of the program shows that a large number of those who received the phones haven’t proved they are eligible to receive them.

The Lifeline program—begun in 1984 to ensure that poor people aren’t cut off from jobs, families and emergency services—is funded by charges that appear on the monthly bills of every landline and wireless-phone customer. Payouts under the program have shot up from $819 million in 2008, as more wireless carriers have persuaded regulators to let them offer the service.

The FCC on the Lifeline program.

FCC Kept ‘Obamaphone’ Fraud Under Wraps Until After It Expanded Program

Commissioners were instructed not to reveal $5 million fine until day after controversial Lifeline expansion vote

Federal regulators were instructed to keep a massive fraud investigation under wraps until a day after a controversial vote to expand a program that was allegedly used to bilk taxpayers of tens of millions of dollars, one those regulators claims.

The Federal Communications Commission on Friday announced that it would seek $51 million in damages from a cell phone company that allegedly defrauded the federal Lifeline program of nearly $10 million.

The commission’s five members unanimously backed the Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL), but Republican commissioner Ajit Pai parted from his colleagues in a partial dissent. According to Pai, he and other commissioners were told not to reveal the details of its investigation until April 1, a day after the FCC voted to expand the Lifeline program.

“Commissioners were told that the Notice of Apparent Liability could not be released or publicly discussed until April 1, 2016, conveniently one day after the Commission was scheduled to expand the Lifeline program to broadband,” Pai wrote. “That’s not right.”

Pai did not say who issued that directive. However, it had the effect of preventing public knowledge of widespread fraud in the Lifeline program ahead of a contentious vote on expanding it despite persisting concerns about a lack of internal safeguards.

FCC spokesman Will Wiquist insisted that the timing was completely coincidental. “The timing of the enforcement action was in no way related to the timing of the vote on the program modernization,” he said in an email.

Lifeline has faced controversy over enrollment requirements that its critics say are too lax and vulnerable to fraud. The service, which subsidizes cell phone plans for low-income Americans, allows beneficiaries to enroll using cards issued for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), a welfare program that has also faced fraud allegations.

Critics of the Lifeline program began calling its subsidized cell phones “Obamaphones” early in the Obama administration in response to viral YouTube videos of beneficiaries thanking the president for their free phones. The program was actually created under President Ronald Reagan.

The FCC’s NAL last week accused cell phone provider Total Call Mobile, which provides Lifeline services in 19 states, of “systematic and egregious misconduct” and “widespread enrollment fraud.”

According to the commission, Total Call employees enrolled tens of thousands of duplicate Lifeline beneficiaries and pocketed the extra subsidies. The FCC caught onto the scheme when the company enrolled an undercover FCC investigator in the program without asking for any eligibility documentation.

“Since 2014, Total Call has requested and received an estimated $9.7 million dollars in improper payments from the Universal Service Fund for duplicate or ineligible consumers despite repeated and explicit warnings from its own employees, in some cases compliance specialists, that company sales agents were engaged in widespread enrollment fraud,” the FCC said in a news release.

A common means of fraudulent enrollment was the repeated use of a single SNAP identification card, according to the FCC. That drew the ire of Commissioner Michael O’Reilly, who said the use of SNAP cards as Lifeline verification mechanisms is woefully inadequate.

“I must once again lodge my extreme frustration that the Commission continues to rely on SNAP as an entry point in the Lifeline program, and has the gall to claim that it is a highly accountable program, when it is painfully obvious to anyone paying attention that SNAP is riddled with waste, fraud, and abuse,” he wrote in a partial dissent in the Total Call case.

Despite those ongoing concerns, the FCC recently voted to expand the Lifeline program to include subsidies for 3G wireless broadband service.

That vote followed a contentious debate over the scope of the expansion and its accompanying price tag. The commission approved the expansion by a narrow 3-2 vote on March 31, a day before the FCC announced its Total Call NAL.

The existence of a massive ongoing Lifeline fraud investigation might’ve affected public perception of that vote, if not the vote itself, leading Pai to call the muzzling of commissioners on the Total Call investigation “conveniently” timed.

Pai also objected to commission delays that he said prevented it from sanctioning Total Call for the full scale of its apparent misconduct.

“Even though [the FCC] identified 32,498 intra-company duplicates, we pursue only 2,587. Even though we have evidence that Total Call Mobile bypassed federal safeguards to enroll 99.8% of its subscribers, we hold the company liable for only 16%,” Pai wrote.

“Under these circumstances, our precedent suggests that a forfeiture of at least $84,295,910 would have been appropriate. Yet the Commission settles for something much less.”

Even as the FCC was investigating this pattern of alleged fraud, Total Call was pouring money into its new Washington lobbying operation. According to disclosure forms, it hired lobbyists with the firm ML Strategies in June of last year, a month after the FCC subpoenaed the company.

ML Strategies has reported collecting $120,000 in fees from Total Call to lobby Congress and the FCC on “general issues related to the Lifeline program.”

The FCC’s investigation is not Total Call’s first time running afoul of federal regulators: the commission issued a $12,000 NAL in 2010 accusing the company of failing to abide by regulations on hearing aid compatibility.

Its sister companies have faced far larger fines for more egregious offenses.

Total Call Mobile is wholly owned by prepaid phone card company Total Call International, which is wholly owned by Japanese telecommunications giant KDDI. KDDI is also the sole shareholder of Locus Telecommunications.

The FCC has targeted Locus in numerous enforcement actions over the past decade, and sought fines reaching into the eight figures.

The FCC levied a $5 million penalty against the company in October “for deceptively marketing its prepaid telephone calling cards.” Previous Notices of Apparently Liability sought fines from the company of $5 million, $330,000, $25,000, $23,000, and $12,000.